Final Environmental Assessment of Proposed Changes for Analytical Chemistry and Materials Characterization at the Radiological Laboratory/Utility/Office Building, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico

July 2018
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# Acronyms and Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>analytical chemistry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALARA</td>
<td>as low as reasonably achievable</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARF</td>
<td>airborne release fraction</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEQ</td>
<td>Council on Environmental Quality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFR</td>
<td>Code of Federal Regulations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH-TRU</td>
<td>contact-handled transuranic</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMR</td>
<td>Chemistry and Metallurgy Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMRR</td>
<td>Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Building Replacement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMRR-NF</td>
<td>Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Building Replacement Nuclear Facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DD&amp;D</td>
<td>decontamination, decommissioning, and demolition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DNFSB</td>
<td>Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOE</td>
<td>U.S. Department of Energy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DR</td>
<td>damage ratio</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSA</td>
<td>documented safety analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>EA</td>
<td>environmental assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>EIS</td>
<td>environmental impact statement</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPA</td>
<td>U.S. Environmental Protection Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGR</td>
<td>Federal Guidance Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FONSI</td>
<td>Finding of No Significant Impact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>Federal Register</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTE</td>
<td>full-time equivalent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY</td>
<td>fiscal year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GTCC</td>
<td>greater-than-Class C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEPA</td>
<td>high-efficiency particulate air</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HVAC</td>
<td>heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRP</td>
<td>International Commission on Radiation Protection</td>
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<tr>
<td>LANL</td>
<td>Los Alamos National Laboratory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LANSCE</td>
<td>Los Alamos Neutron Science Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCF</td>
<td>latent cancer fatality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEED</td>
<td>Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPF</td>
<td>leak path factor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LLW</td>
<td>low-level radioactive waste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAR</td>
<td>material at risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MC</td>
<td>materials characterization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDA</td>
<td>material disposal areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEI</td>
<td>maximally exposed individual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLLW</td>
<td>mixed low-level radioactive waste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOX</td>
<td>mixed oxide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAAQS</td>
<td>National Ambient Air Quality Standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEPA</td>
<td>National Environmental Policy Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NNSA</td>
<td>National Nuclear Security Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>NNSS</td>
<td>Nevada National Security Site</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSHA</td>
<td>Occupational Safety and Health Administration</td>
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SUMMARY

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has prepared this environmental assessment (EA) in compliance with: (1) Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations (Title 40 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Parts 1500 through 1508 [40 CFR Parts 1500–1508]); (2) DOE’s National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) implementing procedures at 10 CFR Part 1021; and (3) other applicable Federal statutes. In accordance with 40 CFR 1508.9(a) and 10 CFR 1021.321(b), this EA is intended to provide sufficient evidence and analysis to determine whether to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) or to issue a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) for the Proposed Action.

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has a need for enduring analytical chemistry (AC) and materials characterization (MC) capabilities at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). The Chemistry and Metallurgy Research (CMR) Building in LANL’s Technical Area (TA)-3, where AC and MC operations have historically occurred, cannot be operated to the full extent needed for these operations (DOE 2003b). In 2015, NNSA issued the Supplement Analysis, Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Building Replacement Project at Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico (2015 CMRR SA) (DOE/EIS-0350-S-2) (DOE 2015a), which evaluated the environmental impacts of performing AC and MC operations at two existing LANL facilities in TA-55. One facility is the existing Hazard Category 2 Plutonium Facility, Building 4 (PF-4), and the second is the Radiological Laboratory/Utility/Office Building (RLUOB). RLUOB, for which construction was completed in 2011, contains laboratory and office space, training and operations centers, and an incident command center. Because changes to the programs performed in PF-4 enabled repurposing of laboratory space at PF-4 to support AC and MC operations, and because up to 38.6 grams of plutonium-239 equivalent (PuE)1 are now permitted in a Radiological Facility such as RLUOB due to changes in radiation dosimetry and accident release fractions, it became possible to provide AC and MC capabilities using a combination of laboratory space already available in RLUOB and space to be made available in PF-4.

DOE prepared this EA because NNSA has now identified the potential to recategorize RLUOB from a Radiological Facility to a Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility, with an increased material-at-risk (MAR) limit of 400 grams PuE (15 percent of the 2,610 grams of PuE allowed in a Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility), which would allow certain laboratory capabilities previously planned for PF-4 to be installed in RLUOB. As a result, fewer modifications to PF-4 would be required, while additional modifications would be made to RLUOB. Modifications to PF-4 and RLUOB would not require changes to the structure of either facility. NNSA therefore prepared this EA to evaluate: (1) a Proposed Action Alternative reflecting recategorization of RLUOB to a MAR-limited Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility, with more AC and MC operations at RLUOB than those evaluated in the 2015 CMRR SA, and (2) a No Action Alternative that maintains RLUOB as a Radiological Facility, as evaluated in the 2015 CMRR SA. Eight to ten years would be required for facility modifications under the Proposed Action Alternative, while seven to nine years would be required under the No Action Alternative.

To evaluate the potential environmental consequences from implementing these alternatives, a screening analysis was performed on all resource areas. For the following resource areas, environmental impacts were determined to be minimal and were not evaluated in detail: land use, geology and soils, water.

1 Because the threshold quantity (TQ) for plutonium-239 in a Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility was changed from 8.4 grams to 38.6 grams, up to (but not equaling or exceeding) 38.6 grams of plutonium-239 can be currently handled within a Radiological Facility. This change in the TQ is a function of an enhanced understanding of dosimetry and revised accident release fractions. That is, the health risk associated with 8.4 grams of plutonium-239, as calculated using the previous dosimetry and accident release fractions, yields the same health risk as 38.6 grams of plutonium-239, as calculated using the updated dosimetry and accident release fractions.
resources, biological resources, cultural resources, air quality and climate, visual resources and noise, infrastructure, and socioeconomics. The resource areas of public interest (i.e., human health, facility accidents, waste management, transportation, and environmental justice) were evaluated in more detail in this EA. Information from the analyses is summarized below:

- Under both alternatives, no radiation doses or risks are expected among members of the public due to modifications at PF-4 and RLUOB. The radiation doses received by members of the public during operations would be compliant with regulatory requirements and slightly smaller under the Proposed Action Alternative than those under the No Action Alternative. Under both alternatives, no latent cancer fatalities (LCFs) are expected among the population within 50 miles of RLUOB or PF-4. The annual risk of a maximally exposed individual (MEI) sustaining an LCF is about 5x10^-8 (1 chance in 20 million of an LCF) under the Proposed Action Alternative and 1x10^-7 (1 chance in 10 million of an LCF) under the No Action Alternative. The annual risk of an average individual in the population within 50 miles of RLUOB or PF-4 is about 1x10^-9 (1 chance in 1 billion of an LCF). All radiation doses to members of the public would be far smaller than the radiation doses received from natural background radiation.

- Under both alternatives, involved workers would receive radiation exposures during facility modifications, arising primarily from activities at PF-4. The annual average individual dose received by these workers (300 millirem) would be approximately the same under both alternatives. The total dose received by involved workers for PF-4 modifications would be about 200 person-rem under the Proposed Action Alternative or 253 person-rem under the No Action Alternative. No LCFs are expected among the involved worker population under either alternative (calculated values are 0.2 LCF or less).

- Under both alternatives, an average involved worker at PF-4 would receive an annual dose of about 170 millirem during operations, while an average involved worker at RLUOB would receive an annual dose of about 10 millirem. At both facilities, the annual dose that would be received by an average involved worker is much less than DOE’s dose limit in 10 CFR Part 835 for radiation workers of 5,000 millirem in a year and less than the administrative dose limit for LANL activities of 500 millirem in a year. The collective annual radiation dose received by involved workers during operations would be smaller under the Proposed Action Alternative than that under the No Action Alternative (9.5 versus 11 person-rem). No annual LCFs are expected among the involved workers under either alternative (calculated values are 7x10^-3 or less).

- Neither alternative would materially change risks from potential accidents at PF-4 because the PF-4 MAR and the types of accidents that could occur would not change for either alternative. Accident risks at RLUOB could increase under the Proposed Action Alternative relative to the No Action Alternative, but the risks under both alternatives would be small. None of the accidents evaluated...
Summary

for either alternative would result in an LCF in the population within 50 miles of RLUOB; similarly, none of the accidents evaluated for either alternative is expected to result in an LCF to an MEI or onsite noninvolved worker (that is, the risk of an LCF is much less than 1). The potential accident with the largest risks is a seismic-induced spill and fire under the Proposed Action Alternative. For this accident, no LCFs are expected in the population within 50 miles of RLUOB (calculated value: $2 \times 10^3$ LCF). The risk of an LCF to the MEI is about $2 \times 10^8$ (1 chance in about 50 million of an LCF), while the risk of an LCF to the onsite noninvolved worker is about $4 \times 10^8$ (1 chance in 25 million of an LCF).

- Under both alternatives, accident risks due to ongoing AC and MC operations in the CMR Building and transfer of material between the CMR Building in TA-3 and facilities in TA-55 would be eliminated because operations in the CMR Building would cease, and materials would not be shipped between the CMR Building and TA-55. Overall, NNSA expects that moving AC and MC operations from the CMR Building to RLUOB and PF-4 in TA-55 would lower accident risks.

- Under both alternatives, modifications to RLUOB and PF-4 would generate transuranic (TRU) waste, low-level radioactive waste (LLW), and mixed low-level radioactive waste (MLLW) in comparable quantities. Under the Proposed Action Alternative, a total of 3,030 cubic feet of TRU waste, 4,760 cubic feet of LLW, and 3,460 cubic feet of MLLW would be generated during modifications at PF-4 and RLUOB. Under the No Action Alternative, TRU waste, LLW, and MLLW generation during modifications at PF-4 and RLUOB would be larger than that for the Proposed Action Alternative by about 16 percent, 29 percent, and 57 percent, respectively. Under both alternatives, AC and MC operations would (conservatively) annually generate about 2,370 cubic feet of TRU waste, 71,280 cubic feet of LLW, and 700 cubic feet of MLLW. Facility modifications and AC and MC operations would also generate small quantities of hazardous (or other chemical) waste, nonhazardous waste, and sanitary waste.

- Under both alternatives, TRU waste from facility modifications and operations would be safely stored pending shipment to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) near Carlsbad, New Mexico. Under the Proposed Action and No Action Alternatives, the TRU waste quantities would represent about 0.4 percent and 0.5 percent, respectively, of the WIPP unsubscribed disposal capacity for contact-handled TRU waste. Under both alternatives, LLW, MLLW, and chemical waste generated from facility modifications and AC and MC operations would be shipped to offsite treatment or disposal facilities. Nonhazardous waste would be shipped to offsite facilities for recycle or disposal. Ample offsite treatment or disposal capacity exists for all wastes.

- Under both alternatives, transport of radioactive waste from facility modifications to offsite facilities would not result in an LCF among the transport crew or populations along the transport route. Assuming an individual member of the public was exposed under incident-free transport conditions to radiation emitted from all radioactive waste shipments, that individual would sustain under both alternatives a maximum risk of about $3 \times 10^9$, or 1 chance in about 330 million of an LCF. Assuming a maximum reasonably foreseeable accident occurred (one with an annual probability of a severe accident larger than 1 in 10 million), no LCFs are expected among the population affected by the accident, and the risk to the MEI would be about $5 \times 10^6$, or 1 chance in 200,000 of an LCF.

- Under both alternatives, transport of radioactive waste from AC and MC operations to offsite facilities would not result in an annual LCF among the transport crew or populations along the transport route. Assuming an individual member of the public was exposed under incident-free transport conditions to radiation from all radioactive waste shipments, that individual would sustain

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2 The analysis of TRU waste management in this section includes mixed TRU waste. All TRU waste generated under the EA alternatives would be contact-handled TRU waste.
an annual risk of about $8 \times 10^{-9}$, or 1 chance in about 125 million of an LCF. The maximum reasonably foreseeable accident would be the same as analyzed for transport of radioactive waste from facility modifications.

- Under both alternatives, radioactive emissions to the air from AC and MC operations would result in no disproportionately high and adverse effects on minorities or low-income populations within 50 miles of RLUOB or PF-4. Annual radiation doses to an individual hypothetically located at the nearest boundary of the Pueblo de San Ildefonso or Santa Clara Pueblo would be smaller than the doses calculated for the MEI, who would be located much closer to RLUOB or PF-4 than the pueblo boundaries. Thus, there would be no disproportionately high and adverse effects on the hypothetical maximally exposed Native American individuals.

- The actions evaluated in this EA would produce little or no impacts and therefore, the actions evaluated in this EA would not substantially contribute to cumulative impacts.

DOE solicited comments on the Draft EA during a 60-day public comment period. The Draft EA was available on the DOE NEPA website (https://energy.gov/node/2501991). In addition, copies of the Draft EA were made available to the State of New Mexico and the four accord Native American Tribal Governments and were placed in the local DOE reading room. All comments on the Draft EA were considered by NNSA when preparing the Final EA. Appendix C of this Final EA includes a summary of the comments received on the Draft EA, as well as NNSA’s response to the comments.
1.0 INTRODUCTION

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), has prepared this Final Environmental Assessment of Proposed Changes for Analytical Chemistry and Materials Characterization at the Radiological Laboratory/Utility/Office Building, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico. This environmental assessment (EA) evaluates the potential environmental impacts of recategorizing the Radiological Laboratory/Utility/Office Building (RLUOB) at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) to a material-at-risk (MAR)-limited, Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility. RLUOB is currently approved to operate as a Radiological Facility, i.e., a facility that does not meet the threshold criteria of a Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility, but still possesses radioactive material. Under the Proposed Action, DOE/NNSA would add capabilities at RLUOB and conduct a broader range of analytical chemistry (AC) and materials characterization (MC) analyses in the facility (see text box). The Proposed Action would maximize use of RLUOB laboratory space for AC and MC operations and reduce the amount of space required in the existing Hazard Category 2 Plutonium Facility, Building 4 (PF-4), for these operations, compared to the scenarios analyzed in the 2015 Supplement Analysis, Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Building Replacement Project at Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico (2015 CMRR SA) (DOE/EIS-0350-SA-2) (DOE 2015a).

### Analytical Chemistry and Materials Characterization

AC involves the study, evaluation, and analysis of materials. In general terms, AC is a branch of chemistry that addresses the separation, identification, and determination of the components in a sample. Examples of sample analysis activities include assay and determination of isotopic ratios of plutonium, uranium, and other radioactive materials, as well as identification of major and trace elements in materials; the content of gases; constituents at the surfaces of various materials; and methods to characterize waste constituents in hazardous and radioactive materials. MC relates to the measurement of basic material properties and the changes in those properties as a function of temperature, pressure, or other factors. AC and MC operations support actinide research and development capabilities and NNSA strategic objectives for stockpile stewardship and management at LANL and other sites across the DOE Complex.

DOE has prepared this EA in compliance with: (1) Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations (Title 40 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Parts 1500 through 1508 [40 CFR Parts 1500–1508]); (2) DOE’s National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) implementing procedures at 10 CFR Part 1021; and (3) other applicable Federal statutes. In accordance with 40 CFR 1508.9(a) and 10 CFR 1021.321(b), this EA is intended to provide sufficient evidence and analysis to determine whether to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) or to issue a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) for the Proposed Action.

1.1 Background

LANL is a multidisciplinary, multipurpose Federal laboratory that is primarily engaged in theoretical and experimental research and development activities and has limited responsibility for manufacturing nuclear weapons components. In addition to work supporting the missions of DOE and NNSA, LANL conducts work for other Federal agencies, such as the Department of Defense, as well as for university programs, institutions, and corporate entities.4

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3 MAR is the amount of radionuclides in grams or curies of activity that is available for release when acted upon by a given physical insult, stress, or accident.

4 Refer to the Final Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement for Continued Operation of Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico (DOE 2008a) for detailed information about LANL and its environmental setting, the missions of DOE and NNSA at LANL, and the activities performed at the site.
LANL is located in northern New Mexico, within Los Alamos County, which contains the two primary residential areas of Los Alamos and White Rock (Figure 1). It is about 60 miles north-northeast of Albuquerque, New Mexico, and about 25 miles northwest of Santa Fe, New Mexico. LANL occupies about 40 square miles of land on the eastern flank of the Jemez Mountains along the Pajarito Plateau. LANL is bordered by the Santa Fe National Forest to the north, west, and southeast; Bandelier National Monument to the east and southwest; and San Ildefonso Pueblo lands to the east. The terrain in this area of New Mexico generally consists of mesa tops and canyon bottoms trending in a west-to-east manner, with the canyons intersecting the Rio Grande to the east. The LANL site primarily consists of undeveloped grassland, shrubland, woodland, and forest. LANL operations are conducted within numerous facilities within Technical Areas (TAs), which are geographically distinct administrative units established for control of LANL operations. Figure 2 shows the 47 contiguous TAs that comprise LANL.

AC and MC are fundamental capabilities required for the research and development support of DOE and NNSA missions at LANL (DOE 2003b). AC and MC capabilities have been available at LANL for the entire history of the site since the mid-1940s, generally at the CMR Building, and these capabilities remain critical to future work at the site. The CMR Building’s nuclear operations and capabilities are restricted to maintain compliance with safety requirements (DOE 2003b). The building is not and cannot be operated to the full extent needed to meet future AC and MC operational requirements. This situation compels the need to consider actions to ensure the performance of all required AC and MC operations.

As part of ensuring a continuing capability for AC and MC operations, DOE/NNSA issued the 2015 CMRR SA (DOE 2015a), which evaluated the environmental impacts of performing AC and MC operations at two existing LANL facilities in TA-55. One facility is the Hazard Category 2 PF-4, and the second is RLUOB, which contains laboratory and office space, training and operations centers, and an incident command center. This approach for ensuring continued AC and MC operations at LANL became viable because of changes made to the programs to be performed in PF-4, which enabled repurposing of laboratory space at PF-4 to support additional AC and MC operations. Furthermore, a Radiological Facility can currently possess up to 38.6 grams of plutonium-239 equivalent (PuE)\(^5\), based on supplemental guidance issued by NNSA (NNSA 2014) on the classification of nuclear facilities that considered updated radiological parameters and analyses (see the text box on page 5 and Chapter 2, Section 2.1). It thus became possible to provide AC and MC capabilities using a combination of laboratory space in TA-55 buildings: space that is already available in RLUOB and space to be made available in PF-4. NNSA proposed this modified approach for ensuring continued AC and MC capabilities and evaluated the environmental consequences of this modification in the 2015 CMRR SA.

After further study and evaluation, NNSA has now identified a Proposed Action that would improve the use of laboratory space in TA-55. The Proposed Action would recategorize RLUOB from a Radiological Facility to a Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility with a limit on its MAR of 400 grams PuE (15 percent of the 2,610 grams of PuE allowed in a Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility). This would allow certain laboratory capabilities previously planned for PF-4 to be performed in RLUOB instead. Consequently, not as much space in PF-4 would be converted to AC and MC laboratory space. Fewer modifications to PF-4 would be required, with less generation of radioactive waste and fewer radiological exposures to workers performing the modifications. In contrast, the work to further modify RLUOB and install additional enclosures and equipment for the AC and MC work would occur in radiologically clean areas. Implementing the Proposed Action would not require changes to the structure of any TA-55 facility.

\(^5\) For some facilities, the exact quantities of MAR, as well as the isotopic composition of some forms of plutonium, are sensitive from a security perspective. Many safety analyses have adopted the strategy of using a convenient surrogate, PuE, for the actual quantities, forms, and isotopic composition of the materials. PuE refers to quantities of different radionuclides on a common health-risk basis. The mass or radioactivity of other radionuclides is expressed in terms of the amount of plutonium-239 that would result in the same committed effective dose upon inhalation.
Figure 1. Location of Los Alamos National Laboratory
Figure 2. Identification and Location of Technical Areas Comprising Los Alamos National Laboratory
1.2 Purpose and Need for Agency Action

The purpose and need for NNSA action, which has not changed since the 2003 issuance of the Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Building Replacement Project at Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico (CMRR EIS) (DOE/EIS-0350) (DOE 2003b), is to provide the physical means for accommodating continued AC and MC operations at LANL in a safe, secure, and environmentally sound manner that consolidates like activities (DOE 2003b).

Consolidation of like activities enhances operational efficiency in terms of security, support, and risk reduction related to handling and transportation of nuclear materials.

1.3 Proposed Action

NNSA proposes to modify RLUOB to enable its operation as a MAR-limited, Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility, rather than a Radiological Facility, and to perform more AC and MC operations at RLUOB than the level evaluated in prior NEPA documentation. Consequently, NNSA would make fewer modifications to PF-4 (a Hazard Category 2 Nuclear Facility) and perform fewer AC and MC operations at PF-4 than those previously evaluated. Refer to Chapter 2, Section 2.1, to review the transition from DOE’s decision to replace the CMR Building with RLUOB and the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Building Replacement (CMRR) Nuclear Facility (CMRR-NF) to the Proposed Action to operate RLUOB as a MAR-limited Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility.

1.4 Scope of the Environmental Assessment

This EA evaluates two alternatives: (1) a Proposed Action Alternative reflecting a recategorization of RLUOB to a MAR-limited Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility, with more AC and MC operations conducted at RLUOB and fewer activities performed at PF-4 than those evaluated in the 2015 CMRR SA (DOE 2015a), and (2) a No Action Alternative that would maintain RLUOB as a Radiological Facility.
with AC and MC operations at RLUOB and PF-4 remaining consistent with those evaluated in the 2015 CMRR SA.\(^6\)

### 1.5 Related NEPA Documentation

The analysis in this EA relies in part on previous NEPA analyses that evaluated potential environmental impacts at LANL. This section provides a summary of NEPA documents related to the Proposed Action in this EA. A more detailed discussion of past plans and events that led to the current Proposed Action is presented in Chapter 2, Section 2.1.

In 2003, DOE prepared the *CMRR EIS* (DOE 2003b), which evaluated alternatives for replacing the AC and MC capabilities provided in the CMR Building. The CMRR project was to provide the physical means for conducting mission-critical CMR capabilities, to consolidate like activities for operational efficiency, and to potentially provide extra space for future modifications – for example, space for handling large vessels used to contain dynamic experiments (i.e., experiments that advance the understanding of the behavior of nuclear material subjected to extreme physical conditions). DOE subsequently issued a Record of Decision (ROD) (69 Federal Register [FR] 6967) for constructing and operating a two-building replacement for the CMR Building to be located in TA-55. These buildings were to consist of: (1) a building housing offices, classrooms, laboratories, and other facilities (now called RLUOB); and (2) a nuclear facility (CMRR-NF) housing Hazard Category 2 nuclear operations. RLUOB was constructed and is in operation; however, construction of CMRR-NF was initially delayed and subsequently cancelled (see below).

In January 2005, NNSA issued the Supplement Analysis, *Environmental Impact Statement for the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Building Replacement (CMRR) Project at Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico, Changes to the Location of the CMRR Facility Components (DOE/EIS-0350-SA-01)* (DOE 2005). This supplement analysis (SA) evaluated the environmental impacts of changes to the first phase of the CMRR project by constructing the building now called RLUOB at one of two possible locations, which differed slightly from the locations evaluated in the *CMRR EIS*; one evaluated location was south of the intersection of Pajarito Road and Pecos Drive; the second was north of Pajarito Road. RLUOB was ultimately built at the location north of Pajarito Road.

In May 2008, NNSA issued the *Final Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement for Continued Operation of Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico (LANL SWEIS)* (DOE/EIS-0380) (DOE 2008a). The *LANL SWEIS* evaluated the potential environmental impacts from ongoing LANL operations and new activities, including a TA-55 Refurbishment (now called TA-55 Reinvestment) Project,\(^7\) as well as an analysis of support activities related to construction of the CMRR project in addition to those evaluated in the *CMRR EIS* (DOE 2003b). The *LANL SWEIS* (DOE 2008a) stated that, although planning for RLUOB was complete, construction was underway, and planning for CMRR-NF had been initiated, CMRR-NF construction would not begin until NNSA had completed a programmatic NEPA document and made a decision on the organization of NNSA’s nuclear enterprise. Following the 2008 publication of the *Final Complex Transformation Supplemental Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (Complex Transformation SPEIS)* (DOE/EIS-0236-S4) (DOE 2008b), NNSA issued two RODs (73 FR 77644, 73 FR 77656) that included decisions to retain plutonium operations at LANL and to proceed with construction and operation of CMRR-NF. In RODs for the *LANL SWEIS* (73 FR 55833, 74 FR 33232), NNSA selected the No Action Alternative, including construction and operation of the

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\(^6\) The analyses in this EA depend in part on other NEPA analyses prepared by DOE which are incorporated by reference into this EA and are listed in Appendix B.

\(^7\) The TA-55 Reinvestment Project consists of a number of subprojects, including removal, replacement, and/or upgrade of gloveboxes, stands, chillers and coolers, air dryers, criticality safety alarm systems, confinement doors, stack monitors, uninterruptable power supplies, and fire alarm systems. Although most of the subprojects would occur indoors, implementation of several subprojects was expected to involve varying degrees of land-disturbing activities, including construction of accessory structures or additions to existing structures (DOE 2008a).
CMRR project and the additional support activities evaluated under that alternative. NNSA also decided to implement the TA-55 Reinvestment Project to replace or upgrade obsolete or worn-out facility components and safety systems.

In 2011, NNSA issued the *Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement for the Nuclear Facility Portion of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Building Replacement Project at Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico (CMRR-NF SEIS)* (DOE/EIS-0350-S1) (DOE 2011c), which evaluated the potential environmental impacts from revised alternatives for constructing and operating the CMRR-NF and from ancillary projects that had been proposed since publication of the *CMRR EIS*. In an October 18, 2011, amended ROD (76 FR 64344), NNSA selected the Modified CMRR-NF Alternative for constructing and operating the CMRR-NF portion of the CMRR project.

After publication of the *CMRR-NF SEIS* ROD, NNSA first announced a delay in construction of the CMRR-NF (DOE 2012a) and then cancelled it in the 2016 budget request (DOE 2015b). In this same timeframe, other changes occurred that affected the options available to NNSA for providing needed AC and MC capabilities.

In January 2015, NNSA issued the *2015 CMRR SA* (DOE 2015a), which addressed proposed modifications to NNSA’s approach for ensuring AC and MC capabilities at LANL by performing AC and MC work in RLUOB and in space to be made available at PF-4. Under these modifications, RLUOB would continue to operate as a Radiological Facility, but with an increased allowable quantity of actinides such as plutonium-239. NNSA determined that no additional NEPA documentation was needed to implement this modified approach.

1.6 Public Involvement

Given the level of public interest in NNSA’s continuing efforts to consolidate AC and MC operations at LANL’s TA-55, DOE solicited comments on the Draft EA during a 60-day public comment period. The Draft EA was available electronically on the DOE NEPA website (https://energy.gov/node/2501991). In addition, copies of the Draft EA were made available to the State of New Mexico and the governments of four accord Native American tribes, and were placed in the following DOE public reading room:

Los Alamos National Laboratory Reading Room
94 Cities of Gold Road
Pojoaque, NM 87501
(505) 667-0216

Notification of the availability of the Draft EA for review and comment was provided on the LANL website and in newspapers in the vicinity of LANL.

All comments on the Draft EA provided within the 60-day comment period, beginning on the date of the public notice of availability, were considered by NNSA as part of the preparation of this Final EA. This Final EA includes as Appendix C, Comment Response Document, a summary of the comments received on the Draft EA, as well as NNSA’s response to the comments. This Final EA is available on the DOE NEPA website (address provided above), and copies have been provided to the State of New Mexico and to the four accord pueblo governments, and placed in the DOE Reading Room at the location indicated above.

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8 DOE has cooperative agreements (accords) with the Santa Clara Pueblo, Pueblo de Cochiti, Pueblo of Jemez, and Pueblo de San Ildefonso to develop and maintain environmental monitoring programs.
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Chapter 2 – Project Background and Evolution

2.0 PROJECT BACKGROUND AND EVOLUTION

2.1 Changes to the CMRR Project

As discussed in Chapter 1, Section 1.1, although NNSA’s AC and MC operations in support of stockpile stewardship have been performed at the CMR Building in TA-3 since the 1950s, the capabilities of and operations at the CMR Building are restricted due to safety constraints related mainly to the age of the facility. Consequently, DOE evaluated alternatives for replacing the CMR Building in the 2003 CMRR EIS (DOE 2003b), and issued a ROD (69 FR 6967; February 12, 2004) for constructing and operating the CMRR Facility in TA-55, consisting of RLUOB and the CMRR-NF, a Hazard Category 2 Nuclear Facility (see Section 1.5). Constructed and in operation, RLUOB is categorized as a Radiological Facility capable of handling less-than-Hazard Category 3 radioactive material, even though it was designed and constructed to more stringent requirements than those necessary for a Radiological Facility (see Section 2.3.1). As a Radiological Facility under DOE guidance at the time of the CMRR EIS, RLUOB was authorized to house up to (but not to equal or exceed) 8.4 grams PuE.

DOE evaluated additional alternatives for constructing and operating the CMRR-NF in the 2011 CMRR-NF SEIS (DOE 2011c); in an amended ROD (76 FR 64344; October 18, 2011), DOE selected the Modified CMRR-NF Alternative for constructing and operating CMRR-NF. In addition to alternatives evaluated in detail, the CMRR-NF SEIS considered alternatives that were determined not to be reasonable and thus were not carried forward and evaluated in detail, including upgrades to the CMR Building and an alternative whereby AC and MC capabilities would be distributed among multiple LANL facilities. To implement the latter alternative, a Hazard Category 2 Nuclear Facility, such as PF-4 in TA-55, would be required for some AC and MC work. PF-4 was considered for this work, but it was determined at that time that using the space and capabilities at PF-4 would interfere with other ongoing work and reduce the availability of facility space for future expected DOE and NNSA mission support work. LANL Hazard Category 2 Nuclear Facilities outside of TA-55 were considered, but were determined not to be reasonable options for a variety of reasons, particularly a lack of available space or required engineered safety controls, so their use would introduce new hazards for which the facilities were not designed. In addition, use of facilities in other LANL locations would not conform to the objective of collocating plutonium operations near PF-4 and would require periodic closure of roadways and heightened security to enable transfer of materials between the facilities. NNSA also evaluated whether a combination of space at PF-4 and RLUOB could be used, but dismissed this combination alternative from detailed evaluation because of limits on the quantities of MAR allowed in RLUOB (8.4 grams PuE) and the expected lack of space at PF-4, as discussed above (DOE 2011c).

Since publication of the 2004 CMRR EIS ROD (69 FR 6967) and 2011 CMRR-NF SEIS, construction of CMRR-NF was delayed and then cancelled (DOE 2015b). However, expected PF-4 programs and technical changes made it possible to provide the necessary AC and MC capabilities using a combination of space already available in RLUOB and space to be made available in PF-4. These changes are summarized below:

- **PF-4 Programs.** Changes in programs to be performed at PF-4 enabled repurposing of existing laboratory space at this facility to support additional AC and MC operations. Program changes included a different approach in the experimental strategy for the weapons certification program and elimination of the need for a nuclear ceramic fuels capability using plutonium ceramics. In addition, additional space could be made available by consolidating operations for chemical recovery and

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9 Other reasons included: (1) they had been decommissioned for safety and security reasons and were no longer considered Hazard Category 2 Nuclear Facilities; (2) they were closure sites (specifically, environmental cleanup potential release sites); or (3) they were support facilities lacking the necessary space to perform AC and MC operations (e.g., waste management facilities) (DOE 2011c).
purification of plutonium from residues into a more efficient configuration and removing unused legacy equipment.

- **Technical.** In response to NNSA guidance on the use of updated radionuclide dosimetry information and accident release fractions when establishing the hazard category of a nuclear facility, as required in 10 CFR Part 830.202(b)(3), Nuclear Safety Management, Safety Basis Requirements (NNSA 2014), threshold quantities (TQs)\(^\text{10}\) at NNSA nuclear facilities were re-evaluated. Although the TQs for some radionuclides were reduced pursuant to the guidance, the TQs for others, including plutonium-239, were raised. Because the TQ for plutonium-239 in a Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility was changed from 8.4 grams to 38.6 grams, up to 38.6 grams of plutonium-239 could be contained within a Radiological Facility. This change in TQs is a function of an enhanced understanding of dosimetry\(^\text{11}\) and revised accident release fractions. That is, the health risk associated with 8.4 grams of plutonium-239, as calculated using the previous dosimetry and accident release fractions, yields the same health risk as 38.6 grams of plutonium-239, as calculated using the updated dosimetry and accident release fractions. NNSA has approved the use of updated TQs at LANL; consequently, up to 38.6 grams PuE can be contained within RLUOB in accordance with its categorization as a Radiological Facility.

Continued examination indicated that RLUOB could be safely recategorized as a Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility with a limiting PuE quantity of 400 grams, so that additional AC and MC work could be performed in RLUOB compared to that evaluated in the 2015 CMRR SA (DOE 2015a), with less AC and MC work performed in PF-4. By relocating several AC and MC capabilities into RLUOB rather than PF-4, fewer facility modifications would be required in PF-4. Work to modify PF-4, including equipment installation, would be performed in a facility that has been operating radiologically for decades, while work at RLUOB would be performed in nonradiological (“clean”) areas. In addition, work to modify PF-4 would require removal or modification of some existing equipment (including equipment contaminated with radionuclides or hazardous constituents) before the installation of new equipment, while work to modify RLUOB would essentially consist of installation of new equipment in empty, never used, work spaces. Thus, the overall time required to modify RLUOB and PF-4 to provide the needed AC and MC capabilities would be shorter. In addition, NNSA expects that other impacts associated with facility modifications would be lower overall, such as radiation exposures to workers and generation of radioactive waste. Furthermore, NNSA expects that radiation exposures among workers performing AC and MC operations would be lower due to the lower overall radiation environment at RLUOB compared to that at PF-4. Finally, performing low-MAR, low-risk AC and MC operations at RLUOB rather than PF-4 would improve operational efficiency and reduce the costs for these activities, as well as free valuable PF-4 laboratory space for other activities involving larger quantities of nuclear material.

NNSA proposes to upgrade the PuE limit for RLUOB to 400 grams because this increase is expected to be:

- Sufficient for the combined RLUOB and PF-4 capabilities to satisfy anticipated programmatic needs for AC and MC; and
- Accomplished in a manner ensuring the safety of workers and members of the public without requiring modifications to the RLUOB or PF-4 structure or safety systems.

The following factors were considered in arriving at the proposed 400-gram PuE inventory limit:

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\(^{10}\) Nuclear and radiological facilities at LANL are identified by a hazard category in accordance with the potential consequences in the event of an accident (10 CFR Part 830). Radionuclide TQs define the lower boundaries for classification of nuclear facilities. In this example, 38.6 grams of plutonium-239 is the TQ for classifying a facility as a Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility; facilities such as RLUOB that are authorized to contain plutonium-239 in quantities up to, but not equaling or exceeding 38.6 grams, are categorized as Radiological Facilities.

\(^{11}\) On June 8, 2007, DOE promulgated amendments to 10 CFR 835, Occupational Radiation Protection, to incorporate (among other revised requirements) updated dosimetric models and radiation dose terms (72 FR 31905).
• Based on the levels of impacts on the public and noninvolved workers\textsuperscript{12} from an analysis of a hypothetical unmitigated maximum reasonably foreseeable accident in the \textit{Response to Data Call for NEPA Environmental Assessment: Proposed Physical and Operational Changes for Analytical Chemistry and Materials Characterization at the Radiological Laboratory Utility Office Building (LANL Data Call Response)} (LANL 2018), NNSA does not expect that structures, systems, and components at RLUOB would need to be designated as safety class. Only inventory controls would need to be designated safety significant.\textsuperscript{13}

• The limit would not require physical and operational security requirements comparable to those in place for PF-4.

• The limit would be less than the quantity of plutonium needed for a plutonium nuclear criticality event to occur.

Therefore, NNSA expects that the Proposed Action would ensure the safe continuance of AC and MC capabilities at LANL.

2.2 RLUOB Material at Risk

Under the Proposed Action, RLUOB would become a Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility, but would have a safety basis limitation on the amount of MAR permitted in the facility. That limit of 400 grams PuE is smaller than the limit of up to 2,610 grams PuE allowed in a Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility.

To increase the MAR above 400 grams PuE, significant changes would be required in accordance with DOE security and safety requirements. An overview of the LANL security system is provided in the following text box.

\begin{center}
\textbf{Overview of the LANL Security System}
\end{center}

LANL’s interests are protected against a range of threats such as adversarial groups, theft or diversion of special nuclear material, sabotage, espionage, or loss or theft of classified government property. The protection strategy employs defensible concentric layers where each layer provides additional controls and protections. The airspace above LANL is restricted. Ground-based protection begins at the site perimeter and hardened access control points and builds inwardly to facility exteriors and designated interior zones and control points.

Security features include a network of perimeter fencing and lighting, barriers, electronic surveillance systems, intrusion detection and alarm systems, and access control systems. Barriers are used to delay or channel personnel, deny access to classified materials and vital areas, direct the flow of vehicles through entry control portals, and deter and prevent malevolent penetration by vehicles. Electronic surveillance, intrusion detection, and alarm systems are paired with systems that evaluate anomalous behaviors or potential adversarial actions. Access control systems (e.g., doors or gates controlled by magnetic-stripe badge readers) limit entry to authorized individuals. Visitors entering secure areas are escorted.

Security patrols and visual observations, potentially including random stops and inspections of vehicles, are also used to deter and detect intrusions. (TA-55, for example, is patrolled 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.) LANL’s protective force is trained and equipped to respond to alarms and potential adversarial actions; local, state, or federal law enforcement agencies may provide assistance.

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{12} A definition of a noninvolved worker is provided in Chapter 4, Section 4.1.

\textsuperscript{13} “Safety class structures, systems, and components means the structures, systems, or components, including portions of process systems, whose preventative or mitigative function is necessary to limit radioactive hazardous material exposure to the public, as determined from safety analyses.” … “Safety significant structures, systems, and components means the structures, systems, and components which are not designated as safety class structures, systems, and components, but whose preventative or mitigative function is a major contributor to defense in depth and/or worker safety as determined from safety analyses.” (10 CFR 830.3, Definitions).
\end{footnotesize}
Under the DOE graded approach to nuclear security safeguards, the level of physical security and nuclear material control and accountability varies with the quantity and “attractiveness” of the nuclear material (see text box). RLUOB could maintain a Safeguards Category III status for nuclear material safeguards as long as the plutonium inventory was maintained at or less than 400 grams. If the plutonium inventory were to exceed 400 grams, much more elaborate and expensive physical and operational security requirements would be required, much like those at PF-4. In accordance with DOE Order 474.2, Change 4, Nuclear Material Control and Accountability (DOE 2011b), the operational requirements for a Safeguards Category III facility are less than those for a Safeguards Category I or II facility. PF-4 is a Security Category I facility.

An increase in the plutonium limit above 400 grams PuE would also require changes in the safety basis for the facility. Whereas RLUOB can operate as a Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility with a limit of 400 grams PuE, a limit above that level would require thorough review of the facility and its operations to identify the systems, structures, and components that are most important to safety. An inventory limit exceeding 400 grams PuE would likely require additional administrative and physical controls to preclude the potential for a nuclear criticality accident, as well as additional safety equipment such as nuclear criticality alarm systems. An analysis indicates that, with an inventory limit of 400 grams PuE, none of the current safety systems, such as building ventilation, would require designation as safety class or safety significant to meet DOE requirements (LANL 2018). If the inventory limit were larger than 400 grams PuE, structures, systems, and components may be identified as significant to safety performance and require redesign and upgrading. Such systems would be subject to more stringent requirements for construction, inspection, and maintenance.

An increase in the allowable quantity of MAR above 400 grams PuE would also trigger the need for a documented safety analysis to be prepared and approved for RLUOB. Such a multi-year process would involve identifying, analyzing, and documenting a range of accidents that could occur at the facility. Because a larger quantity of MAR would mean that the potential impacts to noninvolved workers and the public could be greater, existing engineered controls may need to be credited, and new engineered controls may need to be added to mitigate potential impacts. Any additional administrative controls to ensure safe operations would need to be incorporated into facility procedures. After the documented safety analysis was prepared, it would be subject to a thorough review and approval process by NNSA.

2.3 Relevant Facilities

2.3.1 RLUOB

Completed in 2011, RLUOB provides about 19,500 square feet of laboratory space, office space to support 350 personnel, a training center, an operations center, and a facility incident command center (NNSA 2016a). The RLUOB structure and equipment anchorages in radiological spaces meet the requirements for Seismic Performance Category 2, as provided in DOE Standard – Natural Phenomena Hazards Design and Evaluation Criteria for Department of Energy Facilities DOE-STD-1020-2002

1 An example additional security requirement would be to install and operate a perimeter intrusion, detection, assessment, and delay system.
Because RLUOB is a multi-purpose facility, it has its own heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning (HVAC) system to support office occupancy, as well as a separate laboratory HVAC system to support laboratory operations. The laboratory HVAC system is complex and encompasses three levels of confinement barriers, identified as Zone 1, Zone 2, and Zone 3:

Zone 1 – primary confinement system which includes the glovebox enclosures and associated exhaust systems.

Zone 2 – secondary confinement system which includes the walls, floor, ceiling, and doors of the laboratories, including hoods and open-front enclosures.

Zone 3 – additional confinement barrier which includes the walls, floors, ceilings, and doors of the corridor or space that surrounds the laboratory.

The flow of air is from areas of lower to higher contamination potential (i.e., Zone 3 to Zone 2 to Zone 1). Exhaust air from Zone 1 (including air from glovebox enclosures) passes through a certified high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filtration system with fire protection before release to the atmosphere through a stack. Zone 2 handles a much larger air volume and exhausts air from laboratory hoods and open-front enclosures, the laboratory room, and laboratory support rooms. The Zone 2 exhaust system comprises a separate certified HEPA filtration system with fire protection that exhausts directly to the same stack. Stack emissions are monitored to record radiation releases, if any, and to provide data for regulatory compliance determinations. The Zone 3 system provides makeup air to Zone 2 and runs at a negative pressure relative to the outside air and a positive pressure relative to Zone 2 to ensure contamination control. Supply air to the laboratories is filtered and humidity-controlled (LANL 2018).

The laboratories where the AC and MC work would be done are built in a modular fashion, with each basic unit having approximately 750 square feet of floor space. The modules are outfitted with connections for utilities, such as instrument air and laboratory gases, as well as fire-suppression sprinklers. Continuous air monitors and fixed-head air samplers are also installed. Liquid radioactive waste from the laboratories is collected in tanks and tested before being pumped to the Radioactive Liquid Waste Treatment Facility (RLWTF) in TA-50. Capabilities are in place to perform nondestructive analysis and other radioactive waste characterization and verification activities, in compliance with disposal facility waste acceptance criteria, and to provide temporary storage and staging of radioactive and hazardous wastes pending their disposition (LANL 2018).

RLUOB was designed to provide utilities to both RLUOB and the canceled CMRR-NF. RLUOB is equipped with state-of-the-art systems to monitor and control (via the operations center) all instrumented facility systems via real-time digital sensors, including laboratory HVAC temperature and humidity. In addition, RLUOB contains a facility incident center with video and audio links with the LANL central emergency operations center in TA-69 (LANL 2018).

Electric power, water, heat, compressed air, backup power, and other services are provided by utility equipment housed in a physically separate Central Utility Building that was sized to support both RLUOB and the unconstructed CMRR-NF, although support equipment specific to the CMRR-NF was never

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15 This standard, in place at the time of the RLUOB design, was replaced by DOE-STD-1020-2012 (DOE 2012b).

16 Each structure, system, and component in a DOE facility is assigned to one of five performance categories (PCs), depending on its safety importance. For PC-1 structures, systems, and components, the primary concern is preventing major structural damage, collapse, or other failure that would endanger personnel (life safety). A PC-2 structure, system, and component designation is meant to ensure the operability of essential facilities or to prevent physical injury to in-facility workers. PC-2 structures, systems, and components should result in limited structural damage from design-basis natural phenomena events (such as an earthquake) to ensure minimal interruption of facility operation and repair following such an event (DOE 1993).
installed. Three diesel generators outside of the Central Utility Building can supply electric power in the event of emergencies (LANL 2018).

2.3.2 Plutonium Facility Complex

The Plutonium Facility Complex in TA-55 conducts a variety of activities, including basic and applied research in plutonium and actinide chemistry; nuclear materials separation, processing, and recovery; plutonium metallurgy, preparation, casting, fabrication, and recovery; machining and metallurgy; and destructive and nondestructive analysis (NNSA 2016b). The Plutonium Facility Complex consists of five connected buildings consisting of the main plutonium processing facility, PF-4, as well as buildings for administration, technical and office support, and warehousing. PF-4 has operated since April 1978 and employs about 1,000 LANL and subcontractor personnel (NNSA 2012). PF-4 supports LANL plutonium pit manufacturing and surveillance programs, including metal preparation and recovery operations. Plutonium experiments at PF-4 support the nation’s stockpile assessment without the need to conduct actual nuclear tests (NNSA 2016b). A double security fence surrounds PF-4.

PF-4 was built to comply with the contemporary seismic standards for a Hazard Category 1 Nuclear Facility, but is categorized as a Hazard Category 2 Nuclear Facility (DOE 2008a). In consideration of concerns raised by the independent Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) regarding PF-4 performance in the event of a strong earthquake, DOE has undertaken several actions over the past several years to enhance the safety configuration at PF-4, including upgrading the building’s structure and confinement system to withstand design-basis earthquakes, improvements to the building’s fire-suppression systems, and additional seismic and safety analyses (DOE 2015a).

The Plutonium Facility Complex includes capabilities to manage radioactive and nonradioactive wastes generated from activities therein. Transuranic (TRU) waste storage capabilities were recently increased from 400 to 1,600 55-gallon drum equivalents. TRU waste characterization capabilities have been installed at TA-55, including nondestructive analysis, flammable gas testing, and the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)-certified visual examination process (LANL 2018). TA-55 also has the capability to load TRU waste containers into Transuranic Package Transporter (TRUPACT) packaging for shipment to WIPP which is located near Carlsbad, New Mexico (NA-LA 2017) (see Section 4.3.1).

Ongoing PF-4 facility upgrades and seismic analyses are independent of the alternatives evaluated in this EA. Activities to remove and replace gloveboxes, other enclosures, and equipment at PF-4 would not prevent or degrade any of the facility upgrades. Activity scheduling would minimize any conflicts. As addressed in Chapter 4, Section 4.2.1.2, the AC and MC operations to be performed at PF-4 would not increase MAR in PF-4 or the source terms associated with seismically induced PF-4 accidents.

2.3.3 Primary Support Facilities Outside of TA-55

The actions addressed in this EA would be supported by waste management facilities and capabilities located outside of TA-55. As addressed in Chapter 4, Section 4.3.2, capabilities in TA-54 would be used to process enclosures and other equipment removed during PF-4 modifications to reduce waste volumes and to separate TRU waste from low-level radioactive waste (LLW) and mixed low-level radioactive waste (M LLW). Temporary storage of TRU waste may occur at the TRU Waste Facility in TA-63 (DOE 2015a). The Radioassay and Nondestructive Testing (RANT) facility in TA-54 may be used to load TRU waste into TRUPACT packaging for shipment to WIPP. Temporary staging of MLLW or chemical waste could occur in Area L of TA-54 pending shipment off site for treatment or disposal (LANL 2018).

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17 Definitions of the radioactive and nonradioactive wastes to be generated under the alternatives evaluated in this EA are provided in Chapter 4, Section 4.3.1.
18 In its September 26, 2008, ROD (73 FR 55833), DOE decided to construct and operate the TRU Waste Facility as part of the Waste Management Facilities Transition Projects evaluated in the LANL SWEIS (DOE 2008a).
Any radioactive liquid waste generated during facility modifications or AC and MC operations would be managed at the RLWTF in TA-50. Sanitary waste would be managed at the Sanitary Wastewater Systems Plant in TA-46.
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3.0 DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSED ACTION AND ALTERNATIVES

This chapter describes the Proposed Action and a No Action Alternative and identifies those actions that would be common to both alternatives and those that would be different between the alternatives. In addition, alternatives considered but eliminated from further detailed analysis and the reasons for these decisions are addressed.

As evaluated in the 2015 CMRR SA (DOE 2015a), a number of actions would be performed to support modifications and equipment installation in RLUOB and PF-4. These actions are common to both the Proposed Action and the No Action Alternative. Because they were previously evaluated in the 2015 CMRR SA (in some cases, they have been completed) and there would be no meaningful difference in the actions between the current Proposed Action and No Action Alternatives, they are not evaluated in detail in this EA. These actions include providing temporary construction support trailers and storage structures within previously disturbed areas in convenient proximities to RLUOB and PF-4. Several freight containers may be temporarily installed in TA-55 to store equipment or to support subcontractors. In addition to the temporary construction facilities, some permanent changes were evaluated in the 2015 CMRR SA. Additional office and warehouse space is being developed to support activities in RLUOB and PF-4. Facility modifications in RLUOB were implemented to provide an indoor construction staging area and to reconfigure security and radiological control boundaries to facilitate laboratory access by workers that are involved in laboratory modifications. What was originally planned as part of a tunnel extending from RLUOB to the cancelled CMRR-NF was modified to serve as an entrance to RLUOB on the laboratory floor level. This entrance enables efficient entry and egress of facility modification workers and equipment. In support of work in PF-4, modifications in common among the Proposed Action and No Action Alternatives include an indoor construction support area, additional shower and locker room space, and a reconfigured PF-4 entry and egress control area in an adjacent and connected building. Existing space within PF-3 (an existing TA-55 building inside the protected area) may be modified to provide temporary office space.

3.1 Proposed Action – Operate RLUOB as a MAR-Limited, Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility and Modify PF-4

NNSA proposes administrative and physical changes to recategorize RLUOB from a Radiological Facility, allowing up to 38.6 grams PuE, 19 to a MAR-limited, Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility, allowing up to 400 grams PuE. This recategorization would allow installation of a greater number of AC and MC capabilities at RLUOB instead of at PF-4, as currently planned and evaluated for the No Action Alternative. The Proposed Action Alternative would maximize use of RLUOB laboratory space for AC and MC operations and require less laboratory space in PF-4. The proposed additional changes for RLUOB include outfitting and refurbishing approximately 3,000 square feet of unequipped laboratory space with enclosures and AC and MC equipment; no space

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19 The term plutonium-239 equivalent (PuE) is used in this EA to refer to quantities of different radionuclides on a common health-risk basis. The mass or radioactivity of other radionuclides is expressed in terms of the amount of plutonium-239 that would result in the same committed effective dose upon inhalation.
would be retained as contingency space for other activities. Activities requiring quantities of radioactive material greater than those allowed in RLUOB laboratories would still need to be performed in PF-4.

Since publication of the ROD for the CMRR-NF SEIS (76 FR 64344) in 2011, changes have been made to mission needs and expected PF-4 programs (see Chapter 2, Section 2.1). The CMRR-NF was delayed (DOE 2012a) and then cancelled (DOE 2015b), and in accordance with NNSA guidance (NNSA 2014), NNSA increased the quantity of nuclear material allowed in a Radiological Facility to up to 38.6 grams PuE. These changes contributed to the need for the 2015 CMRR SA (DOE 2015a) that evaluated providing the necessary AC and MC capabilities using a combination of space already available in RLUOB and space to be made available at PF-4. The Proposed Action from the 2015 CMRR SA is the No Action Alternative in this EA (see Section 3.2).

Building on the changes analyzed in the 2015 CMRR SA, NNSA determined that RLUOB could be operated as a MAR-limited Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility, allowing 400 grams PuE in RLUOB. NNSA proposes to further outfit available laboratory space in RLUOB for AC and MC operations by installing equipment in approximately 3,000 square feet of empty laboratory rooms and modifying existing laboratory rooms. In PF-4, NNSA proposes to adjust existing laboratory space for AC and MC operations that require quantities of radiological materials greater than that allowed in RLUOB laboratories. Equipment in some laboratory rooms would be removed, and new equipment would be installed or existing equipment reconfigured. **Figure 3** provides a southeasterly view of TA-55 showing the location of RLUOB and PF-4.
3.1.1 RLUOB Modifications

Table 1 provides key construction parameters for the Proposed Action and the No Action Alternatives. The proposed modifications to RLUOB would result in additional laboratory capabilities installed in existing building space under both alternatives. These capabilities would be provided by installing new ventilated enclosures with accompanying instrumentation and ancillary equipment. Under the Proposed Action, the first phase of modification and refitting of RLUOB would be the same as the No Action Alternative; these activities are underway and are scheduled to be completed in approximately 3 to 5 years (DOE 2015a). The AC and MC capabilities to be relocated to RLUOB during phase 1 would be the same as those under the No Action Alternative and would include radiochemistry, trace-element analysis, mass spectrometry, sample preparation and distribution, assay, AC and MC research and development, and support operations.

Table 1. Key Construction Parameters for the Alternatives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Proposed Action Alternative</th>
<th>No Action Alternative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Space Modified (square feet)</td>
<td>RLUOB 13,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PF-4 5,400</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ventilated Enclosures c</td>
<td>Installed in RLUOB 109</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Removed from PF-4 41</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Modified in PF-4 29</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Installed in PF-4 30</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment (FTEs) (peak)</td>
<td>480 d</td>
<td>480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radiation Workers (peak)</td>
<td>150 d</td>
<td>150 e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waste Generated (cubic feet)</td>
<td>TRU waste 3,030 f</td>
<td>3,520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LLW 4,760 f</td>
<td>6,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MLLW 3,460 f</td>
<td>5,440</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FTE = full-time equivalent; LLW = low-level radioactive waste; MLLW = mixed low-level radioactive waste; PF-4 = Plutonium Facility, Building 4; RLUOB = Radiological Laboratory/Utility/Office Building; TRU = transuranic.

a Source: LANL 2018, except where otherwise indicated.
b Source: DOE 2015a, except where otherwise indicated.
c Ventilated enclosures include glovebox enclosures, open-front enclosures, and hoods.
d Assumed for analysis; overall, there could be a small decrease in the number of construction workers under the Proposed Action Alternative (LANL 2018).
e Source: DOE 2015a.
f Waste from removal of ventilated enclosures is conservative. Removed ventilated enclosures might be size-reduced before being sent off site for disposal.

Under the Proposed Action, the second and final phase would install additional AC and MC capabilities at RLUOB that are slated for PF-4 under the No Action Alternative, including plutonium assay, x-ray analysis, plasma spectroscopy, MC synthesis, material compatibility and coupon hydriding, waste management and nondestructive assay measurements, and some MC activities, such as transmission electron microscopy and scanning electron microscopy (LANL 2018). The second phase would be completed in approximately 4 to 7 years, subject to funding (LANL 2018).

Except for small quantities of solid LLW (e.g., personal protective gear) that could result from connecting new equipment to existing liquid radioactive waste drain lines and ventilation systems, waste generated from RLUOB modifications would consist of nonhazardous construction debris such as empty crates and boxes and pipe sections and fittings. Very small quantities of hazardous waste could be generated. These wastes would be managed using established practices.

3.1.2 PF-4 Modifications

Reconfiguration of PF-4 would require removal of some ventilated enclosures, equipment, and materials; reconfiguration of some enclosures; and installation of new enclosures, instrumentation, and ancillary
equipment. Modification and refitting of PF-4 would be completed in approximately 7 years, subject to funding (LANL 2018).

Under the Proposed Action Alternative, the need to install new gloveboxes and programmatic equipment in PF-4 would be eliminated versus the No Action Alternative. Correspondingly, predecessor activities, such as relocation of existing programmatic operations to other PF-4 rooms and decontamination and decommissioning of some equipment would not occur (LANL 2018).

To the extent possible, LLW and MLLW from facility modifications and equipment installation would be characterized and packaged at the Hazardous Material Storage Area in TA-55 before being shipped off site for disposal. However, much of the radioactively contaminated enclosures, equipment, and materials removed from PF-4 would be staged in a waste management area within TA-55 to await transfer to TA-54 for decontamination and size reduction to enable characterization, packaging, and disposal as LLW or MLLW. The decontamination process would generate TRU waste that would be packaged, characterized, and stored, pending certification and shipment for disposal at WIPP. Waste management operations would be consistent with the safety-basis limits established for the affected facilities. PF-4 modifications could generate a small quantity of chemical waste,20 as well as nonhazardous waste (e.g., construction and demolition debris) and sanitary waste. These wastes would be managed using established practices.

3.1.3 Operations

Under the Proposed Action Alternative, RLUOB would be operated as a MAR-limited Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility, allowing 400 grams PuE. AC and MC operations requiring quantities of radioactive materials greater than those allowed in RLUOB laboratories would be conducted in reconfigured space within PF-4. Table 2 summarizes the key operating parameters for the Proposed Action Alternative.

Under the Proposed Action Alternative, AC and MC operations would involve an estimated 135 radiation workers at RLUOB and 48 radiation workers at PF-4. Most workers would come from existing jobs at the CMR Building, RLUOB, and PF-4. Approximately 30 full-time equivalent (FTE) staff would be new employees. Workers in PF-4 would be exposed to higher doses than workers in RLUOB because PF-4 is an active plutonium production facility that has operated since 1978, and larger quantities of radioactive materials are used in the facility.

Gaseous process emissions from RLUOB and PF-4 would pass through HEPA filters before discharge to the atmosphere. Radionuclide emissions from RLUOB and PF-4 would be no more than those listed in Table 2. The majority of the emissions from PF-4 would be associated with other missions involving plutonium; AC and MC operations would result in a small percentage of the total emissions from PF-4 and may not be detectable over the baseline emissions.

Radiactive and chemical wastes would be generated largely from sample preparation and disposal, empty containers and laboratory glassware, spent filters, and personal protective equipment. Nearly all operational TRU waste would arise from AC and MC operations at PF-4. The annual quantity of sanitary waste would be smaller than that estimated in the CMRR EIS (DOE 2003b) because fewer operational personnel would be required than was projected in the EIS. Operational wastes would be managed using established practices.

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20 Chemical waste is not a formal LANL waste category, but denotes a broad category of materials, including hazardous waste regulated under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, toxic waste regulated under the Toxic Substances Control Act, and special waste designated under New Mexico Solid Waste Regulations.
Table 2. Key Operations Parameters for the Alternatives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Proposed Action</th>
<th>No Action Alternative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>New Employment (FTEs)</strong></td>
<td>RLUOB and PF-4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Radiation Workers</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RLUOB</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PF-4</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Radionuclide Emissions (curies per year)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PuE</td>
<td>7.6×10^{-4}</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tritium (elemental)</td>
<td>250</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tritium (water vapor)</td>
<td>750</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krypton-85</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xenon-131m</td>
<td>45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xenon-133</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Annual Waste Generation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRU waste (cubic feet)</td>
<td>2,370</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LLW (cubic feet)</td>
<td>71,280</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLLW (cubic feet)</td>
<td>700</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hazardous waste (pounds)</td>
<td>24,700</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanitary waste (gallons)</td>
<td>390,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FTE = full-time equivalent; LLW = low-level radioactive waste; MLLW = mixed low-level radioactive waste; PF-4 = Plutonium Facility, Building 4; PuE = plutonium-239 equivalent; RLUOB = Radiological Laboratory/Utility/Office Building; TRU = transuranic.

a Source: LANL 2018.
b Source: DOE 2015a, except where otherwise indicated.
c The value represents projected additional hires. Most workers performing AC and MC operations under both alternatives would be existing workers at RLUOB and PF-4 or transferred from other LANL locations such as the CMR Building.
d Source: DOE 2015a; LANL 2018. For analysis, it was assumed that all emissions from AC and MC operations would occur from RLUOB under the Proposed Action Alternative and from PF-4 under the No Action Alternative.
e It was assumed that essentially the same waste generation would occur under both alternatives because the same AC and MC operations would take place under both alternatives.

### 3.2 No Action Alternative – Operate RLUOB as a Radiological Facility and Modify PF-4

Under the No Action Alternative and as evaluated in the 2015 CMRR SA (DOE 2015a), NNSA would transfer AC and MC capabilities from the CMR Building to RLUOB and PF-4. In this regard, the No Action Alternative would be similar to the Proposed Action. The difference would be in the smaller amount of material allowed in RLUOB under the No Action Alternative (up to 38.6 grams PuE) and the extent of modification required to RLUOB (less than under the Proposed Action Alternative) and PF-4 (more than under the Proposed Action Alternative).

#### 3.2.1 RLUOB Modifications

Table 1 provides key construction parameters for the No Action Alternative. In RLUOB, NNSA would install equipment in currently unequipped laboratory space and re-equip three laboratory rooms, consistent with the revised limit for a Radiological Facility of up to 38.6 grams PuE. Activities to be conducted at RLUOB under this limit would include AC and some MC capabilities, including radiochemistry, trace-element analysis, mass spectrometry, sample preparation and distribution, assay, AC and MC research and development, and support operations. Modification and refitting of RLUOB is already underway and is scheduled to be completed in approximately 3 to 5 years.

Similar to those described under the Proposed Action Alternative (Section 3.1.1), modifications to RLUOB would require temporary reconfiguration of security and radiological control boundaries. The types of waste generated during modification of RLUOB would be similar to those under the Proposed Action Alternative.

#### 3.2.2 PF-4 Modifications

In PF-4, NNSA would adjust existing laboratory space for AC and MC operations that require quantities of radiological materials greater than those allowed in RLUOB laboratories. Equipment in some laboratory
rooms in PF-4 would be removed, and new equipment would be installed or existing equipment would be reconfigured. Modifications would be completed in approximately 7 years, subject to funding.

Modifications to PF-4 would be similar to those described under the Proposed Action Alternative (Section 3.1.2), except that one additional room would be converted to laboratory space for AC and MC operations. Reconfiguration would require removal of some ventilated enclosures, equipment, and materials; reconfiguration of some enclosures; and installation of new enclosures, instrumentation, and ancillary equipment.

3.2.3 Operations

Under the No Action Alternative, RLUOB would be operated as a Radiological Facility with a MAR limit of up to 38.6 grams PuE. AC and MC operations requiring quantities of radioactive materials greater than those allowed in RLUOB laboratories would be conducted in reconfigured space within PF-4. Table 2 summarizes the key operating parameters for the No Action Alternative.

Most of the facility conditions and controls described in Section 3.1.3 apply to both the Proposed Action and the No Action Alternatives. Therefore, only the differences between the alternatives are highlighted in this section.

As shown in Table 2, the No Action Alternative would employ more radiation workers at PF-4 than the Proposed Action Alternative, along with fewer radiation workers at RLUOB. Like the Proposed Action Alternative, most would be existing workers from the CMR Building, RLUOB, and PF-4. Under the No Action Alternative, only about 30 FTEs would be new hires.

As described in Section 3.1.3 for the Proposed Action Alternative, gaseous process emissions from RLUOB and PF-4 would pass through HEPA filters before being released to the atmosphere. Total radionuclide emissions from RLUOB and PF-4 under the No Action Alternative are expected to be similar to those under the Proposed Action Alternative, although a larger portion of the emissions would originate from PF-4 because more AC and MC operations would occur in PF-4 under the No Action Alternative.

As described in Section 3.1.3, radioactive and hazardous wastes would be generated largely from sample preparation and disposal, empty containers and laboratory glassware, spent filters, and personal protective equipment. Because more activities would occur in PF-4 under the No Action Alternative, a larger portion of the waste would originate from that facility.

3.3 Alternatives Considered but Eliminated from Further Analysis

A number of alternatives were considered but not carried forward for further analysis in this EA because either they had already been analyzed or had already been considered and dismissed in previous NEPA documents. After reviewing these alternatives again, NNSA continues to consider them unreasonable, with one exception. For the reasons discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.1, the Proposed Action Alternative addressed in this EA reflects an alternative that was previously determined to be not feasible, that of using distributed capabilities at LANL for AC and MC operations (see Section 3.3.3). The following alternatives were considered but eliminated from further analysis:

- Extensive Upgrades to the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Building
- Limited Upgrades to the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Building
- Distributed Capabilities at Other Existing LANL Nuclear Facilities
- Constructing a Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Building Replacement at LANL
- Constructing Multiple New Buildings at LANL
- Alternative Sites
- Delaying a Decision
The reasons for eliminating these alternatives from further analysis are discussed in the following subsections.

### 3.3.1 Extensive Upgrades to the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Building

In the *CMRR EIS* (DOE 2003b), DOE considered the proposal to complete extensive upgrades to the existing CMR Building’s structural and safety systems to meet current mission support requirements for another 20 to 30 years of operations and dismissed it from detailed analysis. DOE determined that the extensive upgrades originally planned would be much more expensive and time-consuming and of only marginal effectiveness. As a result, DOE decided to perform only the upgrades necessary to ensure the short-term safe and reliable operation of the CMR Building and to seek an alternative path for long-term reliability. Over the long term, NNSA cannot continue to operate the assigned LANL mission-critical CMR support capabilities in the existing CMR Building at an acceptable level of risk to public and worker health and safety without operational restrictions. These operational restrictions preclude the full implementation of the needed level of operation. Therefore, this alternative was not evaluated further in the *CMRR EIS* and likewise was not analyzed in this EA.

### 3.3.2 Limited Upgrades to the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Building

The *CMRR-NF SEIS* (DOE 2011c) described why limited upgrades to the existing CMR Building had been considered and dismissed from further evaluation. NNSA had considered undertaking a more limited, but intensive, set of upgrades to a single wing of the CMR Building, Wing 9, to meet current seismic design requirements so that this wing could be used for a limited set of Hazard Category 2 AC and MC operations. Due to the various engineering and geological issues; the costs of implementing upgrades to an older structure, developing a new security infrastructure, and maintaining a second security infrastructure and safety basis (in addition to that for TA-55); the mission work disruptions associated with construction; operational constraints due to the limited laboratory space; and programmatic and operational issues and risks from moving special nuclear material between TA-3 and TA-55, this alternative was not further evaluated in the *CMRR-NF SEIS* and likewise was not analyzed in this EA.

NNSA also has considered the possibility of renovating, upgrading, and reusing other CMR Building wings and additional wing combinations to provide the space needed for continuing AC and MC work. However, for the reasons cited in the previous paragraphs, the other wings and wing combinations are not considered reasonable alternatives for providing adequate safe and secure space for future operations in a cost-effective manner and therefore were not further evaluated in the *CMRR-NF SEIS* and likewise were not analyzed in this EA.

### 3.3.3 Distributed Capabilities at Other Existing Los Alamos National Laboratory Nuclear Facilities

In the February 2004 ROD (69 FR 6967) for the *CMRR EIS*, NNSA decided that AC and MC capabilities would be located in TA-55. Locating the AC and MC capabilities in TA-55 reflects NNSA’s goal to bring all LANL nuclear facilities into a nuclear core area. Siting of the AC and MC capabilities in TA-55 would place them near the existing PF-4, where the programs that make the most use of these capabilities are located. RLUOB has already been constructed in TA-55. Therefore, only locations in close proximity to TA-55 were considered in this EA.

As a result of the recent increase in the quantity of nuclear material allowed in a Radiological Facility (i.e., up to 38.6 grams PuE), this EA also considered the use of other existing Radiological Facilities at LANL, in combination with RLUOB, to provide the necessary AC and MC capabilities. Two variations of this alternative were considered: (1) operation of RLUOB as a Radiological Facility and (2) operation of RLUOB as a Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility, but with less than 400 grams PuE. NNSA’s goal to consolidate all LANL plutonium operations at TA-55 effectively limits this alternative to one viable Radiological Facility, the adjacent Target Fabrication Facility (TFF) in TA-35, located immediately east of the TA-55 boundary. Although TFF currently houses some MC capabilities similar to those available in or
proposed for RLUOB, the facility was completed in 1983 and therefore was not designed to meet modern seismic requirements. In addition, only a small fraction of the building floor space is configured and suitable for MC operations. Furthermore, operations have been limited to very small quantities of plutonium and other nuclear materials. Even if TFF were to be modified to house additional AC and MC capabilities, it would be limited to up to 38.6 grams PuE. Operating both RLUOB and TFF as Radiological Facilities would provide less than 20 percent of the MAR limit that could be achieved by operating RLUOB as a MAR-limited Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility as proposed. It would be neither necessary nor economically feasible to modify the TFF to increase its AC and MC capabilities, given that operating RLUOB as proposed would provide the necessary AC and MC capabilities in one modern facility. For these reasons, this alternative was not further analyzed in this EA.

3.3.4 Constructing a Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Building Replacement Nuclear Facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory

Various configurations for a CMR Building Replacement at LANL were evaluated in the CMRR EIS (DOE 2003b) and CMRR-NF SEIS (DOE 2011c). In the February 12, 2004, ROD for the CMRR EIS (69 FR 6967), DOE selected the Preferred Alternative and decided to construct and operate RLUOB and CMRR-NF. On October 18, 2011, DOE issued an amended ROD (76 FR 64344) for the CMRR NF-SEIS, selecting the Modified CMRR-NF Alternative for constructing and operating the CMRR-NF portion of the CMRR project.

In 2012, NNSA took actions in accordance with the President’s fiscal year 2013 (FY 2013) budget request, which included no funding for CMRR-NF and deferred construction of the CMRR-NF for at least 5 years (DOE 2012a). Accordingly, DOE began to investigate other less costly methods of providing future AC and MC capabilities. The proposal to relocate AC and MC capabilities to RLUOB and PF-4 is a consequence of these investigations. The CMRR-NF was cancelled in the Department of Energy FY 2016 Congressional Budget Request, National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE 2015b). Therefore, the CMRR-NF is no longer a reasonable alternative and was not further analyzed in this EA.

3.3.5 Constructing Multiple New Buildings at Los Alamos National Laboratory

The CMRR-NF SEIS (DOE 2011c) described why construction and operation of multiple new buildings at LANL had been considered and dismissed from further evaluation. A three-building CMRR Facility (RLUOB and two nuclear facilities), as considered in the CMRR EIS, would have separated the nuclear facility functions by hazard categorization, resulting in two buildings (a Hazard Category 2 Nuclear Facility and a Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility). A parallel concept to separate the CMRR Facility functions based on their security classification requirements was considered, which would also result in two nuclear facilities.

Dividing the laboratory space between two nuclear facilities rather than using a single nuclear facility does not change the task area space requirements for performing the AC, MC, and research functions. However, dividing laboratory space between facilities would slightly increase the overall task area space needed because some task area space would be duplicated in each building. Although the level of controls would differ, systems and support space (e.g., change rooms, utilities, air-handling and filtration systems, and monitoring and control systems) would be required in each building. Constructing two buildings (and duplicating the systems and support space) would increase the required amounts of construction materials and, if they were constructed in parallel, would require additional land areas for support space. Operating two separate buildings (in addition to RLUOB) would require a slight increase in support personnel (e.g., radiological control technicians) and more operational personnel (e.g., materials and waste packaging and transfer staff). Therefore, multiple new building configuration and construction proposals for AC and MC capabilities were not further evaluated in the CMRR-NF SEIS (DOE 2011c) and likewise were not analyzed in this EA.
3.3.6 Alternative Sites

As discussed in the 2011 CMRR-NF SEIS, the 2008 Complex Transformation SPEIS (DOE 2008b) analyzed other potential locations outside LANL for the required AC and MC operations. In the ROD for the Complex Transformation SPEIS (73 FR 77644), NNSA included its decision to retain plutonium manufacturing and research and development at LANL. This decision supports NNSA’s goal of consolidating activities and reducing the size of the Nation’s nuclear weapons complex, together with modernizing outmoded infrastructure. Therefore, because the alternative sites for key activities within the nuclear weapons complex, as well as the need for the AC and MC capabilities, have been reviewed in depth and programmatic decisions already have been issued, no additional sites outside of LANL were considered in this EA.

3.3.7 Delaying a Decision

NNSA also considered delaying a decision regarding the Proposed Action at this time and re-examining it at a later date, perhaps as long as several decades from now. However, space is needed to support critical AC and MC mission-support work that can no longer be performed in the CMR Building. Therefore, delaying a decision and re-examining it at a later date is not a feasible option, and this alternative was not analyzed in this EA.
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Chapter 4 – Affected Environment and Environmental Consequences

4.0 AFFECTED ENVIRONMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES

To evaluate potential environmental consequences on an annual basis, the analyses in this section depend in part on assumptions about the length of time that activities such as facility modifications take place. If the analyzed activity takes less or more time to complete than that assumed, then the potential annual environmental consequences may be increased or reduced, although the total (collective) consequences would not change.

This section presents the affected environment and potential environmental consequences for the Proposed Action and No Action Alternatives for those environmental resource areas identified as relevant for this EA. The affected environment information for each resource area is provided in summary form; considerable additional information is provided in other NEPA documents such as the LANL SWEIS (DOE 2008a) and the CMRR-NF SEIS (DOE 2011c).

The analysis uses a sliding-scale approach that is consistent with DOE’s Recommendations for the Preparation of Environmental Assessments and Environmental Impact Statements (DOE 2004b). This guidance implements the CEQ regulations directing agencies preparing EISs to focus on significant environmental issues and alternatives (40 CFR 1502.1) and on impacts in proportion to their significance (40 CFR 1502.2(b)). Less depth and breadth of analysis should be applied to resource areas that clearly have minor environmental impacts, while greater depth and breadth of analysis should be applied to resource areas that have potentially larger impacts. The degree to which the potential environmental consequences for a resource area may be controversial is a factor when determining the appropriate depth and breadth of analysis.

NNSA thus performed a screening analysis to identify resource areas warranting more detailed analyses. Table 3 presents the results of this screening analysis. More detailed analyses are described in Sections 4.1 through 4.5, respectively, for human health consequences from normal operations, human health consequences from potential accidents, waste management, transportation, and environmental justice. Less detailed analyses are discussed in Sections 4.6 through 4.14 for the land use, geology and soils, water resources, ecological resources, cultural resources, air quality and climate, visual resources and noise, infrastructure, and socioeconomic resource areas.

Table 3. Screening of Resource Areas for More Detailed Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resource Area</th>
<th>Detailed Analysis?</th>
<th>Section</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Human Health – Normal Operations</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Health – Facility Accidents</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waste Management</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Justice</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Use</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geology and Soils</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Resources</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biological Resources</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Resources</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>4.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Quality and Climate</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>4.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visual Resources and Noise</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>4.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>4.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socioeconomics</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>4.14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The analysis in this EA focuses on the environmental consequences that could result from activities within or near RLUOB and PF-4 at TA-55. Activities at TA-55 would be supported by operations at other TAs, including the waste management capabilities in TA-54, the TRU Waste Facility in TA-63, and the RLWTF in TA-50. However, the impacts from operations at these facilities have been evaluated in previous NEPA documents (e.g., DOE 2008a, 2015a), and the activities under the alternatives addressed in this EA are not expected to cause additional unevaluated impacts.

4.1 Human Health – Normal Operations

This section addresses radiological impacts on members of the public and LANL workers. Health risks were considered for the offsite population within a 50-mile radius, an average member of the public within this population, a member of the public identified as the maximally exposed individual (MEI), and involved workers. Members of the public and workers are protected from exposure to radioactive material and hazardous chemicals by facility design and administrative procedures. DOE regulations and directives include 10 CFR Part 820, “Procedural Rules for DOE Nuclear Facilities,” DOE Order 458.1, Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment (DOE 2011a), 10 CFR Part 835, “Occupational Radiation Protection,” and 10 CFR Part 851, “Worker Safety and Health Program.”

To protect the public from impacts from radiological exposure, DOE Order 458.1 imposes an annual individual dose limit of 10 millirem from airborne pathways (incorporating the requirements of 40 CFR Part 61, Subpart H), 100 millirem from all pathways, and 4 millirem from the drinking-water pathway. Public doses from all pathways must be maintained to levels as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA). To protect workers from impacts from radiological exposure, 10 CFR Part 835 imposes an individual dose limit of 5,000 millirem in a year. However, DOE’s goal is to maintain radiological exposures ALARA. Therefore, DOE has recommended that DOE sites establish administrative control levels for individual worker doses based on an evaluation of historical and projected radiation exposures, work load, and mission (DOE 2008c). The administrative control level for LANL is 500 millirem in a year (DOE 2008a).

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21 An involved worker is an onsite worker who is directly or indirectly involved with operations at a facility and receives an occupational radiation exposure from direct radiation (i.e., neutron, x-ray, beta, or gamma) or from radionuclides released to the environment from normal operations. A noninvolved worker is a site worker outside of a facility who is unlikely to be subjected to direct radiation exposure, but could be exposed to emissions from that facility. The offsite population comprises members of the general public living within 50 miles of a facility. The MEI is a hypothetical member of the public at a location of public access that would result in the highest exposure, which is assumed to be at the site boundary during normal operations and postulated accidents.
4.1.1 Affected Environment

Members of the Public

The major source of radiation exposure to the public is natural background radiation and radiation from man-made sources. Average levels of background radiation for the population in the vicinity of LANL are shown in Table 4. Radon is the primary source of exposure from natural background radiation, while medical use of radionuclides is the dominant contributor from man-made sources. As shown in Table 4, the total annual dose to an individual in the LANL area from natural background and man-made radiation could be as high as 880 millirem.

