Lisa E. Gordon-Hagerty, DOE Under Secretary for Nuclear Security and Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, rolled out the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) on Feb. 27, 2018, to NNSA’s federal and contractor workforce, including the laboratories, plants and sites. Over 350 people participated in person or by video link to learn more about the NPR and its impact on the NNSA. Ms. Gordon-Hagerty noted that the people in the field will be the execution team for the NPR and that DOE Secretary Perry and Deputy Secretary Brouillette are fully supportive of NNSA’s role in the NPR’s execution. NNSA played an integral part in the NPR’s development by working with the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of State (DOS) and will continue doing so as NNSA and its National Labs and sites move to execute this important policy. In concluding her remarks, Ms. Gordon-Hagerty reiterated her top priorities, which are infrastructure and making sure that NNSA has the personnel it needs to execute the plan and the NNSA mission by attracting the workforce of the future.
Senior leaders from the Offices of Policy; Defense Programs; Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation; Safety, Infrastructure, and Operations; and Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation, spoke about the NPR impact on their organizations.
The event moderator, Cindy Lersten from the NNSA Office of Policy, noted the large number of external events to date on the NPR, in which NNSA participated alongside DOD and DOS. Going forward, as NNSA executes the NPR, this partnership with DOD and DOS is key.
Ms. Lersten provided the context for the 2018 NPR development. In December 2017, the administration released the National Security Strategy which drives the administration’s overall nuclear security posture. This was followed in January 2018 by the National Defense Strategy, focusing on the Pentagon’s goals within the National Security Strategy. Finally, in February 2018, the NPR was released, addressing the role of nuclear weapons in the U.S. security strategy. These strategies are all linked and drive NNSA’s work.
One of the participants in the NPR drafting process, Dr. Chris Yeaw, Senior Policy Advisor for Defense Programs in the Office of Policy, provided background on the document’s development. He noted that this is the fourth U.S. NPR since the end of the Cold War: the others were issued in 1994, 2001, and 2010. This administration’s NPR process kicked off in January 2017 with the National Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM)1, titled, “Peace through Strength.” The NSPM listed a number of attributes for the nuclear deterrent: modern, robust, flexible, resilient, ready, and tailored. These were the guiding principles in developing the NPR while the intent was to provide the President with maximum strategic flexibility. He explained that a major driving force of the 2018 NPR was the geopolitical environment, especially the fact that U.S. adversaries are increasing their numbers and types of nuclear weapons and have increasingly ambitious geopolitical goals.
In particular, Dr. Yeaw outlined Russia’s recent aggression, which includes the 2007 invasion of Georgia and the 2014 illegal annexation of Crimea, with continuing support for rebels in eastern Ukraine. He cited Russia’s “escalate to de-escalate” philosophy, which goes back to 1999 when Putin rescinded the “no first use” policy and also mentioned Russia’s open threats against NATO allies. In terms of weapons development, Putin walked away from the presidential nuclear initiatives that dealt with non-strategic nuclear weapons and has greatly expanded Russia’s stockpile of this category of weapons.
In addition, Dr. Yeaw highlighted concerns with China’s actions, such as its statement to commit to war should Taiwan declare independence and its establishment of missile sites and military airstrips on islands in the South China Sea. Furthermore, China produced documents in the early 2000s on lowering the nuclear threshold and is building related weapons such as dual capable ballistic missiles. Finally, he cited North Korea’s nuclear weapons ambitions, ICBM development, and unpredictable behavior.
He noted how the United States seeks a balanced approach to its nuclear deterrent that includes both nonproliferation and arms control activities, as well as maintaining a safe, secure and flexible nuclear capability. To provide the option for a proportional response to an adversary’s limited use of nuclear weapons, the United States now has new initiatives: a low-yield sub-launched ballistic missile and a sea-launched cruise missile. Both are designed to provide a prompt, assured option of responding to a limited nuclear strike, with the goal being not to lower the nuclear use threshold but to raise the nuclear use threshold of the adversaries.
