Idaho Operations Office Planned Construction of a Waste Vitrification Facility
In 1995, the Office of Inspector General evaluated planned construction projects at the Idaho
National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory. In our resulting audit report, we
questioned a number of the projects because they were not needed to support the Laboratory's
mission, or because they were inappropriately sized. At the time, we found that the Department
was not consistently verifying the need for projects, nor was it identifying and evaluating
alternatives. As a result of the audit, the Department agreed to more aggressively manage
construction by canceling unnecessary projects and thoroughly assessing alternatives at the
Idaho site.
National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory. In our resulting audit report, we
questioned a number of the projects because they were not needed to support the Laboratory's
mission, or because they were inappropriately sized. At the time, we found that the Department
was not consistently verifying the need for projects, nor was it identifying and evaluating
alternatives. As a result of the audit, the Department agreed to more aggressively manage
construction by canceling unnecessary projects and thoroughly assessing alternatives at the
Idaho site.
Personnel Security Clearances and Badge Access Controls at Department Headquarters
Inspection of Training Issues at the Rocky Flats Field Office
Licensing of Trade Secrets by Sandia National Laboratories Trade Secrets
The Office of Inspector General (OIG), U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), initiated an inspection
into the facts and circumstances surrounding the issuance of a trade secret license in June 2000 by
Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia) at Livermore, California, to Axsun Technologies (Axsun), a
private company. This inspection was initiated after the OIG received allegations that the issuance
of the Axsun license was in violation of both DOE policy and the requirements of Sandia’s
management and operating contract. It was alleged that Sandia had been advised for many years
that DOE policy prohibited the national laboratories from creating, maintaining or marketing trade
secrets. The allegation suggested that the licensing of trade secrets by Sandia had been prevalent
over the years, and that the Axsun license was only the most recent in a history of willful
misconduct by the laboratory.
into the facts and circumstances surrounding the issuance of a trade secret license in June 2000 by
Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia) at Livermore, California, to Axsun Technologies (Axsun), a
private company. This inspection was initiated after the OIG received allegations that the issuance
of the Axsun license was in violation of both DOE policy and the requirements of Sandia’s
management and operating contract. It was alleged that Sandia had been advised for many years
that DOE policy prohibited the national laboratories from creating, maintaining or marketing trade
secrets. The allegation suggested that the licensing of trade secrets by Sandia had been prevalent
over the years, and that the Axsun license was only the most recent in a history of willful
misconduct by the laboratory.
Cyber-Related Critical Infrastructure Identification and Protection Measures
In recent years, critical infrastructure protection has taken on increasing national importance as
attacks and resulting damage to the country's critical cyber interests have increased. In 1998, in
response to these threats, the Administration issued a directive to demonstrate the Federal
government's commitment to protecting critical assets. More recently, President Bush signaled
his support for critical infrastructure protection efforts by issuing Executive Order 13231,
Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Information Age. The President's order seeks to
strengthen the protection of critical information systems, including emergency preparedness
communications, and the physical assets that support those systems.
attacks and resulting damage to the country's critical cyber interests have increased. In 1998, in
response to these threats, the Administration issued a directive to demonstrate the Federal
government's commitment to protecting critical assets. More recently, President Bush signaled
his support for critical infrastructure protection efforts by issuing Executive Order 13231,
Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Information Age. The President's order seeks to
strengthen the protection of critical information systems, including emergency preparedness
communications, and the physical assets that support those systems.
Accounting for Sealed Sources of Nuclear Material Provided to Foreign Countries
Through the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the Department of Energy (Department) and its
predecessor agencies provided nuclear materials to foreign facilities as part of the Atoms
for Peace Program. While this program was designed to aid other nations in developing
their own nuclear energy capabilities, the materials provided, including fuel rods, sealed
sources, and raw materials, remained U.S. Government-owned. Beginning in the 1960s,
the U.S. discontinued its policy of lending the material, and began to transfer ownership
through sale or donation. However, according to Departmental records, the U.S.
Government still retained title to much of the nuclear material provided to foreign
entities.
The Department's Nuclear Materials Management and Safeguards System (NMMSS) was
designed, in part, to provide a system of accounting and control over source and special
nuclear materials. The Department also maintained a separate registry to account for and
track the location of "Sealed Sources." Sealed Sources, which contain nuclear or
radiological material, are packaged to be environmentally safe and are generally used for
calibration of radiation measuring and monitoring instruments in nuclear research and
development. The Sealed Source registry was discontinued in 1984.
In October 2001, the Office of Inspector General issued a report on Accounting for
Government-owned Nuclear Materials Provided to Non-Department Domestic Facilities
(DOE/IG-0529). That report found, among other things, that the Department could not
fully account for sealed sources of nuclear material loaned to domestic licensees. In view
of this finding and recent world events, we initiated this audit to determine whether the
Department could account for Government-owned sealed sources provided to foreign
countries.
predecessor agencies provided nuclear materials to foreign facilities as part of the Atoms
for Peace Program. While this program was designed to aid other nations in developing
their own nuclear energy capabilities, the materials provided, including fuel rods, sealed
sources, and raw materials, remained U.S. Government-owned. Beginning in the 1960s,
the U.S. discontinued its policy of lending the material, and began to transfer ownership
through sale or donation. However, according to Departmental records, the U.S.
Government still retained title to much of the nuclear material provided to foreign
entities.
The Department's Nuclear Materials Management and Safeguards System (NMMSS) was
designed, in part, to provide a system of accounting and control over source and special
nuclear materials. The Department also maintained a separate registry to account for and
track the location of "Sealed Sources." Sealed Sources, which contain nuclear or
radiological material, are packaged to be environmentally safe and are generally used for
calibration of radiation measuring and monitoring instruments in nuclear research and
development. The Sealed Source registry was discontinued in 1984.
In October 2001, the Office of Inspector General issued a report on Accounting for
Government-owned Nuclear Materials Provided to Non-Department Domestic Facilities
(DOE/IG-0529). That report found, among other things, that the Department could not
fully account for sealed sources of nuclear material loaned to domestic licensees. In view
of this finding and recent world events, we initiated this audit to determine whether the
Department could account for Government-owned sealed sources provided to foreign
countries.