

obtained through the Office of the Secretariat by mail at the above address or by phone at (202) 254-6314.

Other materials submitted by the CME in support of the applications for contract market designation may be available upon request pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552) and the Commission's regulations thereunder (17 CFR part 145 (1987)), except to the extent they are entitled to confidential treatment as set forth in 17 CFR 145.5 and 145.9. Requests for copies of such materials should be made to the FOI, Privacy and Sunshine Act Compliance Staff of the Office of the Secretariat at the Commission's headquarters in accordance with 17 CFR 145.7 and 145.8.

Any person interested in submitting written data, views or arguments on the proposed terms and conditions, or with respect to other materials submitted by the CME, should send such comments to Jean A. Webb, Secretary, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 2033 K Street, NW., Washington, DC 20581 by the specified date.

Issued in Washington, DC, on July 19, 1993.

Gerald D. Gay,
Director.

[FR Doc. 93-17541 Filed 7-22-93; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6351-01-M

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Public Information Collection Requirement Submitted to OMB for Review

AGENCY: DoD.

ACTION: Notice.

The Department of Defense has submitted to OMB for clearance, the following proposal for collection of information under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. chapter 35).

Title, Applicable Form, and OMB Control Number: Police Record Check, DD Form 369, OMB Control No. 0704-0007

Type of Request: Revision

Number of Respondents: 125,000

Responses Per Respondent: 1

Annual Responses: 125,000

Average Burden Per Response: 27 minutes

Annual Burden Hours: 56,250

Needs and Uses: In accordance with 10 U.S.C. 504, 505, and 520(a), applicants for enlistment must be screened to identify any discreditable involvement with police or other law enforcement agencies. This

information collection is used to identify persons who may be undesirable for military service. The DD Form 369, "Police Record Check;" is forwarded to law enforcement agencies to determine if an applicant has a record.

Affected Public: Individuals or households; State or local governments

Frequency: On occasion

Respondent's Obligation: Required to obtain or retain a benefit

OMB Desk Officer: Mr. Edward C. Springer

Written comments and recommendations on the proposed information collection should be sent to Mr. Springer at the Office of Management and Budget, Desk Officer for DoD, room 3235, New Executive Office Building, Washington, DC 20503.

DoD Clearance Officer: Mr. William P. Pearce.

Written requests for copies of the information collection proposal should be sent to Mr. Pearce, WHS/DIOR, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302.

Dated: July 19, 1993.

L.M. Bynum,

Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, Department of Defense.

[FR Doc. 93-17475 Filed 7-22-93; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 5000-04-M

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Revised Notice of Intent to Prepare a Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Reconfiguration of the Nuclear Weapons Complex

AGENCY: Department of Energy.

ACTION: Revised notice of intent (NOI) to prepare a Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for reconfiguration of the nuclear weapons complex.

SUMMARY: Since February 1991, when the Department of Energy (DOE) originally announced its intent to prepare a Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS) for reconfiguring the nuclear weapons complex (56 FR 5590), the nuclear weapons stockpile has been significantly reduced. To illustrate the magnitude of the stockpile reductions, the nation is presently in the process of reducing its nuclear weapons stockpile to approximately 25 percent of levels planned as recently as five years ago. These reductions have prompted a fresh look at, and reevaluation by the Department of, its earlier Reconfiguration proposal, to ensure that

the effects of the historic events which ended the Cold War are taken into account in determining the appropriate configuration of the nation's future nuclear weapons complex. As a result, and pursuant to section 102(2)(C) of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, as amended (42 U.S.C. 4321 *et seq.*) and the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations (40 CFR parts 1500-1508), the DOE is issuing this revised notice of intent (NOI) to prepare a PEIS for reconfiguring its weapons complex.

Based on the reevaluation, the Department is proposing changes in the scope of the Reconfiguration PEIS, most notably:

(1) Addition of consolidated long-term storage facilities for plutonium and highly enriched uranium which will or may be needed in the future to fulfill national security requirements;

(2) Addition of consolidation of functions involving like materials, including the option of integrating certain research, development and testing (RD&T) functions with the storage and processing functions;

(3) Addition of the Nevada Test Site (NTS) in Nevada and deletion of the Hanford Site in Washington as potential sites for future weapons complex facilities; and

(4) Changes in the no-action alternative as a result of recently announced mission changes at weapon complex sites, including transferring the Rocky Flats Plant to a cleanup mission and placing the K-Reactor at the Savannah River Site in cold standby.

These proposed changes in the PEIS scope reflect the fact that the future nuclear weapons complex can be even smaller and more integrated than previously envisioned in the original NOI. The changes also reflect the increased importance associated with stewardship of existing special nuclear materials that will or may be used in the future to meet national security requirements.

On a related matter, prior to the issuance of the original NOI, the Department had announced the preparation of two programmatic environmental impact statements, one concerning the reconfiguration of the nuclear weapons complex, and the second dealing with alternative strategies and policies for conducting the Department's environmental restoration and waste management program. The Department determined at that time that these two programs were not so connected as to require a single environmental impact statement. While the Department is proceeding with this revised Notice of Intent for the

Reconfiguration Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement, it will also be reviewing this initial determination in light of the changed circumstances described in this Notice.

To ensure that the public's concerns and views are fully considered, DOE is affording the public an opportunity to comment on the proposed scope of the Reconfiguration PEIS, and on whether it should be combined with the PEIS on the environmental restoration and waste management program.

