Since 1992, the Department of Energy (Department) and the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) have carried out an analytically-based Stockpile Surveillance Program to
help ensure the safety, reliability, and performance of the nuclear weapons in the Nation's
stockpile. On a continuing basis, NNSA randomly selects weapons from the active inventory for
disassembly, inspection, and testing for defects and problems. Test results serve, in part, as a
basis for certifying to the President that there is no need to resume underground nuclear testing.
When the surveillance program identifies a suspected problem, NNSA must determine if further
testing and analysis is warranted. If so, a Significant Finding Investigation (SFI) is opened.
Weapons experts at one of the Department's defense laboratories generally conduct the SFI and
are charged with determining the severity of the problem and whether further action is required.
Administration (NNSA) have carried out an analytically-based Stockpile Surveillance Program to
help ensure the safety, reliability, and performance of the nuclear weapons in the Nation's
stockpile. On a continuing basis, NNSA randomly selects weapons from the active inventory for
disassembly, inspection, and testing for defects and problems. Test results serve, in part, as a
basis for certifying to the President that there is no need to resume underground nuclear testing.
When the surveillance program identifies a suspected problem, NNSA must determine if further
testing and analysis is warranted. If so, a Significant Finding Investigation (SFI) is opened.
Weapons experts at one of the Department's defense laboratories generally conduct the SFI and
are charged with determining the severity of the problem and whether further action is required.
Calutron Isotope Production Capabilities
In August 2002, the Department of Energy (Department) formalized its plan to permanently disable the only
domestic facility capable of producing electromagnetically enriched stable isotopes. The Department
intended to dismantle the equipment in the facility, called calutrons, and rely on existing isotope inventories,
isotopes produced by Russia, or the adaptation of other isotope separation technologies to meet the domestic
demand for stable isotopes. This plan was based on the premise that the calutrons were excess to mission
needs and not economical.
domestic facility capable of producing electromagnetically enriched stable isotopes. The Department
intended to dismantle the equipment in the facility, called calutrons, and rely on existing isotope inventories,
isotopes produced by Russia, or the adaptation of other isotope separation technologies to meet the domestic
demand for stable isotopes. This plan was based on the premise that the calutrons were excess to mission
needs and not economical.
Remote Treatment Facility
The Department of Energy stores about 676 cubic meters of highly radioactive solid waste at
the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) reservation. The
Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology's Argonne National Laboratory West
(Argonne West), located on the reservation, generated about half of this waste and is
responsible for its disposal. Argonne West also continues to generate highly radioactive waste
as part of its ongoing operations. The remainder of the waste on the reservation is the
responsibility of the Office of Environmental Management and consists of material generated as
a result of INEEL's historic mission to build and test nuclear reactors as well as waste
transferred to INEEL from other sites for interim storage.dc=N
the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) reservation. The
Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology's Argonne National Laboratory West
(Argonne West), located on the reservation, generated about half of this waste and is
responsible for its disposal. Argonne West also continues to generate highly radioactive waste
as part of its ongoing operations. The remainder of the waste on the reservation is the
responsibility of the Office of Environmental Management and consists of material generated as
a result of INEEL's historic mission to build and test nuclear reactors as well as waste
transferred to INEEL from other sites for interim storage.dc=N
Business Management Information System
The Department of Energy began development of an integrated, agency-wide business
information system in 1998. As originally conceived, the Business Management Information
System (BMIS) was to integrate a new core financial management system with other business
related systems, such as procurement and human resources, and eliminate a number of legacy
program-level business related systems.
Development of the core accounting system component of BMIS began in September 2000.
This component, known as Phoenix, was intended to replace the Department's primary
accounting, financial reporting, and funds distribution systems, and was to be interfaced with
financial and business systems of operating contractors, national laboratories, and power
marketing administrations. Life cycle implementation and production costs for the Phoenix
portion of BMIS were projected to be about $82 million. We initiated this audit to determine
whether the development of BMIS satisfied Federal and Department systems development
requirements and goals and was aligned with the Corporate Systems Information Architecture.
information system in 1998. As originally conceived, the Business Management Information
System (BMIS) was to integrate a new core financial management system with other business
related systems, such as procurement and human resources, and eliminate a number of legacy
program-level business related systems.
Development of the core accounting system component of BMIS began in September 2000.
This component, known as Phoenix, was intended to replace the Department's primary
accounting, financial reporting, and funds distribution systems, and was to be interfaced with
financial and business systems of operating contractors, national laboratories, and power
marketing administrations. Life cycle implementation and production costs for the Phoenix
portion of BMIS were projected to be about $82 million. We initiated this audit to determine
whether the development of BMIS satisfied Federal and Department systems development
requirements and goals and was aligned with the Corporate Systems Information Architecture.
Inspector General Semiannual Report to Congress, April 1 to September 30, 2002
I am pleased to submit the Office of Inspector General’s
for the 6-month period ending September 30, 2002. The Report reflects
our continuing commitment to focus the Office of Inspector General efforts on the
issues and concerns most critical to you, the Administration, and the Congress.
The tragic events of September 11, 2001, have impacted the way this Office
views its mission. During this reporting period, we devoted significant resources
to critical issues relating to the national security. In particular, we increased our
already substantial commitment to helping the Department identify and evaluate
potential systemic and situational vulnerabilities in the areas of cyber and physical
security, counterintelligence, and nuclear materials and critical infrastructure
protection. Although the Department has taken a number of positive actions to
correct certain security-related deficiencies, our reviews continue to identify a
need for improvement in this critical management challenge area.Ï
for the 6-month period ending September 30, 2002. The Report reflects
our continuing commitment to focus the Office of Inspector General efforts on the
issues and concerns most critical to you, the Administration, and the Congress.
The tragic events of September 11, 2001, have impacted the way this Office
views its mission. During this reporting period, we devoted significant resources
to critical issues relating to the national security. In particular, we increased our
already substantial commitment to helping the Department identify and evaluate
potential systemic and situational vulnerabilities in the areas of cyber and physical
security, counterintelligence, and nuclear materials and critical infrastructure
protection. Although the Department has taken a number of positive actions to
correct certain security-related deficiencies, our reviews continue to identify a
need for improvement in this critical management challenge area.Ï
Audit of Procurement at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site