Mr. Mike Thompson, Assistant Deputy Administrator for Major Modernization Programs in the NNSA Defense Programs Office, discussed the supplemental initiatives in the new NPR: the low-yield sub-launched ballistic missile and the sea-launched cruise missile, and what this means for NNSA in terms of execution. Essentially, there are three main areas of focus: 1) maintain the current stockpile; 2) stockpile responsiveness – fill the gaps not covered by life extension programs; and 3) weapons modernization. Although there are some issues with strategic materials, plans for domestic uranium enrichment and plutonium and tritium production are well under way. Specifically, pit production plans are in progress and NNSA is working with the Tennessee Valley Authority on options to increase its tritium-production capacity. Separately, domestic uranium enrichment takes a much longer-term approach. NNSA can extend the need date out to the 2039/2040 timeframe as it works out how to produce the required amount domestically.
In addition, Mr. Thompson explained the “continuity plus” concept of the NPR, which involves four supplemental initiatives: 1) low-yield ballistic missile capability; 2) pursuit of a sea-launched cruise missile; 3) retaining the B-83; and 4) W78 replacement.
Going forward, NNSA will work with DOD through the Technical Coordinating Committee to turn NPR policies into military requirements. This has started for the low-yield capability and the FY2018 and FY2019 budget requests establish a strong foundation for anything that might be supplemental to the current program of work.
Mr. Ken Sheely, Deputy Associate Administrator for Infrastructure in the NNSA Office of Safety, Infrastructure, and Operations, pointed out that the focus in the NPR on infrastructure is because NNSA infrastructure is: 1) too old: over half is more than 40 years old; facilities’ designed lifetime is generally 40-50 years; 2) too big: 10% of the real estate is not being used; and 3) too brittle: 2/3 of the facilities are less than adequate.
He added that every NPR has included a focus on infrastructure but that in the past, NNSA has used antiquated tools to measure infrastructure needs. Now, NNSA is using a prioritized, risk-based process with data-driven risk-informed metrics to drive its decision-making and this process has already started to slow down the infrastructure decline as a result.
Mr. John Dunn from NNSA’s Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Office, underscored that the NPR states the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the cornerstone of the nonproliferation regime and that the United States remains committed to its obligations under it. In fact, the NPR endorses strengthening the NPT and the international safeguards system, improving capabilities to detect and deter proliferation, and reducing the availability of sensitive materials and technologies.
Mr. Dunn added that the NPR states that arms control can contribute to U.S. and allies’ security by managing strategic competition, increasing predictability, and reducing the risk of miscalculation. He reiterated the U.S. commitment to arms control efforts that enhance U.S. and allied security, are verifiable, and are done with partners that comply with their obligations. The supplemental initiatives in the NPR do not run counter to U.S. obligations under international treaties. Although the administration will not seek ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), it will continue to support the CTBT Organization’s Preparatory Committee and its international system for nuclear explosion monitoring. The United States will not resume nuclear explosive testing unless necessary to ensure the safety and effectiveness of the stockpile; and encourages all states to declare or maintain a moratorium on testing.
Regarding current arms control agreements, Mr. Dunn said the United States remains committed to fulfilling its obligations under the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty as long as it remains in force. The United States has met its central limit obligations under the Treaty and Russia is also expected to be in compliance with these limits.
Conversely, he noted that in 2014, the United States declared Russia to be violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. The United States has prepared an integrated strategy to respond to the violation which includes diplomatic, economic and military response measures.
Mr. David Hoagland, from the NNSA Office of Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation, noted that the NPR reinforces the value of U.S. capabilities to counter the threat of nuclear terrorism. He explained that the growing and diversifying foreign nuclear programs, as described in the NPR, mean that NNSA must be prepared to deal with a range of contingencies from armed conflict with nuclear weapons, the possibility of a nuclear weapon falling out of state control, or even a scenario in which an adversary uses a nuclear weapon against the United States. These dangers reinforce the need to maintain a range of flexible, risk-informed response capabilities. Mr. Hoagland emphasized that cooperation with other U.S. Government agencies and foreign partners remains critical for the success of NNSA’s counterterrorism and counterproliferation efforts.