DATES: Written comments on the proposed scope of the nuclear weapons complex PEIS are invited from the public. To ensure consideration in preparation of the PEIS, comments must be postmarked by October 29, 1993. Late comments will be considered to the extent practicable.

DOE will hold public scoping meetings beginning in September, 1993 to receive oral comments near all sites proposed to be analyzed in the PEIS. These are: Hanford Site, Idaho Engineering Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Nevada Test Site, Oak Ridge Reservation, Pantex Plant, Rocky Flats Plant, and the Savannah River Site. A meeting will also be held in Washington, DC. DOE will announce the location, date and time for these public meetings in a subsequent **Federal Register** Notice, and in appropriate local media. The announcement of the meetings will be at least 15 days prior to any meetings. The public meetings will provide the public with an opportunity to present formal oral comments and/or written statements, as well as an opportunity to engage in more informal conversations regarding the reconfiguration program with DOE representatives. Additional details regarding the public meetings will be provided in the announcements to be published prior to the meetings. Following this additional scoping period, the Department will issue a revised PEIS Implementation Plan.

ADDRESSES: Written comments on the scope of the PEIS, requests for further information on the DOE nuclear weapons complex reconfiguration program, requests for copies of the revised Reconfiguration PEIS Implementation Plan (when available), and requests for copies of the PEIS or PEIS Executive Summary (when available) should be sent to: Howard Canter, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Office of Weapons Complex Reconfiguration, U.S. Department of Energy, P.O. Box 3417, Alexandria, VA 22302, (202) 586-1300.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For general information on the DOE NEPA review process, please contact: Carol M. Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA Oversight, EH-25, U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20585, (202) 586-4600 or 1-(800)-472-2756.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

Although the national security picture for the United States has changed dramatically, a safe, secure, reliable, and effective nuclear deterrent is central to the security of the United States, and will remain so for the foreseeable future. Therefore, as long as the nation relies on a nuclear deterrent, it is necessary to maintain a nuclear weapons complex that is fully capable of supporting the nuclear deterrent by performing surveillance, evaluation, and maintenance of both the current and future nuclear weapons stockpile. The complex must also be capable of resuming new warhead production if the President authorizes the Department to replace aging weapons, or in response to changes in the international security environment.

Nonetheless, the significant stockpile reductions—coupled with budget reductions which will not support a large, inefficient nuclear weapons complex—dictate that the future weapons complex will undoubtedly look different in form and scope from the existing nuclear weapons complex. Given these realities, the Department must achieve and maintain a fully capable complex that is even smaller, less diverse, and less expensive to operate than that which was contemplated at the time of the original Notice of Intent.

DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex

The DOE nuclear weapons complex is organized into three functional elements: (1) Nuclear Materials Storage, Processing and Component Fabrication; (2) Nonnuclear Manufacturing; and (3) Research, Development and Testing (RD&T). When the original NOI was announced, the complex consisted of 13 major facilities located in 12 states. Due to recently announced mission changes, some functions that were previously performed at particular sites will no longer be performed at those sites. Therefore, the currently functioning nuclear weapons complex is different from that identified in the original NOI. A description of the nuclear weapons capabilities at the sites to be included in the PEIS analysis which support the nuclear and RD&T functional elements

of the weapons complex is provided in Table 1. The environmental analysis of the proposed action and alternatives for consolidation of the nonnuclear functional element of the complex is documented in the separate Nonnuclear Consolidation Environmental Assessment (June, 1993). A proposed Finding of No Significant Impact, based upon this environmental assessment, was published in the **Federal Register** for public review and comment on July 8, 1993, (58 FR 36658).

Table 1.—Current Nuclear Weapons Complex Sites¹

Functional Element: Nuclear Materials Storage, Processing and Component Fabrication Sites

Pantex Plant (Amarillo, Texas)— Provides support, including surveillance and maintenance, of the enduring nuclear weapons stockpile; dismantles nuclear weapons returned from the stockpile; produces chemical high explosive components; assembles, if required, nuclear weapons; provides interim storage for plutonium pits; conducts research, development and testing (RD&T) of high explosives and high explosive components.

Savannah River Site (Aiken, South Carolina)— Provides support for the enduring nuclear weapons stockpile including tritium processing and recycling operations, and tritium reservoir loading; provides interim storage for plutonium.

Y-12 Plant (Oak Ridge, Tennessee)— Provides support for the enduring nuclear weapons stockpile including stockpile evaluation, and limited fabrication capability for uranium and lithium weapons components; recovers and processes uranium and lithium materials from retired weapons; provides interim storage for uranium and lithium.

Rocky Flats Plant (Golden, Colorado)— Currently in transition from a predominantly nuclear weapons production mission to an environmental restoration, cleanup, and waste management mission; provides interim storage for plutonium.

¹ Sites included in this table are only those that deal predominantly with nuclear materials or nuclear components. Four of the sites listed in the original NOI, i.e. Mound, Pinellas, Kansas City and Sandia National Laboratory, are not included in the table because analyses of functions involving these sites were included in the Nonnuclear Consolidation Environmental Assessment. In addition, the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory is not included because, since the publication of the original NOI, it has ceased the chemical processing of naval reactor spent fuel to recover enriched uranium.

Hanford Site (Richland, Washington)—Provides interim storage for plutonium.

Functional Element: Weapons Research, Development and Testing Sites

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (Livermore, California)—Conducts research and development of nuclear warheads; designs and tests advanced technology concepts; maintains weapons design program.

Los Alamos National Laboratory (Los Alamos, New Mexico)—Provides research and development of nuclear warheads; designs and tests advanced technology concepts; maintains weapons design program; provides limited fabrication capability for plutonium components; and provides interim storage for plutonium.