Normal releases from LANL operations are an additional source of exposure to the public. Airborne releases of radionuclides from LANL operations are monitored, and radiation doses among members of the public are annually determined. Ingestion doses (including doses from drinking water) are too small to measure and are essentially zero (LANL 2016c).

Table 4. Background Sources of Radiation Exposure That Affect Individuals in the Vicinity of Los Alamos National Laboratory

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Radiation Source</th>
<th>Effective Dose Equivalent (millirem per year)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Natural Background Radiation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External cosmic b</td>
<td>50 to 90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External terrestrial</td>
<td>50 to 150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal terrestrial</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radon (in homes)</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>430 to 570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man-Made Radiation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diagnostic and nuclear medicine</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumer and industrial products</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>740 to 880</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a Values reflect national averages or averages for the LANL area.
b Cosmic radiation doses are larger in the higher elevations west of LANL and smaller at the lower elevations near the Rio Grande.

Annual population dose data for LANL is provided in Table 5. Between 2007 and 2016, the annual dose to the population within a 50-mile radius of LANL ranged from 0.06 (in 2015) to 0.79 person-rem (in 2008) (LANL 2017). For comparison, the same population received a dose from natural background radiation (only) of between 150,000 and 200,000 person-rem in 2016, based on a population of 343,000 within a 50-mile radius of LANL (LANL 2017, Table 8-1). The population dose from LANL operations in 2016 (0.10 person-rem) to a population of 343,000 translates to an average dose of less than 0.0003 millirem to an individual within a 50-mile radius of LANL (LANL 2017).

As also indicated in Table 5, the dose that the MEI could receive from airborne emissions of radionuclides ranged from a low of 0.12 millirem in 2016 to a high of 3.53 millirem in 2011. Note that the MEI dose of 3.35 millirem in 2011 resulted from the one-time event of remediating Material Disposal Area B; the dose in all other years was no higher than 0.58 millirem. All of the MEI doses in Table 5 are well below the regulatory limits (10 millirem from airborne pathways and 100 millirem from all pathways) of DOE Order 458.1 (DOE 2011a) and much lower than the individual dose from background radiation.
Table 5. Population and MEI Dose from Normal Operations at Los Alamos National Laboratory

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population Dose (person-rem) *</th>
<th>MEI Dose (millirem)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>3.53 b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MEI = maximally exposed individual.

* Population within 50 miles of LANL; 343,000 in 2016.

b The 3.53 millirem dose resulted from the remediation of Material Disposal Area B.


No latent cancer fatalities (LCFs) are expected in the affected population. Using a risk estimator of $6.0 \times 10^{-4}$ LCF per rem or person-rem of exposure (DOE 2003a), the calculated risk of an LCF within the exposed population from annual exposures ranged from about $4 \times 10^{-5}$ in 2015 to about $5 \times 10^{-4}$ in 2008. Using the same risk estimator, the estimated probability of the MEI developing an LCF from any of these annual exposures ranged from about $7 \times 10^{-8}$ (1 chance in about 14 million) in 2016 to about $2 \times 10^{-6}$ (1 chance in 500,000) in 2011. Using the same risk estimator, the probability of an individual developing an LCF from exposure to 1 year of natural and other background radiation (up to 880 millirem with an average of about 780 millirem [LANL 2017]) would be about 0.0005, or 1 chance in 2,000.

Public health impacts from chemical hazards could occur during normal operations at LANL via inhalation of air containing hazardous chemicals released to the atmosphere by LANL operations. Other potential pathways that pose risks to public health include ingestion of contaminated drinking water or direct exposure. Adverse health impacts on the public from hazardous chemicals are minimized through administrative and design controls to decrease hazardous chemical releases to the environment and achieve compliance with permit requirements. LANL maintains monitoring and inspection programs to verify the effectiveness of these controls (DOE 2011c).

LANL Workers

LANL workers receive the same dose as the general public from background radiation, but they also receive a dose from working in facilities with nuclear materials. Table 6 presents the average dose to an individual LANL radiation worker and the cumulative dose to all workers from operations in 2012 through 2016. These doses fall within the radiological limits established by 10 CFR Part 835. Using a risk estimator of $6.0 \times 10^{-4}$ LCFs per rem or person-rem of exposure among workers, the highest individual risk of an individual worker developing an LCF from any of these exposures is $6 \times 10^{-5}$ (1 chance in about 17,000). No LCFs among the worker population are expected from these annual doses. Based on the total worker dose presented in the table, the calculated risk of an LCF among all LANL workers from normal operations during the 5 years from 2012 through 2016 ranged from about 0.06 to 0.08.

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22 A worker dose to risk conversion factor of $5 \times 10^{-4}$ may be used (DOE 2003a). The risk estimator for workers is lower than the estimator for the public because of the absence from the workforce of the more radio-sensitive infant and child age groups. However, as suggested by this reference document, given uncertainties in the risk estimates, the same value that was used for the general public was used for workers.
Chemical exposure pathways to LANL workers during normal operations could include inhaling the workplace atmosphere, drinking LANL potable water, and contacting hazardous materials associated with work assignments. Workers are protected from hazards specific to the workplace through appropriate training, protective equipment, monitoring, and management controls. LANL workers are also protected by adherence to Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) occupational standards for exposure to potentially hazardous chemicals. Appropriate monitoring, which reflects the frequency and amounts of chemicals used in the operation processes, ensures that these standards are not exceeded. Additionally, DOE requirements ensure that conditions in the workplace are as free as possible from recognized hazards that cause or are likely to cause illness or physical harm (DOE 2011c).

### 4.1.2 Environmental Consequences of the Proposed Action Alternative

This section presents the potential radiological consequences from facility modifications and AC and MC operations under the Proposed Action Alternative. Individual and population radiological doses and risks were determined for members of the public, workers, and fan offsite MEI. The analysis concentrated on impacts that could occur due to emissions of radioactive material to the air from RLUOB and PF-4 because neither facility modifications nor AC and MC operations would result in a discharge of radioactive material to the subsurface or an uncontrolled release of radioactive material to surface waters. In addition, the use of hazardous chemicals at LANL was evaluated for members of the public and workers.

#### 4.1.2.1 Radiological Impacts during Facility Modifications

Current air emissions from RLUOB do not meaningfully contribute to the public dose from operations at LANL (LANL 2016c). Modifications to RLUOB are not expected to add to radiological air emissions from the facility because the modifications will occur in radiologically clean areas. No public radiation doses are expected from the more extensive modifications to PF-4 that were evaluated in the 2015 CMRR SA (DOE 2015a). Therefore, the less extensive modifications to PF-4 under the Proposed Action Alternative are not expected to result in public radiation doses.

The radiological impacts to involved workers during modifications to RLUOB and PF-4 were evaluated in the 2015 CMRR SA and resulted primarily from the removal and replacement of gloveboxes and other enclosures and equipment at PF-4. The 2015 CMRR SA concluded that RLUOB modifications would not result in any meaningful dose to workers.

The 2015 CMRR SA (DOE 2015a) indicated that the average individual worker involved in modifications to PF-4 would receive an annual dose of about 300 millirem. The total worker dose from PF-4 modifications under the Proposed Action Alternative were calculated by adjusting the total doses determined for the facility modifications under the No Action Alternative (as derived from the 2015 CMRR SA) by the ratio of the number of enclosures removed, modified, or installed at PF-4 under both alternatives.
(As shown in Table 1, 128 enclosures would be removed, modified, or installed at PF-4 under the No Action Alternative, and 100 enclosures would be removed, modified, or installed at PF-4 under the Proposed Action Alternative.) As shown in Table 7, this would result in a total worker population dose of about 200 person-rem. The individual worker annual dose would be well below the DOE worker dose limit of 5,000 millirem (10 CFR Part 835) and less than the administrative control limit at LANL of 500 millirem per year (DOE 2008a). If the same worker were to receive the average annual dose for the entire time required for PF-4 modifications, that worker would receive a dose of 1.7 rem.

No LCFs within the worker population are expected; the calculated number of LCFs from doses received both annually and over the entire facility modification period would be 0.02 and 0.1, respectively. For an individual worker, the risk of an LCF would be 2×10⁻⁴ (1 chance in 5,000 of an LCF) annually. If that worker received the average annual dose for all the time required for PF-4 modifications, the risk of that worker receiving an LCF would be 1×10⁻³ (1 chance in 1,000 of an LCF).

### Table 7. Proposed Action Alternative – Radiological Impacts to Workers Modifying PF-4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Radiation Dose or Risk</th>
<th>Individual Worker</th>
<th>Worker Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Annual Dose or Risk from Facility Modifications</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dose</td>
<td>300 millirem</td>
<td>36 person-rem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk (LCF)</td>
<td>2×10⁻⁴</td>
<td>0 (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dose limit</td>
<td>5,000 millirem</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative control limit</td>
<td>500 millirem</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Dose or Risk from Facility Modifications</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dose</td>
<td>1.7 rem</td>
<td>200 person-rem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk (LCF)</td>
<td>1×10⁻³</td>
<td>0 (0.1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

LCF = latent cancer fatality; PF-4 = Plutonium Facility, Building 4.

- The risk to an individual worker is the risk of an LCF and is a value less than or equal to 1. The risk to the worker population is the projected number of LCFs in the population and is a whole number; the calculated number of LCFs is provided in parentheses.
- Estimated dose from 2015 CMRR SA for workers involved in enclosure and equipment removal, reconfiguration, and replacement activities during modifications to PF-4 (DOE 2015a). The same worker was assumed to be involved in facility modifications for the entire period.
- Estimated PF-4 construction worker population from the 2015 CMRR SA (DOE 2015a).
- Based on worker risk estimates of 0.0006 LCFs per rem or person-rem (DOE 2003a).
- DOE 2008a.

#### 4.1.2.2 Radiological Impacts during AC and MC Operations

Under the Proposed Action Alternative, radiological emissions from RLUOB and PF-4 are expected to be no more than the quantities listed in Table 8 (LANL 2018). These emissions are the same as those identified for AC and MC operations in the CMRR EIS (DOE 2011c). LANL has indicated that there would be reduced AC and MC operations, resulting in reduced emissions, at RLUOB and PF-4 compared to those from historical use of the CMR Building. For example, LANL has indicated that future AC and MC operations would likely not involve processing krypton or xenon, but samples containing trace levels of these elements could be tested (LANL 2018). Nonetheless, the emissions projected in the CMRR EIS and CMRR SEIS were conservatively assumed for analysis.
Due to the limitations on material quantities that would be imposed on activities in RLUOB, some AC and MC operations requiring larger quantities of material would be performed at PF-4. The decision on which facility would be used for a test would be made as individual testing needs are identified. Although the majority of the work may be performed at RLUOB, the portion of work to be performed at each facility has not yet been defined. Therefore, it was assumed for analysis that all operational emissions under the Proposed Action Alternative would come from RLUOB. Conversely, for the No Action Alternative, all emissions were assumed to come from PF-4. These two assumptions enable a comparison of the differences in public impacts between the Proposed Action and No Action Alternatives.

Table 9 shows the annual impacts to the population projected to be living within a 50-mile radius of RLUOB in 2030 (a population of approximately 497,000); the impacts to an average member of the public; and the impacts to an offsite MEI located at the LANL site boundary directly north of RLUOB.

As shown in Table 9, the estimated annual population dose associated with RLUOB operations is 0.98 person-rem. The MEI would receive an estimated annual dose of 0.082 millirem, and the average annual dose to an individual within the population would be 0.0020 millirem. DOE has established an annual limit of 10 millirem for a radiation dose received due to releases of radionuclides to the air from all sources at a DOE site (DOE Order 458.1 [DOE 2011a]). The average individual and MEI doses are both less than 1 percent of this limit. Additionally, for comparison, Table 9 presents the population and individual doses from exposure to natural background radiation levels in the Los Alamos area. As shown, the population and individual doses from RLUOB operation are both well below 1 percent of the dose from natural background radiation.

No LCFs are expected among the population within 50 miles of RLUOB because the calculated annual risk of an LCF in the population is much less than 1 (6×10⁻⁴). The corresponding increased risk of an average individual within this population developing an LCF is about 1×10⁻⁶, or 1 chance in a billion for each year of operation. For the MEI, an increased annual risk of developing an LCF is about 5×10⁻⁸, or 1 chance in 20 million for each year of operation.

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23 The 2030 population was projected to be approximately 497,000 within 50 miles of RLUOB and 488,000 within 50 miles of PF-4. The principal reason for the difference in the population estimates is that RLUOB is somewhat closer to Albuquerque than PF-4; thus the 50-mile radius for this facility includes a slightly larger portion of the Albuquerque populated area.
Table 9. Proposed Action Alternative – Annual Radiological Impacts of AC and MC Operations at RLUOB on Members of the Public

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Radiation Dose or Risk</th>
<th>Maximally Exposed Individual</th>
<th>Population Within 50 Miles</th>
<th>Average Individual Within 50 Miles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Radiation Dose</td>
<td>0.082 millirem</td>
<td>0.98 person-rem</td>
<td>0.0020 millirem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk (LCF)</td>
<td>5×10⁻⁶</td>
<td>0 (6×10⁻⁴)</td>
<td>1×10⁹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulatory dose limit</td>
<td>10 millirem</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
<td>10 millirem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dose as a percentage of the regulatory limit</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
<td>0.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dose from natural background radiation</td>
<td>570 millirem</td>
<td>220,000 person-rem</td>
<td>430 millirem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dose as a percentage of background dose</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.0004</td>
<td>0.0005</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AC = analytical chemistry; LCF = latent cancer fatality; MC = materials characterization.

a The risk to an MEI or an average individual within 50 miles is the risk of an LCF and is a value less than or equal to 1. The risk to the population within 50 miles is the projected number of LCFs in the population and is a whole number; the calculated number of LCFs is provided in parentheses.

b The population dose for this table was based on a projected 2030 population estimate of 497,270 within 50 miles of RLUOB. The population within a 50-mile radius, as determined from U.S. Census data for 2015 (Census 2017a), was projected to 2030 based on the trends in the populations in the counties within the 50-mile radius.

c Based on a risk estimator of 0.0006 LCFs per rem or person-rem (DOE 2003a).

d DOE Order 458.1 establishes an annual limit of 10 millirem via the air pathway to any member of the public from DOE operations. This limit was derived from the requirements in 40 CFR Part 61, Subpart H.

Until RLUOB and PF-4 begin AC and MC operations, public impacts from operation of the CMR Building would continue. In the CMRR EIS, DOE estimated that the projected 2020 population (448,000) within 50 miles of the CMR Building would receive an annual dose of 0.059 person-rem, with an average individual dose of 1.3×10⁻⁴ millirem. The MEI would receive an annual dose of 0.0059 millirem. No LCFs were expected in the population within 50 miles of the CMR Building (calculated value of 4×10⁻⁵ LCF), while the annual risks of an LCF to an average individual in this population and the MEI were estimated to be 7.9×10⁻¹¹ and 3.5×10⁻⁹, respectively (1 chance in 13 billion and 1 chance in 290 million, respectively) (DOE 2003b).

The radiological impacts to AC and MC workers in the PF-4 and RLUOB facilities were evaluated in the 2015 CMRR SA (DOE 2015a), which projected an average annual dose of about 10 millirem for workers at RLUOB. Projected worker doses at PF-4 were based on an average dose of 170 millirem to a PF-4 worker prior to the facility modifications. This dose is higher than the worker dose for a CMR worker and higher than the average dose to a LANL worker who received a measurable dose (see Table 6). These average individual doses and an assumed operational workforce of 48 at PF-4 and 135 at RLUOB were used to generate the information presented in Table 10. The individual worker annual doses of 170 and 10 millirem at PF-4 and RLUOB, respectively, are well below the DOE worker dose limit of 5,000 millirem (10 CFR Part 835) and less than the LANL administrative control limit of 500 millirem (DOE 2008a). The average dose would result in a worker population dose of 9.5 person-rem per year of operation.

No LCFs are expected among the worker population from this annual dose because the calculated risk is much less than 1 (6×10⁻³). The average individual risk of an LCF from these annual exposures would be 1×10⁻⁴ (1 chance in 10,000 of an LCF) and 6×10⁻⁶ (1 chance in about 170,000 of an LCF), respectively, for a worker at PF-4 and RLUOB.
Table 10. Proposed Action Alternative – Annual Radiological Impacts of AC and MC Operations at RLUOB and PF-4 on Involved Workers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Radiation Dose or Risk a</th>
<th>Individual Worker</th>
<th>Worker Population b</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PF-4 Dose or Risk</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dose</td>
<td>170 millirem 5</td>
<td>8.2 person-rem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk (LCF) d</td>
<td>1x10^-4</td>
<td>0 (5x10^-3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| RLUOB Dose or Risk      |                     |                     |
| Dose                    | 10 millirem 5       | 1.4 person-rem      |
| Risk (LCF) d            | 5x10^-5             | 0 (8x10^-4)         |

| Total Dose or Risk      |                     |                     |
| Dose                    | Not applicable       | 9.5 person-rem      |
| Risk (LCF) d            | Not applicable       | 0 (6x10^-3)         |
| Dose limit e            | 5,000 millirem       | Not applicable      |
| Administrative control limit f | 500 millirem | Not applicable |

AC = analytical chemistry; LCF = latent cancer fatality; MC = materials characterization; PF-4 = Plutonium Facility, Building 4; RLUOB = Radiological Laboratory/Utility/Office Building.

a The risk to an individual worker is the risk of an LCF and is a value less than or equal to 1. The risk to the worker population is the projected number of LCFs in the population and is a whole number; the calculated number of LCFs is provided in parentheses.

b Based on an AC and MC worker population of 48 at PF-4 and 135 at RLUOB. Dose and administrative limits do not exist for worker populations.

c 2015 CMRR SA dose for workers at PF-4 and RLUOB (DOE 2015a).
d Based on worker risk estimates of 0.0006 LCFs per rem or person-rem (DOE 2003a).
f DOE 2008a.

Until all AC and MC operations are established in RLUOB and PF-4, workers performing AC and MC operations at the CMR Building would continue to receive radiation doses at that facility. In the CMRR SEIS (DOE 2011c), the annual dose at the CMR Building was estimated to be 21 person-rem, while the average annual individual radiation dose was estimated to be 100 millirem, representing an annual risk of an LCF of 6x10^-5 (1 chance in about 17,000 of an LCF). Worker doses at the CMR Building would decline as AC and MC operations transfer from the CMR Building to TA-55.

4.1.2.3 Hazardous Chemicals Impacts

Members of the public would not receive chemical-related health impacts from facility modifications and AC and MC operations at PF-4 and RLUOB. As stated in the 2015 CMRR SA (DOE 2015a), the laboratory quantities of chemicals that could be released to the atmosphere during normal operations would be minor and below the screening levels used to determine the need for additional analysis. Workers would be protected from adverse effects from the use of hazardous chemicals by adherence to OSHA and EPA occupational standards that limit concentrations of potentially hazardous chemicals.

Analysis of samples or components containing beryllium would be performed in RLUOB. Operations involving refining, machining, or manufacturing beryllium or beryllium-containing products that have the potential to expose workers to finely divided, respirable beryllium would not be performed in RLUOB. Historic operations involving finely divided, respirable beryllium have been a concern with DOE and NNSA and lessons learned from those past operations are applied through industrial hygiene programs at LANL. Engineering controls and procedures developed in accordance with the industrial hygiene program ensure existing operations with beryllium in PF-4 are protective of workers.

4.1.3 Environmental Consequences of the No Action Alternative

As with the Proposed Action Alternative (see Section 4.1.2), individual and population radiological doses and risks were determined for members of the public and for workers, and radiological doses and risks were
determined for an offsite MEI. The analysis again concentrated on impacts that could occur due to emissions of radioactive material to the air from RLUOB and PF-4 because neither facility modifications nor AC and MC operations would result in a discharge of radioactive material to the subsurface (including groundwater) or in an uncontrolled release of radioactive material to surface waters. In addition, the use of hazardous chemicals at LANL was evaluated for members of the public and for workers.

4.1.3.1 Radiological Impacts during Facility Modifications

As under the Proposed Action Alternative, current air emissions from RLUOB do not meaningfully contribute to the public dose from operations at LANL. Modifications to RLUOB are not expected to change the radiological air emissions from the facility because the modifications would occur in radiologically clean areas. No public radiation doses are expected from the modifications to PF-4 that were evaluated in the 2015 CMRR SA (DOE 2015a). Therefore, modifications to PF-4 under the No Action Alternative are not expected to result in public radiation doses. Radiological impacts to workers for modifications to PF-4 were evaluated in the 2015 CMRR SA and resulted primarily from the removal and replacement of gloveboxes and other enclosures and equipment at PF-4 (DOE 2015a).

The 2015 CMRR SA indicated that the total worker dose from modifications to PF-4 would be about 36 person-rem per year, and modifications to RLUOB would not result in any meaningful dose to workers. The average individual dose for a worker involved in PF-4 modifications would be about 300 millirem per year (DOE 2015a). As shown in Table 11, the total worker population dose for the entire period of facility modifications would be about 253 person-rem (DOE 2015a). The individual worker annual dose of 300 millirem would be well below the DOE worker dose limit of 5,000 millirem (10 CFR Part 835) and less than the administrative control limit at LANL of 500 millirem (DOE 2008a). If the same worker received the average annual dose for the entire period of facility modifications, that worker would receive a total dose of 2.1 rem.

Table 11. No Action Alternative – Radiological Impacts to Involved Workers during PF-4 Modifications

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Radiation Dose or Risk *</th>
<th>Individual Worker</th>
<th>Worker Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Annual Dose or Risk from Facility Modifications</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dose</td>
<td>300 millirem</td>
<td>36 person-rem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk (LCF)</td>
<td>2×10⁻⁴</td>
<td>0 (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dose limit</td>
<td>5,000 millirem</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative control limit</td>
<td>500 millirem</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Dose or Risk from Facility Modifications</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dose</td>
<td>2.1 rem</td>
<td>253 person-rem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk (LCF)</td>
<td>1×10⁻³</td>
<td>0 (0.2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

LCF = latent cancer fatality; PF-4 = Plutonium Facility, Building 4.

* The risk to an individual worker is the risk of an LCF and is a value less than or equal to 1. The risk to the worker population is the projected number of LCFs in the population and is a whole number; the calculated number of LCFs is provided in parentheses.

† Estimated worker dose from 2015 CMRR SA for workers involved in enclosure and equipment removal, reconfiguration, and replacement activities at PF-4 (DOE 2015a). The same worker was assumed to be involved in facility modifications for the entire period.

‡ Estimated worker population dose for PF-4 modifications from the 2015 CMRR SA (DOE 2015a).

§ Based on worker risk estimates of 0.0006 LCFs per person-rem (DOE 2003a).


‖ DOE 2008a.

No LCFs are expected within the worker population because the calculated number of LCFs in the population from doses received annually and over the entire facility modification period is less than 1 (calculated values of 0.02 LCF and 0.2 LCF, respectively). For an individual worker, the risk of an LCF is 2×10⁻⁴ (1 chance in 5,000 of an LCF) annually; if that worker received the average annual dose for the
entire period of facility modifications, the risk of that worker receiving an LCF would be \(1 \times 10^{-3}\) (1 chance in 1,000 of an LCF).

### 4.1.3.2 Radiological Impacts during AC and MC Operations

Radiological emissions from RLUOB and PF-4 are not expected to exceed the annual quantities listed in Table 8 under the Proposed Action Alternative. As discussed in Section 4.1.2.2, LANL has indicated that AC and MC operations would be reduced, which would correspondingly reduce RLUOB and PF-4 emissions compared to those from historical use of the CMR Building. Nonetheless, the emissions projected in the *CMRR EIS* (DOE 2003b) and *CMRR SEIS* (DOE 2011c) for AC and MC operations were conservatively assumed for this EA as well as in the 2015 *CMRR SA* (DOE 2015a).

Due to the limitations on material quantities that would be imposed on activities in RLUOB, some AC and MC operations requiring larger quantities of material would be performed at PF-4. The decision on which facility would be used for a test would be made as individual testing needs are identified. The portion of work to be performed at each facility has not yet been defined, but under the No Action Alternative, there would be greater restrictions on the quantities of material that could be used at RLUOB than under the Proposed Action Alternative. Therefore, it was assumed that all emissions under the No Action Alternative would come from PF-4. Conversely, for the Proposed Action Alternative, all emissions were assumed to occur from RLUOB. These two assumptions enable a comparison of the differences in public impacts between the No Action and Proposed Action Alternatives.

Potential radiological impacts were estimated for the general public living within 50 miles of PF-4. **Table 12** shows the annual collective impacts to the population projected to be living within a 50-mile radius of PF-4 in 2030 (a population of approximately 488,000; see footnote 24); the impacts to an average member of the public; and the impacts to an offsite MEI who is located at the LANL site boundary directly north of PF-4.

**Table 12. No Action Alternative – Annual Radiological Impacts on Members of the Public from AC and MC Operations**

| Radiation Dose or Risk  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maximally Exposed Individual</td>
<td>Population Within 50 Miles</td>
<td>Average Individual Within 50 Miles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dose</td>
<td>0.16 millirem</td>
<td>1.2 person-rem</td>
<td>0.0025 millirem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk (LCF) c</td>
<td>(1 \times 10^{-7})</td>
<td>0 ((7 \times 10^{-6}))</td>
<td>(1 \times 10^{-9})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulatory limit d</td>
<td>10 millirem</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
<td>10 millirem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dose as a percentage of the regulatory limit</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dose from natural background radiation</td>
<td>570 millirem</td>
<td>220,000 person-rem</td>
<td>430 millirem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dose as a percentage of background dose</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.0005</td>
<td>0.0006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AC = analytical chemistry; LCF = latent cancer fatality; MC = materials characterization.

- The risk to an MEI or to an average individual within 50 miles is the risk of an LCF and is a value less than or equal to 1. The risk to the population within 50 miles is the projected number of LCFs in the population and is a whole number; the calculated number of LCFs is provided in parentheses.
- The population dose for this table was based on a projected 2030 population estimate of 488,152 surrounding PF-4. The population within a 50-mile radius, as determined from U.S. Census data for 2015 (Census 2017a), was projected to 2030 based on the trends in the populations in the counties within the 50-mile radius.
- Based on a risk estimator of 0.0006 LCFs per rem or person-rem (DOE 2003a).
- DOE Order 458.1 establishes an annual limit of 10 millirem via the air pathway to any member of the public from DOE operations. This limit was derived from the requirements in 40 CFR Part 61, Subpart H.
Table 12 shows the annual population dose associated with AC and MC operations to be 1.2 person-rem. The MEI would receive an annual dose of 0.16 millirem, and the annual dose to an average individual in the population would be 0.0025 millirem. DOE has established an annual limit of 10 millirem for a radiation dose received from releases of radionuclides to the air from all sources at a DOE site (DOE Order 458.1 [DOE 2011a]). The MEI dose from PF-4 operations would be less than 2 percent of this limit, while the average individual dose would be well below 1 percent of this limit. Additionally, Table 12 provides for comparison the population and individual doses from exposure to natural background radiation levels for the Los Alamos area. As shown, the population and individual doses from AC and MC operations are both well below 1 percent of the dose from natural background radiation.

No LCFs are expected within the general population because the annual risk of an LCF in the population is much less than 1 \( (7 \times 10^{-4}) \). The increased risk of an average individual within 50 miles developing an LCF would be about \( 1 \times 10^{-9} \), or 1 chance in 1 billion per year of operation. For the MEI, there would be an increased annual risk of developing an LCF of about \( 1 \times 10^{-7} \), or 1 chance in 10 million per year of operation.

Until RLUOB and PF-4 begin AC and MC operations, public impacts from operation of the CMR Building would continue, as addressed in Section 4.1.2.2. That is, the projected 2020 population within 50 miles of the CMR Building would receive an annual dose of 0.059 person-rem, with no expected LCFs within this population (calculate value of \( 4 \times 10^{-5} \) LCF). The average individual within this population and the MEI would receive doses of \( 1.3 \times 10^{-5} \) millirem and 0.0059 millirem, respectively, with risks of an LCF of \( 7.9 \times 10^{-11} \) (1 chance in 13 billion) and \( 3.5 \times 10^{-9} \) (1 chance in 290 million), respectively.

The radiological impacts to AC and MC workers at PF-4 and RLUOB were evaluated in the 2015 CMRR SA (DOE 2015a). Projected worker doses at PF-4 were based on the average dose to a PF-4 worker prior to the facility modifications, which is higher than the worker dose for a CMR worker and higher than the average dose to a LANL worker who receives a measurable dose. Based on this average worker dose and the assumed 60-person work force for AC and MC operations in PF-4 and 100 in RLUOB (DOE 2015a), the average and total workforce radiological impacts are presented in Table 13. The average worker dose would be 170 millirem per year in PF-4 and 10 millirem per year in RLUOB. These individual worker annual doses would be well below the DOE worker dose limit of 5,000 millirem (10 CFR Part 835) and less than the administrative control limit of 500 millirem at LANL (DOE 2008a). The resulting annual worker population dose would be 11 person-rem.

No LCFs from this annual dose are expected among the worker population because the calculated risk of an LCF is much less than 1 \( (7 \times 10^{-3}) \). The average individual risks of an LCF from these annual doses are \( 1 \times 10^{-4} \) (1 chance in 10,000 of an LCF) and \( 6 \times 10^{-6} \) (1 chance in about 170,000 of an LCF), respectively, for a worker at PF-4 and RLUOB.

Until all AC and MC operations are established in RLUOB and PF-4, workers performing AC and MC operations at the CMR Building would continue to receive radiation doses. In the CMRR SEIS (DOE 2011c), the annual worker dose at the CMR Building was estimated to be 21 person-rem, and the annual average individual radiation dose was estimated to be 100 millirem, representing an annual risk of an LCF of \( 6 \times 10^{-5} \) (1 chance in about 17,000 of an LCF). Worker doses at the CMR Building would decline as AC and MC operations transfer to RLUOB and PF-4.

4.1.3.3 Hazardous Chemicals Impacts

Members of the public would not receive chemical-related health impacts from facility modifications and AC and MC operations at PF-4 and RLUOB. As stated in the 2015 CMRR SA (DOE 2015a), the laboratory quantities of chemicals that could be released to the atmosphere during normal operations would be minor and below the screening levels used to determine the need for additional analysis. Workers would be protected from adverse effects from the use of hazardous chemicals by adherence to OSHA and EPA occupational standards that limit concentrations of potentially hazardous chemicals.
Table 13. No Action Alternative – Annual Radiological Impacts of AC and MC Operations on Involved Workers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Radiation Dose or Risk a</th>
<th>Individual Worker</th>
<th>Worker Population b</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>PF-4 Dose or Risk</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dose</td>
<td>170 millirem c</td>
<td>10 person-rem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk (LCF) d</td>
<td>1x10^{-4}</td>
<td>0 (6x10^{-3})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RLUOB Dose or Risk</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dose</td>
<td>10 millirem c</td>
<td>1 person-rem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk (LCF) d</td>
<td>6x10^{-6}</td>
<td>0 (6x10^{-4})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Dose or Risk</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dose</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk (LCF) d</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
<td>0 (7x10^{-3})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dose limit c</td>
<td>5,000 millirem</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative control limit f</td>
<td>500 millirem</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AC = analytical chemistry; LCF = latent cancer fatality; MC = materials characterization; PF-4 = Plutonium Facility, Building 4; RLUOB = Radiological Laboratory/Utility/Office Building.

- a The risk to an individual worker is the risk of an LCF and is a value less than or equal to 1. The risk to the worker population is the projected number of LCFs in the population and is a whole number; the calculated number of LCFs is provided in parentheses.
- b Based on an AC and MC worker population of 60 at PF-4 and 100 at RLUOB (DOE 2015a). Dose limits and administrative limits do not exist for worker populations.
- c Dose evaluated in the 2015 CMRR SA for workers at PF-4 and RLUOB (DOE 2015a).
- d Based on worker risk estimates of 0.0006 LCFs per rem or person-rem (DOE 2003a).
- f DOE 2008a.

4.2 Human Health – Facility Accidents

Potential accidents associated with operations at PF-4, RLUOB, and support facilities have been extensively evaluated in existing NEPA documents and safety analyses for those facilities. These NEPA documents include the CMRR EIS (DOE 2003b), LANL SWEIS (DOE 2008a), CMRR-NF SEIS (DOE 2011c), 2015 CMRR SA (DOE 2015a), and Final Surplus Plutonium Disposition Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SPD Supplemental EIS) (DOE/EIS-0283-S2) (DOE 2015c). These facilities maintain safety basis documents that evaluate the hazards associated with operations and identify controls to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of workers, the public, and the environment, taking into account the work to be performed and the associated hazards (10 CFR 830.4(c)). In addition, the LANL Data Call Response (LANL 2018) reviews the range of potential nuclear and chemical hazards in RLUOB and identified bounding accident scenarios based on the existing safety documents for RLUOB and the CMR Building.

For this EA, the proposed operations at affected facilities were reviewed to determine whether the new operations would result in substantial changes to the accident risks identified in safety basis documents in previous NEPA analyses. The NEPA documents cited above evaluate a range of accidents, including operational accidents such as spills, fires, and explosions; accidents initiated by external events such as wildfires and aircraft crashes; and natural phenomena-initiated events such as earthquakes. The operations associated with the proposed activities at PF-4 and RLUOB are similar to those identified in the current NEPA documents that support those facilities, including the 2015 CMRR SA, which evaluated the categorization of RLUOB as a Radiological Facility with a radioactive material inventory limit of less than 38.6 grams PuE (i.e., the current No Action Alternative); the LANL SWEIS and the SPD Supplemental EIS for PF-4; the CMRR EIS; the CMRR-NF SEIS for RLUOB; and the LANL SWEIS for support facilities including waste management capabilities in TA-50 and TA-54. The proposed changes evaluated in this EA do not introduce new types of hazards compared to those identified in these existing NEPA documents, and the accident risks are expected to be well within the range of those reported in them. In some cases,
the amounts of radionuclides in gloveboxes and rooms would decrease substantially from the quantities assumed in these previous NEPA documents. From an accident risk and impact perspective, the principal difference between the No Action Alternative and the Proposed Action Alternative is the proposal to raise the RLUOB building inventory limit from less than 38.6 grams PuE to 400 grams PuE. No new accident scenarios were identified during tours of RLUOB, review of existing NEPA documents, or evaluation of the LANL safety reviews of the Proposed Action in RLUOB and the existing safety basis documents for PF-4.

The following subsections identify how the proposed changes in operations at PF-4, RLUOB, and support facilities would affect accident risks in those facilities, and describe the extent to which the accident risks reported in the existing NEPA documents bound the incremental risks associated with the proposed changes in operations. This EA refers to existing analyses in previous NEPA documents and safety analyses, and – particularly for RLUOB – models the impacts from potential accidents using the MACCS2 (MELCOR Accident Consequence Code System) computer code (NRC 1990, 1998). Inputs to the analyses include the source term for each modeled accident, which refers to the quantity of material released to the environment from the accident. The source term is initiated by aerosolization of the material from the accident, which depends on the form of the material, the degree and robustness of the containment, and the energetics of the accident scenario. Once the material is aerosolized, it must travel through building confinement and filtration systems or bypass the systems before there is a possibility of release to the air. No accident scenarios were identified that would result in a substantial release of radioactive material via liquid pathways.

The five-factor formula from DOE-HDBK-3010-95 (DOE 2013b) was used to estimate the airborne source term for each evaluated accident:

\[
\text{Source Term} = \text{MAR} \times \text{DR} \times \text{ARF} \times \text{RF} \times \text{LPF}
\]

Where:
- \( \text{MAR} \) = material-at-risk (curies or grams)
- \( \text{DR} \) = damage ratio
- \( \text{ARF} \) = airborne release fraction
- \( \text{RF} \) = respirable fraction
- \( \text{LPF} \) = leak path factor

Radioactive doses and risks were evaluated for noninvolved workers, the offsite population, and an MEI. A noninvolved worker is a site worker outside of a facility who would not be subject to direct radiation exposure, but could be exposed to emissions from that facility, particularly during postulated accidents. The offsite population comprises members of the general public living within 50 miles of an affected facility. The MEI is a hypothetical member of the public at a location of public access that would result in the highest exposure, which was assumed to be at the LANL site boundary during postulated accidents. For individuals or population groups, estimates of potential LCFs were made using a risk estimator of 0.0006 LCF per rem or person-rem (DOE 2003a). For acute doses to an individual equal to or greater than 20 rem, the factor was doubled (NCRP 1993).

Appendix A provides details on the above formula factors and other features of the accident analyses.

### 4.2.1 Potential Accidents at PF-4

Potential severe accidents in PF-4 were evaluated in the *LANL SWEIS* (DOE 2008a) and, more recently, in the *SPD Supplemental EIS* (DOE 2015c). These analyses demonstrate that the PF-4 structure and support equipment provide substantial confinement of radionuclides. The *SPD Supplemental EIS* reflects current operating modes and includes results from TA-55 safety basis documents, including the then current Documented Safety Analysis (DSA).
4.2.1.1 Current/Existing NEPA Accident Analysis for PF-4

The SPD Supplemental EIS provides a detailed evaluation of accidents at PF-4, based on accidents evaluated in the PF-4 DSAs. Although many types and isotopic mixtures of plutonium and other radionuclides may be present at PF-4, the PF-4 DSA focuses on weapons-grade plutonium, which is mostly plutonium-239, and heat-source plutonium, which is mostly plutonium-238. For safety analysis purposes, the plutonium inventories for all types and isotopic mixtures are expressed in terms of plutonium-239 equivalent. Thus, for the purposes of this EA, plutonium quantities at PF-4 and in releases from the evaluated accidents are presented as PuE.

Operational accidents included a nuclear criticality (uncontrolled fission reaction), a spill involving 4,500 grams of molten plutonium, a glovebox fire involving 9,000 grams of plutonium, a vault fire involving 1,500 kilograms of plutonium, and a hydrogen deflagration involving 1,040 grams of plutonium in salts and 1,040 grams of plutonium in oxides. In addition, a design-basis earthquake with spills and fires (with degraded confinement) was evaluated, assuming the entire processing (first) floor safety limit of plutonium (2,600 kilograms) was at risk and subject to spillage and fires. In the evaluation of a beyond-design-basis earthquake plus fire, the building ventilation system, the building structure, and the filters were assumed to have failed and to not substantially limit release of material to the environment.

For the SPD Supplemental EIS (DOE 2015c), accident source terms were developed that present realistic, yet conservative, estimates of potential releases from PF-4. These accident scenarios were called the SEIS Scenarios in the SPD Supplemental EIS. For these SEIS scenarios, the building confinement, including HEPA filters, was expected to continue functioning, although perhaps at a degraded level, during and after the accident.

4.2.1.2 Proposed AC and MC Operations at PF-4

The enhancement of AC and MC operations at PF-4 under both the No Action and Proposed Action Alternatives would replace past PF-4 operations that have been evaluated in PF-4 safety basis documents. Under both alternatives, the proposed AC and MC operations in PF-4 would be similar to those identified in the CMRR EIS (DOE 2003b) and CMRR-NF SEIS (DOE 2011c), as planned for CMRR-NF. In those EISs, a range of operational accidents was considered, but controls were expected to be in place, including a hardened structure and a robust confinement system that would ensure all operational accidents at CMRR-NF would only release radioactive material to the environment through controlled release via HEPA filters. Similar safety controls are in place at PF-4.

Operational Accidents—For both alternatives, the proposed AC and MC operations could involve operations on samples of nuclear material taken in gram quantities or less from quantities of nuclear material of up to several kilograms (hence the need to conduct operations in a Hazard Category 2 Nuclear Facility instead of RLUOB). The overall inventory of AC and MC materials in PF-4 would likely be less than 10 percent of the PF-4 processing floor inventory, and most of the AC and MC material would be in the form of non-dispersible metal. For AC operations, about 70 percent of the inventory would be metal; for MC operations, more than 95 percent would be metal (DOE 2015a). Potential accidents associated with the proposed AC and MC operations would not have sufficient inherent energy to aerosolize and disperse more material within a glovebox than the bounding operational accidents for PF-4 that were evaluated in the SPD Supplemental EIS (DOE 2015c). Those bounding operational accidents could result in airborne plutonium within a PF-4 glovebox from a spill of 4,500 grams of molten plutonium in a glovebox used for the Advanced Recovery and Integrated Extraction System project (SEIS Scenario: 0.028 grams PuE stack release), or a glovebox fire involving 9,000 grams of plutonium (SEIS Scenario: 0.024 grams PuE stack release). The SPD Supplemental EIS hydrogen deflagration accident from dissolution of plutonium metal was estimated to result in a stack release of 2.2 grams PuE under the SEIS Scenario (DOE 2015c, Table D-9).
The radiological impacts from bounding operational accidents at PF-4 were estimated in the *SPD Supplemental EIS* to result in doses of up to 0.11 rem to an individual at the site boundary and up to 26 person-rem to the population within 50 miles (with no LCFs expected) (DOE 2015c, Table D-18). The revisions to the PF-4 DSAs between 2011 and 2015 would not change this result. The MAR associated with the proposed AC and MC operations would be lower than that in PF-4 gloveboxes, as evaluated in the *SPD Supplemental EIS*. Thus, the impacts from accidents involving the proposed AC and MC operations in PF-4 would be bounded by the impacts evaluated in the *SPD Supplemental EIS*.

**Seismically Initiated Accidents**—For both alternatives, the proposed AC and MC operations would not be expected to increase source terms or material releases from PF-4, compared to any of the seismically initiated accidents evaluated for this facility in the *SPD Supplemental EIS*. New AC and MC operations would replace existing activities involving plutonium, as evaluated in current safety basis documents and the *SPD Supplemental EIS* PF-4 accident analysis. The total building plutonium inventory associated with the proposed AC and MC operations would represent a small fraction of current building inventories. For the design-basis earthquake with spill and fire evaluated in the *SPD Supplemental EIS*, the entire processing (first) floor safety limit of plutonium (2,600 kilograms) was considered at risk and subject to spillage and fires. Replacement of some activities evaluated in the *SPD Supplemental EIS* with the AC and MC operations proposed in this EA would not change these material limits. In fact, the MAR associated with the proposed AC and MC operations would be lower than that assumed to be in gloveboxes and PF-4 rooms in the *SPD Supplemental EIS* analysis. The forms of the materials associated with AC and MC operations are not expected to be more vulnerable to large-scale aerosolization in seismic spills and fire accidents than those evaluated in the *SPD Supplemental EIS*. Thus, the impacts from seismically initiated accidents involving the proposed AC and MC operations in PF-4 would be bounded by the impacts evaluated in the *SPD Supplemental EIS*, and the contribution of AC and MC operations to these impacts would be small. For the design-basis earthquake with spill plus fire, the release to the environment was estimated for the SEIS Scenario to be 3.8 to 6.0 grams PuE, depending on the alternative addressed in the *SPD Supplemental EIS* for surplus plutonium disposition (DOE 2015c).

The radiological impacts from the design-basis earthquake with spill plus fire accident were estimated in the *SPD Supplemental EIS* to result in doses of up to 0.19 to 0.30 rem to an individual at the site boundary and up to 71 person-rem to the population within 50 miles (with no LCFs expected) (DOE 2015c, Table D-18). The revisions to the PF-4 DSA between 2011 and 2014 would result in a slight reduction to these doses.

For the beyond-design-basis earthquake with spill plus fire accident, the most recent analysis of potential releases to the environment is in the PF-4 DSA addendum that was addressed in the *SPD Supplemental EIS* (DOE 2015c). That analysis evaluated the potential radiological impacts of an earthquake so severe that it caused major structural damage to the heavily reinforced PF-4. The earthquake was assumed to damage the internal structures, causing the roof to collapse onto the first floor and the first floor to collapse into the basement. It was assumed for analysis that radioactive materials within PF-4 would spill and be impacted by falling structural components, and a major, facility-wide fire would ensue. The assumed extent of damage is highly unlikely, even in an earthquake with ground motion much higher than that of the design-basis earthquake. Although there could be a substantial release of radioactive material following such an earthquake accompanied by a facility-wide fire, loss of life within the facility and within the region due to seismic damage would be the predominant impact of such an earthquake.

The estimated releases to the atmosphere are 321 grams PuE under an *SPD Supplemental EIS* alternative whereby 2 metric tons of plutonium would be processed at PF-4, and 362 grams PuE under an *SPD Supplemental EIS* alternative whereby 35 metric tons of plutonium would be processed at PF-4 (DOE 2015c, Table D-9). Of these releases, materials associated with the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Program would account for approximately 18 percent of the release under the lower throughput case and 32 percent under the higher throughput case.
The radiological impacts from the beyond design-basis earthquake with spill plus fire accident were estimated in the *SPD Supplemental EIS* to result in doses of 16 to 18 rem to an individual at the site boundary and up to 4,300 person-rem in the population within 50 miles (with up to 3 LCFs) (DOE 2015c, Table D-18).

Because the material inventories associated with AC and MC operations are primarily in non-dispersible metal forms, represent less than 10 percent of the overall building inventories, and would not increase the facility MAR, they would not appreciably add to the source term of earthquake-initiated accidents. Consequently, the potential impacts from the bounding accidents evaluated in the *SPD Supplemental EIS* or current PF-4 safety documents would not be affected by the proposed AC and MC operations.

### 4.2.1.3 Intentional Destructive Acts with the Proposed AC and MC Operations at PF-4

The enhancement of AC and MC operations at PF-4 under both the No Action and Proposed Action Alternatives would replace PF-4 operations that have been evaluated in PF-4 safety basis documents and would not increase the overall amount of radioactive material within PF-4. The potential impacts from intentional destructive acts at PF-4 have been previously evaluated in NEPA documentation as discussed in Section 4.1.2.5 of the *SPD Supplemental EIS* (DOE 2015c). For that EIS, NNSA prepared a classified analysis of the potential impacts of intentional destructive acts. Substantive details of intentional destructive act scenarios, security countermeasures, and potential impacts are not released to the public because disclosure of this information could be exploited. An overview of the security system at LANL, however, is provided in a text box in Section 2.2.

### 4.2.2 Potential Accidents in RLUOB

The *LANL Data Call Response* (LANL 2018) reviews the potential nuclear and chemical hazards at RLUOB that are associated with ongoing operations, both as a Radiological Facility (under the No Action Alternative) and as a Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility with a 400-gram PuE building inventory limit (under the Proposed Action Alternative).

The chemical inventory and the projected impacts to a collocated worker at 100 meters and a member of the public at 1,000 meters as a fraction of the DOE protective action criteria (PAC) are presented in the *LANL Data Call Response* (LANL 2018). This analysis indicates that no chemical inventory currently exceeds the PAC for either the collocated worker or the public, and the chemical hazard is classified as low. Any revisions to this summary as a result of revisions to the predicted annual facility inventory or presence of new chemicals would be reflected in the Preliminary DSA for RLUOB if the Proposed Action Alternative is selected (LANL 2018). Possible revisions would not exceed PAC levels warranting controls, given the AC and MC operations. Because the chemical hazards to workers were considered standard industrial hazards, and the risks to the public have been shown to be a fraction of PAC-2 level, chemical hazards are not evaluated further in this EA.

The potential nuclear accident scenarios at RLUOB that would be associated with a 400-gram PuE building inventory limit were reviewed for this EA based on past accident evaluations. The AC and MC operations that would take place in RLUOB would be similar to those currently occurring in the CMR Building, Wings 5 and 7, except the MAR limit would be 4,000 grams PuE in each wing. The overall CMR Building limit is even greater (9,000 grams PuE).

The hazards identified for RLUOB operating as a MAR-Limited Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility are as follows:

- Fires within the building, a room, or a glovebox
- Explosions due to overpressurizations
- Loss of confinement due to a spill within laboratories or impact during operations
- Direct exposure
- Criticality
External events (including man-made events), including natural gas explosion, wildland fire, airplane crash, or vehicle impact

Natural phenomenon, including high wind, earthquake, and lightning strike

The LANL Data Call Response identifies a range of controls to prevent or mitigate the postulated accidents, including glovebox or hood; glovebox heat detection; facility ventilation systems; air monitors; fire suppression system; fire detection and paging system; fire barriers; and limits on combustibles. A specific administrative control for the proposed recategorization of RLUOB as a Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility is the building MAR limit of 400 grams PuE; this value is used in the analysis of potential impacts in this EA. In addition, a special administrative control of 100 grams PuE as a laboratory room limit would mitigate dose consequences to facility workers in the event of an accident (LANL 2018).

Based on a review of previously prepared NEPA documents and the LANL Data Call Response (LANL 2018), the following accidents were selected for evaluation in this EA. These accidents are expected to represent all accidents that might occur in RLUOB with either the 38.6-gram or 400-gram PuE building inventory limit.

Process or Facility-Wide Spill—All of the NEPA documents and safety analyses identify a potential accident whereby a spill results in loss of confinement of the material and release to a room, the building ventilation system (if available), and potentially, the environment. The spill could be initiated by an operator error, equipment failure, impact on the material by equipment, or a severe earthquake. The MAR for this accident could range from a few grams for most glovebox accidents to, in principle, the building inventory limit of 400 grams PuE under the Proposed Action Alternative and up to 38.6 grams PuE under the No Action Alternative. Because most of the dispersible radioactive materials would be in containers and would not be readily spilled, it was assumed that no more than 10 percent of the building inventory would be in the form of readily dispersible material (i.e., oxide). That is, the damage ratio (DR) was assumed to be 0.1. Because no controls on the form of the material to be analyzed in RLUOB (powder, liquid, or solid) are currently planned, it was assumed that the material would be in the form that is most easily released and results in the greatest radiological impacts. Thus, it was assumed that the spilled material would be powder, with an airborne release fraction (ARF) of 0.002 and a respirable fraction (RF) of 0.3, for a combined ARF×RF of 0.0006. For most spills within RLUOB, the building ventilation and HEPA filtration systems are expected to continue to function, although perhaps at a degraded level. Because a spill would not be expected to threaten the integrity of the building or its HEPA filters, a leak path factor (LPF) of 0.005 was assumed.

Process or Facility-Wide Fire—All of the NEPA and safety documents identify a potential accident whereby a fire results in loss of confinement of the material and release to a room, the building ventilation system (if available), and potentially, the environment. The fire could be initiated by an operator error, equipment failure, impact on the material by equipment, or a severe earthquake. The MAR for this accident could range from a few grams for most glovebox accidents up to, in principle, the building inventory limit of 400 grams PuE under the Proposed Action Alternative and up to 38.6 grams PuE under the No Action Alternative. Because no controls on the form of the material to be analyzed in RLUOB (powder, liquid, or solid) are currently planned, it was assumed that the material would be in the form that is most easily released and results in the greatest radiological impacts. Release mechanisms include burning or oxidation of plutonium metal, evaporation of heated solutions, and aerosolization of oxides. Because most of the metals and dispersible radiological materials would be in containers and not subject to burning, it was assumed that no more than 10 percent of the building inventory would be in a form subject to rapid oxidation (i.e., burning) or would be readily dispersible (i.e., oxide). Thus, a DR of 0.1 was assumed.

Because the types of operations planned for RLUOB are similar to those historically performed at the CMR Building, most of the inventory will likely be in the form of metal. Because the bounding release mechanism is burning metal, an ARF of 0.0005 and an RF of 0.5 was assumed, for a combined ARF×RF of 0.00025.
For small fires within RLUOB, the building ventilation system is expected to continue to function, although perhaps at a degraded level. The building ventilation system is currently designated as an “item relied upon for safety.” Because the postulated fire is not expected to threaten the integrity of the building confinement system or the HEPA filters, an LPF of 0.005 was assumed.

**Natural Gas Explosion**—The *LANL Data Call Response* identifies a natural gas explosion as a potential accident scenario. A natural gas line is adjacent to RLUOB, and a leak of natural gas into the building and a subsequent explosion could be a mechanism that results in spillage, loss of confinement, and subsequent fires. Controls including adherence to national consensus codes and standards are in place to minimize this type of accident (LANL 2018). For this EA, the radiological impacts from this potential accident are bounded by those from a large earthquake and fire, as addressed below.

**Seismic-Induced Spill and Fire**—All of the NEPA documents and safety analyses identify a potential accident whereby a major earthquake is the initiator of spills, impacts, and fires that result in loss of confinement of the material and release to a room, the building ventilation system (if available), and potentially, the environment. The MAR for this accident could range from a few grams for most glovebox accidents up to, in principle, the building inventory limit of 400 grams PuE under the Proposed Action Alternative and up to 38.6 grams PuE under the No Action Alternative. Release mechanisms include spills and impacts to oxides and liquids, burning or oxidation of plutonium metal, evaporation of heated solutions, and aerosolization of oxides due to fires. However, because most of the dispersible radiological materials would be in containers and would not be readily spilled, it was assumed that about 10 percent of the inventory would be in the form of powder that would be subject to dispersal due to seismically initiated spills, impact, blast, and (to a lesser extent) fire (i.e., a DR equal to 0.1). Because no controls on the form of the material to be analyzed in RLUOB (i.e., powder, liquid or solid) are currently planned, it was assumed that the material would be in a form that is most easily released and results in the greatest radiological impacts. It was thus assumed that the material would be in the form of powder, with a combined ARF×RF of 0.0041 due to the combined effects of blast, spill, and impact.

The LPF after a seismic-induced spill and fire is uncertain. The building ventilation system would not be expected to function effectively during and immediately after the event. In the *SPD Supplemental EIS* (DOE 2015c), it was assumed that, for new facilities and significantly upgraded facilities, the ventilation system would be designed not to fail catastrophically (DOE 2015c). Consequently, a building LPF of 0.1 was assumed for this EA and is expected to be conservative and to adequately represent an LPF for cracks in the building or transport through rubble.

**Table 14** presents the MAR, building LPFs, and releases for each major accident under the Proposed Action and No Action Alternatives. Accident frequencies presented in Table 14 are estimates based on similar accidents identified in other LANL NEPA documents, as discussed in Appendix A, Section A.1.6.

**Table 15** presents the impacts to the MEI, to the population within 50 miles of RLUOB, and to a downwind noninvolved worker for the accident scenarios.

Table 15 shows that the risks from the evaluated accidents under the Proposed Action Alternative are about a factor of 10 larger than those under the No Action Alternative. Still, the risks under both alternatives are small. None of the evaluated accidents in either alternative would result in an LCF in the population within 50 miles of RLUOB; similarly, none of the accidents evaluated for either alternative would result in a risk to the MEI or onsite noninvolved worker that would exceed 1. The potential accident with the largest risks is a seismic-induced spill and fire under the Proposed Action Alternative. For this accident, no LCFs are expected in the population within 50 miles of RLUOB (calculated value: 2×10⁻⁷ LCF). The risk of an LCF to the MEI would be 2×10⁻⁸ (1 chance in about 50 million of an LCF), while the risk of an LCF to the onsite noninvolved worker would be 4×10⁻⁸ (1 chance in 25 million of an LCF).
Table 14. Accident Scenarios and Source Terms for RLUOB

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Accident</th>
<th>Frequency (per year)</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>DR</th>
<th>ARF</th>
<th>RF</th>
<th>LPF</th>
<th>Release (g PuE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Proposed Action Alternative</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process or Facility-Wide Spill</td>
<td>1×10^{-2} to 1×10^{-4} (unlikely)</td>
<td>400 g PuE</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>1.2×10^{4}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process or Facility-Wide Fire</td>
<td>1×10^{-2} to 1×10^{-4} (unlikely)</td>
<td>400 g PuE</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.0005</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>5.0×10^{4}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seismic-Induced Spill and Fire</td>
<td>1×10^{-2} to 1×10^{-4} (unlikely)</td>
<td>400 g PuE</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>ARF× RF 0.0041</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Action Alternative</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process or Facility-Wide Spill</td>
<td>1×10^{-2} to 1×10^{-4} (unlikely)</td>
<td>38.6 g PuE</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>1.2×10^{4}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process or Facility-Wide Fire</td>
<td>1×10^{-2} to 1×10^{-4} (unlikely)</td>
<td>38.6 g PuE</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.0005</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>5.0×10^{4}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seismic-Induced Spill and Fire</td>
<td>1×10^{-2} to 1×10^{-4} (unlikely)</td>
<td>38.6 g PuE</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>ARF× RF 0.0041</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.0016</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ARF = airborne release fraction; DR = damage ratio; g = grams; LPF = leak path factor; MAR = material-at-risk; PuE = plutonium-239 equivalent; RF = respirable fraction.

a Accident frequency ranges are discussed in Appendix A, Section A.1.6.

Table 15. RLUOB Radiological Accident Frequencies and Consequences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Accident</th>
<th>Accident Frequency (per year)</th>
<th>Maximally Exposed Individual a</th>
<th>Population within 50 Miles</th>
<th>Onsite Noninvolved Worker</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Dose (rem)</td>
<td>Increased Probability of LCF c</td>
<td>Dose (rem)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposed Action Alternative</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process or Facility-Wide Spill</td>
<td>1×10^{-2} to 1×10^{-4} (unlikely)</td>
<td>2.3×10^{-6}</td>
<td>1×10^{-9}</td>
<td>2.9×10^{-4}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process or Facility-Wide Fire</td>
<td>1×10^{-2} to 1×10^{-4} (unlikely)</td>
<td>8.9×10^{-8}</td>
<td>5×10^{-11}</td>
<td>7.6×10^{-5}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seismic-Induced Spill and Fire</td>
<td>1×10^{-2} to 1×10^{-4} (unlikely)</td>
<td>2.9×10^{-5}</td>
<td>2×10^{-8}</td>
<td>0.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Action Alternative</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process or Facility-Wide Spill</td>
<td>1×10^{-2} to 1×10^{-4} (unlikely)</td>
<td>2.2×10^{-7}</td>
<td>1×10^{-10}</td>
<td>2.8×10^{-5}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process or Facility-Wide Fire</td>
<td>1×10^{-2} to 1×10^{-4} (unlikely)</td>
<td>8.6×10^{-9}</td>
<td>5×10^{-12}</td>
<td>7.4×10^{-6}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seismic-Induced Spill and Fire</td>
<td>1×10^{-2} to 1×10^{-4} (unlikely)</td>
<td>2.8×10^{-6}</td>
<td>2×10^{-9}</td>
<td>0.0024</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

LCF = latent cancer fatality.

a The MEI was assumed to be 1.3 kilometers from the accident location.

b Accident frequency ranges are discussed in Appendix A, Section A.1.6.

c Increased risk of an LCF to an individual, assuming the accident occurs.

d The reported value is the projected number of LCFs in the population, assuming the accident occurs, and is therefore presented as a whole number. The result calculated by multiplying the collective population dose by the risk factor (0.0006 LCFs per rem or person-rem per DOE 2003a) is shown in parentheses.
**Intentional Destructive Acts at RLUOB**—The potential impacts of intentional destructive acts at LANL have been extensively evaluated in classified appendices to past NEPA documentation, including the *SPD Supplemental EIS* (DOE 2015c) and the *LANL SWEIS* (DOE 2008a). Substantive details of intentional destructive act scenarios, security countermeasures, and potential impacts are not released to the public because disclosure of this information could be exploited. An overview of the security system at LANL, however, is provided in a text box in Section 2.2.

The potential impacts from any physically reasonable release of radioactive materials due to an intentional destructive act at RLUOB would be bounded by the impacts for the “Seismic-Induced Spill and Fire” accident scenario addressed above. The accident scenario is assumed to affect the entire inventory of nuclear materials in the facility (400 grams of PuE). The parameters for that accident scenario were selected to provide an upper bound on the physically reasonable impacts from hypothetical catastrophic events impacting RLUOB, including a natural gas explosion within the building and a major earthquake that could cause major damage to the building structure and equipment and a subsequent fire. A separate analysis of the potential impacts of an intentional destructive act is therefore not necessary.

### 4.2.3 Combined Accident Implications

With implementation of either the Proposed Action or the No Action Alternative, the accident risks associated with nuclear operations in TA-55 would change, but those changes would be small, as discussed below. Such accident risks include those for PF-4, RLUOB, and support operations, including radioactive waste management activities in TA-54. In addition, the accident risks associated with ongoing AC and MC operations in the CMR Building and transfer of nuclear material between the CMR Building in TA-3 and the TA-55 facilities would be eliminated. Overall, NNSA expects that moving AC and MC operations from the CMR Building to modern or upgraded facilities in TA-55 would lower the accident risks associated with AC and MC operations.

The increment to accident risks in the TA-55 area would be small. Bounding operational accidents at PF-4, assuming existing operations, are projected to release 0.024 to 2.2 grams PuE to the environment (DOE 2015c, Table D-9). Replacement of activities in PF-4 rooms and gloveboxes with the AC and MC operations evaluated in this EA would not result in larger potential releases from these bounding operational accidents. The bounding operational accidents (i.e., process or facility-wide spill or fire) in RLUOB under the Proposed Action Alternative would release $5.0 \times 10^{-3}$ to $1.2 \times 10^{-4}$ gram PuE to the environment. The bounding operational release from RLUOB ($1.2 \times 10^{-4}$ gram) would represent 0.005 to 0.5 percent of the bounding operational accident releases from PF-4. More realistically, under both the Proposed Action and No Action Alternatives, many of the RLUOB safety controls, including building ventilation systems, would likely continue to function during most operational accidents.

Assuming a very severe seismic event were to occur that caused wide-scale spills and fires within PF-4, with or without the proposed AC and MC operations, releases of 3.8 to 6.0 grams PuE were estimated in the *SPD Supplemental EIS* (DOE 2015c) for the design-basis earthquake with spill plus fire, while releases of 321 to 362 grams PuE were estimated for the beyond-design basis earthquake with spill plus fire. The bounding seismic release from RLUOB with the proposed AC and MC operations would be $0.016$ and $0.0016$ grams PuE under the Proposed Action and No Action Alternatives, respectively. Thus, with the addition of AC and MC operations to PF-4 and RLUOB, the combined accident releases and corresponding impacts would be 0.3 to 0.4 percent larger under the Proposed Action Alternative than those from PF-4 alone, assuming a design-basis earthquake, and 0.03 to 0.04 percent larger than those from PF-4 alone under the No Action Alternative. Assuming a beyond design-basis earthquake, combined accident releases would be almost entirely attributable to releases from PF-4. The differences are primarily due to the *SPD Supplemental EIS* assumption that the building ventilation system in PF-4 would continue to function during a design-basis earthquake, with an LPF of 0.005 for plutonium.
Under the Proposed Action and No Action Alternatives, the accident risks associated with continued AC and MC operations at the CMR Building would be eliminated; these risks were evaluated in the CMRR EIS (DOE 2003b) and CMRR-NF SEIS (DOE 2011c).

Radioactive waste from the room and enclosure changes in PF-4 and the new AC and MC operations in PF-4 and RLUOB would not introduce new types of hazards to waste management activities in TA-54. Similar types of TRU waste (including legacy TRU waste), LLW, and MLLW from the CMR Building, PF-4, and other LANL activities have been routinely handled in TA-54. Waste volumes associated with upgrades to PF-4 and RLUOB and AC and MC operations would be small relative to historic waste volumes, as shown in Section 4.3. These additional waste volumes would not be expected to substantially change accident probabilities. Therefore, the radioactive waste associated with the proposed TA-55 facility modifications and new AC and MC operations would not substantially change the overall radioactive waste accident risks at TA-54.

4.3 Waste Management

4.3.1 Affected Environment

As summarized in the text box, LANL generates a variety of wastes, including TRU and mixed TRU wastes;24 LLW and MLLW; chemical waste; nonhazardous waste, including routine office trash (sanitary solid waste); and wastewaters (i.e., sanitary liquid waste and industrial effluent). Wastes at LANL are managed in accordance with Federal and state requirements applicable to specific waste types and their content. Operations are conducted in accordance with LANL’s waste minimization and pollution prevention program. See the LANL SWEIS (DOE 2008a) for additional information.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Environmental Assessment Definitions of Common Types of Waste at LANL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transuranic (TRU) waste—Waste containing more than 100 nanocuries of alpha-emitting transuranic isotopes with half-lives greater than 20 years per gram of waste.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-level radioactive waste (LLW)—Waste that is radioactive and does not fall into any of the following classifications: high-level radioactive waste, transuranic waste, spent nuclear material, or byproduct materials (uranium and thorium mill tailings).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed low-level radioactive waste (MLLW)—Waste that contains both LLW and hazardous waste, as defined by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). Management programs for MLLW at LANL include wastes that contain LLW and chemical constituents regulated under other statutes such as the New Mexico Solid Waste Regulations and the Toxic Substances Control Act.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical waste—Chemical waste is not a formal LANL waste category, but per the LANL SWEIS (DOE 2008a), denotes a broad category of materials including hazardous waste regulated under RCRA, toxic waste regulated under the Toxic Substances Control Act, and special waste designated under the New Mexico Solid Waste Regulations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonhazardous waste—Waste that is not radioactive or hazardous and can be disposed of in a permitted solid waste landfill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wastewater—Any water that has been adversely affected in quality by anthropogenic influence.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 16 lists annual quantities of solid radioactive and chemical wastes at LANL, PF-4, other facilities in TA-55, and the CMR Building, in comparison with quantities projected for LANL and these facilities in the LANL SWEIS (DOE 2008a). Quantities are listed for 2010 through 2014 (5 years), as reported in recent LANL SWEIS yearbooks (LANL 2012, 2013a, 2013b, 2015, 2016b). In addition, Table 16 lists the quantities of nonradioactive wastes that were recycled and disposed of during these years. Within this time frame, RLUOB generated only negligible quantities of radioactive and nonradioactive wastes. During all 5 years, the total quantities of all radioactive and chemical wastes annually generated at LANL were smaller than the projections in the LANL SWEIS, and between 44 and 84 percent of all nonhazardous waste was

24 The analysis of TRU waste management in this section includes mixed TRU waste. All TRU waste generated under the EA alternatives would be contact-handled TRU waste.
recycled rather than disposed. Generation of radioactive and chemical wastes at TA-55 (primarily PF-4) and the CMR Building was generally less than the annual projections in the LANL SWEIS. Exceptions were generation of MLLW at TA-55 during 1 year, generation of chemical waste at TA-55 during 4 years, and generation of TRU waste at the CMR Building during 1 year.

Table 16. Annual Los Alamos National Laboratory Waste Generation versus LANL SWEIS Projections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TRU a</td>
<td>170,000</td>
<td>61,300</td>
<td>61,300</td>
<td>91,000</td>
<td>118,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4,060</td>
<td>6,330</td>
<td>4,480</td>
<td>3,310</td>
<td>3,070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Projected Volume</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LLW</td>
<td>5,729,000</td>
<td>3,866,000</td>
<td>3,731,000</td>
<td>3,759,000</td>
<td>3,758,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>946,000</td>
<td>1,267,000</td>
<td>131,000</td>
<td>103,000</td>
<td>120,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Projected Volume</td>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MLLW</td>
<td>1,381,000</td>
<td>498,000</td>
<td>498,000</td>
<td>423,000</td>
<td>423,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4,020</td>
<td>3,290</td>
<td>1,440</td>
<td>34,000</td>
<td>3,070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Projected Volume</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>3.9</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>19,619,000</td>
<td>9,422,000</td>
<td>7,752,000</td>
<td>8,140,000</td>
<td>8,479,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Projected Volume</td>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3.2</td>
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<td>19,619,000</td>
<td>9,422,000</td>
<td>7,752,000</td>
<td>8,140,000</td>
<td>8,479,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent of Projected Volume</td>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.7</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>8,327,000</td>
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<td>Percent of Projected Volume</td>
<td></td>
<td>42</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>17</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,850</td>
<td>10,800</td>
<td>2,070</td>
<td>1,420</td>
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<td>44</td>
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<td>hazardous</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                      | TRU a | 11,900    | 11,900    | 11,900    | 11,900    | 11,900    |
|                      |       | 3,530     | 4,560     | 2,650     | 2,830     | 2,790     |
| Percent of Projected Volume |       | 30        | 38        | 22        | 24        | 24        |
|                      | LLW   | 26,700    | 26,700    | 26,700    | 26,700    | 26,700    |
|                      |       | 5,750     | 6,550     | 9,460     | 4,870     | 8,690     |
| Percent of Projected Volume |       | 22        | 25        | 35        | 18        | 33        |
|                      | MLLW  | 530       | 530       | 530       | 530       | 530       |
|                      |       | 755       | 385       | 78        | 106       | 35        |
| Percent of Projected Volume |       | 140       | 73        | 15        | 20        | 6.7       |
|                      | Chemical | 19,000   | 19,000    | 19,000    | 19,000    | 19,000    |
|                      |       | 26,100    | 32,400    | 16,200    | 339,000 b | 24,400    |
| Percent of Projected Quantity |       | 140       | 170       | 85        | 1,800 b   | 130       |

|                      | TRU a | 1,480     | 1,480     | 1,480     | 1,480     | 1,480     |
|                      |       | 7.4       | 7.9       | 103       | 20        | 10        |
| Percent of Projected Volume |       |           |           |           |           |           |
|                      | LLW   | 64,800    | 64,800    | 64,800    | 64,800    | 64,800    |
|                      |       | 22,400    | 15,700    | 3,020     | 1,900     | 106       |
| Percent of Projected Volume |       | 35        | 24        | 4.7       | 2.9       | 0.16      |
|                      | MLLW  | 671       | 671       | 671       | 671       | 671       |
Solid Radioactive Wastes—TA-54 has historically been the location of most LANL solid radioactive and chemical waste management capabilities. TRU waste storage capabilities in TA-54 include below-grade storage in shafts and above-grade storage in domes and on pads. Treatment capabilities include sorting, segregation, and size reduction; waste characterization capabilities include real-time radiography and high-efficiency neutron counting. After characterization, TRU waste was transferred to the Radioassay and Nondestructive Testing Facility (RANT), also located in TA-54, and loaded into TRUPACT packaging for shipment to WIPP (DOE 2015a).

Waste management capabilities in TA-54 are in transition. For many years LANL conducted LLW disposal operations in Area G in TA-54, but these disposal operations were discontinued within a 63-acre area in TA-54. LLW disposal operations elsewhere in Area G are paused. Capabilities exist in Area L of TA-54 for LLW, MLLW, and chemical waste storage, as well as staging for offsite shipment.

Waste management capabilities in TA-54 and other LANL locations have been upgraded. TRU waste characterization capabilities have been installed at TA-54, including nondestructive analysis, flammable gas testing, and the WIPP-certified visual examination process. Fully characterized TRU waste certified as compliant with the WIPP waste acceptance criteria (DOE 2016a) is loaded into TRUPACT packaging for shipment to WIPP. TRUPACT loading operations may occur at TA-55 or RANT (LANL 2018).

TRU waste storage capabilities in TA-55 were increased from 400 55-gallon drum equivalents to 1,600. As of March 2018, about 80 percent of the volume capacity had been used, as well as about 73 percent of the capacity based on MAR limits (LANL 2018). The Transuranic Waste Facility in TA-63 is capable of storing 825 55-gallon drum equivalents during normal operations and 1,240 drum equivalents during surge events (DOE 2015c).

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25 Over the past decade, LANL made considerable progress in reducing the amount of TRU waste stored at TA-54 through processing operations and shipment to WIPP. As of 2014, about 32,950 cubic feet of TRU waste remained in above-grade storage at TA-54, and 84,650 cubic feet remained in below-grade storage, a factor of 50 reduction from the 6,750,000 cubic feet in storage as of 2003 (DOE 2015a).

26 DOE decided to transition the waste management capabilities at LANL (73 FR 55833), including construction of the new TRU Waste Facility in TA-63, based on the analysis in the LANL SWEIS (DOE 2008a). Becoming operational in 2017, the TRU Waste Facility in TA-63 handles Defense Program newly generated solid TRU waste. (Newly generated solid TRU waste is waste generated after 1999.) The facility is a Hazard Category 2 Nuclear Facility, with a RCRA permit to store hazardous waste. It provides TRU waste storage capacity and includes a RCRA-permitted pad to house characterization and testing trailers used to certify the compliance of containers of TRU waste with the WIPP waste acceptance criteria. The facility also provides intra-site shipping, receiving, and operational support (DOE 2016d).
Other radioactive wastes generated at TA-55 will be managed using capabilities in TA-55 and TA-54. Staging of LLW for shipment off site for disposal may occur at TA-55 or in Area L of TA-54. Temporary storage of mixed LLW will occur, as required, at TA-55 or at a permitted location in Area L pending shipment off site for treatment or disposal (LANL 2018).

*Chemical Waste*—Chemical waste including solvents, unused chemicals, laboratory trash, and other materials may be temporarily stored at TA-55 or in Area L at TA-54 pending shipment offsite for treatment and/or disposal (DOE 2015c; LANL 2018).

*Solid Nonhazardous Waste*—Solid nonhazardous waste is generally transferred to the onsite Los Alamos County Eco Station before shipment to permitted recycle or disposal facilities, such as those in Rio Rancho and Valencia County (DOE 2015c).

*Wastewater*—The RLWTF in TA-50 is the principal LANL facility for treating liquid radioactive waste. It consists of a treatment facility, support buildings, and liquid and chemical storage tanks and receives liquid waste for treatment from various sites across LANL, with permitted outfall to Mortandad Canyon. The tank farm was upgraded in recent years, and new ultrafiltration, reverse osmosis, and nitrate reduction equipment was installed (DOE 2015c). Construction of a replacement for the RLWTF LLW treatment system is ongoing. This new system will include an evaporation unit to eliminate liquid discharges into the environment (DOE 2011c). Additional information about the upgrade project for RLWTF, which includes a facility for storage and treatment of liquid TRU waste, is provided in Chapter 5, Section 5.1.

Sanitary wastewater from LANL facilities is transferred to the Sanitary Wastewater Systems Plant in TA-46, which has an annual capacity of 220 million gallons of liquid sanitary waste. Treated water may be recycled at the TA-3 power plant (as makeup water for cooling towers) or discharged into Sandia Canyon via a permitted outfall. Industrial effluent is discharged through National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permitted outfalls. The number of outfalls and annual effluent volumes has been reduced in recent years, with a goal of achieving zero liquid discharge (DOE 2015c).

### 4.3.2 Environmental Consequences of the Proposed Action Alternative

#### 4.3.2.1 Waste from Facility Modifications

Waste from facility modifications would include radioactive wastes, chemical waste, and nonhazardous waste, such as general trash. Table 17 summarizes the projected types and quantities of radioactive wastes from facility modifications. Additional information about radioactive and nonradioactive waste generation is provided below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Waste Type</th>
<th>Proposed Action Alternative</th>
<th>No Action Alternative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PF-4</td>
<td>RLUOB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRU waste</td>
<td>3,030</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LLW</td>
<td>4,660</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLLW</td>
<td>3,460</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

LLW = low-level radioactive waste; MLLW = mixed low-level radioactive waste; PF-4 = Plutonium Facility, Building 4; RLUOB = Radiological Laboratory/Utility/Office Building; TRU = transuranic.

- Includes mixed TRU waste. All TRU waste is contact-handled TRU waste.
- This volume reflects the envelope volume of large pieces of equipment, including enclosures that would be safely stored after removal from PF-4 pending further processing; these processing operations would likely result in smaller overall TRU waste volumes and larger LLW volumes.

Source: DOE 2015a; LANL 2018.

**PF-4 Modifications**—Waste from PF-4 modifications would primarily arise from removal or modification of ventilated enclosures and associated piping and equipment. Radioactive wastes, including TRU waste, LLW, and MLLW, would be segregated and placed into containers such as drums or boxes. Workers would...
dismantle and discard internal glovebox equipment that will not be reused in PF-4. Large pieces of equipment may be secured inside the enclosures rather than removed. The containerized enclosures would generally be temporarily stored, pending processing at TA-54, to minimize the total quantity of TRU waste being generated; radioactive waste from the processing operations would be managed as TRU waste, LLW, or MLLW. Waste characterization may occur at TA-55, TA-54, or TA-63. Only contact-handled TRU waste is expected.

After processing and characterization, the approximately 3,030 cubic feet of TRU waste from PF-4 modifications may be stored pending shipment to WIPP (see Section 4.3.1). The approximately 4,660 cubic feet of LLW (including, for example, enclosures or waste from enclosure reconfiguration) would be shipped to an offsite disposal facility. MLLW may include materials such as lead-soldered wire, copper tubing joints, or enclosures containing lead shielding. The approximately 3,460 cubic feet of MLLW would be temporarily staged as needed before shipment off site for treatment or disposal.

PF-4 modifications and equipment installation could generate a negligible quantity of chemical waste due to contingency activities such as remediation of chemical spills. If generated, this waste may be temporarily stored, in accordance with regulatory permits, before shipment off site for treatment or disposal. In addition, a small quantity of nonhazardous waste could be generated, such as wooden crates and boxes, metal pipe sections, wire, scrap drywall, or similar materials. This waste would be sorted for disposition by recycle or disposal.

Liquid sanitary waste would be generated in quantities somewhat larger than current rates. Sanitary waste collected in trailered facilities would be shipped off site for treatment. Sanitary waste generated at PF-4 would be routed to the Sanitary Waste System for treatment and discharge to permitted outfalls. Assuming generation of 50 gallons of sanitary waste per person per day and 260 working days per year (DOE 2003b), about 6.2 million gallons of sanitary waste would be generated during the peak year of facility modifications at both PF-4 and RLUOB.

