Subject: Office of Inspector General’s combined Fiscal Year (FY) 2002 Annual Performance Results and FY 2003 Annual Performance Plan
Cold Standby Program at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant
The Department has not clearly defined the termination point of the
Cold Standby Program. Initially, the Department's Office of Nuclear
Energy, Science and Technology (Nuclear Energy) coordinated the end
of Cold Standby with the deployment of a government-funded gas
centrifuge facility. The plans called for the Cold Standby mission to
end in September 2005 with centrifuge production reaching adequate
levels by September 2008. Under those assumptions, there would be a
minimum one-year gap in backup domestic enrichment capability,
representing the time between the latest possible resumption of gaseous
diffusion operations and the planned full operation of the governmentfunded
gas centrifuge facility. However, the government-funded
centrifuge program was never implemented, and in 2002, the
Department negotiated with the United States Enrichment Corporation
(USEC) to deploy a commercial gas centrifuge facility. Under USEC's
plan, comparable enrichment production will begin in September 2011,
increasing the amount of time between the possibility of restarting the
Portsmouth facility and the deployment of a new commercial centrifuge
to a minimum of three years.
Cold Standby Program. Initially, the Department's Office of Nuclear
Energy, Science and Technology (Nuclear Energy) coordinated the end
of Cold Standby with the deployment of a government-funded gas
centrifuge facility. The plans called for the Cold Standby mission to
end in September 2005 with centrifuge production reaching adequate
levels by September 2008. Under those assumptions, there would be a
minimum one-year gap in backup domestic enrichment capability,
representing the time between the latest possible resumption of gaseous
diffusion operations and the planned full operation of the governmentfunded
gas centrifuge facility. However, the government-funded
centrifuge program was never implemented, and in 2002, the
Department negotiated with the United States Enrichment Corporation
(USEC) to deploy a commercial gas centrifuge facility. Under USEC's
plan, comparable enrichment production will begin in September 2011,
increasing the amount of time between the possibility of restarting the
Portsmouth facility and the deployment of a new commercial centrifuge
to a minimum of three years.
This inspection report is classified and is available for review by appropriately cleared personnel with a need to know
This inspection report is classified and is available for review by appropriately
cleared personnel with a need to know.IG-0633
cleared personnel with a need to know.IG-0633
The Security of Uranium Hexafluoride at the East Tennessee Technology Park
Modernization of Tritium Requirements Systems
The Department of Energy's National Nuclear Secuirty Administration (NNSA) maintains the nation's nuclear weapons stockpile, of which tritium is a vital component. The tritium in certain weapon components must be periodically replaced due to decay. Since halting production in 1988, the Department has met its tritium requirements through a recycling process a tthe Savannah River Site. Hoewever, plans are in place to have newly produced tritium ready for use as early as Fiscal Year 2007. To establish an optimal production schedule, an accurate projection of the amount of tritium required is necessary.
Implementation of Indications, Warning, Analysis and Reporting Capability
A significant number of the Department of Energy (Department) sites
were not taking appropriate action to report computer attacks, probes,
or compromises. Specifically, computer incidents were not always
being reported to the Computer Incident Advisory Capability (CIAC) as
required by Departmental guidance. Office of Inspector General
Technology Crimes Section (Technology Crimes) and Federal
counterintelligence officials were also not always notified of incidents
as appropriate.
Despite policy changes designed to increase awareness and specific
reporting guidance from the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB)1, most sites were not reporting malicious or persistent computer
attacks. For example, 43 of 80 (54 percent) of the Department's
organizations made no reports of malicious activity to CIAC during
FY 2002. As noted by senior cyber security officials at Headquarters, it
is improbable that non-reporting organizations were not subject to
significant or unusually persistent attacks or probes considering the
dramatic increase in malicious attacks or reconnaissance of Federal
systems. This view is bolstered by data furnished by the Federal
Computer Incident Response Center indicating that computer incidents
increased Government-wide by more than 7,000 percent during
FY 2002.onsent
were not taking appropriate action to report computer attacks, probes,
or compromises. Specifically, computer incidents were not always
being reported to the Computer Incident Advisory Capability (CIAC) as
required by Departmental guidance. Office of Inspector General
Technology Crimes Section (Technology Crimes) and Federal
counterintelligence officials were also not always notified of incidents
as appropriate.
Despite policy changes designed to increase awareness and specific
reporting guidance from the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB)1, most sites were not reporting malicious or persistent computer
attacks. For example, 43 of 80 (54 percent) of the Department's
organizations made no reports of malicious activity to CIAC during
FY 2002. As noted by senior cyber security officials at Headquarters, it
is improbable that non-reporting organizations were not subject to
significant or unusually persistent attacks or probes considering the
dramatic increase in malicious attacks or reconnaissance of Federal
systems. This view is bolstered by data furnished by the Federal
Computer Incident Response Center indicating that computer incidents
increased Government-wide by more than 7,000 percent during
FY 2002.onsent