Nevada Test Site (Las Vegas, Nevada)—Conducts underground nuclear testing.

Reconfiguration PEIS History

On February 11, 1991, the DOE published the original NOI to prepare a PEIS for the Reconfiguration of the Nuclear Weapons Complex (56 FR 5590). DOE proposed to develop a comprehensive strategy to accomplish the goal of creating a smaller, less diverse, less costly nuclear weapons complex. At that time, DOE announced that the Reconfiguration PEIS would analyze the environmental consequences of alternative long-term reconfiguration strategies for the DOE nuclear weapons complex, envisioned to be in place early in the 21st century ("Complex 21"), and weigh these against the consequences of maintaining the existing configuration.

In that NOI, two reconfiguration options were proposed: (1) Relocating the nuclear weapons functions then performed at the Rocky Flats Plant (RFP) (Golden, Colorado) to another site; and (2) co-locating nuclear materials production and manufacturing functions assigned to Y-12 (Oak Ridge, Tennessee) and/or Pantex (Amarillo, Texas) with the relocated RFP functions. DOE envisioned that the reconfigured weapons complex would consist of stand-alone facilities for processing and fabricating plutonium and uranium/lithium components, as well as a facility to conduct weapons assembly/disassembly/high explosives activities. The candidate sites considered for the relocation of these functions under either option were the Hanford Site (Richland, Washington), Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (Idaho Falls, Idaho), Savannah River Site (Aiken, South Carolina), Oak Ridge Reservation (Oak Ridge, Tennessee), and Pantex Site

(Amarillo, Texas). Additionally, the PEIS was to include an analysis of alternatives for consolidating nonnuclear manufacturing activities, and consolidating some research, development, and testing (RD&T) functions currently performed at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), and Sandia National Laboratory (SNL).

At the time of that NOI, developing a new source of tritium was of such urgency that decisions concerning the new production reactor (NPR) were believed to be needed in advance of decisions regarding the remainder of the complex. Therefore, the Reconfiguration PEIS was separate from the EIS then being prepared for the NPR program to supply tritium.

Through a public scoping process, which included 15 public scoping meetings from March to August 1991, DOE solicited comments on its reconfiguration proposal. The purpose of the scoping meetings was to receive public comments to assist DOE in preparing an Implementation Plan (IP) describing the scope of the PEIS, including the alternatives to be analyzed, and a schedule for completion. The public comment period ended on September 30, 1991.

On September 27, 1991, President Bush announced an initiative to reduce the Nation's nuclear weapons stockpile. In response to this initiative, the Department announced on November 1, 1991, that it would delay decisions on the new production reactor technology and site and include the environmental analysis for a new tritium production source in the Reconfiguration PEIS. In light of the significantly reduced stockpile, this addition to the Reconfiguration PEIS resulted in the need to evaluate the impacts of "downsized" reactors, reevaluate alternative technologies such as accelerators, and to reevaluate the original reactor siting alternatives. On November 29, 1991, DOE published a notice of opportunity for public comment, incorporating the NPR environmental analysis into the Reconfiguration PEIS (56 FR 60985). This public comment period ended on January 6, 1992.

The September 1991 arms reduction initiative also provided DOE with the opportunity to accelerate the nonnuclear consolidation effort in the weapons complex without impacting national defense or the remainder of the Reconfiguration program. Therefore, in December 1991, the Department announced a proposal to accelerate nonnuclear consolidation, and on January 27, 1992, DOE published a

notice of its plans to prepare a separate environmental assessment (EA) for nonnuclear consolidation within the nuclear weapons complex (57 FR 3046). Further reductions in the stockpile and a cessation of production of new weapons for the immediate future were announced by President Bush in his January 28, 1992, State of the Union message.

On February 19, 1992, DOE issued an Implementation Plan (IP) for the Reconfiguration PEIS (DOE/EIS-01611P). In that IP, DOE proposed alternatives for the Reconfiguration PEIS which would have assessed stand-alone production facilities for plutonium and uranium/lithium components, as well as weapons assembly/disassembly activities. While smaller in capacity than originally envisioned when the Reconfiguration NOI was announced, these stand-alone facilities would still have supported a relatively large stockpile.

Since issuing that IP, an arms reduction agreement between the United States and Russia was announced in June 1992, and was signed by Presidents Bush and Yeltsin in January 1993 as the START II Treaty. This agreement caused the most significant reductions to date in the planned future weapons stockpiles of both nations, and has provided DOE with a historic opportunity to consider a much smaller weapons complex than previously envisioned. Therefore, in the latter part of 1992, the Department determined that it was necessary to reevaluate the Reconfiguration program to ensure that only alternatives which reflected requirements of a greatly downsized nuclear weapons stockpile would be assessed in the PEIS.

Specifically, the Department has been reevaluating: (1) The appropriate sizing for the future weapons complex facilities; (2) the capabilities and functions required for the future complex; (3) the siting alternatives for each weapons function to be analyzed in the PEIS; and (4) the technology alternatives for new tritium supply capacity. This examination of program direction has resulted in several important conclusions, and certain departures from the Department's original planning basis. The overall proposed changes in the PEIS scope are described below.