RLUOB Modifications—Modifications to RLUOB would not generate TRU waste; however, about 105 cubic feet of LLW could be generated when making final connections (hot tie-ins) to existing laboratory connections and liquid radioactive waste drain lines and would consist of metal scrap, personal protective equipment, and similar material. LLW would be placed into containers, such as 55-gallon drums or B-25 boxes, and staged for offsite shipment. Minimal MLLW is expected.

Similar to PF-4 modifications, modifications to RLUOB could generate a small quantity of chemical waste due to contingency activities such as remediation of chemical spills. If generated, this waste may be temporarily stored in accordance with regulatory permits before shipment off site for treatment or disposal. A small quantity of nonhazardous waste could be generated, such as wooden crates and boxes, metal pipe sections, wire, scrap drywall, or similar materials. Similar to PF-4 modifications, this waste would be sorted for disposition by recycle or disposal. Sanitary wastes would be addressed as discussed for PF-4 modifications using existing capabilities in RLUOB or trailered facilities.

4.3.2.2 Operational Waste

The CMRR EIS (DOE 2003b), LANL SWEIS (DOE 2008a), and CMRR-NF SEIS (DOE 2011c) estimated the following annual waste volumes from operations under the CMRR project:

- TRU and mixed TRU waste: 2,370 cubic feet
- LLW: 71,280 cubic feet
- MLLW: 700 cubic feet
- Hazardous waste: 24,700 pounds
Due to the reduced scope of operations evaluated in this EA (e.g., no large-vessel cleanout activities), operational waste generation at RLUOB and PF-4 would be smaller than that projected in these NEPA documents.

Small annual quantities of nonhazardous waste would also be generated, to be managed in the same manner as that for PF-4 and RLUOB modifications (Section 4.3.2.1).

The annual quantity of sanitary waste attributable to AC and MC operations would be smaller than that projected in the NEPA documents cited above because fewer operational personnel would be required. Assuming up to 30 additional workers at PF-4 and RLUOB to conduct AC and MC operations (see Section 4.14), 50 gallons of waste generated per worker per day and 260 working days per year (DOE 2003b), about 390,000 gallons would be annually generated.

### 4.3.2.3 Waste Disposition

**Table 18** summarizes annual radioactive and chemical waste quantities from facility modifications and AC and MC operations (Sections 4.3.2.1 and 4.3.2.2) and compares these quantities to projections in the *LANL SWEIS* and actual LANL waste generation rates for the years 2010 through 2014 (see Table 16). The duration of waste generation at PF-4 and RLUOB is uncertain due to a variety of factors, such as funding and scheduling for enclosure removal, modification, and installation. Over the entire duration of facility modifications, there may be periods when little or no waste would be generated at either or both facilities. Based on the number of enclosures to be removed, modified, or installed at PF-4 under the alternatives (see Table 1) and the estimated period for PF-4 modifications from the *2015 CMRR SA* (DOE 2015a) (7 years), for purposes of analyzing the potential impacts on the waste management system, it was assumed that the bulk of radioactive waste from PF-4 modifications would be generated over a 5.5-year period under the Proposed Action Alternative and 7 years under the No Action Alternative. Only a small amount of LLW would be generated at RLUOB from making final connections to existing laboratory connections and liquid radioactive waste drain lines; it was assumed that this waste would be generated over a 1-year period. The table presents the waste annually generated at both PF-4 and RLUOB, assuming waste generation overlaps at the two facilities. Disposition of the wastes addressed in this EA was evaluated by comparison to this table and additional information below.

**TRU Waste**—TRU waste from PF-4 modifications (3,030 cubic feet) would be generated at an average annual rate of about 550 cubic feet. As shown in Table 18, this volume would represent about 0.32 to 0.90 percent of the total LANL TRU waste volumes projected over the years 2010 through 2014 in the *LANL SWEIS* (DOE 2008a), and about 8.7 to 18 percent of the actual TRU waste generation rate at LANL during these years. The projected annual TRU waste volume from PF-4 modifications would also be smaller than the annual TRU waste volumes projected and that actually generated in the Plutonium Complex alone (see Table 16). Furthermore, the total projected volume of TRU waste (3,030 cubic feet) would represent 33 percent of the volume of TRU waste (9,180 cubic feet) projected from implementation of the TA-55 Reinvestment Project, as evaluated in the *LANL SWEIS*.

TRU waste from PF-4 modifications would be safely stored, pending further processing and characterization (as required) and loading within TRUPACT packaging for delivery to WIPP. TRU waste from PF-4 modifications would not be generated without the assurance of adequate and safe TRU waste management capacity.
The 3,030 cubic feet of TRU waste projected from PF-4 modifications would use a small percentage of the WIPP disposal capacity. The total WIPP capacity for TRU waste disposal is set at 6.2 million cubic feet, pursuant to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Land Withdrawal Act. Based on agreements between DOE and the State of New Mexico, this volume includes 5.95 million cubic feet of contact-handled TRU (CH-TRU) waste (DOE 2015a). From DOE’s Annual Transuranic Waste Report – 2016 (DOE 2016b), approximately 586,000 cubic feet of WIPP unsubscribed CH-TRU waste capacity could support the LANL activities evaluated in this EA. The 3,030 cubic feet of TRU waste from the evaluated activities (all CH-TRU waste) would represent only about 0.4 percent of this unsubscribed capacity. In any event, the projected volume

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Table 18. Comparisons of Annual Radioactive and Chemical Waste Generation Rates from the EA Alternatives to LANL SWEIS Projections and Actual Rates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Waste Type</th>
<th>Disposition Method</th>
<th>Proposed Action Alternative</th>
<th>No Action Alternative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Proposed Action Alternative</td>
<td>No Action Alternative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Projected Waste Generation</td>
<td>Projected Waste Generation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Offsite disposal at WIPP</td>
<td>550 ft³, 0.32 – 0.90</td>
<td>500 ft³, 0.30 – 0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRU Waste</td>
<td>Offsite NNSS or commercial disposal</td>
<td>950 ft³, 0.017 – 0.026</td>
<td>970 ft³, 0.017 – 0.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LLW</td>
<td>Offsite NNSS or commercial disposal</td>
<td>630 ft³, 0.045 – 0.15</td>
<td>780 ft³, 0.056 – 0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLLW</td>
<td>Offsite commercial disposal</td>
<td>Negligible</td>
<td>Negligible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical Waste</td>
<td>Offsite commercial disposal</td>
<td>Negligible</td>
<td>Negligible</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Under the Proposed Action Alternative, wastes from PF-4 and RLUOB modifications were assumed for analysis to be generated over 5.5 years and 1 year, respectively; under the No Action Alternative, wastes from PF-4 and RLUOB modifications were assumed for analysis to be generated over 7 years and 1 year, respectively. Waste generation from PF-4 and RLUOB modifications was assumed to occur concurrently.


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27 The term “unsubscribed” refers to that portion of the total WIPP capacity that is not being used or needed for the disposal of DOE’s currently estimated inventory of TRU waste.

28 The total volume of CH-TRU waste projected for emplacement in WIPP (including anticipated volumes plus volumes already emplaced or in temporary storage) as of the end of 2015 is about 5,364,000 cubic feet (DOE 2016b). Subtracting this volume from the WIPP CH-TRU capacity of 5.95 million cubic feet leaves about 586,000 cubic feet of unsubscribed CH-TRU waste capacity. TRU waste volumes include mixed TRU waste.
is bounded by the TRU waste volume projected from implementation of the TA-55 Reinvestment Project evaluated in the \textit{LANL SWEIS} (DOE 2008a), which is included in the volumes anticipated for WIPP disposal in DOE’s \textit{Annual Transuranic Waste Report – 2016}.

Operational TRU waste from AC and MC operations would be less than the generation rate projected in the \textit{CMRR EIS} (DOE 2003b) and other NEPA documents (DOE 2008a, 2011c), which was 2,370 cubic feet per year. This TRU waste generation rate would represent about 1.4 to 3.9 percent of the total LANL TRU waste generation rate projected in the \textit{LANL SWEIS}, and 37 to 77 percent of that actually generated from 2010 through 2014 (see Table 18). The operational waste generation rate would be smaller than the annual TRU waste volumes projected and actually generated in the Plutonium Complex alone (see Table 16). Although annual TRU waste generation would increase at TA-55, TRU waste generation would decrease at the CMR Building when AC and MC operations end. From 2010 to 2014, annual TRU and mixed TRU waste generation at the CMR Building ranged from 110 to 1,520 cubic feet (see Table 16). The annual TRU waste volume from AC and MC operations is included in the volumes anticipated by LANL for WIPP disposal in DOE’s Annual Transuranic Waste Reports.

TRU waste from AC and MC activities would be stored until it is sent off site for disposal. Because DOE expects that WIPP will be available for TRU waste disposal by the time appreciable quantities of TRU waste from these activities would be generated, NNSA expects that storage requirements would be temporary and storage capacity would be adequate. TRU waste from AC and MC operations would not be generated without the assurance of adequate and safe TRU waste management capacity.

\textit{LLW}—A total of 4,760 cubic feet of LLW is projected from PF-4 and RLUOB modifications, representing about 14 percent of the 34,830 cubic feet of LLW projected from the TA-55 Reinvestment Project, as evaluated in the \textit{LANL SWEIS}. LLW from PF-4 and RLUOB modifications would be generated at rate of up to 950 cubic feet per year. This small annual volume of LLW would represent about 0.017 to 0.026 percent of the LANL LLW generation rate projected in the \textit{LANL SWEIS} and 0.075 to 0.92 percent of the actual LANL LLW generation rate from 2010 through 2014 (see Table 18).

Although it is possible that some of this LLW could be disposed of on site, it was assumed for analysis that all LLW would be disposed of in offsite facilities. \textbf{Table 19} summarizes the percentages of available disposal capacities that the LLW volume would represent at three potential offsite facilities: EnergySolutions in Utah, the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), and Waste Control Specialists (WCS) in Texas. The LLW volume from facility modifications would represent only small percentages of the available disposal capacity at any facility.

During operations, the annual volume of LLW would be less than that estimated in the \textit{CMRR EIS} (DOE 2003b) and subsequent NEPA documents (DOE 2008a, 2011c), which is annually 71,280 cubic feet. This generation rate would represent about 1.2 to 1.9 percent of that projected from all LANL activities in the \textit{LANL SWEIS} (DOE 2008a) and about 5.6 to 69 percent of the actual LANL generation rate from 2010 through 2014 (see Table 18). Annual LLW generation would increase at TA-55, but decrease at the CMR Building as AC and MC operations end. From 2010 to 2014, annual LLW generation at the CMR Building ranged from about 106 to 22,400 cubic feet (see Table 16). It was assumed that operational LLW would be sent to an offsite disposal facility, such as those listed in Table 19, with no impacts on offsite disposal capacity.

\textit{MLLW}—About 3,460 cubic feet of MLLW is projected from PF-4 modifications, representing about 59 percent of the 5,830 cubic feet of MLLW projected from the TA-55 Reinvestment Project, as evaluated in the \textit{LANL SWEIS}. MLLW from PF-4 modifications would be generated at an average annual rate of about 630 cubic feet. This annual quantity of waste would represent about 0.045 to 0.15 percent of the LANL MLLW generation rate projected in the \textit{LANL SWEIS} and 1.8 to 44 percent of the actual LANL MLLW generation rate from 2010 through 2014 (see Table 18).
Annual generation of MLLW from AC and MC operations would be less than the 700 cubic feet projected in the CMRR EIS (DOE 2003b) and subsequent NEPA documents (DOE 2008a, 2011c). This MLLW generation rate would represent about 0.051 to 0.17 percent of the MLLW that was annually projected in the LANL SWEIS and 2.1 to 49 percent of the MLLW that was actually generated at LANL from 2010 through 2014 (see Table 18). Annual MLLW generation would increase at TA-55 as a result of the proposed AC and MC operations, but decrease at the CMR Building as AC and MC operations end. From 2010 to 2014, annual MLLW generation at the CMR Building ranged from about 1.4 to 316 cubic feet (see Table 16).

MLLW may be temporarily stored on site in compliance with permitted storage requirements. Because MLLW storage would occur only until sufficient accumulation of waste to warrant efficient offsite shipment, generation of MLLW due to the activities evaluated in this EA would not impact onsite MLLW storage capacity. All MLLW would be sent off site for treatment or disposal at NNSS or commercial facilities (such as the facilities identified in Table 19), consistent with their waste acceptance criteria. The small MLLW volumes would not impact offsite treatment and disposal capacities.

Chemical Waste—Meaningful quantities of chemical waste are not expected from facility modification activities. In contrast, 2,000 pounds of chemical waste were projected from implementation of the TA-55 Reinvestment Project, as evaluated in the LANL SWEIS (DOE 2008a). Annual generation of chemical waste during AC and MC operations would be less than the 24,700 pounds projected in the CMRR EIS (DOE 2003b) and subsequent NEPA documents (DOE 2008a, 2011c). This generation rate would represent about 0.13 to 0.32 percent of the chemical waste generation rate projected in the LANL SWEIS and about 0.30 to 1.7 percent of the chemical waste actually generated at LANL from 2010 through 2014 (see Table 18). Annual chemical waste generation resulting from the proposed AC and MC operations would increase at TA-55, but decrease at the CMR Building as AC and MC operations end. From 2010 to 2014, annual chemical waste generation at the CMR Building ranged from about 209 to 13,600 pounds (see Table 16).

Chemical waste may be temporarily stored on site in compliance with permitted storage requirements before being sent off site for treatment or disposal. Because waste storage would generally occur only until

Table 19. Percent of Disposal Capacities in the Evaluated Disposal Facilities from Disposal of LLW and MLLW from Facility Modification Activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Waste Type</th>
<th>Waste Volume (cubic feet)</th>
<th>Energy Solutions</th>
<th>NNSS</th>
<th>WCS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>b</td>
<td>c</td>
<td>d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LLW</td>
<td>4,760</td>
<td>0.0042</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.018</td>
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<tr>
<td>MLLW</td>
<td>3,460</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>0.086</td>
<td>0.013</td>
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<tr>
<td>LLW</td>
<td>6,150</td>
<td>0.0055</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.024</td>
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<tr>
<td>MLLW</td>
<td>5,440</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.021</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

LLW = low-level radioactive waste; MLLW = mixed low-level radioactive waste; NNSS = Nevada National Security Site; WCS = Waste Control Specialists.

a Source: DOE 2015a; LANL 2018.
b The disposal capacity for LLW and MLLW was assumed to be the remaining capacity in the Class A West Embankment (113 million cubic feet) and the Mixed Waste disposal cell (9.67 million cubic feet), respectively, as of August 27, 2015 (EnergySolutions 2016).
c The disposal capacity for LLW and MLLW at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Complex was assumed to be 48 million cubic feet and 4 million cubic feet, respectively, in accordance with DOE’s December 3, 2014, ROD (79 FR 78421) for the Final Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement for the Continued Operation of the Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada National Security Site and Off-Site Locations in the State of Nevada (DOE 2013a).
d It was assumed that all LLW and MLLW would be disposed of in the Federal Waste Facility at WCS, which has a total capacity of 26 million cubic feet (736,000 cubic meters) (WCS 2017).
accumulation of a sufficient quantity of waste to warrant efficient offsite shipment, LANL onsite storage capacity would not be negatively impacted. Because numerous offsite facilities are available for treatment or disposal of the variety of wastes managed as chemical waste at LANL, the waste generated from the activities evaluated in this EA would not impact offsite facility capacities.

Other Wastes—AC and MC operations at PF-4 and RLUOB would annually generate small quantities of liquid LLW to be routed to the RLWTF for treatment. No impacts on the RLWTF annual treatment capacity of 1.1 million gallons are expected.

Facility modifications and operations would generate nonhazardous waste. Consistent with LANL procedures, much of this material would be recycled. During 2010 through 2014, for example, from 44 to 84 percent of all nonhazardous waste generated at LANL was recycled (see Table 16). Facility modifications and operations would also generate liquid sanitary waste. As addressed in Sections 4.3.2.1 and 4.3.2.2, about 6.2 million gallons of sanitary waste would be generated during the peak year of facility modifications, while 390,000 gallons would be annually generated during AC and MC operations. These annual generation rates would represent only about 3 percent and 0.1 percent, respectively, of the Sanitary Waste System annual treatment capacity of 220 million gallons.

4.3.3 Environmental Consequences of the No Action Alternative

4.3.3.1 Waste from Facility Modifications

The same types of facility modifications would occur as those under the Proposed Action Alternative, except that fewer modifications would occur at PF-4, and additional modifications would occur at RLUOB. Therefore, the same types of radioactive and nonradioactive wastes would be generated, except in different quantities. Table 17 summarizes the projected types and quantities of radioactive wastes from facility modifications.

PF-4 Modifications—TRU waste, LLW, and MLLW would be generated and managed using the same methods as those under the Proposed Action Alternative (see Section 4.3.2.1), except in somewhat larger total quantities, as summarized in Table 17. As under the Proposed Action Alternative, TRU waste would be safely stored pending shipment to WIPP for disposal, while LLW and MLLW would be shipped to offsite facilities for treatment or disposal. Any chemical waste generated during facility modifications would be shipped off site for treatment or disposal; nonhazardous waste would be sorted for disposition by recycle or disposal; and liquid sanitary waste would be addressed using existing or modified building capabilities or portable services.

RLUOB Modifications—TRU waste would not be generated. LLW would be generated and managed in the same way as that summarized in Section 4.3.2.1 under the Proposed Action Alternative, except in somewhat larger total quantities. As under the Proposed Action Alternative, this LLW could be generated when making final connections to existing liquid radioactive waste drain lines. No TRU waste or MLLW would be generated.

Somewhat larger quantities of chemical and nonhazardous wastes could be generated during RLUOB modifications due to the increased scope of work at that building compared to that for the Proposed Action Alternative. Sanitary and general trash would be addressed using existing capabilities in RLUOB or trailered sanitary facilities.

4.3.3.2 Operational Waste

Annual waste generation from AC and MC operations would be essentially the same as that under the Proposed Action Alternative (see Section 4.3.2.2).

4.3.3.3 Waste Disposition

As indicated in Table 18, the annual generation rates of TRU waste, LLW, MLLW, and chemical waste under the No Action Alternative would be comparable to those under the Proposed Action Alternative. The
annual waste generation rates during facility modification activities and during AC and MC operations would be smaller than those for the entire LANL site that were projected for the years 2010 through 2014 in the LANL SWEIS (DOE 2008a) and were actually generated during these years. As under the Proposed Action Alternative, the total generation rates of TRU waste, LLW, and MLLW during facility modification activities at RLUB and PF-4 would be smaller than those projected for the TA-55 Reinvestment Project evaluated in the LANL SWEIS.

NNSA expects that TRU waste storage capacity will be adequate at LANL until TRU waste can be shipped to WIPP for disposal. All TRU waste generated during facility modifications would be CH-TRU waste, which would represent about 0.5 percent of WIPP’s unsubscribed CH-TRU capacity (see Section 4.3.2.3). The annual TRU waste volume from AC and MC operations is included in the volumes anticipated by LANL for WIPP disposal in DOE’s Annual Transuranic Waste Reports (see Section 4.3.2.3). LLW and MLLW from facility modifications and operations would be shipped off site to Federal or commercial facilities, with no expected impacts on disposal capacity at any of the evaluated offsite facilities (see Table 19).

Chemical waste may be temporarily stored on site, in compliance with permitted storage requirements, before being sent off site for treatment or disposal. Because waste storage would generally occur only until a sufficient quantity of waste is accumulated to allow efficient offsite shipment, LANL onsite storage capacity would not be negatively impacted. Numerous offsite facilities are available for treatment or disposal of the materials managed as chemical waste at LANL, and there would be no impacts on offsite facility capacities.

Liquid LLW, nonhazardous waste, and liquid sanitary waste would be managed in the same manner as that under the Proposed Action Alternative, with no impacts on onsite or offsite waste management capacities.

4.4 Transportation

This section summarizes the potential impacts associated with shipping radioactive waste by truck to offsite treatment or disposal facilities (i.e., DOE/NNSA or commercial sites). All waste transportation and traffic control plans are reviewed by the LANL Traffic Systems Engineer to ensure compliance with the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices and American Association of State Highway and Transportation Requirements.29

Human health impacts could result from transporting radioactive waste during incident-free transport and potential accident conditions. For incident-free transport, the potential human health impacts from the radiation fields surrounding packages containing radioactive material were evaluated for affected transport crews (workers) and populations (members of the public along the route [off-traffic or off-link], sharing the route [in-traffic or on-link], and at rest areas and stops along the route). Impacts were determined as the collective radiation doses received by the affected transport crews and populations, and as risks in terms of the number of LCFs expected among the affected transport crews and populations. Calculated LCFs less than 1 (unity) indicate that no LCFs are expected among the affected transport crews or populations. In addition, incident-free impacts (radiation doses and risks) were evaluated for a hypothetical member of the public assumed to reside alongside the route used for the radioactive shipments.

The analyses for potential accident conditions were performed in three ways. First, analyses were performed that express the impacts of radiological accidents in terms of probabilistic risk (dose-risk), which is defined as the accident probability (accident frequency) multiplied by the accident consequence. These analyses of accident risks account for a spectrum of accidents, ranging from high-probability accidents of low severity (fender benders) to hypothetical high-severity accidents that have corresponding low probabilities of occurrence. Only as a result of a severe fire or a powerful collision, both extremely low-

29 Potential environmental consequences due to shipment to or from LANL of radioactive material that may be subject to AC or MC analysis at LANL are addressed in the LANL SWEIS (DOE 2008a).
probability events, could a transportation package of the types used to transport radioactive material be
damaged to the extent that radioactivity could be released to the environment with significant consequences.

Second, analyses were performed that assessed the nonradiological risks to members of the public that
could result from transporting radioactive waste. These nonradiological risks are independent of the nature
of the cargo being transported and are expressed as fatal traffic accidents resulting only from the physical
forces that accidents can impart to humans. These risks were estimated as the product of the total distance
traveled by the transport vehicle and the statistical risk of an accident fatality per unit distance. The risks
were determined as the calculated number of traffic fatalities among the populations along the transport
routes; calculated risks less than 1 indicate that no traffic fatalities are expected among the affected
populations.

Third, analyses were performed that assessed the largest radiological consequences from a maximum
reasonably foreseeable accident with a radioactive frequency greater than $1 \times 10^{-7}$ (1 chance in 10 million)
per year along the route. These analyses address the question: “what would be the consequences if a severe
accident actually occurred?” The analyses were performed using the RISKIND computer program
(Yuan et al. 1995), assuming average atmospheric conditions. Radiological consequences were determined
in terms of doses and LCF risks to the affected population and to an individual assumed to be located nearby
the accident.

No specific offsite transportation risks were evaluated in the CMRR EIS (DOE 2003b). The LANL SWEIS
(DOE 2008a), however, includes a detailed analysis of the impacts from transporting TRU waste to WIPP,
LLW to NNSS or a commercial facility in Utah (Energy Solutions), and MLLW in the form of evaporator
bottoms to treatment facilities in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, with return of the treated MLLW to LANL. The
analysis was performed using the population data from the year 2000 census and the RADTRAN 5 computer
program (Neuhauser and Kanipe 2003) to estimate the impacts to transport workers, populations,
and an MEI who may be a worker or a member of the public (e.g., a person stuck in traffic, a gas station
attendee, or an inspector).

For this EA, the transportation risks associated with the projected wastes were evaluated by assuming types
and forms of wastes similar to those evaluated in the LANL SWEIS (DOE 2008a), projecting the populations
along the transport routes to 2030 levels, and using the RADTRAN 6.02 (Weiner et al. 2013) computer
program. The RADTRAN 6.02 computer program uses more-recent inhalation dose conversion factors
from Federal Guidance Report (FGR) Number 13 (EPA 1999a). In addition, the transportation risks were
determined by considering an updated projection of accident risks that used information from the University
of Michigan Transportation Research Institute (UMTRI 2003).

For purposes of analysis, environmental consequences were evaluated for transport of TRU waste to WIPP;
transport of LLW to Energy Solutions in Utah, NNSS, or WCS in Texas; and transport of MLLW to these
same three facilities. That is, all three facilities evaluated for disposal of LLW were also evaluated for
disposal of MLLW. Energy Solutions and WCS both possess extensive capabilities to treat MLLW before
disposal in compliance with Federal requirements under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA). Treatment operations for the MLLW generated under the EA alternatives are expected to
primarily involve encapsulation of lead contaminated with radioactive material. NNSS has less extensive
MLLW treatment capabilities and is only treating MLLW generated within the State of Nevada; treatment
of MLLW generated outside the State of Nevada was evaluated, however, in the Final Site-Wide
Environmental Impact Statement for the Continued Operation of the Department of Energy/National
Nuclear Security Administration Nevada National Security Site and Off-Site Locations in the State of
Nevada (DOE/EIS-0426) (DOE 2013a).

Risks from shipment of nonradioactive wastes to offsite treatment, recycle, or disposal facilities, or
transport of nonradioactive materials to LANL (e.g., equipment), would occur only from the physical forces
that accidents could impart to humans. These accident risks would be no greater than the risks associated with transport of nonradioactive materials to and from LANL during normal operations.

4.4.1 Environmental Consequences of the Proposed Action Alternative

4.4.1.1 Facility Modifications

Modifications to TA-55 facilities would generate one-time volumes of TRU waste, LLW, and MLLW that would be similar to those evaluated in the LANL SWEIS, Appendix G, Section G.7, under the TA-55 Reinvestment Project, which entailed removal and replacement of outdated and degraded gloveboxes and equipment, ventilation ductwork, and other materials. Table 20 compares the projected number of shipments of radioactive waste under both alternatives. As indicated, the numbers of shipments under both alternatives would be both small and comparable. The projected shipments are far less than the numbers evaluated in the LANL SWEIS for operation of LANL over 10 years. Over all alternatives evaluated in the LANL SWEIS, the minimum numbers of shipments were 1,460 shipments of TRU waste, 9,217 shipments of containerized LLW, and 196 shipments of MLLW (DOE 2008a).

**Table 20. Number of Radioactive Waste Shipments**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Waste Type</th>
<th>Proposed Action Alternative</th>
<th>No Action Alternative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TRU waste</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LLW</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLLW</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

LLW = low-level radioactive waste; MLLW = mixed low-level radioactive waste; TRU = transuranic.

Table 21 summarizes the potential environmental consequences of shipping radioactive waste by truck to offsite facilities. The consequences were evaluated, assuming all TRU waste would be transported using TRUPACT packaging to WIPP and all LLW and MLLW would be transported in boxes to three optional LLW and MLLW disposal facilities: EnergySolutions in Utah, NNSS, and WCS in Texas. (Boxes reflect the primary expected packaging mode for LLW and MLLW from facility modifications.) The table summarizes the environmental consequences for transport of LLW or MLLW only to NNSS because the environmental consequences that were determined for transport of LLW or MLLW to NNSS envelope the consequences for transport to EnergySolutions or WCS, or for transport to a combination of the three evaluated facilities. Table 21 also shows the potential environmental consequences from the combination of shipments that would result in the maximum consequences. That is, it was assumed that all TRU waste would be transported to WIPP, and all LLW and MLLW would be transported to the evaluated disposal facility (NNSS), resulting in the largest potential environmental consequences.

**Incident-Free Transport**—Table 21 shows that the largest potential consequences are those for incident-free transport of TRU waste to WIPP. Even so, because the calculated transport crew and population risks for incident-free transport are both less than 1 (2×10⁻⁴ LCF and 6×10⁻⁵ LCF, respectively), no LCFs are expected among the transport crew or the population along the transport route.

Similar to the analysis for TRU waste transport, Table 21 shows that incident-free transport of all LLW or all MLLW is not expected to result in LCFs among the transport crews or populations along the evaluated transport routes because all calculated risks are less than 1. The largest potential consequences among the three evaluated facilities are for transport of LLW or MLLW to NNSS, resulting in a calculated risk to the transport crew of 9×10⁻⁵ or 6×10⁻⁵ LCF, respectively, and a calculated risk to the population along the transport route of 3×10⁻⁵ or 2×10⁻⁵ LCF, respectively.
Table 21. Potential Environmental Consequences from Transport of Radioactive Waste from Facility Modifications

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Waste</th>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>Crew Dose (person-rem)</th>
<th>Incident-Free Transport</th>
<th>Accident Conditions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Crew Risk (LCF)</td>
<td>Radiological Risk (LCF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Population Risk (LCF) a,b</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Population (person-rem) b</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRU</td>
<td>WIPP</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>2×10^{-4}</td>
<td>0.995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LLW</td>
<td>NNSS c</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>9×10^{-5}</td>
<td>0.048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLLW</td>
<td>NNSS c</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>6×10^{-5}</td>
<td>0.032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All waste c</td>
<td>Combination with maximum consequences d</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>3×10^{-4}</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Proposed Action Alternative

No Action Alternative

- LCF = latent cancer fatality; LLW = low-level radioactive waste; MLLW = mixed low-level radioactive waste; NNSS = Nevada National Security Site; TRU = transuranic; WIPP = Waste Isolation Pilot Plant.
- a Determined using a risk of 0.0006 LCF per rem or person-rem (DOE 2003a).
- b Population radiation doses and risks along the transport routes were evaluated by assuming a population growth to 2030.
- c The largest environmental consequences are for transport of LLW or MLLW to NNSS. Transport of LLW or MLLW to EnergySolutions in Utah or Waste Control Specialists in Texas would result in smaller environmental consequences.
- d Consequences were determined by summing the doses and risks from transporting all TRU waste to WIPP and the doses and risks from transporting all LLW and MLLW to NNSS. As noted in table note c, transport to NNSS would result in the largest consequences.

Table 21 also shows that incident-free transport of all radioactive waste to the evaluated disposal facilities is not expected to result in an LCF among the transport crews or the populations along the transport routes because all calculated risks are less than 1. Transport of all radioactive waste results in a calculated risk to the transport crews of $3\times10^{-4}$ LCF and a calculated risk to the populations along the transport routes of $1\times10^{-9}$.

Note that DOE regulations limit the maximum annual dose to a transport crew member to 100 millirem in a year unless the individual is a trained radiation worker. The dose to a trained radiation worker is limited to 5 rem in a year (DOE 2008c). Assuming a risk factor of 0.0006 LCF per rem or person-rem (DOE 2003a), a trained radiation worker receiving a dose at the maximum annual exposure level (5 rem) would have a potential annual LCF risk of 0.003, which is equivalent to a risk of 1 chance in about 330 of an LCF.

A member of the public could reside along the route traveled by trucks transporting radioactive waste to offsite disposal facilities. Assuming an individual receptor was located 98 feet from the truck route (DOE 2008a, K-14) for all shipments, the total dose that this receptor would receive from all shipments of TRU waste, LLW, and MLLW would be about 0.0042 millirem. This dose could result in a total risk of an LCF of about $3\times10^{-9}$ (1 chance in about 330 million of an LCF).

**Accident Conditions**—Considering all potential accidents from a spectrum of accidents ranging from high-probability accidents of low severity (fender benders) to hypothetical high-severity accidents that have corresponding low probabilities of occurrence, no LCFs are expected among the populations along the transport routes. The largest calculated risk is associated with transport of TRU waste; still, the calculated risk is less than 1 ($2\times10^{-8}$ LCF). The calculated risk to the population from a fatal traffic accident from transporting all TRU waste to WIPP is larger than the calculated radiological risk from the spectrum of
potential accidents. Nonetheless, no traffic fatalities (calculated risk of $2.9 \times 10^4$) are expected. Calculated risks are smaller for shipments of LLW and MLLW. Assuming all shipments of LLW and MLLW were to the facility (NNSS) with the largest transport risks, no LCFs or traffic fatalities are expected among the affected population. The calculated radiological risk for LLW transport is $6 \times 10^{-9}$, while the calculated traffic fatality risk is $4.7 \times 10^{-4}$. The calculated radiological risk for MLLW transport is $4 \times 10^{-9}$, while the calculated traffic fatality risk is $3.1 \times 10^{-4}$.

Transport of all radioactive waste is not expected to result in any LCFs among the affected populations or result in a traffic fatality. The calculated radiological risk is $3 \times 10^{-8}$ LCF, and the calculated traffic fatality risk is $1.1 \times 10^{-3}$.

For radioactive waste transported under the Proposed Action Alternative, the maximum reasonably foreseeable offsite truck transportation accident with the greatest consequence would involve a truck carrying TRU waste. The annual probability that such an accident would occur depends on the number of shipments that could occur in a single year. If it is conservatively assumed that all 13 shipments of TRU waste from facility modifications occurred in a single year, then the probability that such an accident could occur is about $2.8 \times 10^{-7}$ (1 chance in about 3.6 million) per year in a suburban area. If such an accident did occur, the consequences in terms of general population dose would be about 8 person-rem. Such an exposure would result in no LCFs (calculated risk of $5 \times 10^{-3}$) among the exposed population. This accident would result in a dose of 8.2 millirem to a hypothetical MEI located 330 feet from the accident and exposed to the accident plume for 2 hours, with a corresponding risk of developing an LCF of $5 \times 10^{-6}$, or 1 chance in 200,000 of an LCF.

### 4.4.1.2 Operations

The operational characteristics at LANL would not change, regardless of the locations of the AC and MC activities. The sampling methods and mission support operations associated with AC and MC would not change and therefore, would not result in generation of operational wastes that were not considered in the CMRR EIS (DOE 2003b), LANL SWEIS (DOE 2008a), or CMRR-NF SEIS (DOE 2011c). Transport of radioactive waste from AC and MC operations to offsite facilities would conservatively require 13 annual shipments to WIPP, 176 annual shipments to a LLW disposal facility, and 2 annual shipments to a MLLW disposal facility (DOE 2011c).

Using the same assumptions regarding radioactive waste transport as those for radioactive waste from facility modifications, Table 22 shows the potential environmental consequences from transport of TRU waste to WIPP and transport of LLW and MLLW to the facility resulting in the largest consequences (NNSS). Table 22 also shows the potential environmental consequences from transport of all radioactive waste, for which it was assumed that all TRU waste would be transported to WIPP and all LLW and MLLW would be transported to the evaluated disposal facility (NNSS), resulting in the largest potential environmental consequences.

**Incident-Free Transport**—Table 22 shows that the largest potential consequences would be those for incident-free transport of LLW to NNSS. Even so, because the calculated annual crew and population risks for incident-free transport are both smaller than 1 ($1 \times 10^{-3}$ LCF and $4 \times 10^{-4}$ LCF, respectively), no LCFs are expected annually among the transport crew or among the population along the transport route. Smaller calculated risks (and no LCFs) are associated with shipment of TRU waste and MLLW. The calculated annual risk to the transport crew for TRU waste shipment is $2 \times 10^{-4}$ LCF, while the calculated annual risk to the route population is $6 \times 10^{-5}$ LCF; the calculated annual risk to the transport crew for MLLW shipment is $1 \times 10^{-5}$ LCF, while the calculated annual risk to the route population is $5 \times 10^{-6}$ LCF.
Table 22. Potential Annual Environmental Consequences from Transport of Radioactive Waste from AC and MC Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TRU</td>
<td>WIPP</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>2×10^{-4}</td>
<td>0.095</td>
<td>6×10^{-5}</td>
<td>2×10^{-4}</td>
<td>2.9×10^{-4}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LLW</td>
<td>NNSS</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1×10^{-4}</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>4×10^{-4}</td>
<td>9×10^{-4}</td>
<td>6.9×10^{-3}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLLW</td>
<td>NNSS</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>1×10^{-5}</td>
<td>0.0080</td>
<td>5×10^{-6}</td>
<td>1×10^{-9}</td>
<td>7.8×10^{-5}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All waste</td>
<td>Combination with maximum consequences</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2×10^{-3}</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>5×10^{-4}</td>
<td>1×10^{-7}</td>
<td>7.2×10^{-3}</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AC = analytical chemistry; LCF = latent cancer fatality; LLW = low-level radioactive waste; MC = materials characterization, MLLW = mixed low-level radioactive waste; NNSS = Nevada National Security Site; TRU = transuranic; WIPP = Waste Isolation Pilot Plant.

a Determined using a risk of 0.0006 LCF per rem or person-rem (DOE 2003a).

b Population radiation doses and risks along the transport routes were evaluated by assuming population growth to 2030.

c The largest environmental consequences were determined for transport of LLW or MLLW to NNSS. Transport of LLW or MLLW to EnergySolutions in Utah or Waste Control Specialists in Texas would result in smaller environmental consequences.

d Consequences were determined by summing the doses and risks from transporting all TRU waste to WIPP and; the doses and risks from transporting all LLW and MLLW to NNSS. As noted in table note c, transport NNSS would result in the largest consequences.

Table 22 also shows that incident-free transport of all radioactive waste to the evaluated disposal facilities is not expected to result in an annual LCF among the transport crews or the populations along the transport routes. Transport of all radioactive waste would result in a calculated annual risk to the transport crews of 2×10^{-3} LCF and a calculated annual risk to the populations along the transport routes of 5×10^{-4}. Also note that the radiation dose potentially received by any individual transport worker would be limited in accordance with DOE regulations.

Assuming a member of the public resides along the route traveled by all trucks transporting radioactive waste to offsite disposal facilities, and assuming the same assumptions for this receptor as those for facility modifications, the total dose that this receptor would receive from all offsite shipments of TRU waste, LLW, and MLLW would be about 0.013 millirem per year. This total dose could result in an annual risk of an LCF of about 8×10^{-9} (1 chance in about 125 million of an LCF).

**Accident Conditions**—Considering all potential accidents from a spectrum of accidents ranging from high-probability accidents of low severity (fender benders) to hypothetical high-severity accidents that have corresponding low probabilities of occurrence, no LCFs are expected annually among the population along the transport route from shipments of LLW (calculated annual risk of 9×10^{-8} LCF). The calculated risk to the population from a fatal traffic accident from transporting all LLW to NNSS is larger than the calculated radiological risk from the spectrum of potential accidents. Still, no accident fatalities are expected annually among the population along the transport route because the calculated annual risk of a fatality is less than 1 (calculated annual risk of 6.9×10^{-3}).

Transport of all radioactive waste is similarly not expected to result in an annual LCF among the affected population due to the spectrum of potential accidents or to result in an annual traffic fatality. The calculated annual radiological risk is 1×10^{-7} LCF, and the calculated annual risk of a traffic fatality is 7.2×10^{-3}.

The maximum reasonably foreseeable offsite truck transportation accident with the greatest consequence would involve a truck carrying TRU waste. The probability that such an accident would occur is about 2.8×10^{-7} (1 chance in about 3.6 million) per year in a suburban area. If such an accident occurred, the consequences would be the same as those evaluated for transport of TRU waste from facility modifications.
4.4.2 Environmental Consequences of the No Action Alternative

4.4.2.1 Facility Modifications

Incident-Free Transport—As shown in Table 21, the potential environmental consequences from incident-free transport of radioactive waste from facility modifications to offsite facilities are comparable to those for the Proposed Action Alternative. The conclusions from the analysis are the same as those for the Proposed Action Alternative. For transport of any or all types of radioactive waste from facility modifications, incident-free transport to offsite facilities would not result in an LCF among the transport crew or the population along the transport routes. Assuming a member of the public resides along the route traveled by all trucks transporting radioactive waste to offsite disposal facilities, and assuming the same assumptions for this receptor as those for facility modifications, the total dose that this receptor would receive from all offsite shipments of TRU waste, LLW, and MLLW would be about 0.0051 millirem. This total dose could result in an annual risk of an LCF of $3 \times 10^{-9}$ (1 chance in about 330 million of an LCF).

Accident Conditions—As shown in Table 21, the environmental consequences from potential accidents during transport of radioactive waste are comparable to those for the Proposed Action Alternative. The range of potential accidents that could occur during transport of any or all types of radioactive waste to offsite facilities would not result in an LCF among the population along the transport routes. The maximum reasonably foreseeable offsite truck transportation accident with the greatest consequence would involve a truck carrying TRU waste. Conservatively assuming that all TRU waste shipments occurred in a single year, the probability that such an accident could occur is about $3.3 \times 10^{-7}$ (1 chance in about 3 million) per year in a suburban area. If such an accident occurs, the consequences would be the same as those evaluated for transport of TRU waste from facility modifications (Section 4.4.1.1).

4.4.2.2 Operations

Incident-Free Transport—The potential environmental consequences from incident-free transport of radioactive waste from AC and MC operations to offsite facilities are the same as those under the Proposed Action Alternative (see Table 22). The conclusions from the analysis are also the same as those under the Proposed Action Alternative. For transport of any or all types of radioactive waste from AC and MC operations, incident-free transport to offsite facilities would not result in an LCF among the transport crew or the population along the transport routes. Assuming a member of the public resides along the route traveled by all trucks transporting radioactive waste to offsite disposal facilities, the annual dose and risk that this receptor would receive from all offsite shipments of TRU waste, LLW, and MLLW would be the same as that under the Proposed Action Alternative (Section 4.4.1.2).

Accident Conditions—The environmental consequences from the range of potential accidents that could occur during transport of all types of radioactive waste are the same as those under the Proposed Action Alternative (see Table 22). The maximum reasonably foreseeable offsite truck transportation accident with the greatest consequence would involve a truck carrying TRU waste. The probability that such an accident would occur is about $2.8 \times 10^{-7}$ (1 chance in about 3.6 million) per year in a suburban area. If such an accident did occur, the consequences would be the same as those evaluated under the Proposed Action Alternative for transport of TRU waste during facility modifications (Section 4.4.1.1).

4.5 Environmental Justice

4.5.1 Affected Environment

The environmental justice analysis for this EA evaluated the potential radiation doses received by affected population groups within 50 miles of PF-4 and RLUOB due to airborne emissions from AC and MC operations. No environmental consequences to members of the public were identified from facility modifications under either alternative. The other resource areas evaluated in this EA are not expected to be meaningful in terms of an environmental justice analysis. Facility modifications and operations would take place within existing structures, and few, if any, impacts are expected for either alternative for the land
use, geology and soils, water resources, ecological resources, cultural resources, air quality and climate, visual resources and noise, infrastructure, and socioeconomic resource areas (see Sections 4.6 through 4.14). No impacts to any member of the public are expected from generation and management of waste (see Section 4.3). The potential environmental consequences that could occur due to transport of radioactive waste are small under either alternative (see Section 4.4).

The analysis was performed on total, minority, and low-income population groups in the LANL vicinity, projected to 2030 levels. The total projected population is approximately 488,000 individuals within 50 miles of PF-4 and 497,000 individuals within 50 miles of RLUOB (see Section 4.1.2.2). As shown in Table 23, individuals identifying themselves as members of a minority group make up 58 percent of this population. But within 5 and 10 miles of PF-4 and RLUOB, the minority population makes up no more than 38 percent of the population. Low-income individuals within 50 miles of PF-4 and RLUOB comprise no more than 14 percent of the population, and within 5 and 10 miles of these facilities, low-income individuals represent no more than 8 percent of the population.

| Table 23. Projected 2030 Populations: PF-4 and RLUOB |
|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Population Groups | 5-mile | 10-mile | 20-mile | 50-mile | 5-mile | 10-mile | 20-mile | 50-mile |
| Total Population | 10,524 | 19,701 | 63,290 | 488,152 | 10,447 | 19,660 | 63,381 | 497,270 |
| Non-Minority | 6,524 | 12,200 | 21,002 | 206,436 | 6,461 | 12,206 | 21,127 | 210,840 |
| Minority | 4,000 | 7,501 | 42,288 | 281,716 | 3,986 | 7,454 | 42,254 | 286,430 |
| Hispanic | 2,224 | 4,022 | 33,562 | 229,521 | 2,224 | 4,022 | 33,562 | 229,521 |
| Native American | 186 | 1,120 | 4,836 | 25,137 | 187 | 1,083 | 4,826 | 25,401 |
| Non-Low-Income | 9,716 | 18,262 | 52,586 | 418,460 | 9,642 | 18,238 | 52,686 | 426,821 |
| Low-Income | 808 | 1,439 | 10,704 | 69,692 | 805 | 1,422 | 10,695 | 70,449 |

PF-4 = Plutonium Facility, Number 4; RLUOB = Radiological Laboratory/Utility/Office Building.
Note: The total, minority, and low-income populations within a 50 mile radius, as determined from U.S. Census data for 2015 (Census 2017a, 2017b, 2017c, 2017d), were projected to 2030, based on trends in the populations in the counties within a 50-mile radius.

### 4.5.2 Proposed Action Alternative – Radiological Impacts during Normal Operations

Offsite impacts are shown in Table 24 for each population group within 5, 10, 20, and 50 miles of the evaluated source of airborne emissions. These impacts, as measured by average individual doses, are highest within 5 and 10 miles of the facilities. At these distances, the percentage of the population that identifies itself as minority is lower than that within the 50-mile population. Although the average individual dose is higher for populations closer to the facilities, there is little difference in the average individual dose among the various population groups within each distance. Average individual doses are roughly an order of magnitude higher within the 5- and 10-mile distances than those for average individuals within a 50-mile distance.

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30 As with the population impacts analysis (Section 4.1.2.2 and 4.1.3.2), the impacts were calculated assuming that all emissions from AC and MC operations occurred from RLUOB under the Proposed Action Alternative and from PF-4 under the No Action Alternative.
Within 5 miles of the source of radiological emissions, the potential average annual individual dose is about 0.02 millirem for all population groups and ranges from 0.0099 to 0.016 millirem within a 10-mile distance. Within the 10-mile distance, the average individual doses for the minority, Hispanic, and Native American populations are comparable to or less than the dose for the non-minority population, and the average individual dose for the low-income population is comparable to that for the non-low-income population. Within a 20-mile distance, the average annual individual doses for the minority, Hispanic, and Native American populations are smaller than the dose for the non-minority population, and the average individual dose for the low-income population is smaller than that for the non-low-income population. Within a 50-mile distance, the average individual doses among all population groups are comparable and about 0.002 millirem per year. Based on average annual individual risks, there would be no disproportionately high or adverse impacts to minority or low-income populations.

To investigate the issue of impacts to the Native American community, impacts were assessed for a hypothetical individual residing at the Pueblo de San Ildefonso and Santa Clara Pueblo boundaries, where the greatest potential impacts on Native Americans are expected. For airborne releases, this individual would have the same exposure characteristics as the MEI identified in the evaluation of impacts associated with normal operations. The analysis showed that normal operational releases from RLUOB or PF-4 would result in a maximum dose to the MEI located at the LANL boundary roughly a mile north of PF-4 and RLUOB. Factors contributing to a lower dose for an MEI at either of these pueblos include distance (the nearest Pueblo de San Ildefonso boundary is about 1.5 miles from PF-4 and RLUOB; the nearest Santa Clara Pueblo boundary is more than 13 miles away) and meteorological conditions (e.g., dominant wind direction). An individual located at the boundary of either of these pueblos would receive an annual individual dose that would be less than the MEI dose of 0.082 millirem under the Proposed Action Alternative or 0.16 millirem under the No Action Alternative. Thus, there would be no disproportionately high and adverse impacts on these individuals.

An analysis of the environmental consequences potentially experienced by a receptor who derives all of his or her food locally and consumes increased amounts of locally obtained fish, deer, elk, and other foods (special pathways receptor) is presented in Chapter 5, Cumulative Impacts.

4.5.3 No Action Alternative – Radiological Impacts during Normal Operations

As under the Proposed Action Alternative, offsite impacts were evaluated as average individual doses for each population group within 5, 10, 20, and 50 miles of the evaluated source of airborne emissions (Table 25). These impacts are highest within 5 and 10 miles of the facilities. At these distances, the percentage of the population that identifies itself as minority is lower than that within the 50-mile population. Although the average individual dose is higher for populations closer to the facilities, there is little difference in the average individual dose among the various population groups within each distance. Average individual doses are roughly an order of magnitude higher within the 5- and 10-mile distances than those for average individuals within a 50-mile distance.

### Table 24. Annual Radiation Doses to Average Individuals within Population Groups in the Los Alamos National Laboratory Area under the Proposed Action Alternative (millirem per year)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population Group</th>
<th>Within 5 Miles</th>
<th>Within 10 Miles</th>
<th>Within 20 Miles</th>
<th>Within 50 Miles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Population</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.0071</td>
<td>0.0020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Minority</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.0021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.0056</td>
<td>0.0019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic a</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.0050</td>
<td>0.0019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native American b</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>0.0099</td>
<td>0.0048</td>
<td>0.0018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Low-Income</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.0075</td>
<td>0.0020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-Income</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.0050</td>
<td>0.0019</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a The Hispanic population includes all Hispanic persons, regardless of race.

b Includes persons who also indicated Hispanic or Latino origin.
Within 5 miles of the source of radiological emissions, the potential average annual individual dose is about 0.03 millirem for all population groups and ranges from 0.013 to 0.022 millirem within a 10-mile distance. Within the 10-mile distance, the average individual doses for the minority, Hispanic, and Native American populations are comparable to or less than the dose for the non-minority population, and the average individual dose for the low-income population is comparable to that for the non-low-income population. Within a 20-mile distance, the average annual individual doses for the minority, Hispanic, and Native American populations are smaller than the dose for the non-minority population, and the average individual dose for the low-income population is smaller than that for the non-low-income population. Within a 50-mile distance, the average individual doses among all population groups are comparable (about 0.002 to 0.003 millirem per year). Based on average annual individual risks, there would be no disproportionately high or adverse impacts to minority or low-income populations.

The environmental justice analysis performed for the Proposed Action Alternative for Native American communities is applicable to the No Action Alternative. The potential dose that could be received at the boundaries of the Pueblo de San Ildefonso or Santa Clara Pueblo would be essentially the same as that under the No Action Alternative. Thus, there would be no cumulative disproportionately high and adverse human health and environmental effects on an individual hypothetically located at these boundaries.

As under the Proposed Action Alternative, an analysis of the environmental consequences potentially experienced by a receptor deriving all of his or her food locally and consuming increased amounts of locally obtained fish, deer, elk, and other foods (special pathways receptor) is presented in Chapter 5, Cumulative Impacts.

4.6 Land Use

The 47 contiguous TAs at LANL are used for building sites, experimental areas, and waste disposal. About 20 percent of LANL’s 37 square miles of land is developed with facilities and structures, including much of TA-55. Major constraints to further development include factors such as topography, slope, soils, vegetation, geology and seismology, climate, endangered species, archaeological and cultural resources, and surface hydrology. Undeveloped portions of the site provide security, safety, and expansion possibilities for future mission-support requirements (DOE 2011c).

Proposed Action Alternative

Facility Modifications—Trailers and storage structures supporting facility modifications would be located in TA-55 on previously disturbed land, consistent with activities evaluated in the LANL SWEIS (DOE 2008a) for subprojects under the TA-55 Reinvestment Project.

Operations—Operations at TA-55 would be consistent with those described in the LANL SWEIS.
Conclusion—There would be no newly disturbed land and no change in the land use designation of TA-55. Neither facility modifications nor AC and MC operations would impact land use at LANL.

No Action Alternative

As under the Proposed Action Alternative, there would be no newly disturbed land and no change in the land use designation of TA-55. The same support trailers and storage structures would be temporarily located on previously disturbed land, consistent with activities evaluated in the LANL SWEIS for subprojects under the TA-55 Reinvestment Project (DOE 2008a). Therefore, there would be no impact on land use at LANL.

4.7 Geology and Soils

LANL is located on the Pajarito Plateau, which is divided into multiple, narrow, east-southeast-trending mesas, separated by deep parallel canyons. Rocks in the LANL region are volcanic and sedimentary. The youngest surficial geologic units consist of sediment deposited by flowing water (alluvium) and rock debris accumulated at the bases of slopes along stream channels and in canyons (colluvium). A recent description of the seismic environment at LANL is provided in the SPD Supplemental EIS (DOE 2015c).

Proposed Action Alternative

Facility Modifications—Facility modifications would occur within existing structures, with no need for aggregate, backfill, or other geologic or soil resources. No discharges to soil are planned, and any accidental spills (such as oil that could drip from trucks delivering equipment or picking up waste) would be remediated.

Operations—Operations would not require use of geologic or soil resources or contaminate soil at LANL.

Conclusion—Because previously undisturbed land would not be affected and there would be no use of geologic or soil resources and no discharges to soil, there would be no impacts on geology and soils.

No Action Alternative

As under the Proposed Action Alternative, facility modifications would occur within existing structures, with no need for aggregate, backfill, or other geologic or soil resources and no discharges to soil. Operations would not require use of geologic or soil resources or contaminate soil at LANL. Because previously undisturbed land would not be affected and there would be no use of geologic or soil resources and no discharges to soil, the No Action Alternative would have no impacts on geology and soils.

4.8 Water Resources

Water resources at LANL encompass the surface and groundwater sources of water suitable for Native American traditional and ceremonial purposes, plant and wildlife propagation, and human endeavors and enterprise. The LANL region includes onsite and offsite water systems that could be affected by effluent discharge and release of stormwater runoff. Changes in the environment can potentially affect hydrologic equilibrium, water quality, and availability of usable water (DOE 2011c).

Proposed Action Alternative

Facility Modifications—No surface water would be used to support facility modifications. Portable toilets or existing facility sanitary systems would be used, resulting in no direct discharge of sanitary wastewater and no impact on surface waters. Support activities for facility modifications would occur within an already disturbed location in an industrial area, where stormwater runoff would be managed in accordance with existing permits. Additional soil erosion and sediment control measures would be implemented, if required, along with spill prevention practices, to minimize any potential dispersion of soil and sediment that could impact surface and subsurface water quality. Applicable requirements of the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) General Permit for Stormwater Discharges from Construction Activities would be in place. The facility modification support area is not near a wetland or within a floodplain. The
only wetland in TA-55 is at a lower elevation in Mortandad Canyon. The nearest 100-year floodplains are similarly at lower elevations within Two-Mile, Mortandad, and Pajarito Canyons (DOE 2011c).

Water supplied by the Los Alamos County Department of Public Utilities would support facility modifications, rather than water from onsite wells. As addressed in Section 4.13, NNSA expects that groundwater use would be primarily associated with workers performing the modifications. The number of workers performing the modifications would vary considerably over the duration of facility modifications, but could rise to approximately 480 additional FTEs during the peak year of facility modifications (see Section 4.14). As evaluated in Section 4.13, groundwater use by these workers during this peak year could total about 6.2 million gallons of water, a small amount compared to site availability and historic usage. There would be no discharge of wastewater to the subsurface. The scope of the proposed activities would be less than that evaluated in the CMRR-NF SEIS (DOE 2011c) for construction of the CMRR-NF, with less need for groundwater.

Operations—There would be no use of surface water and no uncontrolled discharge of wastewater to the surface or subsurface. Although annual consumption of groundwater as supplied by Los Alamos County could slightly increase at RLUOB and PF-4 compared to current demands, this annual increase would be less than that evaluated for the CMRR project in the CMRR EIS (DOE 2003b). NNSA expects that the increase in groundwater use would be primarily associated with additional personnel performing AC and MC operations at RLUOB and PF-4. As addressed in Section 4.14, up to 30 additional FTEs may be employed. As evaluated in Section 4.13, an additional 30 FTEs would require about 390,000 gallons of groundwater, a small amount compared to site availability and historic usage.

Conclusion—No meaningful impacts on water resources are expected.

No Action Alternative

No surface water would be used to support facility modification. The same measures would be employed to protect surface water and groundwater resources as those under the Proposed Action Alternative. As with the Proposed Action Alternative, NNSA expects that groundwater use would be primarily associated with workers performing the modifications. Peak employment during facility modifications is expected to be comparable to that under the Proposed Action Alternative, with a comparable requirement for groundwater (about 6.2 million gallons per year), a small amount compared to site availability and historic usage (see Section 4.13) and less than that evaluated in the CMRR-NF SEIS for construction of the CMRR-NF.

Groundwater use during AC and MC operations would be comparable to that under the Proposed Action Alternative. The increase in groundwater use would be primarily associated with additional personnel performing AC and MC operations at RLUOB and PF-4 (approximately 30 FTEs). As evaluated in Section 4.13, an additional 30 FTEs would require about 390,000 gallons of groundwater, a small amount compared to site availability and historic usage.

No meaningful impacts on water resources are expected during facility modifications or AC and MC operations.

4.9 Biological Resources

LANL contains diverse ecosystems. Terrestrial animals associated with vegetation zones in the LANL area include 57 species of mammals, 200 species of birds, 28 species of reptiles, 9 species of amphibians, and 1,200 species of arthropods (DOE 2011c). Wetlands within LANL, including a single wetland within TA-55 (in Mortandad Canyon), provide habitat for reptiles, amphibians, and invertebrates (DOE 2011c, 2015a). Because several threatened and endangered species occur (or possibly occur) at LANL, areas of
environmental interest have been established at LANL for the Mexican spotted owl, bald eagle, southwestern willow flycatcher, and Jemez Mountain salamander. Portions of TA-55 include both core and buffer zones for the Mexican spotted owl. The areas of environmental interest for the bald eagle, southwestern willow flycatcher, and Jemez Mountain salamander do not include any part of TA-55 (DOE 2015a). Since issuance of the CMRR EIS ROD in 2004 (69 FR 6967), several biological assessments were prepared and submitted to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS). These biological assessments evaluated the potential effects on the Mexican spotted owl from construction of additional buildings, associated parking lots, and laydown yards in LANL TAs, including TA-55 (LANL 2004, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2011). USFWS determined that the proposed construction (as defined in the biological assessments) may affect, but is not likely to adversely affect, the Mexican spotted owl (USFWS 2005, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2011).

Proposed Action Alternative

*Facility Modifications*—Facility modifications would be supported by trailers and other structures temporarily located in TA-55, with no additional removal of vegetation or habitat. Because the wetland within TA-55 is not located near the facility modification support area, facility modifications would have little or no effect on LANL wetlands or the aquatic resources that inhabit these wetlands. Sediment and erosion control plans (e.g., measures to remove soil or mud from trucks departing the work site) would be implemented to control stormwater runoff.

As discussed above, several biological assessments and USFWS determinations have addressed the potential impacts on threatened and endangered species from proposed construction activities at LANL. No exterior building construction would be required under the Proposed Action Alternative. Other than increased traffic during the years of facility modifications, the only change from current conditions at TA-55 would be use of a previously disturbed exterior area to support modifications within existing structures.

*Operations*—Previously undisturbed land would not be affected, and there would be no uncontrolled discharge to soil, surface water, or groundwater. The wetland in TA-55 would not be affected. Adverse conditions such as traffic, lighting, and noise at TA-55 that could affect threatened and endangered species would not be meaningfully different than existing conditions.

*Conclusion*—Facility modifications and AC and MC operations would have little or no effects on biological resources, including threatened and endangered species.

No Action Alternative

The same types of facility modifications would occur as those under the Proposed Action Alternative, with little or no effect on wetlands or the aquatic resources that inhabit these wetlands. Other than increased traffic during the years of facility modifications, the only change from current conditions at TA-55 would be use of a previously disturbed area to support modifications within existing structures. Adverse operational conditions at TA-55 (e.g., traffic, lighting, and noise) that could affect threatened and endangered species would not be meaningfully different than existing conditions. Therefore, facility modifications and AC and MC operations under the No Action Alternative would have little or no effects on biological resources, including threatened and endangered species.

4.10 Cultural Resources

Cultural resources are human imprints on the landscape that are defined and protected by a series of Federal laws, regulations, and guidelines. Cultural resources include archaeological resources, such as paleontological resources and prehistoric sites; traditional cultural properties, such as ancestral villages,

31 Although the bald eagle has been removed from the Federal List of Endangered and Threatened Wildlife in the lower 48 states of the United States, it continues to be protected under the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act.
petroglyphs, or traditional use areas; and historical resources, such as buildings that date back to the Manhattan Project or the early Cold War period (DOE 2011c).

Proposed Action Alternative

Facility Modifications—No archaeological resources or traditional cultural properties have been identified in the previously disturbed area where facility modification support activities would occur. Thus, it is unlikely that an inadvertent discovery of archaeological resources or traditional cultural properties would be made.

PF-4 is considered potentially eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places because it was built during the Cold War period of significance and has yet to be reviewed for eligibility. Under the National Historic Preservation Act, properties considered potentially eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places must be managed as if they are eligible for listing until formal determinations are made. Modifications to PF-4 are tracked by cultural resources staff. As appropriate, NNSA would consult with the State Historic Preservation Officer and, if necessary, collect data and recover artifacts.

Operations—No additional land disturbance would occur. Operations would take place within existing but modified structures.

Conclusion—No effects on cultural resources are expected.

No Action Alternative

As under the Proposed Action Alternative, facility modification support activities would take place in a previously disturbed area with no expected impacts on archaeological resources or traditional cultural properties. AC and MC operations would not require additional land disturbance and would take place within existing but modified structures. No effects on cultural resources are expected.

4.11 Air Quality and Climate Change

This section evaluates the potential environmental consequences due to emissions of nonradiological pollutants to the air, as well as climate change due to atmospheric release of greenhouse gases. The potential environmental consequences due to emissions of radiological material to the air are discussed in Section 4.1.

Air Quality—Air quality is determined by the type and amount of the pollutants emitted into the atmosphere, the size and topography of the air basin, and prevailing meteorological conditions. The baseline standards for pollutant concentrations are the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) and state air quality standards. Areas like LANL that demonstrate compliance with NAAQS are considered “attainment areas,” while areas that are not in compliance with NAAQS are known as “nonattainment areas.” Air quality permits have been obtained from the New Mexico Environment Department’s Air Quality Bureau for various activities at LANL. In accordance with Title V of the Clean Air Act and New Mexico Administrative Code 20.2.70, a site-wide operating permit is in place at LANL. Table 26 summarizes the average emissions of four criteria air pollutants for the years 2011 through 2014 and compares them against the emission projections in the LANL SWEIS (DOE 2008a) and against LANL’s Title V permit limits. As shown, the average emissions for all four pollutants during these 5 years were less than the projections in the LANL SWEIS and less than LANL’s Title V permit limits.

Climate Change—In 2014, the White House Office of the Press Secretary published Fact Sheet: What Climate Change Means for New Mexico and the Southwest, which presents selected findings and information from the Third U.S. National Climate Assessment that are relevant to New Mexico. Increased temperatures and decreased precipitation resulting from climate change would impact agriculture, water, health, ecosystems, tribes, and adaptation both directly and indirectly (WH 2014).
Climate change impacts on LANL operations would be similar to those that may occur in the southwest region, with the magnitude and significance of the impacts increasing over time. Direct impacts are expected to include a decrease in the availability of water, increased demand for electricity for cooling, decreased demand for electricity and fuel for heating, and a potentially greater level of maintenance on infrastructure (for example, repairing roadways damaged by higher temperatures, wildfires, or flooding). Seasonal hot weather, seasonal flooding from rain and snowmelt, and wildfires are current environmental phenomena that could potentially affect operations. Fire models project more wildfire and increased risks to communities due to increased warming and drought (WH 2014). The timing or design of some activities at LANL may need to change to accommodate changed environmental conditions.

Low water levels for the nearby hydroelectric plants and possible upgrades to the coal-burning generators are likely future impacts facing LANL (LANL 2014). Switching from coal and carbon-based generation to renewable and non-carbon electrical generation would likely increase the cost of electricity, but would help mitigate climate impacts. In FY 2014, LANL reduced its Scope 1 and 2 greenhouse gas emissions by 19 percent compared to FY 2008. These reductions were mainly achieved by purchasing renewable energy credits and reducing electricity use (LANL 2014). In FY 2014, LANL also exceeded its 7.5 percent renewable energy goal. Approximately 12 percent of LANL’s electricity consumption during this year came from renewable sources (LANL 2014). During the years 2011 through 2014, LANL activities caused an average annual emission of 63,700 tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (LANL 2012, 2013a, 2013b, 2015, 2016b).

Proposed Action Alternative

Facility Modifications—Facility modifications within existing buildings would primarily involve the use of electric power tools, with negligible emissions. Therefore, criteria air pollutants would be generated primarily from fugitive dust (particulate matter) and tailpipe emissions from trucks and employee vehicles. Fugitive dust would be primarily generated from trucks and personnel operating in a support area next to RLUOB. This support area is covered with gravel, and generation of dust in the area would be controlled. During the peak year of facility modifications, the number of personnel employed at LANL could increase by approximately 480 workers (see Section 4.14), which would represent about 4.5 percent of the LANL workforce in 2016. Assuming one vehicle for each employee, the number of vehicles accessing LANL and their associated emissions would increase by the same small percentage. Nonetheless, emissions and contributions from fugitive dust would be less than those evaluated in the CMRR EIS (DOE 2003b) because of the reduced construction scope evaluated in this EA compared to that of the CMRR project. As stated in the CMRR EIS, overall air quality would remain within applicable standards and, because LANL is in an attainment area, the General Conformity rule does not apply and no conformity analysis is required.

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32 Scope 1 emissions are direct emissions from owned or controlled sources; Scope 2 emissions are indirect emissions from the generation of purchased energy.
As summarized in Table 26, from 2010 through 2014, emissions of criteria pollutants (carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides, particulate matter, and sulfur oxides) from all LANL activities averaged no more than 19 percent of their Title V permit limits (LANL 2012, 2013a, 2013b, 2015, 2016b). The increases in emissions due to the activities evaluated under the Proposed Action Alternative would be small and thus are not expected to cause LANL to exceed its Title V emission limits for criteria pollutants.

Operations—Criteria air pollutants would be emitted primarily from periodic tests of emergency generators and from employee vehicles. Activities under the Proposed Action Alternative would not alter the test protocols for emergency generators at RLUOB and PF-4, and there would be no changes in criteria air emissions from these tests.

Employment under the Proposed Action Alternative is expected to increase by up to 30 FTEs (see Section 4.14), which would result in a potential increase in annual emissions from employee vehicles. However, this increase in employment would represent about 0.3 percent of the LANL workforce in 2016. Assuming one vehicle for each employee, the number of vehicles accessing LANL and their associated emissions would increase by the same small percentage. Furthermore, there would be decreased personnel requirements at RLUOB and PF-4 compared to those evaluated for the CMRR project (DOE 2003b), with corresponding decreases in annual emissions from employee vehicles. Any additional air emissions from operations are not expected to have a significant effect on the location and severity of impacts on downwind receptors such as the Elk Ridge mobile home park or the northern boundary of the LANL site.

Climate Change—During facility modifications, there would be very minor emissions of Scope 2 greenhouse gases due to use of electric powered tools; however, electricity use at RLUOB and PF-4 would primarily involve activities (such as lighting) that are independent of the modifications. Similarly, emissions of greenhouse gases due to use of natural gas for activities such as building heat would occur independently of the modifications. The principal emissions of greenhouse gases would primarily result from personally owned vehicles accessing LANL in support of the modifications. (On a daily basis, the number of personnel vehicles accessing LANL would be much larger than the number of trucks accessing LANL and supporting facility modifications.) The CMRR-NF SEIS (DOE 2011c) estimated that a construction workforce of 420 would result in an annual emission of about 1,280 tons of carbon dioxide equivalent due to personnel vehicles and busses transporting workers to and from the work site (DOE 2011c). Extrapolating to an assumed peak-year workforce of 480 (see Section 4.14), peak-year emissions of greenhouse gases from facility modifications would be approximately 1,460 tons of carbon dioxide equivalent, which would represent about 2 percent of LANL’s 5-year average emissions of greenhouse gases from 2011 through 2014.

During AC and MC operations, there could be small additions to electrical use at PF-4 and RLUOB, which could result in small additions to Scope 2 emissions due to electricity use. However, electricity use at RLUOB and PF-4 would primarily involve activities (such as lighting) that are independent of AC and MC operations. Similarly, emissions of greenhouse gases due to use of natural gas for activities such as building heat would occur independently of AC and MC operations. There would be no change from current emissions of greenhouse gases from periodic tests of emergency electrical generators at RLUOB and PF-4. Assuming AC and MC operations at RLUOB and PF-4 would require up to 30 additional employees (see Section 4.14) and each employee drove a personal vehicle to LANL, annual greenhouse emissions due to these employee vehicles would be approximately 90 tons of carbon dioxide equivalent. These emissions would represent approximately 0.1 percent of LANL’s 5-year average emissions of greenhouse gases from 2011 through 2014.

No Action Alternative

Facility Modifications—Annual nonradiological and radiological emissions would be comparable to those under the Proposed Action Alternative because essentially the same types of activities would take place at PF-4 and RLUOB, and the peak number of additional personnel required to perform facility modifications...
would be thus comparable (see Section 4.14). Increases in nonradiological emissions due to the activities evaluated under the No Action Alternative would be smaller than those evaluated in the CMRR EIS (DOE 2003b) and are not expected to cause LANL to exceed its Title V emission limits for criteria pollutants.

Operations—As under the Proposed Action Alternative, activities under the No Action Alternative would not alter the test protocols for emergency generators, and there would be no changes in criteria air emissions from these tests. There would be a comparable number of new hires to perform AC and MC operations (see Section 4.14), resulting in a comparable minor increase in annual nonradiological emissions from employee vehicles. There would be decreased personnel requirements at RLUOB and PF-4 compared to the CMRR project (DOE 2003b), with corresponding decreases in annual emissions from employee vehicles. Air emissions are not expected to have a significant effect on the location and severity of impacts on downwind receptors such as the Elk Ridge mobile home park or the northern boundary of the LANL site.

Climate Change—Impacts would be the same as those under the Proposed Action Alternative.

4.12 Visual Resources and Noise

For security reasons, much of the development within LANL, which is generally austere and utilitarian, has occurred out of the view of the public, and passing motorists or nearby residents can see only a small portion of what is actually on site. Much of TA-55 is developed. The three-story RLUOB building is visible from a number of locations throughout LANL and is the key visible structure along Pajarito Road; however, views from Pajarito Road are limited to LANL workers because the road is generally closed to the public (DOE 2011c).

Noise is unwanted sound that interferes or interacts negatively with the human or natural environment. Existing noise related to LANL facilities that is detectable by the public comes from a variety of sources, including activities that are not associated with the two alternatives evaluated in this EA, such as construction, high-explosive testing, and firearms practice by security guards. Noise from the alternatives evaluated in this EA is expected to primarily result from truck and automobile movements within LANL. Non-LANL noise occurring within Los Alamos County is also dominated by traffic movement (DOE 2011c).

Proposed Action Alternative

Facility Modifications—The appearance of an area within the already industrialized TA-55 would change due to the presence of support trailers and storage structures and the arrival and departure of trucks. There would also be an increase in noise levels in TA-55 from the arrival and departure of trucks and personnel vehicles. As evaluated in Section 4.11, during the peak year of facility modifications, the number of vehicles accessing LANL could increase by about 4.5 percent. However, the quality of this vehicle noise would be comparable to current conditions and is not expected to result in a change in noise impacts outside the LANL boundary. Facility modifications would take place within existing buildings, with no expected change in noise impacts outside these buildings.

Operations—Because RLUOB and PF-4 are both located in the already industrialized TA-55, their operation would present no change from current visual conditions. Operational noise from RLUOB and PF-4 would be the same as current levels, with the only meaningful potential for increased noise arising from a slightly increased daily number of employee vehicles. As evaluated in Section 4.11, the number of vehicles accessing LANL could increase by about 0.3 percent. The small addition to noise from these additional vehicles would be the same quality as current conditions and is not expected to change noise impacts outside the LANL boundary.

Conclusion—Neither facility modifications nor AC and MC operations would have meaningful impacts on visual resources in TA-55 or change noise impacts outside the LANL boundary.
No Action Alternative
As evaluated under the Proposed Action Alternative, an area within the already industrialized TA-55 would contain support trailers and storage structures, as well as arriving and departing trucks. Noise from the arrival and departure of trucks and personnel vehicles would be the same in terms of intensity as that under the Proposed Action Alternative. Facility modifications would take place within existing buildings, with no expected change in noise impacts outside these buildings.

As under the Proposed Action Alternative, operation of RLUOB and PF-4 would not change the current visual environment. Operational noise associated with RLUOB and PF-4 would be essentially the same as current levels, with the only meaningful potential for increased noise arising from a slightly increased daily number of employee vehicles compared to that under current operations. This increased noise would be comparable to that evaluated under the Proposed Action Alternative. Therefore, neither facility modifications nor AC and MC operations would have meaningful impacts on visual resources in TA-55 or change noise impacts outside the LANL boundary.

4.13 Infrastructure
LANL infrastructure includes a transportation network (roads) and a supply and distribution network for natural gas, electricity, and water. About 80 miles of paved roads and parking surfaces have been developed at LANL; there are no railway connections. Natural gas is the primary heating fuel at LANL and in Los Alamos County. Electrical service to LANL is supplied using two existing regional 115-kilowatt electric power lines through a cooperative arrangement with Los Alamos County. Water at LANL is supplied through a network of wells, distribution lines, pump stations, and storage tanks. Table 27 lists the LANL capacities for gas use, electricity, and water per the LANL SWEIS (DOE 2008a) and compares the actual use of these facilities with the listed capacities for the years 2010 through 2014, as published in the most recent LANL SWEIS yearbooks (LANL 2012a, 2013a, 2013b, 2015, 2016b). For all 5 years, the actual use of the listed utilities was a fraction of the LANL capacities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Utility</th>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Capacity</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gas</td>
<td>Decatherms a</td>
<td>8,070,000</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity</td>
<td>Megawatt-hours</td>
<td>1,314,000</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water</td>
<td>Million gallons</td>
<td>1,806</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* A decatherm is 1,000 cubic feet of natural gas.

Proposed Action Alternative
Facility Modifications—There would be minor increases in utility demands during facility modifications. Electricity use (e.g., for power tools) would be minor compared to other facility uses (such as lighting) that are independent of facility modifications. Natural gas is used for activities (such as heating) that are essentially independent of the facility modifications, and little additional use of gas is expected. Additional water use would be primarily associated with the workers conducting the modifications. Assuming that all workers would be additional to those currently employed at RLUOB and PF-4, a daily average water use of 50 gallons, 260 worker days per year (DOE 2011c), and a peak of approximately 480 FTEs (Section 4.14), the peak water use for facility modifications would be about 6.2 million gallons per year. This peak annual water use would amount to only about 0.3 percent of the LANL water supply capacity.

Operations—AC and MC operations are less encompassing in scope than the activities evaluated in the CMRR EIS (DOE 2003b) for the CMR project. Although utility demands could increase slightly compared to current needs at TA-55, the same types of AC and MC operations would occur as those evaluated in the
2015 CMRR SA (DOE 2015a). DOE determined in that NEPA document that additional utility use for AC and MC operations would not exceed LANL capacities. Furthermore, utility use for AC and MC operations under this alternative could be smaller than that evaluated in the 2015 CMRR SA because more AC and MC operations would be performed in RLUOB, a modern, Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED)-designated building. Operational utility increases at TA-55 would be offset by operational utility decreases at the CMR Building.

NNSA expects that the largest increase in utility demands would be increased water use that is primarily associated with increased personnel requirements for AC and MC operations under this alternative (approximately 30 FTEs; see Section 4.14). Given the same assumptions for water use as those for facility modifications, an increase of 30 FTEs at LANL would result in an increase in annual water use of about 390,000 gallons. This increase would represent about 0.02 percent of the LANL water capacity.

Conclusion—There would be no meaningful additional use of utilities such as gas, electricity, or water. Although there would be a small increase over current utility demands to support facility modifications and operations, these increases would not exceed LANL site capacities.

No Action Alternative

Increases in annual utility demands during facility modifications are expected to be comparable to those evaluated under the Proposed Action Alternative. Annual electricity use would be comparable overall because the same types of electric power tools would be used as those under the Proposed Action Alternative, and greater use of these tools at RLUOB would be countered by less use of these tools at PF-4. Little natural gas would be used for the same reason as under the Proposed Action Alternative. Peak annual water use would be comparable because the peak number of workers required for facility modifications would be comparable (see Section 4.14).

There would be a small increase in operational utility demands at RLUOB and PF-4, consistent with that evaluated in the 2015 CMRR SA, but as determined in that NEPA document, there would be no impacts on LANL capacities. As under the Proposed Action Alternative, NNSA expects that the largest increase in utility demands would be increased water use associated with personnel requirements for AC and MC operations. Because personnel requirements for AC and MC operations under this alternative would be comparable, the increase in water use would also be comparable and well within LANL’s water capacity.

4.14 Socioeconomics

The socioeconomic region of influence (ROI) for LANL is defined as the four-county area of Los Alamos, Rio Arriba, Sandoval, and Santa Fe Counties in New Mexico (DOE 2015a). The majority of LANL employees reside in this four-county area. As of 2016, total direct LANL employment was about 10,500 (LANL 2016a), representing about 6 percent of the employment in the LANL ROI, which totaled about 163,000 in 2011 (DOE 2015c). Direct LANL employment causes an approximately equal level of indirect employment in the LANL ROI, assuming an employment multiplier for the LANL area of 2 (DOE 2015c).

Proposed Action Alternative

Facility Modifications—Facility modification personnel would include a combination of resident TA-55 technicians, outside project subcontract workers, and technical experts for equipment installation. Although some of the workforce would come from existing LANL staff, it was assumed that current LANL personnel would be largely committed to other projects and the required personnel would represent new hires.

