Calendar Year 2020

We reviewed the Department of Energy's (Department) progress in implementing the Federal
Managers' Financial Integrity Act (FMFIA) of 1982. The review was made to assist you in
determining whether the evaluations of the systems of management, accounting, and
administrative controls were carried out in a reasonable and prudent manner by the
Department for Fiscal Year 2000.
The Department of Energy’s laboratories, including those managed by the National Nuclear Security
Administration, conduct research involving biological select agents and select agent materials (e.g.,
DNA or select agents and subunits of toxins derived from select agents). For example, the
laboratories are currently working to develop detection and response systems to improve
preparedness in the event of a domestic attack involving the use of a biological select agent as a
weapon of mass destruction. Biological select agents include about 40 viruses, bacteria, rickettsia,
fungi, and toxins whose transfer within the United States is controlled. This is because such agents
pose a substantial threat to public health and safety.
The Department of Energy (DOE) Richland Operations Office and the Office
of River Protection (together referred to as "Richland") and the Hanford Site's
(Site) prime contractors had a fleet of 1,332 light and heavy motor vehicles as
of March 31, 2000. These vehicles were leased from the General Services
Administration (GSA). Fleet costs for Fiscal Year 2000 were approximately
$5.5 million.D87
On October 12, 2000, the Chairmen of several committees of the U.S. Congress requested an assessment by the Office of Inspector General of the most significant management challenges facing the Department of Energy. We have received similar requests annually since 1997. As in the past, our response to this year's inquiry parallels the Department's reporting under the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act. The Office of Inspector General has a significant role in the Integrity Act process, which has traditionally resulted in an effective depiction of long-standing, institution-wide problems facing the Department of Energy. This special report constitutes our response to the congressional inquiry. The analysis is focused on those Department challenges that, in our view, warrant increased emphasis or appear to have reached
a heightened level of urgency. Throughout our discussion, we have highlighted issues of concern relative to the newly formed National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). The Office of Inspector General is devoting considerable time and resources to evaluating various aspects of the NNSA's complex mission and operations.
In 1994, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) recommended that the Department of Energy (Department) take action to stabilize the highly radioactive Americium/Curium solution (Am/Cm) stored at the Savannah River Site's F-Canyon Facility. The purpose of this recommendation was to reduce
safety and health risks to Department employees and the public. In 1995, the Department made a commitment to the DNFSB to stabilize approximately 14,440 liters of Am/Cm in inventory at the Savannah River Site by September 1998. The objective of this audit was to determine whether the Department will meet its commitment to stabilize the Am/Cm by September 2002.
As a result of its weapons program activities, the Department of Energy (Department) has a significant inventory of surplus fissile materials. Within the Department, the National Nuclear Security Administration and the Office of Environmental Management are responsible for managing this inventory, including its protection and disposal. To accomplish these objectives, the Department has established a program to ship the fissile materials, including surplus
pits and plutonium metals, oxides, fluorides, and residues, from several Department facilities to a final designated disposition location. The various fissile materials are to be shipped in Type B containers certified by the Department or the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, or under an exemption as duly granted by the appropriate Federal agency. The objective of this audit was to determine whether the Department has containers suitable for shipping its surplus fissile material.