Major Reconfiguration PEIS Scope Changes

1. Long-term Storage for Special Nuclear Materials

Because a significant number of weapons have been, and will continue

to be, retired from the nation's active nuclear weapons stockpile, the Department proposes to analyze in the PEIS a consolidated long-term storage facility for plutonium and a consolidated facility for highly enriched uranium, to provide safe, secure, and reliable storage for these national assets. A consolidated storage facility for each of these materials would avoid duplicative processing and analytical laboratory capabilities, prevent multiple infrastructure and overhead costs, and preserve the ability to consolidate all functions involving like materials at one site, as described below.

Previously, the stockpile reductions mandated that relatively few weapons would be retired without replacement. Therefore, when the original NOI and IP were prepared, the long-term storage of these materials was not a contemplated mission requirement since disassembled components would be recycled into new weapons. Presently the DOE does not have a consolidated facility to store either plutonium, which is stored at several different sites, or highly enriched uranium, most of which is stored in facilities at Oak Ridge, with small quantities stored at several other sites in the complex. Consolidated storage of plutonium and highly enriched uranium assets would be expected to improve security and accountability associated with these materials, reduce life-cycle storage costs, and eliminate duplicative facilities. There is no proposal to store radioactive wastes at either the plutonium storage facility or the uranium storage facility.

It is the Department's intention that plutonium would be stored in the consolidated long-term storage facility until it is either used in the weapons program or another use or disposition option is proposed and approved in the future. It is expected that the highly enriched uranium (HEU) being returned from retired weapons will eventually be used to provide fuel for reactors requiring HEU, such as those in the nation's nuclear navy.

2. Consolidation of Functions Involving Like Materials

Taking full advantage of the opportunity to restructure and downsize the complex means that activities involving like materials must be consolidated to the maximum extent possible. The Department considers it unreasonable to have plutonium component fabrication at one site, and plutonium storage facilities at a second site, particularly at a time when the Department is trying to downsize the complex and operate more efficiently.

Similar to the rationale for consolidated storage facilities described above, separating these functions would require duplicative processing and analytical laboratory capability at each site, involve needless transportation of nuclear material between sites, and result in duplicative infrastructures and overhead costs. The same rationale applies to uranium storage, processing and component fabrication, and to tritium processing and production. Therefore, the Department proposes that common to all alternatives analyzed in the PEIS would be co-location of all storage, processing, analytical laboratory and fabrication facilities for either plutonium or uranium at the same site in the future weapons complex. Similarly, the Department proposes that tritium processing and tritium production be co-located at a single site. Lastly, the Department intends to analyze the option of integrating some research, development, and testing (RD&T) activities, which historically have been performed in separate facilities at the national laboratories, into proposed weapons complex storage and processing facilities. This is expected to result in maximum utilization of both personnel and the proposed facilities, while also providing significant long-term cost savings by consolidating facilities which utilize like materials.

3. Siting Alternatives for Weapons Functions

Together with the original Notice of Intent, an Invitation for Site Proposals (Invitation) was published (56 FR 5595) which invited parties outside the DOE weapons complex to suggest sites for location of future weapons complex activities. Having received no expressions of interest from outside the DOE weapons complex as a result of the Invitation, a Site Evaluation Panel evaluated five DOE nuclear manufacturing and production sites which met the minimum qualification criteria in the Invitation and recommended in "A Report by the NWCR Site Evaluation Panel," (October, 1991) that all five be considered further as potential sites for future weapons complex functions. The minimum qualification criteria in the Invitation encompassed land, water, and electricity availability as well as the absence of known unacceptable environmental, safety and health impacts associated with siting, constructing, operating and decommissioning the facilities, that could not be mitigated by reasonable measures. Therefore, in the original IP, Hanford, Oak Ridge, Savannah River,

Pantex, and Idaho were identified as reasonable alternative sites for the proposed reconfigured Complex 21 facilities. Based upon its reevaluation of the original proposal, DOE proposes to add the Nevada Test Site (NTS) as a potential site for the Complex 21 facilities. NTS is a large, remote site that meets the minimum qualification criteria against which the other sites were evaluated, and it has a significant existing infrastructure that could accommodate one or more weapons complex functions.

Additionally, the Hanford site has been eliminated as a candidate site for the future complex because nuclear weapons production functions at that site have been terminated, and the site is dedicated to environmental restoration and waste management activities. The Department considers it to be unreasonable to terminate all weapons production missions from the site, spend billions of dollars in order to restore it for other uses, and then reintroduce nuclear weapons program construction and operation activities which will prevent other uses of the site for the long term. The continued commitment to focussing activities on environmental restoration/waste management at Hanford is also consistent with the Secretary's recent reaffirmation of the importance of meeting the Department's cleanup goals at the site.

Regarding new tritium production, the NPR EIS was intended to assess Hanford, Savannah River, and Idaho as reasonable sites. New tritium supply would no longer be considered at Hanford, but would be considered at NTS. In addition, given the much smaller capacity required for tritium production requirements than originally contemplated, the Department has concluded that Oak Ridge constitutes a reasonable alternative site for a new tritium production facility. Further, there appears to be no basis for exclusion of Pantex as a candidate site for a new tritium production facility when it is considered a reasonable site for all other Complex 21 nuclear functions. Therefore, the Department proposes to add Oak Ridge and Pantex to the list of candidate sites for such a facility.