The total time required to complete facility modifications at both facilities is uncertain because it depends on a variety of factors such as funding, the time required to design and fabricate enclosures, and the scheduling of tasks at PF-4 and RLUOB (e.g., whether installations in the different RLUOB laboratories or PF-4 rooms can be conducted concurrently or sequentially). The total time required for facility modifications at both facilities is expected to be approximately 7 to 9 years (LANL 2018).
Personnel requirements for facility modifications would vary from year to year, comparable to that evaluated for RLUOB and PF-4 modifications in the 2015 CMRR SA (DOE 2015a). That is, the number of personnel required for facility modifications is expected to range from about 100 FTEs to about 480 FTEs. The peak personnel requirement (approximately 480 workers) would represent about 5 percent of the LANL workforce in 2016 and about 0.3 percent of the workforce in the LANL ROI. This peak personnel requirement would be less than that analyzed in the CMRR-NF SEIS (about 790 FTEs) (DOE 2011c) for construction of CMRR-NF. The additional personnel at LANL would generate an approximately equal number of indirect jobs in the LANL ROI. After the facility modifications are complete, there could be a minor requirement for personnel over a few years to complete readiness reviews and bring AC and MC activities up to full operations.

Operations—To support AC and MC operations at PF-4 and RLUOB, several personnel would be transferred from the CMR Building, and up to 30 FTEs would be new hires. This estimate of 30 additional employees is expected to be conservative because it is the same estimate as that in the 2015 CMRR SA (DOE 2015a), which evaluated more AC and MC operations in PF-4 than those under the Proposed Action Alternative. Performing the same AC and MC operations in RLUOB rather than PF-4 may require fewer employees due to the less-extensive safeguards and security requirements at RLUOB compared to those for PF-4 (a Hazard Category 2 Nuclear Facility). Using the same estimates of the LANL and regional workforces as those for the above facility modification analysis, 30 new hires would represent about 0.2 percent of the LANL workforce and 0.02 percent of the employment in the LANL ROI. The additional 30 personnel at LANL would generate an approximately equal number of indirect jobs in the LANL ROI (DOE 2015c).

Conclusion—Facility modifications would cause increased temporary employment at LANL for facility modifications, but at levels lower than previously analyzed (DOE 2011c). Additional employment to support AC and MC operations may be smaller than that evaluated in the CMRR EIS (DOE 2003b). There would be little or no stress on housing and community services in the LANL ROI and no meaningful socioeconomic impacts.

No Action Alternative

Modifications to RLUOB and PF-4 are expected to require 8 to 10 years, with most of the work being done in 7 years. This estimate includes minor work following facility modifications and readiness reviews and bringing AC and MC activities up to full operations (DOE 2015a; LANL 2018). Similar activities would take place under the No Action Alternative as those under the Proposed Action Alternative, except that additional modifications would be made to RLUOB and fewer modifications would be made to PF-4. As under the Proposed Action Alternative, personnel requirements for facility modifications would vary from year to year, but are expected to peak at about 480 FTEs. This peak personnel requirement would be less than that analyzed in the CMRR-NF SEIS (DOE 2011c) and represent about 4.5 percent of the LANL workforce and about 0.3 percent of the workforce in the LANL ROI. The additional personnel at LANL would generate an approximately equal number of indirect jobs in the LANL ROI (DOE 2015c).

Personnel requirements during AC and MC operations would be essentially the same as those under the Proposed Action Alternative. As evaluated in the 2015 CMRR SA (DOE 2015a), there would be about 30 new hires to perform AC and MC operations. These new hires would cause little or no stress on housing and community services in the LANL ROI and no meaningful socioeconomic impacts.

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33 A peak personnel requirement (477 FTEs) during facility modifications was evaluated for activities evaluated in the 2015 CMRR SA (DOE 2015a).
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5.0 CUMULATIVE IMPACTS

CEQ regulations (40 CFR Parts 1500–1508) define cumulative impacts as effects on the environment that result from implementing a proposed Federal action when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions, regardless of what agency or person undertakes such other actions (40 CFR 1508.7). Thus, the cumulative impacts of an action can be viewed as the total effects on a resource, ecosystem, or human community of that action, as well as all other actions affecting that resource, no matter what entity (Federal, non-Federal, or private) is taking the action (EPA 1999b).

Cumulative effects can result from individually minor, but collectively significant, actions taking place over a period of time. Cumulative effects can also result from spatial (geographic) and/or temporal (time) crowding of environmental perturbations (i.e., concurrent human activities and the resulting impacts on the environment are additive if there is insufficient time for the environment to recover).

In general, the following approach was used to estimate cumulative impacts for this EA:

- The affected environment and baseline conditions were identified. Most of this information was taken from Chapter 4 of this EA.
- Past, present, and reasonably foreseeable actions and the effects of those actions were identified.
- Aggregate (additive) effects of past, present, and reasonably foreseeable actions were assessed.

Cumulative impacts were assessed by combining the range of effects of the two alternatives addressed in this EA with the effects of other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable actions in the LANL ROI. Many of these actions would occur at different times and locations and may not be truly additive. The effects were combined, irrespective of the time and location of the impact, to envelop any uncertainties in the projected activities and their effects. This approach produces a conservative estimation of cumulative impacts for the activities considered.

5.1 Other Activities at Los Alamos National Laboratory

Reasonably foreseeable future actions at LANL are summarized in the following paragraphs. The actions listed may not include all actions at LANL. However, they should provide an adequate basis for determining the magnitude of the potential cumulative impacts.

Land Conveyance and Transfer Program—In the Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Conveyance and Transfer of Certain Land Tracts Administered by the U.S. Department of Energy and Located at Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos and Santa Fe Counties, New Mexico, DOE/EIS-0293 (DOE 1999), DOE evaluated the environmental impacts of the conveyance and transfer of surplus land to other agencies. Several RODs (65 FR 14952, 67 FR 45495, 70 FR 48378, 77 FR 3257) have been issued in support of these actions. DOE has transferred more than 2,430 acres with an additional 1,700 acres scheduled for transfer over the next 10 years (DOE 2016d). The program is not expected to significantly affect the analyses in this EA.

Radioactive Liquid Waste Treatment Facility—The RLWTF Upgrade Project will upgrade the capabilities provided by the RLWTF to collect, store, treat, and dispose of up to 1.3 million gallons per year of liquid LLW and industrial wastewater and 7,700 gallons per year of liquid TRU waste. Activities associated with this ongoing project were evaluated in the LANL SWEIS (DOE 2008a). The project scope includes the following subprojects (DOE 2016d):

- **LLW Subproject**: This subproject involves construction of a less than Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility for treatment of liquid LLW. The subproject includes facility/infrastructure and LLW treatment process piping; secondary waste treatment (including storage, treatment, and packaging); treated effluent storage, reuse, and discharge; receipt and storage of chemicals; a laboratory for process sample analysis; secondary solid waste storage and handling; and electrical/control/data
transmission and receipt of equipment associated with LLW influent storage, treatment processes, and effluent storage/discharge and shipment of solid waste. This subproject is ongoing, with equipment installation and tie-ins to liquid LLW lines already underway.

- **TRU Liquid Waste Subproject**: This subproject involves construction of a Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility for storage of liquid TRU waste influent, treatment for the removal of TRU elements, and transfer to LLW treatment. The subproject includes facility/infrastructure and liquid TRU waste treatment process piping; secondary waste treatment (including storage, treatment, and packaging); treated effluent transfer; receipt and storage of chemicals; secondary solid waste storage and handling; and electrical/control/data transmission and receipt of equipment associated with liquid TRU waste influent storage, treatment processes, and effluent transfer and shipment of solid waste.

- **Zero Liquid Discharge Subproject**: This subproject involves construction of evaporation tanks; transfer lines and pumping from existing and new (i.e., proposed) radioactive liquid waste facilities; and discharge capabilities for off-normal events. The subproject constitutes a best management practice.

**Surplus Plutonium Disposition Program**—The **SPD Supplemental EIS (DOE/EIS-0283-S2) (DOE 2015c)** addresses disposition of 13.1 metric tons of surplus plutonium composed of 7.1 metric tons of plutonium from pits and 6 metric tons of non-pit plutonium. The **SPD Supplemental EIS** alternatives for disposition of surplus plutonium are: (1) fabrication into mixed oxide (MOX) fuel at the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility at the Savannah River Site (SRS); (2) immobilization using a new vitrification capability at SRS, followed by vitrification with high-level radioactive waste at the SRS Defense Waste Processing Facility; (3) dissolution at the H-Canyon/HB-Line at SRS, followed by vitrification at the Defense Waste Processing Facility; or (4) preparation at SRS or LANL for disposal as TRU waste at WIPP. In addition, the **SPD Supplemental EIS** evaluated the impacts of options for disassembly and conversion of the pit plutonium, including use of newly constructed and existing facilities at SRS and LANL (DOE 2015c).

DOE did not identify a Preferred Alternative in the **SPD Supplemental EIS**. On December 24, 2015, DOE announced a Preferred Alternative for the 6 metric tons of surplus non-pit plutonium (80 FR 80348), which is to prepare this plutonium at SRS for disposal at WIPP. In its April 5, 2016, ROD (81 FR 19588), DOE decided to implement its Preferred Alternative to prepare 6 metric tons of non-pit plutonium for disposal at WIPP. DOE has no Preferred Alternative for dispositioning the remaining 7.1 metric tons of surplus pit plutonium and no Preferred Alternative for providing the capability to disassemble surplus pits and convert pit plutonium to a form suitable for disposition.

**Disposal of Greater-Than-Class C (GTCC) Low-Level Radioactive Waste and GTCC-Like Waste**—In January 2016, DOE issued the **Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Disposal of Greater-Than-Class C (GTCC) Low-Level Radioactive Waste and GTCC-Like Waste (GTCC LLW EIS) (DOE/EIS-0375) (DOE 2016d)** to evaluate the potential environmental impacts from the proposed development, operation, and long-term management of a facility or facilities for disposal of GTCC LLW and DOE GTCC-like waste. GTCC LLW has radionuclide concentrations exceeding the limits for Class C LLW that were established by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 10 CFR Part 61. DOE GTCC-like waste has similar characteristics. There is no location for disposal of GTCC LLW, and the Federal government is responsible for such disposal under the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 (Public Law 99-240). The **GTCC LLW EIS** evaluates several disposal technologies, including a geologic repository, intermediate depth boreholes, enhanced near-surface trenches, and above-grade vaults. LANL is one of the six candidate DOE sites considered for GTCC LLW disposal in the **GTCC LLW EIS** (Disposal at LANL would occur at TA-54.) DOE also considered two disposal locations in the WIPP vicinity and generic commercial sites in four regions of the country.
The Preferred Alternative is to dispose of GTCC and GTCC-like waste in the WIPP geologic repository (Alternative 2) and/or at generic commercial facilities (Alternatives 3-5). The land disposal conceptual designs evaluated in the GTCC LLW EIS could be altered or enhanced, as necessary, to provide the optimal application at a given location. Before implementing any alternative examined in the GTCC LLW EIS, DOE would conduct site-specific NEPA reviews, as appropriate, to identify the location or locations within a given site for a geologic repository, intermediate-depth borehole, trench, or vault facility for the disposal of GTCC LLW and GTCC-like waste.

Cleanup Activities—Cleanup activities are being conducted in compliance with Federal and state regulations. These activities may have short-term adverse impacts, but will have long-term beneficial impacts on the environment. Cleanup activities were evaluated in the LANL SWEIS (DOE 2008a) and are not expected to significantly affect the analyses in this EA.

Increased Pit Production at LANL. The 2015 National Defense Authorization requires that DOE demonstrate the capability to produce nuclear warhead pits at a level of 80 pits per year. On May 10, 2018, NNSA announced a plan to provide this capability by 2030 by distributing pit production between SRS and LANL (NNSA 2018). Under this plan, at least 50 pits per year would be produced at SRS and at a repurposed Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility and at least 30 pits per year would be produced at LANL. The proposed production of 30 pits per year would require increasing the authorized level of pit production at LANL from the 20 pits per year level selected in the ROD (73 FR 55833) following preparation of the LANL SWEIS (DOE 2008a) and the Complex Transformation PEIS (DOE 2008b). NNSA will determine the appropriate level of NEPA documentation to support the recent announcement and complete the necessary analyses and RODs prior to proceeding with actions related to increases above the currently authorized pit production levels.

It will take a number of years to develop the implementation strategy, perform the production planning, and make any required physical changes to accommodate the higher level of pit production. Nonetheless, for purposes of evaluating the potential cumulative impacts of a higher level of pit production, this EA incorporates analysis from the LANL SWEIS. The environmental impacts that could result at LANL from increasing the authorized level of pit production above 20 pits per year would be bounded by impacts that could result from hypothetically implementing the Expanded Operations Alternative evaluated in the LANL SWEIS (DOE 2008a). Impacts associated with this alternative included those that could result from production of up to 80 pits per year, which is more than twice the pit production rate proposed for LANL in the NNSA Pit Production Announcement (NNSA 2018).

5.2 Other Activities in the Region

It is necessary to consider past, present, and future activities implemented by other Federal, state, and local agencies outside LANL, but within its ROI. Past and present activities are generally reflected in the affected environment information described in Chapter 4. Most of the future actions at locations outside LANL are not expected to affect the cumulative impacts of LANL activities because of their distance from LANL, their relatively small size, and their zoning, permitting, environmental review, and construction and operations requirements.

The main facility at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) in Albuquerque is located approximately 60 miles from LANL. Due to this distance, cumulative impacts other than air emissions are not expected to be influenced by SNL. For radiological air emissions, the 2015 SNL dose to the offsite MEI was estimated to be 0.003 millirem, and the population dose was estimated to be 0.085 person-rem (SNL 2016). Because any

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34 In the LANL SWEIS, DOE identified the Expanded Operations Alternative as the Preferred Alternative; however, DOE decided to implement the No Action Alternative for pit production, retaining the authorized level of pit production at 20 pits per year (73 FR 55833).
combined impacts would be very small, impacts from SNL are not considered further in this cumulative impacts analysis.

5.3 Cumulative Impacts at Los Alamos National Laboratory

As described in Chapter 4, the actions evaluated in this EA would cause little or no impacts on land use; geology and soils; water resources; biological resources; cultural resources; air quality and climate, visual resources and noise; infrastructure; and socioeconomics. Because the actions evaluated in this EA would produce little or no impacts on these resource areas, they would not substantially contribute to cumulative impacts. Thus, this section analyzes cumulative impacts on human health, waste management, and environmental justice. In addition, nationwide cumulative impacts on transportation and climate change are presented in Section 5.4.

Public and Occupational Health and Safety

Table 28 presents the estimated cumulative impacts of radiation exposure under the LANL SWEIS Expanded Operations Alternative (DOE 2008a), doses associated with potential surplus plutonium disposition alternatives (DOE 2015c), doses associated with potential disposal of GTCC LLW at LANL (DOE 2016d), and doses associated with activities at RLUOB and PF-4 under the range of alternatives evaluated in this EA. The estimated doses under the LANL SWEIS Expanded Operations Alternative, which reflects the highest level of operations that is expected to occur at LANL, represent a conservative estimate of the doses that could result from ongoing LANL activities because they include doses associated with the continued operation of the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE), hypothetical production of 80 pits per year, and ongoing remediation of material disposal areas (MDAs) at LANL. Operation of LANSCE is the predominant contributor to offsite dose to the population surrounding LANL. Remediation of MDAs at LANL is the predominant contributor to worker dose. In addition, the LANL SWEIS totals include operation of the CMRR Facility, and this analysis does not make any adjustment for the reduction in dose that would be realized when the existing CMR Building is completely shut down.

Table 28. Estimated Cumulative Radiological Impacts from Normal Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Maximally Exposed Individual</th>
<th>Population Within 50 Miles</th>
<th>Site Workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dose (millirem per year)</td>
<td>LCF Risk per Year *</td>
<td>Collect Dose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LANEL SWEIS Expanded Operations Alternative (DOE 2008a)</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>5×10^{-6}</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD Supplemental EIS (DOE 2015c)</td>
<td>0.081</td>
<td>5×10^{-8}</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GTCC LLW EIS (DOE 2016d)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternatives Evaluated in this EA b</td>
<td>0.082 to 0.16</td>
<td>5×10^{-4} to 1×10^{-7}</td>
<td>0.98 to 1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total LANL Dose</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>5×10^{-6}</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

EA = environmental assessment; LCF = latent cancer fatality; LLW = low-level radioactive waste; NA = not available.

a The risk of an LCF to a MEI is a value less than or equal to 1. The risk to the population within a 50-mile radius or to site workers is the projected number of LCFs in the 50-mile radius or worker population and is a whole number; the calculated number of LCFs is provided in parentheses.

b Source: Tables 9, 10, 12, and 13 of this EA.

Beyond activities at LANL, no other activities in the area surrounding LANL are expected to result in radiological impacts on the public beyond those associated with natural background radiation and other background radiation, as discussed in Chapter 4, Section 4.1.1. The projected dose from continued LANL
operations is a small fraction of the dose that persons living near LANL receive annually from natural background radiation and other sources, such as diagnostic x-rays.

No LCFs are expected for the MEI or the general population. The dose to the offsite MEI is expected to remain within the 10-millirem-per-year limit required by 40 CFR Part 61, Subpart H, National Emission Standards for Emissions of Radionuclides Other than Radon from Department of Energy Facilities. In addition, there would be no appreciable increase in the annual risk of an LCF among the general public from LANL operations.

The 543 person-rem projected dose under the Expanded Operations Alternative in the LANL SWEIS (DOE 2008a) corresponds to an annual risk of an LCF in the worker population of 0.3 (or 1 chance of an LCF in the worker population for each 3 years of operation). The addition of impacts from the operation of RLUOB and PF-4 under the alternatives evaluated in this EA would not increase this estimate because a CMRR worker dose of approximately 61 person-rem per year was included in the estimate in the LANL SWEIS. Worker doses would decrease by about 140 person-rem per year after MDA remediation work is completed (DOE 2008a). Inclusion of the SPD Supplemental EIS (DOE 2015c) and GTCC LLW EIS (DOE 2016d) estimates for work at LANL would add about 190 person-rem and 5 person-rem per year, respectively, and would increase the annual risk of an LCF in the worker population by about 0.1. Individual worker doses would be maintained ALARA and within applicable regulatory limits.

The estimated doses shown in Table 28 are a very small fraction of the normal background dose received by the population in and around LANL. Chapter 4, Section 4.1.1, of this EA provides an analysis of radiation in the environment around LANL that is attributed to naturally occurring radiation and radiation from past and present operations at LANL. Natural background radiation was estimated to range from approximately 430 to 570 millirem per year, compared to the total estimated doses from LANL operations of 8.5 millirem per year to the MEI and approximately 0.1 millirem per year to the MEI for the alternatives evaluated in this EA.

**Waste Management**

Cumulative amounts of waste generated at LANL would be greatest if the Expanded Operations Alternative described in the LANL SWEIS were fully implemented. This alternative includes substantial waste generation rates at LANL, largely due to remediation of MDAs and decontamination, decommissioning, and demolition (DD&D) of facilities. The contribution to cumulative waste management impacts from other proposed actions at LANL, particularly overall waste generation at LANL during the next 10 years from disposition of buildings and environmental restoration efforts, could be large. Construction and demolition wastes would be recycled and reused to the extent practicable. Existing waste treatment and disposal facilities would be used according to specific waste types. The estimated waste generation totals for LANL were adjusted for this EA to reflect the 2009 cancellation of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership program, the December 19, 2008 (73 FR 77644), and the decision not to build a Consolidated Nuclear Facility at LANL; and are further adjusted for this EA to include potential waste from activities evaluated in the SPD Supplemental EIS (DOE 2015c). In addition, the annual quantities of waste from LANL operations include the quantities assuming the hypothetical production of 80 pits per year. Table 29 presents the estimated cumulative annual amount of radioactive and nonradioactive waste that could be generated at LANL.

Cumulative TRU waste, LLW, MLLW, and chemical waste generation would be within the levels forecast under the Expanded Operations Alternative described in the LANL SWEIS. The available capacity of WIPP is expected to be sufficient to accommodate the estimated cumulative volumes of TRU waste from LANL operations (DOE 2008a). Offsite disposal options for LLW include NNSS and commercial facilities (DOE 2008a). MLLW waste would be sent off site for treatment of the hazardous component and disposal. The alternatives evaluated in this EA would contribute a maximum of 11 percent of the estimated cumulative annual waste generation at LANL.
Cumulative generation of construction and demolition waste would be higher than that under the Expanded Operations Alternative in the \textit{LANL SWEIS} (DOE 2008a) due to the increased waste estimates from the \textit{GTCC LLW EIS} and from DD&D of the existing CMR Building. Significant quantities of nonradioactive solid wastes, including construction and demolition debris, would be generated under the Expanded

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Waste Type</th>
<th>LANL Operations \textsuperscript{a}</th>
<th>Alternatives Evaluated in this \textit{EA} \textsuperscript{b}</th>
<th>CMR Building DD&amp;D \textsuperscript{c}</th>
<th>Revised LANL Operations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transuranic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less GNEP</td>
<td>530 to 3,300</td>
<td>88 (6 to 11%)</td>
<td>38 to 75</td>
<td>790 to 1,490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Consolidated Nuclear Facility</td>
<td>0 to -900</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less earlier CMR Building DD&amp;D Estimate</td>
<td>0 to -1,200</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less earlier CMR Building DD&amp;D Estimate</td>
<td>-90</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plus \textit{GTCC LLW EIS} \textsuperscript{d}</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plus SPD Supplemental EIS \textsuperscript{e}</td>
<td>220</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revised Total</td>
<td>660 to 1,330</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-level radioactive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less GNEP</td>
<td>27,700 to 141,400</td>
<td>2,640 (2 to 8%)</td>
<td>9,500 to 19,000</td>
<td>33,000 to 137,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Consolidated Nuclear Facility</td>
<td>0 to -3,400</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less earlier CMR Building DD&amp;D Estimate</td>
<td>0 to -12,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less earlier CMR Building DD&amp;D Estimate</td>
<td>-2,600</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plus \textit{GTCC LLW EIS} \textsuperscript{d}</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plus SPD Supplemental EIS \textsuperscript{e}</td>
<td>380</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revised Total</td>
<td>21,000 to 115,800</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed low-level radioactive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less GNEP</td>
<td>390 to 18,300</td>
<td>26 (&lt;1 to 6%)</td>
<td>70 to 140</td>
<td>430 to 18,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Consolidated Nuclear Facility</td>
<td>0 to -4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less earlier CMR Building DD&amp;D Estimate</td>
<td>0 to -72</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less earlier CMR Building DD&amp;D Estimate</td>
<td>-30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plus \textit{GTCC LLW EIS} \textsuperscript{d}</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plus SPD Supplemental EIS \textsuperscript{e}</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revised Total</td>
<td>330 to 18,100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical Waste (million pounds)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Consolidated Nuclear Facility</td>
<td>6.4 to 12.9</td>
<td>0.025 (&lt;1%)</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>6.6 to 11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less earlier CMR Building DD&amp;D Estimate</td>
<td>0 to -1.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plus \textit{GTCC LLW EIS} \textsuperscript{d}</td>
<td>-0.025</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plus SPD Supplemental EIS \textsuperscript{e}</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revised Total</td>
<td>6.4 to 11.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction and Demolition Waste</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less earlier CMR Building DD&amp;D Estimate Plus \textit{GTCC LLW EIS} \textsuperscript{d}</td>
<td>64,000 to 72,000</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
<td>27,500 to 55,000</td>
<td>177,000 to 208,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plus SPD Supplemental EIS \textsuperscript{e}</td>
<td>-5,000 to -10,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revised Total</td>
<td>147,000 to 150,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{a} Data from Table 4-57 of the \textit{CMRR-NF SEIS} (DOE 2011c) except for the \textit{GTCC LLW EIS} (DOE 2016d) and the \textit{SPD Supplemental EIS} (DOE 2015c), and the inclusion of waste from hypothetical production of 80 pits per year.

\textsuperscript{b} Operational data from Chapter 4, Section 4.3.2.2, of this EA. Under the Proposed Action Alternative, the projected annual quantities of radioactive and chemical wastes during facility modifications would be smaller than the estimated annual quantities during AC and MC operations. The parentheses indicate the percentage of operational waste quantities compared to quantities from revised LANL operations.

\textsuperscript{c} Data from Table 4-50 of the \textit{CMRR-NF SEIS} (DOE 2011c). Work to be done over a 2- to 4-year period.

\textsuperscript{d} Highest annual data computed from information in Table 5.3.11–1 of the \textit{GTCC LLW EIS} (DOE 2016d).

\textsuperscript{e} Highest annual waste generation for construction or operation from Tables 4-15 and 4-19 (DOE 2015c).

Source: DOE 2011c, 2015c, 2016d.
Chapter 5 – Cumulative Impacts

Operations Alternative if all wastes were removed from MDAs. Demolition of the CMR Building would increase the lower and upper bounds of this estimate, based on the latest projections for the amount of this waste that may be generated during the demolition period. Construction for disposal of GTCC LLW at LANL also could increase generation of solid waste at LANL. Construction and demolition wastes would be recycled and reused to the extent practicable. Debris that cannot be recycled would be disposed of at solid waste landfills or construction and demolition debris landfills. The closure of the Los Alamos County Landfill means that solid wastes would be disposed of via the Los Alamos County Eco Station, where wastes would be segregated and then transported to an appropriately permitted solid waste landfill. The alternatives evaluated in this EA would contribute approximately 1 percent of estimated cumulative annual construction and demolition waste generation.

Environmental Justice

Cumulative environmental justice impacts occur when the net effect of regional projects or activities results in disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental effects on minority or low-income populations. As described in Chapter 4, Section 4.5, there would be no high and adverse effects on any population within the LANL ROI. Impacts on minority or low-income populations would be comparable to those on the population as a whole. Therefore, no cumulative disproportionately high and adverse effects on minority or low-income populations are expected as a result of the small incremental dose resulting from either alternative evaluated in this EA.

In addition, DOE evaluated whether potential impacts on indigenous populations surrounding LANL could be greater than those on the general population as a consequence of their locations near LANL and their cultural affiliation with the natural environment. As described in Chapter 4, Section 4.5, of this EA, DOE performed analyses to examine doses for a hypothetical individual residing at the Pueblo de San Ildefonso and Santa Clara Pueblo boundaries, where the greatest potential impacts on Native Americans are expected. An individual located at either of these pueblos would receive an annual individual dose that would be less than the MEI dose. Thus, there would be no cumulative disproportionately high and adverse effects on these hypothetical individuals.

Furthermore, to assist in identifying the potential impacts from differential patterns of subsistence consumption and cultural practices, this EA references the LANL SWEIS (DOE 2008a), for which a number of specific special pathways receptor analyses were performed, including for a hypothetical individual that derived all of his or her food from local sources and also consumed increased amounts of fish, deer, and elk from the areas surrounding LANL and drank surface water and cota (a tea made from local plants). This special pathways receptor would be exposed to additional amounts of contaminated soils and sediments from performing outdoor activities on or near LANL. Such a receptor was estimated to receive an additional dose of up to 4.5 millirem per year from these special pathways (see the LANL SWEIS, Section 5.11).

From the 2015 Los Alamos National Laboratory Annual Site Environmental Report (LANL 2016c), the dose to a MEI is about 0.13 millirem from site emissions. As described above, the maximum dose to the MEI from the alternatives evaluated in this EA is estimated to be 0.16 millirem per year. Therefore, if the MEI associated with this EA were also assumed to be the LANL site MEI and a special pathways receptor, the maximum dose would be up to 4.8 millirem per year (i.e., up to 4.5 millirem associated with special pathways, 0.13 millirem from other site operations, and up to 0.16 millirem associated with normal operations from AC and MC operations at RLUOB and PF-4). This dose would represent an increase of about 1 percent above the approximately 430 to 570 millirem that a person residing near LANL would normally receive each year from natural background radiation. Although the dose would be higher than that received by an average member of the public in the LANL ROI, it would be well below the annual 100 millirem dose criterion for protection of the public (DOE Order 458.1 [DOE 2011a]) and a small fraction of the background dose received by all persons. In terms of an increased risk of a fatal cancer, the 4.8 millirem per year cumulative special pathways dose would represent an annual estimated risk of
3×10^6, or about 1 chance in 350,000 of an LCF. Therefore, there would be no cumulative disproportionately high and adverse effects on such a receptor.

5.4 Nationwide and Global Cumulative Impacts

This section evaluates cumulative impacts for nationwide radioactive material transportation and global climate change.

Radioactive Material Transportation

The collective doses and cumulative health effects resulting from approximately 130 years (from 1943 to 2073) of radioactive material and waste transport across the United States were estimated in the SPD Supplemental EIS (DOE 2015c, Table 4–48). As shown in Table 30, the total collective worker doses from all types of shipments (including general transportation, historical shipments, reasonably foreseeable actions, and shipments under the LANL SWEIS [DOE 2008a]) were estimated to be 422,000 person-rem, which could result in 253 excess LCFs among the worker population. The total collective doses to the general public were estimated to be 437,000 person-rem, which could result in 262 excess LCFs among the general population. The majority of the collective doses for workers and the general population would be associated with general transportation of radioactive materials. Examples of these activities include shipments of radiopharmaceuticals to nuclear medicine laboratories and shipments of commercial LLW to commercial disposal facilities. As shown in Table 30, the estimated doses associated with radioactive waste transportation under the Proposed Action Alternative in this EA (as described in Section 4.4) would be small and would not substantially contribute to cumulative impacts.

Table 30. Potential Cumulative Impacts from Transport of Radioactive Waste

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Crew Dose (person-rem)</th>
<th>Crew Risk (LCF) a</th>
<th>Population Dose (person-rem)</th>
<th>Population Risk (LCF) a</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Other Actions (1943 to 2073) b</td>
<td>421,000</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>436,000</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD Supplemental EIS (DOE 2015c)</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Draft SSFL Area IV EIS (DOE 2017a)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.0003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternatives Evaluated in this EA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facility Modifications c</td>
<td>0.54 to 0.68</td>
<td>3×10^4 to 4×10^4</td>
<td>0.17 to 0.22</td>
<td>1×10^4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations d</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>422,000</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>437,000</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

EA = environmental assessment; LCF = latent cancer fatality.

a Determined using a risk factor of 0.0006 LCF per person-rem (DOE 2003a).
b Source: DOE 2015c; includes impacts from the Expanded Operations Alternative from the LANL SWEIS (DOE 2008a) and from the GTCC LLW EIS (DOE 2016d). The population dose in the GTCC LLW EIS (DOE 2016d) is 10 person-rem (0.006 LCF) larger.
c Source: Table 21 of this EA.
d Source: Table 22 of this EA, assuming 50 years of operations.

Global Climate Change

During 2014, greenhouse gas emissions in the United States totaled about 7,570 billion tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (EPA 2016). As described in Chapter 4, Section 4.11, during the years 2011 through 2014, LANL activities caused an average annual emission of about 63,700 tons of carbon dioxide equivalent. By way of comparison, annual operational emissions of greenhouse gases from the alternatives evaluated in this EA are estimated to be approximately 90 tons of additional carbon dioxide equivalent, which would represent about 0.1 percent of LANL’s 5-year average emissions of greenhouse gases from 2011 through 2014, and a very small fraction of U.S. emissions. At present, there is no methodology that would allow DOE to estimate the specific impacts of LANL emissions on climate change.
6.0 REFERENCES


DNFSB (Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board), 2017, Letter from J. L. Connery, Chairman DNFSB, to The Honorable Ernest J. Moniz, Secretary of Energy, January 3.


DOE (U.S. Department of Energy), 2011c, Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement for the Nuclear Facility Portion of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Building Replacement Project at Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico, DOE/EIS-0350-S1, Los Alamos, New Mexico, August.


DOE (U.S. Department of Energy), 2017a, *Draft Environmental Impact Statement for Remediation of Area IV and the Northern Buffer Zone of the Santa Susana Field Laboratory*, DOE/EIS-0402, Office of Environmental Management, Simi Valley, California, January.


USFWS (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service), 2005, Letter from S. MacMullin, USFWS Field Supervisor, to E. Withers, NNSA ESA Program Manager, Re: Biological Assessment of the Potential Effects of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Facility Replacement Project on Federally Listed Threatened, Endangered, and Sensitive Species at Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico, Consultation #2-22-03-1-0302 dated March 9, 2005, Albuquerque, New Mexico.
USFWS (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service), 2006, Letter from B. Hanson, USFWS Acting Field Supervisor, to E. Withers, NNSA ESA Program Manager, Re: Amended Biological Assessment: The Potential Effects of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Facility Replacement Project on Federally Listed Threatened, Endangered, and Sensitive Species at Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico, Consultation #2-22-03-1-0302 dated February 7, 2006, Albuquerque, New Mexico.


USFWS (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service), 2009, Letter from W. Murphy, USFWS Field Supervisor, to V. Loucks, NNSA Biological Resource Program Manager, Re: Amended Biological Assessment: The Potential Effects of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Facility Replacement Project on Federally Listed Threatened, Endangered, and Sensitive Species at Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico, Consultation #22420-09-1-0066 dated August 6, 2009, Albuquerque, New Mexico.


APPENDIX A
EVALUATION OF HUMAN HEALTH EFFECTS FROM FACILITY ACCIDENTS

Appendix A of this final environmental assessment (EA) presents an evaluation of the potential impacts on human health from postulated accidents associated with the activities performed in support of analytical chemistry (AC) and materials characterization (MC) operations at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). AC and MC operations under the Proposed and No Action Alternatives evaluated in this Final EA take place in the Radiological Laboratory/Utility/Office Building (RLUOB) and Plutonium Facility, Building 4 (PF-4) in Technical Area (TA)-55.

Section A.1 presents the methodology used to evaluate potential impacts from potential accidents at RLUOB and PF-4. Section A.2 describes the detailed scenarios, source terms, and impacts from the accidents evaluated for RLUOB. Section A.3 presents the potential impacts of a major site-wide earthquake, a large explosion, or other potential accidents affecting PF-4. Section A.4 presents combined impacts should both facilities be affected.

A.1 Impact Assessment Methods for Facility Accidents

A.1.1 Introduction

Potential accidents are defined in existing facility documentation such as safety analysis reports, documented safety analyses (DSAs), hazards assessment documents, and National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) documents. The accidents include radiological and chemical accidents that have a low frequency of occurrence but large consequences, as well as a spectrum of other accidents that have a higher frequency of occurrence but smaller consequences. The data in these documents include accident scenarios, the material-at-risk (MAR), source terms (quantities of hazardous materials available for release to workers, the public, or the environment), and consequences.

In determining the potential for facility accidents and their impacts, and presenting the magnitude of the consequences should they occur, this Final EA considers two important concepts in the presentation of results: (1) risk, and (2) uncertainty and conservatism. Risk is addressed below; uncertainty and conservatism are addressed in Section A.1.7.

One metric that can be obtained from the radiological accident analysis is the dose to an individual or the population. Another metric that can be obtained is accident risk. Risk is usually defined as the product of the consequence and estimated frequency of a given accident. Accident consequences may be presented in terms of dose (for example, person-rem) or health effects (for example, latent cancer fatalities [LCFs]). The accident frequency is the number of times the accident is estimated to occur over a given period of time (for example, in a year). Potential higher-consequence design-basis and beyond-design-basis accidents are not expected to occur over the life of a facility, and their frequency is typically much less than 1 in 100 per year of operation.

A number of specific types of radiological accident risk can be directly calculated from the results of the MACCS2 [MELCOR Accident Consequence Code System] computer code (NRC 1990, 1998) and are reported in this Final EA. A common set of dose factors, consistent with application of DOE-STD-1027-92 (DOE 1992), are used for all alternatives to evaluate the relative impacts from the different alternatives. The population risk is the product of the accident frequency and the total consequences projected to be experienced by the population. For example, if an accident has a frequency of 0.001 (or 1×10⁻³) per year and the consequence of the accident is 5 LCFs, then the annual risk of a single LCF in the population is 0.001×5 = 0.005. Population risk is a measure of the expected number of LCFs experienced by the population as a whole over the course of a year. In a similar manner, if an accident has a frequency of 0.001
and the consequence of the accident to an individual is an increased risk of an LCF of 0.01, then the annual risk of an LCF is 0.001 \times 0.01 = 0.00001 (or 1 chance in 100,000 of an LCF).

A.1.2 Identification of Material Potentially Released to the Environment

The amount and particle size distribution of material aerosolized in an accident generally depends on the form of that material, the degree and robustness of containment, and the energetics of the potential accident scenario. Once the material is aerosolized, it must still travel through building confinement and filtration systems or bypass the systems before being released to the environment.

A standard DOE formula was used to estimate the source term for each accident at each of the proposed surplus plutonium facilities:

\[
\text{Source Term} = \text{MAR} \times \text{DR} \times \text{ARF} \times \text{RF} \times \text{LPF}
\]

where:

- MAR = material-at-risk (curies or grams)
- DR = damage ratio
- ARF = airborne release fraction
- RF = respirable fraction\(^{35}\)
- LPF = leak path factor

The MAR is the amount of radionuclides (in curies of radioactivity or grams of each radionuclide) available for release when acted upon by a given physical stress or accident. The MAR is specific to a given process in the facility of interest. It is not necessarily the total quantity of material present; rather, it is that amount of material in the scenario of interest postulated to be available for release.

The damage ratio (DR) is the fraction of MAR exposed to the effects of the energy, force, or stress generated by the postulated event. For the accident scenarios discussed in this analysis, the value of the DR varies depending on the details of the accident scenario, but can range up to 1.0.

The airborne release fraction (ARF) is the fraction of material that becomes airborne due to the accident. The respirable fraction (RF) is the fraction of the material with a particulate aerodynamic diameter less than or equal to 10 microns (0.0004 inches) that could be retained in the respiratory system following inhalation. The value of each of these factors depends on the details of the specific accident scenario postulated. ARFs and RFs were estimated according to reference material in *Airborne Release Fractions/Rates and Respirable Fractions for Nonreactor Nuclear Facilities*, DOE-HDBK-3010 (originally issued in 1994 and reaffirmed in 2013 [DOE 2013b]).

The leak path factor (LPF) accounts for the action of removal mechanisms (e.g., containment systems, filtration, and deposition) to reduce the amount of airborne radioactivity ultimately released to occupied spaces in the facility or the environment.

No accident scenarios were identified that would result in a substantial release of plutonium or other radionuclides via liquid pathways.

Consistent with the purposes of NEPA evaluations, the accident assumptions for the EA were based on realistic yet conservative assumptions on what might happen in an accident. Thus real accidents are expected to release even smaller quantities of nuclear materials from the building to the environment. Site safety documents serve a different purpose and generally assume all material, regardless of form, is involved in an accident and all that could become airborne is released from the building. This approach allows identification of safety controls, such as strong containers and building confinement systems, including high efficiency (HEPA) filters that would reduce releases from accidents. In this EA, limited credit is taken for the safety systems that would be in place during operations.

\(^{35}\) Respirable fractions are not applied in the assessment of doses based on noninhalation pathways, such as criticality.
A.1.3 Evaluation of Facility Radiological Accident Consequences

Potential Receptors

For each potential accident, information is provided on accident consequences and frequencies for three types of receptors: (1) a noninvolved worker, (2) the maximally exposed member of the public, and (3) the offsite population. The first receptor, a noninvolved worker, is a hypothetical individual working on site, but not involved in the proposed activity. For purposes of this Final EA, the noninvolved worker was conservatively assumed to be exposed to the full release, without any protection, located at a distance of about 240 yards from the release point in TA-55. Such a person was assumed to be unaware of the accident, and so be unaware of the emergency actions needed for protection, and to remain in the plume for the entire passage. Workers within the area where the accident occur would be trained to respond to an emergency and are expected to take proper actions to limit their exposure to a radioactive plume. If they failed to take proper actions, they could receive higher doses. For the accidents addressed in this Final EA, accidental releases would be either at ground level, building roofs, or through low-to medium-stacks for all design-basis accidents. In contrast to the NEPA approach of a realistic analysis of the impacts to a noninvolved or collocated worker, DOE safety requirements specify a bounding impact analysis (without safety controls) be performed for a hypothetical noninvolved or collocated worker at 100 meters (~109 yards) downwind and safety controls be added, if necessary, to protect the worker.

The second receptor, a maximally exposed member of the public (MEI), is a hypothetical individual assumed to be at a location along the site boundary (typically the LANL boundary) where he or she would receive the largest dose. Exposures received by this individual are intended to represent the highest doses to a member of the public. The third receptor, the offsite population, comprises all members of the public within 50 miles of the accident location.

Consequences for workers directly involved in the processes under consideration are addressed generically, without attempt at a scenario-specific quantification of consequences. The uncertainties involved in quantifying accident consequences become overwhelming for most radiological accidents due to the high sensitivity of dose values to assumptions about the details of the release and the location and behavior of the affected worker. Consequences for potential receptors as a result of plume passage were determined without regard for emergency response measures and, thus, are more conservative than are expected if evacuation and sheltering were explicitly modeled. Instead, it was assumed that potential receptors would be fully exposed in fixed positions for the duration of plume passage, thereby maximizing their exposure to the plume. A conservative estimate of total consequences was obtained by assuming all released radionuclides contributed to the inhalation dose as opposed to removal of some of them from the plume by surface deposition; surface deposition is a less significant contributor to overall risk and is controllable through interdiction.

For the public, the MEI, and a noninvolved worker, there are no established radiological standards for doses associated with an accident. DOE uses an individual dose of 25 rem in its safety analysis as an evaluation guideline as to whether safety class or safety significant controls are required.

Population Distributions

Population distributions used in the impact assessments were based on the most recently available U.S. census information (the 2015 U.S. census). These values were extrapolated to a representative year of projected operations (2030), based on estimated population growth rates in the LANL vicinity. Population distributions were spatially distributed on a circular grid with 16 directions and 10 radial distances out to 50 miles. Grids were positioned at centralized locations from which the preponderance of radionuclides would be released in the event of an accident. Table A–1 presents the results of this effort for the 50-mile population from RLUOB.
A.1.4 Modeling of Dispersion of Releases to the Environment

The MACCS2 computer code (version 1.13.1) was used to estimate the radiological consequences of accidents for the proposed facilities. The WinMAACCS2 interface (NRC 2007) was used as an input tool for MACCS2. A detailed description of the MACCS2 model is available in U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission documents NUREG/CR-4691 (NRC 1990) and NUREG/CR-6613 (NRC 1998). Originally developed to model the radiological consequences of nuclear reactor accidents, this code has been used for the analysis of accidents in many environmental impact statements (EISs) and other safety documentation and is considered applicable to the analysis of accidents associated with the disposition of plutonium.

MACCS2 models the offsite consequences of an accident that releases a plume of radioactive materials into the atmosphere — specifically, the degree of dispersion versus distance as a function of historical wind direction, speed, and atmospheric conditions. Were such an accidental release to occur, the radioactive gases and aerosols in the plume would be transported by the prevailing wind and dispersed in the atmosphere, and the population would be exposed to radiation. MACCS2 generates the distribution of downwind doses at specified distances, as well as the distribution of population doses out to 50 miles.

Because the purposes of the NEPA analyses and DOE safety-basis analyses differ, the assumptions and techniques used for modeling dispersion of releases to the environment with the MACCS2 model in this EA are similar to, yet in some cases different from, those used by DOE for safety-basis analyses. The goal of the NEPA analyses is to present realistic but conservative estimates of the potential impacts of accidents, while the goal of the safety-basis analyses is to present bounding estimates of potential impacts and identify safety controls to prevent or mitigate those accidents.
MACCS2 was run with meteorological data for the years 2011 through 2015 for several release points corresponding to the major radiological accidents evaluated. The results for the 5 calendar years were reviewed and the year with the highest offsite consequences was used to project the impacts.

Radiological doses were calculated that would result from the inhalation of one gram of plutonium aerosol particles by using the 50-year committed inhalation dose coefficients for adults that are presented in International Commission on Radiation Protection (ICRP) Publication 119 (ICRP 2012) and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Federal Guidance Report (FGR) 13 (EPA 1999a). The dose coefficients in ICRP Publication 119 are for three broad categories of aerosol particle absorption rates in the human respiratory tract, namely fast (F), medium (M) and slow (S). These categories correspond roughly to the lung clearance classes in EPA’s FGR 11 (EPA 1988): D, W, and Y respectively. Category S is assigned to materials that are less soluble in water, and aerosol plutonium particles produced by metal fires or from mechanical impact on finely divided oxide powders fall into this category. So do aerosol particles generated from plutonium metal by mechanical means because plutonium is pyrophoric and respirable aerosol particles of plutonium are consequently rapidly oxidized.

The MACCS2 dose library based on FGR 13 (EPA 1999a) inhalation dose conversion factors was used for this Final EA. For exposure to plutonium oxides and aerosols from metal, the dominant pathway for exposure is inhalation of very small, respirable particles. For accidents involving release of plutonium, the more-recent dose conversion factors, based on FGR 13 (EPA 1999a), would result in estimated doses of about 19 percent of the values reported in many earlier DOE EISs, which typically used dose conversion factors from the older FGR 11 (EPA 1988) lung models. Overall, the values reported in this Final EA are both conservative and internally consistent. The uncertainties in the estimated source terms far outweigh the differences in the modeling and dose conversion factor models that are used in this Final EA.

As implemented in this Final EA, the MACCS2 model evaluates doses due to inhalation of aerosols such as respirable plutonium, as well as exposure to the passing plume. This represents the major portion of the dose that a noninvolved worker or member of the public would receive as a result of a facility accident involving plutonium. The longer-term effects of plutonium deposited on the ground and surface waters after the accident, including effects through resuspension and inhalation of plutonium and ingestion of contaminated crops, were not modeled for accidents in this Final EA. These pathways have been studied and found not to contribute as significantly to dosage as inhalation, and they are controllable through interdiction. Instead, the deposition velocity of the radioactive material was set to zero, so that material that might otherwise be deposited on surfaces remains airborne and available for inhalation. This adds conservatism to inhalation doses that can become considerable at large distances (as much as two orders of magnitude of conservatism at the 50-mile limit). Thus, the method used in this Final EA is conservative compared with the dose results that would be obtained if deposition and resuspension were taken into account.

The region around the facility is divided by a polar-coordinate grid centered on the facility itself. The user specifies the number of radial divisions and their endpoint distances. The angular divisions used to define the spatial grid correspond to the 16 directions of the compass.

Dose distributions were calculated in a probabilistic manner. Releases during each of the 8,760 hours of the year were simulated, resulting in a distribution of dose reflecting variations in weather conditions at the time of the postulated accidental release. The code outputs the conditional probability of exceeding an individual or population dose as a function of distance. As is typical for DOE NEPA documents, the reported doses in this Final EA are the mean or average dose based on the range of weather or meteorological conditions at LANL. Safety basis documents often use 95th percentile doses, which imply that only 5 percent of the weather conditions would result in higher doses. The MACCS2 analysis for this Final EA indicated that 95th percentile doses are about a factor of 3 higher for the 50-mile population, and about a factor of 7 higher for the offsite individual doses reported in this Final EA.
MACCS2 cannot be used to directly calculate the distribution of maximum doses (resulting from meteorological variations) around irregular contours, such as a site boundary. As a result, analyses that use MACCS2 to calculate site boundary doses usually default to calculating doses at the distance corresponding to the shortest distance to the site boundary. In effect, the site boundary is treated as if it were circular, with a radius equal to the shortest distance from the facility to the actual site boundary. While this approximation is conservative with respect to dose (with the possible exception of doses from elevated plumes), it eliminates the use of some site-specific information, namely the site boundary location (other than the nearest point), wind direction, and any correlation between wind direction and other meteorological parameters. Because the primary purpose of this Final EA is to aid in a decision between the evaluated alternatives, a different approach was taken to more-accurately characterize the potential for maximum doses at the site boundary.

For this Final EA, the individual doses reported are for the wind direction with the highest consequences. This approach would be quite conservative if applied in some directions where the wind blows infrequently, but would be generally the most useful when receptors in multiple directions may be of interest.

For this Final EA, a duration of 10 minutes was assumed for all RLUOB and PF-4 facility accident releases. This is consistent with the accident phenomenology expected for all scenarios, with the possible exception of fire. Depending on the circumstances, the time between fire ignition and extinction may be considerably longer, particularly for larger beyond-design-basis fires. However, even in a fire of long duration, it is possible to release substantial fractions of the total radiological source term in fairly short periods as the fire consumes areas of high MAR concentrations. The assumption of a 10-minute release duration for fire is intended to generically account for this circumstance.

As implemented in this Final EA, the MACCS2 model evaluates doses due to inhalation of aerosols such as respirable plutonium, as well as exposure to the passing plume. This represents the major portion of the dose that a noninvolved worker or member of the public would receive as a result of an accident. The longer-term effects of plutonium deposited on the ground and surface waters after the accident, including through resuspension and resulting inhalation of plutonium and ingestion of contaminated crops, were not modeled. These pathways would not contribute as significantly to the inhalation dose because access to impacted areas and ingestion of contaminated foods would be controllable through interdiction. Modeling parameters selected for input to the MACCS2 model were either default parameters or were parameters selected because they were known to be conservative. While other parameters might be selected, sensitivity analyses have demonstrated that the combined effect of the selected modeling parameters is conservative.

### A.1.5 Evaluation of the Consequences of Releases to the Environment

The probability coefficients for determining the likelihood of fatal cancer, given a dose, are taken from the 1990 Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP 1991) and DOE guidance (DOE 2004a). For low doses or low dose rates, probability coefficients of $6.0 \times 10^{-4}$ fatal cancers per rem and person-rem are applied for both workers and the general public (DOE 2003a). For cases where the individual dose would be equal to or greater than 20 rems, the LCF risk was doubled (NCRP 1993).

### A.1.6 Frequency of Occurrence Estimates

Existing safety documents for PF-4 and RLUOB facilities do not include estimates of frequencies for all scenarios. In many instances, frequencies are discussed qualitatively; quantitative estimates are not developed. For some types of accidents, the bases for frequency estimates varied from facility to facility or used data that were not current. It was necessary, therefore, to evaluate existing estimates of accident scenario frequencies to ensure the frequency estimates are consistent and reasonable.

Quantitative estimates were generally used in this Final EA when they were provided in an existing safety document. A qualitative frequency category, or bin, often was selected based on the description of the
scenario in the safety document. Frequency categories recommended in DOE-STD-3009-2014, *Preparation of Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analysis* (DOE 2014), were used. Accident frequencies are generally grouped into the bins of “anticipated,” “unlikely,” “extremely unlikely,” and “beyond extremely unlikely,” with estimated frequencies of greater than $1 \times 10^{-2}$, $1 \times 10^{-3}$ to $1 \times 10^{-4}$, $1 \times 10^{-5}$ to $1 \times 10^{-6}$, and less than $1 \times 10^{-6}$ per year, respectively. The evaluated accidents represent a spectrum of accident frequencies and consequences ranging from low-frequency/high-consequence to high-frequency/low-consequence events.

When a new accident scenario was postulated for this Final EA, judgment was used to estimate the frequency category of the accident scenario. The frequency estimates are based on assessment of the likelihood of the initiating event and the number and potential effectiveness (availability) of the preventive and existing mitigative controls that must fail in order for the scenario to occur. Quantitative evaluations (such as event or fault tree analyses) were not performed.

### A.1.7 Uncertainties and Conservatism

The analyses of accidents are based on calculations relevant to hypothetical sequences of events and models of their effects. The models provide estimates of the frequencies, source terms, pathways for dispersion, exposures, and effects on human health that are as realistic as possible within the scope of the analysis. In many cases, minimal experience with the postulated accidents leads to uncertainty in the calculation of their consequences and frequencies. This fact has prompted the use of models or input values that yield conservative estimates of consequence and frequency. All alternatives have been evaluated using uniform methods and data to allow a fair comparison.

### A.2 Development of RLUOB Accident Scenarios for the Proposed Action and No Action Alternatives

Potential accidents associated with operations at PF-4, RLUOB, and support facilities have been extensively evaluated in existing NEPA documents and safety analyses supporting the operation of those facilities. These NEPA documents include the *CMRR EIS* (DOE 2003b), *LANL SWEIS* (DOE 2008a), *CMRR-NF SEIS* (DOE 2011c), 2015 *CMRR SA* (DOE 2015a), and *SPD Supplemental EIS* (DOE 2015c). These facilities maintain safety basis documents that evaluate the hazards associated with operations and identify controls to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of workers, the public, and the environment, taking into account the work to be performed and the associated hazards (10 Code of Federal Regulations [CFR] 830.4[c]). In addition, the *Response to Data Call for NEPA Environmental Assessment: Proposed Physical and Operational Changes for Analytical Chemistry and Materials Characterization at the Radiological Laboratory Utility Office Building (LANL Data Call Response)* (LANL 2018) reviews the range of potential nuclear and chemical hazards in RLUOB and identified bounding accident scenarios based on the existing safety documents for RLUOB and the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research (CMR) Building.

For this Final EA, the proposed operations at affected facilities were reviewed to determine whether the new operations would result in substantial changes to the accident risks identified in safety basis documents and previous NEPA analyses. The NEPA documents cited above evaluate a range of accidents including operational accidents such as spills, fires, and explosions; accidents initiated by external events such as wildfires and aircraft crashes; and natural phenomena-initiated events such as earthquakes. The operations associated with the proposed activities at PF-4 and RLUOB are similar to those identified in the current NEPA documents supporting those facilities, including the 2015 *CMRR SA* which evaluated using RLUOB as a Radiological Laboratory with a plutonium-239 equivalent (PuE)*36 limit of up to 38.6 grams (i.e., the

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36 For some facilities, the exact quantities of MAR, as well as the isotopic composition of some forms of plutonium, are sensitive from a security perspective. Many safety analyses have adopted the strategy of using a convenient surrogate, plutonium-239 equivalents, for the actual quantities, forms, and isotopic composition of the materials. PuE refers to quantities of different
current No Action Alternative); the LANL SWEIS and the SPD Supplemental EIS for PF-4; the CMRR EIS; the CMRR-NF SWEIS (DOE 2011c) for RLUOB; and the LANL SWEIS for support facilities including waste management capabilities in TA-50 and TA-54. The proposed changes evaluated in this Final EA do not introduce new types of hazards or larger quantities of radionuclides compared to those identified in these existing EISs and the accident risks are expected to be well within the accident risks reported in them. In some cases, the amounts of radionuclides in gloveboxes and rooms would decrease substantially from the quantities assumed in the existing NEPA documents. From an accident risk and impact perspective, the principal difference between the No Action Alternative evaluated in the 2015 CMRR SA and the Proposed Action Alternative is raising the RLUOB inventory limit to 400 grams PuE. No new accident scenarios have been identified during tours of RLUOB, reviews of existing NEPA documents, or reviews of the ongoing LANL safety reviews of the Proposed Action in RLUOB and the exiting safety basis documents for PF-4.

The following subsections identify how the proposed changes in operations at PF-4 and RLUOB would affect accident risks in those facilities. The subsections also evaluate the extent to which the accident risks reported in the existing NEPA documents bound the incremental risks associated with the proposed changes in operations. Radioactive doses and risks are evaluated for noninvolved workers, the offsite population, and an MEI. After addressing accident risks separately for PF-4 and RLUOB, the appendix addresses the implications for accident risks considering the combination of nuclear facilities in TA-55, the CMR in TA-3, and waste management activities in TA-54.

A.2.1 Hazard Identification and Material-at-Risk for RLUOB

The LANL Data Call Response (LANL 2018) reviews the potential nuclear and chemical hazards at RLUOB associated with ongoing operations as a Radiological Laboratory (the No Action Alternative) and operations as a Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility with a 400-gram PuE building inventory limit (the Proposed Action Alternative). Table A-2 presents a summary of nuclear hazards identified for RLUOB based primarily on the existing DSAs and the LANL Data Call Response (LANL 2018), adjusted for the increased material-at-risk limit of 400 grams PuE under the Proposed Action Alternative.

The LANL Data Call Response (LANL 2018) indicates that while RLUOB currently operates as a less than Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility, the amounts of radiological material inside the gloveboxes range in size from milligram to near gram quantities. Some areas outside of the gloveboxes are used to store radiological material in anticipation of analysis or waste discard. Under the Proposed Action Alternative, RLUOB would operate as a Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility but many of the gloveboxes would still contain radiological material in the same milligram to near gram quantities, except there would be more of these gloveboxes. Also, some of the gloveboxes would contain tens of grams of material though the majority of the material in these quantities would be in a metal form. Small amounts of oxide and residual amounts in solution would be present. During normal, abnormal, and accident conditions, the facility worker would be subject to radiological consequences that are comparable to what the facility worker experiences within RLUOB as a less than Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility.

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radionuclides on a common health-risk basis. The mass or radioactivity of other radionuclides is expressed in terms of the amount of plutonium-239 that would result in the same committed effective dose upon inhalation.
Table A–2. Summary of Nuclear Hazards

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hazard Description</th>
<th>Amount/Units</th>
<th>Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PuE MAR limit for facility</td>
<td>400 grams PuE total</td>
<td>Oxides, solutions, metals, powders, salts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fissile Limit *</td>
<td>400 grams of Pu-239</td>
<td>Any form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>500 grams of U-233</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>700 grams of U-235</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breakdown of Hazards</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PuBe</td>
<td>&lt; 5 grams and &lt; 10 mR/h</td>
<td>Powder, metals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Am-241</td>
<td>&lt; 1 gram and &lt; 50 mR/h</td>
<td>Solution, powder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tritium contaminated parts or small samples</td>
<td>&lt; 1 gram tritium</td>
<td>Adhered to parts or small amounts of gas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U-233</td>
<td>Small gram quantities per process location are typical, and 2-liter containers per process location; less than the fissile limit of 500 grams</td>
<td>Oxides, liquids, metals, powders, salts, residue solutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U-235</td>
<td>Up to 700 grams in solid, and small-gram quantities in liquid per process location; not to exceed fissile limit of 700 grams.</td>
<td>Oxides, liquids, metals, powders, salts, residue solutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U-238</td>
<td>Up to several hundred grams in solid, and small-gram quantities in liquid per process location.</td>
<td>Oxides, liquids, metals, powders, salts, residue solutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Np-237</td>
<td>Small-gram quantities per process location, and 2-liter containers per process location.</td>
<td>Oxides, liquids, metals, powders, salts, residue solutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pu (mainly weapons grade and may include other Pu material types)</td>
<td>Small gram quantities per process location, and 2-liter containers per process location.</td>
<td>Oxides, liquids, metals, powders, salts, residue solutions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Am = americium; MAR = material-at-risk; mR/h = millirad per hour; Np = neptunium; Pu = plutonium; PuBe = plutonium/beryllium; PuE = plutonium-239 equivalent; U = uranium.

* Per the LANL Criticality Safety Program, Pu-239/U-235/U-233 with combined mass of 450 grams will require a criticality safety evaluation (LANL 2018).

Source: LANL 2018.

The chemical inventory and the projected impacts to a collocated worker at 100 meters and a member of the public at 1,000 meters as a fraction of the DOE protective action criteria (PAC) are presented in the LANL Data Call Response (LANL 2018). For convenience, the largest chemical hazards (greater than 10 percent of PAC) are summarized in Table A–3, showing that currently no chemical inventory exceeds the PAC for either the collocated worker or the public. Thus, the chemical hazard is classified as low. LANL expects that the need for more chemicals would be limited to the potential need for hydrochloric acid in addition to the current facility inventory limit of 50 pounds. LANL expects that any revisions to this summary as a result of revisions to the predicted annual facility inventory or presence of new chemicals would be reflected in the Preliminary DSA if the Proposed Action Alternative is adopted (LANL 2018). Possible revisions should not exceed protective action criteria levels warranting controls given the proposed AC and MC operations.

Chemical exposures from actual handling by the facility workers are considered Standard Industrial Hazards per the guidance in DOE-STD-3009-2014, Section A.2 (DOE 2014). This would be elaborated upon in the Preliminary DSA if the Proposed Action Alternative is adopted (LANL 2018). Because the chemical hazards to workers are considered standard industrial hazards and the risks to the public have been shown to be fractions of the PAC-2 levels, chemical hazards will not be evaluated further in this Final EA.
Table A–3. Summary of Chemical Hazards

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chemical</th>
<th>Predicted Annual Facility Inventory (pounds)</th>
<th>Noninvolved (collocated) Worker Impact Assessment at 100 meters</th>
<th>Public Impact Assessment at 1 Kilometer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PAC-3 Limit (pounds)</td>
<td>Fraction of PAC-3 Limit</td>
<td>PAC-2 Limit (pounds)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fraction of PAC-2 Limit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammonium hydroxide (as NH₃)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>0.108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argon</td>
<td>41,100</td>
<td>1.01×10⁴</td>
<td>0.405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.85×10⁶</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bromine</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>0.412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carbon monoxide</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>58.5</td>
<td>0.855</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hydrochloric acid</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>54.9</td>
<td>0.911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hydrogen bromide (Hydrobromic acid)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>61.2</td>
<td>0.245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hydrogen fluoride (Hydrofluoric acid)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>0.149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mesitylene (1, 3, 5-Trimethyl benzene)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>0.129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nitric acid (&gt; 94.5)</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>803</td>
<td>0.623</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nitric oxide</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.79</td>
<td>0.792</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nitrogen (cyrogenic)</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>1.54×10³</td>
<td>0.104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4.73×10⁶</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9.73×10⁴</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nitrogen dioxide</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5.82</td>
<td>0.859</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sodium hydroxide</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>773</td>
<td>0.129</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PAC = protective action criteria.  
Source: LANL 2018.

A.2.2 Accident Scenario Identification for RLUOB

The potential nuclear accident scenarios at RLUOB associated with a 400-gram PuE building inventory limit for the Proposed Action Alternative were reviewed based on past accident evaluations. The analytical chemistry and material characterization processes in the recategorized (400-gram PuE) RLUOB are similar to those that currently occur in the CMR facility, Wings 5 and 7, except that the MAR limits are 4,000 grams PuE in each Wing. The overall CMR facility limit is even greater (9,000 grams PuE).

The hazards identified for RLUOB reconfigured as a MAR-limited Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility are:

- Fires within the building, a room, or a glovebox
- Explosions due to overpressurizations
- Loss of confinement due to a spill within laboratories or impact during operations
- Direct exposure
- Criticality
- External events (including man-made events) including natural gas explosion, wildland fire, airplane crash, or vehicle impact
- Natural phenomenon, including high wind, earthquake, and lightning strike
Criticality is precluded by the total material limit in the reconfigured RLUOB of 400 grams PuE, which is below the theoretical value for criticality for plutonium set at 450 grams by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 10 CFR Part 70. A limit (or other appropriate controls) on total fissionable material equivalent to accommodate expected small-scale, highly enriched uranium operations and ensure criticality safety will be required if the 400 gram PuE quantity is exceeded. Also, combinations of plutonium-239, uranium-233, and uranium-235 will require evaluation (LANL 2018).

The *LANL Data Call Response* identifies a building MAR limit of 400 grams PuE as a specific administrative control expected for the proposed reconfigured RLUOB. This value is the basis for impacts analyses presented in this EA. For the purpose of mitigating doses to facility workers in the event of an accident, the *LANL Data Call Response* (LANL 2018) also proposes a laboratory room MAR limit of 100 g PuE.

The current RLUOB hazards analysis report for RLUOB categorized as a Radiological Laboratory identifies a range of controls to prevent or mitigate the postulated accidents, including: glovebox or hood; glovebox heat detection; facility ventilation systems; air monitors; fire suppression system; fire detection and paging system; fire barriers; and limits on combustibles.

*Table A–4* lists the safety controls that are currently available in RLUOB and are planned for selection as Other Equipment Important to Safety in the Preliminary DSA as a function of accident type (LANL 2018).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Safety Control</th>
<th>Fire</th>
<th>Explosives</th>
<th>Loss of Confinement</th>
<th>Direct Exposure</th>
<th>External Events</th>
<th>Natural Phenomena</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fire Protection System</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laboratory Enclosure Systems</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ventilation Systems</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building Structural Design</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lightning Protection System</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: LANL 2018.

The structure and safety systems at RLUOB are expected to provide substantial barriers to mitigate accidents and minimize the release of hazardous materials to the environment. The *LANL Data Call Response* (LANL 2018) indicates RLUOB’s primary structural design requirement is for a DOE Performance Category (PC)-2 compliant design, but most of RLUOB is classified as PC-1. Institutional requirements are compliant with the LANL Engineering Standards Manual PD-342 (see Section 5, Table II-7, of the manual) and the International Building Code (IBC).

A reanalysis of RLUOB has been performed with respect to the current seismic hazard at TA-55 (Yost et al. 2016). Those seismic analyses of RLUOB’s structure indicate that the structure will meet the seismic performance goals in DOE-STD-1020-2012, *National Phenomena Hazards Analysis and Design Criteria for DOE Facilities* (DOE 2012b) for Seismic Design Category 1 for Limit State A without any modification to the structure. The results also show that a majority of elements of the structure meet the performance requirements for Seismic Design Category 2 for Limit State B.\(^{38}\)

\(^{37}\) 10 CFR 70.4 defines a Critical mass of special nuclear material (SNM) to be SNM in a quantity exceeding 700 grams of contained uranium-235; 520 grams of uranium-233; 450 grams of plutonium; 1,500 grams of contained uranium-235, if no uranium enriched to more than 4 percent by weight of uranium-235 is present; 450 grams of any combination thereof; or one-half such quantities if massive moderators or reflectors made of graphite, heavy water, or beryllium may be present.

\(^{38}\) A seismic design category (SDC) is a category assigned to a structure, system or component (SSC) that is a function of the severity of adverse radiological and toxicological effects of the hazards that may result from the seismic failure of the SSC on
The office portion of RLUOB is classified as IBC Type 1A/International Organization for Standardization Class 6 (Fire Resistant Construction). RLUOB’s structure is cast-in-place concrete from the foundation through the first floor. Above that, the structure is steel with lightweight concrete floors over a composite metal deck. Notable structural design features include the use of special steel moment frames above the second floor to resist lateral load, and the use of special concrete shear walls from the basement to the second floor (LANL 2018).

The RLUOB fire protection system is designed to detect and suppress fires. It consists of sensors, sprinkler heads, distribution piping to the sprinklers, and electric fire pumps to provide water to the distribution piping. It also includes a standpipe system to enable fire department personnel to manually suppress any residual elements of a fire that are not completely extinguished by the fire protection system. The sprinkler system includes wet pipe sprinkler systems, dry sidewall sprinklers, and deluge sprinkler systems. Activation of the fire sprinklers automatically activates the fire pumps (activation of a fire sprinkler releases water and lowers the water pressure in the system, which in turn signals the fire pumps to start).

The heating, ventilation, and air conditioning system for the RLUOB radiological laboratory area consists of three levels of confinement barriers, identified as Zone 1, Zone 2, and Zone 3. The flow of air is from areas of lower to higher contamination potential (i.e., Zone 3 to Zone 1). The zones are defined as follows:

- **Zone 1** – primary confinement system which includes the glovebox enclosures and associated exhaust systems.
- **Zone 2** – secondary confinement system which includes the walls, floor, ceiling, and doors of the laboratories, including hoods and open-front enclosures.
- **Zone 3** – additional confinement barrier which includes the walls, floors, ceilings, and doors of the corridor or space that surrounds the laboratory.

Air from laboratory gloveboxes, vacuum pumps, and the wet vacuum and radioactive liquid waste tanks are exhausted through the Zone 1 exhaust system. Because the Zone 1 exhaust has the most potential for contamination and is a primary containment boundary, the exhaust air passes through a certified high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filtration system with fire protection before release to the atmosphere. The Zone 1 exhaust system is mounted in the basement area and exhausting directly to the stack. It consists of two radiological HEPA filter units and two associated centrifugal fans. Zone 2 handles a much larger air volume and exhausting air from laboratory hoods and open-front enclosures, the laboratory room, and laboratory support rooms. The Zone 2 exhaust system also is mounted in the basement area and comprises a certified HEPA filtration system with fire protection that exhausts directly to the stack. It consists of six radiological HEPA filter units and six associated centrifugal fans. Stack emissions are monitored to record radiation releases, if any, and to provide data for regulatory compliance determinations. The Zone 3 system provides makeup air to Zone 2 and runs at a negative pressure relative to the outside air and a positive pressure relative to Zone 2 to ensure contamination control. Supply air to the laboratories is filtered and humidity-controlled.

**A.2.3 Selection and Source Term Evaluation of Representative Accident Scenarios**

Based on the review of the various NEPA documents and the *LANL Data Call Response*, the following accidents were selected for evaluation in this Final EA. These accidents are expected to represent all accidents that might occur in RLUOB with either the 38.6-gram or 400-gram PuE building inventory limit.

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workers, the public, and the environment. SSCs may be assigned to SDCs that range from 1 through 5. For example, a conventional building whose failure may not result in any radiological or toxicological consequences is assigned to SDC-1; a safety-related SSC in a nuclear material processing facility with a large inventory of radioactive material may be placed in SDC-5. A limit state is the limiting acceptable deformation, displacement, or stress that a SSC may experience during, or following, an earthquake and still perform its safety function. Four limit states are identified in DOE-STD-1020-2012 (DOE 2012b).
Process or Facility-Wide Spill—All of the NEPA and safety documents identify an accident whereby a spill results in loss of confinement of material and release to room, the building ventilation system if available, and potentially the environment. The spill could be initiated by an operator error, equipment failure, impacts on the material by equipment, or a severe earthquake. The MAR for this accident could range from a few grams for most glovebox accidents up to, in principle, the building inventory limit of 400 grams PuE for the Proposed Action Alternative and up to 38.6 grams PuE for the No Action Alternative.

The LANL Data Call Response (LANL 2018) indicates that while RLUOB currently operates as Radiological Laboratory, the amount of radiological material inside the gloveboxes ranges in size from milligram to near gram quantities. Some areas outside of the gloveboxes are used to store radiological material in anticipation of analysis or waste discard. Under the Proposed Action Alternative, RLUOB would operate as a Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility but many of the gloveboxes would still contain radiological material in the same milligram to near gram quantities, except there would be more of these gloveboxes. Also, some of the gloveboxes would contain up to tens of grams of material although the majority of the material would likely be in a metal form. Small amounts of oxide and residual amounts in solution would be present. Release mechanisms would include spills and impacts, although most of the dispersible radiological materials would be in containers and not readily spilled. Thus, for purposes of this Final EA, it is assumed that no more than 10 percent of the building inventory is in the form of readily dispersible material (i.e., oxide). A DR of 0.1 is assumed.

Table A–5 presents a summary of airborne release fractions (ARF) and respirable fractions (RF) from DOE-HDBK-3010-94 (DOE 2013b).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Release Mechanism/Material Form</th>
<th>ARF</th>
<th>RF</th>
<th>ARF × RF</th>
<th>DOE-HDBK-3010-94 Page Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spill accident, material is powder</td>
<td>2 × 10^{-3}</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.0006</td>
<td>4-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spill accident, material is metal</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4-45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spill accident, material is solution</td>
<td>2 × 10^{-4}</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>3-33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact accident, material is powder</td>
<td>1 × 10^{-2}</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>4-87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact accident, material is solid</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4-45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact accident, material is liquid</td>
<td>2 × 10^{-4}</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>3-33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ARF = airborne release fraction; RF = respirable fraction.
Source: DOE 2013b.

Because no controls are currently planned on the form of the material to be analyzed in RLUOB (powder, liquid or solid), it is assumed for this Final EA that the material is in the form that is most easily released and results in the largest radiological impacts. For spill accidents, the bounding release mechanisms and form of the material is powder, with an ARF of 0.002 and a RF of 0.3, for a combined ARF×RF of 0.0006.

For most spills within RLUOB, the building ventilation system is expected to continue to function after a spill or loss of glovebox containment accident, although perhaps at a degraded level, and minimize any releases to the environment. The Zone 1 building ventilation system uses two stages of HEPA filtration and is currently designated as an “item relied upon for safety.”

The LPF accounts for the action of removal mechanisms (e.g., containment systems, filtration, and deposition) to reduce the amount of airborne radioactivity ultimately released to occupied spaces in the facility or to the environment. LPFs are assigned in accident scenarios involving a major failure of confinement barriers. Because this spill is not expected to threaten the integrity of the building confinement system or the HEPA filters, an LPF of 0.005 is assumed for this Final EA.

Process or Facility-Wide Fire—All of the NEPA and safety documents identify an accident whereby a fire results in loss of confinement of the material and release to room, the building ventilation system if
available, and potentially the environment. The fire could be initiated by an operator error, equipment failure, impacts on the material by equipment, or a severe earthquake. The MAR for this accident could range from a few grams for most glovebox accidents up to, in principle, the building inventory limit of 400 grams PuE for the Proposed Action Alternative and up to 38.6 grams PuE for the No Action Alternative. Because there are no controls on the form of the material spilled (powder, liquid or solid), it is assumed for this Final EA that the material is in the form that is most easily released and results in the greatest radiological impacts. Release mechanisms include burning or oxidation of plutonium metal, evaporation of heated solutions, and aerosolization of oxides.

Realistically, most of the metals and dispersible radiological materials would be in containers and not subject to burning. For this Final EA, it is assumed that no more than 10 percent of the building inventory is in a form subject to rapid oxidation (burning) or is readily dispersible material (i.e., oxide). Therefore, a DR of 0.1 is assumed.

Table A–6 presents a summary of airborne release fractions and respirable fractions for fire accidents from DOE-HDBK-3010-94 (DOE 2013b).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Release Mechanism/Material Form</th>
<th>ARF</th>
<th>RF</th>
<th>ARF × RF</th>
<th>DOE-HDBK-3010-94 Page Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fire accident, material is powder</td>
<td>6×10⁻³</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.000006</td>
<td>4-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire accident, material is metal</td>
<td>5×10⁻⁴</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.00025</td>
<td>4-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire accident, material is solution</td>
<td>2×10⁻³</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>3-15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ARF = airborne release fraction; RF = respirable fraction.
Source: DOE 2013b.

For fire accidents, because the dominant material type indicated in the RLUOB Safety Design Strategy is metal, the bounding release mechanism is burning metal, with an ARF of 0.0005 and a RF of 0.5, for a combined ARF×RF of 0.00025.

For small fires within RLUOB, the building ventilation system are expected to continue to function, although perhaps in a degraded condition. The building ventilation system is currently designated as an “item relied upon for safety.” Because of the types of operations planned for RLUOB, most of the inventory is likely in the form of metal or powder. This fire are not expected to threaten the integrity of the building confinement system or the HEPA filters, so for purposes of this EA, an LPF of 0.005 is assumed.

Natural Gas Explosion—The LANL Data Call Response (LANL 2018) identifies a natural gas explosion as a potential accident scenario. At RLUOB, there is a natural gas line adjacent to the building and a leak of natural gas into the building and subsequent explosion could be a mechanism that results in spillage, loss of confinement, and subsequent fires. Controls including adherence to national consensus codes and standards are in place to minimize this type of accident. For this Final EA, the radiological impacts of this accident are bounded by those from a large earthquake and fire as addressed below.

Seismic-Induced Spill and Fire—All of the NEPA and safety documents identify an accident whereby a major earthquake is an initiator of spills, impacts, and fires that result in loss of confinement of the material and release to room, the building ventilation system if available, and potentially the environment. The MAR for this accident could range from a few grams for most glovebox accidents up to, in principle, the building inventory limit of 400 grams PuE for the Proposed Action Alternative and up to 38.6 grams PuE for the No Action Alternative. Because there are no controls on the form of the material spilled (powder, liquid or solid), it is assumed for the purposes of this Final EA that the material is in the form that is most easily released and results in the greatest radiological impacts. Release mechanisms include spills and impacts to oxides and liquids, burning or oxidation of plutonium metal, evaporation of heated solutions, and aerosolization of oxides due to fires.
For purposes of this Final EA, the entire building inventory is assumed to be vulnerable to release in a seismically induced facility-wide spill and fire. In addition, the inventory is assumed to be vulnerable to release due to blasts from explosions, such as natural gas-initiated events, that might follow the earthquake. Release mechanisms include spills, blast effects, and impacts. Realistically, most of the dispersible radiological materials would be in containers and not readily spilled. For purposes of this Final EA, it is assumed that no more than 10 percent of the building inventory is in the form of readily dispersible material (i.e. oxide). Therefore, a DR of 0.1 is assumed.

Assuming a seismic event, given that most of the materials in RLUOB will likely be in the form of metal or powder, the dominant release mechanisms are likely to be spills of powders, impacts of objects onto containers of powder, and blasts directed onto containers of powder or spilled powder. Material in the form of powder could be subject to all three mechanisms. Because of the limited combustible materials within RLUOB and the nature of activities within RLUOB, long-burning fires are not expected, even after a major earthquake that causes severe structural damage to the facility, equipment and gloveboxes within, and material storage containers.

