Certain excess personal property transferred by Nevada to the
Community Reuse Organization (CRO) was not in the best interest of
the taxpayers. For instance, in February 2002, Nevada transferred a
drill rig to the CRO, which ultimately sold it to an equipment broker
located in Texas. This broker was not involved in local community
transition activities. The equipment broker originally sent a request to
purchase the equipment to Nevada in June 2001. Before acting on the
broker's request, Nevada offered the equipment to other Department
sites and other Federal agencies, but did not receive any requests for
the equipment. Rather than offer the drill rig competitively through
the General Services Administration, however, Nevada instructed the
CRO to purchase the drill rig, for future sale to the equipment broker.
Community Reuse Organization (CRO) was not in the best interest of
the taxpayers. For instance, in February 2002, Nevada transferred a
drill rig to the CRO, which ultimately sold it to an equipment broker
located in Texas. This broker was not involved in local community
transition activities. The equipment broker originally sent a request to
purchase the equipment to Nevada in June 2001. Before acting on the
broker's request, Nevada offered the equipment to other Department
sites and other Federal agencies, but did not receive any requests for
the equipment. Rather than offer the drill rig competitively through
the General Services Administration, however, Nevada instructed the
CRO to purchase the drill rig, for future sale to the equipment broker.
Department of Energy's Safety Bases for Nuclear Facilities
Treatment of Mixed Incinerable Waste
We found the Department of Energy (Department) was not treating its
mixed incinerable solid waste expeditiously or cost-effectively.
Specifically, the Department:
• Did not fully utilize the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA)
Incinerator or the Vacuum-Assisted Thermal Desorption (VTD)
System;
• Stored about 2.5 million pounds of incinerable waste at seven sites
rather than treating the waste in Oak Ridge; and,
• Approved development of an additional VTD treatment facility in
Utah, even though existing facilities were underutilized in Oak
Ridge.
mixed incinerable solid waste expeditiously or cost-effectively.
Specifically, the Department:
• Did not fully utilize the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA)
Incinerator or the Vacuum-Assisted Thermal Desorption (VTD)
System;
• Stored about 2.5 million pounds of incinerable waste at seven sites
rather than treating the waste in Oak Ridge; and,
• Approved development of an additional VTD treatment facility in
Utah, even though existing facilities were underutilized in Oak
Ridge.
Actions Taken in Response to Missing Hazardous Waste Containing Cyanide
Recently, the U.S. Government has become increasingly
sensitive to the potential for terrorists to use certain
materials as weapons of mass destruction. A report
completed by the Central Intelligence Agency stated that
“The threat from terrorists using a weapon of mass
destruction has increased since Sept. 11, and extremist
groups appear most interested in chemicals like cyanide.”
For example, in February 2002, four suspected terrorists
were arrested in Italy in possession of cyanide and maps of
Rome pinpointing the U.S. Embassy and the city’s drinking
water network.
sensitive to the potential for terrorists to use certain
materials as weapons of mass destruction. A report
completed by the Central Intelligence Agency stated that
“The threat from terrorists using a weapon of mass
destruction has increased since Sept. 11, and extremist
groups appear most interested in chemicals like cyanide.”
For example, in February 2002, four suspected terrorists
were arrested in Italy in possession of cyanide and maps of
Rome pinpointing the U.S. Embassy and the city’s drinking
water network.
Statement of Gregory H. Friedman, Inspector General U.S. Department of Energy Subject: Los Alamos National Laboratory inquiry
Audit of the Office of Science Infrastructure Modernization Initiatives
Inspection Firearms Internal Controls at Los Alamos National Laboratory
The Department of Energy’s (DOE) Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) maintains
1,643 firearms for use by its protective force contractor, Protection Technology Los
Alamos (PTLA), and its Security and Safeguards and Dynamic Experimentation
Divisions. Firearms are considered sensitive items by DOE and are subject to strict
inventory controls. The purpose of this inspection was to determine if internal controls
over firearms at LANL are adequate and whether the firearms inventory is administered
appropriate1 y.
1,643 firearms for use by its protective force contractor, Protection Technology Los
Alamos (PTLA), and its Security and Safeguards and Dynamic Experimentation
Divisions. Firearms are considered sensitive items by DOE and are subject to strict
inventory controls. The purpose of this inspection was to determine if internal controls
over firearms at LANL are adequate and whether the firearms inventory is administered
appropriate1 y.