Calendar Year 2020

In 1998, legislation was enacted requiring the Department of Energy (Department) to
convert the 794,000 metric tons of depleted uranium hexafluoride stored at its gaseous
diffusion plants to a more stable form. In August 2002, the Department awarded a
contract to IJranium Disposition Services, LLC for the design, construction, and
operation of conirersion facilities in Paducah, Kentucky and Portsmouth, Ohio. The
Paducah facility was designed with four conversion lines to process its larger inventory
o-f depleted uranium hexafluoride, while the Portsmouth facility was designed with three
lincs. The Department expected that it would takz approximately 25 years to convert all
of the depleted uranium hexafluoride to a more stable form

In 1998, legislation was enacted requiring the Department of Energy (Department) to
convert the 794,000 metric tons of depleted uranium hexafluoride stored at its gaseous
diffusion plants to a more stable form. In August 2002, the Department awarded a
contract to IJranium Disposition Services, LLC for the design, construction, and
operation of conirersion facilities in Paducah, Kentucky and Portsmouth, Ohio. The
Paducah facility was designed with four conversion lines to process its larger inventory
o-f depleted uranium hexafluoride, while the Portsmouth facility was designed with three
lincs. The Department expected that it would takz approximately 25 years to convert all
of the depleted uranium hexafluoride to a more stable form.

Pursuant to the Federal Power Act, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
regulates certain aspects of non-Federal hydroelectric dams. FERC is required to ensure the
safety, stability. and integrity of these dams with the goal of protecting life, health, and
property from, among other things, instances of sabotage and vandalism. To meet these
requirements, FERC developed its Dam Safety and Security Programs to inspect and review
safety and security efforts for about 2,600 dams. Of this number, over 900 are considered so
significant or high hazard that if breached, loss of life and substantial economic and energy
production disruption could result.

'Phe Department of Energy uses the "Design Basis Threat" (DBT) process to guide and
manage its safeguards and security program throughout the complex. The DBT identifies
the most credible threats posed by adversaries to highly sensitive and classified
Departmental qssets and operations. In essence, the DBT sets the standards that site
safeguards and security programs are required to meet in order to protect Departmental
operations and assets, including special nuclear material (SNM) and classified
information. Post-September 1 1, 2001, the Department initiated a comprehensive effort
to update its DBT to address the new challenges related to those events.

On an annual basis, the Office of Inspector General identifies what it considers to be the
most significant management challenges Facing the Department of Energy. Now required
as part of the Reports Consolidation Act of 2000, this effort includes an assessment of the
agency's progress in addressing previously identified challenges and an evaluation of
emerging issues facing the Department. Our conclusions are based on the results of
current Office of Inspector General audits, inspections and investigations.
l~'hroug11th is evaluation, the Office of Inspector General highlights high risk
Departmental activities and those activities with demonstrated performance problems.
Consistent with our mission, the overall goal is to focus attention on significant issues
with the objective of enhancing the effectiveness of agency programs and operations.
The Management challenge process is also used by the Office of Inspector General to set
internal priorities for evaluating Department programs and operations.