Hanford Site Radiation and Hazardous Waste Training
The Hanford Site (Site) has numerous radiological and hazardous waste areas. To ensure worker safety and
health, the Richland Operations Office (Richland) and the Office of River Protection (ORP) require
radiation and/or hazardous waste training for employees who enter contaminated areas. Site records
showed that many employees received radiation training even though there was no record of their entry into
contaminated areas. This indicated that employees may have received training that was not required. The
objective of the audit was to determine if employees received training in radiation and/or hazardous waste
that was not required.
health, the Richland Operations Office (Richland) and the Office of River Protection (ORP) require
radiation and/or hazardous waste training for employees who enter contaminated areas. Site records
showed that many employees received radiation training even though there was no record of their entry into
contaminated areas. This indicated that employees may have received training that was not required. The
objective of the audit was to determine if employees received training in radiation and/or hazardous waste
that was not required.
The Department of Energy (Department) devotes a significant amount of its annual budget to the acquisition and maintenance of information technology (IT) related resources. According to the Department's Fiscal Year 2000 budget request, $1.6 billion or 9 percent of the Department's annual budget of $17.8 billion, was for the acquisition, operation, and maintenance of these resources. Over $500 million, or 32 percent of the IT related budget, was for development, modernization, and enhancements of systems at the Department and contractor level. The Department's IT budget includes costs incurred in support of weapons programs such as the Advanced Strategic Computing Initiative.
Allegations Concerning the Department of Energy’s Site Safeguards and Security Planning Process
The Director, Office of Security and Emergency Operations provided the Office of Inspector
General with a letter he had received which raised allegations of serious improprieties in the
Department of Energy’s Site Safeguards and Security Planning (SSSP) process. Specifically, the
letter included allegations that a number of people within the Department were “lying in the
reporting of the actual status of security” at the Department’s most important nuclear sites, and
that a contractor’s findings under the SSSP Quality Assurance (QA) process were either ignored
or not acted upon in a timely manner. In addition, it was alleged that “illegal” retaliation was
taken against those who were trying to correct the Department’s security problems through SSSP
reviews or through assistance to a special assistant to the Secretary on Department security
issues. The Office of Inspector General initiated an inspection to evaluate these issues.
General with a letter he had received which raised allegations of serious improprieties in the
Department of Energy’s Site Safeguards and Security Planning (SSSP) process. Specifically, the
letter included allegations that a number of people within the Department were “lying in the
reporting of the actual status of security” at the Department’s most important nuclear sites, and
that a contractor’s findings under the SSSP Quality Assurance (QA) process were either ignored
or not acted upon in a timely manner. In addition, it was alleged that “illegal” retaliation was
taken against those who were trying to correct the Department’s security problems through SSSP
reviews or through assistance to a special assistant to the Secretary on Department security
issues. The Office of Inspector General initiated an inspection to evaluate these issues.
The Department's "Implementation of Presidential Decision Directive 63, Critical Infrastructure Protection"
In 1997, a Presidential Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection concluded that the national critical infrastructures – energy, banking, transportation, vital human services, and telecommunications – were vulnerable to attack through the malicious use of commonly available tools. On May 22, 1998, as a result of the Commission's findings, the President issued
Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD 63), Critical Infrastructure Protection. PDD 63 required Federal agencies to take action to eliminate significant vulnerabilities, especially cyber-related, and to assure the continuity and viability of the nation's critical infrastructures. The objective of our audit was to determine whether the Department's implementation of PDD 63, Critical Infrastructure Protection, was achieving its intended purpose.
Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD 63), Critical Infrastructure Protection. PDD 63 required Federal agencies to take action to eliminate significant vulnerabilities, especially cyber-related, and to assure the continuity and viability of the nation's critical infrastructures. The objective of our audit was to determine whether the Department's implementation of PDD 63, Critical Infrastructure Protection, was achieving its intended purpose.
Management of the Nuclear Weapons Production Infrastructure
Since the cessation of underground testing of nuclear weapons in the early 1990’s, the Department of Energy's responsibility to ensure the safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile has been met through its Stockpile Stewardship Program. This
program includes a wide range of activities: stockpile surveillance, stockpile maintenance, non-nuclear experimentation and testing, and computational simulation.
program includes a wide range of activities: stockpile surveillance, stockpile maintenance, non-nuclear experimentation and testing, and computational simulation.