Table A–7 presents a summary of airborne release fractions and respirable fractions for seismic accidents from DOE-HDBK-3010-94 (DOE 2013b).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Release Mechanism/Material Form</th>
<th>ARF</th>
<th>RF</th>
<th>ARF × RF</th>
<th>DOE-HDBK-3010-94 Page Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Blast accident, material is powder and the material is shielded</td>
<td>5×10⁻³</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.0015</td>
<td>4-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spill accident, material is powder</td>
<td>2×10⁻³</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.0006</td>
<td>4-49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact accident, material is powder</td>
<td>1×10⁻²</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>4-87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined Release:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0041</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ARF = airborne release fraction; RF = respirable fraction.
Source: DOE 2013b.

For purposes of this Final EA, a major building collapse is assumed to occur with all of the inventory being in the form of powder which would be subject to dispersal due to seismically initiated spills, impacts, blast, and (to a lesser extent) fires. For a bounding estimate of the material that might be released to the environment, it is assumed that the material is in the form of powder, with a combined ARF×RF of 0.0041 due to combined effects of blasts, spills, and impacts.

The LPF after a seismic induced spill and fire is uncertain. The building ventilation system are not expected to function effectively during and immediately after the event. In the SPD Supplemental EIS, it is assumed that for new facilities and significantly upgraded facilities, the ventilation system would be designed to not fail catastrophically. A building LPF of 0.1 is assumed and expected to be conservative. This factor should adequately represent an LPF for cracks in the building or transport through rubble.

Table A–8 presents a summary of accident scenarios and source terms for RLUOB. Accident frequency ranges presented in Table A–8 are estimates based on similar accidents identified in other LANL NEPA documents (see Section A.1.6).
Table A–8. Accident Scenarios and Source Terms for RLUOB

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Accident ID</th>
<th>Frequency * (per year)</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>DR</th>
<th>ARF</th>
<th>RF</th>
<th>LPF</th>
<th>Release (g PuE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Proposed Action Alternative</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process or Facility-Wide Spill</td>
<td>1×10⁻² to 1×10⁻⁴ (unlikely)</td>
<td>400 g PuE</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>1.2×10⁻⁴</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process or Facility-Wide Fire</td>
<td>1×10⁻² to 1×10⁻⁴ (unlikely)</td>
<td>400 g PuE</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.0005</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>5.0×10⁻⁵</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seismic-Induced Spill and Fire</td>
<td>1×10⁻² to 1×10⁻⁴ (unlikely)</td>
<td>400 g PuE</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>ARF×RF 0.0041</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Action Alternative</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process or Facility-Wide Spill</td>
<td>1×10⁻² to 1×10⁻⁴ (unlikely)</td>
<td>38.6 g PuE</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>1.2×10⁻³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process or Facility-Wide Fire</td>
<td>1×10⁻² to 1×10⁻⁴ (unlikely)</td>
<td>38.6 g PuE</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.0005</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>5.0×10⁻⁶</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seismic-Induced Spill and Fire</td>
<td>1×10⁻² to 1×10⁻⁴ (unlikely)</td>
<td>38.6 g PuE</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>ARF×RF 0.0041</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.0016</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ARF = airborne release fraction; DR = damage ratio; LPF = leak path factor; MAR = material-at-risk; g PuE = grams plutonium-239 dose equivalent; RF = respirable fraction.

a Accident frequency ranges are discussed in Section A.1.6.

A.2.4 Radiological Impacts of Accidents at RLUOB under the Proposed Action and No Action Alternatives

Table A–9 presents estimated radiological doses and LCF risks for individuals and the public. These impacts are based on the estimated accidental plutonium releases presented in Table A–8. These impacts assume no emergency actions are taken to mitigate the impacts even though onsite workers are trained on actions to take as a part of routine emergency preparedness training.

A.3 Development of PF-4 Accident Scenarios for the Proposed Action and No Action Alternatives

A.3.1 Potential Accidents in PF-4

Potential severe accidents in PF-4 were evaluated in the LANL SWEIS (DOE 2008a) and, more recently, in the SPD Supplemental EIS (DOE 2015c). These analyses demonstrate that the PF-4 structure and support equipment provide substantial confinement of radionuclides. The SPD Supplemental EIS reflects current operating modes and includes results from TA-55 safety basis documents, including the then current Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) for PF-4.

A.3.2 Current/Existing NEPA Accident Analysis for PF-4

The SPD Supplemental EIS provides a detailed evaluation of accidents at PF-4, based on accidents evaluated in the PF-4 DSAs. Although many types and isotopic mixtures of plutonium and other nuclides may be present at PF-4, the PF-4 DSA is focused on weapons-grade plutonium and heat-source plutonium. For safety analysis purposes, the plutonium inventories for all types and isotopic mixtures are expressed in terms of weapons-grade plutonium equivalent which is about 93 percent plutonium-239, except for heat-source plutonium. Thus, for purposes of this Final EA, plutonium quantities at PF-4 are expressed in terms of weapons-grade plutonium equivalents (hereafter termed plutonium). For dose estimation purposes, the releases from the evaluated accidents are presented as PuE.
Table A–9. RLUOB Radiological Accident Frequencies and Consequences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Accident ID</th>
<th>Accident Frequency (per year)</th>
<th>Maximally Exposed Individual a</th>
<th>Population within 50 Miles b</th>
<th>Onsite Noninvolved Worker c</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>dose d (rem)</td>
<td>increased probability of LCF e</td>
<td>dose d (person-rem)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process or Facility-Wide Spill</td>
<td>1×10^{-2} to 1×10^{-4} (unlikely)</td>
<td>2.3×10^{-6}</td>
<td>1×10^{-9}</td>
<td>2.9×10^{-4}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process or Facility-Wide Fire</td>
<td>1×10^{-2} to 1×10^{-4} (unlikely)</td>
<td>8.9×10^{-8}</td>
<td>5×10^{-11}</td>
<td>7.6×10^{-5}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seismic-Induced Spill and Fire</td>
<td>1×10^{-2} to 1×10^{-4} (unlikely)</td>
<td>2.9×10^{-5}</td>
<td>2×10^{-8}</td>
<td>0.025</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Proposed Action Alternative

No Action Alternative

| Process or Facility-Wide Spill | 1×10^{-2} to 1×10^{-4} (unlikely) | 2.2×10^{-7} | 1×10^{-10} | 2.8×10^{-5} | 0 (2×10^{-8}) | 2.4×10^{-6} | 1×10^{-9} |
| Process or Facility-Wide Fire | 1×10^{-2} to 1×10^{-4} (unlikely) | 8.6×10^{-9} | 5×10^{-12} | 7.4×10^{-6} | 0 (4×10^{-9}) | 1.9×10^{-8} | 1×10^{-11} |
| Seismic-Induced Spill and Fire | 1×10^{-2} to 1×10^{-4} (unlikely) | 2.8×10^{-6} | 2×10^{-9} | 0.0024 | 0 (1×10^{-6}) | 6.1×10^{-6} | 4×10^{-9} |

LCF = latent cancer fatality.

a The MEI is assumed to be on the site boundary at the point of highest estimated dose, about 1.2 kilometers from the accident location.

b The population doses are based on the projected 2030 population out to 50 miles from RLUOB.

c The doses for the onsite worker are estimated for the point of highest onsite dose assuming the worker remains in the plume for the duration of the release and does not take emergency actions as trained.

d Dose conversion factors for plutonium-239 are based on the EPA FGR 13 (EPA 1999a) and an assumed oxide form and “S” class.

e Increased risk of an LCF to an individual, assuming the accident occurs.

Operational accidents included a criticality, a spill involving 4,500 grams of molten plutonium, a glovebox fire involving 9,000 grams of plutonium, a vault fire involving 1,500 kilograms of plutonium, and a hydrogen deflagration involving 1,040 grams of plutonium in salts and 1,040 grams of plutonium in oxides. In addition, a design-basis earthquake with spills and fires (with degraded confinement) was evaluated assuming the entire processing (first) floor safety limit of plutonium (2,600 kilograms) was at risk and subject to spillage and fires. In the evaluation of a beyond-design-basis earthquake plus fire, a functional confinement system was not credited.

For each of the PF-4 accident scenarios evaluated in the SPD Supplemental EIS, conservative, bounding source-term estimates were developed as part of the LANL safety-basis to identify the controls necessary to protect the public. These source-term estimates take little, if any, credit for the integrity of containers or building confinement under severe accident conditions and assume that all containers and material-at-risk would be subject to near-worst-case conditions. The safety-basis evaluations generally assume an LPF of 1 for the unmitigated case, meaning that all of the material that is made airborne as respirable particles within the building or process enclosure is released to the environment. For the mitigated case, the LANL safety-basis analyses only take credit for the PF-4 building operating in a passive mode, with the doors open and the building confinement system and HEPA filters not functioning, and assume a lower LPF, generally 0.05.

For the SPD Supplemental EIS, accident source-terms were developed that present more realistic, yet conservative, estimates of potential releases from PF-4. These accident scenarios were called the SEIS Scenarios, to contrast with the Safety-Basis Scenarios. For these SEIS scenarios, the building confinement,
including HEPA filters, was expected to continue functioning, although perhaps at a degraded level, during and after the accident. The scenarios use conservative ARFs and RFs from DOE Handbook 3010-94, *Airborne Release Fractions/Rates and Respirable Fractions for Nonreactor Nuclear Facilities* (DOE 2013b).

### A.3.3 Ongoing Safety Analyses and Seismic Upgrades for PF-4

The development of safety analyses for PF-4 and safety improvements therein are summarized in the *SPD Supplemental EIS* which was issued in April 2015.

For the design-basis earthquake scenarios, the PF-4 DSAs assumed the facility remained standing and provided its credited safety containment. To better understand the potential impacts of a large, rare earthquake, LANL prepared an addendum to the DSA in 2013. The analyses in the addendum assumed a hypothetical earthquake that causes major structural damage to PF-4, including collapse of the roof onto the first floor and collapse of the first floor into the basement. It evaluated the potential releases associated with widespread spills and fires postulated to follow the earthquake. The DSA addendum was prepared specifically to address circumstances that could occur after a seismic collapse of PF-4 and a post-seismic fire. The *SPD Supplemental EIS* presents the results of a beyond design-basis earthquake with earthquake induced collapse and widespread fires based on the analysis in the DSA addendum.

As acknowledged by the Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board, over the past decade DOE has made, and continues to make, numerous upgrades to PF-4 to improve seismic safety at PF-4 (DNFSB 2017). DOE is conducting a detailed seismic hazard analysis to develop a better understanding of the stresses on PF-4 and how it could react during a seismic event. In addition, DOE has proposed improvements to PF-4 including fire rated containers, seismically qualified fire suppression systems, and seismically qualified portions of the confinement ventilation system.

### A.3.4 AC and MC Operations in PF-4 and Impacts under the Proposed Action and No Action Alternatives

The enhancement of AC and MC operations at PF-4 under both the No Action (evaluated in the 2015 *CMRR SA*) and the Proposed Action Alternatives would replace past PF-4 operations that have been evaluated in PF-4 safety basis documents. For both alternatives, the proposed AC and MC operations in PF-4 would be similar to those identified in the *CMRR EIS* (DOE 2003b) and the *CMRR-NF SEIS* (DOE 2011c) as being planned for CMRR-NF. In those EISs, a range of operational accidents was considered, but controls were expected to be in place, including a hardened structure and robust confinement system, that would ensure that all operational accidents would release radioactive material to the environment only through controlled release via HEPA filters. Similar safety controls are in place at PF-4. The bounding accidents identified in both the *CMRR EIS* and *CMRR-NF SEIS* were events that might threaten the building confinement systems; these events include a facility-wide fire and seismic events of such magnitude that they could cause wide-scale spills, fires, and failure of building confinement.

*Operational Accidents*— For both alternatives, the proposed AC and MC operations could involve gram quantities or less of nuclear material taken from quantities of nuclear material up to several kilograms (hence the need to conduct analyses on large quantity samples in a Hazard Category 2 Nuclear Facility instead of in RLUOB). The overall inventory of AC and MC materials in PF-4 would likely be less than 10 percent of the PF-4 processing floor inventory and most of the AC and MC material would be in the form of non-dispersible metal. For AC operations, about 70 percent of the inventory would be in the form of metal; for MC operations, more than 95 percent would be metal (DOE 2015a). Potential accidents associated with the proposed AC and MC operations would not have sufficient inherent energy to aerosolize and disperse more material within a glovebox than the bounding operational accidents for PF-4 that were evaluated in the *SPD Supplemental EIS*. Those bounding operational accidents could result in airborne plutonium within a PF-4 glovebox from a spill of 4,500 grams of molten plutonium in a glovebox used for the Advanced Recovery and Integrated Extraction System project (SEIS Scenario: 0.028-gram PuE stack
release), or a glovebox fire involving 9,000 grams of plutonium (SEIS Scenario: 0.024-gram PuE stack release). The SPD Supplemental EIS hydrogen deflagration accident from dissolution of plutonium metal was estimated to result in a stack release of 2.2 grams PuE from the SEIS Scenario (DOE 2015c, Table D-9).

The radiological impacts from bounding operational accidents were estimated in the SPD Supplemental EIS to result in doses of up to 0.11 rem to an individual at the site boundary and up to 26 person-rem to the population within 50 miles (with no LCFs expected) (DOE 2015c, Table D-18). Changes in the PF-4 DSAs between 2011 and 2015 would not change this result. Any operational accident involving the proposed AC and MC activities are not expected to result in larger potential releases to the environment than these bounding SPD Supplemental EIS operational accidents.

Seismically Initiated Accidents—For both alternatives, the proposed AC and MC operations are not expected to increase source terms or material releases from PF-4 compared to any of the seismically initiated accidents evaluated for this facility in the SPD Supplemental EIS. The new AC and MC operations would replace existing plutonium activities evaluated in current safety basis documents and the SPD Supplemental EIS PF-4 accident analysis. The total building plutonium inventory associated with the additional AC and MC operations would represent a small fraction of current building inventories. For the design-basis earthquake with spill and fire evaluated in the SPD Supplemental EIS, the entire processing (first) floor safety limit of plutonium (2,600 kilograms) was at risk and subject to spillage and fires. With the replacement of some activities evaluated in the SPD Supplemental EIS with the AC and MC operations proposed in this SA, these material limits would not change. In fact, the material-at-risk associated with the proposed AC and MC operations would be lower than that in gloveboxes and PF-4 rooms as currently evaluated. The forms of the materials associated with the AC and MC operations are not expected to be more vulnerable to large-scale aerosolization in seismic spills and fire accidents than those evaluated in the SPD Supplemental EIS. Thus, the impacts from seismically initiated accidents involving the proposed AC and MC operations in PF-4 would be bounded by the impacts evaluated in the SPD Supplemental EIS, and the contribution of AC and MC operations to these impacts would be small. For the design-basis earthquake with spill plus fire, the release to the environment was estimated for the SEIS Scenario to be 3.8 to 6.0 grams PuE, depending on the alternative addressed in the SPD Supplemental EIS (DOE 2015c).

The radiological impacts from the design-basis earthquake with spill plus fire accident was estimated in the SPD Supplemental EIS to result in doses of up to 0.19 to 0.30 rem to an individual at the site boundary and up to 71 person-rem to the population within 50 miles (with no LCFs expected) (DOE 2015c, Table D-18). Changes in the PF-4 DSA between 2011 and 2014 would result in a slight reduction in these doses.

For the beyond-design-basis earthquake with spill plus fire, the most recent analysis of potential releases to the environment is in the DSA addendum that was reported in the SPD Supplemental EIS. That analysis evaluates the potential radiological impacts of an earthquake so severe that it would cause major structural damage to the heavily reinforced PF-4. The earthquake was assumed to damage the internal structures causing the collapse of the roof onto the first floor and collapse of the first floor into the basement. The analysis assumes that radioactive materials within PF-4 would spill and be impacted by falling structural components, and that a major, facility-wide fire would ensue. The assumed extent of damage is highly unlikely even in an earthquake with ground motion much higher than that of the design-basis earthquake. Although there could be a substantial release of radioactive material following such an earthquake accompanied by a facility-wide fire, loss of life within the facility and within the region due to seismic damage would be the predominant impact of such an earthquake.

The more realistic case provided in the SPD Supplemental EIS (SEIS Scenario) is conservative and likely over-estimates the potential releases, but uses more realistic parameters. That case makes differing assumptions depending on the location and type of MAR, but considers a DR of 0.1 for the oxide and metal from spills and fires and 0.5 from impacts on both the main floor and basement of PF-4. For some of the other more volatile materials, DRs of 1 are assumed. Because a wide range of materials were assumed to
be vulnerable to spills, impacts from falling debris, and long-burning external fires, median or average ARFs and RFs from DOE Handbook 3010-94 (DOE 2013b) were assumed. Extremely high LPFs were also assumed. For releases due to spills, an LPF of 0.3 was assumed. For releases due to impacts and fires, an LPF of 0.5 was assumed. Estimated releases to the atmosphere for this case are 321 grams (11 ounces) of plutonium-239 equivalent under an SPD Supplemental EIS alternative whereby 2 metric tons of plutonium would be processed at PF-4, and 362 grams PuE under an SPD Supplemental EIS alternative whereby 35 metric tons of plutonium would be processed at PF-4 (DOE 2015c, Table D-9). Of these releases, materials associated with the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Program would account for approximately 18 percent of the release under the lower throughput case and 32 percent under the higher throughput case.

The radiological impacts from the beyond design-basis earthquake with spill plus fire accident was estimated in the SPD Supplemental EIS to result in doses of 16 to 18 rem to an individual at the site boundary and up to 4,300 person-rem the population within 50 miles (with the possibility of up to 3 LCF) (DOE 2015c, Table D-18).

Because the material inventories associated with AC and MC operations are primarily in non-dispersible metal forms, represent less than 10 percent of the overall building inventories, and would not increase the facility MAR, they would not appreciably add to the source term of earthquake-initiated accidents. Consequently, the impacts from the bounding accidents in the SPD Supplemental EIS or current PF-4 safety documents would not be affected by AC and MC operations under either EA alternative.

A.4 Combined Accident Implications for the Proposed Action and No Action Alternatives

With implementation of the either the Proposed Action or the No-Action Alternative evaluated in this Final EA, the accident risks associated with nuclear operations in the TA-55 area would change, but those changes would be small. Those accident risks include those for PF-4 and RLUOB as well as support operations including radioactive management activities in TA-54. In addition, the accident risks associated with ongoing AC and MC operations in the CMR Building and transfer of nuclear material between the CMR Building in TA-3 and TA-55 facilities would be eliminated. Overall, moving AC and MC operations from the CMR Building to a modern or upgraded facility is expected to lower the accident risks associated with the AC and MC operations.

The increment to accident risk in the TA-55 area would be small. Bounding operational accidents at PF-4 assuming existing operations are projected to release 0.024 to 2.2 grams PuE to the environment (DOE 2015c, Table D-9). As indicated in Section A.3.4, replacement of activities in rooms and gloveboxes with the AC and MC operations evaluated in this Final EA would not result in larger potential releases from these bounding operational accidents. As shown in Table A–8, bounding operational accidents (process or facility-wide spill or fire) in RLUOB under the Proposed Action Alternative would release $5.0 \times 10^3$ to $1.2 \times 10^4$ grams PuE to the environment. The bounding operational release from RLUOB ($1.2 \times 10^4$ grams) would represent 0.005 to 0.5 percent of the bounding operational accident release from PF-4. More realistically, many of the safety controls including building ventilation systems likely would to continue to function during most operational accidents in RLUOB under both the Proposed Action and No Action alternatives.

Assuming a very severe seismic event causing wide-scale spills and fires within PF-4, with or without the proposed AC and MC operations, releases of 3.8 to 6.0 grams PuE were estimated for the design-basis earthquake with spill plus fire while releases of 321 to 362 grams PuE were estimated for the beyond-design basis earthquake with spill plus fire (see Section A.3.4). As shown in Table A–8, the bounding seismic release from RLUOB assuming the proposed AC and MC operations is 0.016 and 0.0016 grams PuE under the Proposed Action and No Action Alternatives, respectively. Thus, with the addition of AC and MC operations to PF-4 and RLUOB, the combined accident releases and corresponding impacts would be 0.3 to 0.4 percent larger under the Proposed Action Alternative than those from PF-4 alone, assuming a design-
basis earthquake, and 0.03 to 0.04 percent larger than those from PF-4 alone under the No Action Alternative. Combined accident releases assuming a beyond design-basis earthquake would be almost entirely attributable to releases from PF-4. The differences in releases from PF-4 are primarily due to the assumption in the *SPD Supplemental EIS* that the building ventilation system in PF-4 would continue to function during a design-basis earthquake with a leak path factor of 0.005 for plutonium.

Under both the Proposed Action and No Action Alternatives, the accident risks associated with continued AC and MC operations at the CMR Building would be eliminated; these risks are evaluated in the *CMRR EIS* (DOE 2003b) and *CMRR-NF SEIS* (DOE 2011c).

The radioactive waste from the room and enclosure changes in PF-4 and from new AC and MC operations in PF-4 and RLUOB would not introduce new types of hazards to ongoing waste management activities in TA-54. Similar types of TRU waste, LLW, and MLLW are routinely handled in TA-54. Waste volumes associated with the upgrades to PF-4 and RLUOB and AC and MC activities are very small relative to ongoing waste volumes as indicated in Chapter 4, Section 4.3, of this EA. These additional waste volumes are not expected to substantially change accident probabilities and would be well within historical waste volumes handled at TA-54. Under either EA alternative, the radioactive waste associated with TA-55 facility modifications and AC and MC operations would not substantially change the overall radioactive waste accident risks at TA-54.
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APPENDIX B
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT ANALYSES INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE

The analyses in this environmental assessment (EA) depend in part on other analyses prepared by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). These other NEPA analyses, listed below, are incorporated by reference into this EA:


*Final Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement for Continued Operation of Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico, DOE/EIS-0380, National Nuclear Security Administration, Los Alamos Site Office, Los Alamos, New Mexico, May 2008.*

*Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement for the Nuclear Facility Portion of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Building Replacement Project at Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico, DOE/EIS-0350-S1, Los Alamos, New Mexico, August 2011.*

*Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Building Replacement Project at Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico, Supplement Analysis, DOE/EIS-0350-SA-2, Los Alamos, New Mexico, January 2015.*


*Draft Environmental Impact Statement for Remediation of Area IV and the Northern Buffer Zone of the Santa Susana Field Laboratory, DOE/EIS-0402, Office of Environmental Management, Simi Valley, California, January 2017.*
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COMMENT RESPONSE DOCUMENT
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APPENDIX C
COMMENT RESPONSE DOCUMENT

This appendix was prepared as a comment response document (CRD) to address the public comments received on the Draft Environmental Assessment of the Proposed Changes for Analytical Chemistry and Materials Characterization at the Radiological Laboratory/Utility/Office Building, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico (draft EA). Section C.1 describes the public review process, including the comment period and the means through which comments on the draft EA were received. Section C.2 presents summaries of technical and/or recurring comments and provides the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) responses to those summaries. Section C.3 presents copies of the comments that were received on the draft EA, side-by-side with NNSA’s responses.

C.1 Public Comment Process

NNSA prepared the draft EA in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) and Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) and Department of Energy (DOE) NEPA implementing regulations (Title 40 of the Code of Federal Regulations [CFR] Parts 1500 – 1508 and 10 CFR Part 1021, respectively).

On February 21, 2018, NNSA announced the availability of the draft EA for review and solicited comments on the draft. Availability was announced by letters sent to the State of New Mexico, the Pueblo de San Ildefonso, Santa Clara Pueblo, Pueblo of Jemez, and Pueblo de Cochiti, Federal and New Mexico congressional representatives, local government officials, and the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB). NNSA also posted the draft EA on the NNSA and DOE NEPA websites, and sent emails to those on the NNSA Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) electronic distribution list. In addition, notices were published in one electronic newspaper, the Los Alamos Daily Post, and three print newspapers, the Los Alamos Monitor, the Santa Fe New Mexican, and the Albuquerque Journal – North. The notifications solicited written comments and requested that they be submitted through the U.S. mail or by email and established a comment period ending on March 26, 2018. NNSA received eight requests asking for extensions to the comment period; requests generally asked for a 30- to 60-day extension. In response to these requests, NNSA extended the public comment period to April 25, 2018.

NNSA actively solicited public comments on the draft EA and considered these comments in preparing the final EA. Upon receipt, letters and emails (comment documents) were assigned a document number for tracking purposes during the comment response process. Forty-three comment documents providing comments on the draft EA or NNSA actions were received during the public comment period.

Each comment document was reviewed to identify individual comments, which were numbered sequentially within each document. The combination of comment document number and individual comment number provides a unique identifier for each comment (e.g., comment number 14-1 corresponds to commenter 14, comment number 1).

Comments received on the draft EA provided the basis for revising and finalizing the EA. The comments assisted in determining whether the alternatives and analyses presented in the draft EA should be modified or augmented; whether information presented in the draft EA needed to be corrected or updated; and whether clarification in the text of the final EA was needed to facilitate better understanding of certain issues. Change bars are presented alongside the text in the final EA to indicate where substantive changes were made and where text was added or deleted. Editorial changes in the final EA are not marked.
C.2 Comment Summaries and Responses

C.2.1 General Opposition to Pit Production

Many commenters indicated opposition to pit\(^1\) production or increased pit production at LANL.

**Response:** NNSA acknowledges that there is opposition to the nuclear weapons mission. LANL is one of three national laboratories engaged in activities in support of the NNSA mission.

In a Record of Decision (ROD) issued in December 2008 (73 FR 77644), NNSA announced its programmatic decision to retain manufacturing and research and development capabilities involving plutonium at LANL. In support of these activities, LANL must continue to maintain existing nuclear capabilities, such as those performed at the existing Chemistry and Metallurgy Research (CMR) Building and at the Plutonium Facility (PF-4) in Technical Area (TA)-55. These capabilities are required to ensure NNSA’s ability to safely maintain and manage the Nation’s nuclear stockpile.

The Proposed Action evaluated in the final EA is another in a long-standing effort to meet the requirement for enduring analytical chemistry (AC) and materials characterization (MC) capabilities at LANL. While AC and MC support actinide research and development activities, the project evaluated in this EA is not directly tied to the level of pit production. Operations would support the ongoing NNSA actinide missions by maximizing use of existing laboratory space to improve operational efficiency. The EA and considerations regarding the Radiological Laboratory/Utility/Office Building (RLUOB) are separate from issues associated with plutonium pit production. Pit production would not occur at RLUOB under either the Proposed Action or the No Action Alternative evaluated in this EA. The mission need has not changed since the 2003 *Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Building Replacement Project at Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico (CMRR EIS)* (DOE 2003b). This Proposed Action is an opportunity for NNSA to improve efficiency and reduce costs without adding risk to the public, facility workers, or the environment. AC and MC operations support actinide research and development capabilities and NNSA strategic objectives for stockpile stewardship and management at LANL and other sites across the DOE Complex. U.S. national security policies and the mission of NNSA at LANL are not within the scope of this EA. The Proposed Action in this EA would provide NNSA with more efficient AC and MC capabilities required for support of NNSA-established LANL mission requirements, but these capabilities are not tied specifically to LANL’s pit production capability at the TA-55 PF-4 or to any pit production level.

C.2.2 General Concerns about Implementing NEPA for the Proposed Action

Commenters expressed a variety of concerns related to implementation of the NEPA process for this EA. Commenters addressed the type of NEPA document that NNSA should prepare, called for preparation of a new environmental impact statement (EIS) rather than an EA, requested that NNSA address certain additional issues, stated that the draft EA was insufficient to support a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI), and stated that the RLUOB EA process did not present opportunities for scoping and involvement of outside parties.

**Response:** NNSA proposes to modify RLUOB to enable its operation as a material-at-risk limited, Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility, rather than as a Radiological Facility, and to perform more AC and MC operations at RLUOB than the level of operations evaluated in prior NEPA documentation (see Section 1.5, of this EA). NNSA prepared this EA to address the potential environmental impacts associated with this Proposed Action.

NNSA has determined that an EA is the appropriate level of NEPA documentation, consistent with CEQ NEPA regulations and DOE implementing procedures (40 CFR 1501.4(b) and 10 CFR 1021.321(a), respectively). DOE requires preparation of an EA “for a proposed DOE action that is described in the classes of actions listed in Appendix C to Subpart D of this part, and for a proposed DOE action that is not described in any of the classes of actions listed in Appendices A, B, or D to Subpart D, except that an EA is not required

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\(^1\) A pit is the plutonium core of a nuclear weapon.
if DOE has decided to prepare an EIS. DOE may prepare an EA on any action at any time in order to assist agency planning and decision making” (§1021.321(a)). Appendices A and B refer to categorical exclusions, Appendix C addresses classes of action that normally require EAs but not necessarily EISs, and Appendix D addresses classes of actions that normally require EISs. NNSA is preparing this EA to assist in planning and decisionmaking because the need for the agency action addressed in this EA is neither explicitly nor implicitly identified in any of the aforementioned appendix lists.

CEQ’s instructions are that agencies “focus on significant environmental issues and alternatives” (40 CFR 1502.1) and discuss impacts “in proportion to their significance” (40 CFR 1502.2(b)). This is referred to as the sliding-scale approach to NEPA analysis that recognizes that agency proposals can be characterized as falling somewhere on a continuum with respect to environmental impacts. In this EA, NNSA addresses only those issues and resource areas that the agency believes could have a potential for significant environmental impact.

In accordance with 10 CFR 1021.322, NNSA prepared a FONSI because it has determined that the EA supports the finding that the Proposed Action will not have a significant effect on the human environment. If the EA had not supported a FONSI, NNSA either would not proceed with the Proposed Action addressed in the EA or would prepare an EIS and issue a ROD before proceeding with the Proposed Action.

When preparing an EA, an agency has discretion as to the level of public involvement. A scoping period is not required for an EA and NNSA determined that one was not necessary for this EA because the Proposed Action was of limited scope, required no new facilities, and was within the confines of LANL’s established mission. In accordance with DOE Implementing Procedures, the draft EA was made available to the State of New Mexico and to local Native American tribes potentially impacted by the action (10 CFR 1021.301(d)). In conjunction with the required notifications, NNSA announced the availability of the draft EA, provided the public with an extended 60-day public comment period, and made the draft EA and cited reference materials available on the internet.

C.2.3 General Concerns that the EA Approach Results in Segmentation of the NEPA Process and a Programmatic EIS Is Needed

Commenters submitted a variety of comments regarding concerns over segmentation of the NEPA analysis for various actions and the need for a programmatic EIS (PEIS). Specific comments include:

- the entire process NNSA has relied on for EISs and EAs has resulted in segmentation of the NEPA analysis;
- the draft EA addresses an interconnected action and its preparation results in segmentation of NEPA decisions; thus, the Proposed Action evaluated in the EA should be part of a far broader PEIS on expanded pit production;
- RLUOB re-categorization and conversion is not an isolated action, but is intertwined with other actions that require the development of an EIS; and
- the draft EA does not demonstrate the level of “Independent Utility” for facility hazard recategorization needed to justify separate NEPA consideration apart from NNSA’s other impending actions involving pit production.

Response: There is no segmentation of the NEPA analyses; nor is there a need for a PEIS based on the Proposed Action evaluated in this EA. The action evaluated in this EA is to meet the requirement for enduring AC and MC capabilities at LANL. NNSA prepared the CMRR EIS (DOE 2003b) in 2003 to address the need to provide the physical means for accommodating the continuation of mission-critical AC and MC capabilities in a safe, secure, and environmentally sound manner. In 2004, NNSA issued a ROD (69 FR 6967) for constructing and operating a two-building replacement for the CMR Building to be located in TA-55. The RLUOB is one of those two buildings. NNSA subsequently evaluated potential environmental impacts of
significant changes to the second of the two buildings in the CMRR-NF SEIS (DOE 2011c). Subsequent to issuing the CMRR-NF SEIS, NNSA cancelled construction of the CMRR-NF. NNSA then evaluated other options for providing the needed AC and MC capabilities and capacities and prepared the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Building Replacement Project at Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico, Supplement Analysis (2015 Supplement Analysis) (DOE/EIS-0350-SA-2) (DOE 2015a). NNSA determined that no additional NEPA analysis was necessary for an action that would provide AC and MC capabilities at LANL using a combination of laboratory space available in RLUOB (as a Radiological Facility) and laboratory space to be made available in PF-4.

The Proposed Action evaluated in this EA is an extension of the process first evaluated in the CMRR EIS to provide physical space for performing AC and MC. The Proposed Action takes advantage of a modern facility, RLUOB, for conducting a larger portion of the AC and MC work than the level evaluated in the 2015 Supplement Analysis. Re-categorization of RLUOB to a Hazard Category 3 nuclear facility is not a connected action in the context of NEPA analysis and does have independent utility as described in 40 CFR 1508.25(a), which states: “Connected actions are those that enable other actions that require a Federal action, or where the enabled action cannot or will not proceed unless the underlying action is taken; or are interdependent parts of a larger action and depend on the larger action for justification. Projects that have independent utility are not connected actions.”

The Proposed Action evaluated in this EA is not tied specifically to LANL’s pit production capability or to NNSA’s recent announcement regarding future pit production (NNSA 2018). The level of pit production at LANL or any other site across the DOE Complex is independent of the requirement for continued AC and MC capability. Issues surrounding decisions about the levels of and locations for pit production have been analyzed in the Complex Transformation SPEIS; decisions on the level of pit production at LANL were analyzed in the 2008 Final Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement for Continued Operation of Los Alamos National Laboratory, New Mexico (LANL SWEIS) (DOE 2008a). NNSA will determine the appropriate level of NEPA documentation to support the recent announcement regarding recapitalization of plutonium pit production (NNSA 2018) and complete the necessary analyses and RODs prior to proceeding with actions related to increases above currently authorized pit production levels. Nuclear weapons pit production does not occur at RLUOB and would not occur at RLUOB under either of the alternatives evaluated in the EA. Therefore, the re-categorization of RLUOB to allow for an enhanced AC and MC capability is neither a connected action nor part of a larger action that requires this action for justification.

C.2.4 General Concerns that the Accident Analysis is Inadequate

Several commenters stated that the safety analysis in the draft EA was inadequate because it was a “preliminary analysis” for which safety, occupational, and seismic risks are explained away rather than being rigorously addressed. Concerns were also expressed about the lack of analyses of potential beryllium hazards and intentional destructive acts (IDAs).

Response: The evaluation of the potential environmental impacts of accidents was performed for this EA at a level commensurate with the level of risks presented by the Proposed Action, which would increase the allowed quantity of radioactive materials within RLUOB. The accident analysis referred to in the draft EA as “preliminary” an analysis is expected to encompass the range of accidents and potential impacts that the Proposed Action could present. The accident analysis for the EA is similar to, and at the same level of detail as, an analysis performed for an EIS. The analysis was performed in accordance with DOE guidance on accident analysis under NEPA: Recommendations for Analyzing Accidents under the National Environmental Policy Act (DOE 2002). The EA references an analysis that was performed in the early phases of evaluating the viability of recategorizing RLUOB to a Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility and limitations on the quantity of material to be managed in the facility. In the draft EA this was referred to as a “preliminary” analysis whereas it was an initial analysis appropriate for the early stages of the project. In addition to the accident analysis performed in this EA, if the project proceeds, the LANL contractor will perform and NNSA will
review additional analyses appropriate for the stage of project development. Because the word preliminary was misconstrued, it was deleted in this final EA.

Consistent with the principle provided in NEPA guidance that impacts should be discussed in proportion to their significance (40 CFR 1502.2(b)), the analysis uses a sliding scale approach that is appropriate for a Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility. The approach to the evaluation of accidents is presented in detail in Section 4.2 and Appendix A of the EA. That approach makes very conservative assumptions on the types or forms of radioactive materials that might be within the building. As permitted in DOE’s guidance and for purposes of analysis in this EA, only limited functioning of safety features that are in place at RLUOB, such as the building ventilation system, is assumed for selected accident scenarios.

As discussed in Section 4.2.2 and Appendix A.2.2 of this EA, a wide-range of potential accident scenarios are considered, including: operational accidents such as fires, explosions, spills, and nuclear criticality; external events including man-made events, a natural gas explosion, a wildland fire, an airplane crash, or a vehicle impact; and natural phenomenon, including high winds, lightning strikes, and seismic activity. Regarding seismic activity, the laboratory portion of the RLUOB building is structurally quite robust. Nonetheless, the “Seismic-Induced Spill and Fire” accident scenario evaluated in this EA does not take credit for the robust building structure or building ventilation system safeguards. Rather, it is assumed that 10 percent of the radioactive material that becomes airborne in the accident would reach the atmosphere through cracks in the building or building rubble. As discussed in this EA, these assumptions are quite conservative.

The draft EA did not specifically evaluate the potential environmental impacts from an IDA. In this final EA, NNSA added a discussion of IDAs and how they were considered. The potential impacts from any physically reasonable release of radioactive materials due to an IDA would be bounded by the impacts for the “Seismic-Induced Spill and Fire” accident scenario, which is evaluated in this EA.

Historic operations involving finely divided, respirable beryllium have been a concern to DOE and NNSA and lessons learned from past operations are applied through industrial hygiene programs at LANL. LANL has a well-established Chronic Beryllium Disease Prevention Program. It specifies the requirements and procedures for working with beryllium at LANL. It is intended to minimize worker exposure to beryllium and meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 850, Chronic Beryllium Disease Prevention Program. A Qualified Industrial Hygiene and Safety Professional evaluates activities and operations involving beryllium. Laboratory workers engaging in beryllium activities and operations are subject to the required training and medical surveillance. The draft EA did not specifically mention potential worker exposures to finely divided, respirable beryllium because cutting, grinding, polishing, and machining of beryllium will not be performed in RLUOB. RLUOB will have chemical analysis capabilities to analyze smear samples and air monitoring filters obtained from potentially beryllium-contaminated areas elsewhere at LANL and to analyze the beryllium content of beryllium-containing or contaminated compounds. Sample processing and analyses would be performed in the gloveboxes or open-front hoods. Section 4.1 of the final EA was revised to indicate that beryllium is not a chemical hazard of concern for RLUOB operations.

C.2.5 General Concerns that the Environmental Justice Impacts Analysis is Inadequate

Commenters expressed concerns that the environmental justice and related cumulative environmental justice effects analysis in the draft EA relies on a special receptors analysis from a decade ago (the 2008 LANL SWEIS). Commenters noted that concerns about the analysis were included in the Santa Clara Pueblo comments on the LANL SWEIS. Commenters indicated that the stated distance to the Pueblo de San Ildefonso stated in Section 4.5.2 of the draft EA was incorrectly large, raising concerns that the impacts to offsite individuals had been incorrectly evaluated.

Response: An environmental justice analysis is presented in detail in Section 4.5 of this EA. Section 4.1, Tables 9 to 13, and Section 4.5, demonstrate that both the limited types of operations currently conducted in RLUOB and the operations with the proposed increase in radioactive materials within RLUOB present small environmental risks to workers within RLUOB, to persons on the LANL site, and to members of the public off
the LANL site. In Table 9, the annual dose to a hypothetical individual at the LANL boundary is conservatively estimated to be about 0.082 millirem, which is over 100 times smaller than the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency regulatory limit of 10 millirem per year. Doses further away from the LANL boundary, including on pueblo lands, would be even less. Because of the types of operations currently performed in RLUOB and those proposed in this EA, only very small, HEPA-filtered releases of radioactive materials into the atmosphere would be expected during normal operations and in the event of an accident. Only during very severe earthquakes that could hypothetically collapse portions of the laboratory structure of RLUOB would unfiltered, airborne release be expected. Thus, neither the current nor the Proposed Action operations in RLUOB would be expected to increase any on- or offsite radiological contamination. The stated large distance to the Pueblo de San Ildefonso in Section 4.5.2 of the draft EA was an error that was corrected in the final EA. The impacts to offsite individuals were correctly evaluated and reported in the draft EA, and are correctly evaluated and reported in the final EA.

Regarding the Santa Clara Pueblo reference to comments raised on the LANL SWEIS, NNSA refers the reader to comment response 316-9 in the LANL SWEIS. In that response NNSA noted that there are many possible routes by which people may be exposed to contaminants in their environment. Certain individuals may consume foods or engage in activities that are specific to their culture on a regular basis (daily or weekly), and most members of the population may occasionally consume those foods and engage in those activities. On average, however, all people in a population will consume a predictable quantity of water and basic foodstuffs every year. For that reason, it is widely accepted within the scientific and regulatory community that ingestion of water and foodstuffs is, in general, the most significant route of exposure to contaminants in the terrestrial environment.

To estimate the exposure to individuals subsisting on a special pathways diet, it was assumed for analysis in the LANL SWEIS that all foodstuffs were locally grown and that drinking water came from local wells. Furthermore, additional exposure to these individuals was assumed to occur through: (a) occasional ingestion of surface water, soil and sediment from more contaminated LANL locations; and (b) occasional consumption of certain wild foods that have higher levels of contaminants than most locally grown meats and vegetables. The dose and risk calculations for the special pathways diet assumed the consumption of game animals, including consumption of some nongame fish, native vegetation (pinyon nuts and Indian tea [cota]), surface water, and incidental ingestion of soil and sediments in surface water and from swallowing inhaled dust. The potential radiological doses from these pathways were analyzed in addition to the doses from meat, milk, produce, water, and sediment consumption as reflected in the “offsite resident” pathway analysis in the LANL SWEIS. These products are monitored regularly as part of the LANL environmental surveillance program.

Santa Clara Pueblo commented extensively on this approach. In its ROD and Mitigation Action Plan (MAP) related to the 2008 LANL SWEIS, NNSA acknowledged environmental justice issues raised by the Pueblo and agreed to work collaboratively with the Pueblo to ascertain the SWEIS analysis or develop suggested ways of incorporating findings of a Santa Clara-specific human health risk assessment. That assessment will be funded by NNSA is planned to commence in 2018. NNSA reports on the Santa Clara initiative in the SWEIS MAP Quarterly and Annual Reports. In practical terms the Santa Clara-specific human health risk assessment will enhance environmental sampling and monitoring programs of the Pueblo and three other tribal governments located near LANL. These tribal programs have been jointly funded by NNSA and the DOE Office of Environmental Management since 1997.

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2 High-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter shall exhibit a minimum efficiency of 99.97 percent when tested with an aerosol of 0.3 micrometer diameter (DOE 2015e).
C.2.6 General Concerns and opposition to increased plutonium limits at RLUOB due to past and ongoing safety issues at LANL

Several commenters indicated concern and opposition to increased plutonium limits at RLUOB due to past and ongoing safety issues at LANL. Commenters expressed concerns about a range of safety issues at LANL, including safety violations, a poor safety record, criticality violations, DNFSB interactions and concerns, and the LANL safety culture.

Response: The RLUOB facility has been operated safely since it commenced operations in 2011. The proposed increase in inventory limit would not change the ability of RLUOB to continue to be operated safely. As demonstrated in the EA, the impacts of both routine operations and accidents with the Proposed Action are similar to those of ongoing operations and are small and limited by the inventory of radioactive materials at the facility. The RLUOB is a modern facility with modern operating equipment. The proposed inventory limit for RLUOB was selected to best take advantages of the laboratory space and capabilities of the RLUOB facility, but not require the additional safety and security features that would be necessary with operations involving larger quantities of plutonium that might present the risk of a nuclear criticality or significant contamination. As shown by the accident analysis included in this EA, even under severe accident conditions, release of the limited inventory proposed for RLUOB would result in doses to workers and the offsite public within established safety limits.

Over the last several years, the independent DNFSB has expressed safety concerns to DOE similar to those raised by the commenters related to a range of safety issues associated with plutonium operations at LANL. These concerns which include seismic concerns at PF-4, criticality concerns at PF-4, safety management, and safety culture, have been addressed in ongoing actions at LANL. As a part of the Integrated Safety Management systems at LANL, the safety lessons learned from concerns at PF-4 are applied to RLUOB, LANL, and the rest of the DOE complex. Thus, NNSA has full confidence that RLUOB can continue to be operated safely and that moving additional AC and MC activities to RLUOB would contribute to overall safety at LANL.

C.3 Public Comments and NNSA Responses

This section presents a side-by-side display of the comments received by NNSA during the public comment period on the draft EA and DOE’s response to each comment. To find a specific commenter or comment in the following pages, refer to the “List of Commenters” at the start of this appendix. This list is organized alphabetically by commenter name and shows the corresponding page number(s) where commenters can find their comment(s).
Commenter No. 1: Jon Lipsky

From: Jon Lipsky
Sent: Saturday, February 24, 2018 2:14:19 PM
To: RLUOBEA
Subject: EA-2052 - Public Comment

The purpose of this communication is to provide public comment regarding EA-2051: Proposed Changes for Analytical Chemistry and Materials Characterization at the Radiological Laboratory/Utility/Office Building, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico. The U.S. Department of Energy by and through NNSA must delay the decision, probably indefinitely, as the only feasible option. The proposed activities, AC and MC operations, at LANL are not capable of being safe, secure and environmentally sound. The former Rocky Flats Nuclear Weapons Plant, Golden, Colorado (Rocky Flats) stopped similar production almost three (3) decades ago because it could not operate legally; its activities and operations defied environmental regulation, involved illegal activity, and to this day denies EEOICPA claims for its workers; and, polluted more than 25,000 acres, much of it offsite, without remediation after being added to the National Priority List (NPL) of the most contaminated sites. In 2016 the federal government ultimately compensated Plaintiffs in re: Merilyn Cook, et al, Plaintiffs v. The Dow Chemical Company and Rockwell International Corporation, Defendants (Merilyn Cook), $375,000,000.00 as a result of improper activities and operations at Rocky Flats.

The proposed RLUOB should be a Hazard Category 1 facility, without qualification. Instant EA should have analyzed the activities and operations at Rocky Flats in determining potential risks for the proposed RLUOB. The U.S. Department of Energy (USDOE) knows or should know that the proposed activities are capable of significant offsite consequences: nuclear criticality events were documented at Rocky Flats evidenced by nuclear worker accounts, offsite strontium\(^{90}\) and cesium\(^{137}\) above background levels; tritium escaped Rocky Flats and adversely affected offsite drinking water supplies; hazardous materi-

1-1 NNSA considered delaying a decision regarding the Proposed Action. However, space and capabilities are needed to perform critical AC and MC mission-support work that can no longer be performed in the CMR Building. Therefore, NNSA determined that it was necessary to evaluate the potential impacts of the Proposed Action versus proceeding with the prior decision to install more of the AC and MC capabilities in PF-4 (the No Action Alternative) and re-examining it at a later date was not a reasonable option.

NNSA acknowledges the issues surrounding operations and events at the Rocky Flats Nuclear Weapons Plant which ceased plutonium pit production operations in 1989. As stated in Section C.2.6, “General Concerns and Opposition to Increased Plutonium Limits at RLUOB due to LANL Safety Issues,” RLUOB has been operated safely since it commenced operations in 2011. The proposed increase in inventory limit would not change the ability of RLUOB to continue to be operated safely. As demonstrated in the EA, the impacts of both routine operations and accidents with the Proposed Action are similar to those of ongoing operations and are small and limited by the inventory of radioactive materials at the facility. The RLUOB is a modern facility with modern operating equipment and does not have the legacy safety issues associated with operating older plutonium facilities. The proposed inventory limit was selected to best take advantages of the capabilities of the RLUOB facility without requiring additional safety features that would be necessary for operations involving larger quantities of plutonium that might present the risk of a nuclear criticality or significant contamination.

Over the last several years, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB), an independent organization within the executive branch of the United States Government, chartered with the responsibility of providing recommendations and advice to the President and the Secretary of Energy regarding public health and safety issues at Department of Energy defense nuclear facilities, has expressed concerns to DOE related to a range of safety issues associated with plutonium operations at LANL, similar to those raised by the commenter. These concerns which include seismic concerns at PF-4, criticality concerns at PF-4, safety management, and safety culture, have been addressed in ongoing actions at LANL. LANL has made great strides in improving the safety management and culture. Both NNSA and the contractor have made efforts to improve the transparency of safety management and reporting, as evidenced by the knowledge that commenters have of specific instances that have occurred. As a part of the Integrated Safety Management systems at LANL, the safety lessons learned from concerns at PF-4 are applied to RLUOB, LANL, and the rest of the DOE complex. Thus, NNSA has full confidence
Commenter No. 1 (cont’d): Jon Lipsky

als/wastes at Rocky Flats were not contained; important beryllium issues were documented, more recently, in the USDOE/OIG report of February 2018 (DOE-OIG-18-20) that were not protective of nuclear workers during Rocky Flats activities and operations with no expectation that it will be in the future; and, the nuclear repository situation in the United States is lacking and does not support instant EA.

Instant EA is a recipe for disaster that is not protective of human health and environment.

The Material-at-Risk (MAR) scenario for the proposed RLUOB increases risk to nuclear workers, offsite contamination and is not protective. In fact, Material Unaccounted For (MUF) scenario is increased that USDOE is not willing to own up to as litigated in the in re: Merilyn Cook federal civil case involving over 2500 pounds of radionuclides including weapons-grade plutonium\(^{239}\). Instant EA involves weapons-grade plutonium\(^{239}\) the most toxic substance known with a half-life of ~ 24,110 years and its dangerous contamination is indefinite. Berylliosis is not curable.

The indefinite nature of weapons-grade plutonium\(^{239}\) contamination is protracted by USDOE failing to utilize Multi-Agency Radiation Survey and Site Investigation Manual (MARSSIM) that avoided independent verification with a contractor-controlled cleanup at Rocky Flats. Instant EA should analyze and inform the public that DOE Order 458.1 – Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment – provides for a 'Total Effective Dose' (TED) that allows USDOE to not remediate contamination. The RLUOB is more likely than not to become an NPL Superfund site, without being scoped as a nuclear repository, that is not protective of human health and the environment. Nuclear waste is not our friend.

Respectfully submitted,
Jon Lipsky, MAS, FBI, Retired
Longmont, CO 80502

that RLUOB and PF-4 can continue to be operated safely and that installing more of the AC and MC capabilities in RLUOB rather than PF-4 would contribute to overall safety at LANL. NNSA expects that radiation exposures among workers performing AC and MC operations would be lower due to the lower overall radiation environment at RLUOB compared to that at PF-4 and would improve operational efficiency and reduce costs.

DOE assigns different hazard categories to its facilities in accordance with hazard analyses that consider the maximum potential injuries and fatalities in the event of a severe accident, without taking credit for designed safety features; administrative controls, other than limiting the total quantity of hazardous materials in the facility; or prompt emergency response. Please see the text box in Section 1.1 of the EA for DOE’s definitions of hazard categories.

There are very significant differences between the scope of operations, quantities of radioactive materials handled, and other factors at Rocky Flats compared to the AC and MC operations currently authorized or proposed at RLOUB and PF-4. Operations at RLUOB would entail use of small quantities of nuclear materials with the total amount in the building not exceeding 400 grams of plutonium-239 equivalent material, not the large quantities asserted in the comment. Any handling of beryllium at RLUOB would be for the purpose of laboratory analysis. The existing and proposed operations in RLUOB have been and would continue to be conducted in a safe, secure, and environmentally sound manner. As discussed in the Summary and Section 4.3 of the EA, ample offsite treatment or disposal capacity exists for all wastes expected from the Proposed Action.

Similarly, the existing and proposed operations in PF-4 supporting AC and MC activities have been and would continue to be conducted in a safe, secure, and environmentally sound manner. PF-4 modifications result in lower overall radiation worker exposure.

The potential environmental impacts that could result from increasing the quantity of radioactive material allowed in RLUOB are evaluated in this EA. Implementing the Proposed Action results in lower overall risks to workers in PF-4. Any litigation involving Rocky Flats is not relevant to the Proposed Action evaluated in the EA.

As addressed in Section C.2.4, “General Concerns that the Accident Analysis is Inadequate,” of this CRD, operations that would generate finely divided, respirable beryllium are not reasonably expected within RLUOB.
Commenter No. 1 (cont’d): Jon Lipsky

1-4 Cleanup of Rocky Flats is not relevant to the Proposed Action evaluated in the EA. Long-term site contamination due to RLUOB activities is not expected. Cleanup and remediation of the PF-4 and RLUOB will eventually occur and will be performed according to the regulatory standards in effect at that time.
Dear CMRRR Project Management Office:

On behalf of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, a non-partisan, non-profit organization with over 80,000 members worldwide, I am writing to express serious concerns over the draft environmental assessment for the Radiological Laboratory Utility and Office Building (AKA “Rad Lab”) at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico.

For the following reasons, I believe that after completing a final Rad Lab environmental assessment NNSA should proceed to a full environmental impact statement.

1. The draft EA is premature. Since NNSA will soon announce its decision on where future plutonium pit production will take place, it is unnecessary to conduct this draft environmental assessment at this time. NNSA should conduct a full environmental impact statement after its May 11 decision on the location for future pit production.

2. This Rad Lab environmental assessment is being conducted pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), which requires the opportunity for the public to comment on major federal proposals. NEPA also requires that interconnected actions be considered together, and forbids segmentation into different narrow projects.

   In a clear sign of interconnectivity, the Rad Lab’s planned re-categorization into a Hazard Category-3 nuclear facility is one of four “subprojects” in the NNSA’s FY 2019 budget request under the “Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) Project.” All four subprojects involve relocating analytical chemistry and materials characterization capabilities involving plutonium and other special nuclear materials out of the old, deteriorating Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Building. All together these subprojects will cost two billion taxpayer dollars. NNSA should analyze all four subprojects in one unified environmental impact statement. Conversely, this environmental assessment that analyzes only the narrow question of raising the plutonium limit in the Rad Lab is segmentation that NEPA forbids.

3. NNSA has not justified how LANL’s present plutonium mission would not be adequately served by the already raised limit of 38.6 grams Pu-239 equivalent (up from the original 8.4 grams) for the Rad Lab. Moreover, NNSA has discounted the need for additional safety features based on a “preliminary analysis.” A fuller EIS should be based on completed, documented analysis.

4. The FY 2019 NNSA budget request states berillium analysis will be a specific capability under the Proposed Action. Yet there are only two passing references to berillium in the draft EA, when it is a widely known, potentially severe occupational hazard across the DOE’s nuclear weapons complex. Moreover, a February 2018 DOE Inspector General report found long-standing deficiencies in LANL’s beryllium disease prevention program. Therefore, it is particularly notable that this draft Rad Lab environmental assessment fails to analyze potential berillium occupational exposures, which a full EIS should correct.

Following its May 11 decision on plutonium pit production, NNSA should proceed to a full environmental impact statement that analyzes interconnected proposals for relocating analytical Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) Project.
chemistry and materials characterization operations at LANL. Should NNSA decide to conduct production at the Savannah River Site, or also at LANL, it should then proceed to a programmatic environmental impact statement that analyses all aspects of future plutonium pit production.

Sincerely,

[signed]

Rick Wayman
Santa Barbara, California

operations would take place at PF-4 and more AC and MC operations would take place at RLUOB. As addressed in Section 2.1 of the EA, the Proposed Action would provide a variety of environmental and other benefits such as fewer worker radiation exposures, less waste generation, lower costs, and improved laboratory efficiency.

With respect to the concern about safety features being discounted due to a preliminary analysis, please refer to Section 2.1 of the EA. The analysis was used as part of establishing the 400-gram plutonium-239 limit for RLUOB under the Proposed Action. Future, more detailed, analyses will be conducted to ensure that all required technical and administrative controls would be implemented at RLUOB to maintain worker and public safety. The analyses presented in this EA represent bounding quantities of materials at risk and minimal controls. There is no expectation that the next version of the safety analyses will require a modification of the potential impacts analysis conclusions in the EA.

As addressed in Section C.2.4, “General Concerns that the Accident Analysis is Inadequate,” of this CRD, historic operations involving finely divided, respirable beryllium have been a concern with DOE and NNSA and lessons learned from past operations are applied through industrial hygiene programs at LANL. Section 4.1.2.3 of the final EA was revised to clearly communicate that operations that would generate finely divided, respirable beryllium are not within the scope of RLUOB activities. However, RLUOB would provide capabilities to perform chemical analyses of smear samples and air monitoring filters obtained from areas potentially contaminated with beryllium, and to analyze the beryllium content of beryllium-containing or contaminated compounds.
Commenter No. 3: Donivan Porterfield

From: Donivan Porterfield
Sent: Saturday, February 24, 2018 8:07 PM
To: RLUOBEA
Subject: EA-2052: Draft Environmental Assessment References - link errors

CMRR Project Management Office,

I would like to bring to your attention some apparent errors in the links to reference information. Some links are redundant to different listed content.

The following two reference items have the same link:


The following two reference items have the same link:


NNSA appreciates your identifying the issue with the hyperlinks to references on the website. The links were checked and corrected where needed so that the reference material would be available to reviewers.
Commenter No. 3 (cont’d): Donivan Porterfield


https://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2018/02/f49/DOE%202016_An-nual%20TRU%20Waste%20Inventory%20Rpt%20for%202016_0.pdf

The following two reference items have the same link:


42 ICRP (International Commission on Radiological Protection), 2012, Compendium of Dose Coefficients Based on ICRP Publication 60, ICRP Publication 119, Pergamon Press.


The following two reference items have the same link:

43 LANL (Los Alamos National Laboratory), 2004, Biological Assessment of the Potential Effects of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Facility Replacement Project on Federally Listed Threatened, Endangered, and Sensitive Species, LA-CP-0-0921, Los Alamos, New Mexico. OUO


Response side of this page intentionally left blank.
Commenter No. 3 (cont’d): Donivan Porterfield

44 LANL (Los Alamos National Laboratory), 2006, Amended Biological Assessment: The Potential Effects of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Facility Replacement Project on Federally Listed Threatened, Endangered, and Sensitive Species, LA-CP-06-0020, Los Alamos, New Mexico. OUO


The following two reference items have the same link:


Mr. Donivan Porterfield
Los Alamos, NM 87544
Commenter No. 4: Richard Johnson

From: Rico
Sent: Thursday, April 26, 2018 2:04:43 PM
To: RLUOBEA
Subject: Comment on the Draft EA

April 25, 2018

NNSA Los Alamos Field Office
ATTN: CMRR Project Management Office
3747 West Jemez Road
Los Alamos, NM 87544

Re: Comments on the Draft Environmental Assessment of Proposed Changes for Analytical Chemistry and Materials Characterization at the Radiological Laboratory/Utility/Office Building, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico

To CMRR Project Management Office:

After completing a final Rad Lab environmental assessment, I believe that NNSA needs to proceed to a full environmental impact statement. NNSA claims that this Rad Lab EA is about relocating operations from the old CMR Building. However, NNSA does not justify why LANL’s mission can’t be served with the already raised limit of 38.6 grams of Pu-239. Now they want to raise the limit at the proposed Rad Lab to 400 grams of Pu-239. A full analysis required in an environmental impact statements needs to explain the mission of this new Rad Lab so it can be evaluated with respect to our treaty obligation to only maintain the safety and reliability of our existing stockpile. The question is whether this new facility is to support the mission of increasing pit production at LANL and why do we need to increase pit production. A complete analysis of the supposed need to increase pit production is required and that analysis should be addressed in a full environmental impact statement.

Sincerely,

Richard Johnson
Santa Fe, NM

The same AC and MC capabilities and operations that were evaluated in the 2015 Supplement Analysis (DOE 2015a) are evaluated in the current EA. As indicated in Section 1 of the EA, the overall AC and MC mission remains the same and the Proposed Action only identifies a more efficient approach to meeting the mission. The difference is that under the Proposed Action in the current EA, fewer AC and MC operations would take place at PF-4 and more AC and MC operations would take place at RLUOB. As addressed in Section 2.1 of the EA, the Proposed Action would provide a variety of environmental and other benefits such as fewer worker radiation exposures, less waste generation, lower costs, and improved laboratory efficiency.

An EIS addressing the Proposed Action is not necessary because the EA analysis provides the evidence that the Proposed Action would not result in significant adverse impacts. The Proposed Action evaluated in the EA, which is limited to the recategorization of RLUOB as a MAR-limited Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility and AC and MC operations in RLUOB and PF-4, is not tied to any specific level of pit production activity at LANL or any other site across the DOE Complex. The need for enduring AC and MC capabilities is independent of the level of pit production. Please refer to Section C.2.1, “General Opposition to Pit Production,” of this CRD for additional information.
Commenter No. 5: James Chase

From: james chase
Sent: Thursday, April 26, 2018 6:31:26 PM
To: RLUOBEA
Subject: Re: Comments on the Draft Environmental Assessment of Proposed Changes for Analytical Chemistry and Materials Characterization at the Radiological Laboratory/Utility/Office Building, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico

April 24, 2018

Dear CMRR Project Management Office:

As a 40 year resident of and participant in the tourism economy, I have watched this state miss every opportunity to harness its scientific communities toward the expansion of new energy technologies (solar, wind) and cash crops (industrial hemp), simply because of its historic dependence on and submission to certain revenue streams, many of which have direct and negative impacts on scarce water supplies, and other environmental consequences.

I realize that a state as poor as New Mexico is vulnerable to exploitation by certain financial interests, extraction industries, radioactive waste storage, the labs, etc. However, rushing programs through without doing an objective and multi system environmental cost/benefit analysis is not sound or ethical, and suggests a manufactured urgency motivated by short term gain rather than coherent, long term strategy.

The people that have lived and raised generations of families and built the cultures of this state are rarely notified and offered an opportunity to weigh in (with any effectiveness) on policy decisions that affect their health and livelihoods.

I hope you take the time and care to proceed with all due responsibility inherent with matters of this consequence.

In this case an EA is absolutely not sufficient to address the far-reaching threats that these new facilities pose to groundwater, rivers, air and soil--now and in the future.

The EA analysis forms the basis for comparison of the potential environmental impacts of the alternatives and is consistent with DOE NEPA regulations and guidance. A sliding-scale approach is applied where greater depth and breadth of descriptive and analytic information is provided for the resources that have a greater potential to be impacted by the Proposed Action and the No Action. The same AC and MC capabilities and operations that were evaluated in the 2015 Supplement Analysis (DOE 2015a) are evaluated in the current EA. As indicated in Section 1 of the EA, the overall AC and MC mission remains the same and the Proposed Action only identifies a more efficient approach to meeting the mission. The difference is that under the Proposed Action in the current EA, fewer AC and MC operations would take place at PF-4 and more AC and MC operations would take place at RLUOBEA. As addressed in Section 2.1 of the EA, the Proposed Action would provide a variety of environmental and other benefits such as fewer worker radiation exposures, less waste generation, lower costs, and improved laboratory efficiency.
Commenter No. 5 (cont’d): James Chase

As a taxpayer, citizen and nearly 40-year resident of Northern New Mexico, I am still shocked by the scant attention to environmental questions for existing and proposed programs at the Labs.

I would like like to see a full Environmental Impact Statement released to the public for perusal and comment.

Thank you for your time and consideration,

Jamie Chase
From: Virginia J Miller  
Sent: Thursday, April 26, 2018 8:41:56 AM  
To: RLUOBEA  
Subject: Rad Lab EA

NNSA Los Alamos Field Office  
CMRR Project Management Office

After the completion of the Rad Lab EA and the decision by NNSA regarding the expansion of pit production a full environmental impact statement should be done addressing issues the EA does not:

The safe handling of beryllium and sufficient funding to prevent potentially serious occupational hazards. Protecting workers matters.

Analysis of Intentional Destructive Acts, such as sabotage and terrorism.

I do not support the expansion of pit production anywhere. It is unnecessary, dangerous and very costly, a terrible waste of our resources. Neither do I support the increased limits of Pu-239 equivalent to 38.6 grams from the designed facility limit of 8.4 grams. It sets up unsafe conditions. We should not be producing new plutonium waste when we do not know how to safely store existing waste. OUR CHILDREN AND FUTURE GENERATIONS DESERVE BETTER.

I am working with members of the U.S. Senate to join the effort to ratify the United Nations Treaty banning nuclear weapons and participate in step by step nuclear disarmament.

Thank you for your attention. MAY A JUST PEACE PREVAIL!

Virginia J. Miller  
Santa Fe NM 87501

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Please refer to Section C.2.2, “General Concerns about Implementing NEPA for the Proposed Action,” of this CRD for NNSA’s response to this comment.

As addressed in Section C.2.4, “General Concerns that the Accident Analysis is Inadequate,” of this CRD, historic operations involving finely divided, respirable beryllium have been a concern with DOE and NNSA and lessons learned from past operations are applied through industrial hygiene programs at LANL. Section 4.1.2.3 of the final EA was revised to clearly communicate that operations that would generate finely divided, respirable beryllium are not within the scope of RLUOB activities. However, RLUOB would provide capabilities to perform chemical analyses of smear samples and air monitoring filters obtained from areas potentially contaminated with beryllium, and to analyze the beryllium content of beryllium-containing or contaminated compounds.

Sections 4.2.1.3 and 4.2.2 of the final EA were revised to address potential intentional destructive acts. Please refer to Section C.2.4, “General Concerns that the Accident Analysis is Inadequate,” of this CRD for additional information.

As discussed in Section 2.1 of the EA, the past change in the allowable quantity of plutonium-239 within a Radiological Laboratory, from 8.4 grams to 38.6 grams, which is out of the scope of the current EA, was a function of an enhanced understanding of radiation dosimetry and revised accident release fractions. That is, the health risk associated with 8.4 grams of plutonium-239 as calculated using the previous dosimetry and accident release fractions, yields the same health risk as 38.6 grams of plutonium-239 as calculated using the updated dosimetry and accident release fractions. As discussed in the Summary and Section 4.3 of the EA, ample offsite treatment or disposal capacity exists for all wastes expected from the Proposed Action. Regarding the concern about pit production, please refer to Section C.2.1, “General Opposition to Pit Production,” of this CRD for additional information.
From: carol benson  
Sent: Saturday, April 28, 2018 1:09:26 AM  
To: RLUOBEA  
Subject:  
n DOE:  

I oppose expansion of DOE’s plutonium production program at Los Alamos National Laboratories (LANL). Increased pu production puts us all in more danger, especially given LANL’s poor safety record. 

Sincerely,  
carol benson 

The Proposed Action evaluated in this EA is to recategorize RLUOB to a MAR-limited Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility and to perform more AC and MC laboratory operations at RLUOB and less at PF-4 than was evaluated in prior NEPA documents. The need for enduring AC and MC capabilities at LANL is independent of the level of pit production. Please refer to Section C.2.1, “General Opposition to Pit Production,” of this CRD for additional information. Please also refer to Section C.2.6, “General Concerns and Opposition to Increased Plutonium Limits at RLUOB due to LANL Safety Issues,” of this CRD for NNSA’s response to your comment about LANL’s safety record.
Commenter No. 8: Maj-Britt L. Eagle

NNSA Los Alamos Field Office
ATTN: CMRR Project Management Office
3714 West Jemez Road
Los Alamos, NM 87544
Via email to RLUOBEA@hq.doe.gov


Dear CMRR Project Management Office:

I am writing to express my concerns over the draft environmental assessment for the Radiological Laboratory Utility and Office Building (AKA “Rad Lab”) at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) states this environmental assessment “is intended to provide sufficient evidence and analysis to determine whether to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) or to issue a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) for the Proposed Action.” NNSA’s proposed action is to raise the operational limit for plutonium-239 to 400 grams (or the equivalent in other isotopes) in the Rad Lab. This would cause the facility to be re-categorized from a “Radial Physics Facility” to a Hazard Category-3 Nuclear Facility. Therefore, NNSA has previously declared that on May 11 it will announce a decision on whether or not the Rad Lab truly needs to be re-categorized as a Hazard Category-3 Nuclear Facility. This draft EA is clearly putting the cart before the horse. Therefore, NNSA should proceed to a fuller environmental impact statement after its May 11 decision.

I believe that after completing a full Rad Lab environmental assessment NNSA should proceed to a full environmental impact statement because:

NNSA has previously declared that on May 11 it will announce a decision on whether or not the Rad Lab truly needs to be re-categorized as a Hazard Category-3 Nuclear Facility. This draft EA is clearly putting the cart before the horse. Therefore, NNSA should proceed to a fuller environmental impact statement after its May 11 decision.

NNSA has previously declared that on May 11 it will announce a decision on whether or not the Rad Lab truly needs to be re-categorized as a Hazard Category-3 Nuclear Facility. This draft EA is clearly putting the cart before the horse. Therefore, NNSA should proceed to a fuller environmental impact statement after its May 11 decision.

In a clear sign of interconnectivity, the Rad Lab’s planned re-categorization into a Hazard Category-3 Nuclear Facility is one of four “subprojects” in NNSA’s FY 2019 budget request under the “Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) Project.” All four subprojects involve relocating analytical chemistry and materials characterization capabilities involving plutonium and other special nuclear materials out of the old, deteriorating Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Building. All together these subprojects will cost two billion taxpayer dollars. NNSA should analyze all four subprojects in one unified environmental impact statement. Conversely, this environmental assessment that analyzes only the narrow question of raising the plutonium limit in the Rad Lab is the segmentation that NEPA forbids.

NNSA argues that this Rad Lab EA is solely about relocating operations from the old deteriorating CMR Building so that LANL will have enduring analytical chemistry and materials characterization capabilities for its ongoing plutonium mission. However, NNSA has not justified how LANL’s present plutonium mission would not be adequately served by the already raised limit of 38.6 grams Pu-239 equivalent for the Rad Lab. Moreover, NNSA has discounted the need for additional safety features based on a “preliminary analysis.” A full EIS should be based on completed, documented analysis.

This proposal to raise the Rad Lab’s limit to 400 grams of Pu-239 equivalent is all about LANL’s future plutonium mission, which is no mystery. That future mission involves expanding production from the currently sanctioned level of 20 pits per year to 80 pits per year by 2027, statutorily required by the FY 2015 National Defense Authorization Act.

Please refer to Sections C.2.1, “General Opposition to Pit Production,” and C.2.3, “General Concerns that the EA Approach Results in Segmentation of the NEPA Process and a Programmatic EIS Is Needed,” of this CRD for NNSA’s response to these subjects. NNSA will determine the appropriate level of NEPA documentation to support the recent announcement regarding recapitalization of plutonium pit production, which includes a proposal for an increased level of pit production at LANL (NNSA 2018), and complete the necessary analyses and RODs prior to proceeding with actions related to increases above currently authorized pit production levels. The need for enduring AC and MC capabilities at LANL is independent of the level of pit production.

NNSA has long recognized the need to transfer AC and MC activities that have historically been performed in the CMR Building to other facilities at LANL. NNSA evaluated such transfers in NEPA documentation issued in 2003 (DOE 2003b), 2011 (DOE 2011c) and 2015 (DOE 2015a). The subprojects in DOE’s fiscal year 2019 budget request were addressed by these prior NEPA documents. As implied by the commenter, the Proposed Action evaluated in this EA includes recategorizing RLUOB to a MAR-limited Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility. The recategorization would increase the amount of plutonium-239 equivalent material from the currently authorized level of 38.6 grams to 400 grams. The current EA builds on this past NEPA documentation and the same types of AC and MC activities would occur as those previously evaluated. The difference is that under the Proposed Action, more AC and MC activities would be performed in RLUOB and fewer in PF-4. As addressed in Section 2.1 of the EA, the Proposed Action would provide a variety of environmental and other benefits such as fewer worker radiation exposures, less waste generation, lower costs, and improved laboratory efficiency.

8-1
Commenter No. 8 (cont'd): Maj-Britt L. Eagle

This is further reinforced by the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Project’s troubled history. Briefly, NNSA has repeatedly sought (but failed) through various NEPA processes to raise the limit on plutonium pit production from that originally set by the 1996 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS). Its Record of Decision relocated the plutonium pit production mission to LANL after a 1989 FBI investigation of environmental crimes at the Rocky Flats Plant abruptly stopped production. It is specifically limited pit production to 20 pits per year because of the deteriorated conditions at the old CMR Building that constrained analytical chemistry and materials characterization operations in support of plutonium pit production.

In 2011 NNSA completed a Supplemental EIS for the CMRR-Nuclear Facility, only to cancel it after its estimated costs soared to $6.9 billion. However, an internal NNSA study had advocated for 22,500 square feet of plutonium lab space in the CMRR-Nuclear Facility, “resulting in a production capacity of 50-80 ppy” (pits per year). This draft Rad Lab EA now seeks to create that same square footage of plutonium lab space, not coincidentally the amount needed to support expanded plutonium pit production. Ironically, future production is not to maintain the safety and reliability of the existing nuclear weapons stockpile. It is instead intended to increase the currently authorized 20 pits per year production level as a reasonably foreseeable future action. In the final EA, the cumulative impacts analysis was revised to reflect an increase from the currently authorized 20 pits per year production level as a reasonably foreseeable future action. However, detailed strategies, production planning, and supportive policies will need to occur to increase the level of pit production. The particular cumulative analysis is more appropriate for future actions requiring a pit production NEPA analysis. NNSA does not have the detailed information as to what is required in terms of planning in order to conduct an accurate non-speculative cumulative impacts analysis from increased operations other than to say that the RLUOB and PF-4 process improvements would result in safer more efficient operations regardless of production level.

8-1 cont’d

8-2

The recent announcement regarding recapitalization of defense plutonium capabilities, which includes a proposal for an increased level of pit production at LANL (NNSA 2018), now makes increased pit production a reasonably foreseeable future action. The draft Rad lab EA lists four “reasonably foreseeable future actions” that could lead to cumulative impacts at LANL. It is striking that expanded plutonium pit production is omitted, since it is not only reasonably foreseeable, but is actually congressionally required and actively planned for. It’s difficult to believe this omission is just a simple oversight, when it is so glaringly obvious, perhaps indicative of an intent to avoid the subject of expanded plutonium pit production altogether. That should be corrected in a fuller environmental impact statement or programmatic EIS.

8-3

• The FY 2019 NNSA budget request states beryllium analysis will be a specific capability under the Proposed Action. Yet there are only two passing references to beryllium in the draft EA, when it is a widely known, potentially severe occupational hazard across the DOE’s nuclear weapons complex. Moreover, a February 2018 DOE Inspector General report found long-standing deficiencies in LANL’s beryllium disease prevention program. Therefore, it is particularly notable that this draft Rad Lab environmental assessment fails to analyze potential beryllium occupational exposures, which a full EIS should correct.

8-4

• In violation of declared DOE NEPA policy, this draft Rad Lab EA fails to have any analysis of Intentional Destructive Acts (defined as acts of sabotage or terrorism, including deliberate airplane crashes). This glaring deficiency should be corrected in a full environmental impact statement.

8-5

• DOE and NNSA should always hyperlink all reference documents in NEPA documents.

In sum, following its May 11 decision on plutonium pit production, NNSA should proceed to a fuller environmental impact statement that analyzes interconnected proposals for relocating analytical chemistry and materials characterization operations at LANL. Should NNSA decide to conduct production at the Savannah River Site, or also at LANL, it should then proceed to a programmatic environmental impact statement that analyzes all aspects of future plutonium pit production.

Sincerely,

Maj-Britt L. Eagle

[Name and general location]

8-2 cont’d

8-8

With respect to the concern about safety features being discounted due to a preliminary analysis, please refer to Section 2.1 of the EA. The analysis was used as part of establishing the 400-gram plutonium-239 limit for RLUOB under the Proposed Action. Future, more detailed, analyses will be conducted to ensure that all required technical and administrative controls would be implemented at RLUOB to maintain worker and public safety.

8-3

As addressed in Section C.2.4, “General Concerns that the Accident Analysis is Inadequate,” of this CRD, historic operations involving finely divided, respirable beryllium have been a concern with DOE and NNSA and lessons learned from past operations are applied through industrial hygiene programs at LANL. Section 4.1.2.3 of the final EA was revised to clearly communicate that operations that would generate finely divided, respirable beryllium are not within the scope of RLUOB activities. However, RLUOB would provide capabilities to perform chemical analyses of smear samples and air monitoring filters obtained from areas potentially contaminated with beryllium, and to analyze the beryllium content of beryllium-containing or contaminated compounds.

8-4

Sections 4.2.1.3 and 4.2.2 of the final EA were revised to address potential intentional destructive acts. Please refer to Section C.2.4, “General Concerns that the Accident Analysis is Inadequate,” of this CRD for additional information.

8-5

NNSA made all references used in the RLUOB EA available electronically on the project’s NEPA website (https://energy.gov/node/2501991). A hyperlink is given for each reference.
Commenter No. 9: Jeanne Green

From: Jeanne Green  
Sent: Saturday, April 14, 2018 10:17:42 PM  
To: RLUOBEA  
Subject: Re: Comments on the Draft Environmental Assessment of Proposed Changes for Analytical Chemistry and Materials Characterization at the Radiological Laboratory/Utility/Office Building, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico

NNSA Los Alamos Field Office

Re: Comments on the Draft Environmental Assessment of Proposed Changes for Analytical Chemistry and Materials Characterization at the Radiological Laboratory/Utility/Office Building, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico

Dear CMRR Project Management Office:

Dear Project Management,

I have serious concerns over the draft environmental assessment for the Radiological Laboratory Utility and Office Building (AKA “Rad Lab”) at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) states this environmental assessment “is intended to provide sufficient evidence and analysis to determine whether to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) or to issue a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) for the Proposed Action.”

NNSA’s proposed action is to raise the operational limit for plutonium-239 to 400 grams (or the equivalent in other isotopes) in the Rad Lab. This would cause the facility to be re-categorized from a “Radiological Facility” to a Hazard Category-3 nuclear facility.