4. No Action Alternative

Since the publication of the original NOI, there have been changes in the current weapons complex status quo that in turn affect the PEIS no-action alternative. Some functions that were previously performed at particular sites are not, or will shortly no longer be, performed in existing facilities at those

sites, and some sites that were previously part of the nuclear weapons complex either have a new mission or a greatly reduced capability. Therefore, if reconfiguration or modification/upgrade of the nuclear weapons complex were not to occur, the complex would be limited in its ability to support the projected future stockpile through the first half of the 21st century, and DOE would not likely be able to meet its Atomic Energy Act responsibilities. More specifically:

(1) The Rocky Flats Plant (RFP) will transition from a production dominated site to an environmental restoration, cleanup, and waste management-dominated site in the near future. The contingency status of the buildings which could be used to manufacture any required new plutonium components will be removed. Therefore, the Department will no longer be capable of manufacturing and fabricating plutonium components at RFP;

(2) The Y-12 plant at Oak Ridge, Tennessee will have reduced capacity and will only be able to provide support for the enduring weapons stockpile and limited component fabrication capability. Y-12 would not maintain the capability to support the projected stockpile requirements.

(3) The K-Reactor at the Savannah River Site will be placed in a cold standby position with no planned provision for restart. This will effectively eliminate the DOE's ability to produce tritium to support the projected stockpile requirements. Future tritium requirements would be supported as long as possible by recycling tritium from weapons returned from the active stockpile. At some point the nuclear deterrent capability of the nation would either be lost or based on weapons which would be significantly different than those in the current stockpile, and which would not meet present mission requirements. Should there be no tritium production capability in the United States, purchase of tritium from foreign sources could be explored, but such purchase possibilities would not constitute an assured supply of tritium for the long term and would thus not represent a reasonable PEIS alternative.

PEIS Alternative

The PEIS will assess the environmental impacts of alternative configurations for both the Nuclear Materials Storage, Processing and Component Fabrication element of the nuclear weapons complex and some Research, Development and Testing (RD&T) elements. In order to accelerate the consolidation of nonnuclear

facilities and thereby achieve significant cost savings while preserving technical competence which is being lost within the weapons complex, the environmental impacts associated with consolidation of the Nonnuclear Manufacturing element of the weapons complex have been assessed in a separate Environmental Assessment. On May 27, 1993, the Department announced that it intended to finalize the Environmental Assessment and publish a proposed Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) for public review and comment. The Environmental Assessment and the proposed FONSI have been approved by the Department and the proposed FONSI was published in the *Federal Register* for public review and comment on July 8, 1993 (58 FR 36658).

a. Alternatives for the Nuclear Materials Storage, Processing and Component Fabrication Element

The Nuclear Materials Storage, Processing and Component Fabrication element of the weapons complex encompasses the following functions:

- (1) Plutonium (Pu): Pu Storage, Processing and Component Fabrication;
- (2) Uranium/Lithium (U/Li): Uranium/Lithium Storage, Processing, and Component Fabrication;
- (3) Assembly/Disassembly/High Explosives (A/D/HE); and
- (4) Tritium Production/Processing.

For each of these functions, the Reconfiguration PEIS will assess three different types of alternatives: (1) Constructing and operating new facilities at any of five alternative sites; (2) modifying/upgrading existing facilities at existing sites; and (3) the no-action alternative of continuing to operate existing facilities. Each of these alternatives is discussed below:

Alternative #1—Constructing and Operating New Facilities

For each of the four Nuclear Materials Production and Storage functions (Pu, U/Li, A/D/HE, and Tritium), the PEIS will assess the environmental impacts of constructing and operating new facilities (referred to as "modules") at any of five alternative sites:

- (1) Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL);
- (2) Savannah River Site (SRS);
- (3) Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR);
- (4) Pantex Site; and
- (5) Nevada Test Site (NTS).

Each functional module would contain those facilities necessary to accomplish the particular function. For example, the Pu module would contain facilities capable of storing Pu, processing Pu, and fabricating Pu

components. Additionally, both the plutonium and uranium functional modules would be designed to accommodate the option of integrating RD&T activities within the module so that these RD&T facilities could be collocated with other facilities involving like materials at a single site if desired.

The PEIS will bracket the potential environmental impacts that could result from constructing and operating the proposed new modules by analyzing each module individually, and by analyzing the total consolidation of all modules, at each alternative site. Thus, for each site alternative, the PEIS will present both an individual analysis for each module and a bounding case analysis for total consolidation of all four modules. The impacts of combinations of two or three functions could be determined by adding the impacts of the individual modules. Such an approach may introduce a small degree of conservatism to the PEIS analysis, but is not expected to result in any significant change in the results of the analysis. In any case, following the PEIS, more detailed site-specific NEPA documentation would be prepared as required to analyze the synergism of any selected combinations at a site. The PEIS will also assess the environmental impacts associated with removing a particular function from an existing site.

For the tritium production function, the PEIS analysis will contain sufficient information to support the selection of a production technology. Four separate alternative technologies will be assessed in the PEIS: Heavy Water Reactor, Light Water Reactor, Modular High Temperature Gas Reactor technologies, and a linear particle accelerator. The PEIS will also contain enough information to support a decision concerning the location of the tritium production function.

Alternative #2—Modifying/Upgrading Existing Facilities

The PEIS will also evaluate a modification/upgrade-in-place alternative. Under this approach, weapons complex functions would not be moved and DOE would make those modifications and upgrades necessary to ensure compliance with Federal, State, and local environmental, safety, and health (ES&H) laws and regulations and meet future nuclear weapon stockpile requirements. The PEIS will provide information on, and an assessment of, the potential environmental impacts associated with these modifications and upgrades. More specifically, the modification/upgrade-in-place alternative for each of the Nuclear Materials Storage, Processing and

Component Fabrication functions encompasses the following elements:

Plutonium Processing and Component Fabrication: Because, as noted above, the Department will no longer be capable of fabricating plutonium components at the Rocky Flats Plant, present research and development facilities at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) would be used to process and fabricate plutonium components for this alternative to support the projected stockpile requirements through the first half of the 21st century. However, in order to satisfy ES&H and projected stockpile production requirements, existing facilities might require modifications. The potential environmental impacts associated with modifying facilities at LANL, and operating the LANL facilities, would be assessed in the PEIS.

