The National Nuclear Security Administration’s Weapons Evaluation Test Laboratory
January 3, 2017January 3, 2017
The National Nuclear Security Administration’s Weapons Evaluation Test Laboratory
The primary mission of the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is to ensure the safety, reliability, and performance of the Nation’s nuclear weapons stockpile. NNSA’s stockpile surveillance program continuously assesses and evaluates each nuclear weapon system to detect or anticipate any potential problems. Sandia National Laboratories’ (Sandia) Weapons Evaluation Test Laboratory (WETL), located at the Pantex Plant in Amarillo, Texas, supports the execution of the stockpile surveillance program by testing weapon functionality and providing quality data to support NNSA’s annual stockpile assessments. Specifically, WETL performs laboratory testing using centrifuges and other test equipment. The non-nuclear components are mounted on a centrifuge and exposed to environments that simulate the launch and reentry conditions. Funding for Sandia’s laboratory testing program totaled about $62 million for fiscal years (FY) 2012 through 2015, including $15.8 million for WETL operations.
In December 2013, the Office of Inspector General received an anonymous complaint regarding the management of Sandia’s Integrated Stockpile Evaluation Group. The complaint alleged that Sandia diverted equipment to other programs and failed to fund preventive maintenance for WETL.
Our audit did not substantiate the allegation that Sandia diverted equipment to other programs. Because the allegation contained no specifics, we focused our review on equipment in the year that the complaint was received. Specifically, we verified that all FY 2013 equipment purchases over $25,000 and most purchases of sensitive items (cell phones and computing assets) were reflected in the WETL property list. In addition, an FY 2015 wall-to-wall property inventory performed by Sandia every 4 years found no missing items purchased for WETL in FY 2013. Furthermore, we interviewed all WETL technologists on staff for August and October 2015, and the technologists indicated no concerns regarding equipment diversion. Although some officials expressed concern to us about the adverse impact of constrained budgets on maintenance, we did not identify specific instances where Sandia failed to fund maintenance at WETL. However, we found that Sandia had not met NNSA’s expectations for laboratory testing at WETL.
Unplanned downtime for the testing equipment at WETL created major disruptions to testing operations and contributed, in large part, to the failure to meet baseline testing goals. The primary factor contributing to the unplanned equipment downtime was a nearly 2-year outage of the large centrifuge dedicated to testing Navy weapon systems. The outage was due to noise and vibration issues, followed by an unrelated fire in the drive system. In addition, Sandia’s actions to consolidate explosives operations have affected testing at WETL.
The efficient execution of WETL laboratory tests is critical to identifying stockpile defects in a timely manner to maintain a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile. Although Sandia anticipates that it will eliminate the WETL test backlog by April 2017, because of the age and uniqueness of the centrifuges, we believe there is an increased risk of further operational delays and unplanned equipment outages.
Topic: National Security & Safety