Protective Force Property Management at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
The Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) Lawrence Livermore
AND OBJECTIVE National Laboratory (LLNL) supports the maintenance of a safe,
secure, and reliable nuclear weapon stockpile and provides
expertise toward the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction and terrorist attacks. LLNL is a National Nuclear
Security Administration (NNSA) site operated by the University of
California.
In support of its core mission, Livermore maintains a protective
force that is trained and equipped to secure its facilities and
operations. For the past five years, the Laboratory’s protective
force has maintained a supply room that provides equipment
required for Security Police Officers (SPOs) to carry out their
duties. We were told by a knowledgeable Livermore employee
that about $380,000 in Government funds was expended annually
on Government property that is issued by the supply room to the
Laboratory’s SPOs.
In February 2006, the Office of Inspector General received an
allegation that the LLNL protective force supply room was being
mismanaged. Specifically, it was alleged that: (1) there was no
organized method of accountability and distribution of equipment;
(2) equipment was scattered throughout the supply room with no
apparent system of organization; (3) orders for equipment were
written down on scratch paper, with no formal ordering or order
tracking system; (4) there were instances where equipment ordered
for specific individuals was not received or was received but given
to other officers; and, (5) when equipment was issued, it was not
documented. In addition, concern was expressed that, because of
the poor property controls, there was a strong possibility for
equipment to be diverted and resold outside the Laboratory.
The objective of this inspection was to review the adequacy ofinternal controls associated with LLNL’s protective force supply
room. To provide context for this review, we also conducted
limited reviews of the protective force supply rooms at two other
NNSA facilities, Los Alamos National Laboratory (Los Alamos)
and Sandia National Laboratory-New Mexico (Sandia).
AND OBJECTIVE National Laboratory (LLNL) supports the maintenance of a safe,
secure, and reliable nuclear weapon stockpile and provides
expertise toward the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction and terrorist attacks. LLNL is a National Nuclear
Security Administration (NNSA) site operated by the University of
California.
In support of its core mission, Livermore maintains a protective
force that is trained and equipped to secure its facilities and
operations. For the past five years, the Laboratory’s protective
force has maintained a supply room that provides equipment
required for Security Police Officers (SPOs) to carry out their
duties. We were told by a knowledgeable Livermore employee
that about $380,000 in Government funds was expended annually
on Government property that is issued by the supply room to the
Laboratory’s SPOs.
In February 2006, the Office of Inspector General received an
allegation that the LLNL protective force supply room was being
mismanaged. Specifically, it was alleged that: (1) there was no
organized method of accountability and distribution of equipment;
(2) equipment was scattered throughout the supply room with no
apparent system of organization; (3) orders for equipment were
written down on scratch paper, with no formal ordering or order
tracking system; (4) there were instances where equipment ordered
for specific individuals was not received or was received but given
to other officers; and, (5) when equipment was issued, it was not
documented. In addition, concern was expressed that, because of
the poor property controls, there was a strong possibility for
equipment to be diverted and resold outside the Laboratory.
The objective of this inspection was to review the adequacy ofinternal controls associated with LLNL’s protective force supply
room. To provide context for this review, we also conducted
limited reviews of the protective force supply rooms at two other
NNSA facilities, Los Alamos National Laboratory (Los Alamos)
and Sandia National Laboratory-New Mexico (Sandia).
Concerns With Security Barriers at theY-12 National Security Complex
The DOE Office of Inspector General received an allegation that newly constructed concrete security barriers at the Y-12 site were
inadequate because the design of the weapon ports did not take
into consideration the space required for the weapons’ sight
system. Specifically, the complaint alleged that weapon port
openings were not designed to accommodate the sight system of
protective force weapons, limiting the ability of security police
officers to maneuver their weapons when firing through the ports.
Construction of the security barriers was one of three security
upgrades under the “West Fort” project designation.
