I’d like to thank the Summit for allowing me this opportunity to represent the Department of Energy and the National Nuclear Security Administration today at the 14th Annual Nuclear Deterrence Summit.  I’d like to thank the Summit’s organizers, and all of you, for your interest in our work.

Today, I would like to discuss three broad topics with you. First, I will share the priorities for the National Nuclear Security Administration.  Second, I would like to bring you up to date on accomplishments, activities, and upcoming challenges in America’s nuclear weapons enterprise.  Finally, I would like to talk about NNSA’s nonproliferation efforts and how these missions are evolving to address a changing geopolitical environment. 

I believe each of these subjects highlights two key points:

First, NNSA faces mission imperatives as difficult as any we’ve ever had. And second, we have the national support and talented workforce in our distributed enterprise to be successful. 

That said, the pace of the on-going mission is challenging. It requires the timely introduction of new ideas and approaches and necessitates the advancement of our culture to place production alongside science in our delivery model. We will need strong partnerships among all stakeholders to succeed with the urgency required.

NNSA Priorities

NNSA priorities today, to a great extent, reflect the increasingly complex geopolitical environment we face.  Regrettably, over the last few years we have seen the end of several international agreements, broader interest among states in nascent nuclear weapon programs, and efforts by nuclear weapons states, especially Russia and China, to expand their programs by deploying more and new kinds of nuclear weapons systems.  However, as a Nation we need to think beyond the gloom and doom and be clear-eyed about developing a response that protects the American people, our allies and partners, as well as sets a good example.  Our response matters to the future of global stability.  It is imperative that we are both responsive and responsible in a multipolar and more aggressive geopolitical environment, and that we redouble our efforts on international cooperation.

As you know, NNSA has the responsibility to design, build, and ensure the safety, security, and reliability of the nation’s nuclear stockpile.  We accomplish this mission today by doing three things in a simultaneous, interconnected fashion.  First -- we have a world-class science program that allows us to certify the stockpile without testing, while also serving as a deterrent in its own right.  Second -- we are actively modernizing weapons to replace systems that are past their design lifetimes.  And third, we are revitalizing our infrastructure both by reestablishing capabilities lost after the Cold War and repairing and modernizing facilities that have degraded over the last 30 years. This infrastructure refurbishment is moving forward in sync with our weapon modernization program but must take advantage of the sea change in manufacturing technologies that has occurred over the past three decades.  That sounds straight-forward, but it is important to remember that the nuclear weapon enterprise is a boutique industry – we produce a reasonably small number of highly classified, integrated systems containing nuclear and other materials that must be handled with the strongest safeguards, safety, and security possible.  While our modernization moves forward, we must be sensitive to the impact on our workforce, our communities, and our environment.

Each of these mission areas – science, weapons, and infrastructure – is making great progress, but much work remains.  Now, all three of these activities alone and certainly in combination, will only succeed if we apply innovative solutions and update and adapt our business delivery model. 

Let me take a few minutes to address one aspect of our model that we’ve begun to study in the interest of shifting to an accelerated delivery model – the Management and Operating contracts.  The M&Os provide about 95% of NNSA’s dedicated workforce.  I think the M&O model is brilliant, and brilliantly American.  The idea of using the best practices in U.S. industry and academia to do government work has been the core of that model from the start. 

Because of the distributed nature of our enterprise, NNSA has the opportunity to have an M&O parent or partnership for each site best suited to that institution’s mission and capabilities.  It is not a one-size-fits-all model.  We also allow, and I strongly encourage, the workforce from our M&Os to contribute to other complex and high priority government missions.  In this way, each of our labs, plants, and sites optimize themselves to deliver for NNSA in the way that best suits them while contributing to the Nation.  The NNSA, as the prime sponsor of these institutions, has a unique responsibility to shepherd our M&Os for their missions and for the Nation.  Since most of these institutions were formally established as M&Os after World War II, this model has now served us exceptionally well for 70 years.  NNSA success is inseparable from the ability of our enterprise to thrive.

