Inspection Report: IG-0742

Protective Force Property Management at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

Office of Inspector General

October 11, 2006

October 11, 2006

Protective Force Property Management at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

The Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) Lawrence Livermore AND OBJECTIVE National Laboratory (LLNL) supports the maintenance of a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear weapon stockpile and provides expertise toward the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorist attacks. LLNL is a National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) site operated by the University of California. In support of its core mission, Livermore maintains a protective force that is trained and equipped to secure its facilities and operations. For the past five years, the Laboratory’s protective force has maintained a supply room that provides equipment required for Security Police Officers (SPOs) to carry out their duties. We were told by a knowledgeable Livermore employee that about $380,000 in Government funds was expended annually on Government property that is issued by the supply room to the Laboratory’s SPOs. In February 2006, the Office of Inspector General received an allegation that the LLNL protective force supply room was being mismanaged. Specifically, it was alleged that: (1) there was no organized method of accountability and distribution of equipment; (2) equipment was scattered throughout the supply room with no apparent system of organization; (3) orders for equipment were written down on scratch paper, with no formal ordering or order tracking system; (4) there were instances where equipment ordered for specific individuals was not received or was received but given to other officers; and, (5) when equipment was issued, it was not documented. In addition, concern was expressed that, because of the poor property controls, there was a strong possibility for equipment to be diverted and resold outside the Laboratory. The objective of this inspection was to review the adequacy ofinternal controls associated with LLNL’s protective force supply room. To provide context for this review, we also conducted limited reviews of the protective force supply rooms at two other NNSA facilities, Los Alamos National Laboratory (Los Alamos) and Sandia National Laboratory-New Mexico (Sandia).

  • Inspection Report: IG-0742 (745.5 KB)
    The Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) Lawrence Livermore
    AND OBJECTIVE National Laboratory (LLNL) supports the maintenance of a safe,
    secure, and reliable nuclear weapon stockpile and provides
    expertise toward the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of
    mass destruction and terrorist attacks. LLNL is a National Nuclear
    Security Administration (NNSA) site operated by the University of
    California.
    In support of its core mission, Livermore maintains a protective
    force that is trained and equipped to secure its facilities and
    operations. For the past five years, the Laboratory’s protective
    force has maintained a supply room that provides equipment
    required for Security Police Officers (SPOs) to carry out their
    duties. We were told by a knowledgeable Livermore employee
    that about $380,000 in Government funds was expended annually
    on Government property that is issued by the supply room to the
    Laboratory’s SPOs.
    In February 2006, the Office of Inspector General received an
    allegation that the LLNL protective force supply room was being
    mismanaged. Specifically, it was alleged that: (1) there was no
    organized method of accountability and distribution of equipment;
    (2) equipment was scattered throughout the supply room with no
    apparent system of organization; (3) orders for equipment were
    written down on scratch paper, with no formal ordering or order
    tracking system; (4) there were instances where equipment ordered
    for specific individuals was not received or was received but given
    to other officers; and, (5) when equipment was issued, it was not
    documented. In addition, concern was expressed that, because of
    the poor property controls, there was a strong possibility for
    equipment to be diverted and resold outside the Laboratory.
    The objective of this inspection was to review the adequacy ofinternal controls associated with LLNL’s protective force supply
    room. To provide context for this review, we also conducted
    limited reviews of the protective force supply rooms at two other
    NNSA facilities, Los Alamos National Laboratory (Los Alamos)
    and Sandia National Laboratory-New Mexico (Sandia).