The objective of this inspection was to determine the facts and
circumstances surrounding the allegation.
inadequate because the design of the weapon ports did not take
into consideration the space required for the weapons’ sight
system. Specifically, the complaint alleged that weapon port
openings were not designed to accommodate the sight system of
protective force weapons, limiting the ability of security police
officers to maneuver their weapons when firing through the ports.
Construction of the security barriers was one of three security
upgrades under the “West Fort” project designation.
The objective of this inspection was to determine the facts and
circumstances surrounding the allegation.
Inspector General Semiannual Report to Congress, April 1, 2006 - September 30, 2006
The National Nuclear Security Administration’s B61 Spin RocketMotor Project
The Department cf Energy's Sandia National Laboratories are refurbishing the Spin
Rocket Motor, a 1:rime component of the B61 nuclear weapon system. Both the originai
motor produced i2 i906 and the version last produced in 1991 are the subjects of the
refurbishment. Rvth motors, which are essentially identical, produce thrust to arm thz
weapon. In Deceinber 2001, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
received Nuclear Weapons Council Standing and Safety Committee (NWCSSC) approval
to study the feasibility and cost of replacement options. In April 2003, ihe MWCSSC
approved the development of a new Spin ~ o c k e t h ~ o tboarse d on Sandia's assei-tiolls that
test data collected between 1997 and 2002 showed the motors. due in largc: part to
"detrimental aging," were not performing according to specifications. Detrimental aging
occurs when a component's age prevents it from perfo~mingto meet military
requirements. The first production unit for this refurbishment effort 1s scheduled to be
completed in December 2006, at an estimated overall project cost of about $60 rnilllcn.
NNSA's 6.X process for managing refurbishrne~itsr equires the examination of various
design options and their cost impacts before proceeding to the development-engineering
phase. Pursuant to the 6.X process, a rationale for replacing components is to be
supported by test evidence indicating weapon defects and aging trends. In ~ r d etro be
used as part of a justification, test results must be obtained under "War Reserve"
conditions, that is, conditions similar to those experienced in wartime (e.g., climate
factors such as temperature). Furthermore, refurbishments are to be supported by
evidence indicating the cause and impact of any reported anomalies.
The Office of Inspector General received allegations raising serious questions concerning
the Department of Energy's decision to proceed with the B6 1 Spin Rocket Motor project.
As a consequence, we initiated this audit to evaluate the Department conclusion about the
performance of the motor.
Rocket Motor, a 1:rime component of the B61 nuclear weapon system. Both the originai
motor produced i2 i906 and the version last produced in 1991 are the subjects of the
refurbishment. Rvth motors, which are essentially identical, produce thrust to arm thz
weapon. In Deceinber 2001, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
received Nuclear Weapons Council Standing and Safety Committee (NWCSSC) approval
to study the feasibility and cost of replacement options. In April 2003, ihe MWCSSC
approved the development of a new Spin ~ o c k e t h ~ o tboarse d on Sandia's assei-tiolls that
test data collected between 1997 and 2002 showed the motors. due in largc: part to
"detrimental aging," were not performing according to specifications. Detrimental aging
occurs when a component's age prevents it from perfo~mingto meet military
requirements. The first production unit for this refurbishment effort 1s scheduled to be
completed in December 2006, at an estimated overall project cost of about $60 rnilllcn.
NNSA's 6.X process for managing refurbishrne~itsr equires the examination of various
design options and their cost impacts before proceeding to the development-engineering
phase. Pursuant to the 6.X process, a rationale for replacing components is to be
supported by test evidence indicating weapon defects and aging trends. In ~ r d etro be
used as part of a justification, test results must be obtained under "War Reserve"
conditions, that is, conditions similar to those experienced in wartime (e.g., climate
factors such as temperature). Furthermore, refurbishments are to be supported by
evidence indicating the cause and impact of any reported anomalies.
The Office of Inspector General received allegations raising serious questions concerning
the Department of Energy's decision to proceed with the B6 1 Spin Rocket Motor project.
