Information System Development Practices at the Bonneville and Western Area Power Administrations
Our review of 11 major projects (see Appendix 1) disclosed that
information systems development activities were not always consistent
with Federal requirements or guidance. We found development
problems with nine of the projects. For example:
• Key planning activities such as cost-benefit analyses had not been
performed for eight of the projects we reviewed;
• Evaluations of suitability of potential software solutions were often
inadequate or had not been performed;
• Many projects were not adequately monitored and controlled
throughout their lifecycle, and project baselines and plans were not
revisited in light of scope changes or delays; and,
• For 6 of the 11 projects reviewed, reengineering studies designed to
improve business processes before beginning development had not
been conducted.
In addition, Bonneville and Western did not consistently include all
relevant project costs in accounting for its development efforts.ioactiv
information systems development activities were not always consistent
with Federal requirements or guidance. We found development
problems with nine of the projects. For example:
• Key planning activities such as cost-benefit analyses had not been
performed for eight of the projects we reviewed;
• Evaluations of suitability of potential software solutions were often
inadequate or had not been performed;
• Many projects were not adequately monitored and controlled
throughout their lifecycle, and project baselines and plans were not
revisited in light of scope changes or delays; and,
• For 6 of the 11 projects reviewed, reengineering studies designed to
improve business processes before beginning development had not
been conducted.
In addition, Bonneville and Western did not consistently include all
relevant project costs in accounting for its development efforts.ioactiv
Audit of the Research and Development Investment Criteria for Fossil Energy
Inspection Report to Management on Inspection of 2001 Safeguards and Security Survey of Los Alamos National Laboratory
The objective of this inspection was to determine if the 2001 Safeguards and Security Survey of Los Alamos National Laboratory was compromised as alleged.
Inspection of Implementation of Corrective Actions Resulting From Force-on-Force Performance Tests
The Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance (OA) conducts reviews of Department of Energy (DOE) facilities
and operations to evaluate the status of, among other things,
safeguards and security matters. Integral to these reviews are
force-on-force performance tests. These are major tests of the
overall effectiveness of all site safeguards and security elements
involved in responding to a hypothetical threat scenario based on
the design basis threat1 and identified site-specific threats. These
tests employ an adversary team that tests the skills, procedures and
equipment of those forces responsible for protecting DOE site
security interests.
The objective of our inspection was to determine if DOE has taken
corrective actions to address findings resulting from recent forceon-
force performance tests that were conducted at the Pantex Plant
(Pantex) during January 24-March 17, 2000, and at Los Alamos
National Laboratory’s (LANL’s) Technical Area 18 during
October 2-12, 2000.
and operations to evaluate the status of, among other things,
safeguards and security matters. Integral to these reviews are
force-on-force performance tests. These are major tests of the
overall effectiveness of all site safeguards and security elements
involved in responding to a hypothetical threat scenario based on
the design basis threat1 and identified site-specific threats. These
tests employ an adversary team that tests the skills, procedures and
equipment of those forces responsible for protecting DOE site
security interests.
The objective of our inspection was to determine if DOE has taken
corrective actions to address findings resulting from recent forceon-
force performance tests that were conducted at the Pantex Plant
(Pantex) during January 24-March 17, 2000, and at Los Alamos
National Laboratory’s (LANL’s) Technical Area 18 during
October 2-12, 2000.
Planning for and Measuring Office of Inspector General Results FY 2002 Annual Performance Report and FY 2003 Annual Performance Plan
Operations at Los Alamos National Laboratory
On November 18, 2002, the Office of Inspector General began a fact finding inquiry into allegations
that senior management of the Los Alamos National Laboratory engaged in a deliberate
cover-up of security breaches and illegal activities, in particular, with respect to reported instances
of property loss and theft. The Acting Administrator of the National Nuclear Security
Administration requested this inquiry based, in part, on media reports that Los Alamos employees
had misused the Government purchase order system to buy millions of dollars worth of
goods for personal use and that Los Alamos management had attempted to hide these events
from the Department of Energy and the public.}.
that senior management of the Los Alamos National Laboratory engaged in a deliberate
cover-up of security breaches and illegal activities, in particular, with respect to reported instances
of property loss and theft. The Acting Administrator of the National Nuclear Security
Administration requested this inquiry based, in part, on media reports that Los Alamos employees
had misused the Government purchase order system to buy millions of dollars worth of
goods for personal use and that Los Alamos management had attempted to hide these events
from the Department of Energy and the public.}.