Calendar Year 2020

Waste characterization is a series of steps performed to determine the weight, volume, and physical
characteristics of radioactive waste. The Department of Energy (Department) uses data obtained
from waste characterization to evaluate treatment and disposal options for the waste. The
characterization process begins when the generator of the waste prepares a general description of the
waste produced. The extent of work performed for the final characterization is dependent on the
amount and quality of information provided by the generator and the proposed treatment or disposal
option for the waste.
By letter dated November 1, 1999, Senator Strom Thurmond advised the Office of Inspector General of an allegation that computer equipment containing over 40 computer hard drives reportedly containing classified or sensitive information were surplused and sold by the Department’s Savannah River Site (SRS). The letter raised the concern that the release of this information might pose a threat to the national security of the United States. The management and operating contractor at SRS, Westinghouse Savannah River Company (Westinghouse), is
responsible for the final disposal of surplus equipment, including computer hard drives. The purpose of our inspection was to review the allegation concerning the sale of surplus computer equipment. The objectives of our inspection were to determine whether: (1) surplus computer equipment was disposed of in accordance with Federal and Department requirements,
and (2) Government-owned computer equipment at SRS was properly cleared of sensitive
information prior to disposal.
In a letter to the Office of Inspector General dated February 29, 2000, the Chairman, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, requested information concerning the political activities conducted by Departmental employees. The Committee also made similar requests to other Executive Branch Inspectors General. We performed an audit to determine whether campaigning activities by Departmental employees in politically sensitive positions were in accordance with applicable laws and policies and were not interfering with their official duties. We examined 90 trips taken during the 2-year period from March 1, 1998, through March 1, 2000, including trips in which you participated. We also
reviewed trips taken by Deputy Secretary Glauthier, Under Secretary Moniz, and former Secretary Peña. In addition, we randomly selected trips taken by other Department employees in politically sensitive positions.
Inspection of Allegations Relating to the Albuquerque Operations Office Security Survey Process and the Security Operations' Self-Assessments at Los Alamos National Laboratory
The Office of Inspector General received allegations regarding the conduct of security reviews at the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). Specifically, it was alleged that DOE Albuquerque Operations Office (Albuquerque) management
changed the ratings of annual Security Surveys of LANL security operations after members of the Albuquerque Security Survey team completed the survey. It was also alleged that LANL Security
Operations Division personnel were pressured by their managers to change or mitigate findings in LANL Self-Assessment reports.
Brookhaven National Laboratory's (Brookhaven) Central Shops Division (Central Shops)
provides support services for research and development programs and user facilities. The
Department requires its management and operating contractors to evaluate, by performing a
make-or-buy analysis, whether their services could be obtained at a lower cost by outsourcing
to commercial entities. The objective of the audit was to determine whether Brookhaven
prepared a make-or-buy analysis for its Central Shops.