Plutonium Storage: Plutonium storage would not be consolidated into a single dedicated Pu storage facility; rather, plutonium storage facilities at RFP, SRS, Pantex, Hanford, and LANL would continue to be utilized to store quantities of plutonium in various forms through the first half of the 21st century. Any upgrades or modifications of these existing facilities required to satisfy ES&H or future storage requirements would be assessed in the PEIS.

Uranium/Lithium Storage, Processing, and Component Fabrication: The potential environmental impacts associated with modifying existing U/Li facilities (mainly at Y-12), and operating those facilities through the first half of the 21st century, would be assessed in the PEIS.

Assembly/Disassembly/High Explosives: The potential environmental impacts associated with modifying facilities at Pantex, and operating the Pantex facilities through the first half of the 21st century, would be assessed in the PEIS. For high explosives work, the alternatives evaluated in the PEIS will include modification of the facilities at LLNL or LANL.

Tritium Supply: There is no modification/upgrade-in-place alternative for tritium supply because it would not be reasonable (either technically or economically) to modify/upgrade the K-Reactor at SRS. Therefore, whether or not

reconfiguration occurs, a new tritium production source would be needed in order for the Department to meet future tritium requirements. As noted previously, purchase of tritium from foreign sources does not constitute a reasonable long-term alternative for tritium supply.

Tritium Processing: The Replacement Tritium Facility (RTF) and other

support facilities at SRS would perform tritium processing as required to support the future stockpile requirements. It is not expected that any modifications of the RTF would be required in order to satisfy ES&H and projected stockpile production requirements; however, other support facilities at SRS might require modifications/upgrades. Therefore, the potential environmental impacts of those modifications, along with the operation of the RTF and those support facilities, would be assessed in the PEIS.

Alternative #3—No-Action (Continued Operation)

Under the no-action alternative, reconfiguration of the nuclear weapons complex would not occur, there would be no upgrades/modifications of existing facilities, and future support of the nuclear weapons stockpile would be provided within the confines of the existing nuclear weapons complex capabilities. Some mission requirements for maintenance of the future weapons stockpile would not be met under the no-action alternative. Therefore, for those mission requirements, the no-action alternative could not be adopted and is not considered to be reasonable. However, the no-action alternative for those mission requirements will be presented in the PEIS to represent a baseline condition against which alternatives that would meet the Department's Atomic Energy Act responsibilities could be compared. This baseline has been affected by the recent developments regarding the Rocky Flats Plant, Y-12 and the K-Reactor which were discussed previously. More specifically, the environmental impacts of utilizing existing facilities will be assessed in the PEIS for the following components of the no-action alternative:

(1) **Plutonium Processing and Component Fabrication:** RFP would no longer be capable of processing and fabricating plutonium components. Existing facilities at LANL and LLNL would provide a limited fabrication capability for future plutonium components. The existing capability at LANL and LLNL would be insufficient to support the projected stockpile requirements.

(2) **Plutonium Storage:** Existing plutonium storage facilities at RFP, SRS, Pantex, Hanford, and LANL would continue to be utilized to store quantities of plutonium in various forms.

(3) **Uranium/Lithium Storage, Processing, and Fabrication:** Existing facilities (mainly at Y-12) would provide uranium/lithium storage, and

limited processing, and component fabricating capability. The existing capability would be insufficient to support the projected stockpile requirements.

(4) **Assembly/Disassembly/High Explosives:** Existing facilities at Pantex would develop and fabricate chemical high explosive components, and assemble and disassemble weapons as required to support the projected stockpile requirements.

(5) **Tritium Production:** DOE would have no capability to produce new tritium to support future stockpile requirements. Future tritium requirements would be supported as long as possible by recycling tritium from weapons returned from the active stockpile. Purchase of tritium from foreign sources could also be explored, but as noted previously would not constitute an assured source of tritium for the long-term and is therefore not a reasonable PEIS alternative. As noted previously, in the absence of a reliable source of tritium, the nation's nuclear deterrent capability would eventually either be lost or would be based upon weapons significantly different from those in the current stockpile and which would not meet present mission requirements.

(6) **Tritium Processing:** The RTF and other support facilities at SRS would perform tritium processing operations as required to support the projected stockpile requirements.

In summary, the PEIS will support a decision to build one or more new functional facilities (modules) at any of five alternative sites, modify/upgrade one or more existing facilities, and continue to operate any of the no-action alternative facilities that could comply with ES&H and mission requirements. The PEIS will assess a full range of alternatives: from no-action (continued operations with existing facilities), to complete consolidation of the entire weapons complex functions at any of the five alternative sites. Additionally, a number of alternatives within this full range would be evaluated, thus affording DOE the opportunity to assess varying degrees of consolidation.

b. Alternatives for the Research, Development, and Testing Element

The weapons complex also performs research, development, and testing (RD&T) related to nuclear weapons design, manufacture, and performance. Much of this RD&T takes place at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). As previously stated, the PEIS will evaluate integrating certain of these RD&T activities, i.e.,

those dealing with the use of special nuclear materials and depleted uranium in weapons manufacture, into the proposed Complex 21 modules. Therefore, the specific alternatives that will be evaluated in the PEIS for RD&T functions are as follows:

Plutonium (Pu) RD&T: Pu RD&T is presently performed at LANL and LLNL. Future Pu RD&T would either be consolidated with the Complex 21 Pu module, consolidated at LANL or remain at the two sites where it is now performed.

