The Department of Energy must maintain a variety of nuclear materials to meet its
mission needs and, based on the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the principle of
centralized civilian control of such materials, the nuclear material needs of other Federal
agencies. For example, the Department of Defense and the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) depend on the Department of Energy to supply
plutonium-23 8 to meet certain mission requirements involving national defense and space
exploration. Plutonium-238 is used in the manufacture of radioisotope power systems
that have a number of national security and scientific applications.ÿÿÿ
mission needs and, based on the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the principle of
centralized civilian control of such materials, the nuclear material needs of other Federal
agencies. For example, the Department of Defense and the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) depend on the Department of Energy to supply
plutonium-23 8 to meet certain mission requirements involving national defense and space
exploration. Plutonium-238 is used in the manufacture of radioisotope power systems
that have a number of national security and scientific applications.ÿÿÿ
Management of Sensitive Equipment at Selected Locations
The Department of Energy and its facilities' management contractors have come under
increased scrutiny regarding the management of sensitive personal property. The
Department defined sensitive property as equipment susceptible to misappropriation for
personal use or readily convertible to cash. Generally, this includes equipment such as
computers, personal digital assistants, cameras, and communications equipment. The
Department has made a significant investment in sensitive property. For example, our
analysis of inventory records at the Lawrence Berkeley and Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratories and the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center disclosed that the
acquisition cost of their active sensitive property inventories exceeded $152 million.
Because of the importance of this issue, we initiated an audit at these sites to determine
whether the Department was properly managing sensitive equipment.ety Board"}"}
increased scrutiny regarding the management of sensitive personal property. The
Department defined sensitive property as equipment susceptible to misappropriation for
personal use or readily convertible to cash. Generally, this includes equipment such as
computers, personal digital assistants, cameras, and communications equipment. The
Department has made a significant investment in sensitive property. For example, our
analysis of inventory records at the Lawrence Berkeley and Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratories and the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center disclosed that the
acquisition cost of their active sensitive property inventories exceeded $152 million.
Because of the importance of this issue, we initiated an audit at these sites to determine
whether the Department was properly managing sensitive equipment.ety Board"}"}
National Nuclear Security Administration’s Ability to Meet the Aircraft Requirements of the Joint Technical Operations Team
Worldwide events have heightened concerns over terrorist attacks, particularly with regard to the
possible use of weapons of mass destruction, including radioactive devices, in such attacks. A recent
training exercise in Seattle, Washington, involving a simulated terrorist attack using a radioactive
“dirty bomb” highlighted the importance of cooperation and coordination by Federal, State, and
local governments in providing a rapid, planned response to a terrorist incident involving a weapon
of mass destruction.ýïýïýïý
possible use of weapons of mass destruction, including radioactive devices, in such attacks. A recent
training exercise in Seattle, Washington, involving a simulated terrorist attack using a radioactive
“dirty bomb” highlighted the importance of cooperation and coordination by Federal, State, and
local governments in providing a rapid, planned response to a terrorist incident involving a weapon
of mass destruction.ýïýïýïý
International Materials Protection, Control and Accountability Nonproliferation Initiative
The Department of Energy is responsible for initiatives designed to reduce the threat
related to nuclear materials and weapons in the former Soviet Union (FSU). One of the
most prominent initiatives is the International Materials Protection, Control and
Accountability (IMPC&A) program, whose objective is to reduce the risk posed by
weapons and weapons-usable nuclear material at 95 sites in the FSU. The Department
commits about $250 million annually to this initiative.PCC
related to nuclear materials and weapons in the former Soviet Union (FSU). One of the
most prominent initiatives is the International Materials Protection, Control and
Accountability (IMPC&A) program, whose objective is to reduce the risk posed by
weapons and weapons-usable nuclear material at 95 sites in the FSU. The Department
commits about $250 million annually to this initiative.PCC
Management of the Department’s Protective Forces
The Department of Energy and its contractors are responsible for protecting materials and
facilities critical to the Nation's nuclear defense program, as well as those used to support
scientific, research, and environmental-related missions. While the security of
Department sites has been a priority for many years, in the wake of the terrorist attacks of
September 11,2001, the Department took action to enhance security at its facilities. One
important aspect of this initiative was an increased need for additional protective force
personnel. For example, at National Nuclear Security Administration sites, authorized
positions increased by 17 percent, to 2,319 officers. Once all positions are filled, annual
security force costs for those sites are expected to exceed $251 million for the current
fiscal year, an increase of 67 percent.
In previous reports, the Office of Inspector General identified a number of efficiency
concerns relating to the Department's management of its protective forces. In light of
these concerns, we initiated this audit to evaluate the Department's management of its
protective force program.
facilities critical to the Nation's nuclear defense program, as well as those used to support
scientific, research, and environmental-related missions. While the security of
Department sites has been a priority for many years, in the wake of the terrorist attacks of
September 11,2001, the Department took action to enhance security at its facilities. One
important aspect of this initiative was an increased need for additional protective force
personnel. For example, at National Nuclear Security Administration sites, authorized
positions increased by 17 percent, to 2,319 officers. Once all positions are filled, annual
security force costs for those sites are expected to exceed $251 million for the current
fiscal year, an increase of 67 percent.
In previous reports, the Office of Inspector General identified a number of efficiency
concerns relating to the Department's management of its protective forces. In light of
these concerns, we initiated this audit to evaluate the Department's management of its
protective force program.
Inspection of Savannah River Operations Office Management of Emergency Response and Law Enforcement-Related Grants