That being said, in my view, the philosophy of the M&O contract model has changed over time.  The original concept largely focused on urgent delivery of high quality ideas and products.  National leaders looked to academia and industry to help hire people and manage government missions through a special relationship, and the private sector viewed the contracts as a national service and extension of their responsibilities as American institutions.  However, after the Cold War was over, the M&O model morphed to address concerns of the time – environmental and safety responsibilities, and liabilities.  This model evolved again in the new millennium, focused not so much on hardware delivery but deterrence through capability and national economic strength, with a smaller footprint and less cost. 

However you think about the past, I think we can agree that we now find ourselves in a new era.  An era that includes aspects of its predecessors – safety, environment, economic security, cost effectiveness – with the delivery objective reemerging as an area of emphasis.  Furthermore, the lessons we have learned from those past eras need to be incorporated into our thinking.  Our model must recognize we have moved to a multipolar, globalized economic and military landscape.  So, I think it is appropriate that NNSA deliberatively re-examines our model in light of our priorities and past learnings.  And we have launched a study to do so. 

Finally, on this topic, I want to give a gigantic shout out to the NNSA workforce, and past and present M&O contractors.  Together we have created something special that we will continuously improve.  We all need to have a strong relationship with each other and clear common objectives.

Along with our M&Os, it is also important that NNSA maintains constructive relationships within the Department of Energy, and with external partners in the Department of Defense, the State Department, the White House, Congress, as well as international organizations such as IAEA and CTBTO.  While I can’t comment yet on the FY’23 budget – sorry, no scoops! – I can say that we have had strong support from DOE, the Interagency, and Congress, and we have throughout the process. 

Accomplishments, Activities, and Challenges

Let’s shift to our accomplishments, activities, and challenges. 

In my opinion, it is time to dispel the outdated narrative that NNSA is an organization that fails to deliver on time and on budget.  Thanks to creative ideas and exquisite focus from former and current leaders and workforce, we’ve made great progress.  So let me take time to share highlights.

In science, among other accomplishments, the National Ignition Facility at Lawrence Livermore achieved a major breakthrough in August with an experiment that yielded more than 1.3 megajoules of energy and resulted in a burning plasma state for the first time in any fusion research facility.  Burning plasma is one of the final milestones needed to achieve self-sustaining energy production and occurs when a fusion reaction derives most of its heat from the reaction process itself rather than energy pumped in from the outside.  This success opens up the ability to collect new data relevant for the Stockpile Stewardship Program and puts us closer to achieving ignition, demonstrating how our cutting-edge science programs can aid both our national security and climate goals.

On the weapons side -- in June, we completed the last production unit of the W80-1 Alt 369 warhead for the B-52s’ air launched cruise missile, and in July we completed the first production unit of the W88 Alt 370 warhead for the Navy’s submarine-launched ballistic missile system.  In November, we reached a major milestone with the first production unit for the B61-12 Life Extension Program, which will consolidate and replace most existing B61 variants while improving safety, security, and reliability.  All these projects are the culmination of extensive collaboration across the Nuclear Security Enterprise.

On the infrastructure front, the Uranium Processing Facility at Y-12 is nearing completion despite the unprecedented challenges posed by the COVID pandemic.  This remarkable success of a one-of-a-kind project reflects the dedication of our personnel and the reforms we have instituted for major construction projects.  And of course, we are now focused on our two-site pit production strategy at Los Alamos and Savannah River.  Both Secretary Granholm and I are confident that a two-site plan is the right approach to reach the Nuclear Weapons Council requirement of 80 pits per year.  We have said that we cannot meet the 80 pits per year goal by 2030, and we will work closely with the Department of Defense to develop stockpile strategies that reflect this reality.  Alongside this, the NNSA has developed acceleration strategies to make sure we get to 80 pits per year as close to 2030 as possible.  

Beyond uranium and plutonium, we are excited about a number of other projects at Y-12, Pantex, and other places, aimed at robust production of secondaries, shoring up the explosive supply chain, and securing critical materials.