Uranium (U) RD&T: U RD&T is presently performed at LANL, LLNL, and Y-12. Future U RD&T would either be consolidated with the Complex 21 U/Li module, consolidated at either LLNL or LANL, or remain at the three sites where it is now performed.

Environmental Issues

The PEIS will identify and analyze direct, indirect, and cumulative impacts resulting from the reconfiguration alternatives, including potential effects from constructing and operating the proposed facilities (i.e., impacts to air quality, water resources, plants and animals, land use, historic resources, archaeological sites, socioeconomic impacts); impacts associated with generating wastes (including radioactive, hazardous and mixed), transporting radioactive, hazardous or mixed materials; and the potential consequences of both normal and accidental radiological and nonradiological releases on public and worker health and safety. The PEIS will examine other relevant issues identified by DOE or the public through the past and current scoping process.

Reconfiguration PEIS Decisions

Following preparation of the final PEIS, DOE will issue a Record of Decision (ROD) to document its decisions on the long-term configuration of the nuclear weapons complex. The ROD will explain how DOE has balanced environmental considerations against other relevant factors, such as economic and technical considerations, and agency statutory mission, in reaching its decision.

Reconfiguration Plan

DOE will use the decisions arising from the PEIS to develop a comprehensive reconfiguration plan to guide DOE in implementing the decisions contained in the ROD. The plan will cover such subjects as identifying schedules for transferring responsibilities from one location to another, upgrading facilities in place or bringing new facilities (if any) on-line.

If necessary, the PEIS and the reconfiguration plan may be supplemented later, if there is a need to change or augment the programmatic decisions.

Classified Material

DOE will review classified material while preparing the PEIS. The amount of classified material contained in the PEIS will be minimized to the extent possible consistent with national security requirements. However, despite the efforts to minimize its use, DOE anticipates that the completed PEIS, and its associated ROD, may include classified material which will not be available for general public review. This material would, however, be considered by DOE in reaching a decision on configuration of the future complex. The ensuing nuclear weapons complex reconfiguration plan would include an unclassified summary document which would be available for public distribution and a classified report which would not be made available to the general public.

Invitation to Comment

DOE invites comments on the scope of this PEIS from all interested parties, including affected Federal, State and local agencies and Indian tribes. DOE solicits comments regarding the scope of the PEIS analysis, suggestions on significant environmental issues, alternatives to be included in the PEIS, and other content.

To ensure consideration in preparing the draft PEIS, written comments must be postmarked by October 29, 1993. Late comments will be considered to the extent practicable. Agencies, organizations, and the general public are invited to present oral comments pertinent to preparation of the PEIS at public scoping meetings. DOE will also accept written material at the meetings. In addition, as discussed previously, there will be opportunities for more informal discussions between members of the public and DOE representatives during the scoping process. Written and oral comments will be given equal weight in the scoping process.

DOE will hold public scoping meetings beginning in September 1993 to receive oral comments near all sites proposed to be analyzed in the PEIS. These are: Hanford Site, Idaho Engineering Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Nevada Test Site, Oak Ridge Reservation, Pantex Plant, Rocky Flats Plant, and the Savannah River Site. A meeting will also be held in Washington, DC. The time, date and location for these

meetings will be announced by DOE in the **Federal Register** in the near future. Notice of the public meetings will be published in the **Federal Register** at least 15 days prior to the holding of each meeting. The meetings also will be publicized in local media and other means as appropriate. Advance registration to provide oral comments at these meetings will be facilitated using an "800 number" that will be provided in the **Federal Register** notice. On-site registration on the day of the meeting will be accommodated to the extent possible.

DOE will prepare transcripts of the scoping meetings and make these available for public review. Subsequent to the scoping meetings, DOE will issue a revised PEIS Implementation Plan to provide up-dated information on how the PEIS will be prepared in light of the scope changes. DOE will announce the availability of the draft PEIS, when completed, in the **Federal Register**, and will solicit public review and comment on the draft PEIS. Comments on the draft will be considered in preparing the final PEIS.

Supporting Documents

The unclassified January, 1991 Reconfiguration Study, the Implementation Plan (February 1992) and Revision (when available), and other unclassified supporting information are available for public review at the DOE public reading rooms listed below.

California

U.S. Department of Energy, San Francisco Operations Office, Public Reading room, 1301 Clay Street, room 700N, Oakland, California 94612-5208, (510) 637-1762

Colorado

U.S. Department of Energy, Rocky Flats Public Reading Room, Front Range Community College Library, 3645 West 12th Avenue, Westminster, Colorado 80030, Attention: Will-ann Lamsens, (303) 469-4435

Florida

U.S. Department of Energy, Public Reading Room, Largo Public Library, 351 East Bay Drive, Largo, Florida 34640, (813) 587-6715

Idaho

U.S. Department of Energy, Idaho Operations Office, Public Reading Room, 1776 Science Center Drive, Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402, (208) 526-9162

Missouri

U.S. Department of Energy, Public Reading Room, Red Bridge Branch, Mid-Continent, Public Library, 11140 Locust Street, Kansas City, Missouri 64137, (816) 942-1780

