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Docket No. EO-05-01. On December 20, 2005, the Secretary of Energy issued an emergency order, DOE Order 202-05-03, requiring Mirant’s Potomac River Generating Station in Alexandria, Virginia, to operate under limited circumstances. On September 28, 2006, the Secretary extended the Order, including all of its terms and conditions, DOE Order 202-06-2, until December 1, 2006. This SEA includes descriptions of the DOE emergency orders; assessments of the direct, indirect, and cumulative impacts resulting from the emergency orders; and descriptions of alternative actions for potential future decision-making that include mitigation. This SEA covers a period of about 24 months beginning in December 2005.

Docket No. EO-05-01. On December 20, 2005, the Secretary of Energy issued an emergency order, DOE Order 202-05-03, requiring Mirant’s Potomac River Generating Station in Alexandria, Virginia, to operate under limited circumstances. On September 28, 2...

Assess impacts resulting from DOE's emergency orders regarding Mirant’s Potomac River Generating Station, Alexandria, VA.

This is a request by HEADWATER for a DOE waiver of domestic and foreign patent rights under agreement DE-FC26-04NT42448.

I ain pleased to submit the Office of Inspector General's (OIG) Senziunnuul Report to Congress. This report summarizes significant OIG activities and accomplislunents during the six month period ending September 30, 2006. This report reflects our continuing commitment to focus OIG efforts on the issues and concerns most critical to you, the Administration, the Congress, and the taxpayer. In particular, the report details OIG accomplishments in identifying the Department's most significant management challenges. We look forward to working with you on matters of mutual interest.

Lintgram #59, created by NNSA Administrator Ambassador Linton F. Brooks on October 30, 2006 with highlights addressing Integrated Safety Management

Significant backlogs existed in each of the three types of tests Surveillance Testing conducted in the Surveillance Testing Program---laboratory tests, flight tests, and component tests---as of September 30? 2005. Laboratory tests are conducted on weapons' non-nuclear systems to detect defects due to handling, aging, manufacturing, or design. Flight tests involve dropping or launching a weapon, with its nuclear components removed, to assess performance and reliability. Component tests involve the destructive analysis of the five primary weapon components: pits, secondaries, detonators, cable assemblies, and the gas transfer valves systems to identify defects or failures. Although it made progress in reducing the backlog for a number of systems, the surveillance testing backlog actually increased for the majority of systems and components during the five-year period from Fiscal Year (FY) 2000 to 2005.

Follow-up Audit on Stockpile Surveillance Testing