Here is what I have gleaned from the EA document and my responses:

Need: from EA summary “The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has a need for enduring analytical chemistry (AC) and materials characterization (MC) capabilities at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL).” No. The NNSA may have a mandate for AC and MC, but LANL contractors have shown that the Los Alamos site is not capable of accomplishing that mandate at all. No actual plutonium pits

As addressed in Section C.2.1, “General Opposition to Pit Production,” of this CRD, AC and MC capabilities are required independent of the specific level of pit production that takes place at LANL or any other site across the DOE Complex.
have been produced since 2012 when LANL completed a 5-year run of 30 plutonium pits. No actual plutonium pits have been produced since then. This is due to negligence, “criticality” accidents and arrogance on the part of LANL contracting managers who have made production deadlines a priority over safety, putting New Mexicans at risk for the LANS manager’s profits. LANL has proven it is not capable of meeting AC/MC capabilities. The Department of Energy has determined that “Required improvements to the [Nuclear] Criticality Safety Program are moving at an unacceptably slow rate... [and] The number and latency of infractions in the plutonium facility is of concern”, for which LANL received the only “red grade” in nuclear criticality safety in the entire DOE nuclear weapons complex in the 2016 report of the Department of Energy to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB)

- Most of all, the need for expanded plutonium pit production has not been publicly and firmly established, instead of vaguely being for speculative future new nuclear weapons designs that aren’t needed and may actually degrade national security because they can’t be full-scale tested. With approximately 20,000 available and “usable” surplus “pits” that are viable for a century, where has the need for more pits been established? Certainly not in this EA, nor in the EIS for the CMRR-NF. Even the notion of “deterrence” has proved wrong since wars in Vietnam, Korea, Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Somalia, Yemen and others have occurred undeterred, with the U.S. still bombing 7 to 9 nations.

- Los Alamos is the second wealthiest county per capita in the nation, while poverty rates in New Mexico are at the bottom of the scale. Monetary benefits from creating weapons of mass destruction do not trickle down to New Mexicans. Such riches accrue as a reward for a product that must never be used, since nuclear winter in the wake of nuclear war would very likely eradicate life on earth.
Commenter No. 9 (cont’d): Jeanne Green

• Starting in 2016, NNSA has already spent $2 million in the process to re-categorize the Rad Lab. However, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires that federal officials conduct public review and comment before reaching a decision to commit “irretrievable resources” (such as taxpayer funding) to a proposed project. Hence conducting an environmental assessment (EA) after the fact arguably violates the law.

• NEPA also prohibits the “segmentation” of issues and requires that all “connected” actions be included in the same public review. This environmental assessment (EA) to raise the plutonium limit in the Rad Lab should not be a standalone document, but instead be part of a far broader programmatic environmental impact statement on expanded plutonium pit production.

• Department of Energy’s 1996 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Programmatic Environmental Statement resulted in a formal Record of Decision to relocate plutonium pit production at the Los Alamos Lab. However, that decision specifically limited pit production at LANL to 20 pits per year because of the dangerous, deteriorating conditions at the old CMR Building, which the RLUOB Lab was to partially replace. The Trump Administration’s Nuclear Posture Review requires NNSA to “Provide the enduring capability and capacity to produce plutonium pits at a rate of no fewer than 80 pits per year by 2030." But the 1996 ceiling of 20 pits per year has never been officially raised following NEPA review, despite numerous NNSA attempts to do so.

• The Rad Lab itself has increased from original actual costs of $400 million to build and equip to a total estimated cost of $1.4 billion to raise the plutonium limit and install additional equipment by 2026 for expanded plutonium pit production.

• Energy.gov NEPA, EA-2052: Proposed Changes for Analytical Chemistry and Materials Characterization at the Radiological Laboratory/Utility/Office Building, Los Alamos National Labo-

9-2 The NEPA process is intended to help Federal officials identify reasonable alternatives and make informed decisions that are based on an understanding of environmental consequences of those alternatives. In selecting and implementing an alternative, the government is to take actions that protect, restore, and enhance the environment. The government needs to have a proposal and enough information to conduct a meaningful NEPA analysis. Thus, some work is required prior to kicking off NEPA so that reasonable alternatives and impacts may be identified and analyzed. Please refer to Section C.2.2, “General Concerns about Implementing NEPA for the Proposed Action,” of this CRD for additional information.

9-3 The need for enduring AC and MC capabilities at LANL is independent of the level of pit production. AC and MC capabilities are required whether or not pit production takes place at LANL or any other site across the DOE Complex. The Proposed Action would result in a safer work environment and more efficient process. Please refer to Section C.2.3, “General Concerns that the EA Approach Results in Segmentation of the NEPA Process and a Programmatic EIS Is Needed,” of this CRD for NNSA’s response to this comment.

9-4 Production of over 20 certified pits at LANL will undergo a separate NEPA process at the appropriate time. This project is independent of the level of pit production. Please refer to Sections C.2.1, “General Opposition to Pit Production,” of this CRD for NNSA’s response to your concerns about pit production. The need for enduring AC and MC capability is independent of the level of pit production at LANL or any other site in the DOE Complex.

9-5 Section 2.1, Changes to the CMRR Project, of the EA addresses the development of DOE and NNSA plans for ensuring the National requirement for enduring AC and MC capabilities, including the use of RLUOB to provide some of these required capabilities.
Commenter No. 9 (cont’d): Jeanne Green

As indicated in Section 2.3.1 of the EA, the RLUOB facility was built to robust seismic standards. The RLUOB structure and equipment anchorages in radiological spaces meet the requirements for seismic Performance Category (PC)-2 as provided in DOE standard DOE STD 1020-2002, Natural Phenomena Hazards Design and Evaluation Criteria for Department of Energy Facilities (DOE 2002), while the remainder of the facility meets the requirements of seismic PC-1 (LANL 2011).

The RLUOB was built to PC-2 requirements that follow the 2003 version of the International Building Code (IBC) and the codes that it invoked. By invoking PC-2, the design seismic loads were increased by 50 percent over PC-1 through the requirement that the Importance Factor (I) be 1.5.

For a facility built to the standards of RLUOB, the design of the structure, systems, and components should ensure the operability of essential facilities and/or to prevent physical injury to in-facility workers. The structures, systems, and components should also result in limited structural damage from design-basis natural phenomena events (such as an earthquake) to ensure minimal interruption of facility operation and repair following such an event.

For a new Hazard Category 3 nuclear facility, DOE-Standard 1020-2012 instructs the reader to follow DOE-Standard 1189-2008, Appendix A, for establishing the seismic design category (SDC) requirement. From Table A.1 of DOE-STD-1189-2008, when collocated worker doses are less than 5 rem, the seismic requirement is SDC-1. All of the MAR limits are set to meet this limit; therefore, SDC-1 is the seismic requirement. In simple terms, SDC-1 is the equivalent of PC-1 and SDC-2 is the equivalent of PC-2. SDC-1 requires an Importance Factor of 1.0 versus an Importance Factor of 1.5 as required for SDC-2. The standards are thus different but they are less stringent than those applied to the RLUOB design.

Although the current version of the IBC (2015) has increased seismic requirements over the 2003 version and the ground motion for the design basis earthquake at LANL has increased, the overall increases in loads at the SDC-1 level are still less than the seismic loads that RLUOB was designed for. Thus, the RLUOB meets the current seismic requirements of SDC-1.
Commenter No. 9 (cont’d): Jeanne Green

exposed offsite individual.” Id., p. D-8” The results of the 2009 updated analysis were reviewed and accepted by an external review panel, DOE, and the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB). These ground accelerations were based on the latest geologic data, including that published in Lewis et al.(2009). Expected maximum magnitudes for the various rupture scenarios of the Pajarito fault system range from M 6.5 to 7.3. The 2009 updated study refined the estimate for the dominant earthquake, determining that a range in magnitude of M 6.0 to M 7.0 was appropriate at close distances (LANL 2009c:3-8). https://nnsa.energy.gov/aboutus/ouroperations/generalcounsel/nepaoverview/nepa/spdsupplemental/final-spd-supplemental-e-i

- EA: “Ample offsite treatment or disposal capacity exists for all wastes.” This statement is untrue. Due to the WIPP “kitty litter” accident caused by LANL and costing over a billion dollars is now operating at well below its original capacity and will never be a permanent disposal facility. It was/is a “pilot project”, never meant to be the permanent disposal option. Fracking is happening nearby to WIPP, making possible water infiltration a reality. This is an extremely dangerous situation that is not being addressed. Yucca Mountain has been shown repeatedly not to be a viable location for permanent disposal. Above ground interim storage (parking lot dumps) are not true, terrorist-safe alternatives for disposal. No permanent disposal option for these toxic wastes has been established after 75 years of toxic waste production.

- EA: “Under both alternatives, radioactive emissions to the air from AC and MC operations would result in no disproportionately high and adverse effects on minorities or low-income populations within 50 miles of RLUOB or PF-4. Annual radiation doses to an individual hypothetically located at the nearest boundary of the Pueblo de San Ildefonso or Santa Clara

Although seismic standards have evolved since the construction of RLUOB, the seismic requirements for a Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility like RLUOB are less than the seismic loads for which RLUOB was designed. RLUOB meets the current DOE seismic requirements. Nonetheless, the Seismic-Induced Spill and Fire accident scenario evaluated in the current EA does not take credit for the robust building structure. Rather, it is assumed that 10 percent of the radioactive material that becomes airborne from the accident would reach the atmosphere through cracks in the building or building rubble. As discussed in this EA, these assumptions are quite conservative.

As illustrated in Tables 14 and 15 of the EA, the realistic impacts to an onsite noninvolved worker (0.000063 rem) from a seismically induced spill and fire from the full 400 grams inventory of plutonium, assumed to be oxide powder, are far below the 5 rem requirements of DOE-STD-1189-2008. Even with unrealistic, non-physical, bounding assumptions such as all material is released from containers, all material is in the form of oxide powder, all material that becomes airborne is released from the laboratory area of RLUOB to the outside environment, the impacts to the non-involved or co-located worker are several orders of magnitude below the standard.

The EA statement in question is correct. WIPP has resumed operations and NNSA expects its continued availability for a safe disposal configuration for transuranic waste generated from the Proposed Action. Because the Proposed Action would not generate high-level radioactive waste or spent nuclear fuel, the availability of Yucca Mountain as a disposal location is not relevant to the EA. Considerable disposal capacity exists for all other types of waste expected under the Proposed Action.
Commenter No. 9 (cont’d): Jeanne Green

Pueblo would be smaller than the doses calculated for the MEI, who would be located much closer to RLUOB or PF-4 than the pueblo boundaries. Thus, there would be no disproportionately high and adverse effects on the hypothetical maximally exposed Native American individuals. This statement ignores the impacts of fire to these facilities and contaminated LANL properties. After the Cerro Grande fire, San Ildefonso officials were told not to let their tribal members gather and burn firewood from San Ildefonso trees, since lethal contamination could result. Firewood is the only heat source for many tribal members. Using these numerical formulas for calculating risks to locals nearby denies the facts on the ground of contamination through air, smoke, waterways, rain, soil and vegetation, particularly garden food. The cancer rates of Native populations near LANL are disproportionately high and adverse effects cannot be denied or reduced to a mathematical formula. Human beings lives are at stake here, not just numbers on paper.

• EA: “The actions evaluated in this EA would produce little or no impacts and would generally produce fewer impacts than AC and MC operations in the old CMR Building. Therefore, the actions evaluated in this EA would not substantially contribute to cumulative impacts.” My understanding is that the old CMR building is contaminated and no longer suitable for plutonium operations and that pit production has been moved to the PF-4. To say there would be fewer impacts compared with hypothetically continuing operations at the old unsuitable CMR building is a dishonest argument. The old CMR building needs to be decommissioned.

• EA: “An inventory limit exceeding 400 grams PuE would likely require additional administrative and physical controls to preclude the potential for a nuclear criticality accident, as well as additional safety equipment such as nuclear criticality alarm systems. A preliminary analysis indicates that, with an inventory limit of 400 grams PuE, none of the current safety systems, such as building ventilation, would require designation.

9-8  Please refer to Section C.2.5, “General Concerns that the Environmental Justice Impacts Analysis is Inadequate,” of this CRD for NNSA’s response to this comment.

9-9  Please refer to Section C.2.5, “General Concerns that the Environmental Justice Impacts Analysis is Inadequate,” of this CRD for NNSA’s response to this comment.

9-10 NNSA plans to decommission the CMR building but this action is independent of the Proposed Action evaluated in the EA. Potential impacts from decommissioning the CMR building were addressed in the CMRR EIS (DOE 2003b) and the CMRR-NF SEIS (DOE 2011c). The EA has been modified to include a cumulative impacts statement without reference to the CMR Building.
Commenter No. 9 (cont’d): Jeanne Green

as safety class or safety significant to meet DOE requirements (LANL 2018).” What about all of the near-criticality events at PF-4? Many, many times there were events during which too much plutonium was too close together, excess plutonium found where it shouldn’t be, leaking gloveboxes, and excessive amounts of plutonium missing. With history as a measure, the allowed 400 grams will somehow become more than that with none of the requirements in place for a greater amount. “Such systems would be subject to more stringent requirements for construction, inspection, and maintenance.” (EA)

• An EA is inadequate for assessing all of the safety risks involved for expanded pit production from cradle to grave. When considering the risks to the environment and the public related to creating materials intended for nuclear weapons of mass destruction, our government owes it to the taxpayers who are paying for it, to conduct a complete EIS before proceeding. I request that a full EIS be conducted in order to determine the full cost and extent of the further impacts associated with the creation of more deadly plutonium.

I believe that after completing a final Rad Lab environmental assessment NNSA should proceed to a full environmental impact statement because:

• NNSA has previously declared that on May 11 it will announce a decision on where future expanded plutonium pit production will take place, either at LANL or the Savannah River Site in South Carolina, or both. It is silly that this draft environmental assessment is underway just before that crucial decision, without which it can’t really be determined whether or not the Rad Lab truly needs to be re-categorized as a Hazard Category-3 Nuclear Facility. This draft EA is clearly putting the cart before the horse. Therefore, NNSA should proceed to a fuller environmental impact statement after its May 11 decision.

• NNSA is conducting this Rad Lab environmental assessment pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),

9-11 NNSA considers any incidents involving special nuclear material (including plutonium) as very serious matters and takes actions intended to prevent them from recurring. As a part of the Integrated Safety Management systems at LANL, the safety lessons learned from concerns at PF-4, including those involving plutonium, are applied to operations at RLUOB. Those lessons learned are used in developing the engineering and administrative controls that are implemented at RLUOB. NNSA is confident that the controls developed for handling the laboratory quantities of special nuclear material in RLUOB will maintain the building inventory within the proposed 400 gram plutonium-239-equivalent limit.

9-12 As discussed in Section C.2.1, General Opposition to Pit Production of the CRD, the need for enduring AC and MC capability is independent of the level of pit production at LANL or at any other site across the DOE Complex. The Proposed Action would provide a variety of environmental and other benefits such as fewer worker radiation exposures, less waste generation, lower costs, and improved laboratory efficiency.

9-13 Please refer to Chapter 1, Section 1.0, which defines the Proposed Action as the recategorization of RLUOB to a Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility in order to maximize the use of RLUOB laboratory space for AC and MC operations and reduce the amount of space required in the existing PF-4 for these operations. NNSA evaluated the relocation of operations from the CMR Building to other LANL facilities in NEPA documentation issued in 2003, 2011, and 2015 (DOE 2003b, 2011c, 2015a). Please refer to Sections C.2.2, “General Concerns about Implementing NEPA for the Proposed Action,” and C.2.3, “General Concerns that the EA Approach Results in Segmentation of the NEPA Process and a Programmatic
In a clear sign of interconnectivity, theRad Lab’s planned re-categorization into a Hazard Category-3 nuclear facility is one of four “sub-projects” in the NNSA’s FY 2019 budget request under the “Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) Project.” All four subprojects involve relocating analytical chemistry and materials characterization capabilities involving plutonium and other special nuclear materials out of the old, deteriorating Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Building. All together these subprojects will cost 2 billion taxpayer dollars. NNSA should analyze all four subprojects in one unified environmental impact statement. Conversely, this environmental assessment that analyzes only the narrow question of raising the plutonium limit in the Rad Lab is the segmentation that NEPA forbids.

NNSA argues that this Rad Lab EA is solely about relocating operations from the old deteriorating CMR Building so that LANL will have enduring analytical chemistry and materials characterization capabilities for its ongoing plutonium mission. However, NNSA has not justified how LANL’s present plutonium mission would not be adequately served by the already raised limit of 38.6 grams Pu-239 equivalent (up from the original 8.4 grams) for the Rad Lab. Instead, this proposal to now raise the Pu-239 equivalent to 400 grams is all about LANL’s future plutonium mission, over which there is no mystery. That future mission involves expanding production from the currently sanctioned level of 20 pits per year to 80 pits per year by 2027, statutorily required by the FY 2015 National Defense Authorization Act.

This is further reinforced by the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Project’s troubled history. Briefly, NNSA has repeatedly sought (but failed) through various NEPA processes to raise the limit on plutonium pit production from that originally set by the 1996 Stockpile Stewardship and Manage-
Commenter No. 9 (cont’d): Jeanne Green

The draft Rad Lab EA now seeks to create that same square footage of plutonium lab space, not coincidentally the amount needed to support expanded plutonium pit production. Ironically, future production is not to maintain the safety and reliability of the existing nuclear weapons stockpile. It is instead for speculative future “Interoperable Warheads” for both land and submarine-launched missiles that the Navy doesn’t even want. The point is that the mission of future plutonium pit production needs critical examination because the re-categorization of the Rad Lab to a nuclear facility is arguably not even needed.

• Should NNSA decide on May 11 to conduct future plutonium pit production at the Savannah River Site, or perhaps also at LANL, then clearly a new or supplemental programmatic environmental impact statement (PEIS) is needed. Moreover, any decision to expand plutonium pit production above the current limit of 20 pits per year would require a new or supplemental PEIS, regardless of future location(s).

• The draft Rad Lab EA lists four “reasonably foreseeable future actions” that could lead to cumulative impacts at LANL. It is striking that expanded plutonium pit production is omitted, since it is not only reasonably foreseeable, but is actually congressionally required and actively planned for. It’s difficult to believe this omission is just a simple oversight, when it is so
Commenter No. 9 (cont’d): Jeanne Green

- The FY 2019 NNSA budget request states beryllium analysis will be a specific capability under the Proposed Action. Yet there are only two passing references to beryllium in the draft EA, when it is a widely known, potentially severe occupational hazard across the DOE’s nuclear weapons complex. Moreover, a February 2018 DOE Inspector General report found long-standing deficiencies in LANL’s beryllium disease prevention program. Therefore, it is particularly notable that this draft Rad Lab environmental assessment fails to analyze potential beryllium occupational exposures, which a full EIS should correct.

- In violation of declared DOE NEPA policy, this draft Rad Lab EA fails to have any analysis of Intentional Destructive Acts (defined as acts of sabotage or terrorism, including deliberate airplane crashes). This glaring deficiency should be corrected in a full environmental impact statement.

- DOE and NNSA should always hyperlink all reference documents in all NEPA documents.

Following its May 11 decision on plutonium pit production, NNSA should proceed to a fuller environmental impact statement that analyzes interconnected proposals for relocating analytical chemistry and materials characterization operations at LANL. Should NNSA decide to conduct production at the Savannah River Site, or also at LANL, it should then proceed to a programmatic environmental impact statement (EIS) that analyzes all aspects of future plutonium pit production. This EA is not well thought out.

The PF-4 is not able to handle plutonium safely. Why do you think the Radlab Utility & Office building will be able to handle plutonium safely?

Action. In this final EA, the cumulative impacts analysis was revised to reflect a potential increase from the currently authorized 20 pits per year production level as a reasonably foreseeable future action. However, detailed strategies, production planning, and supportive politics, as well as appropriations, will need to occur to increase the level of pit production. This particular cumulative analysis is more appropriate for future actions requiring a pit production NEPA analysis. NNSA does not have the detailed information as to what is required in terms of planning in order to conduct an accurate non-speculative cumulative impacts analysis from increased operations other than to say that the RLUOB and PF-4 process improvements would result in safer more efficient operations regardless of production level.

As addressed in Section C.2.4, “General Concerns that the Accident Analysis is Inadequate,” of this CRD, historic operations involving finely divided, respirable beryllium have been a concern with DOE and NNSA and lessons learned from past operations are applied through industrial hygiene programs at LANL. Section 4.1.2.3 of the final EA was revised to clearly communicate that operations that would generate finely divided, respirable beryllium are not within the scope of RLUOB activities. However, RLUOB would provide capabilities to perform chemical analyses of smear samples and air monitoring filters obtained from areas potentially contaminated with beryllium, and to analyze the beryllium content of beryllium-containing or contaminated compounds.

Sections 4.2.1.3 and 4.2.2 of the final EA were revised to address potential intentional destructive acts. Please refer to Section C.2.4, “General Concerns that the Accident Analysis is Inadequate,” of this CRD for additional information.

NNSA made all references used in the RLUOB EA available electronically on the project’s NEPA website (https://energy.gov/node/2501991). A hyperlink is given for each reference.

Please refer to Section C.2.6, “General Concerns and Opposition to Increased Plutonium Limits at RLUOB due to LANL Safety Issues,” of this CRD for NNSA’s response to your concerns about the LANL safety record.
Commenter No. 9 (cont’d): Jeanne Green

Documented in a 2017 multi-part series from the Center for Public Integrity; LANL criticality events include:

1. In March 2011, in violation of nuclear material handing protocols, a manager placed an amount of nuclear material in a glovebox that exceeded the criticality limit of the box; and

2. In August 2011, technicians, seeking a photo-op, in violation of nuclear material handling protocols, placed eight rods of plutonium in close proximity to each other – several more rods would have triggered a deadly nuclear chain reaction;

3. A 2013 LANL study found that glovebox leaks in PF-4 (plutonium production facility) occurred roughly three times a month, costing $23,000 each to clean up, and often the result of avoidable errors;

4. In December 2013, LANL sent a drum containing radioactive material to the WIPP storage facility near Carlsbad that ruptured inside the facility – a result of improper mixing of ingredients – costing the government $1.5 billion to “clean up”.

5. In May 2016, a trolley used to carry nuclear materials in a facility at LANL fell from the ceiling and crashed into a glovebox, which was fortunately empty and not in use;

6. The DOE annual report to the DNFSB, released in February 2017, found that LANL was the only nuclear production site whose performance did not meet expectations in the functional area of criticality safety expectations;

7. The April 19th, 2017 fire incident at PF-4, where 4 metric tons of plutonium are also stored, highlighted, once again, a pattern of consistent mismanagement in the maintenance and cleanup of some of the most dangerous materials on Earth. This pattern of problems also has prompted the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board to question whether the facility should continue to operate and handle increasing quantities of plutonium in coming years. The Board questions the lab’s ability to safely carry out future nuclear missions at PF-4.
8. In July 2017, a LANL employee sent “special nuclear material” across the country by air by FED-EX in direct violation of nuclear safety standards; and

9. In August 2017, two further incidents of mishandling of plutonium metals occurred, one of which was acknowledged as a ‘criticality safety event’.

Sincerely,
Jeanne Green
Arroyo Hondo, NM 87513

Response side of this page intentionally left blank.
Commenter No. 10: Judith Bronner

From: Judith Bronner  
Sent: Monday, April 16, 2018 9:47:55 PM  
To: RLUOBEA  
Subject: Comments on DEA of Proposed Changes for Analytical Chemistry ...at the Rad Lab

NNSA Los Alamos Field Office  
April, 16, 2018  
ATTN: CMRR Project Management Office  
3747 West Jemez Road  
Los Alamos, NM 87544

Via email to RLUOBEA@hq.doe.gov

Re: Comments on the Draft Environmental Assessment of Proposed Changes for Analytical Chemistry and Materials Characterization at the Radiological Laboratory/Utility/Office Building, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico

Dear CMRR Project Management Office:

I am writing to express my concerns over the draft environmental assessment for the Radiological Laboratory Utility and Office Building (AKA “Rad Lab”) at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) states this environmental assessment “is intended to provide sufficient evidence and analysis to determine whether to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) or to issue a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) for the Proposed Action.” NNSA’s proposed action is to raise the operational limit for plutonium-239 to 400 grams (or the equivalent in other isotopes) in the Rad Lab. This would cause the facility to be re-categorized from a “Radiological Facility” to a Hazard Category-3 nuclear facility.

I believe that after completing a final Rad Lab environmental assessment NNSA should proceed to a full environmental impact statement because:

Please refer to Chapter 1, Section 1.0, which defines the Proposed Action as the recategorization of RLUOB to a Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility in order to maximize the use of RLUOB laboratory space for AC and MC operations and reduce the amount of space required in the existing PF-4 for these operations. NNSA evaluated the relocation of operations from the CMR Building to other
Commenter No. 10 (cont’d): Judith Bronner

- NNSA has previously declared that on May 11 it will announce a decision on where future expanded plutonium pit production will take place, either at LANL or the Savannah River Site in South Carolina, or both. It is silly that this draft environmental assessment is underway just before that crucial decision, without which it can’t really be determined whether or not the Rad Lab truly needs to be re-categorized as a Hazard Category-3 Nuclear Facility. This draft EA is clearly putting the cart before the horse. Therefore, NNSA should proceed to a fuller environmental impact statement after its May 11 decision.

- NNSA is conducting this Rad Lab environmental assessment pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), which requires the opportunity for the public to comment on major federal proposals. NEPA also requires that interconnected actions be considered together, and forbids segmentation into different narrow projects.

In a clear sign of interconnectivity, the Rad Lab’s planned re-categorization into a Hazard Category-3 nuclear facility is one of four “sub-projects” in the NNSA’s FY 2019 budget request under the “Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) Project.” All four subprojects involve relocating analytical chemistry and materials characterization capabilities involving plutonium and other special nuclear materials out of the old, deteriorating Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Building. All together these subprojects will cost 2 billion taxpayer dollars. NNSA should analyze all four subprojects in one unified environmental impact statement. Conversely, this environmental assessment that analyzes only the narrow question of raising the plutonium limit in the Rad Lab is the segmentation that NEPA forbids.

- NNSA argues that this Rad Lab EA is solely about relocating operations from the old deteriorating CMR Building so that LANL will have enduring analytical chemistry and materials characterization capabilities for its ongoing plutonium mission. However, NNSA has not justified how LANL’s present LANL facilities in NEPA documentation issued in 2003, 2011, and 2015 (DOE 2003b, 2011c, 2015a). Please refer to Sections C.2.2, “General Concerns about Implementing NEPA for the Proposed Action,” and C.2.3, “General Concerns that the EA Approach Results in Segmentation of the NEPA Process and a Programmatic EIS Is Needed,” of this CRD for NNSA’s response on these subjects. NNSA will determine the appropriate level of NEPA documentation to support the recent announcement regarding recapitalization of plutonium pit production, which includes a proposal for an increased level of pit production at LANL (NNSA 2018), and complete the necessary analyses and RODs prior to proceeding with actions related to increases above currently authorized pit production levels. The need for enduring AC and MC capabilities at LANL is independent of the level of pit production.

NNSA has long recognized the need to transfer AC and MC activities that have historically been performed in the CMR Building to other facilities at LANL. The subprojects in DOE’s fiscal year 2019 budget request were addressed by prior NEPA documents issued in 2003, 2011, and 2015 (DOE 2003b, 2011c, 2015a). As implied by the commenter, the Proposed Action evaluated in this EA includes re-categorizing RLUOB to a MAR-limited Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility. The re-categorization would increase the amount of plutonium-239 equivalent material from the currently authorized level of 38.6 grams to 400 grams. The current EA builds on this past NEPA documentation and the same types of AC and MC activities would occur under the Proposed Action, as well as the No Action, as those previously evaluated. The difference is that under the Proposed Action evaluated in this EA, more AC and MC activities would be performed in RLUOB and fewer in PF-4. As addressed in Section 2.1 of the EA, the Proposed Action would provide a variety of environmental and other benefits such as fewer worker radiation exposures, less waste generation, lower costs, and improved laboratory efficiency.

With respect to the concern about safety features being discounted due to a preliminary analysis, please refer to Section 2.1 of the EA. The analysis was used as part of establishing the 400-gram plutonium-239 limit for RLUOB under the Proposed Action. Future, more detailed, analyses will be conducted to ensure that all required technical and administrative controls would be implemented at RLUOB to maintain worker and public safety.
Commenter No. 10 (cont’d): Judith Bronner

plutonium mission would not be adequately served by the already raised limit of 38.6 grams Pu-239 equivalent (up from the original 8.4 grams) for the Rad Lab. Instead, this proposal to now raise the Pu-239 equivalent to 400 grams is all about LANL’s future plutonium mission, over which there is no mystery. That future mission involves expanding production from the currently sanctioned level of 20 pits per year to 80 pits per year by 2027, statutorily required by the FY 2015 National Defense Authorization Act.

• This is further reinforced by the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Project’s troubled history. Briefly, NNSA has repeatedly sought (but failed) through various NEPA processes to raise the limit on plutonium pit production from that originally set by the 1996 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS). Its Record of Decision relocated the plutonium pit production mission to LANL after a 1989 FBI investigating environmental crimes at the Rocky Flats Plant abruptly stopped production. It specifically limited pit production to 20 pits per year because of the deteriorated conditions at the old CMR Building that constrained analytical chemistry and materials characterization operations in support of plutonium pit production.

In 2011 NNSA completed a Supplemental EIS for the CMRR-Nuclear Facility, only to cancel it after its estimated costs soared to $6.5 billion. However, an internal NNSA study had advocated for 22,500 square feet of plutonium lab space in the CMRR-Nuclear Facility, “resulting in a production capacity of 50-80 ppy” (pits per year). This draft Rad Lab EA now seeks to create that same square footage of plutonium lab space, not coincidentally the amount needed to support expanded plutonium pit production. Ironically, future production is not to maintain the safety and reliability of the existing nuclear weapons stockpile. It is instead for speculative future “Interoperable Warheads” for both land and submarine-launched missiles that the Navy doesn’t even want. The point is that the mission of future plutonium pit pro-
Commenter No. 10 (cont'd): Judith Bronner

Production needs critical examination because the re-categorization of the Rad Lab to a nuclear facility is arguably not even needed.

- Should NNSA decide on May 11 to conduct future plutonium pit production at the Savannah River Site, or perhaps also at LANL, then clearly a new or supplemental programmatic environmental impact statement (PEIS) is needed. Moreover, any decision to expand plutonium pit production above the current limit of 20 pits per year would require a new or supplemental PEIS, regardless of future location(s).

- The draft Rad lab EA lists four “reasonably foreseeable future actions” that could lead to cumulative impacts at LANL. It is striking that expanded plutonium pit production is omitted, since it is not only reasonably foreseeable, but is actually congressionally required and actively planned for. It’s difficult to believe this omission is just a simple oversight, when it is so glaringly obvious, perhaps indicative of an intent to avoid the subject of expanded plutonium pit production altogether. That should be corrected in a fuller environmental impact statement or programmatic EIS.

- The FY 2019 NNSA budget request states beryllium analysis will be a specific capability under the Proposed Action. Yet there are only two passing references to beryllium in the draft EA, when it is a widely known, potentially severe occupational hazard across the DOE’s nuclear weapons complex. Moreover, a February 2018 DOE Inspector General report found longstanding deficiencies in LANL’s beryllium disease prevention program. Therefore, it is particularly notable that this draft Rad Lab environmental assessment fails to analyze potential beryllium occupational exposures, which a full EIS should correct.

- In violation of declared DOE NEPA policy, this draft Rad Lab EA fails to have any analysis of Intentional Destructive Acts (defined as acts of sabotage or terrorism, including deliberate airplane crashes). This glaring deficiency should be corrected in a full environmental impact statement.

The recent announcement regarding recapitalization of defense plutonium capabilities, which includes a proposal for an increased level of pit production at LANL (NNSA 2018), now makes increased pit production a reasonably foreseeable action. In this final EA, the cumulative impacts analysis was revised to reflect a potential increase from the currently authorized 20 pits per year production level as a reasonably foreseeable future action. However, detailed strategies, production planning, and supportive politics, as well as appropriations, will need to occur to increase the level of pit production. This particular cumulative analysis is more appropriate for future actions requiring a pit production NEPA analysis. NNSA does not have the detailed information as to what is required in terms of planning in order to conduct an accurate non-speculative cumulative impacts analysis from increased operations other than to say that the RLUOB and PF-4 process improvements would result in safer more efficient operations regardless of production level.

As addressed in Section C.2.4, “General Concerns that the Accident Analysis is Inadequate,” of this CRD, historic operations involving finely divided, respirable beryllium have been a concern with DOE and NNSA and lessons learned from past operations are applied through Industrial Hygiene programs at LANL. Section 4.1.2.3 of the final EA was revised to clearly communicate that operations that would generate finely divided, respirable beryllium are not within the scope of RLUOB activities. However, RLUOB would provide capabilities to perform chemical analyses of smear samples and air monitoring filters obtained from areas potentially contaminated with beryllium, and to analyze the beryllium content of beryllium-containing or contaminated compounds.

Sections 4.2.1.3 and 4.2.2 of the final EA were revised to address potential intentional destructive acts. Please refer to Section C.2.4, “General Concerns that the Accident Analysis is Inadequate,” of this CRD for additional information.
Commenter No. 10 (cont’d): Judith Bronner

- DOE and NNSA should always hyperlink all reference documents in all NEPA documents.

In sum, following its May 11 decision on plutonium pit production, NNSA should proceed to a fuller environmental impact statement that analyzes interconnected proposals for relocating analytical chemistry and materials characterization operations at LANL. Should NNSA decide to conduct production at the Savannah River Site, or also at LANL, it should then proceed to a programmatic environmental impact statement (EIS) that analyses all aspects of future plutonium pit production.

Sincerely, Judith Bronner,
Taos, New Mexico

NNSA made all references used in the RLUOB EA available electronically on the project’s NEPA website (https://energy.gov/node/2501991). A hyperlink is given for each reference.
Commenter No. 11: Jean Nichols

NNSA Los Alamos Field Office
ATTN: CMRR Project Management Office
3747 West Jemez Road
Los Alamos, NM 87544
April 16, 2018

Re: Comments on the Draft Environmental Assessment of Proposed Changes for Analytical Chemistry and Materials Characterization at the Radiological Laboratory/Utility/Office Building, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico

Dear CMRR Project Management Office:

I am writing to express concerns over the draft environmental assessment for the Radiological Laboratory Utility and Office Building (AKA “Rad Lab”) at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) states this environmental assessment “is intended to provide sufficient evidence and analysis to determine whether to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) or to issue a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) for the Proposed Action.” NNSA’s proposed action is to raise the operational limit for plutonium-239 to 400 grams (or the equivalent in other isotopes) in the Rad Lab. This would cause the facility to be re-categorized from a “Radiological Facility” to a Hazard Category 3 nuclear facility. Clearly this will have significant impact.

After completing a final Rad Lab environmental assessment, NNSA should proceed to a full environmental impact statement for the following reasons:

- NNSA has declared that on May 11 it will announce a decision on where future expanded plutonium pit production will take place, either at LANL or the Savannah River Site in South Carolina, or both. It is inappropriate to put forward this draft environmental assessment just before that crucial decision. This draft EA is clearly putting the cart before the horse. NNSA should wait and proceed to a fuller environmental impact statement after its May 11 decision.

- NNSA is conducting this Rad Lab environmental assessment pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), which requires the opportunity for the public to comment on major federal proposals. NEPA also requires that interconnected actions be considered together, and fords segmentation into different narrow projects. The Rad Lab’s planned re-categorization into a Hazard Category-3 nuclear facility is one of four “subprojects” in the NNSA’s FY 2019 budget request under the “Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) Project.” These are interconnected actions and must be considered together. All four subprojects involve relocating analytical chemistry and materials characterization capabilities involving plutonium and other special nuclear materials out of the old, deteriorating Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Building. These subprojects are projected to cost 2 billion taxpayer dollars. NNSA needs to analyze all four subprojects in one unified environmental impact statement. This EA that analyzes only the narrow issue of raising the plutonium limit in the Rad Lab is the segmentation that NEPA forbids.

- NNSA argues that this Rad Lab EA is solely about relocating operations from the old deteriorating CMR Building so that LANL will have enduring analytical chemistry and materials characterization capabilities for its ongoing plutonium mission. However, NNSA has not justified how LANL’s present plutonium mission would not be adequately served by the already raised limit of 38.6 grams Pu-239 equivalent (up from the original 8.4 grams) for the Rad Lab. Instead, this proposal to now raise the Pu-239 equivalent to 400 grams is all about LANL’s future plutonium mission of expanding production from the currently sanctioned level of 30 pits per year to 80 pits per year by 2027. Meanwhile none of the promised cleanup at LANL has been done.

Please refer to Chapter 1, Section 1.0, which defines the Proposed Action as the recategorization of RLUOB to a Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility in order to maximize the use of RLUOB laboratory space for AC and MC operations and reduce the amount of space required in the existing PF-4 for these operations. NNSA evaluated the relocation of operations from the CMR Building to other LANL facilities in NEPA documentation issued in 2003, 2011, and 2015 (DOE 2003b, 2011c, 2015a). Please refer to Sections C.2.1, “General Opposition to Pit Production,” and C.2.3, “General Concerns that the EA Approach Results in Segmentation of the NEPA Process and a Programmatic EIS Is Needed,” of this CRD for NNSA’s response to your concerns about pit production and possible NEPA
Commenter No. 11 (cont’d): Jean Nichols

- The Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Project has had a troubled history. Briefly, NNSA has repeatedly sought (and failed) through various NEPA processes to raise the limit on plutonium pit production from that originally set by the 1996 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS). Its Record of Decision relocated the plutonium pit production mission to LANL after a 1989 FBI investigating environmental crimes at the Rocky Flats Plant abruptly stopped production. It specifically limited pit production to 30 pits per year because of the deteriorated conditions at the old CMR building that constrained analytical chemistry and materials characterization operations in support of plutonium pit production. In 2011 NNSA completed a Supplemental EIS for the CMRR-Nuclear Facility, only to cancel it after its estimated costs soared to $6.3 billion. An internal NNSA study had advocated for 22,500 square feet of plutonium lab space in the CMRR-Nuclear Facility, "resulting in a production capacity of 80-90 pits per year. This draft Rad Lab EA now seeks to create that same square footage of plutonium lab space. The future production is not to maintain the safety and reliability of the existing nuclear weapons stockpile. It is for speculative future "Interoperable Warheads" for both land and submarine-launched missiles that the Navy doesn't even want. The mission of future plutonium pit production needs critical examination because the re-categorization of the Rad Lab to a nuclear facility is arguably not as needed. Nuclear war is not something that we should be preparing for; it is something we should try to protect ourselves from. More nuclear warheads don't make us safer.

- The draft Rad Lab EA lists four "reasonably foreseeable future actions" that could lead to cumulative impacts at LANL. It is ironic that expanded plutonium pit production is omitted, since it is not only on the table but is being actively planned for. It is difficult to believe this omission is an oversight, when it is so obvious, perhaps indicative of an intent to avoid the subject of expanded plutonium pit production altogether. That should be corrected in a fuller environmental impact statement or programmatic EIS.

- The FY 2019 NNSA budget request states beryllium analysis will be a specific capability under the Proposed Action. Yet there are only two passing references to beryllium in the draft EA, when it is a widely known to be a potentially severe occupational hazard across the DOE's nuclear weapons complex. Moreover, a February 2018 DOE Inspector General report found long-standing deficiencies in LANL's beryllium disease prevention program. This draft Rad Lab environmental assessment fails to analyze potential beryllium occupational exposures, which a full EIS should correct. A 2006 independent study of local plumes in the Pecos area showed there to be too high in beryllium and we were advised not to let our kids eat them. We are directly downwind of LANL and have suffered years of wind-borne pollution. Enough is enough!

- In violation of declared DOE NEPA policy, this draft Rad Lab EA fails to have an analysis of Intentional Destructive Acts (defined as acts of sabotage or terrorism, including deliberate airplane crashes). This glaring deficiency should be corrected in a full environmental impact statement. Management problems at LANL do not give the public confidence in this facility's ability to maintain a secure site.

- DOE and NNSA should always hyperlink all reference documents in all NEPA documents.

In conclusion, following its May 11 decision on plutonium pit production, NNSA should proceed to a full environmental impact statement that analyzes interconnected proposals for relocating analytical chemistry and materials characterization operations at LANL. Should NNSA decide to conduct production at the Savannah River Site, or also at LANL, it should then proceed to a programmatic environmental impact statement (EIS) that analyzes all aspects of future plutonium pit production.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Lima NM 87543

11-1 cont’d

11-2 Please refer to Sections C.2.1, “General Opposition to Pit Production,” and C.2.3, “General Concerns that the EA Approach Results in Segmentation of the NEPA Process and a Programmatic EIS Is Needed,” of this CRD for NNSA’s response to this comment.

11-3 As addressed in Section C.2.4, “General Concerns that the Accident Analysis is Inadequate,” of this CRD, historic operations involving finely divided, respirable beryllium have been a concern with DOE and NNSA and lessons learned from past operations are applied through industrial hygiene programs at LANL. Section 4.1.2.3 of the final EA was revised to clearly communicate that operations that would generate finely divided, respirable beryllium are not within the scope of RLUOB activities. However, RLUOB would provide capabilities to perform chemical analyses of smear samples and air monitoring filters obtained from areas potentially contaminated with beryllium, and to analyze the beryllium content of beryllium-containing or contaminated compounds.

11-4 Sections 4.2.1.3 and 4.2.2 of the final EA were revised to address potential intentional destructive acts. Please refer to Section C.2.4, “General Concerns that the Accident Analysis is Inadequate,” of this CRD for additional information.

11-5 NNSA made all references used in the RLUOB EA available electronically on the project’s NEPA website (https://energy.gov/node/2501991). A hyperlink is given for each reference.

11-1 cont’d

segmentation. The need for enduring AC and MC capability is independent of the level of pit production at LANL or any other site across the DOE Complex.

The same AC and MC capabilities and operations that were evaluated in the 2015 Supplement Analysis are evaluated in the current EA. The difference is that under the Proposed Action in the current EA, fewer AC and MC operations would take place at PF-4 and more AC and MC operations would take place at RLUOB. As addressed in Section 2.1 of the EA, the Proposed Action would provide a variety of environmental and other benefits such as fewer worker radiation exposures, les waste generation, lower costs, and improved laboratory efficiency.

Environmental cleanup at LANL was extensively addressed in the 2008 LANL SWEIS (DOE 2008a). Additional information about cleanup at LANL is available in subsequent LANL SWEIS yearbooks and other material that can be found at http://www.lanl.gov/environment/protection/compliance/sweis.php.
Commenter No. 12: Rick Brown

NNSA Los Alamos Field Office
ATTN: CMRR Project Management Office
3747 West Jerney Road
Los Alamos, NM 87544
Via email to CMRR@lanl.gov

Re: Comments on the Draft Environmental Assessment of Proposed Changes for Analytical Chemistry and Materials Characterization at the Radiological Laboratory/Utility/Office Building, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico

Dear CMRR Project Management Office:

I am writing to express my concerns over the draft environmental assessment for the Radiological Laboratory Utility and Office Building (AKA “Rad Lab”) at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) states this environmental assessment “is intended to provide sufficient evidence and analysis to determine whether to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) or to issue a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) for the Proposed Action.” NNSA’s proposed action is to raise the operational limit for plutonium-239 to 400 grams (or the equivalent in other isotopes) in the Rad Lab. This would cause the facility to be re-categorized as a “Radiological Facility” to a Hazard Category-3 nuclear facility.

I believe that after completing a final Rad Lab environmental assessment, NNSA should proceed to a full environmental impact statement because:

- NNSA has previously declared that on May 11 it will announce a decision on where to expand plutonium production will take place, either at LANL, or the Savannah River Site in South Carolina, or both. It is silly that this draft environmental assessment is underway just before that crucial decision, without which it can’t really be determined whether or not the Rad Lab truly needs to be re-categorized as a Hazard Category-3 Nuclear Facility. This draft EA is clearly putting the cart before the horse. Therefore, NNSA should proceed to a fuller environmental impact statement before May 11.

- NNSA is conducting this Rad Lab environmental assessment pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), which requires the opportunity for the public to comment on major federal proposals. NEPA also requires that interconnected actions be considered together, and forbids segmentation into different narrow projects.

In a clear sign of interconnectivity, the Rad Lab’s planned re-categorization into a Hazard Category-3 nuclear facility is one of four “subprojects” in the NNSA’s FY 2019 budget request under the “Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) Project.” All four subprojects involve relocating analytical chemistry and materials characterization laboratories involving plutonium and other special nuclear materials out of the old, deteriorating Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Building. All together those subprojects will cost 7 billion taxpayer dollars. NNSA should analyze all four subprojects in one unified environmental impact statement. Conversely, this environmental assessment that analyses only the narrow question of raising the plutonium limits in the Rad Lab is the segmentation that NEPA forbids.

- NNSA argues that this Rad Lab EA is needed for relocating operations from the old deteriorating CMR Building so that LANL will have enduring analytical chemistry and materials characterization capabilities for its ongoing plutonium mission. However, NNSA has not justified how LANL’s current plutonium mission would not be adequately served by the already raised limit of 38.6 grams Pu239 equivalent (5g from the original 8.4 grams for the Rad Lab). Instead, this proposal to now raise the Pu239 equivalent to 400 grams is all about LANL’s future plutonium mission, over which there is no mystery. That future mission involves expanding production from the currently sanctioned level of 20 pits per year to 80 pits per year by 2027, statutorily required by the FY 2015 National Defense Authorization Act.

Please refer to Chapter 1, Section 1.0, which defines the Proposed Action as the recategorization of RLUOB to a Hazard Category-3 Nuclear Facility in order to maximize the use of RLUOB laboratory space for AC and MC operations and reduce the amount of space required in the existing PF-4 for these operations. NNSA evaluated the relocation of operations from the CMR Building to other LANL facilities in NEPA documentation issued in 2003, 2011, and 2015 (DOE 2003b, 2011c, 2015a). Please refer to Sections C.2.1, “General Opposition to Pit Production,” and C.2.3, “General Concerns that the EA Approach Results in Segmentation of the NEPA Process and a Programmatic EIS Is Needed,” of this CRD for NNSA’s response to your concerns about pit production and possible NEPA segmentation. The need for enduring AC and MC capability is independent of the level of pit production at LANL or any other site across the DOE Complex.
The same AC and MC capabilities and operations that were evaluated in the 2015 Supplement Analysis are evaluated in the current EA. The difference is that under the Proposed Action in the current EA, fewer AC and MC operations would take place at PF-4 and more AC and MC operations would take place at RLUOB. As addressed in Section 2.1 of the EA, the Proposed Action would provide a variety of environmental and other benefits such as fewer worker radiation exposures, less waste generation, lower costs, and improved laboratory efficiency.

12-2 Please refer to Sections C.2.1, “General Opposition to Pit Production,” and C.2.3, “General Concerns that the EA Approach Results in Segmentation of the NEPA Process and a Programmatic EIS Is Needed,” of this CRD for NNSA’s response to this comment.

12-3 As addressed in Section C.2.4, “General Concerns that the Accident Analysis is Inadequate,” of this CRD, historic operations involving finely divided, respirable beryllium have been a concern with DOE and NNSA and lessons learned from past operations are applied through industrial hygiene programs at LANL. Section 4.1.2.3 of the final EA was revised to clearly communicate that operations that would generate finely divided, respirable beryllium are not within the scope of RLUOB activities. However, RLUOB would provide capabilities to perform chemical analyses of smear samples and air monitoring filters obtained from areas potentially contaminated with beryllium, and to analyze the beryllium content of beryllium-containing or contaminated compounds.

12-4 Sections 4.2.1.3 and 4.2.2 of the final EA were revised to address potential intentional destructive acts. Please refer to Section C.2.4, “General Concerns that the Accident Analysis is Inadequate,” of this CRD for additional information.

12-5 NNSA made all references used in the RLUOB EA available electronically on the project’s NEPA website (https://energy.gov/node/2501991). A hyperlink is given for each reference.
Commenter No. 13: Barney Magrath

From: Barney Magrath  
Sent: Monday, April 23, 2018 12:49:02 AM  
To: RLUOBEA  
Subject: I’d like to comment on the Los Alamos CMRR project

Hello Friends - I have heard that the DOE is seeking comments on the CMRR project at Los Alamos

Firstly, LANL’s safety record on Pu work, highlighted by the WIPP accident, is abysmal. So giving them another big job with this Plutonium material is insane.

Secondly, they don’t have the space to expand into this endeavor. Have you been on the mesa? It is too crowded and an accident will affect everyone that lives there.

It's all about safety for the residents of Northern New Mexico so that is why this new lab, built to work on Plutonium, should not be built here. We’ve got enough problems

Thank you for your time

Most Cordially
Barney Magrath
Optics Entrepreneur

13-1 Please refer to Section C.2.6, General Concerns and Opposition to Increased Plutonium Limits at RLUOB due to LANL Safety Issues, of this CRD for NNSA’s response to your concerns about the LANL safety record.

13-2 As discussed in Section 2.3 of the EIS, no new facilities would be required under the Proposed Action to recategorize RLUOB from a Radiological Facility to a MAR-limited Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility. As discussed in Sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 of the EA, all facility modifications would be within the laboratory rooms in both RLUOB and PF-4 to accommodate changes in the AC and MC capabilities are required to accomplish the Proposed Action.

13-3 RLUOB is currently operating as a Radiological Facility with a plutonium-239 limit of up to 38.6 grams. The proposal to recategorize RLUOB into a MAR-limited Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility would use existing, available, and unused laboratory space within RLUOB. Modifications to RLUOB and PF-4 would result in decreased potential for worker exposure and increase process efficiencies.
Appendix C – Comment Response Document

To: RLUOBEA@hq.doe.gov
From: George Jones, Santa Fe, NM
Re: Public Comments on RLUOB Pit Expansion
Date: April 22, 2018

Dear DOE:

I am a private citizen residing in Santa Fe, New Mexico and I want to comment on this matter.

The proposal to significantly expand the amount of plutonium being handled and processed at the Los Alamos RLUOB is very dangerous and completely ignores the recent safety history of that facility, the safety priority of LANL’s management team and the physical condition and capability of the building itself. This proposal should NOT be enacted for the following three reasons:

1. The lab has an incredibly poor safety record in handling radioactive materials:

Many reports over just the past few years have cited mistakes, accidents and potentially near critical events. A recent mistake was the reported failure to alert two plumbers performing what they believed was routine maintenance on a sink to the nature of the material on the other side of the wall. The two workers had to go through a decontamination process after their work had penetrated to the other side of that wall. Workers have incorrectly loaded containers of radioactive waste on an aircraft, which is dangerous and illegal. A photo shoot of the lab included the placement of six plutonium cylinders within such proximity of each other as almost created an irreversible chain reaction—a critical event.

These are only three of numerous examples documented in the media and LANL has averaged over one safety mishap per month during the past two years.

It is clear that LANL management has an incorrect set of priorities when it comes to nuclear safety. Given the above track record one can only conclude that safety takes second place to making schedules and making a profit. One must wonder if the current contract management team, which includes Bechtel and UC Berkley, fully appreciate the dangers that they place on the LANL workers and community and that of the surrounding city and nearby population centers.

Over the last several years, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB), an independent organization within the executive branch of the United States Government, chartered with the responsibility of providing recommendations and advice to the President and the Secretary of Energy regarding public health and safety issues at Department of Energy defense nuclear facilities, has expressed concerns to DOE related to a range of safety issues associated with plutonium operations at LANL, similar to those raised by the commenter. These concerns which include seismic concerns at PF-4, criticality concerns at PF-4, safety management, and safety culture, have been addressed in ongoing actions at LANL. LANL has made great strides in improving the safety management and culture. Both NNSA and the contractor have made efforts to improve the transparency of safety management and reporting, as evidenced by the knowledge that commenters have of specific instances that have occurred. As a part of the Integrated Safety Management systems at LANL, the safety lessons learned from concerns at PF-4 are applied to RLUOB, LANL, and the rest of the DOE complex. Thus, NNSA has full confidence that RLUOB and PF-4 can continue to be operated safely and that installing more of the AC and MC capabilities in RLUOB rather than PF-4 would contribute to overall safety at LANL. NNSA expects that radiation exposures among workers performing AC and MC operations would be lower due to the lower overall radiation environment at RLUOB compared to that at PF 4 and would improve operational efficiency and reduce costs.

RLUOB is a modern facility built to rigorous engineering standards. The existing and proposed operations in RLUOB have been and would continue to be conducted in a safe, secure, and environmentally sound manner. Modifications to RLUOB and PF-4 would result in decreased potential for worker exposure and increase process efficiencies. Please refer to Section C.2.6, “General Concerns and Opposition to Increased Plutonium Limits at RLUOB due to LANL Safety Issues,” of this CRD for NNSA’s response to your concerns about the LANL safety record.

14-1

RLUOB handles small quantities (i.e., tens to hundreds of grams) of radioactive materials. With the Proposed Action, RLUOB would continue to handle small quantities of radioactive materials. As demonstrated in the EA, handling the proposed quantities of radioactive materials in RLUOB presents very small hazards to facility workers and negligible hazards to the public. PF-4 modifications would result in reduced worker exposure creating a safer environment. Please refer to Section C.2.6, “General Concerns and Opposition to Increased Plutonium Limits at RLUOB due to LANL Safety Issues,” of this CRD for NNSA’s response to your concerns about the LANL safety record.
2. The current condition of the facility does not provide for this expansion:

The actual building (RLUOB) is old and needs to be replaced, according to an independent study (U.S. Nuclear Weapon "Pit" Production Options for Congress, Congressional Research Service, February 21, 2014). That same study notes the building’s current plutonium pit production capability is only four pits per year, hardly enough to make a timely replacement of the over 3,000 warheads currently deployed or stored. The study recommends a few things that could increase production to as many as eight pits per year, but even at that level it would take 375 years to replace the pits in our active arsenal. In short, the current facility cannot achieve this administration’s objectives and the limited number of pits it can produce come at a high safety risk.

3. The upcoming potential change in the management entity places a question mark over the progress on safety:

The contract under which UC Berkley, Bechtel and others operate the lab is up for renewal and proposals are being, or soon will be, evaluated. A change in the management entity should provide an excellent opportunity to address the safety issues, but that will take time and training of the workforce. It will not happen quickly and, if the new management team does not make safety the number one priority, will not happen at all. The DOE should provide close supervision of this transition before moving forward with increasing the amount of plutonium handled by the lab. DOE must really consider the issues cited in the Congressional Research Report and allocate funds and time for construction of a replacement facility, be it at LANL or elsewhere.

Respectfully yours,
George Jones
Santa Fe, NM

14-3 NNSA and LANL management are committed to ensuring a safe work environment. Please refer to Section C.2.6, “General Concerns and Opposition to Increased Plutonium Limits at RLUOB due to LANL Safety Issues,” of this CRD for NNSA’s response to concerns about the LANL safety record.

14-4 RLUOB construction began in the late 1990’s and the new facility went into operation in 2011. As discussed in Section C.2.1, “General Opposition to Pit Production,” of this CRD, pit production does not occur at RLUOB or CMR, and will not occur under any of the alternatives evaluated in the EA. Rather, the Proposed Action evaluated in this EA addresses the mix of AC and MC operations to be performed between RLUOB and PF4. Laboratory capabilities at these facilities would be adequate to perform the functions required under the Proposed Action.

14-5 Please refer to Section C.2.6, “General Concerns and Opposition to Increased Plutonium Limits at RLUOB due to LANL Safety Issues,” of this CRD for NNSA’s response to concerns about the LANL safety record. NNSA management will provide continuity of oversite and will emphasize safety during the transition to a new LANL contractor. The workforce will largely remain the same, but there will be a new management team that NNSA expects to place an emphasis on safety as a primary consideration in the conduct of all operations.
April 20, 2018

Via e-mail to M.Goodrum@hq.doe.gov and first-class mail

William S. Goodrum
Manager
National Nuclear Security Administration
Los Alamos Field Office
1747 West Jemez Road
Los Alamos NM 87544
ATTN: CARR Project Management Office

Re: Santa Clara Pueblo’s comments on the Draft Environmental Assessment of Proposed Changes for Analytical Chemistry and Materials Characterization at the Radiological Laboratory/Utility Office Building, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico (DOE/EA-2082)

Dear Mr. Goodrum:

Santa Clara Pueblo submits the following comments on the Draft Environmental Assessment of Proposed Changes for Analytical Chemistry and Materials Characterization at the Radiological Laboratory/Utility Office Building (“Draft EA”).

We trust these comments will be respected as part of our government-to-government relationship with the U.S. Department of Energy (“DOE”), which is formalized in numerous documents, including but not limited to the DOE Order 144.1 (approved January 16, 2009), the DOE American Indian and Alaska Native Tribal Government Policy, and our AEA developed in 1992 directly between Santa Clara Pueblo and the DOE which was restated and reaffirmed by both governments in 2006. While our comments here primarily reference DOE, they apply in equal force to the National Nuclear Security Administration (“NNSA”) since the NNSA is part of the DOE and since Los Alamos National Laboratory (“LANL”) is considered to be a NNSA site.

Through the Draft EA, DOE seeks to re-categorize the Radiological Laboratory/Utility Office Building (“BLUOP”) from a Radiological Facility that is limited to handling 38.6 grams of plutonium-239 equivalent (“PuE”) to a Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility, with an increased
Commenter No. 15 (cont'd): J. Michael Chavarria, Governor, Santa Clara Pueblo

An EIS addressing the Proposed Action is not necessary because the EA analysis provides the evidence that the Proposed Action would not result in significant adverse impacts. The EA concludes that worker exposures would be reduced and operations efficiency improved. The Proposed Action evaluated in the EA, which is limited to the recategorization of RLUOB as a MAR-limited Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility and AC and MC operations in RLUOB and PF-4, is not tied to any specific level of pit production at LANL or any other site across the DOE Complex. The need for enduring AC and MC capabilities is independent of the level of pit production. DOE and NNSA have long recognized the need to transfer these required AC and MC activities to more modern facilities at LANL. DOE evaluated such transfers in an EIS issued in 2003 (DOE 2003b), a supplemental EIS issued in 2011 (DOE 2011c), and a supplement analysis issued in 2015 (DOE 2015a). The current EA builds on this past NEPA documentation and the same types of AC and MC activities would occur under the Proposed Action as those previously evaluated. The difference is that under the Proposed Action evaluated in this EA, more AC and MC activities would be performed in RLUOB and fewer in PF-4. Please also refer to Section C.2.3, “General Concerns that the EA Approach Results in Segmentation of the NEPA Process and a Programmatic EIS Is Needed,” of this CRD for additional information.

As noted in the response to comment 15-1, the Proposed Action evaluated in the EA is not tied to any specific level of pit production at LANL or any other site across the DOE Complex. The need for enduring AC and MC capabilities is independent of the level of pit production. Please refer to Section C.2.3, “General Concerns that the EA Approach Results in Segmentation of the NEPA Process and a Programmatic EIS Is Needed,” of this CRD for NNSA’s response to this comment.

As discussed in the response to comment 15-1, an EIS addressing the Proposed Action is not necessary because the EA analysis provides the evidence that the Proposed Action would not result in significant adverse impacts. The need for enduring AC and MC capabilities is independent of the level of pit production. DOE and NNSA have long recognized the need to transfer these required AC and MC activities to more modern facilities at LANL. DOE evaluated such transfers in an EIS issued in 2003 (DOE 2003b), a supplemental EIS issued in 2011 (DOE 2011c), and a supplement analysis issued in 2015 (DOE 2015a). The current EA builds on this past NEPA documentation and the same types of AC and MC activities would occur under the Proposed Action as those previously evaluated. The difference is that under the Proposed Action evaluated in this EA, more AC and MC activities would be performed in RLUOB and fewer in PF-4.
Commenter No. 15 (cont’d): J. Michael Chavarria, Governor, Santa Clara Pueblo

Mr. Goodrum
Santa Clara Pueblo’s comments on the Draft Environmental Assessment of Proposed Changes for Analytical Chemistry and Materials Characterization at the Radiological Laboratory/Utility Office Building, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico (DOE/EA-2052)
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Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration Fiscal Year 2018 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan Report To Congress (November 2017) at 2-30, ¶2.4.1.2; https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2017/11/f46/beta_stm_plan_final_november_2017%2015159_Draft.pdf. The RLUOB is specifically mentioned as part of the “infrastructure, equipment, and critical skills [needed] to meet [NNSA’s] plutonium mission requirements” in that Plan. See id. and see ¶2.4.1.3.


Thus, the RLUOB conversion and re-categorization is intertwined with the plutonium mission to meet a statutory requirement of DOE demonstrating ability to produce 80 pits per year. This constitutes a "major federal action" under NEPA that triggers the need for an EIS.

NEPA regulations define a "major federal action" to include:

- [a]n action of programs, such as a group of concerted actions to implement a specific policy or plan, systematic and connected agency decisi10100100on, allowing agency resources to implement a specific statutory program or executive directive.

40 C.F.R. §1508.18(b)(4).

The FY 2019 NNSA budget and FY 2018 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan citations above demonstrate that this definition of "major federal action" has been met with the RLUOB conversion and re-categorization is just one piece of the bigger plutonium mission puzzle with connected agency decisions allocating resources to implement a specific statutory program. And, the United States Supreme Court has instructed that environmental impact statements, although not applicable when an agency requests appropriations, should be prepared for underlying legislation proposing programmatic actions for which appropriations are sought. See Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347 (1979) at 361-362. In other words, in accordance with the Supreme Court's interpretation of NEPA, see 42 U.S.C. §4332(c), such underlying legislation is a major federal action requiring an EIS. Accord, Westlands Water Dist. v. United States Dep't of Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, 850 F. Supp. 1388, 1415 (E.D. Cal. 1994).

The requirement to prepare an EIS has been triggered by the fact that a law was enacted in FY 2015 requiring the DOE to demonstrate ramped up pit production to 80 pits per year. Yet, no such EIS has been prepared to date. The last NEPA authorizing plutonium pit

15-4 As noted in the response to comment 15-1, the same AC and MC capabilities and operations that were evaluated in the 2015 Supplement Analysis are evaluated in the current EA, except that under the Proposed Action in the current EA, fewer AC and MC operations would take place at PF-4 and more AC and MC operations would take place at RLUOB. As discussed in Section 2.1 of the EA, the Proposed Action to recategorize RLUOB would provide a variety of environmental and other benefits such as fewer worker radiation exposures, less waste generation, lower costs, and improved laboratory efficiency. The Proposed Action is not tied to any specific level of pit production at LANL or any other site across the DOE Complex.

15-5 The need for enduring AC and MC capabilities is independent of the level of pit production. DOE and NNSA have long recognized the need to transfer these required AC and MC activities to more modern facilities at LANL. DOE evaluated such transfers in an EIS issued in 2003 (DOE 2003b), a supplemental EIS issued in 2011 (DOE 2011c), and a supplement analysis issued in 2015 (DOE 2015a). The current EA builds on this past NEPA documentation and the same types of AC and MC activities would occur under the Proposed Action as those previously evaluated. The difference is that under the Proposed Action evaluated in this EA, more AC and MC activities would be performed in RLUOB and fewer in PF-4.

With respect to the cited statutory requirement involving production of pits at a level of 80 per year, NNSA has recently announced plans regarding recapitalization of defense plutonium capabilities that would increase the level of pit production at LANL and introduce pit production at the Savannah River Site (NNSA 2018). NNSA will determine the appropriate level of NEPA documentation to support the recent announcement and complete the necessary analyses and RODs prior to proceeding with actions related to increases above currently authorized pit production levels. Regardless of the level of pit production at LANL or elsewhere, NNSA has an enduring need for AC and MC capabilities, which is the subject of the current EA.

15-6 As addressed in the response to comment 15-5, NNSA will determine the appropriate level of NEPA documentation to support the recent announcement on the recapitalization of defense plutonium capabilities that includes a proposal for an increased level of pit production at LANL (NNSA 2018). DOE will complete the necessary analyses and RODs prior to proceeding with actions related to increases above currently authorized pit production levels. Regardless of the level of pit production at LANL or elsewhere, NNSA has an enduring need for AC and MC capabilities, which is the subject of the current EA.
Commenter No. 15 (cont’d): J. Michael Chavarria, Governor, Santa Clara Pueblo

Mr. Goodrum
Santa Clara Pueblo’s comments on the Draft Environmental Assessment of Proposed Changes for Analytical Chemistry and Materials Characterization at the Radiological Laboratory/Utility/Office Building, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico (DOE/EA-2052)
April 20, 2018

The EA analysis demonstrates that there are no significant impacts projected from implementation of the Proposed Action. Thus, preparation of an EIS is not required. Because the proposed AC and MC activities are the same types of activities that have been performed for many years at existing facilities at LANL, the risks that would be associated with these AC and MC activities are well known and hardly unique. The analysis in the EA demonstrates that there are no significant impacts.

The EA concludes that worker exposures would be reduced and operations efficiency improved. Please refer to Section C.2.2, “General Concerns about Implementing NEPA for the Proposed Action,” of this CRD for additional information.

As discussed in the response to comment 15-7, the Proposed Action involves neither unique nor unknown risks, and the analysis in the EA demonstrates that there are no significant impacts. The EA concludes that worker exposures would be reduced and operations efficiency improved. Please refer to Section C.2.2, “General Concerns about Implementing NEPA for the Proposed Action,” of this CRD for additional information.

As addressed in Section 2.1 of the EA, the preliminary analysis referenced by the commenter was used as part of establishing the 400-gram plutonium-239 limit for RLUOB under the Proposed Action. Because the proposed AC and MC activities are the same types of activities that have been performed for many years at existing facilities at LANL, the risks that would be associated with these AC and MC activities are well known and hardly unique. The analysis in the EA demonstrates that only very small environmental or human health impacts would be expected from the Proposed Action. Future, more detailed, analyses will be conducted to ensure that all required technical and administrative controls would be implemented at RLUOB to maintain worker and public safety. The analyses presented in the EA represent bounding quantities of materials at risk and minimal controls. There is no expectation that the next version of the safety analyses will require a modification of the potential impacts analysis conclusions in the EA. Please refer to Section C.2.2, “General Concerns about Implementing NEPA for the Proposed Action,” of this CRD for additional information.
Commenter No. 15 (cont'd):  J. Michael Chavarria, Governor,
Santa Clara Pueblo

Regarding the reference to comments raised on the LANL SWEIS, NNSA refers the commenter to comment response 316-9 in the LANL SWEIS. In that response, NNSA noted that there are many possible routes by which people may be exposed to contaminants in their environment, and that certain individuals may consume foods or engage in activities that are specific to their culture on a regular basis (daily or weekly), while most members of the population may occasionally consume those foods and engage in those activities. To estimate the exposure to individuals subsisting on a special pathways diet, it was assumed for analysis that all foodstuffs were locally grown and that drinking water came from local wells, and that the special pathways diet included the consumption of game animals and nongame fish, native vegetation (e.g., pinyon nuts and Indian tea [cota]), surface water, and incidental ingestion of soil and sediments in surface water and from swallowing inhaled dust. The potential radiological doses from these pathways were analyzed in addition to the doses from meat, milk, produce, water, and sediment consumption as reflected in the “offsite resident” pathway analysis in the LANL SWEIS. Santa Clara Pueblo commented extensively on this approach and in its Record of Decision and Mitigation Action Plan related to the 2008 LANL SWEIS NNSA acknowledged environmental justice issues raised by the Pueblo and agreed to work collaboratively with the Pueblo to ascertain the SWEIS analysis or develop suggested ways of incorporating findings of a Santa Clara-specific human health risk assessment.

Please also refer to Section C.2.5, “General Concerns that the Environmental Justice Impacts Analysis is Inadequate,” of this CRD for additional information.

The analysis in the EA includes information from the special pathways diet, and the potential impacts from this special pathways diet were analyzed in addition to the doses determined for this EA. NNSA suggests that if foodstuffs or other exposure pathways important to the Pueblos were not being monitored, the Pueblos should identify the specific foods and practices to DOE. This would enable NNSA to better address their concerns through the LANL environmental surveillance program and in future analyses. Information needed to adequately consider the exposure potential would include the specific natural materials (plants or animal parts used), where the materials are obtained, how they are used (eaten raw, smoked, stewed, dried), the amounts used, the number or fraction of Pueblo people who use them, and the approximate frequency of use (daily, weekly, monthly). Please also refer to Section C.2.5, “General Concerns that the Environmental Justice Impacts Analysis is Inadequate,” of this CRD for NNSA’s response to this comment.
Commenter No. 15 (cont’d):  J. Michael Chavarria, Governor, Santa Clara Pueblo

Mr. Goodrum
Santa Clara Pueblo's comments on the Draft Environmental Assessment of Proposed Changes for Analytical Chemistry and Materials Characterization at the Radiological Laboratory/Utility Office Building, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico (DOE/EA-2052) April 20, 2018

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This EA was prepared so that NNSA can make an informed decision on the Proposed Action irrespective of prior decisions. Based on the EA analysis an EIS is not necessary as there are no significant effects projected from implementation of the Proposed Action. The draft EA was issued for a 60-day public comment period and all comments received in the draft EA were considered when preparing the final EA. Please refer to Section C.2.2, “General Concerns about Implementing NEPA for the Proposed Action,” of this CRD for additional information.

The Proposed Action is intended to ensure enduring AC and MC capabilities at LANL, a need that is independent of the level of pit production at LANL or any other site across the DOE Complex. DOE and NNSA have long recognized the need to transfer these required AC and MC activities to more modern facilities at LANL. DOE evaluated such transfers in NEPA documentation issued in 2003 (DOE 2003b), 2011 (DOE 2011c), and 2015 (DOE 2015a). The current EA builds on this past NEPA documentation and the same types of AC and MC activities would occur under the Proposed Action as those previously evaluated. The difference is that under the Proposed Action evaluated in this EA, more AC and MC activities would be performed in RLUOB and fewer in PF-4.

The rod (73 FR 77644) cited by the commenter for the Complex Transformation PEIS remains in effect. The Proposed Action is intended to ensure enduring AC and MC capabilities at LANL, a need that is independent of any level of pit production at LANL or any other site across the DOE Complex. DOE and NNSA have long recognized the need to transfer these required AC and MC activities to more modern facilities at LANL. DOE evaluated such transfers in NEPA documentation issued in 2003 (DOE 2003b), 2011 (DOE 2011c), and 2015 (DOE 2015a). The current EA builds on this past NEPA documentation and the same types of AC and MC activities would occur under the Proposed Action as those previously evaluated. The difference is that under the Proposed Action evaluated in this EA, more AC and MC activities would be performed in RLUOB and fewer in PF-4.

The Proposed Action is intended to ensure enduring AC and MC capabilities at LANL, a need that is independent of the level of pit production at LANL or any other site across the DOE Complex. DOE and NNSA have long recognized the need to transfer these required AC and MC activities to more modern facilities at LANL. DOE evaluated such transfers in NEPA documentation issued in 2003 (DOE 2003b), 2011 (DOE 2011c), and 2015 (DOE 2015a). The current EA builds on this past NEPA documentation and the same types of AC and MC activities would occur under the Proposed Action as those previously evaluated. The difference is that under the Proposed Action evaluated in this EA, more AC and MC activities would be performed in RLUOB and fewer in PF-4.

NEPA regulations instruct that:

NEPA's purpose is not to generate paperwork - even excellent paperwork - but to foster excellent action. The NEPA process is intended to help public officials make decisions that are based on understanding the environmental consequences, and take actions that protect, restore, and enhance the environment.

40 C.F.R. §1500.1(c).

It is with this spirit that Santa Clara Pueblo offers these comments, because the environment that we seek to have DOE protect, restore, and enhance is connected to, and part of, our home and place of worship and is integral to preserving the culture and traditions of the Santa Clara people.

For all of these reasons, Santa Clara Pueblo respectfully requests that further analyses of RLUOB conversion and re-categorization be conducted as part of an EIS (or a supplement to any
Commenter No. 15 (cont’d): J. Michael Chavarria, Governor, Santa Clara Pueblo

Mr. Goodrum
April 20, 2016
Page 7

relevant existing programmatic EIS) and that such analyses await and factor in pending announcements from DOE regarding the nature and extent to which the plutonium mission will remain at LANL.

Sincerely,

J. Michael Chavarria
Governor

cc via first-class mail:
DOE Secretary Rick Perry
NNSA Administrator Lisa Gordon-Hagerty
Senator Tom Udall
Senator Martin Heinrich
Representative Ben Ray Lujan
Representative Michelle Lujan Grisham
Representative Steve Pearce

cc via e-mail only:
Members of the Santa Clara Pueblo Tribal Council
Mel Tafoya, interim Tribal Administrator
Dios Chavarria, Director, Santa Clara Pueblo Office of Environmental Affairs
Greg Smith, Esq.
Jessica Aberle, Esq.

under the Proposed Action as those previously evaluated. The difference is that under the Proposed Action evaluated in this EA, more AC and MC activities would be performed in RLUOB and fewer in PF-4.

15-16 The analysis in the EA includes information from the special pathways diet, and the potential impacts from this special pathways diet were analyzed in addition to the doses determined for this EA. NNSA would appreciate that if foodstuffs or other exposure pathways important to the Pueblos were not being monitored, the Pueblos identify the specific foods and practices to NNSA. This would enable NNSA to better address their concerns through the LANL environmental surveillance program and in future analyses. NNSA would be pleased to have a government to government discussion with the Pueblos regarding information needed to address the Pueblos’ concerns for future LANL projects. Please also refer to Section C.2.5, “General Concerns that the Environmental Justice Impacts Analysis is Inadequate,” of this CRD for additional information.

15-17 Please refer to Section C.2.3, “General Concerns that the EA Approach Results in Segmentation of the NEPA Process and a Programmatic EIS Is Needed,” of this CRD for NNSA’s response to this comment.
Commenter No. 15 (cont’d):  J. Michael Chavarria, Governor,  
Santa Clara Pueblo

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Commenter No. 15 (cont’d): J. Michael Chavarria, Governor, 
Santa Clara Pueblo

NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that the Tribal Council hereby approves the  
attached comments regarding the Draft ELUOB Environmental  
Assessment.

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the Tribal Council authorizes and directs the 
Governor to execute and submit the attached comments regarding the 
Draft ELUOB Environmental Assessment on behalf of the Pueblo.

CERTIFICATION
I, the undersigned, duly elected Governor of the Santa Clara Pueblo, do hereby certify 
that the Tribal Council, at a duly called meeting that was convened with proper notice 
and was held on the 29th day of April, 2011, at Santa Clara Pueblo, New Mexico, a 
quorum being present, approved the foregoing Resolution with ___ in favor, and ___ 
opposed, ___ abstaining, ___ being absent

[Signature]
Governor J. Michael Chavarria

ATTEST:

[Signature]
Tribal Secretary Charles M. Siercous

Response side of this page intentionally left blank.
Commenter No. 16: Michael Chacon, Pueblo de San Ildefonso

From: Michael Chacon  
Sent: Monday, April 23, 2018 8:51:02 PM  
To: RLUOBEA  
Cc: ‘Raymond Martinez’  
Subject: Comments on EA 2052 Proposed Changes for Analytical Chemistry and Materials Characterization at the Radiological Laboratory Utility Office Building Los Alamos National Laboratory Los Alamos New Mexico

Below are the comments on the Subject document from the Pueblo de San Ildefonso, Department of Environmental and Cultural Preservation. Thank you for your attention to these comments.

Best Regards,

Michael Chacon

Comments start below.

Section 4.5 Environmental Justice

GENERAL COMMENT

Environmental Justice requires an evaluation of the aggregate risk of the existence of multiple nuclear facilities at the head of Mortandad Canyon, which drains onto the lands of the Pueblo de San Ildefonso not simply the effects of the RLUOB project alone.

COMMENTS BY SECTION

4.5.2 Proposed Action Alternative – Radiological Impacts during Normal Operations

QUOTE: “the nearest Pueblo de San Ildefonso boundary is more than 8.5 miles from PF-4 and RLUOB”

COMMENT: This is incorrect and must be corrected. The distance is closer to 0.8 miles, suggesting that this is a typo.

Please refer to Section C.2.5, “General Concerns that the Environmental Justice Impacts Analysis is Inadequate,” of this CRD for NNSA’s response to this comment.

The cited distance of 8.5 miles in Section 4.5.2 of the draft EA is indeed a typographical error that was corrected in the final EA. The potential impacts to offsite individuals were correctly evaluated and reported in both the draft and final EA.
Commenter No. 16 (cont’d): Michael Chacon,  
Pueblo de San Ildefonso

QUOTE: “An individual located at the boundary of either of these pueblos would receive an annual individual dose that would be less than the MEI dose of 0.082 millirem under the Proposed Action Alternative or 0.16 millirem under the No Action Alternative. Thus, there would be no disproportionately high and adverse impacts on these individuals.”

COMMENT: If this is based on the incorrect “the nearest Pueblo de San Ildefonso boundary is more than 8.5 miles from PF-4 and RLUOB” assumption, then this must be corrected.

