The Department's Unclassified Cyber Security Program-2006
To help accomplish its strategic goals in the areas of defense, energy, science and the
environment, the Department utilizes numerous interconnected computer networks and
individual systems. Virtually all of the Department's systems are increasingly subjected
to sophisticated attacks designed to circumvent security measures, trick unsuspecting
users into divulging sensitive information or propagate harmful programs. A strong
cyber security program is essential to minimizing adverse impacts on Department
mission associated with successful attacks or intrusions and protecting operational,
personally identifiable and other sensitive data from compromise. Overall, the
Department expects to invest over $295 million in Fiscal Year (FY) 2006 to protect its
annual $2 billion investment in infornlation technology resources.
environment, the Department utilizes numerous interconnected computer networks and
individual systems. Virtually all of the Department's systems are increasingly subjected
to sophisticated attacks designed to circumvent security measures, trick unsuspecting
users into divulging sensitive information or propagate harmful programs. A strong
cyber security program is essential to minimizing adverse impacts on Department
mission associated with successful attacks or intrusions and protecting operational,
personally identifiable and other sensitive data from compromise. Overall, the
Department expects to invest over $295 million in Fiscal Year (FY) 2006 to protect its
annual $2 billion investment in infornlation technology resources.
The mission of the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Off-site
Recovery Project (OSRP) is to recover unwanted radioactive sealed sources (sources)
held in the piblic sector. thereby reducing the threat of the sources being used in
radiological dispersal de\iices or a "dirty bomb." Plutonium-239 (Pu-239), one of the
rildioactive sealed sources recovered by OSRP, requires additional safeguards because ~t
is a special nuclear material. These sources were manufactured in the United States
(Li S.) and loaned or leased to colleges and universilies, commercial companies and other
coiintries by the Atomic Energy Commission. Due to the fact that they are on loan, they
remain the property of the Department of Energy. As of May 2006, there were 772
outstanding Pu-239 sources, ecli~alinga pproxi~nately2 '7,300 grams that the OSRP had ycr
to recover
Recovery Project (OSRP) is to recover unwanted radioactive sealed sources (sources)
held in the piblic sector. thereby reducing the threat of the sources being used in
radiological dispersal de\iices or a "dirty bomb." Plutonium-239 (Pu-239), one of the
rildioactive sealed sources recovered by OSRP, requires additional safeguards because ~t
is a special nuclear material. These sources were manufactured in the United States
(Li S.) and loaned or leased to colleges and universilies, commercial companies and other
coiintries by the Atomic Energy Commission. Due to the fact that they are on loan, they
remain the property of the Department of Energy. As of May 2006, there were 772
outstanding Pu-239 sources, ecli~alinga pproxi~nately2 '7,300 grams that the OSRP had ycr
to recover
The mission of the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Off-site Recovery Project (OSRP) is to recover unwanted radioactive sealed sources (sources) held in the piblic sector. thereby reducing the threat of the sources being used in rad...
Follow-up on the Management of Plutonium-239 Sealed Sources Recovery Activities
Follow-up on the Management of Plutonium-239 Sealed Sources Recovery Activities
Department's Hydrogen Projects
Beryllium Controls at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory
The Oak Ridge National Laboratory (Laboratory) did not
properly manage activities related to beryllium
contaminated equipment at building 9201-2. In particular,
beryllium contaminated equipment was transferred to nonberyllium
areas; employees working with the contaminated
equipment were not fully identified and notified; and
transferred equipment was not labeled appropriately. In
addition, we observed that building 9201-2 was not posted
as a potential beryllium contamination area and access
controls were not established.
properly manage activities related to beryllium
contaminated equipment at building 9201-2. In particular,
beryllium contaminated equipment was transferred to nonberyllium
areas; employees working with the contaminated
equipment were not fully identified and notified; and
transferred equipment was not labeled appropriately. In
addition, we observed that building 9201-2 was not posted
as a potential beryllium contamination area and access
controls were not established.
Management Controls over Small Business Opportunities at Livermore NationalLaboratory