Inspection of Selected Aspects of the Department of Energy’s Classified Document Transmittal Process
In view of recent concerns regarding the security of Department of Energy (DOE) classified information, including nuclear weapons information, we initiated an inspection to determine whether officials of the Department and its contractors, including officials of the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) and its contractors, followed the Department’s policies and procedures when transmitting classified documents to entities outside the Department.
Administration (NNSA) and its contractors, followed the Department’s policies and procedures when transmitting classified documents to entities outside the Department.
Letter Report on Security Incident at Technical Area 18, Los Alamos National Laboratory
In October 2000, information was provided to the Office of Inspector General concerning a security incident at Technical Area 18 (TA-18), Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). On September 28, 2000, at 13:48 hours Mountain Time Zone (MTZ), an alarm was activated on a vault which contains a nuclear critical mass assembly machine. It was discovered that the locking device on the reactor vault had failed, preventing the vault
door from being properly secured at the conclusion of a radiological experiment the previous day, September 27, 2000. Based on this information, we initiated an inspection of this matter. The purpose of this letter report is to advise you of the results of our inspection.
door from being properly secured at the conclusion of a radiological experiment the previous day, September 27, 2000. Based on this information, we initiated an inspection of this matter. The purpose of this letter report is to advise you of the results of our inspection.
Inspector General Semiannual Report to Congress, April 1 to September 30, 2000
The Office of Inspector General (OIG) plays an important
role in helping to ensure the efficiency, effectiveness, and
integrity of all of the programs and operations of the
Department of Energy, including those of the National
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). During this
reporting period, the OIG continued to provide special
attention to the particular management challenges,
vulnerabilities, and issues of concern to the NNSA. The
challenges to the NNSA in its formative stages are many, and
the OIG has sought to be of service to this crucial national
security mission. Most notably, we issued a report on the
state of the nuclear weapons infrastructure, discussed on
pages 4 and 24 of this report. Our reviews addressed other
important issues facing the NNSA and the Department, as
well, including in the areas of safeguards and security,
contract administration, and program management. The OIG
will continue to serve as an independent voice to the
Department, the NNSA, the Congress, and the taxpayer on
important matters of national concern.
role in helping to ensure the efficiency, effectiveness, and
integrity of all of the programs and operations of the
Department of Energy, including those of the National
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). During this
reporting period, the OIG continued to provide special
attention to the particular management challenges,
vulnerabilities, and issues of concern to the NNSA. The
challenges to the NNSA in its formative stages are many, and
the OIG has sought to be of service to this crucial national
security mission. Most notably, we issued a report on the
state of the nuclear weapons infrastructure, discussed on
pages 4 and 24 of this report. Our reviews addressed other
important issues facing the NNSA and the Department, as
well, including in the areas of safeguards and security,
contract administration, and program management. The OIG
will continue to serve as an independent voice to the
Department, the NNSA, the Congress, and the taxpayer on
important matters of national concern.
The Restructure of Security Services by the Oak Ridge Operations Office
In Fiscal Year (FY) 1998, the Oak Ridge Operations Office (Operations Office) decided to restructure its security services in an effort to reduce cost, gain more administrative control, and to capitalize on the efficiencies associated with a centralized approach to security. This new approach was thoroughly vetted
with senior Department officials at Headquarters. To achieve its objectives, in FY 2000 the Operations Office awarded a 3-year base term contract for security services valued at $218 million to Wackenhut Services, Incorporated (Wackenhut). In its analysis justifying the new approach, the Operations Office estimated that cost savings of approximately $5 million a year would result from this new security services contract. Yet, in fact, security costs increased from $78.4 million in FY 1999 to an estimated $92.1 million in FY 2000. In response to the increase in security service cost, the Acting Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs requested that the Office of Inspector General evaluate security costs at the Oak Ridge Reservation to determine why costs
increased after the Operations Office restructured security services under the Wackenhut contract. The objective of the audit paralleled the request from Defense Programs.
with senior Department officials at Headquarters. To achieve its objectives, in FY 2000 the Operations Office awarded a 3-year base term contract for security services valued at $218 million to Wackenhut Services, Incorporated (Wackenhut). In its analysis justifying the new approach, the Operations Office estimated that cost savings of approximately $5 million a year would result from this new security services contract. Yet, in fact, security costs increased from $78.4 million in FY 1999 to an estimated $92.1 million in FY 2000. In response to the increase in security service cost, the Acting Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs requested that the Office of Inspector General evaluate security costs at the Oak Ridge Reservation to determine why costs
increased after the Operations Office restructured security services under the Wackenhut contract. The objective of the audit paralleled the request from Defense Programs.
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's Dam Safety Program
Under the Federal Power Act, as amended, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Commission) is responsible for ensuring that over 2,500 non-Federal hydroelectric dams under its jurisdiction are properly constructed, operated and maintained. To determine whether the dams' physical structures are maintained in a safe manner to protect the public, the Commission performs onsite inspections to identify evidence of damage or other conditions that could impair proper project operation or violate license requirements.