4.5.3 No Action Alternative – Radiological Impacts during Normal Operations

QUOTE: “The potential dose that could be received at the boundaries of the Pueblo de San Ildefonso or Santa Clara Pueblo would be essentially the same as that under the No Action Alternative.”

COMMENT: If this is based on the incorrect “the nearest Pueblo de San Ildefonso boundary is more than 8.5 miles from PF-4 and RLUOB” assumption, then this must be corrected.

16-3 Impacts to the hypothetical maximally exposed individual, for both normal, routine operations and accidents, were evaluated with the assumption that such an individual resided continuously at the LANL boundary. Impact calculations in all directions to the LANL boundary were made based on historical weather data and the maximum dose from these calculations reported in the draft EA. Doses further away from the LANL boundary, including lands on the Pajarito Plateau, would be even less. The typographical error in Section 4.5.2 suggesting a large distance to the Pueblo de San Ildefonso was corrected in the final EA. However, the impacts to offsite individuals were correctly evaluated and reported in both the draft and final EA.

16-4 The typographical error in Section 4.5.3 suggesting a large distance to the Pueblo de San Ildefonso was corrected in the final EA. The impacts to offsite individuals were correctly evaluated and reported in both the draft and final EA.
17-1 Please refer to Section C.2.2, “General Concerns about Implementing NEPA for the Proposed Action,” of this CRD for NNSA’s response to this comment.

17-2 In the December 2008 ROD for the Complex Transformation PEIS (73 FR 77644), NNSA decided to retain manufacturing and research and development capabilities involving plutonium at LANL. In support of these activities, LANL must continue to maintain AC and MC capabilities to ensure NNSA’s ability to safely maintain and manage the Nation’s nuclear stockpile. The need for enduring AC and MC capability at LANL is independent of the level of pit production at LANL or any other site in the DOE Complex. This EA addresses the need for these continuing capabilities as did previous NEPA documentation (e.g., DOE 2003b, 2011c, 2015a). Therefore, a new or supplemental EIS is not needed for a decision consistent with NEPA requirements relevant to the Proposed Action. Refer to Section C.2.3, “General Concerns that the EA Approach Results in Segmentation of the NEPA Process and a Programmatic EIS Is Needed,” for additional information.

17-3 The Proposed Action is intended to ensure enduring AC and MC capabilities at LANL, a need that is independent of any level of pit production at LANL or any other site across the DOE Complex. As stated by the commenter, DOE and NNSA have long recognized the need to transfer these required AC and MC activities to more modern facilities at LANL. DOE evaluated such transfers in NEPA documentation issued in 2003 (DOE 2003b), 2011 (DOE 2011c), and 2015 (DOE 2015a). The current EA builds on this past NEPA documentation and the same types of AC and MC activities would occur under the Proposed Action as those previously evaluated. The difference is that under the Proposed Action evaluated in this EA, more AC and MC activities would be performed in RLUOB and fewer in PF-4. Please refer to Section C.2.3, “General Concerns that the EA Approach Results in Segmentation of the NEPA Process and a Programmatic EIS Is Needed,” for additional information.

17-4 Please refer to Chapter 1, Section 1.0, which defines the Proposed Action as the recategorization of RLUOB to a Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility in order to maximize the use of RLUOB laboratory space for AC and MC operations and reduce the amount of space required in the existing PF-4 for the operations. NNSA evaluated the relocation of operations from the CMR Building to other LANL facilities in NEPA documentation issued in 2003, 2011, and 2015 (DOE 2003b, 2011c, 2015a). LANL must continue to maintain AC and MC capabilities to ensure NNSA’s ability to safely maintain and manage the Nation’s nuclear stockpile. The need for enduring AC and MC capability at LANL is independent of the level of pit production at LANL or any other site in the DOE Complex. The same AC and MC
Commenter No. 17 (cont’d): Loren Mudd

The NNSA has no justified how LANL’s present plutonium mission of 20 pits per year would not be adequately served by the already raised limit of 38.6 grams Pu-239 equivalent (up from the original 8.4 grams) for the Rad Lab. The draft Rad lab EA lists four “reasonably foreseeable future actions” that could lead to cumulative impacts at LANL. It is striking that expanded plutonium pit production is omitted, since it is not only reasonably foreseeable, but is actually conceptually required and actively planned for. It’s difficult to believe this omission is just a simple oversight, when it is so glaringly obvious, perhaps indicative of an intent to avoid the subject of expanded plutonium pit production altogether. That should be corrected in a fuller environmental impact statement or programmatic EIS.

- In 2011 NNSA completed a Supplemental EIS for the CMRR-Nuclear Facility, only to cancel it after its estimated costs soared to $6.5 billion. However, an internal NNSA study had advocated for 22,500 square feet of plutonium lab space in the CMRR-Nuclear Facility, “resulting in a production capacity of 50-80 ppy” (pits per year). This draft Rad Lab EA now seeks to create that same square footage of plutonium lab space, not coincidentally the amount needed to support expanded plutonium pit production. Ironically, future production is not to maintain the safety and reliability of the existing nuclear weapons stockpile. It is instead for speculative future “Interoperable Warheads” for both land and submarine-launched missiles that the Navy doesn’t even want. The point is that the mission of future plutonium pit production needs critical examination because the re-categorization of the Rad Lab to a nuclear facility is arguably not even needed.

- NNSA has discounted the need for additional safety features based on a “preliminary analysis.” A fuller EIS should be based on completed, documented analysis. This is further reinforced by the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Project’s troubled history. NNSA has repeatedly sought (but failed) through various NEPA processes to raise the limit on plutonium pit production from that originally set by the 1996 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS). Its Record of Decision relocated the plutonium pit production mission to LANL after a 1989 FBI investigation of environmental crimes at the Rocky Flats Plant abruptly stopped production. It specifically limited pit production to 20 pits per year because of the deteriorated conditions at the old CMR Building that constrained analytical chemistry and materials characterization operations in support of plutonium pit production.

- The FY 2019 NNSA budget request states beryllium analysis will be a specific capability under the Proposed Action. Yet there are only two passing references to beryllium in the draft EA, when it is a widely known, potentially severe occupational hazard across the DOE’s nuclear weapons complex. Moreover, a February 2018 DOE Inspector General report found long-standing deficiencies in LANL’s beryllium disease prevention program. Therefore, it is particularly notable that this draft Rad Lab environmental assessment fails to analyze potential beryllium occupational exposures, which a full EIS should correct.

- In violation of declared DOE NEPA policy, this draft Rad Lab EA fails to have any analysis of Intentional Destructive Acts (defined as acts of sabotage or terrorism, including deliberate airplane crashes). This glaring deficiency should be corrected in a full environmental impact statement.

- DOE and NNSA should always hyperlink all reference documents in all NEPA documents.

In sum, following its May 11 decision on plutonium pit production, NNSA should proceed to a fuller environmental impact statement that analyzes interconnected proposals for relocating analytical chemistry and materials characterization operations at LANL. Should NNSA decide to conduct production at the Savannah River Site, or also at LANL, it should then proceed to a programmatic environmental impact statement that analyses all aspects of future plutonium pit production.

Sincerely,

Loren Mudd
Santa Fe, NM

capabilities and operations that were evaluated in the 2015 Supplement Analysis are evaluated in the current EA. The difference is that under the Proposed Action, which would recategorize RLUOB from a Radiological Laboratory to a Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility with a MAR limit of 400 grams of plutonium-239, fewer AC and MC operations would take place at PF-4 and more AC and MC operations would take place at RLUOB. As addressed in Section 2.1 of the EA, as compared to the 2015 Supplement Analysis, the Proposed Action would provide a variety of environmental and other benefits such as fewer worker radiation exposures, less waste generation, lower costs, and improved laboratory efficiency.

The recent announcement regarding recapitalization of defense plutonium capabilities, which includes a proposal for an increased level of pit production at LANL (NNSA 2018), now makes increased pit production a reasonably foreseeable action. In this final EA, the cumulative impacts analysis was revised to reflect an increase from the currently authorized 20 pits per year production level as a reasonably foreseeable future action. However, detailed strategies, production planning, and supportive politics, as well as appropriations, will need to occur to increase the level of pit production. This particular cumulative analysis is more appropriate for future actions requiring a pit production NEPA analysis. NNSA does not have the detailed information as to what is required in terms of planning in order to conduct an accurate non-speculative cumulative impacts analysis from increased operations other than to say that the RLUOB and PF-4 process improvements would result in safer more efficient operations regardless of production level.

The same AC and MC capabilities and operations that were evaluated in the 2015 Supplement Analysis (DOE 2015a) are evaluated in the current EA. The difference is that under the Proposed Action, which would recategorize RLUOB from a Radiological Laboratory to a Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility with a MAR limit of 400 grams of plutonium-239, fewer AC and MC operations would take place at PF-4 and more AC and MC operations would take place at RLUOB. As addressed in Section 2.1 of the EA, as compared to the 2015 Supplement Analysis, the Proposed Action would provide a variety of environmental and other benefits such as fewer worker radiation exposures, less waste generation, lower costs, and improved laboratory efficiency.

An EIS addressing the Proposed Action is not required because the EA analysis provides the evidence that the Proposed Action would not result in significant adverse impacts. The EA concludes that worker exposures would be reduced and operations efficiency improved. Please refer to Section 2.1 of the EA with respect to the concern about safety features being discounted due to a preliminary analysis.
The analysis was used as part of establishing the 400-gram plutonium-239 limit for RLUOB under the Proposed Action. Future, more detailed, analyses will be conducted to ensure that all required technical and administrative controls would be implemented at RLUOB to maintain worker and public safety. The analyses presented in the EA represent bounding quantities of materials at risk and minimal controls. There is no expectation that the next version of the safety analyses will require a modification of the potential impacts analysis conclusions in the EA.

The Proposed Action is intended to ensure enduring AC and MC capabilities at LANL, a need that is independent of the level of pit production at LANL or any other site across the DOE Complex. DOE and NNSA have long recognized the need to transfer these required AC and MC activities to more modern facilities at LANL. DOE evaluated such transfers in NEPA documentation issued in 2003 (DOE 2003b), 2011 (DOE 2011c), and 2015 (DOE 2015a). The current EA builds on this past NEPA documentation and the same types of AC and MC activities would occur under the Proposed Action as those previously evaluated. The difference is that under the Proposed Action evaluated in this EA, more AC and MC activities would be performed in RLUOB and fewer in PF-4.

As addressed in Section C.2.4, “General Concerns that the Accident Analysis is Inadequate,” of this CRD, historic operations involving finely divided, respirable beryllium have been a concern with DOE and NNSA and lessons learned from past operations are applied through industrial hygiene programs at LANL. Section 4.1.2.3 of the final EA was revised to clearly communicate that operations that would generate finely divided, respirable beryllium are not within the scope of RLUOB activities. However, RLUOB would provide capabilities to perform chemical analyses of smear samples and air monitoring filters obtained from areas potentially contaminated with beryllium, and to analyze the beryllium content of beryllium-containing or contaminated compounds.

Sections 4.2.1.3 and 4.2.2 of the final EA were revised to address potential intentional destructive acts. Please refer to Section C.2.4, “General Concerns that the Accident Analysis is Inadequate,” of this CRD for additional information.

NNSA made all references used in the RLUOB EA available electronically on the project’s NEPA website (https://energy.gov/node/2501991). A hyperlink is given for each reference.

Please refer to Section C.2.3, “General Concerns that the EA Approach Results in Segmentation of the NEPA Process and a Programmatic EIS Is Needed,” of this CRD for NNSA’s response to this comment.
Commenter No. 18: Cedar Koons

From: Cedar Koons
Sent: Monday, April 23, 2018 10:42:59 PM
To: RLUOBEA
Subject: RAD lab

Dear Sir or Madam,

I am writing to express my protest against the manufacture of plutonium pits at LANL. This plan is very misguided and goes against the best interests of our country and its citizens. As a New Mexican I especially abhor the risk this plan puts us in and the waste of precious resources on more nuclear weaponry.

Thank you for your attention to my protest.

Best Regards,

Cedar Koons
Dixon, NM 87527

18-1 This EA evaluates the potential environmental impacts associated with ensuring enduring AC and MC capabilities at LANL. The need for enduring AC and MC capabilities at LANL is independent of the specific level of pit production at LANL or any other sites across the DOE Complex. Please refer to Section C.2.1, “General Opposition to Pit Production,” of this CRD for additional information.
Commenter No. 19: Bethany Guggenheim

From: Bethany Guggenheim
Sent: Monday, April 23, 2018 10:59:36 PM
To: RLUOBEA
Subject: Plutonium increase....

What a terrible idea. I protest this more than strongly. Not sure it should even be something that we should be protesting about since YOU ALL should know the consequence.

Bethany Guggenheim
Dixon, NM
Commenter No. 20: Shel Neymark & Elizabeth Riedel

From: Shel Neymark
Sent: Monday, April 23, 2018 11:47:48 PM
To: RLUOBEA
Subject: pit production

Please do not expand pit production at Los Alamos National Lab. We already have too many workable pits. We can already destroy the planet many times over. We need to put our resources into human needs and climate change issues.
The lab needs clean up before starting new projects. As a downwinder, our health is imperiled.
The lab’s record on protecting the health of its workers is dismal.
The risk of catastrophic forest fire at the labs is high.

Shel Neymark & Elizabeth Riedel
Embudo NM 87531

20-1 This EA evaluates the potential environmental impacts associated with ensuring enduring AC and MC capabilities at LANL, where the need for these capabilities is independent of any specific level of pit production at LANL or any other site across the DOE Complex. Please refer to Section C.2.1, “General Opposition to Pit Production,” of this CRD for additional information.

20-2 Environmental cleanup at LANL is progressing in accordance with a Compliance Order on Consent entered into by DOE and the New Mexico Environment Department. Environmental cleanup at LANL was extensively addressed in the 2008 LANL SWEIS (DOE 2008a). Additional information about environmental cleanup at LANL is available in subsequent LANL SWEIS yearbooks and other material that can be found at http://www.lanl.gov/environment/protection/compliance/sweis.php. Please refer to Section C.2.6, “General Concerns and Opposition to Increased Plutonium Limits at RLUOB due to LANL Safety Issues,” of this CRD for NNSA’s response to your concerns about the LANL safety record.

20-3 The potential risks due to natural phenomena at LANL, such as wildfires and earthquakes, have been extensively evaluated, both on a site-wide basis and a facility-specific basis. For example, risks due to natural phenomena at LANL are extensively evaluated in the 2008 LANL SWEIS (DOE 2008a). Specifically concerning RLUOB, the accident analyses in Sections 4.2.2 and A.2.2 of this EA consider wildland fires as a partial initiator of potentially serious facility accidents. LANL has an active Wildlands Fire Management Plan which reduces the wildland fire risk to RLUOB and PF-4. The EA also addresses the impacts that could result from hypothetical very severe earthquakes and facility-wide fires. The radiological impacts from such accidents due to potential releases from RLUOB are presented in the EA and are shown to be small. Please refer to Section C.2.4, “General Concerns that the Accident Analysis is Inadequate,” of this CRD for additional information.
Commenter No. 21: Barb O'Connor

From: B
Sent: Tuesday, April 24, 2018 1:55:26 AM
To: RLUOBEA
Subject: LANL Rad Lab, etc.

Please stop your plans for bomb production plutonium pits at LANL and the high level nuclear waste repository in southern New Mexico. Please clean up LANL Labs.

None of this will increase our security or that of the world.

What is needed is to take the Trillions of dollars that you are taking from us and use it to do something that will help humanity not for these weapons of mass destruction. The only ones to benefit from this are those involved in this military industrial complex. $$$!

I just cannot understand your thinking on this or those in Congress that support this. It is absolutely unbelievable. Fear and insecurity and the money that can be made from it are driving this destructive system.

I know this note will not be heard by deaf ears at your agency, but I just have to put in my two cents objection to what is going on in the state of NM. It is such a beautiful defenseless state that is being used by everyone connected to this industry... hidden in NM out of site...out of mind of the average citizen. Such a sad state of affairs.

Sincerely submitted,
Barb O'Connor, ofs

This EA evaluates the potential environmental impacts associated with ensuring enduring AC and MC capabilities at LANL, where the need for these capabilities is independent of any specific level of pit production at LANL or any other site across the DOE Complex. Please refer to Section C.2.1, “General Opposition to Pit Production,” of this CRD for additional information. Operation of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in southern New Mexico, which accepts transuranic waste for disposal rather than high-level radioactive waste, is out of the scope of this EA. Environmental cleanup at LANL was extensively addressed in the 2008 LANL SWEIS (DOE 2008a). Additional information about cleanup at LANL is available in subsequent LANL SWEIS yearbooks and other material that can be found at http://www.lanl.gov/environment/protection/compliance/sweis.php.

Please refer to Section C.2.1, “General Opposition to Pit Production,” of this CRD for NNSA’s response to this comment.
**Commenter No. 22: Susan Trujillo**

From: Trujillo  
Sent: Tuesday, April 24, 2018 2:02:18 PM  
To: RLUOBEA  
Subject: Comments on RAD lab changes  

April 24, 2018  
NNSA Los Alamos Field Office  
ATTN: CMRR Project Management Office  
3747 West Jemez Road  
Los Alamos, NM 87544  
Via email to RLUOBEA@hq.doe.gov  

Re: Comments on the Draft Environmental Assessment of Proposed Changes for Analytical Chemistry and Materials Characterization at the Radiological Laboratory/Utility/Office Building, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico  

Dear CMRR Project Management Office:  

I am writing to express my concerns over the draft environmental assessment for the Radiological Laboratory Utility and Office Building (AKA “Rad Lab”) at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) states this environmental assessment “is intended to provide sufficient evidence and analysis to determine whether to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) or to issue a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) for the Proposed Action.”  

NNSA’s proposed action is to raise the operational limit for plutonium-239 to 400 grams (or the equivalent in other isotopes) in the Rad Lab. This would cause the facility to be re-categorized from a “Radiological Facility” to a Hazard Category-3 nuclear facility.
LANL is not an appropriate location for a Hazard Category-3 nuclear facility. The risks of wildfire and earthquakes alone should be enough to stop such a project. The terrible safety record of LANL should be enough to stop such a project. Not to mention the waste of resources to be used to build weapons that that can never be used. Shame!

I love the State of New Mexico and the people of New Mexico. LANL is a threat. Let’s find a better project for LANL to take on. Something with a future. Not something to destroy our future.

Thank you for your time and consideration.

Sincerely,

Susan Trujillo
Ranchos de Taos, NM 87557

RLUOB is a modern facility built to rigorous engineering standards and operated in full compliance with health and safety regulations. The existing and proposed operations in RLUOB have been and would continue to be conducted in a safe, secure, and environmentally sound manner. Please refer to Section C.2.6, “General Concerns and Opposition to Increased Plutonium Limits at RLUOB due to LANL Safety Issues,” of this CRD for NNSA’s response to your concerns about the LANL safety record.

The potential risks due to natural phenomena at LANL, such as wildfires and earthquakes, have been extensively evaluated, both on a site-wide basis and a facility-specific basis. For example, risks due to natural phenomena at LANL are extensively evaluated in the 2008 \textit{LANL SWEIS} (DOE 2008a). Specifically concerning RLUOB, the accident analyses in Sections 4.2.2 and A.2.2 of this EA consider wildland fires as a partial initiator of potentially serious facility accidents. The EA also addresses the impacts that could result from hypothetical very severe earthquakes and facility-wide fires. The radiological impacts from such accidents due to potential releases from RLUOB are presented in the EA and are shown to be small. Please refer to Section C.2.4, “General Concerns that the Accident Analysis is Inadequate,” of this CRD for additional information.
Commenter No. 23: Doris “Dee” Finney

From: DeeFinney
Sent: Tuesday, April 24, 2018 5:22:27 PM
To: RLUOBEA
Subject: LANL

Dear Sir/Madam,

I am writing to express my concern related to increased production at LANL that will increase the usage of plutonium. I am a public health nurse and have witnessed the ravages of radiation on the communities surrounding the lab. We have very high rates of cancer and lung diseases related to radiation exposure from the lab. Please seriously consider another location for this new program as we have suffered enough from the production at the lab for the nuclear arsenal. Our communities are suffering from poverty, drug addiction, educational cuts, and health issues related to production and manufacturing of weapons and the by products that end up in air and water. Please consider what we are dealing with already before making the decision to increase production of plutonium products.

Thank your for your attention,

Doris “Dee” Finney RN

The Proposed Action evaluated in this EA, which is limited to the recategorization of RLUOB as a MAR-limited Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility, is not tied to any specific level of pit production activity at LANL or any other site across the DOE Complex. The need for enduring AC and MC capabilities at LANL is independent of any level of pit production. Please refer to Section C.2.1, “General Opposition to Pit Production,” of this CRD for additional information.

LANL has an active program to address remediation of past releases that have resulted in environmental contamination. Environmental cleanup is progressing in accordance with a Compliance Order on Consent entered into by DOE and the New Mexico Environment Department. Environmental cleanup at LANL was extensively addressed in the 2008 LANL SWEIS (DOE 2008a). Additional information about environmental cleanup at LANL is available in subsequent LANL SWEIS yearbooks and other material, which can be found at http://www.lanl.gov/environment/protection/compliance/sweis.php. The remediation is to clean up these sites to levels that are protective of public health. Current operating facilities air emissions and liquid discharges comply with permits and standards that are intended to protect public health. Opportunities to further reduce emissions and discharges are also a component of operational evaluations. LANL performance in environmental monitoring and protection are reported in annual site environmental reports, which can found at http://www.lanl.gov/environment/environmental-report.php.
From: Sasha Pyle  
Sent: Tuesday, April 24, 2018 7:45:19 PM  
To: RLUOBEA  
Subject: public comment on Rad Lab EA

NNSA Los Alamos Field Office  
ATTN: CMRR Project Management Office  
3747 West Jemez Road  
Los Alamos, NM 87544

Via email to RLUOBEA@hq.doe.gov  

April 24, 2018  

Re: Comments on the Draft Environmental Assessment of Proposed Changes for Analytical Chemistry and Materials Characterization at the Radiological Laboratory/Utility/Office Building, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico

Dear CMRR Project Management Office:

Pit production at LANL continues to be controversial. Are more pits needed? (A clear case could be made that they are not.) Are there safe protocols in place for the environmental threats and waste disposal issues that will ensue from ramping up production? (A clear case could be made that there are not.)

To rush a draft Environmental Assessment at a moment when the production site is on the verge of being chosen--to attempt to forestall the publication of a potentially invaluable full Environmental Impact Statement or even complex-wide Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement--seems to me both rash and unproductive. What a waste of everyone’s time, money, attention and comments, when clearly more analysis is needed. And what a sloppy end run around the intent of the National Environmental Policy Act, the clearly laid-out requirements of which must be fulfilled as a matter of compliance with Federal law. NEPA specifies that analysis of interconnected actions must be con-
Commenter No. 24 (cont’d): Sasha Pyle

ducted with an eye to total environmental impacts, not separated piece-meal into separate programs for evaluation and prediction.

Increasing the amount of weapons-grade plutonium that LANL's production program is authorized to use is dangerous, premature and irresponsible. And probably illegal if the letter of the law is to be observed. Altering the category of the facility from "Radiological" to Hazard Level 3 is no small matter. Public comment is required.

The need to transfer sensitive operations out of the aging CMR facility has been asserted repeatedly in recent years by Lab and NNSA officials, and used as justification for expensive proposed new facilities and programs, all designed to increase plutonium core production. This relentless push, based on a willful disregard for the real condition of our existing tested arsenal, has led to flawed proposals over and over again. What I and many other citizens see is a scenario where the contractors want more and more money flowing to them, regardless of any actual benefits to our national security. The obvious conflict of interest present, where Lab Directors serve as CEOs of the associated corporate entities that slurp at the federal trough, casts every new proposal under a suspicious shadow.

With this recent history well in mind, I conclude that in this case an EA is absolutely not sufficient to address the far-reaching threats that these new facilities pose to groundwater, rivers, air and soil—now and in the future.

As a taxpayer, citizen and nearly 40-year resident of Northern New Mexico, (one who has spent 30 years studying this issue) I am extremely disappointed in the shoddy attention to environmental questions that we see repeatedly from existing and proposed programs at the Labs. Time for an EIS and a PEIS, not a useless EA.

Thank you for your consideration.

Sasha Pyle
Santa Fe NM

The Proposed Action does not increase the amount of weapons grade plutonium at LANL. The Proposed Action evaluated in the EA is to recategorize RLUOB to a MAR-limited Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility and to perform more AC and MC laboratory operations at RLUOB and less at PF-4 than was evaluated in prior NEPA documents. The need for enduring AC and MC capabilities at LANL is independent of the level of pit production. Public comments on the draft EA were solicited during a 60-day public comment period and all comments received were considered when preparing this final EA.

The Proposed Action is intended to ensure enduring AC and MC capabilities at LANL, a need that is independent of the level of pit production at LANL or any other site across the DOE Complex. As stated by the commenter, DOE and NNSA have long recognized the need to transfer these required AC and MC activities to more modern facilities at LANL. DOE evaluated such transfers in NEPA documentation issued in 2003 (DOE 2003b), 2011 (DOE 2011c), and 2015 (DOE 2015a). The current EA is a builds on this past NEPA documentation and the same types of AC and MC activities would occur under the Proposed Action as those previously evaluated. The difference is that under the Proposed Action evaluated in this EA, more AC and MC activities would be performed in RLUOB and fewer in PF-4.

The EA was prepared by an NNSA-selected contractor who is independent of LANS. NNSA managed EA preparation and is solely responsible for the content and adequacy of the analysis.

The Proposed Action evaluated in the EA does not involve construction of a new nuclear facility but rather the recategorization of the RLUOB and interior modification of the RLUOB and PF-4. As documented in the EA, the potential impacts associated with the Proposed Action are very small. NNSA expects that radiation exposures among workers performing AC and MC operations would be lower due to the lower overall radiation environment at RLUOB compared to that at PF-4 and would improve operational efficiency and reduce costs. Please also refer to Section C.2.2, “General Concerns about Implementing NEPA for the Proposed Action,” of this CRD for additional information.

Please refer to Section C.2.2, “General Concerns about Implementing NEPA for the Proposed Action,” of this CRD for NNSA’s response to this comment.
An environmental impact statement addressing the Proposed Action is not required because the EA analysis provides the evidence that the Proposed Action would not result in significant adverse impacts. The EA concludes that worker exposures would be reduced and operations efficiency improved. The Proposed Action evaluated in the EA, which is limited to the recategorization of RLUOB as a MAR-limited Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility to enable additional MC and AC capabilities at this facility, is not tied to any specific level of pit production activity at LANL or any other site across the DOE Complex. The need for enduring AC and MC capabilities at LANL is independent of any level of pit production. Please refer to Section C.2.1, “General Opposition to Pit Production,” of this CRD for additional information.

In accordance with NEPA regulations, NNSA chose to prepare an environmental assessment in order to assist with the planning and decisionmaking for the proposed action. The resulting EA analysis provided evidence that the Proposed Action would not result in significant adverse impacts; thus, an environmental impact statement is not required. The need for enduring AC and MC capabilities is independent of any level of pit production. Please refer to Sections C.2.2, “General Concerns about Implementing NEPA for the Proposed Action,” and C.2.3, “General Concerns that the EA Approach Results in Segmentation of the NEPA Process and a Programmatic EIS Is Needed,” of this CRD for additional information.
NNSA plans to decommission the CMR Building, but that action is not within the scope of this EA. Potential impacts from decommissioning the CMR Building were addressed in the CMRR EIS (DOE 2003b) and the CMRR-NF SEIS (DOE 2011c).

Please refer to Section C.2.6, “General Concerns and Opposition to Increased Plutonium Limits at RLUOB due to LANL Safety Issues,” of this CRD for NNSA’s response to your concerns about the LANL safety record.

Environmental cleanup at LANL is progressing in accordance with a Compliance Order on Consent entered into by DOE and the New Mexico Environment Department. Environmental cleanup at LANL was extensively addressed in the 2008 LANL SWEIS (DOE 2008a). Additional information about environmental cleanup at LANL is available in subsequent LANL SWEIS yearbooks and other material that can be found at [http://www.lanl.gov/environment/protection/compliance/sweis.php](http://www.lanl.gov/environment/protection/compliance/sweis.php).

As discussed in the Summary and Section 4.3 of the EA, ample offsite treatment or disposal capacity exists for all wastes expected from the Proposed Action, including all radioactive wastes.

The Proposed Action evaluated in the EA is limited to the recategorization of RLUOB as a MAR -limited Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility to enable additional AC and MC capabilities at this facility. The Proposed Action is not tied to any specific level of pit production activity at LANL or any other site across the DOE Complex. Please refer to Section C.2.2, “General Concerns about Implementing NEPA for the Proposed Action,” of this CRD for NNSA’s response to this comment.
Commenter No. 26: June Ferrill

From: June Ferrill, Ph.D., Santa Fe, NM citizen and Contributor to 2018 NM State Democratic Platform

Re: Plutonium Pit Expansion at Los Alamos

Date: April 24, 2018

Dear DOE Government Officials:

It would be irresponsible to expand plutonium pit production at Los Alamos National Laboratories (LANL) to 400 grams given the Lab’s safety record and present culture and facility limitations:

- LANL consistently has safety violations, many of which have been serious criticality incidents, some of which resulted in radiation exposure and burns and could have resulted in loss of life
- The consortium of for-profit and non-profit LANL management contractors has not lead to a culture of safety. LANL’s contractors are in transition; not a good time to add expansion.
- The facility in which plutonium pit production occurs has structural problems cited in the Defense Facilities Safety Board Report (DFSB), April 2017. The RLUOB/EA facility is permitted to hold 26 grams of plutonium, not 400.

LANL received a failing grade on safety from the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) report in January, 2017, citing 23 criticality incidents in 2016 and the accidents have continued in 2017. (“Nuclear Criticality Safety Programs,” NNSA, DOE, ww.env.nm.gov.) LANL lacks a sufficient number of criticality engineers needed to work on safety. More plutonium production would only contribute to more safety issues.

The contractors at LANL have been instrumental in developing a culture that puts profits before safety. Oversight boards, including the New Mexico Department of Environment and the NNSA have enabled this culture by not collecting fines while contractor fees and bonuses

The Proposed Action evaluated in the EA, which is limited to the recategorization of RLUOB as a MAR-limited Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility, with a material at risk limit of 400 grams of plutonium-239, is not tied to any specific level of pit production activity at LANL or any other site across the DOE Complex. The need for enduring AC and MC capabilities at LANL is independent of any level of pit production. As a Radiological Laboratory, RLUOB may currently possess up to 38.6 grams of plutonium-239.

Please refer to Section C.2.6, “General Concerns and Opposition to Increased Plutonium Limits at RLUOB due to LANL Safety Issues,” of this CRD for NNSA’s response to your concerns about the LANL safety record.
Commenter No. 26 (cont’d): June Ferrill

continue. Nineteen of twenty-three major fines have been waived or reduced. (“Nuclear Negligence,” The Center for Public Integrity, June 18, 2017.) Senator Claire McCaskill’s August 2, 2017 letter to National Nuclear Safety Administrator Klotz states: “The private firms contracted to operate and maintain these facilities have not been held accountable …for the safety lapses that occurred under their watch. Contractors were paid between $40,000 and $160,000 per day, …amounting to ...$2 billion in pure profit over 10 years. …During that period, 19 of the 21 major fines for safety lapses were waived or significantly reduced...The contractors received 86% of maximum profits available to them over a ten year period.” (http://www.lasg.org/MPF2/documents/SenMcCaskill_ltr-to-NNSA_safety-violations_3Aug2017.pdf.)

Another issue with LANL’s culture, its management contractors and other management officials have trouble policing themselves. Even the DOE has acknowledged this difficulty: “Overall, The Department of Energy (DOE) found LANL’s corrective action program did not always adequately address issues, did not effectively prevent their recurrence, and did not consistently identify systemic problems.” (Department of Energy Audit Report, February 25, 2016, DOE-OIG-16-07).

LANL is in transition with new management contractors expected in the fall of 2018. Time is needed to change a culture and to see if change in safety issues has occurred. Taking on expanded pit production before very serious issues have been resolved can only add to problems already existing.

LANL’s continuous safety violations and its culture of putting profits before safety should be enough to discourage expansion of pit production, but the Plutonium Facility, where the pits are produced, has issues. The DNFSB correspondence in 2017 identified seismic vulnerabilities with the Plutonium Facility structure; deficiencies with the Plutonium Facility safety basis and fire suppression system; and opportunities for risk reduction by reducing the quantity of radioactive material on the first floor of the Plutonium Facility. (Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, 27th Annual Report to Congress, April 2017.)

26-3 cont’d

Please refer to Section C.2.6, “General Concerns and Opposition to Increased Plutonium Limits at RLUOB due to LANL Safety Issues,” of this CRD for NNSA’s response to your concerns about the LANL safety record.

26-4

NNSA has selected the new management team to emphasize the safe conduct of operations that is protective of the public, workers and the environment. The Proposed Action evaluated in the EA is not tied to any specific level of pit production at LANL or any other site across the DOE Complex. The need for enduring AC and MC capabilities at LANL is independent of any level of pit production. Please refer to Section C.2.6, “General Concerns and Opposition to Increased Plutonium Limits at RLUOB due to LANL Safety Issues,” of this CRD for NNSA’s response to your concerns about the LANL safety record.

26-5

The Proposed Action is limited to the recategorization of RLUOB as a MAR-limited Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility and AC and MC operations and is not tied to any specific pit production level at LANL or any other site across the DOE Complex. The need for enduring AC and MC capabilities at LANL is independent of any level of pit production.
On top of all these vulnerabilities, the CMRR environmental impact statement (2003) restricted the amount of plutonium allowed in RLUOBE to 8.4 grams. A Congressional Research Service report, (Jonathan E. Medalia, Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy, U.S. Nuclear Weapon “Pit” Production Options for Congress, February 21, 2014) stated that 26 grams were permitted. However, that amount has already been increased to 38.6 grams. Increasing the amount to 400 grams is totally unrealistic, given the facility’s limitations and LANL’s safety record in handling and storing plutonium.

For all these reasons—continued criticality incidents, a culture that puts profits before safety, a management in transition, and the structural issues at the Plutonium facility itself—LANL does not seem capable of handling expanded nuclear pit production until (and if) massive changes occur.

Thank you for this opportunity to comment.

Sincerely,

June Ferrill, Ph.D.
Co-Author of 2018 NM State Democratic Platform Planks on Nuclear Public Safety

At the time of preparation of the 2003 CMRR EIS (DOE 2003b), a facility categorized as a Radiological Laboratory was authorized to possess up to 8.4 grams of plutonium-239. But as discussed in Section 2.1 of the EA, the allowable quantity of plutonium-239 within a Radiological Laboratory was revised, from 8.4 grams to up to 38.6 grams, entirely as a function of an enhanced understanding of radiation dosimetry and revised accident release fractions. That is, the health risk associated with 8.4 grams of plutonium-239 as calculated using the previous dosimetry and accident release fractions, yields the same health risk as 38.6 grams of plutonium-239 as calculated using the updated dosimetry and accident release fractions. The current EA evaluates the potential environmental impacts associated with recategorizing RLUOB as a Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility with a possession limit of up to 400 grams of plutonium-239. As shown in the EA, the Proposed Action will not result in any adverse significant impacts. The EA concludes that worker exposures would be reduced and operations efficiency improved. RLUOB is a modern facility built to rigorous engineering standards. The existing and proposed operations in RLUOB have been and would continue to be conducted in a safe, secure, and environmentally sound manner.

Over the last several years, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB), an independent organization within the executive branch of the United States Government, chartered with the responsibility of providing recommendations and advice to the President and the Secretary of Energy regarding public health and safety issues at Department of Energy defense nuclear facilities, has expressed concerns to DOE related to a range of safety issues associated with plutonium operations at LANL, similar to those raised by the commenter. These concerns which include seismic concerns at PF-4, criticality concerns at PF-4, safety management, and safety culture, have been addressed in ongoing actions at LANL. LANL has made great strides in improving the safety management and culture. Both NNSA and the contractor have made efforts to improve the transparency of safety management and reporting, as evidenced by the knowledge that commenters have of specific instances that have occurred. As a part of the Integrated Safety Management systems at LANL, the safety lessons learned from concerns at PF-4 are applied to RLUOB, LANL, and the rest of the DOE complex. Thus, NNSA has full confidence
that RLUOB and PF-4 can continue to be operated safely and that installing more of the AC and MC capabilities in RLUOB rather than PF-4 would contribute to overall safety at LANL. NNSA expects that radiation exposures among workers performing AC and MC operations would be lower due to the lower overall radiation environment at RLUOB compared to that at PF-4 and would improve operational efficiency and reduce costs.

The RLUOB facility is a modern facility built to the appropriate, applicable seismic standards. The seismic concerns cited by the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board for PF-4 have been considered by NNSA. The accident analysis in the EA does not take credit for the seismic integrity of the RLUOB facility in the Seismic-Induced Spill and Fire accident scenario (see Section 4.2 and Appendix A of the EA). Rather, it is assumed that 10 percent of the radioactive material that becomes airborne in the accident would reach the atmosphere through cracks in the building or building rubble. As discussed in this EA, these assumptions are quite conservative. The expectation is that the accident analyses in the EA overestimate the potential damage and releases from RLUOB in a very severe earthquake.
Commenter No. 27: Basia Miller

From: Basia Miller  
Sent: Tuesday, April 24, 2018 10:06:17 PM  
To: RLUOBEA  
Subject: Comment on plutonium production

Attention DOE:

I oppose expansion of DOE’s plutonium production program at Los Alamos National Laboratories (LANL). Increased Pu production puts us all in more danger, especially given LANL’s poor safety record.

Sincerely,

Basia Miller  
Santa Fe, New Mexico 87507

The Proposed Action evaluated in this EA is to recategorize RLUOB to a MAR-limited Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility and to perform more AC and MC laboratory operations at RLUOB and less at PF-4 than was evaluated in prior NEPA documents. The need for enduring AC and MC capabilities at LANL is independent of the level of pit production. Please refer to Section C.2.1, “General Opposition to Pit Production,” of this CRD for additional information. Please also refer to Section C.2.6, “General Concerns and Opposition to Increased Plutonium Limits at RLUOB due to LANL Safety Issues,” of this CRD for NNSA’s response to your concerns about the LANL safety record.
From: Cody Slama  
Sent: Tuesday, April 24, 2018 10:33:02 PM  
To: RLUOBEA  
Subject: I Oppose the Expansion of Plutonium Pits

Dear DOE,

Living downstream from Los Alamos I have experienced contamination in my drinking water from the creation of nuclear weapons. Please do not continue this program as it will put me and my loved ones at further risk.

I oppose expansion of DOE’s plutonium production program at Los Alamos National Laboratories (LANL). Increased pu production puts us all in more danger, especially given LANL’s poor safety record.

Thank you,
Cody Slama  
Albuquerque, NM

LANL has active programs to address remediation of past releases that have resulted in environmental contamination and to control current and future releases. Environmental cleanup is progressing in accordance with a Compliance Order on Consent entered into by DOE and the New Mexico Environment Department. Environmental cleanup at LANL was extensively addressed in the 2008 LANL SWEIS (DOE 2008a). Additional information about environmental cleanup at LANL is available in subsequent LANL SWEIS yearbooks and other material, which can be found at [http://www.lanl.gov/environment/protection/compliance/sweis.php](http://www.lanl.gov/environment/protection/compliance/sweis.php). The remediation is to clean up these sites to levels that are protective of public health. Current operating facilities are managed to reduce the gaseous and liquid discharges to levels that comply with permits and standards that are intended to protect public health. LANL performance in environmental monitoring and protection are reported in annual site environmental reports, which can found at [http://www.lanl.gov/environment/environmental-report.php](http://www.lanl.gov/environment/environmental-report.php).

The Proposed Action evaluated in the EA, which is limited to the recategorization of RLUOB as a MAR-limited Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility, is not tied to any specific level of pit production at LANL or any other site across the DOE Complex. The need for enduring AC and MC capabilities at LANL is independent of any level of pit production. Please refer to Section C.2.1, “General Opposition to Pit Production,” of this CRD for additional information. Please also refer to Section C.2.6, “General Concerns and Opposition to Increased Plutonium Limits at RLUOB due to LANL Safety Issues,” of this CRD for NNSA’s response to your concerns about the LANL safety record.
Commenter No. 29: Rebecca Mueller

From: Rebecca Mueller  
Sent: Wednesday, April 25, 2018 12:02:07 AM  
To: RLUOBEA  
Subject: Expansion of LANL plutonium pit production

Dear NNSA,

I oppose any expansion of plutonium pit production at LANL. As others have noted, expanded pit production is not a step toward increased safety and reliability of LANL’s existing nuclear weapons stockpiles but rather a step toward future new-design nuclear weapons. As has also been noted, as New Mexicans we have a special responsibility to help lead the world toward a nuclear weapons-free future given that forty percent of the funding for the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA’s) nuclear weapons research and production programs is spent in our state alone; and furthermore, our congressional delegation has unfailingly supported the nuclear weapons industry in the name of jobs. (Yet New Mexico perennially ranks last or close to last in poverty and numerous socioeconomic indicators—with the exception of Los Alamos County, the second richest county in the USA). The proposed production of plutonium pits is of particular concern. Please do the right thing and prevent the expansion of pit production in any amount at LANL.

Sincerely,

Rebecca Mueller, Ph.D.
Dixon NM 87527

The Proposed Action evaluated in the EA is to recategorize RLUOB to a MAR-limited Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility and to perform more AC and MC laboratory operations at RLUOB and less at PF-4 than was evaluated in previous NEPA documents. The need for enduring AC and MC capabilities at LANL is independent of the level of pit production. Please refer to Section C.2.1, “General Opposition to Pit Production,” of this CRD for additional information.
**Commenter No. 30: Paula Claycomb**

**From:** Paula Claycomb  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 25, 2018 1:12:23 AM  
**To:** RLUOBEA  
**Subject:** NO! To plutonium pit production

Dear Sirs or Mesdames,

I write from Taos, NM, to express my concern about the possible expanded production of plutonium pits. Really? In 2018, when we have enough nuclear weapons already stockpiled to destroy many Earths?

Please listen: Los Alamos National Laboratory has a poor -- very poor -- safety record. Not only do we not need more plutonium pits, which in any case are not to maintain the safety and reliability of the existing nuclear weapons stockpiles, but instead are for future new-design nuclear weapons, but you will be risking the health of all those who live and work in or around Los Alamos.

Thank you and sincerely,

Paula Claycomb

| 30-1 | The Proposed Action evaluated in this EA is to recategorize RLUOB to a MAR-limited Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility and to perform more AC and MC laboratory operations at RLUOB and less in PF-4 than was evaluated in prior NEPA documents. The need for enduring AC and MC capabilities at LANL is independent of the level of pit production. Please refer to Section C.2.1, “General Opposition to Pit Production,” of this CRD for NNSA’s response to this comment. |
| 30-2 | Please refer to Section C.2.6, “General Concerns and Opposition to Increased Plutonium Limits at RLUOB due to LANL Safety Issues,” of this CRD for NNSA’s response to your concerns about the LANL safety record. |
Commenter No. 31: Patricia M. Golden

From: Patricia Golden  
Sent: Wednesday, April 25, 2018 2:10:03 PM  
To: RLUOBEA  
Subject: re: Expansion of DOE’s plutonium production program at LANL

Attention DOE:

I oppose expansion of DOE’s plutonium production program at Los Alamos National Laboratories (LANL). Increased pu production puts us all in more danger, especially given LANL’s poor safety record.

Sincerely,

Patricia M. Golden  
Van Horn, TX 79855

The Proposed Action evaluated in this EA is to recategorize RLUOB to a MAR-limited Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility and to perform more AC and MC laboratory operations at RLUOB and less at PF-4 than was evaluated in prior NEPA documents. The need for enduring AC and MC capabilities at LANL is independent of the level of pit production. Please refer to Section C.2.6, “General Concerns and Opposition to Increased Plutonium Limits at RLUOB due to LANL Safety Issues,” of this CRD for NNSA’s response to your concerns about the LANL safety record.
Commenter No. 32: Claude Francois

From: Clodie Francois
Sent: Wednesday, April 25, 2018 2:51:24 PM
To: RLUOBEA
Subject: Comments

NNSA Los Alamos Field Office
April 25, 2018
ATTN: CMRR Project Management Office
3747 West Jemez Road
Los Alamos, NM 87544

Comments on the Draft Environmental Assessment of Proposed Changes for Analytical Chemistry and Materials Characterization at the Radiological Laboratory/Utility/Office Building, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico

Dear CMRR Project Management Office:

I am writing to express my concerns over the draft environmental assessment for the Radiological Laboratory Utility and Office Building (AKA “Rad Lab”) at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) states this environmental assessment “is intended to provide sufficient evidence and analysis to determine whether to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) or to issue a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) for the Proposed Action.” NNSA’s proposed action is to raise the operational limit for plutonium-239 to 400 grams (or the equivalent in other isotopes) in the Rad Lab. This would cause the facility to be re-categorized from a “Radiological Facility” to a Hazard Category-3 nuclear facility.

I believe that after completing a final Rad Lab environmental assessment NNSA should proceed to a full environmental impact statement because:

- NNSA has previously declared that on May 11 it will announce a decision on where future expanded plutonium pit production will take place: either at LANL, the Savannah River Site in...
South Carolina, or both. It is silly that this draft environmental assessment is underway just before that crucial decision, without which it can’t really be determined whether or not the Rad Lab truly needs to be re-categorized as a Hazard Category-3 Nuclear Facility. This draft EA is clearly putting the cart before the horse. Therefore, NNSA should proceed to a fuller environmental impact statement after its May 11 decision.

- NNSA is conducting this Rad Lab environmental assessment pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), which requires the opportunity for the public to comment on major federal proposals. NEPA also requires that interconnected actions be considered together, and forbids segmentation into different narrow projects.

In a clear sign of interconnectivity, the Rad Lab’s planned re-categorization into a Hazard Category-3 nuclear facility is one of four “sub-projects” in the NNSA’s FY 2019 budget request under the “Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) Project.” All four subprojects involve relocating analytical chemistry and materials characterization capabilities involving plutonium and other special nuclear materials out of the old, deteriorating Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Building. All together these subprojects will cost two billion taxpayer dollars. NNSA should analyze all four subprojects in one unified environmental impact statement. Conversely, this environmental assessment that analyzes only the narrow question of raising the plutonium limit in the Rad Lab is the segmentation that NEPA forbids.

- NNSA argues that this Rad Lab EA is solely about relocating operations from the old deteriorating CMR Building so that LANL will have enduring analytical chemistry and materials characterization capabilities for its ongoing plutonium mission. However, NNSA has not justified how LANL’s present plutonium mission would not be adequately served by the already raised limit of 38.6 grams Pu-239 equivalent (up from the original 8.4 grams) for the Rad Lab. Moreover, NNSA has discounted the need for additional safety features based on a preliminary analysis, please refer to Section 2.1 of the EA. The analysis was used as part of establishing the 400-gram plutonium-239 limit for RLUOB under the Proposed Action. Future, more detailed, analyses will be conducted to ensure that all required technical and administrative controls would be implemented at RLUOB to maintain worker and public safety. The analyses presented in this EA represent bounding quantities of materials at risk and minimal controls. There is no expectation that the next version of the safety analyses will require in the existing PF-4 for these operations

NNSA has long recognized the need to transfer AC and MC activities that have historically been performed in the CMR Building to other facilities at LANL. NNSA evaluated such transfers in NEPA documentation issued in 2003 (DOE 2003b), 2011 (DOE 2011c) and 2015 (DOE 2015a). The subprojects in DOE’s fiscal year 2019 budget request were addressed by these prior NEPA documents. As implied by the commenter, the Proposed Action evaluated in this EA includes recategorizing RLUOB to a MAR-limited Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility. The recategorization would increase the amount of plutonium-239 equivalent material from the currently authorized level of 38.6 grams to 400 grams. The current EA builds on this past NEPA documentation and the same types of AC and MC activities would occur under the Proposed Action, as well as the No Action, as those previously evaluated. The difference is that under the Proposed Action evaluated in this EA, more AC and MC activities would be performed in RLUOB and fewer in PF-4. As addressed in Section 2.1 of the EA, the Proposed Action would provide a variety of environmental and other benefits such as fewer worker radiation exposures, less waste generation, lower costs, and improved laboratory efficiency.

With respect to the concern about safety features being discounted due to the recent announcement regarding recapitalization of plutonium pit production (NNSA 2018), and complete the necessary analyses and RODs prior to proceeding with actions related to increases above currently authorized pit production levels. Whereas this EA acknowledges the need for enduring AC and MC capabilities that have historically been performed in the CMR Building, this EA is not “solely about relocating operations” from the CMR Building. Please refer to Chapter 1, Section 1.0, which defines the Proposed Action as the recategorization of RLUOB to a Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility in order to maximize the use of RLUOB laboratory space for AC and MC operations and reduce the amount of space required in the existing PF-4 for these operations.
"preliminary analysis." A fuller EIS should be based on completed, documented analysis.

- This proposal to raise the Rad Lab’s limit to 400 grams of Pu-239 equivalent is all about LANL’s future plutonium mission, which is no mystery. That future mission involves expanding production from the currently sanctioned level of 20 pits per year to 80 pits per year by 2027, statutorily required by the FY 2015 National Defense Authorization Act.

- This is further reinforced by the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Project’s troubled history. Briefly, NNSA has repeatedly sought (but failed) through various NEPA processes to raise the limit on plutonium pit production from that originally set by the 1996 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS). Its Record of Decision relocated the plutonium pit production mission to LANL after a 1989 FBI investigation of environmental crimes at the Rocky Flats Plant abruptly stopped production. It specifically limited pit production to 20 pits per year because of the deteriorated conditions at the old CMR Building that constrained analytical chemistry and materials characterization operations in support of plutonium pit production.

In 2011 NNSA completed a Supplemental EIS for the CMRR-Nuclear Facility, only to cancel it after its estimated costs soared to $6.5 billion. However, an internal NNSA study had advocated for 22,500 square feet of plutonium lab space in the CMRR-Nuclear Facility, “resulting in a production capacity of 50-80 ppy” (pits per year). This draft Rad Lab EA now seeks to create that same square footage of plutonium lab space, not coincidentally the amount needed to support expanded plutonium pit production. Ironically, future production is not to maintain the safety and reliability of the existing nuclear weapons stockpile. It is instead for speculative future “Interoperable Warheads” for both land and submarine-launched missiles that the Navy doesn’t even want. The point is that the mission of future plutonium pit production needs critical examination because the re-categorization of the Rad Lab to a nuclear facility is arguably not even needed.
Commenter No. 32 (cont’d): Claude Francois

- Should NNSA decide on May 11 to conduct future plutonium pit production at the Savannah River Site, or perhaps also at LANL, then clearly a new or supplemental programmatic environmental impact statement (PEIS) is needed. Moreover, any decision to expand plutonium pit production above the current limit of 20 pits per year would require a new or supplemental PEIS, regardless of future location(s).

- The draft Rad lab EA lists four “reasonably foreseeable future actions” that could lead to cumulative impacts at LANL. It is striking that expanded plutonium pit production is omitted, since it is not only reasonably foreseeable, but is actually congressionally required and actively planned for. It’s difficult to believe this omission is just a simple oversight, when it is so glaringly obvious, perhaps indicative of an intent to avoid the subject of expanded plutonium pit production altogether. That should be corrected in a fuller environmental impact statement or programmatic EIS.

- The FY 2019 NNSA budget request states beryllium analysis will be a specific capability under the Proposed Action. Yet there are only two passing references to beryllium in the draft EA, when it is a widely known, potentially severe occupational hazard across the DOE’s nuclear weapons complex. Moreover, a February 2018 DOE Inspector General report found longstanding deficiencies in LANL’s beryllium disease prevention program. Therefore, it is particularly notable that this draft Rad Lab environmental assessment fails to analyze potential beryllium occupational exposures, which a full EIS should correct.

- In violation of declared DOE NEPA policy, this draft Rad Lab EA fails to have any analysis of Intentional Destructive Acts (defined as acts of sabotage or terrorism, including deliberate airplane crashes). This glaring deficiency should be corrected in a full environmental impact statement.

DOE and NNSA should always hyperlink all reference documents in all NEPA documents.

32-1 cont’d

32-2 The recent announcement regarding recapitalization of defense plutonium capabilities, which includes a proposal for an increased level of pit production at LANL (NNSA 2018), now makes increased pit production a reasonably foreseeable action. In this final EA, the cumulative impacts analysis was revised to reflect a potential increase from the currently authorized 20 pits per year production level as a reasonably foreseeable future action. However, detailed strategies, production planning, and supportive politics, as well as appropriations, will need to occur to increase the level of pit production. This particular cumulative analysis is more appropriate for future actions requiring a pit production NEPA analysis. NNSA does not have the detailed information as to what is required in terms of planning in order to conduct an accurate non-speculative cumulative impacts analysis from increased operations other than to say that the RLUOB and PF-4 process improvements would result in safer more efficient operations regardless of production level.

32-3 As addressed in Section C.2.4, “General Concerns that the Accident Analysis is Inadequate,” of this CRD, historic operations involving finely divided, respirable beryllium have been a concern with DOE and NNSA and lessons learned from past operations are applied through industrial hygiene programs at LANL. Section 4.1.2.3 of the final EA was revised to clearly communicate that operations that would generate finely divided, respirable beryllium are not within the scope of RLUOB activities. However, RLUOB would provide capabilities to perform chemical analyses of smear samples and air monitoring filters obtained from areas potentially contaminated with beryllium, and to analyze the beryllium content of beryllium-containing or contaminated compounds.

32-4 Sections 4.2.1.3 and 4.2.2 of the final EA were revised to address potential intentional destructive acts. Please refer to Section C.2.4, “General Concerns that the Accident Analysis is Inadequate,” of this CRD for NNSA’s response to this comment. The bounding accident analysis addresses the consequences of intentional destructive acts.

32-5 NNSA made all references used in the RLUOB EA available electronically on the project’s NEPA website (https://energy.gov/node/2501991). A hyperlink is given for each reference.
Commenter No. 32 (cont’d): Claude Francois

In sum, following its May 11 decision on plutonium pit production, NNSA should proceed to a fuller environmental impact statement that analyzes interconnected proposals for relocating analytical chemistry and materials characterization operations at LANL. Should NNSA decide to conduct production at the Savannah River Site, or also at LANL, it should then proceed to a programmatic environmental impact statement that analyses all aspects of future plutonium pit production.

Sincerely,

Claude Francois
Chamisal 87521

Response side of this page intentionally left blank.
Commenter No. 33: Ross Lockridge

From: Ross Lockridge  
Sent: Wednesday, April 25, 2018 4:39:08 PM  
To: RLUOBEA  
Subject: Comments on the Draft EA & Increased pu Production

I too oppose to any expansion (as the EA contemplates) of DOE’s plutonium production program at Los Alamos National Laboratories (LANL).

Increased plutonium production of course puts us all in more danger. This is especially apparent given LANL’s poor safety record.

Ross Lockridge  
Cerrillos, NM 87010

The Proposed Action evaluated in this EA is to recategorize RLUOB to a MAR-limited Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility and to perform more AC and MC laboratory operations at RLUOB and less in PF-4 than was evaluated in previous NEPA documents. The need for enduring AC and MC capabilities at LANL is independent of the level of pit production. Please refer to Sections C.2.1, “General Opposition to Pit Production,” and Section C.2.6, “General Concerns and Opposition to Increased Plutonium Limits at RLUOB due to LANL Safety Issues,” of this CRD.
Comment No. 34: Christopher E. Paine

NNSA Los Alamos Field Office
April 25, 2018

ATTN: CMRR Project Management Office
3747 West Jemez Road
Los Alamos, NM 87544

Via email to RLUOBEA@hq.doe.gov

Dear Sir/Madam:

I was appalled recently to learn that NNSA is again considering a “Finding of No Significant Impact” (FONSI) under NEPA as the vehicle for raising the operational limit for Plutonium-239 in the Radiological Laboratory Utility and Office Building (“Rad-Lab”) – this time to 400 grams (or the equivalent in other isotopes) – allowing the facility to be re-categorized from a “Radiological Facility” to a “Hazard Category-3” nuclear facility. This would be a grossly irresponsible and indeed illegal agency action – for the following reasons:

1. **THIS EA REPRESENTS AN UNWARRANTED ATTEMPT AT NEPA “SEGMENTATION.”** NNSA disingenuously argues that this Rad Lab EA is limited to relocating operations from the deteriorating CMR Building so that LANL will have enduring analytical capabilities to support its ongoing plutonium mission. This flimsy pretense flies in the face of NNSA’s prior declaration that on May 11, 2018 it will announce a major programmatic proposal on where it intends to conduct future expanded plutonium pit production: either at LANL; at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina; or possibly at both sites. In other words, LANL’s “ongoing plutonium mission” is in the midst of being REDEFINED, and the Rad-Lab’s enhanced capabilities are intimately connected to this process. NEPA requires that interconnected agency actions, which either separately or together comprise “a major federal action” with significant environmental impacts, must be considered together and subjected to a full-fledged environmental impact process with public participation.

34-1 Please refer to Section C.2.3, “General Concerns that the EA Approach Results in Segmentation of the NEPA Process and a Programmatic EIS Is Needed,” of this CRD for NNSA’s response on this subject. The need for enduring AC and MC capabilities at LANL is independent of the level of pit production and NNSA has determined that an EA is the correct level of NEPA analysis for the Proposed Action. NNSA will determine the appropriate level of NEPA documentation to support the recent announcement regarding recapitalization of plutonium pit production, which includes a proposal for an increased level of pit production at LANL (NNSA 2018), and complete the necessary analyses and RODs prior to proceeding with actions related to increases above currently authorized pit production levels.
2. **THE SUBJECT OF THIS EA IS A CONNECTED “SUB-PROJECT” OF A $2 BILLION DOLLAR FEDERAL LINE ITEM PROJECT.** The Rad Lab’s planned re-categorization into a Hazard Category-3 nuclear facility is but one of four “subprojects” of a “Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) Project” in NNSA’s FY 2019 budget request. All four subprojects involve relocating analytical chemistry and materials characterization capabilities plutonium and other special nuclear materials out of the old CMR building, and together these subprojects will likely cost taxpayers on the order of $2 billion. Under NEPA, impact analysis of the narrow question of raising the plutonium limit in the Rad-Lab cannot be arbitrarily “segmented” from the impacts of these other three subprojects, as they are all clearly connected components that comprise a larger “CMRR Project.”

3. **THE DRAFT EA DOES NOT DEMONSTRATE THE LEVEL OF “INDEPENDENT UTILITY” FOR FACILITY HAZARD RECATEGORIZATION NEEDED TO JUSTIFY SEPARATE NEPA CONSIDERATION, APART FROM NNSA’S OTHER IMPENDING ACTIONS INVOLVING PIT PRODUCTION.** NNSA cannot assert, on the one hand, that the proposed hazard recategorization has the required “independent utility” and minimal environmental impacts needed to be the rightful object of a FONSI, while on the other hand, failing to demonstrate that LANL’s present plutonium mission could not be adequately served within the Rad-Lab’s already raised limit of 38.6 grams Pu-239 equivalent (up from the original 8.4 grams). In the absence of such a technical showing, the proposed hazard recategorization remains, by default, joined at the hip to the proposed expansion of pit production capacity, and therefore inextricably linked to the programmatic analysis of alternatives for satisfying NNSA’s purpose and need for undertaking THAT Proposed Action, announcement of which is pending.

34-2 NNSA has long recognized the need to transfer AC and MC activities that have historically been performed in the CMR Building to other facilities at LANL. NNSA evaluated such transfers in NEPA documentation issued in 2003 (DOE 2003b), 2011 (DOE 2011c) and 2015 (DOE 2015a). The subprojects in DOE’s fiscal year 2019 budget request were addressed by these prior NEPA documents. The current EA builds on this past NEPA documentation and the same types of AC and MC activities would occur under the Proposed Action as those previously evaluated. The difference is that under the Proposed Action evaluated in this EA, more AC and MC activities would be performed in RLUOB and fewer in PF-4. Please refer to Section C.2.3, “General Concerns that the EA Approach Results in Segmentation of the NEPA Process and a Programmatic EIS Is Needed,” of this CRD for additional information.

34-3 NNSA does not agree with the premise that there must be a showing that the present plutonium mission cannot be served within RLUOB’s current limit in order for the action proposed in this EA to not be inextricably connected to an expansion of pit production. NNSA’s 2015 Supplement Analysis (DOE 2015a) identified a means of providing AC and MC so that LANL could proceed with transferring those capabilities from the CMR Building, by using a combination of laboratory space in RLUOB (with a plutonium-239 equivalent limit of 38.6 grams) and PF-4; this is the No Action Alternative in the current analysis. Under the Proposed Action, the RLUOB plutonium-239 equivalent limit would be increased to 400 grams, allowing some of the capabilities that were to be installed and performed in PF-4 to be installed and performed in RLUOB. As addressed in Section 2.1 of the EA, the Proposed Action would provide a variety of environmental and other benefits such as fewer worker radiation exposures, less waste generation, lower costs, and improved laboratory efficiency. The need for enduring AC and MC capabilities at LANL is independent of the level of pit production and the Proposed Action is a means of providing them. Please refer to Section C.2.3, “General Concerns that the EA Approach Results in Segmentation of the NEPA Process and a Programmatic EIS Is Needed,” of this CRD for additional information.
Commenter No. 34 (cont’d): Christopher E. Paine

4. **THE EA/FONSI ROUTE IS NOT CREDIBLE IN VIEW OF EXISTING STATUTORY MANDATES TO INCREASE PIT PRODUCTION.** Indeed, NNSA’s attempt to sever the proposed facility hazard recategorization from its pending announcement of proposed action(s) to implement expanded plutonium pit production capacity—from the currently sanctioned level of 20 pits per year to 80 pits per year by 2027—appears untenable on its face, as such future expansion is already mandated by the FY 2015 National Defense Authorization Act.

5. **THE DRAFT EA’S TRUNCATED SAFETY ANALYSIS IS NOT CREDIBLE IN THE LIGHT OF RECENT SAFETY PROBLEMS WITH RADIONUCLIDES AT LANL.** In view of the persistent and well-documented safety problems LANL has experienced in its plutonium and radioactive waste handling operations in recent years, NNSA’s discounting of the need for additional safety features, based on a “preliminary analysis,” is simply not credible. Any rejection of additional safety features must be based on a thorough and complete NEPA analysis open to peer review and comment by independent scientists and the public.

6. **THE DRAFT EA FAILS TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE BERYLLIUM HAZARD.** The FY 2019 NNSA budget request states beryllium analysis will be a specific capability of the subproject analyzed in the draft EA. Yet this document contains but two passing references to beryllium, which is a well-known and severe occupational hazard across DOE’s nuclear weapons complex. Moreover, a February 2018 DOE Inspector General report found long-standing deficiencies in LANL’s beryllium disease prevention program. Therefore, it is particularly notable that this draft Rad Lab environmental assessment fails to analyze potential beryllium occupational exposures. This deficiency must be corrected in a comprehensive EIS.

34-4 Please refer to the response to comment 34-1.

34-5 NNSA has not discounted the need for additional safety features. Rather, as part of a regimented, stepwise process, NNSA has conducted the first in a series of safety analyses and evaluations to determine the appropriate level of safety systems, structures, and components commensurate with the amount of material to be managed within RLUOB. As discussed in Section 2.1 of the EA, the analysis was used as part of establishing the 400-gram plutonium-239 limit for RLUOB under the Proposed Action. Future, more detailed, analyses would be conducted to ensure that all required technical and administrative controls would be implemented at RLUOB to maintain worker and public safety. The analyses presented in the EA represent bounding quantities of materials at risk and minimal controls. There is no expectation that the next version of the safety analyses will require a modification of the potential impacts analysis conclusions in the EA. Please also refer to Section C.2.6, “General Concerns and Opposition to Increased Plutonium Limits at RLUOB due to LANL Safety Issues,” of this CRD regarding safety at LANL.

34-6 As addressed in Section C.2.4, “General Concerns that the Accident Analysis is Inadequate,” of this CRD, historic operations involving finely divided, respirable beryllium have been a concern with DOE and NNSA and lessons learned from past operations are applied through industrial hygiene programs at LANL. Section 4.1.2.3 of the final EA was revised to clearly communicate that operations that would generate finely divided, respirable beryllium are not within the scope of RLUOB activities. However, RLUOB would provide capabilities to perform chemical analyses of smear samples and air monitoring filters obtained from areas potentially contaminated with beryllium, and to analyze the beryllium content of beryllium-containing or contaminated compounds.
Commenter No. 34 (cont’d): Christopher E. Paine

7. THE EA FAILS TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF INTENTIONAL DESTRUCTIVE ACTS.

In violation of declared DOE NEPA policy, this draft Rad Lab EA fails to analyze how the proposed increase in plutonium (or other radionuclide) inventory would affect the consequences of Intentional Destructive Acts (defined as acts of sabotage or terrorism, including deliberate airplane crashes). This deficiency should be corrected in a full environmental impact statement, which must also take account of the impact of increased Pu-pit production on the potential consequences of Intentional Destructive Acts.

In closing, it seems abundantly clear that a FONSI in this instance would be unwarranted and indeed a blatant violation of NEPA. Instead, NNSA should forthwith prepare two documents: a PEIS setting forth the purpose and need, and environmental impacts and risks, of pursuing various programmatic alternatives for increasing pit production capacity from 20 to 80 pits per year (including the mandatory alternative of No Action beyond the status quo); and subsequently, a site-specific EIS for each pit production alternative chosen.

Sincerely,

Christopher E. Paine
Charlottesville, VA

34-7 Sections 4.2.1.3 and 4.2.2 of the final EA were revised to address potential intentional destructive acts. Please refer to Section C.2.4, “General Concerns that the Accident Analysis is Inadequate,” of this CRD for additional information.

34-8 As noted in the response to comment 34-1, NNSA determined that an EA was the appropriate level of NEPA analysis for the Proposed Action to recategorize RLUOB to a MAR-limited Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility and to perform more AC and MC laboratory operations at RLUOB and less at PF-4 than was evaluated in prior NEPA documents. As also noted, NNSA will determine the appropriate level of NEPA documentation to analyze the programmatic and site-specific alternatives for potential changes to plutonium pit production (NNSA 2018).
Commenter No. 35: Susan Rodriguez

From: D&S Rodriguez
Sent: Wednesday, April 25, 2018 8:17:50 PM
To: RLUOBEA
Subject: expanded production of plutonium pits

Attention DOE:

I oppose expansion of DOE’s plutonium pit production program at Los Alamos National Laboratories. Given the poor safety record at LANL, increased pu production puts us all at risk.

Sincerely,

Susan Rodriguez
Trl NM 87120

The Proposed Action evaluated in this EA is to recategorize RLUOB to a MAR-limited Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility and to perform more AC and MC laboratory operations at RLUOB and less at PF-4 than was evaluated in prior NEPA documents. The need for enduring AC and MC capabilities at LANL is independent of the level of pit production. Please refer to Section C.2.1, “General Opposition to Pit Production,” for additional information. Please refer to Section C.2.6, “General Concerns and Opposition to Increased Plutonium Limits at RLUOB due to LANL Safety Issues,” of this CRD for NNSA’s response to your concerns about the LANL safety record.
Comments

In this draft EA (DEA), the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) continues, and brings to its penultimate point, a jigsaw puzzle of interconnected and partial National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) analyses and Records of Decision (RODs) some two decades in the making, to support expanded industrial plutonium operations at LANL including a) expanded warhead core ("pit") production and b) expanded pit disassembly and conversion (PDC) to plutonium dioxide.

In the subject DEA, NNSA relies on or amends a variety of prior NEPA programmatic environmental impact statements (PEISs), EISs, EAs, supplemental PEISs (SPEISs), supplemental EISs (SEISs), Site-Wide EISs (SWEISs) and their annual updates (SWEIS "Yearbooks"), and supplement analyses (SAs) dating variously from 1996 to 2018.

It is a gigantic, long-running, adventitious segmentation of NEPA analyses. This is the most important failure of this draft EA.

While we can be sympathetic to these failings on a personal level given the complex way the subjects have evolved over the past two decades or so, as a genuine NEPA document it just won't do.

The statutory purpose of NEPA analyses is to support prospective federal decisions for major federal actions having a significant impact on the environment. All reasonable alternatives to the proposed action must be analyzed in an EIS, not in a hodge-podge of miscellaneous NEPA documents of varying ages and contexts which do not clarify present federal alternatives and their respective impacts.

As a rule, and in this case, NNSA practices NEPA in such a way as to mostly avoid its stated purposes.

To some extent the present segmentation could be fixed, but not in this or any EA process. A programmatic plutonium EIS is needed, as several NNSA and Department of Energy (DOE) sites and programs are involved in the decisions inherent to this EA.

To be very clear, no Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) should be issued in this case, for reasons partially elaborated below.

A result of this segmentation is that there has been no EIS for industrial pit production (at LANL or anywhere else) and no EIS for industrial PDC (at LANL or anywhere else). The industrial pit production and PDC decisions are linked, and these are in turn linked to decisions about plutonium storage and disposal actions.

The commenter notes that this EA relies on or amends a number of prior NEPA documents. It is NNSA’s position is that this is not segmentation, but a proper incorporation by reference of information from prior NEPA analyses. NNSA has long recognized the need to transfer AC and MC activities that have historically been performed in the CMR Building to other facilities at LANL. NNSA evaluated such transfers in NEPA documentation issued in 2003 (DOE 2003b), 2011 (DOE 2011c) and 2015 (DOE 2015a). The subprojects referred to in the comment were addressed by these prior NEPA documents. The current EA builds on this past NEPA documentation and the same types of AC and MC activities would occur under the Proposed Action, as well as the No Action, as those previously evaluated. The difference is that under the Proposed Action evaluated in this EA, more AC and MC activities would be performed in RLUOB and fewer in PF-4. Please refer to Section C.2.3, “General Concerns that the EA Approach Results in Segmentation of the NEPA Process and a Programmatic EIS Is Needed,” of this CRD for NNSA’s response on this subject.

Other NEPA analyses referred to by the commenter regarding levels of pit production and performance of pit disassembly and conversion are not a component of the Proposed Action, thus, not within the scope of this EA. However, NNSA notes that each of these major federal actions has been, and will continue to be, appropriately addressed in their respective NEPA documents.
Our single most important comment is therefore to conduct a plutonium PEIS process and, subsequent to (a) comprehensive ROD(s) pursuant to that PEIS, EISs for specific projects such as the one in question here, EISs which are complete in themselves and which use real "no action" alternatives. Needless to say, reliance on a labyrinth of by-now-ancient and faulty EISs which did not examine the whole suite of realistic alternatives at the time (as subsequent events have shown), and still less do so today, can hardly be said to comply with NEPA. It has been NNSA’s practice – continued in this DEA – to posit "No Action" alternatives which are actually huge positive actions, often continued actions, and then to use extremely conservative "bounding analyses" for impacts such as waste production from these "No Action" alternatives, so that the apparent marginal impacts of proposed new programs or increases in programs are less than the artificially-constructed "bounding envelope" of "No Action" impacts. In this way the proposed new actions have (apparently) no new impacts and may even appear to be environmental "improvements," on paper at least. This is fraudulent practice. Rather than trying to improve this EA, we recommend halting the present process in favor of the approach outlined above.

If and when this EA is finalized and the expected FONSI issued, which the carefully limited (and therefore misleading) analysis presented would seem to support, NNSA will have the documents in place to:

- Press on with line item construction (in O4-D-125, the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement [CMRR] project) of the:
  - "RLUOB Equipment Installation Phase Two" (REI2) Subproject (total project cost [TPC], $633 million [M]);
  - "Re-categorizing RLUOB to Hazard Category 3 (RC3) Subproject (TPC $339 M), which together with the previous subproject and the two completed RLUOB subprojects (the original RLUOB construction and REI1, with TPCs $199M and $197M respectively) would make RLUOB a $1.4 billion (B) building, the most expensive single construction project in the history of NM by far;
  - "PF-4 [LANL’s main plutonium facility] Equipment Installation Phase 1 (PEI1) Subproject" ($394 M), and the
  - "PF-4 Equipment Installation Phase 2 (PEI2) Subproject" ($674 M).

The first two of these go toward capabilities and missions at RLUOB which were never part of earlier NEPA analyses or representations to NM communities and to Indian tribes, and which, we believe, violate numerous Department of Energy (DOE) regulations and orders regarding construction of nuclear facilities.

- Continue with modifications to PF-4 under these two subprojects and other line items to support expanded industrial missions, "covered" (not) under other NEPA analyses.

- Issue an amended ROD selecting all or part of the "Expanded Operations" alternative in NNSA’s 2008 LANL SWEIS, a prospect mentioned in the 2018 LANL SWEIS SA issued earlier this month, enabling.

NNSA believes that it has appropriately addressed the No Action Alternative in this EA. As explained in the Council on Environmental Quality’s Forty Most Asked Questions Concerning CEQ’s NEPA Regulations (CEQ 1981), Section 1502.14(d) requires inclusion of a No Action Alternative in EISs, “but there are two distinct interpretations of ‘no action’ that must be considered, depending on the nature of the proposal being evaluated.” As further explained, “the ‘no action’ alternative may be thought of in terms of continuing with the present course of action until that action is changed.” This is the case for this RLUOB EA, in which the No Action Alternative reflects a continuation of actions from previous NNSA decisions on how to provide AC and MC capabilities.
Commenter No. 36 (cont’d): Greg Mello, Los Alamos Study Group

- NNSA’s (already patent) decision to expand War Reserve (WR) pit production beyond the ROD-limited 20 pits per year (ppy), to 30 ppy at LANL, and
- a possible NNSA decision - which could come as early as next month (May 2018), or years from now - to increase pit production at LANL to 80 ppy (and quite possibly up to an implied circa 160 ppy in two shifts). We believe modification of RLUOB to an HC3 facility would provide adequate AC services for this large mission.

- Issue, if desired, a ROD based on NNSA’s Plutonium Disposition Supplemental EIS (SPDSEIS) to support processing 35 metric tons (MT) of pits and other forms of plutonium into plutonium dioxide of greater or lesser purity at LANL depending on final disposition, involving greater or lesser AC services in RLUOB as needed. We believe a HC3 RLUOB could support this mission as well.

- Construct or upgrade whatever other facilities and infrastructure are necessary to support these expanded industrial missions. Once the big decisions were made - and making RLUOB a Hazard Category 3 (H3) Nuclear Facility is one of them - it would then seem essential, efficient, and safer to fill in any facility “gaps.” The cumulative impacts of all these decisions would be captured only after they were made.

In other words, a decision to dramatically change the mission and functions of LANL is being taken in an entirely segmented fashion. A more opaque and confusing “NEPA” process could hardly be devised.

The second major failure of this DEA is that, as we believe, the “decision” to upgrade RLUOB, a Radiological Facility, to a HC3 Nuclear Facility has in fact already been made, funded, and is underway.

In many ways NNSA has been and remains the enabling passenger, not the driver, in this process. This DEA is a sort of legal “cleanup operation” aimed at “covering” de facto decisions already taken.

In that regard, conceptual design (Critical Decision Zero [CD-0]) for RC3 was completed in 2014, as was selection of a construction alternative and cost range (CD-1). We believe the core enabling structural and mechanical infrastructure for the HC3 “decision” was built a long time before this, prior to 2010. In the language of NEPA, NNSA has already irreversibly committed major federal resources to the goals of the RC3 subproject.

No separate cost ranges for the two alternatives were ever presented to Congress or the public. Congress has been funding the CMRR project with each active subproject configured assuming eventual completion of RC3 ever since RC3 was formally added to the CMRR project in the February 2016 CMRR Project Data Sheet, submitted to Congress for FY2017 funding, which Congress provided. Not continuing with RC3 does not appear to be a contemplated option at this point.

In this DEA, NNSA’s preferred alternative - converting RLUOB to an HC3 facility - is generally described as having a lower environmental and worker health impact than operating RLUOB as a Radiological Facility (the “No Action Alternative”) because more of the (unquantified) AC and MC missions would need to be done in PF-4 in the misnamed “no action” case. This is misleading for several reasons.

As characterized in this EA, recategorizing RLUOB from a Radiological Facility to a MAR-limited Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility is a Proposed Action by NNSA. This EA was prepared so that NNSA could evaluate potential environmental impacts of the action and alternatives and determine if the Proposed Action meets the NEPA standard for a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) or whether it is necessary to prepare an EIS. Because of the timing related to the budget cycle, NNSA included the Proposed Action as a subproject prior to a decision so that the project could proceed in a timely manner if the NEPA analysis supported the issuance of a FONSI.
36-4 Modifications to and operations in both PF-4 and RLUOB are described in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 of the EA for the Proposed Action and No Action Alternatives, respectively. The descriptions are sufficient to evaluate the potential environmental impacts of the two alternatives. Under the Proposed Action, a certain amount of space in PF-4 that is currently occupied by enclosures and equipment for other purposes would not be converted to use for AC and MC activities. The removal of the enclosures and equipment and future modification of this space for a different use will undergo a NEPA analysis when a proposal and adequate information are available.