New Mexico-Albuquerque

U.S. Department of Energy, Public Reading Room, National Atomic Museum, 20358 Wyoming SE., Albuquerque, New Mexico 87185-5400, Attention: Diana Zepeda, (505) 845-6670/4378

New Mexico-Los Alamos

U.S. Department of Energy, Community Reading Room, 1450 Central Avenue, suite 101, Los Alamos, New Mexico 87545, (505) 665-2127

Nevada

U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office, 2753 South Highland Drive, Las Vegas, Nevada 89193, (702) 295-1274

Ohio

U.S. Department of Energy, Miamisburg Library, DOE Public Reading Room, 35 South Fifth Street, Miamisburg, Ohio 45342, (513) 866-1071

South Carolina

U.S. Department of Energy Reading Room, University of South Carolina, Aiken Campus, 171 University Parkway, Aiken, South Carolina 29801, (803) 641-3320

Tennessee

U.S. Department of Energy, Oak Ridge Operations Office, Freedom of Information Officer, 200 Administration Road, room G-209, Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37831, (615) 576-5765

Texas

U.S. Department of Energy Reading Room, Lynn Library/Learning Center, Amarillo College, 2201 South Washington Street, Amarillo, Texas 79109, (806) 371-5400

Washington

U.S. Department of Energy, Public Reading Room, Washington State University, 100 Sprout Road, Richland, Washington 99352, (509) 376-8583

District of Columbia

U.S. Department of Energy, Freedom of Information Reading Room, room 1E-190, Forrestal Building, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20585, (202) 586-6020

For information on the availability of specific documents and hours of operation, please contact the reading rooms at the telephone numbers provided.

Issued in Washington, DC this 20th day of July, 1993.

Peter N. Brush,

Acting Assistant Secretary, Environment, Safety and Health.

[FR Doc. 93-17580 Filed 7-22-93; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6450-01-P

Privacy Act of 1974; Notice to Amend a System of Records

AGENCY: Department of Energy (DOE).

ACTION: Proposed amendment to a system of records.

SUMMARY: In accordance with the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. 552a, DOE is publishing for public comment a revision of an existing system of records, "DOE-19, Accounts Receivable Financial System." The revision establishes new routine uses, increases the number of locations for the system, and updates other information related to the system. The new routine uses permit the disclosure of information maintained in the system of records through computer matching to identify, locate, and collect from the DOE delinquent debtors.

DATES: Any interested party may submit written comments about the proposed revisions. Comments must be received on or before August 23, 1993. Unless DOE receives comments that would dictate otherwise, DOE intends to operate the system as proposed starting August 23, 1993.

ADDRESSES: Comments should be directed to the following address: U.S. Department of Energy, Denise Diggin, Chief, Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts Branch, AD-621, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20585.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Denise Diggin, Chief, Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts Branch, AD-621, U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20585, (202) 586-5955; Helen Sherman, Director, Office of Financial Policy, CR-20, U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20585, (202) 586-4860; or Abel Lopez, Office of General Counsel, GC-43, U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20585, (202) 586-8618.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: DOE proposes to amend its system of records, "DOE-19, Accounts Receivable Financial System," to establish new routine uses, increase the system locations, and update other information. The new routine uses permit the disclosure of information maintained in the system of records: (1) To the Defense Manpower Data Center of the Department of Defense, the United States Postal Service, and other Federal, State, or local agencies for computer matching to identify individuals who are delinquent in debts owed to DOE. (The computer matching will identify and locate individuals who are receiving Federal salaries or benefit payments. DOE will use the information

obtained as a result of the matching to collect the debts under the provisions of the Debt Collection Act of 1982 (Pub. L. 97-365) by voluntary repayment, by administrative offset, or by salary offset procedures.); (2) to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) under 26 U.S.C. 6103(m)(2) to obtain the mailing address of a taxpayer to collect or to compromise a claim by DOE against a taxpayer under 31 U.S.C. 3711, 3717, and 3718; and (3) to the IRS to collect the debt by offset against the debtor's tax refunds under the Federal Tax Refund Offset Program. The specific changes to the record system are set forth below followed by the record system published in its entirety as amended.

Issued in Washington, DC, this 19th day of July, 1993.

Linda G. Sye,

Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Human Resources and Administration.

Amendment**DOE 19****System Name:**

Accounts Receivable Financial System.

CHANGES:**System Location:**

Delete entry and replace with:

System location:

- (1) U.S. Department of Energy (Headquarters), 1000 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20585.
- (2) U.S. Department of Energy, Alaska Power Administration, PO Box 50, Juneau, AK 99802.
- (3) U.S. Department of Energy, Albuquerque Operations Office, PO Box 5400, Albuquerque, NM 87115-5400.
- (4) U.S. Department of Energy, Bonneville Power Administration, PO Box 3627, Portland, OR 97208.
- (5) U.S. Department of Energy, Chicago Operations Office, 9800 South Cass Avenue, Argonne, IL 60439.
- (6) U.S. Department of Energy, Fernald Field Office, PO Box 398705, Cincinnati, OH 45239-8705.
- (7) U.S. Department of Energy, Idaho Operations Office, 785 DOE Place, Idaho Falls, ID 83402.
- (8) U.S. Department of Energy, Morgantown Energy Technology Center, PO Box 880, 3610 Collins Ferry Road, Morgantown, WV 26507-0880.
- (9) U.S. Department of Energy, Naval Petroleum Reserves in California, PO Box 11, Tupman, CA 93276.
- (10) U.S. Department of Energy, Naval Petroleum and Oil Shale Reserves, 800 Werner Court, Suite 342, Casper, WY 82601.