We have also innovated how we manage smaller construction projects to better align with best industrial practices and increased our utilization of lease-to-own properties that will alleviate some of our administrative office requirements and bring us closer to the communities where we work and live.

Finally, in order to maintain our cutting-edge scientific capabilities, we will begin significant infrastructure investments in science as well.  We are at the early stages of the critical decision process on a new combined radiation environment test facility at Sandia called CREST.  We are also making progress with the Enhanced Capability for Subcritical Experiments facility in Nevada.

Collectively, these projects demand a significant national commitment.  However, they will be invaluable in developing a modern, flexible Enterprise capable of serving as the cornerstone of the nation’s deterrence capabilities well into the future. 

Now let’s step back and look at the big picture in the nuclear weapons enterprise:

  • This year we are celebrating the 30th anniversary of the cessation of underground nuclear explosive testing while maintaining a safe, secure, and reliable stockpile – a true testament to the stockpile stewardship program. 
  • The Navy has life extended W76-1s and will be taking possession of life extended W88 warheads soon.  The low yield W76-2 has been added to their arsenal.  We are also in the early stages of the W93 to augment naval capabilities. 
  • We are refurbishing two weapons for the air-leg of our triad: the B61-12 and the W80-4 for the Long Range Standoff weapon.  Finally, the land-based leg of our triad will receive the modernized W87-1 warhead for the GBSD. 
  • A new Uranium Processing Facility is nearing the completion of construction, a two-site Plutonium strategy will restore our ability to make pits starting in 2023, and there are plans to upgrade much of our enterprise.

Overall, these weapon and infrastructure accomplishments and plans reflect the fact that the Enterprise is shifting focus from legacy maintenance and refurbishment to true modernization.  A refurbishment posture made sense in an environment when the nation was rapidly reducing the number and types of weapons in our stockpile, there were new arms control treaties and agreements, and our weapons and infrastructure had not exceeded their lifespan.

Unfortunately, that is not our environment today.  We can no longer technically justify a refurbishment-only strategy for our weapons and infrastructure, and must replace, not just life-extend, components, subsystems, buildings, and equipment. 

It is critical, however, that our modernization efforts are focused and cost-effective.  We need to clearly define not only the deterrence objectives for the stockpile but also recognize the opportunity this investment has on, for example:

  • Creating systems that are adaptable for any national security environment in the decades to come; easily able to scale up and down;
  • Setting an example of restraint and diplomacy;
  • Honoring the spirit of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty; and
  • Providing flexibility for future decision makers.

This modernization program will place high demands on our workforce and our infrastructure.  The tools developed for stockpile modernization are now required to not only certify but to help optimize weapons that will last for decades.  New manufacturing capacity and innovation is needed as we replace more and more components.

In short, we know that we have to deliver and collectively feel a sense of urgency to do so. 

As a final note on the stockpile, I know there is a lot of curiosity about the ongoing Nuclear Posture Review and how it will affect this work.  I’m sorry, but once again, I’m not going to provide spoilers . . . but I can say that NNSA has been closely involved in the NPR process and we will embrace the policy decisions and are ready to respond.

Nuclear Nonproliferation

Now, as a responsible nuclear power, our obligations extend beyond ensuring the safety, security, and reliability of our own stockpile. Protecting the American people requires both deterrence and a strong commitment to nuclear nonproliferation and arms control. These are the two sides of the nuclear security coin.  NNSA has a duty to advance nuclear nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and counterterrorism.  The NNSA’s primary efforts with respect to nuclear nonproliferation are:

  • Securing nuclear and radiological materials both domestically and around the world;
  • Minimizing and eliminating weapons-usable materials, including replacing nuclear and radiological materials with viable alternatives wherever feasible;
  • Controlling the further spread of proliferation-sensitive materials, technology, and expertise; and
  • Advancing nuclear nonproliferation and arms control concepts and monitoring and verification techniques.

