This is to inform you that the audit of the Departments Fiscal Year (FY) 2007 Consolidated Financial Statemetns has resulted in an unqualified audit opinion.
In the event of a major disruption to its nonnal operations, Bonneville must be prepared
to continue its essential functions, particularly its power scheduling, tra~lsmission
scheduling, and system operations. In this regard, Bonneville is required to follow
Federal Preparedness Circular 65 (FPC 65), as prescribed by the Department of
Homeland Security's Federal Emergency Management Agency. Under FPC 65, agencies
are to develop viable contingency plans. The Circular also provides a number of key
steps that agencies should take for continuity of operations. Specifically, it recommends
that each agency: ( I ) prepare alternate operating facilities; (2) establish a devolution plan
to be implemented if it is incapable of performing essential functions from either its
prlmary or alternate facility; and (3) test the capabilities of its continuity of operations
program. The objective of the audit was to determine whether Bonrleville had a viable
continuity of operations capability for its essential functions.
to continue its essential functions, particularly its power scheduling, tra~lsmission
scheduling, and system operations. In this regard, Bonneville is required to follow
Federal Preparedness Circular 65 (FPC 65), as prescribed by the Department of
Homeland Security's Federal Emergency Management Agency. Under FPC 65, agencies
are to develop viable contingency plans. The Circular also provides a number of key
steps that agencies should take for continuity of operations. Specifically, it recommends
that each agency: ( I ) prepare alternate operating facilities; (2) establish a devolution plan
to be implemented if it is incapable of performing essential functions from either its
prlmary or alternate facility; and (3) test the capabilities of its continuity of operations
program. The objective of the audit was to determine whether Bonrleville had a viable
continuity of operations capability for its essential functions.
In the event of a major disruption to its nonnal operations, Bonneville must be prepared to continue its essential functions, particularly its power scheduling, tra~lsmission scheduling, and system operations. In this regard, Bonneville is required t...
Continuity of Operations at Bonneville Power Administration
In the event of a major disruption to its nonnal operations, Bonneville must be prepared
to continue its essential functions, particularly its power scheduling, tra~lsmission
scheduling, and system operations. In this regard, Bonneville is required to follow
Federal Preparedness Circular 65 (FPC 65), as prescribed by the Department of
Homeland Security's Federal Emergency Management Agency. Under FPC 65, agencies
are to develop viable contingency plans. The Circular also provides a number of key
steps that agencies should take for continuity of operations. Specifically, it recommends
that each agency: ( I ) prepare alternate operating facilities; (2) establish a devolution plan
to be implemented if it is incapable of performing essential functions from either its
prlmary or alternate facility; and (3) test the capabilities of its continuity of operations
program. The objective of the audit was to determine whether Bonrleville had a viable
continuity of operations capability for its essential functions.
to continue its essential functions, particularly its power scheduling, tra~lsmission
scheduling, and system operations. In this regard, Bonneville is required to follow
Federal Preparedness Circular 65 (FPC 65), as prescribed by the Department of
Homeland Security's Federal Emergency Management Agency. Under FPC 65, agencies
are to develop viable contingency plans. The Circular also provides a number of key
steps that agencies should take for continuity of operations. Specifically, it recommends
that each agency: ( I ) prepare alternate operating facilities; (2) establish a devolution plan
to be implemented if it is incapable of performing essential functions from either its
prlmary or alternate facility; and (3) test the capabilities of its continuity of operations
program. The objective of the audit was to determine whether Bonrleville had a viable
continuity of operations capability for its essential functions.
I am pleased to submit the Oi'fice of Inspector General's (OIG's) Serniunnual Report to
Congress. This report summarizes significant OIG activities and accomplishments during
the six month period ending September 30,2007.
Congress. This report summarizes significant OIG activities and accomplishments during
the six month period ending September 30,2007.
Work Order Estimate and Cost Issues for Site Support Services at Los AlamosNational Laboratory
The Department of Energy's Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) is one of the largest multidisciplinary science institutions in the world. The National Nuclear Security Administration has cognizance over the Laboratory. Site support services at LANL, including maintenance and repairs, are provided by KSL Services Joint Venture (KSL) under a 5-year, almost $800 million, cost-plus-award-fee subcontract arrangement. Ultimately, essentially all KSL charges are reimbursed by the Department through the Laboratory. Under the terms of the subcontract, KSL is to excercise disciplne and rigor to ensure that appropriate levels of project controls and management are provided for the delivery of work on schedule and within budget. KSL's performance is evaluated semi-annually against performance objectives, expectations, and associated weighting factors.
Selected Aspects of the East Tennessee Technology Park's Security Clearance Retention Process
The Department of Energy uses a formal process of security clearances to help prevent
unauthorized access to sites and facilities that niaintain or store classified information
and/or special nuclear material. As part of this process, security badges are issued to
indicate whethcr the individual possesses a security clearance and, as a consequence,
whctlier access to agency facilities is permitted. In addition, the Department maintains a
Central Personnel Clearance Index to track security clearance information. In virtually
all circumstances, policy requires that security clearances be terminated when an
individual ends their association with the Department. A limited exception to that policy
exists for contractor employees that arc to be reemployed within three months. Closely
controlling security clearances and restricting access to facilities to authorized individuals
arc essential to protecting the Department's valuable security and property assets.
In May 2007, the Oftice of Inspector General issued a report on Thr De p~r t r n e t i tA~zl~tl it
Resolutiotl ~rtrclF c~llolt~-~Prrpo cess (DOEIIG-0766). This audit disclosed, among other
things, that security clearances at the East Tennessee Technology Park (ETTP) were
being retained well beyond the three-month window allowed by Departmental policy.
Because of the potential for terminated employees who retained active clearances to
improperly access Departmental facilities, we initiated this audit to determine whether the
practice of maintaining active security clearances at ETTP for terminated en~ployeesw as
appropriate and/or necessary.
unauthorized access to sites and facilities that niaintain or store classified information
and/or special nuclear material. As part of this process, security badges are issued to
indicate whethcr the individual possesses a security clearance and, as a consequence,
whctlier access to agency facilities is permitted. In addition, the Department maintains a
Central Personnel Clearance Index to track security clearance information. In virtually
all circumstances, policy requires that security clearances be terminated when an
individual ends their association with the Department. A limited exception to that policy
exists for contractor employees that arc to be reemployed within three months. Closely
controlling security clearances and restricting access to facilities to authorized individuals
arc essential to protecting the Department's valuable security and property assets.
In May 2007, the Oftice of Inspector General issued a report on Thr De p~r t r n e t i tA~zl~tl it
Resolutiotl ~rtrclF c~llolt~-~Prrpo cess (DOEIIG-0766). This audit disclosed, among other
things, that security clearances at the East Tennessee Technology Park (ETTP) were
being retained well beyond the three-month window allowed by Departmental policy.
Because of the potential for terminated employees who retained active clearances to
improperly access Departmental facilities, we initiated this audit to determine whether the
practice of maintaining active security clearances at ETTP for terminated en~ployeesw as
appropriate and/or necessary.