As a consequence, we initiated this audit to evaluate the Department conclusion about the
performance of the motor.
The Department cf Energy's Sandia National Laboratories are refurbishing the Spin Rocket Motor, a 1:rime component of the B61 nuclear weapon system. Both the originai motor produced i2 i906 and the version last produced in 1991 are the subjects of th...
The Department cf Energy's Sandia National Laboratories are refurbishing the Spin
Rocket Motor, a 1:rime component of the B61 nuclear weapon system. Both the originai
motor produced i2 i906 and the version last produced in 1991 are the subjects of the
refurbishment. Rvth motors, which are essentially identical, produce thrust to arm thz
weapon. In Deceinber 2001, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
received Nuclear Weapons Council Standing and Safety Committee (NWCSSC) approval
to study the feasibility and cost of replacement options. In April 2003, ihe MWCSSC
approved the development of a new Spin ~ o c k e t h ~ o tboarse d on Sandia's assei-tiolls that
test data collected between 1997 and 2002 showed the motors. due in largc: part to
"detrimental aging," were not performing according to specifications. Detrimental aging
occurs when a component's age prevents it from perfo~mingto meet military
requirements. The first production unit for this refurbishment effort 1s scheduled to be
completed in December 2006, at an estimated overall project cost of about $60 rnilllcn.
Rocket Motor, a 1:rime component of the B61 nuclear weapon system. Both the originai
motor produced i2 i906 and the version last produced in 1991 are the subjects of the
refurbishment. Rvth motors, which are essentially identical, produce thrust to arm thz
weapon. In Deceinber 2001, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
received Nuclear Weapons Council Standing and Safety Committee (NWCSSC) approval
to study the feasibility and cost of replacement options. In April 2003, ihe MWCSSC
approved the development of a new Spin ~ o c k e t h ~ o tboarse d on Sandia's assei-tiolls that
test data collected between 1997 and 2002 showed the motors. due in largc: part to
"detrimental aging," were not performing according to specifications. Detrimental aging
occurs when a component's age prevents it from perfo~mingto meet military
requirements. The first production unit for this refurbishment effort 1s scheduled to be
completed in December 2006, at an estimated overall project cost of about $60 rnilllcn.
The Department of Energy's Sandia National Laboratories are refurbishing the Spin
Rocket Motor, a prime component of the B61 nuclear weapon system. Both the originai
motor produced in i966 and the version last produced in 1991 are the subjects of the
refurbishment. Both motors, which are essentially identical, produce thrust to arm the
weapon. In December 2001, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
received Nuclear Weapons Council Standing and Safety Committee (NWCSSC) approval
to study the feasibility and cost of replacement options In April 2003, the NWCSSC
approved the development of a new Spin Rocket Motor based on Sandia's assertions that
test data collected between 1997 and 2002 showed the motors, due in largc: part to
"detrimental aging," were not performing according to specifications. Detrimental aging
occurs when a component's age prevents it from performing to meet military
requirements. The first production unit for this refurbishment effort is scheduled to be
completed in December 2006, at an estimated overall project cost of about $60 million
Rocket Motor, a prime component of the B61 nuclear weapon system. Both the originai
motor produced in i966 and the version last produced in 1991 are the subjects of the
refurbishment. Both motors, which are essentially identical, produce thrust to arm the
weapon. In December 2001, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
received Nuclear Weapons Council Standing and Safety Committee (NWCSSC) approval
to study the feasibility and cost of replacement options In April 2003, the NWCSSC
approved the development of a new Spin Rocket Motor based on Sandia's assertions that
test data collected between 1997 and 2002 showed the motors, due in largc: part to
"detrimental aging," were not performing according to specifications. Detrimental aging
occurs when a component's age prevents it from performing to meet military
requirements. The first production unit for this refurbishment effort is scheduled to be
completed in December 2006, at an estimated overall project cost of about $60 million