Our nuclear nonproliferation efforts have made significant progress in replacing Highly Enriched Uranium with Low Enriched Uranium for civilian applications, increasing the preparedness to respond and lower the impact of a nuclear incident, and providing increasingly capable space-based sensors to monitor nuclear activities.  However, like so much at NNSA, the defense nuclear nonproliferation mission is evolving.  Emerging technologies such as additive manufacturing, unmanned aerial systems, advanced nuclear reactors, high-powered computing, and artificial intelligence provide opportunities to enhance the nuclear threat reduction mission by harnessing their capabilities to detect nuclear proliferation and aid other missions. Yet these same technologies also introduce new risks, lowering the barrier to proliferation and making it easier for state and non-state actors to pursue nuclear or radiological devices.

Additionally, the Biden administration has two major new initiatives that we need to support.  First, while we continue our nonproliferation mission by securing and minimizing the use of weapons-grade nuclear material, NNSA must examine how best to expand and adapt this mission in support of nuclear power as a method to combat climate change. 

IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi recently visited the NNSA and spoke at our Administrator’s Strategy Forum.  In his remarks he noted that interest in nuclear technology has increased significantly in the last few years, and that as a result the IAEA may have hundreds or even thousands of new facilities to inspect in the coming decades. 

If nuclear energy is part of the solution to the global climate crisis – and I strongly believe that it is – then it is crucial that nonproliferation safeguards and security are baked into the expansion of the global commercial nuclear sector.  This is an area that is getting more of our attention.  It is also crucial that we continue to expand capabilities to respond to nuclear incidents and accidents domestically and abroad that could result from increased nuclear power production.

Second -- the Biden administration seeks to engage in meaningful dialogue with Russia, China, and other nations on a range of emerging military-technological developments that implicate strategic stability, and to restore American leadership in arms control.  One of my goals, therefore, is to ensure NNSA is ready to support 21st century arms control and nonproliferation. 

A new era requires new tools and capabilities, and towards this end, I have launched a strategic review of our Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation.  D-N-N already does excellent work, and this review will ensure our organization is prepared to support arms control and nonproliferation for decades to come.

Conclusion

I would like to conclude by making a personal observation about NNSA.  I have been fortunate to have served in the Nuclear Security Enterprise for nearly four decades. I  joined Sandia National Laboratories as a member of the technical staff in the early eighties and was “present at the creation” of NNSA in 2000.  The Enterprise has been through cycles of changing national priorities, geopolitical shifts, mission drift, and governance reforms.  Today, we find ourselves in another new era and we will rise to the occasion as we have before.

I’m also fortunate that the Biden administration and Congress have provided me with a great senior leadership team, including Principal Deputy Administrator Frank Rose and Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Corey Hinderstein.  I look forward to Dr. Marvin Adams’ confirmation as Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs. 

I’d be remiss if I didn’t take a moment to thank Dr. Charlie Verdon, who has provided critical leadership to Defense Programs and served as acting Administrator at the start of this Administration. I’m grateful – we are all grateful – for Charlie’s contributions.  Indeed, Charlie embodies the highest quality dedication to public service typical of the Enterprise’s 57,000-strong workforce.  Over the past six months it has been reassuring to witness first-hand the professionalism and commitment across the Nuclear Security Enterprise. 

I’m especially proud of NNSA’s contributions in confronting the COVID-19 pandemic.  Despite facing unprecedented personal and professional challenges over the past two years, our workforce has risen to the challenge.  I’m genuinely impressed, not only by the remarkable resilience demonstrated across our Nuclear Security Enterprise, but also by the NNSA scientists who have helped to lead the fight against the virus itself.

It’s for all these reasons I feel confident in our future, and why I am honored to lead the NNSA for the Biden administration under the guidance of Secretary Granholm and Deputy Secretary Turk.  We have a tremendous opportunity to bring science, product, and infrastructure to the next level of innovation and maturity, providing future generations greater flexibility and faster responses.

Thank you again for allowing me the opportunity to speak with you today about these issues that are so important to me, and so important at this moment in time.  I look forward to your questions.