Inspection Letter Report on “Inspection of Possible Ethics Violation”
The Department's Unclassified Cyber Security Program—2005
We found that the Department of Energy (Department)
continued to take steps to strengthen its cyber security
program and had implemented a number of
countermeasures to reduce network vulnerabilities
addressed in our Evaluation Report on the Department's
Unclassified Cyber Security Program-2004 (DOE/IG-0662,
September 2004). During the past year, senior-level
management officials have focused their attention on
protecting the Department's systems and data. In
particular, we observed that:s"}
continued to take steps to strengthen its cyber security
program and had implemented a number of
countermeasures to reduce network vulnerabilities
addressed in our Evaluation Report on the Department's
Unclassified Cyber Security Program-2004 (DOE/IG-0662,
September 2004). During the past year, senior-level
management officials have focused their attention on
protecting the Department's systems and data. In
particular, we observed that:s"}
The Los Alamos National Laboratory Hydrodynamic Test Program
Los Alamos did not complete all hydrotests as scheduled.
Fifteen hydrotests were scheduled in Fiscal Years (FY)
2002 through 2004. Of these, six were completed as
scheduled, six were delayed up to two years, and three had
not been completed as of April 2005. Future hydrotests
may also be at risk.t
Fifteen hydrotests were scheduled in Fiscal Years (FY)
2002 through 2004. Of these, six were completed as
scheduled, six were delayed up to two years, and three had
not been completed as of April 2005. Future hydrotests
may also be at risk.t
Sludge Removal Operations at the Hanford Site's K Basins
The sludge removal phase of the Spent Nuclear Fuels (SNF) Project
and Cost has experienced schedule delays and cost increases. For example,
the original Tri-Party Agreement (TPA) milestone called for
sludge removal to begin by December 2002; however, Fluor was
unable to begin operations until July 2004 – 18 months later than
planned.
In April 2003, Fluor initiated the final step towards beginning
sludge removal operations. This step, called the Operational
Readiness Review (ORR), required an assessment to verify that an
adequate state of readiness had been achieved to begin startup of
sludge removal operations. Due to numerous deficiencies, the
ORR was halted shortly after it started. Deficiencies included
instances where installed equipment did not meet construction
specifications, testing documentation was either inadequate or
nonexistent, and changes were made to equipment designs without
an adequate review for potential safety impacts.
and Cost has experienced schedule delays and cost increases. For example,
the original Tri-Party Agreement (TPA) milestone called for
sludge removal to begin by December 2002; however, Fluor was
unable to begin operations until July 2004 – 18 months later than
planned.
In April 2003, Fluor initiated the final step towards beginning
sludge removal operations. This step, called the Operational
Readiness Review (ORR), required an assessment to verify that an
adequate state of readiness had been achieved to begin startup of
sludge removal operations. Due to numerous deficiencies, the
ORR was halted shortly after it started. Deficiencies included
instances where installed equipment did not meet construction
specifications, testing documentation was either inadequate or
nonexistent, and changes were made to equipment designs without
an adequate review for potential safety impacts.
The National Nuclear Security Administration's Refurbishment of the B61
The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is at risk of
Project Schedule, not achieving the First Production Unit (FPU) for the B61
Scope, and Cost refurbishment within the original schedule and scope
specifications. NNSA was unable to reuse a key material in the
refurbishment which, in turn, delayed the design and testing of key
components and increased costs for research and development of a
substitute material. NNSA also experienced other delays that, in
our opinion, were avoidable. Specifically, we found that:
• Completion of a key component milestone was delayed at
least 13 months due to inconsistencies in participating sites'
production schedules and,
• Delivery of key production equipment was delayed as
much as 9 months due to the failure of project officials to
agree on the delivery schedule and problems with a
commercial vendor.
In addition, NNSA reduced the project scope by eliminating
testing against certain physical environments and had not
developed a valid cost baseline to control costs.
Project Schedule, not achieving the First Production Unit (FPU) for the B61
Scope, and Cost refurbishment within the original schedule and scope
specifications. NNSA was unable to reuse a key material in the
refurbishment which, in turn, delayed the design and testing of key
components and increased costs for research and development of a
substitute material. NNSA also experienced other delays that, in
our opinion, were avoidable. Specifically, we found that:
• Completion of a key component milestone was delayed at
least 13 months due to inconsistencies in participating sites'
production schedules and,
• Delivery of key production equipment was delayed as
much as 9 months due to the failure of project officials to
agree on the delivery schedule and problems with a
commercial vendor.
In addition, NNSA reduced the project scope by eliminating
testing against certain physical environments and had not
developed a valid cost baseline to control costs.
Management Controls over the National Environmental Policy Act Decisions at the Idaho Operations Office