36-5 The Proposed Action in this EA is to recategorize RLUOB to a MAR-limited Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility and to perform more AC and MC laboratory operations at RLUOB and less in PF-4 than was evaluated in prior NEPA documents. The need for enduring AC and MC capabilities at LANL is independent of the level of pit production. Chapters 4 and 5 of this EA present the analysis of operational impacts in RLUOB and PF-4 with and without the Proposed Action.

36-6 As stated in this EA, the Proposed Action includes a MAR limit of 400 grams of plutonium-239 equivalent; NNSA does not intend on introducing higher quantities of material into the facility. Section 2.2 of this EA explains that further changes to the amount of material allowed in RLUOB would require physical, as well as administrative, changes to meet higher security and safety standards. The RLUOB was designed and built to engineering standards for a Radiological Facility.

As indicated in Section 2.3.1 of the EA, the RLUOB facility was built to robust seismic standards. The RLUOB structure and equipment anchorages in radiological spaces meet the requirements for seismic Performance Category (PC)-2 as provided in DOE standard DOE-STD-1020-2002, Natural Phenomena Hazards Design and Evaluation Criteria for Department of Energy Facilities (DOE 2002), while the remainder of the facility meets the requirements of seismic PC-1 (LANL 2011). The RLUOB was built to PC-2 requirements that follow the 2003 version of the International Building Code (IBC) and the codes that it invoked. By invoking PC-2, the design seismic loads were increased by 50 percent over PC-1 through the requirement that the Importance Factor (I) be 1.5.

For a facility built to the standards of RLUOB, the design of the structure, systems, and components should ensure the operability of essential facilities and/or to prevent physical injury to in-facility workers. The structures, systems, and components should also result in limited structural damage from design-basis natural phenomena events (such as an earthquake) to ensure minimal interruption of facility operation and repair following such an event.
Commenter No. 36 (cont’d): Greg Mello, Los Alamos Study Group

NNSA now proposes to recategory RLUOB so as to contain up to 311 times the mass of plutonium previously claimed (2,610 grams vs. 8.4 grams Pu-239 equivalent [Pu-239eq]). Limiting the portion of the total material present which counts as material at risk (MAR) to 400 grams can be achieved by physically protecting samples better, so a "MAR-limited" inventory of 400 grams could well mean a total inventory of 2,610 grams.

Once the HC3 barrier is breached as is proposed, the barriers to further increasing inventory beyond the upper HC3 threshold quantity, largely involve paperwork. Exceptions and temporary excursions can be made in cases of "national emergency" and indeed for much less compelling reasons as well. Emergency "backup" plans are already on the books, and have been briefed to Congress and others, for larger-scale pit production. Even security category threshold quantities might be suspended at RLUOB with compensatory measures.

Up to 16,000 grams of low-grade plutonium materials - dilute solutions, for example - can be stored in a Security Category 1 facility. Could RLUOB handle that much, in a pinch?

If national security depended on it – in the collective counsel of the Nuclear Weapons Council and congressional defense committees, for example – and if most of the hardware were already in place, suspension of the normal DOE orders would be relatively trivial. Even on a good day compliance with DOE orders - essentially, memos-to-file - is spotty. No external regulatory body has jurisdiction over worker and public safety at NNSA facilities except as regards some effluents and waste streams. Or, as the Congressional Research Service has suggested in the case of RLUOB, Congress could simply suspend rules found to be onerous by fiat.

Contrary to vague representations in this draft EA, RLUOB was not designed and built as a nuclear facility. The procedures and quality standards of 10 CFR 830 for nuclear facilities were not followed. Its structural design, for example, was completed prior to construction? With DOE orders essentially, memos-to-file - it is spotty. No external regulatory body has jurisdiction over worker and public safety at NNSA facilities except as regards some effluents and waste streams. Or, as the Congressional Research Service has suggested in the case of RLUOB, Congress could simply suspend rules found to be onerous by fiat.

Contrary to vague representations in this draft EA, RLUOB was not designed and built as a nuclear facility. The procedures and quality standards of 10 CFR 830 for nuclear facilities were not followed. Its structural design, for example, was completed prior to publication of LANS’s 2007 probabilistic seismic hazard assessment and did not incorporate its findings. Limited, voluntary, unaudited compliance with NQA-1 requirements is non-compliance. A sony list of presumptive NQA-1 violations at RLUOB could be prepared. Even after completion International Building Code (IBC) violations were discovered at RLUOB. Only parts of RLUOB meet PC-2 standards for seismic performance, for example.

We know of no external review of these issues.

Significant quality problems dogged RLUOB construction, as LANS officials later explained to an industry audience. Repeated structural changes were made, sometimes literally on restaurant napkins, leading to subcontractor litigation.

As originally described, with a 8.4 g Pu-239 limit as was necessary for a radiological laboratory, RLUOB could not have had any viable AC or MC mission. Wasn’t the decision to “convert” RLUOB to a nuclear facility somehow actually taken prior to construction, or at the very latest during construction?

- At 8.4 g Pu-239eq, what were the missions of RLUOB’s 26 laboratories, each 750 sq. ft., totaling 19,500 sq. ft. Again, there could not be many, or perhaps even any AC or MC mission. Divided evenly across 26 labs that’s 323 milligrams per laboratory. Surely the heavy equipment installed years ago (as shown in public presentations and publications) is not for such small quantities of plutonium.

For a new Hazard Category 3 nuclear facility, DOE-Standard 1020-2012 instructs the reader to follow DOE-Standard 1189-2008, Appendix A, for establishing the seismic design category (SDC) requirement. From Table A.1 of DOE-STD-1189-2008, when collocated worker doses are less than 5 rem, the seismic requirement is SDC-1. All of the MAR limits are set to meet this limit; therefore, SDC-1 is the seismic requirement. In simple terms, SDC-1 is the equivalent of PC-1 and SDC-2 is the equivalent of PC-2. SDC-1 requires an Importance Factor of 1.0 versus an Importance Factor of 1.5 as required for SDC-2. The standards are thus different, but they are less stringent than those applied to the RLUOB design.

Although the current version of the IBC (2015) has increased seismic requirements over the 2003 version and the ground motion for the design basis earthquake at LANL has increased, the overall increases in loads at the SDC-1 level are still less than the seismic loads that RLUOB was designed for. Thus, the RLUOB meets the current seismic requirements of SDC-1.

Although seismic standards have evolved since the construction of RLUOB, the seismic requirements for a Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility like RLUOB are less than the seismic loads for which RLUOB was designed. RLUOB meets the current DOE seismic requirements. Nonetheless, the Seismic-Induced Spill and Fire accident scenario evaluated in the current EA does not take credit for the robust building structure. Rather, it is assumed that 10 percent of the radioactive material that becomes airborne from the accident would reach the atmosphere through cracks in the building or building rubble. As discussed in this EA, these assumptions are quite conservative.

As illustrated in Tables 14 and 15 of the EA, the realistic impacts to an onsite noninvolved worker (0.000063 rem) from a seismically induced spill and fire from the full 400 grams inventory of plutonium, assumed to be oxide powder, are far below the 5 rem requirements of DOE-STD-1189-2008. Even with unrealistic, non-physical, bounding assumptions such as all material is released from containers, all material is in the form of oxide powder, all material that becomes airborne is released from the laboratory area of RLUOB to the outside environment, the impacts to the non-involved or co-located worker are several orders of magnitude below the standard.

In the Section 1.5 discussion of related NEPA documentation, NNSA summarizes the evolution of plans for providing AC and MC capabilities to be moved out of the CMR Building. RLUOB was one of two facilities that were planned, the other being
With such a low limit on plutonium, why did LANS attempt to meet some nuclear facility standards during design and construction, at an extra cost of tens of millions?

After “completion” and [partial] occupancy of RLUOB (CD-4) in 2010, why were most of the RLUOB laboratories empty, with purposes “TBD,” as project officials explained? Upon information and belief this situation continued even after “completion” (CD-4) of RLUOB equipment installation (RE11) in 2013 and may still be the case today. Why were all these labs built? We posed this question to project managers but received no convincing answers. Why precisely were such massive and elaborate air handling and other mechanical systems needed for an 8.4 gram mission? Look at the heavy gloveboxes and other fixtures already installed, which by 2013 had cost $197 million (M) (RE11) over and above the cost of the facility itself ($199 M). Other radiological facilities at LANL, as far as we know fully compliant with radiological standards, have nowhere near such equipment.

NNSA changed the threshold quantity of plutonium allowable in RLUOB to 38.6 grams only in 2014. Why did NNSA wait seven years to do that, when DOE had promulgated new regulations for the higher limit in 2007 and had already put them into practice at other DOE sites? No one told the interested parties in NM that NNSA could and would raise the threshold quantity of plutonium in RLUOB by a factor of 4.6 until 2014. This date was long after an air-quality permit had been obtained and stipulated sign-offs from the appealing parties had been arranged (on the basis of 8.4 g).

LANL’s public plans and budgets for RLUOB began to involve upgrading the facility to a HC3 Nuclear Facility as early as 2012, six years ago. For all these reasons and others, we believe NNSA has already irreversibly committed large resources to transform RLUOB into a HC3 nuclear facility. The present EA process is just a deceptive formality. It is an elaborate lie that stands NEPA’s hope for “analysis first, decisions second” on its head. Bureaucratically, it is a “CYA” exercise.

Many of the critical judgments in this draft EA derive from analyses (not just data) in a “data call” conducted by Los Alamos National Security (LANS), a materially-interested party. The LANL M&O contractor cannot legally conduct NEPA analyses that affect its business interests (see: Council on Environmental Quality, NEPA “40 Questions”). Although the LANS contract is ending on September 30 of this year, about 99.8% of the staff will become employees of the next interest-conflicted management and operating (M&O) contractor, which may include one or more of the present LANS corporate partners. The universe of NNSA M&O contractors is comprised of a relatively small number of cooperating corporate entities, executives in which not infrequently move from company to company. For these reasons the change in LANL M&O contractor does not provide much insulation from conflict of interest concerns. The present DEA does not meet the conflict of interest “smell test.”

For example, it is LANS, we are told in this DEA, which has estimated that with an inventory limit of 400 grams PuE, “none of the current safety systems [at RLUOB], such as building ventilation, would require designation as safety class or safety significant to meet DOE requirements.” That is a highly-consequential judgment. This DEA cannot rely on LANL for it.

As the operating contractor at LANL, LANS is in the best position to provide technical data included in the Data Call report on which the impact analysis in the EA was performed. The EA was prepared by a NNSA-selected contractor who is independent of LANS. NNSA managed EA preparation and is solely responsible for the content and adequacy of the analysis. NNSA notes that the current safety systems are not required to be designated as safety class or safety significant. The EA accident analysis (see Section 4.2 and Appendix A of the EA) shows that with two proposed 400 grams plutonium-239 equivalent inventory limit, none of the bounding accidents analyzed, including the unlikely event of an earthquake followed by a fire, would result in unmitigated public and noninvolved worker radiological doses greater than regulatory limits (1 rem and 5 rem, respectively); therefore, no structures, systems, and components would need to be designated as safety class or safety significant. Please see the text box at the introduction of Section 3 of the EA for more details.
Commenter No. 36 (cont’d):  Greg Mello, Los Alamos Study Group

In this case and elsewhere, this DEA slides the distinction between 400 g \textit{MAE} and 400 g \textit{total} inventory.

Impact comparisons with activities now occurring in the old Chemistry and Metallurgy Research (CMR) building are irrelevant and bogus because NNSA has committed to ending those activities regardless of any decision made regarding RLUOB's HC or this EA – and long prior to completion of either alternative described here. All references to the CMR building are merely rhetorical and have no place here.

LANS has prepared a preliminary outline of the potential tasks required for RLUOB to become a HC3 facility (LA-UR-13-27404 R1, Don Shoemaker and Amy Wong). How many of these tasks and analyses have been done, in support of this decision? This DEA should have referenced those tasks.

The DEA states (p. 10) that

> Continued examination indicated that RLUOB could be safely recategorized as a Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility with a limiting PuE quantity of 400 grams, so that additional AC and MC work could be performed in RLUOB compared to that evaluated in the 2015 CMRR SA (DOE 2015a), with less AC and MC work performed in PF-4.

"Continued examination" \textit{by whom}? Isn't this (foregone) conclusion precisely what is supposedly being analyzed in the DEA?

Contrary to the DEA, we do not believe that inventories greater than 400 g Pu-239 in RLUOB need trigger criticality controls if limits are imposed on each separate laboratory.

Exemplary of the lack of objectivity in the document is the table on p. 27 showing background radiation doses to the public near LANL, said to range from 740-880 mrem/year. Why so high? Because everyone is assigned doses from radon, diagnostic and nuclear medicine, and consumer products of 300, 300, and 18 mrem respectively for these sources. In fact, many people do not receive these doses. The table should therefore give a grand total of something closer to 130-880 mrem/year, just using the DEA data presented, not 740-880 mrem/year.

The accident scenario in the DEA require closer review than we have done. We note that they suffer from the overall problem of being small in comparison to releases from PF-4. But what programs in PF-4 involve large plutonium inventories? Why, the same programs that are enabled by RLUOB and its transformation into a HC3 facility. Again the issue is not RLUOB's lab per se but rather a larger set of decisions, with larger consequent risks and impacts, that are nowhere to be seen in their entirety in this or any NEPA analysis, let alone seen the context of all reasonable alternatives, which is the NEPA standard.

Another besetting error, likewise stemming from fragmentation of analysis, is to assume, as the DEA does (p. 53), that "TRU waste from AC and MC operations would not be generated without the assurance of adequate and safe TRU waste management capacity."

A wag might ask, why start now? When has that capacity ever really been present at LANL?

On its face, the DEA describes what appears to be a wonderful set of environmental and worker safety improvements at LANL. Why would any federal decisionmaker not suspend or override existing safety regulations, setting a rather alarming precedent, in order to bring about these terrific improvements, which seem only the logical next links in a chain of decisions already taken?

The need for the Proposed Action in RLUOB is described in Section 1.2 of the EA and has not changed since the 2003 issuance of the CMRR EIS. The need is to provide the physical means for enduring AC and MC operations at LANL in a safe, secure, and environmentally sound manner that consolidates like activities. The primary comparison in this EA is between impacts of the No Action Alternative (performing AC and MC activities in RLUOB [operating as a Radiological Facility]) and PF-4) and the Proposed Action (performing more AC and MC activities in RLUOB [operating as a MAR-limited Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility] and fewer activities in PF-4). NNSA is committed to ceasing operations in the CMR Building; however, until the capabilities are provided in these other facilities, activities continue in the CMR Building. Consequently, emissions from the CMR Building continue and NNSA feels it is appropriate to disclose the associated potential impacts.

The document cited by the commenter is one of many peer documents that NNSA has prepared in support of LANL activities to provide AC and MC capabilities, including those associated with the Proposed Action. The EA analysis utilized descriptions and analytical sections that are relevant to the impacts analysis of the Proposed Action and Alternatives and cites those documents. An EA is intended to disclose and analyze the potential environmental impacts of a Proposed Action and Alternatives to briefly provide sufficient evidence for determining whether to prepare an EIS or support the issuance of a Finding of No Significant Impact.

By establishing the facility limit of 400 grams of plutonium-239 equivalent, additional controls such as individual laboratory limits are not needed.

The text in Section 4.1.1 of the EA indicates that some of the dose is from natural background radiation and some from manmade sources. Table 4 was revised in the final EA to more clearly distinguish between natural background radiation and manmade contributions to radiation dose.
The reality of the situation is quite different than portrayed in this DEA. An EA is the narrowest type of NEPA analysis, with few standards. Of NEPA analyses it is also the most closed to outside parties, having no requirement for scoping hearings for example. It is not adequate to the present NEPA task.

Commenter No. 36 (cont’d): Greg Mello, Los Alamos Study Group

The difference in the potential accident impacts between RLUOB and PF-4 are evidenced by the differences in the material at risk in the two facilities. The Proposed Action in RLUOB limits the amount of plutonium-239 equivalent to 400 grams; as discussed in Section 4.2.2, this is the amount potentially subject to spills and fires. As discussed in Section 4.2.1.1, implementation of the Proposed Action would not change the operational and seismic accidents in PF-4 evaluated in the SPD Supplemental EIS. In both the SPD Supplemental EIS and this EA, it is assumed for the seismically initiated facility-wide fire accident in PF-4 that the material at risk that is subject to spillage and fires is 2,600 kilograms of plutonium, the material at risk in the facility (not just the quantity that would be used for AC and MC).

Estimated TRU waste generation from facility modifications in RLUOB and PF-4 and from operations are presented in Section 4.3 of the EA. The potential impacts on waste management systems are also presented in Section 4.3, using the best available information. NNSA would ensure that there is adequate capacity to safely store TRU waste prior to transporting it to WIPP for disposal. WIPP has the capacity to take LANL generated TRU waste as well.

As shown in the analysis in the EA, the Proposed Action does result in fewer or lower environmental impacts than those associated with the No Action Alternative. In particular because there would be less work performed to modify space in PF-4 under the Proposed Action, less radioactive waste would be generated. Because there would be less work overall within the existing radiation environment of PF-4, worker radiation doses would be lower.

NNSA determined that an EA is the correct level of NEPA analysis to evaluate the potential impacts of the Proposed Action and No Action Alternative. The EA impacts analysis provides sufficient evidence and analysis to determine there are no significant impacts. Therefore, issuance of a Finding of No Significant Impact is appropriate. In addition to the required distribution of a draft EA, NNSA sent notifications to individuals and organizations who have expressed an interest in NEPA actions at LANL. NNSA also announced the availability online and in four local newspapers. Each of these notifications stated where the EA was available [along with the cited documents] for downloading or reading and invited public comment on the draft EA. All public comments were considered in the preparation of the final EA and issuance of the Finding of No Significant Impact.
Dear CMRR Project Management Office:

I am concerned about the environmental assessment for the Radiological Laboratory Utility and Office Building ("Rad Lab") at LANL. NNSA has proposed that the operational limit for Pu-239 at the Rad Lab be raised from 8.4 to 400 grams. The Rad Lab assessment will lead to a decision on whether to carry out a full Environmental Impact Statement concerning this proposed action or not. The proposed raising of the limit would cause the categorization of the Rad Lab to change from "Radiological Facility" to a Hazard Category-3 nuclear facility.

The National Environmental Policy Act requires that connected actions be considered together, and forbids segmentation into isolated projects. But the planned re-categorization of the Rad Lab is one of four "subprojects" in the budget request made by the NNSA for FY 2019. These projects all involve moving analytical chemistry and materials capabilities related to plutonium and other special nuclear materials out of the old Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Building. NNSA should analyze all four subprojects in one unified environmental impact statement. The draft Rad Lab assessment, which analyzes only raising the plutonium limit in the Rad Lab, is a clear example of the segmentation that NEPA does not allow.

Should NNSA decide on May 11 to conduct future plutonium pit production at either the Savannah River site or at LANL, then a new supplemental NEPA analysis is needed. Any decision to expand plutonium pit production beyond the current limit of 20 pits per year would require a new or supplemental PEIS.

The draft Rad Lab assessment lists several "reasonably foreseeable future actions" that might lead to cumulative impacts at LANL. This list of actions does not include increased plutonium pit production. Such expanded production is not only foreseeable, it is required by action of Congress, and currently in planning. Expanded pit production should be considered in a more complete environmental impact statement or PEIS.

The draft Rad Lab assessment does not discuss beryllium at any length. Beryllium is not only foreseeable, it is required by action of Congress, and currently in planning. Expanded pit production should be considered in a more complete environmental impact statement or PEIS.

Please refer to Section C.2.3, "General Concerns that the EA Approach Results in Segmentation of the NEPA Process and a Programmatic EIS Is Needed," of this CRD for NNSA’s response on this subject. NNSA will determine the appropriate level of NEPA documentation to support the recent announcement regarding recapitalization of plutonium pit production, which includes a proposal for an increased level of pit production at LANL (NNSA 2018), and complete the necessary analyses and RODs prior to proceeding with actions related to increases above currently authorized pit production levels.

The recent announcement regarding recapitalization of defense plutonium capabilities, which includes a proposal for an increased level of pit production at LANL (NNSA 2018), now makes increased pit production a reasonably foreseeable action. In this final EA, the cumulative impacts analysis was revised to reflect a potential increase from the currently authorized 20 pits per year production level as a reasonably foreseeable future action. However, detailed strategies, production planning, and supportive politics, as well as appropriations, will need to occur to increase the level of pit production. This particular cumulative analysis is more appropriate for future actions requiring a pit production NEPA analysis. NNSA does not have the detailed information as to what is required in terms of planning in order to conduct an accurate non-speculative cumulative impacts analysis from increased operations other than to say that the RLUOB and PF-4 process improvements would result in safer more efficient operations regardless of production level.

As addressed in Section C.2.4, "General Concerns that the Accident Analysis is Inadequate," of this CRD, historic operations involving finely divided, respirable...
beryllium have been a concern with DOE and NNSA and lessons learned from past operations are applied through industrial hygiene programs at LANL. Section 4.1.2.3 of the final EA was revised to clearly communicate that operations that would generate finely divided, respirable beryllium are not within the scope of RLUOB activities. However, RLUOB would provide capabilities to perform chemical analyses of smear samples and air monitoring filters obtained from areas potentially contaminated with beryllium, and to analyze the beryllium content of beryllium-containing or contaminated compounds.

Sections 4.2.1.3 and 4.2.2 of the final EA were revised to address potential intentional destructive acts. Please refer to Section C.2.4, “General Concerns that the Accident Analysis is Inadequate,” of this CRD for additional information.

Sincerely,

Curtis Miller
Commenter No. 38: Dr. Stanley Riveles

Sent: Thursday, April 26, 2018 12:31:49 AM  
To: RLUOBEA  
Subject: Comments on the Draft Environmental Assessment DOE/EA-2052, February 2018

April 25, 2018
NNSA Los Alamos Field Office  
ATTN: CMRR Project Management Office  
3747 West Jemez Road  
Los Alamos, NM 87544  

Via email to RLUOBEA@hq.doe.gov

Re: Comments on the Draft Environmental Assessment of Proposed Changes for Analytical Chemistry and Materials Characterization at the Radiological Laboratory/Utility/Office Building, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico

Dear CMRR Project Management Office:

In my view, the present “Draft Environmental Assessment” (EA) is a wholly inadequate evaluation of the environmental impacts of the proposed project to conduct analytical chemistry and materials characterization at LANL. There is no question that a full environmental impact statement is required that takes into consideration the entire range of interrelated projects associated with this initiative. It should also take account of the national security context that has generated this requirement. Otherwise, the communities and region cannot fully understand and assess the potential costs and benefits that result therefrom.

I offer the following reasons:

1. It is public knowledge that the CMRR project is associated with increased plutonium pit production for nuclear weapons at LANL. Nowhere in the EA is the association with nuclear weapons components mentioned or acknowledged. The omission is glaring and tends to diminish the credibility of the EA. A more transparent EA would have acknowledged the associa-

38-1 Please see Section C.2.2, “General Concerns about Implementing NEPA for the Proposed Action,” and C.2.3, “General Concerns that the EA Approach Results in Segmentation of the NEPA Process and a Programmatic EIS Is Needed,” of this CRD for NNSA’s response to these subjects. The focus of this EA is on the Proposed Action to recategorize RLUOB to a MAR-limited Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility and to perform more AC and MC laboratory operations at RLUOB and less in PF-4 than was evaluated in previous NEPA documents.

38-2 This EA does indicate that AC and MC capabilities have an association with pit production. Section 1.1 of the EA indicates that “AC and MC are fundamental capabilities required for the research and development support of DOE and NNSA missions at LANL.” In Section 2.3.2, the EA states, “PF-4 supports LANL plutonium pit manufacturing and surveillance programs, including metal preparation and recovery operations. Plutonium experiments at PF-4 support the nation’s stockpile assessment without the need to conduct actual nuclear tests.” The need for enduring AC and MC capabilities at LANL is independent of the level of pit production.
Commenter No. 38 (cont’d): Dr. Stanley Riveles

2. The public record also makes clear that the CMRR project is one part of an interrelated set of projects proposed by DOE for its FY 2019 budget. The four related projects are grouped under the CMRR project budget line item. Perhaps, it will be asserted that these other projects are ignored because they have no significant environmental impact. But how is the public to know? At a minimum, a transparent and straightforward EA would have enumerated the various projects; described their purposes; and explained why the environmental impact can be ignored, if this is indeed the case. Once again, the effect is to diminish the credibility of the assessment exercise.

3. At a minimum, the EA is premature, in that it anticipates plutonium pit production decisions that DOE has not yet made. According to public record, a possible decision may be made in May 2018 whether to locate plutonium pit production at LANL or Savannah River, or possibly both. If that decision does in fact does come to fruition, the presumption has to be that there are implications for the CMRR that will have to be addressed in terms of environmental impact. If, indeed, DOE determines that Savannah River will host all plutonium pit production, this EA may be overtaken by events and become irrelevant. One cannot believe that millions of dollars will be invested in a series of CMRR projects at LANL unless plutonium pit production is undertaken there. But even assuming that plutonium pit production continues at some level at LANL, the public will rightly ask about the assumptions and facts stipulated by the current EA, and how they relate to the production decisions. How much more credible it would have been had DOE waited until a decision had been made before issuing such an EA. Instead, restricting the EA issues to “recategorization” of lab facilities, while ignoring the broader context, undermines the public’s confidence in the conclusions.

38-2 cont’d

38-3 NNSA has long recognized the need to transfer AC and MC activities that have historically been performed in the CMR Building to other facilities at LANL. NNSA evaluated such transfers in NEPA documentation issued in 2003 (DOE 2003b), 2011 (DOE 2011c) and 2015 (DOE 2015a). The subprojects in DOE’s fiscal year 2019 budget request were addressed by these prior NEPA documents. The current EA builds on this past NEPA documentation and the same types of AC and MC activities would occur under the Proposed Action and No Action Alternative as those previously evaluated. The difference is that under the Proposed Action evaluated in this EA, more AC and MC activities would be performed in RLUOB and fewer in PF-4. Please refer to Section C.2.3, “General Concerns that the EA Approach Results in Segmentation of the NEPA Process and a Programmatic EIS Is Needed,” of this CRD for NNSA’s response on this subject.

38-4 The Proposed Action and No Action Alternative address the need for enduring AC and MC capabilities at LANL independent of the level of pit production. The Proposed Action and No Action Alternative are directly associated with prior analyses and decisions to move AC and MC out of the CMR Building into other facilities at LANL. NNSA will determine the appropriate level of NEPA documentation to support the recent announcement regarding recapitalization of plutonium pit production, which includes a proposal for an increased level of pit production at LANL (NNSA 2018), and complete the necessary analyses and RODs prior to proceeding with actions related to increases above currently authorized pit production levels.
Commenter No. 38 (cont’d): Dr. Stanley Riveles

4. The EA would have us believe that the differential environmental impacts of the two CMRR options examined are roughly similar. Therefore, the choice of which path to take should be based on some measure of technical merit. But what is not justified explicitly is the requirement to upgrade the CMR capability from a radiological facility to the Hazard Category 3 facility. Such an upgrade means crossing a significant threshold in terms of safety and environmental impact. What mission is served by raising the CMR limit from 38.6 grams PU-239 to 400 grams? The EA begs this question and loses credibility in the process.

5. The entire EA discussion of radioactive waste management and disposition is premised on increasing the limit on CMR capability to 400 grams Pu-239. What remains unexamined is the option of no change in the current CMR capacity. The public has the right to know how the radioactive waste burden on the LANL community is affected by increasing the CMR limit by ten-fold. What are the net increases in the various types of radioactive waste streams?

Conclusion: In light of the shortcomings of the EA described above, I conclude that the current EA is inadequate in meeting the requirements of NEPA. In my view, the full range of CMRR programs should be addressed in a statutory Environmental Impact Statement following 1) a DOE decision on the location of the plutonium pit production and 2) FY 2019 funding of the pertinent programs.

Yours truly,
Dr. Stanley Riveles
El Prado, NM 87529

38-5 The proposal to recategorize RLUOB into a MAR-limited Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility would use existing, available, and unused laboratory space within RLUOB. Modifications to RLUOB and PF-4 would result in decreased potential for worker exposure and increase process efficiencies. The potential impacts from the Proposed Action and the No Action Alternative are comparable, although those associated with the Proposed Action are somewhat smaller for certain resource areas (e.g., worker exposure, waste generation). The rationale for raising the RLUOB radioactive materials limit is explained in Chapter 1.0 in the first paragraph of the Introduction: “This environmental assessment (EA) evaluates the potential environmental impacts of recategorizing the Radiological Laboratory/Utility/Office Building (RLUOB) at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) to a material-at-risk (MAR)-limited, Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility. RLUOB is currently approved to operate as a Radiological Facility, i.e., a facility that does not meet the threshold criteria of a Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility, but still possesses radioactive material. Under the Proposed Action, DOE/NNSA would add capabilities at RLUOB and conduct a broader range of analytical chemistry (AC) and materials characterization (MC) analyses in the facility. The Proposed Action would maximize use of RLUOB laboratory space for AC and MC operations and reduce the amount of space required in the existing Hazard Category 2 Plutonium Facility, Building 4 (PF-4), for these operations, compared to the scenarios analyzed in the 2015 Supplement Analysis, Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Building Replacement Project at Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico (2015 CMRR SA) (DOE/EIS-0350-SA-2) (DOE 2015a).”

38-6 The commenter’s reference to a 10-fold increase presumably refers to the change in the amount of plutonium-239 equivalent that would be allowed in RLUOB. This increase (the Proposed Action) would allow more AC and MC activities to be performed in RLUOB than would otherwise be performed in PF-4. Performing those AC and MC activities in PF-4 rather than in RLUOB is represented by the No Action Alternative. The impacts from waste management activities, both from facility modifications and from operations, associated with the Proposed Action and No Action Alternative, are presented in Section 4.3.2 of the EA. The analysis shows that there would no difference in the generation of operational waste, but that the Proposed Action would generate less radioactive waste from facility modifications than the No Action Alternative.
Commenter No. 39: Liz Schwartz

From: Liz Schwartz
Sent: Thursday, April 26, 2018 1:56:49 AM
To: RLUOBEA
Subject: DO NOT EXPAND PRODUCTION OF PLUTONIUM PITS

Dear Sirs:

Of particular concern to me is the expansion of plutonium pits, the fissile cores of nuclear weapons, in which the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has a bad safety record.

Expanded pit production is NOT to maintain the safety and reliability of the existing nuclear weapons stockpiles, but instead is for future new-design nuclear weapons which will threaten destruction of our entire world.

DO NOT EXPAND PRODUCTION OF PLUTONIUM PITS

Sincerely,

Elizabeth Schwartz
Taos NM 87521

The Proposed Action evaluated in this EA is to recategorize RLUOB to a MAR-limited Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility and to perform more AC and MC laboratory operations at RLUOB and less at PF-4 than was evaluated in previous NEPA documents. The need for enduring AC and MC capabilities at LANL is independent of the level of pit production. Please refer to Section C.2.1, “General Opposition to Pit Production,” of this CRD for NNSA's response to this comment.
Commenter No. 40: Deborah Reade

NNSA Los Alamos Field Office
ATTN: CMRR Project Management Office
3747 West Jemez Road
Los Alamos, New Mexico 87544
Via email to RU00BEA@hq.doe.gov

April 25, 2018


Dear CMRR Project Management Office:

I am writing because I am concerned about the draft environmental assessment (EA) for the Radiological Laboratory Utility and Office Building (Rad Lab) at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). The proposed action in this EA would raise the operational limit for plutonium-239 to 400 grams in the Rad Lab, causing this facility to be re-categorized to a Hazard Category-3 nuclear facility.

I believe that this proposed action should not go forward at all, but if it does, that the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) should proceed to a full environmental impact statement for the following reasons:

1. The EA is grossly deficient
2. The EA is grossly premature
3. This action is connected to several other actions at LANL. The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires such related actions to be considered together
4. Inadequate notice and information has been provided for New Mexicans who are Low English Proficiency (LEP) individuals; thus the entire process so far has proceeded in a discriminatory manner

1. The EA is grossly deficient

NNSA has said there is no need for additional safety features in the Rad Lab based on a "preliminary analysis." I don’t know what kind of analysis could have come to that conclusion since LANL has an abysmal safety record, admits publicly that LANL is unsafe, got an F in their criticality review and continues regularly to make mistakes and have accidents, some of which result in releases and injuries. When asked how they're doing with safety currently, after the LANL treatment debacle that resulted in a drum explosion and release at WIPP, LANL recently described safety as being "a journey." That’s just a "nice" way of saying that LANL is still unsafe and still has an unsafe safety culture. The recent record of mistakes and accidents totally supports this conclusion.

In addition, LANL is built on an area that is riddled with earthquake faults and is in the middle of a wildfire zone. It is irresponsible to ignore these facts when considering if it is safe to have plutonium in this area at all, let alone to think about greatly increasing the amount that is allowed.

40-1 Please refer to Section C.2.4, General Concerns that the Accident Analysis is Inadequate and C.2.6, “General Concerns and Opposition to Increased Plutonium Limits at RLUOB due to LANL Safety Issues,” of this CRD for NNSA’s responses on these subjects. With respect to the concern about the use of a preliminary analysis, as part of a regimented, stepwise process, NNSA has conducted the first in a series of safety analyses and evaluations to determine the appropriate level of safety systems, structures, and components commensurate with the amount material to be managed within RLUOB. The analysis was used as part of establishing the 400-gram plutonium-239 equivalent limit for RLUOB under the Proposed Action. Future, more detailed, analyses will be conducted to ensure that all required technical and administrative controls would be implemented at RLUOB to maintain worker and public safety. The analyses presented in the EA represent bounding quantities of materials at risk and minimal controls. There is no expectation that the next version of the safety analyses will require a modification of the potential impacts analysis conclusions in the EA.

40-2 The natural phenomena hazards of earthquake and wildfire are considered in assessing the ability to safely manage nuclear materials in a facility. Focusing on the Proposed Action evaluated in this EA, the potential impacts of a fire and of an earthquake followed by a fire are evaluated in Section 4.2.2 and Appendix A. The analysis shows that with the proposed 400 grams plutonium-239 equivalent inventory limit, none of the accidents, including the unlikely event of an earthquake followed by a fire, would be expected to result in unmitigated public and noninvolved worker radiological doses greater than regulatory limits (1 rem and 5 rem, respectively). While the Proposed Action in this EA is to increase the amount of material that could be managed in RLUOB, it does not appreciably increase the amount of material to be managed at LANL. Please refer to Section C.2.4, “General Concerns that the Accident Analysis is Inadequate,” of this CRD for NNSA’s response to this comment.
Wildfires regularly sweep through the area and have resulted in massive releases of radioactive and hazardous materials in the past. DOE's own reviewers have said that there could be problems with the fire suppression systems in some of LANL's older buildings and whether any of the buildings could withstand a major earthquake is questionable. This is why safety is a journey at LANL. Safety is really just an inconvenience at LANL, which is why it’s so easily dismissed in this EA.

Another example of a safety issue that is ignored almost completely in the EA is the beryllium analysis capability that is part of the proposed action. Again, LANL has been found by DOE’s own inspectors to have long-standing deficiencies in its beryllium disease prevention program. These deficiencies are ongoing right now. Years and years and so little attention is given to these problems that they just continue. Again, safety and disease prevention appear just to be irritations to LANL. A full EIS should analyze potential beryllium exposures and include this information in the decision whether or not to proceed with this plutonium increase.

Finally, under safety, the EA has no analysis at all of Intentional Destructive Acts (sabotage and terrorism) even though this is in violation of DOE NEPA policy. Perhaps this analysis was lost somewhere on the safety journey. This must definitely be included in any risk assessment.

A full review of safety problems including a risk assessment that gives adequate consideration to human error can only be done in a full Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).

2. The EA is grossly premature

Statements about the EA say that possible expanded plutonium pit production has nothing to do with the request to increase the amount of plutonium allowed in the Rad Lab from the original 8.4 grams to 400 grams—a nearly 50-fold increase. Even if you go from the current 38.6-allowed grams to 400 grams you’re talking more than a 10-fold increase. NNSA claims the EA is only about relocating current operations to a better facility. Meanwhile, the draft EA requires the same amount of lab space needed to support expanded pit production and current operations don’t need such a large plutonium increase—especially since LANL already gave themselves an almost 500% increase from 8.4 grams to 38.6 grams.

This kind of obfuscation where you try to hide what you’re really doing, just makes the public distrust your statements and your motives even more. This comes on top of LANL increasing the amount allowed to 38.6 grams without justification or public review and input as required by NEPA. This type of activity makes it impossible to trust that everything necessary has been covered in the EA and again makes a full EIS even more important.

But DOE has also completely jumped the gun here as it is obvious that the main driver for this increase in plutonium is the possible pit production increase at LANL. Yet NNSA won’t be announcing where future pit production will occur until May 11. Clearly, if this increase is to occur at LANL or at LANL and another DOE site, either a programmatic EIS or another EIS would be necessary anyway. It is unfortunate that DOE has wasted time and resources to create an untimely and inadequate EA when it should have been clear from the beginning that a full EIS is required.

As addressed in Section C.2.4, “General Concerns that the Accident Analysis is Inadequate,” of this CRD, historic operations involving finely divided, respirable beryllium have been a concern with DOE and NNSA and lessons learned from past operations are applied through industrial hygiene programs at LANL. Section 4.1.2.3 of the final EA was revised to clearly communicate that operations that would generate finely divided, respirable beryllium are not within the scope of RLUOB activities. However, RLUOB would provide capabilities to perform chemical analyses of smear samples and air monitoring filters obtained from areas potentially contaminated with beryllium, and to analyze the beryllium content of beryllium-containing or contaminated compounds.

Sections 4.2.1.3 and 4.2.2 of the final EA were revised to address potential intentional destructive acts. Please refer to Section C.2.4, “General Concerns that the Accident Analysis is Inadequate,” of this CRD for additional information.

The current EA is not premature, but is appropriate for its intended purpose. As indicated in the EA, the Proposed Action is directly associated with prior analyses and decisions to move AC and MC out of the CMR Building into other facilities at LANL and is not associated with a potential increase in pit production.

As discussed in Section 2.1 of the EA, the past change in the allowable quantity of plutonium-239 within a Radiological Laboratory, from 8.4 grams to 38.6 grams was a function of an enhanced understanding of radiation dosimetry and revised accident release fractions. That is, the health risk associated with 8.4 grams of plutonium-239 as calculated using the previous dosimetry and accident release fractions, yields the same health risk as 38.6 grams of plutonium-239 as calculated using the updated dosimetry and accident release fractions. NNSA followed DOE procedures and prepared a Supplement Analysis (DOE 2015a), the appropriate NEPA analysis for this action.

The recently announced plans regarding recapitalization of defense plutonium capabilities includes a proposal for an increase in the level of pit production at LANL and the introduction of pit production at the Savannah River Site (NNSA 2018). NNSA will determine the appropriate level of NEPA documentation to support the recent announcement and complete the necessary analyses and RODs prior to proceeding with actions related to increases above currently authorized pit production levels.
Commenter No. 40 (cont’d): Deborah Reade

3. The proposed action is connected to several other actions

The Rad Lab’s planned re-categorization into a Hazard Category-3 nuclear facility is just one of four related projects under the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research (CMR) Replacement Project. All four subprojects involve moving analysis and characterization capabilities involving plutonium and other nuclear materials out of the old CMR building. This is not the first time that DOE has divided a significant project into sub-parts and claimed that each sub-part was insignificant or not dangerous and only required an EA. Yet NEPA expressly forbids this, as it should. NNSA must analyze all four sub-projects together in one EIS so the full picture of risks, safety and necessity can be understood.

4. The public process for this EA has been discriminatory

New Mexico is a “majority-minority” state where more than 59% of the population is Hispanic or Native American and where 35.7% of the population speaks a language other than English in the home. In addition, LANL is the DOE site that has more people of color surrounding it than any other DOE site in the country.

Although I have not yet done a detailed analysis of public notice for this EA, I believe NNSA’s efforts in this direction have been insufficient. In addition to the need for public notice in Spanish and possibly in other languages as well, it has already been established in public notice needs for the New Mexico Environment Department public processes, that rural people in New Mexico do not have the same access to the internet and therefore may need printed materials. In areas where there are no Spanish language newspapers (or other language papers) “enhanced” noticing with printed materials at multiple community centers, and radio announcements may be necessary to supplement online and newspaper public notices in order for notice not to be carried out in a discriminatory way.

In addition, was the EA or a summary of the EA, translated into Spanish or other required languages? What about supporting documentation? Was that information then available both online and in printed form? I don’t think so. If information is not available to the LEP public in a language they can understand, they are cut out of the process more or less completely. Again, this is discriminatory.

If the public process for this EA was discriminatory, as I believe, the entire process, including notice must be redone in a non-discriminatory way. Much simpler would be either to drop this plan to increase plutonium completely or to do the full EIS process for this project and to make sure to carry out the public process for that in a non-discriminatory way. The public would be happy to work with you to improve your public outreach and to provide suggestions on how to make sure that everyone has an equal opportunity to participate and to provide meaningful comments on that EIS.

Sincerely,
Deborah Reade
Santa Fe, New Mexico 87501-1817

NNSA has long recognized the need to transfer AC and MC activities that have historically been performed in the CMR Building to other facilities at LANL. NNSA evaluated such transfers in NEPA documentation issued in 2003 (DOE 2003b), 2011 (DOE 2011c), and 2015 (DOE 2015a). The subprojects in DOE’s fiscal year 2019 budget request were addressed by these prior NEPA documents. The current EA builds on this past NEPA documentation and the same types of AC and MC activities would occur under the Proposed Action as those previously evaluated. The difference is that under the Proposed Action evaluated in this EA, more AC and MC activities would be performed in RLUOB and fewer in PF-4. As addressed in Section 2.1 of the EA, the Proposed Action would provide a variety of environmental and other benefits such as fewer worker radiation exposures, less waste generation, lower costs, and improved laboratory efficiency. Please refer to Section C.2.3, “General Concerns that the EA Approach Results in Segmentation of the NEPA Process and a Programmatic EIS Is Needed,” of this CRD for additional information.

This comment states that NNSA provided inadequate notice and information thus the entire process has proceeded in a discriminatory manner. NNSA followed the NEPA procedures and guidance for public involvement. As the Council on Environmental Quality notes in the Citizen’s Guide to the NEPA, Having Your Voice Heard (CEQ 2007), when an agency prepares an EA “the agency has discretion as to the level of public involvement.” NNSA sent out a notice of availability to parties and organizations identified in the past who have shown interest in or could feel they are potentially affected by the Proposed Action. NNSA also announced the availability of the draft for public review and comment in four local newspapers, made it available online, along with the cited references, and in the local reading room (in Pojoaque). As a result of public requests during the comment period, NNSA extended the document review and comment period from 30 days to 60 days. No requests were received regarding translation of the document into another language, nor were there any other comments regarding review process discrimination.
From: Suzie Schwartz  
Sent: Thursday, April 26, 2018 5:50:51 AM  
To: RLUOBEA  
Subject: RE: Formal Public Comment on the Draft EA on proposed changes for the Ac and MC Characterization at the RLUOBEA, Los Alamos, NM  

April 25, 2018  

NNSA Los Alamos Field Office  
ATTN: CMRR Project Management Office  
3747 West Jemez Road  
Los Alamos, NM 87544  

Via email to RLUOBEA@hq.doe.gov  

Dear CMRR Project Management Office:  

As a 35 year resident of Northern New Mexico, I am writing to express my concerns about the draft environmental assessment being conducted by the NNSA for the Radiological Laboratory Utility and Office Building AKA the “Rad Lab” at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, which is intended to determine if there is a need to proceed to a full Environmental Impact Statement, or alternatively, to decide to issue a “Finding” of “No Significant Impact” for the proposed action of raising the limit for plutonium operations from the original 8.4 grams to the present 38.6 grams, and now to the proposal of 400 grams.  

Based on my experience and understanding of bureaucratic policy, I believe it is crucial to the taxpayers that the NNSA/DOE conduct a full Programmatic Environmental Impact Study upon completion of their narrow Environmental Assessment study.  

Below are some of the reasons I believe that after completing a final Rad Lab Environmental Assessment, the NNSA should proceed to a full programmatic environmental impact statement:  

LANL’s present plutonium mission is already more than adequately served by the already raised limit of 38.6 grams. Raising the plutonium...
Commenter No. 41 (cont’d): Suzanne Schwartz

239 limit to 400 grams or by 10 times the current limit will require the transformation of the “Rad Lab from the relatively benign RLUOB office building to a Hazard Category-3 nuclear facility. This type of recategorization and its possible consequences cannot be assessed by a narrow environmental assessment study alone.

In fact, NEPA National Environmental Policy Act, forbids “segmentation”. The Rad Lab’s planned re-categorization into a Hazard Category-3 nuclear facility is one of four “subprojects” in the NNSA’s FY 2019 budget request under the “Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) Project.” All of which are related to each other. All four subprojects involve relocating analytical chemistry and materials characterization capabilities involving plutonium and other special nuclear materials out of the old, deteriorating Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Building. All together these subprojects will cost two billion taxpayer dollars. NNSA should analyze all four subprojects in one unified environmental impact statement. Conversely, this environmental assessment that analyzes only the narrow question of raising the plutonium limit in the Rad Lab is the segmentation that NEPA forbids.

The NNSA has declared that on May 11 2018 it will announce a decision on where future expanded plutonium pit production will take place: either at LANL, the Savannah River Site in South Carolina, or both. It makes no sense that this draft environmental assessment is underway just prior that crucial decision, without which it can’t really be determined whether or not the Rad Lab truly needs to be re-categorized as a Hazard Category-3 Nuclear Facility. This draft EA is clearly putting the cart before the horse. Therefore, NNSA should proceed to a fuller environmental impact statement after its May 11 decision.

Also, in reference to NEPA rules, the NNSA is conducting this Rad Lab environmental assessment pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act, which requires the opportunity for the public to comment on major federal proposals. Again, NEPA requires that interconnected actions be considered together, and forbids segmentation into different narrow projects.
This proposal to raise the Rad Lab’s limit to 400 grams of Pu-239 equivalent is all about LANL’s future plutonium mission, which is no mystery. That future mission involves expanding production from the currently sanctioned level of 20 pits per year to 80 pits per year by 2027, statutorily required by the FY 2015 National Defense Authorization Act.

The Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Project has an extremely troubled history. I have been following it’s exploits for years. Briefly, NNSA has repeatedly sought (but failed) through various NEPA processes to raise the limit on plutonium pit production from that originally set by the 1996 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS). Its Record of Decision relocated the plutonium pit production mission to LANL after a 1989 FBI investigation of environmental crimes at the Rocky Flats Plant abruptly stopped production. It specifically limited pit production to 20 pits per year because of the deteriorated conditions at the old CMR building that constrained analytical chemistry and materials characterization operations in support of plutonium pit production.

In 2011 NNSA completed a Supplemental EIS for the CMRR-Nuclear Facility, only to cancel it after its estimated costs soared to $6.5 billion. However, an internal NNSA study had advocated for 22,500 square feet of plutonium lab space in the CMRR-Nuclear Facility, “resulting in a production capacity of 50-80 ppy” (pits per year). This draft Rad Lab EA now seeks to create that same square footage of plutonium lab space, not coincidentally the amount needed to support expanded plutonium pit production. Ironically, future production is not to maintain the safety and reliability of the existing nuclear weapons stockpile. It is instead for speculative future “Interoperable Warheads” for both land and submarine-launched missiles that the Navy doesn’t even want. The point is that the mission of future plutonium pit production needs critical examination because the re-categorization of the Rad Lab to a nuclear facility is arguably not even needed.
Commenter No. 41 (cont’d): Suzanne Schwartz

If the NNSA decides on May 11 to conduct future plutonium pit production at the Savannah River Site, or perhaps also at LANL, then clearly a new or supplemental programmatic environmental impact statement (PEIS) is needed. Also, any decision to expand plutonium pit production above the current limit of 20 pits per year would require a new or supplemental PEIS, regardless of future location(s).

As I mentioned before, the draft Rad lab EA lists four “reasonably foreseeable future actions” that could lead to cumulative impacts at LANL. It is of great interest that expanded plutonium pit production is omitted, since it is not only reasonably foreseeable, but required by congress, and actively planned for. It’s difficult to believe this omission is just a simple oversight, when it is so glaringly obvious, perhaps indicative of an intent to avoid the subject of expanded plutonium pit production altogether. That should be corrected in a fuller environmental impact statement or programmatic EIS.

The FY 2019 NNSA budget request states beryllium analysis will be a specific capability under the Proposed Action. Yet there are only two passing references to beryllium in the draft EA, when it is a widely known, potentially severe occupational hazard across the DOE’s nuclear weapons complex. Moreover, a February 2018 DOE Inspector General report found long-standing deficiencies in LANL’s beryllium disease prevention program. Therefore, it is particularly notable that this draft Rad Lab environmental assessment fails to analyze potential beryllium occupational exposures, which a full EIS should correct.

In violation of declared DOE NEPA policy, this draft Rad Lab EA fails to have any analysis of Intentional Destructive Acts (defined as acts of sabotage or terrorism, including deliberate airplane crashes). This glaring deficiency should be corrected in a full environmental impact statement.

The DOE and NNSA should always hyperlink all reference documents in all NEPA documents. It is extremely frustrating and time consuming in this day and age of hyperlink capability, that the spectacularly taxpayer funded DOE and NNSA are not able to hyperlink their source materials in order for the extremely busy but concerned public to verify.

The recent announcement regarding recapitalization of defense plutonium capabilities, which includes an increased level of pit production at LANL (NNSA 2018), now makes increased pit production a reasonably foreseeable action. In the final EA, the cumulative impacts analysis was revised to reflect a potential increase from the currently authorized 20 pits per year production level as a reasonably foreseeable future action. However, detailed strategies, production planning, and supportive politics, as well as appropriations, will need to occur to increase the level of pit production. This particular cumulative analysis is more appropriate for future actions requiring a pit production NEPA analysis. NNSA does not have the detailed information as to what is required in terms of planning in order to conduct an accurate non-speculative cumulative impacts analysis from increased operations other than to say that the RLUOB and PF-4 process improvements would result in safer more efficient operations regardless of production level.

As addressed in Section C.2.4, “General Concerns that the Accident Analysis is Inadequate,” of this CRD, historic operations involving finely divided, respirable beryllium have been a concern with DOE and NNSA and lessons learned from past operations are applied through industrial hygiene programs at LANL. Section 4.1.2.3 of the final EA was revised to clearly communicate that operations that would generate finely divided, respirable beryllium are not within the scope of RLUOB activities. However, RLUOB would provide capabilities to perform chemical analyses of smear samples and air monitoring filters obtained from areas potentially contaminated with beryllium, and to analyze the beryllium content of beryllium-containing or contaminated compounds.

Sections 4.2.1.3 and 4.2.2 of the final EA were revised to address potential intentional destructive acts. Please refer to Section C.2.4, “General Concerns that the Accident Analysis is Inadequate,” of this CRD for additional information.

NNSA made all references used in the RLUOB EA available electronically on the project’s NEPA website (https://energy.gov/node/2501991). A hyperlink is given for each reference.
In conclusion, I respectfully request, that following its May 11 decision on plutonium pit production, NNSA proceed to a fuller environmental impact statement that analyzes interconnected proposals for relocating analytical chemistry and materials characterization operations at LANL. Should NNSA decide to conduct production at the Savannah River Site, or also at LANL, I also request that the NNSA use my tax dollars to then proceed to a programmatic environmental impact statement that analyses all aspects of future plutonium pit production.

Sincerely,

Suzanne Schwartz
El Prado, New Mexico 87529
Re: Comments on the Draft Environmental Assessment of Proposed Changes for Analytical Chemistry and Materials Characterization at the Radiological Laboratory/Utility/Office Building, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico¹ (hereinafter “DraftRad Lab EA”)

Summary of Nuclear Watch New Mexico’s Comments

1) This Draft Rad Lab EA is deficient. There are major omissions, for example the lack of analyses of potential beryllium hazards and Intentional Destructive Acts. Moreover, safety, occupational and seismic risks are explained away in “preliminary analyses.” All this should be corrected in a more complete environmental impact statement, including final and transparent analyses of safety and seismic risks.

2) Re-categorizing the Rad Lab as a Hazard Category-3 nuclear facility is only one of four current subprojects relocating analytical chemistry and materials characterization operations involving plutonium at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). Since the National Environmental Policy Act requires that connected actions be analyzed together, an environmental impact statement should avoid prohibited segmentation and consider the four current subprojects together, which will cost taxpayers 2 billion dollars. That money could be better spent to create badly needed jobs, since the Proposed Action produces only 30 new jobs.

3) The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has previously declared that it will announce on May 11 where future plutonium pit production will take place, either at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) or the Savannah River Site (SRS), or both. This draft Rad Lab EA is grossly premature before that decision.

Nuclear Watch believes that the two newer subprojects, raising the Rad Lab plutonium limit (the subject of this Draft EA) and reconfiguring LANL’s main plutonium facility, are directly related to the expansion of plutonium pit production. NNSA has not justified how the two subprojects do not adequately support relocation of LANL’s AC and MC capabilities, which the

¹ Available electronically at https://energy.gov/node/2501991
903 W. Alameda 0325, Santa Fe, NM 87501 • Voice and fax: 505.989.7542
info@nukewatch.org • www.nukewatch.org • http://www.nukewatch.org/watchblog/
http://www.facebook.com/NukeWatchNM

42-1 Please refer to Section C.2.4, “General Concerns that the Accident Analysis is Inadequate,” for NNSA’s response to this comment. As addressed in that section, historic operations involving finely divided, respirable beryllium have been a concern with DOE and NNSA and lessons learned from past operations are applied through industrial hygiene programs at LANL. Section 4.1.2.3 of the final EA was revised to clearly communicate that operations that would generate finely divided, respirable beryllium are not within the scope of RLUOB activities. However, RLUOB would provide capabilities to perform chemical analyses of smear samples and air monitoring filters obtained from areas potentially contaminated with beryllium, and to analyze the beryllium content of beryllium-containing or contaminated compounds. Sections 4.2.1.3 and 4.2.2 of the final EA were also revised to address potential intentional destructive acts. Future, more detailed, analyses will be conducted to ensure that all required technical and administrative controls would be implemented at RLUOB to maintain worker and public safety. The analyses presented in the EA represent bounding quantities of materials at risk and minimal controls. There is no expectation that the next version of the safety analyses will require a modification of the potential impacts analysis conclusions in the EA.

42-2 NNSA has long recognized the need to transfer AC and MC activities that have historically been performed in the CMR Building to other facilities at LANL. NNSA evaluated such transfers in NEPA documentation issued in 2003 (DOE 2003b), 2011 (DOE 2011c) and 2015 (DOE 2015a). The subprojects in DOE’s fiscal year 2019 budget request were addressed by these prior NEPA documents. The 2015 Supplement Analysis (DOE 2015a) was the first time that use of PF-4 to meet the need for new AC and MC laboratory space was evaluated. The current EA builds on this past NEPA documentation and the same types of AC and MC activities would occur under the Proposed Action as those previously evaluated. The difference is that under the Proposed Action evaluated in this EA, more AC and MC activities would be performed in RLUOB and fewer in PF-4. As addressed in Section 2.1 of the EA, the Proposed Action would provide a variety of environmental and other benefits such as fewer worker radiation exposures, less waste generation, lower costs, and improved laboratory efficiency.

42-3 As indicated in the response to comment 42-2, the current Proposed Action is a logical continuation of prior NEPA analysis (starting in 2003) to move AC and MC activities from the CMR Building to other locations at LANL. The Proposed Action evaluated in this EA is to recategorize RLUOB to a MAR-limited Hazard Category 3.
Commenter No. 42 (cont’d): Jay Coghlan, Director, Nuclear Watch New Mexico

agency professes to be the only point of this Draft Rad Lab. It is absurd (intentional?) that NNSA does not list expanded plutonium pit production as a “reasonably foreseeable future action” at LANL since it is legislatively required by the FY 2015 Defense Authorization Act.

Conclusion: NNSA should proceed with a broader environmental impact statement after its May 11 decision on the future of expanded plutonium pit production. First, the Draft Rad Lab EA’s deficiencies noted in these comments must be corrected in a fuller EIS. Further, that EIS needs to include the current interconnected four subprojects all aimed at relocating AC and MC operations at LANL. If NNSA’s May 11 decision is to have expanded pit production at both LANL and SRS (which we consider likely), NNSA should then proceed with a new or supplemental programmatic environmental impact statement. After all, the 1996 Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS and 2008 LANL Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement both limited plutonium pit production at the Lab to no more than 20 pits per year. Despite repeated attempts, NNSA has not yet formally raised that production limit in a NEPA document, which Nuclear Watch believes NNSA is legally required to do. Following that, site-specific NEPA documents implementing that expanded plutonium pit production decision will need to be completed for SRS and/or LANL, as the case may be.

Narrative Comments

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) states this environmental assessment:

[I]ntended to provide sufficient evidence and analysis to determine whether to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) or to issue a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) for the Proposed Action... NNSA therefore prepared this EA to evaluate: (1) a Proposed Action Alternative reflecting re-categorization of RLUOB to a MAR-3-limited

This is especially true given that NNSA has already raised the Rad Lab’s administrative limit on plutonium-239 (or equivalent) from 8.4 grams to 38.6 grams. Combined with AC and MC capabilities at LANL’s adjacent main plutonium facility (PF-4) that can actually handle far larger amounts of special nuclear materials, why is that not sufficient to maintain LANL’s analytical chemistry and materials characterization capabilities? Nuclear Watch believes that the burden is on NNSA to demonstrate why re-categorizing the Rad Lab to a Hazard Category-3 nuclear facility and spending up to $675 million taxpayer dollars in “reconfiguring” PF-4 is not directly linked to the expansion of plutonium pit production.

We note that site-specific NEPA documents for plutonium pit production at SRS will necessarily need to be lengthy and complex, with little reliance on previous NEPA documents, given that pit production will be an entirely new mission at that site. Although SRS handles and stores many tons of plutonium, there is no existing infrastructure for pit production, and therefore the site will be starting virtually from scratch. Of particular interest will be how the highly flawed MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility might be converted to pit production.

As discussed in the response to comment 42-2, the need for enduring AC and MC capabilities at LANL is independent of the level of pit production and NNSA’s recent announcement. Nonetheless, the recent announcement regarding recapitalization of defense plutonium capabilities, which includes a proposed increased level of pit production at LANL (NNSA 2018), now makes increased pit production a reasonably foreseeable action. In the final EA, the cumulative impacts analysis was revised to reflect a potential increase from the currently authorized 20 pits per year production level as a reasonably foreseeable future action. However, detailed strategies, production planning, and supportive politics, as well as appropriations, will need to occur to increase the level of pit production. This particular cumulative analysis is more appropriate for future actions requiring a pit production NEPA analysis. NNSA does not have the detailed information as to what is required in terms of planning in order to conduct an accurate non-speculative cumulative impacts analysis from increased operations other than to say that the RLUOB and PF-4 process improvements would result in safer more efficient operations regardless of production level.

As discussed in the response to comment 42-2, the need for enduring AC and MC capabilities at LANL is independent of the level of pit production and NNSA’s recent announcement. The Proposed Action would provide a variety of environmental and other benefits such as fewer worker radiation exposures, less waste generation, lower costs, and improved laboratory efficiency, compared to the action evaluated in the 2015 Supplement Analysis (DOE 2015a). As discussed in the response to comment 42-3, the cumulative impacts analysis was revised to reflect a potential increase from the currently authorized 20 pits per year production level as a reasonably foreseeable future action. However, detailed strategies, production planning, and supportive politics, as well as appropriations, will need to occur to increase the level of pit production. This particular cumulative analysis is more appropriate for future actions requiring a pit production NEPA analysis. NNSA does not have the detailed information as to what is required in terms of planning in order to conduct an accurate non-speculative cumulative impacts analysis from increased operations other than to say that the RLUOB and PF-4 process improvements would result in safer more efficient operations regardless of production level.

The recently announced plans regarding recapitalization of defense plutonium capabilities includes a proposal for an increase in the level of pit production at LANL and the introduction of pit production at the Savannah River Site.
Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility, with more AC and MC operations at RLUOB than those evaluated in the 2015 CMRR SA, and (2) a No Action Alternative that maintains RLUOB as a Radiological Facility, as evaluated in the 2015 CMRR SA.

Specific Deficiencies In the Draft Rad Lab EA

The draft Rad Lab EA has inadequate analysis of seismic concerns. Please see the extended section on this in comments below.

Lack of Analysis of Beryllium risks: The FY 2019 NNSA budget request states:

Specific capabilities in RC3 scope include, but are not limited to the following:
- AC Sample Preparation
- Pu Assay
- Interstitial Analysis
- Beryllium Analysis

“RC3” (Re-categorizing RLUOB to Hazard Category 3) is of course the subject of this Draft Rad Lab EA. Yet there are only two passing references to beryllium in the Draft EA. Beryllium is a widely known, potentially severe occupational hazard across the DOE’s nuclear weapons complex. A February 2018 DOE Inspector General report found long-standing deficiencies in

SDC-1. All of the MAR limits are set to meet this limit; therefore, SDC-1 is the design category (SDC) requirement. From Table A.1 of DOE-STD-1189-2008, readers are referred to follow DOE-Standard 1189-2008, Appendix A, for establishing the seismic evaluation criteria. The RLUOB structure and equipment anchorages in radiological spaces meet the requirements for seismic Performance Category (PC)-2 as provided in DOE Standard DOE-STD-1020-2002, Natural Phenomena Hazards Design and Evaluation Criteria for Department of Energy Facilities (DOE 2002), while the remainder of the facility meets the requirements of seismic PC-1 (LANL 2011). The RLUOB was built to PC-2 requirements that follow the 2003 version of the International Building Code (IBC) and the codes that it invoked. By invoking PC-2, the design seismic loads were increased by 50 percent over PC-1 through the requirement that the Importance Factor (I) be 1.5.

For a facility built to the standards of RLUOB, the design of the structure, systems, and components should ensure the operability of essential facilities and/or to prevent physical injury to in-facility workers. The structures, systems, and components should also result in limited structural damage from design-basis natural phenomena events (such as an earthquake) to ensure minimal interruption of facility operation and repair following such an event.

For a new Hazard Category 3 nuclear facility, DOE Standard 1020-2012 instructs the reader to follow DOE Standard 1189-2008, Appendix A, for establishing the seismic design category (SDC) requirement. From Table A.1 of DOE-STD-1189-2008, when collocated worker doses are less than 5 rem, the seismic requirement is SDC-1. All of the MAR limits are set to meet this limit; therefore, SDC-1 is the seismic requirement. In simple terms, SDC-1 is the equivalent of PC-1 and SDC-2 is the equivalent of PC-2. SDC-1 requires an Importance Factor of 1.0 versus an Importance Factor of 1.5 as required for SDC-2. The standards are thus different but they are less stringent than those applied to the RLUOB design.

Although the current version of the IBC (2015) has increased seismic requirements over the 2003 version and the ground motion for the design basis earthquake at
LANL’s record keeping for DOE’s Chronic Beryllium Disease Prevention Program.\textsuperscript{10} The Lab failed to keep an accurate beryllium inventory and could not assure that known contaminated areas were safe before allowing work to continue. In that context, it is particularly notable that this Draft Rad lab environmental assessment fails to analyze potential beryllium occupational exposures, which a full environmental impact statement should correct.

**Intentional Destructive Acts:** In violation of declared DOE NEPA policy, this draft Rad lab fails to have any analysis whatsoever of Intentional Destructive Acts (defined as acts of sabotage or terrorism, including deliberate airplane crashes). That policy explicitly states, “Each DOE EIS and EA should explicitly consider intentional destructive acts. This applies to all DOE proposed actions, including both nuclear and non-nuclear proposals.”\textsuperscript{11} This glaring deficiency should be corrected in a full environmental impact statement.

**Reasonably Foreseeable Actions:** The Draft Rad lab EA states:

\textbf{5.1 Other Activities at Los Alamos National Laboratory}

Reasonably foreseeable future actions at LANL are summarized in the following paragraphs. The actions listed may not include all actions at LANL. However, they should provide an adequate basis for determining the magnitude of the potential cumulative impacts.\textsuperscript{12}

It then goes on to list the Land Conveyance and Transfer Program, the Radioactive Liquid Waste Treatment Facility, TRU Liquid Waste Water Subproject, and the Zero Liquid Discharge Project.

What is striking is the omission of expanded plutonium pit production, which is not only reasonably foreseeable, but is actually congressionally required and actively being planned for. It’s difficult to believe this omission is just a simple oversight, when it is so glaringly obvious.

This again points to the inadequacy of this Draft EA, which should be rectified through a broader supplemental programmatic environmental impact statement in the event that it decides on May 11 to conduct expanded plutonium pit production at both LANL and the Savannah River Site (extended comment on this below).

**Reference documents** should be hyperlinked to their original source in the online draft environmental assessment. This should be true of all DOE NEPA documents. Nuclear Watch urges the Department to get with modern times.


\textsuperscript{12} Draft Rad Lab EA, p. 79.
Seismic Concerns: Lack of Proper Analysis Necessitates a Full EIS

Like others sections of this Draft Rad Lab EA, much of the seismic analysis comes from preliminary studies and reports that are not peer reviewed, and therefore cannot be regarded as authoritative. On occasion, LANL abandons its own seismic standards and relies on individual assessments to demonstrate that seismic performance goals for the re-categorized Rad Lab can be met. A recent seismic review of the Rad Lab mentions a safety analysis that it claims indicates that the offsite consequences of a seismic initiated accident were low enough to support a Seismic Design Category 1 (SDC1) classification. So, despite the proposed raised limit of 400 grams of plutonium-239 (or the equivalent), DOE deliberately sets seismic safety standards for the re-categorized Rad Lab incredibly low. But that safety analysis that the recent Rad Lab seismic update relied upon is not cited or made available. Therefore, the updated Rad Lab seismic analysis is incomplete, if not downright faulty.

The Rad Lab, when originally constructed in 2010, was categorized as a Performance Category 2 (PC-2) as per DOE Standard 1020-1994. PC-2 is the second lowest category out of four and:

[S]hould result in limited structural damage from design basis natural phenomena events to ensure minimal interruption to facility operation and repair following the event. PC-2 performance is analogous to the design criteria for essential facility (e.g., hospitals, fire and police stations, centers for emergency operations) in the model building codes.15

But the Rad Lab is now proposed to be re-categorized as a Hazard Category-3 nuclear facility, not a hospital or fire station. The recent seismic reanalysis referenced in the draft Rad Lab EA used a design basis earthquake equal to the ground motion projected to occur once every 2,500 year, also known as a PC-3 earthquake. PC-3 is a higher performance category, just below that for a nuclear reactor. As the independent Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board put it:

A PC-3 would prevent or mitigate criticality accidents, chemical explosions, and events with the potential to release hazardous materials outside the facility... PC-3 provisions are consistent with those used for reevaluation of commercial plutonium facilities with conservatism in between that of model building code requirements for essential facilities and civilian nuclear power plant requirements.17

So the Rad Lab with 400 grams of plutonium, if built today, should be built as a PC-3 facility, but instead was only built as a PC-2 facility back in 2010 to hold 8.4 grams of plutonium. The Yost report says of itself that it was initiated because of “programmatic needs” (i.e., raising the plutonium to 400 grams) and an increase in projected seismic hazards, which sounds like a

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14 This is the lowest category for structures that represent low hazard to human life.
16 Op. cit. Results of RLUOB Seismic Study – With Updated Conclusions, LA-UR-16-28686
conclusion reached looking for data to support it. Los Alamos National Security, LLC (the LANL contractor) commissioned this seismic study of the Rad Lab to determine if the structure could meet the current seismic requirements for both a Seismic Design Category 1 and a Seismic Design Category 2 structure. There is a huge difference between PC-3 and Seismic Design Category 1 requirements. The Yost report attempts to make everything look good, but relies on individual assessments instead of DOE standards.

The Yost report admits that the assessments used are not standard when it states:

A modified seismic margins approach was used to determine the seismic capability of the structure. Using a seismic margins approach, the seismic performance of the structure may be determined. The seismic performance can then be compared to target performance goals in DOE-STD-1020. The use of alternate methods, such as the seismic margins approach is permitted in both DOE-STD-1020... 18

However, there is no mention of “seismic margins approach” in DOE-STD-1020-2012. And who knows what a “modified seismic margins approach” may be? Alternate methods are NOT given for seismic margin approaches in DOE-STD-1020-2012. But the DOE standard does state:

It may be possible to conduct the aspects of the seismic evaluation in a more rigorous manner that removes conservatism such that the SSC may be shown to be adequate. Alternatively, a probabilistic assessment might be undertaken in order to demonstrate that the performance goals can be met.19

Many of the seismic performance goals required by DOE Standard 1020-2012 were not met for parts of the Rad Lab structure, and then, using “alternate methods” were re-analyzed by unnamed people using unknown methods.

For example (Yost starting on p. 4):
- The attachment of the metal roof deck to the moment frame beams was shown to be inadequate at three locations in Area C and at one location on level 4.
  - A subsequent analysis was performed...[how and by whom are not given]
  - It was found...[by whom is not given]
  - It was also verified...[how and by whom are not given]
- The initial results showed several locations in the Area C and Level 4 roof decks that fell short of the SDC2B performance goal.
  - Additional study showed...[by whom is not given]
- Several frame beam-bracing details were suspected to be inadequate to allow the beams to develop their full plastic hinge capacity. After evaluating multiple bracing configurations, it was determined that several braces could not develop the loads stipulated by AISC 341-05.
  - To address this issue it was decided to determine...[by whom is not given]

18 Op. cit. Results of RLUOB Seismic Study – With Updated Conclusions, LA-UR-16-28686
Commenter No. 42 (cont’d): Jay Coghlan, Director, Nuclear Watch New Mexico

The preliminary results showed one concrete pilaster failed SDC2B performance goals. The west wall contains the pilaster in a location where the wall retains two stories of earth. The preliminary model considered different reduction factors on wall and pilaster elements which created an artificial stiffness disparity between the elements which act as one.

42-6

- To correct this inconsistency, the stiffness reduction factors used to simulate cracked concrete were adjusted... [how and by whom are not given]

Despite this lack of concrete citation, a conclusion is then reached:

The results demonstrate that the structure will meet the seismic performance goals in DOE-STD-1020-2012 for SDC1 Limit State A without any modification to the structure. The results also show that a majority of elements meet the performance requirements for SDC 2 for limit state B. (Yost Pg. 5)

So, we have a proposed nuclear facility, the re-categorized Rad Lab, which meets the minimum seismic safety requirements for a non-nuclear facility for the whole building, but only meets the next level of safety requirements for a claimed “majority” of the rest of the building. Is there a DOE precedent for a Hazard Category-3 nuclear facility having two not necessarily compatible SDC ratings? If a chain is only as strong as its weakest link, one can only assume that in reality the Rad Lab only meets the lowest rating. And that’s not good enough for a nuclear weapons production support facility with 400 grams of plutonium.

Preliminary analysis that is not peer reviewed is not good enough. Individual assessments are not good enough. Unnamed people using unknown methods to state that the Rad Lab is seismically safe is not good enough. The complexity and number of seismic issues alone at the Rad Lab require a full environmental impact statement.

Some Legal Context Under the National Environmental Policy Act

NNSA is preparing this draft Rad Lab environmental assessment pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). NEPA requires federal agencies to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) for “proposals for legislation and other major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.” NEPA regulations define a “major federal action” to include:

Adoption of programs, such as a group of concerted actions to implement a specific policy or plan; systematic and connected agency decisions allocating agency resources to implement a specific statutory program or executive directive.

The U.S. Supreme Court has instructed that environmental impact statements, although not required when an agency requests appropriations, should be prepared for underlying legislation proposing programmatic actions for which appropriations are sought. [28] [29]

42-9

The recent announcement regarding recapitalization of defense plutonium capabilities, which includes a proposal for an increased level of pit production at LANL (NNSA 2018), now makes increased pit production a reasonably foreseeable action. In this final EA, the cumulative impacts analysis was revised to reflect a potential increase from the currently authorized 20 pits per year production level as a reasonably foreseeable future action. However, detailed strategies, production planning, and supportive politics, as well as appropriations, will need to occur to increase the level of pit production. This particular cumulative analysis is more appropriate for future actions requiring a pit production NEPA analysis. NNSA does not have the detailed information as to what is required in terms of planning in order to conduct an accurate non-speculative cumulative impacts analysis from increased operations other than to say that the RLUOB and PF-4 process improvements would result in safer more efficient operations regardless of production level.

All references used in the RLUOB EA are electronically available on the project website (https://energy.gov/node/2501991). A hyperlink is given for each reference.

NNSA prepared this EA to determine whether or not the Proposed Action has the potential to cause significant environmental effects. Based on the EA analysis, NNSA has determined that a Finding of No Significant Impact is appropriate and an EIS is not necessary. The Proposed Action would provide a variety of environmental and other benefits such as fewer worker radiation exposures, less waste generation, lower costs, and improved laboratory efficiency. The need for enduring AC and MC capabilities is independent of the level of pit production. DOE and NNSA have long recognized the need to transfer these required AC and MC activities to more modern facilities at LANL. DOE evaluated such transfers in an EIS issued in 2003 (DOE 2003b), a supplemental EIS issued in 2011 (DOE 2011c), and a supplemental analysis issued in 2015 (DOE 2015a). The current EA builds on this past NEPA documentation and the same types of AC and MC activities would occur under the Proposed Action as those previously evaluated. The difference is that under the Proposed Action evaluated in this EA, more AC and MC activities would be performed in RLUOB and fewer in PF-4. Please also refer to Section C.2.3, “General Concerns that the EA Approach Results in Segmentation of the NEPA Process and a Programmatic EIS Is Needed,” of this CRD for additional information.

[29] See 40 C.F.R. §1508.18(b)(4).
If a major federal action “significantly” affects the quality of the human environment, an EIS is required.23 If there is a substantial question whether a proposed action may significantly impact the environment, the agency must prepare an EIS. NEPA regulations also require that the degree to which the environmental effects of the action are likely to be highly controversial should be taken into consideration while reaching a decision to prepare an environmental impact statement or not.24

Nuclear Watch argues that all of the above applies to this Draft Rad Lab EA, whose stated purpose is to reach a decision to issue a Finding of No Significant Impact, or alternatively to prepare a more complete environmental impact statement. We further argue that the latter decision is the correct outcome that NNSA must follow, as re-categorizing the Rad Lab as a Hazard Category-3 nuclear facility is the beginning step of implementing expanded production of plutonium pits. That expansion is statutorily required (see more below), will cause broad programmatic actions for which NNSA is requesting appropriations, will significantly impact the environment, and is highly controversial.

Programmatic Concerns Require an EIS

NNSA cannot reach a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) for this draft environmental assessment until after the public comment period is over on April 25. Following that NNSA should make the Finding available for 30-day public review and comment because “[t]he proposed action is, or is closely similar to, one which normally requires the preparation of an environmental impact statement … [and] is one without precedent.” 25 Therefore a FONSI should not be finalized until May 26 at the earliest possible date.

However, NNSA has previously declared that on May 11 it will announce a decision on where future expanded plutonium pit production will take place, either at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) or the Savannah River Site (SRS) in South Carolina, or both. It is silly that this draft environmental assessment is underway before that crucial decision, without which it can’t really be determined whether or not the Rad Lab truly needs to be re-categorized as a Hazard Category-3 nuclear facility. This Draft EA is clearly putting the cart before the horse. As such, NNSA should proceed to a fuller environmental impact statement after its May 11 decision on plutonium pit production.

Concerning whether the “[t]he proposed action is, or is closely similar to, one which normally requires the preparation of an environmental impact statement,” NEPA requires that interconnected actions be analyzed together, and forbids segmentation into different narrow projects. In a clear sign of interconnectivity, the Rad Lab re-categorization is one of four “subprojects” in the NNSA’s FY 2019 Congressional Budget Request under the budget line item “04-D-125 Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Project.” All four subprojects explicitly involve relocating analytical chemistry and materials characterization capabilities at LANL, and cost 2 billion in irretrievable taxpayer dollars. Conversely, for NNSA to analyze only

22 See Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347 (1979) at 361-362
24 40 C.F.R. §1508.27(b)(4) and (b)(5).
25 See 40 CFR 1501.4(e)(2)
the narrow question of raising the plutonium-239 (or equivalent) administrative limit in the Draft EA is the segmentation that NEPA forbids.

According to the NNSA’s FY 2019 Congressional Budget Request, these interrelated subprojects, all under the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Project budget line item, are:

REI Phase 2 (REI2) Subproject (04-D-125-04): Transfers part of AC and MC capabilities from CMR to RLUOB by designing, purchasing, and installing additional equipment in RLUOB. A CD-3A request for procurement of long lead equipment and site preparations, following a reconciled Independent Cost Estimate (ICE) conducted by DOEPM, was approved for REI2 on December 18, 2014. CD-3B for additional long lead procurements for REI2 was approved on December 22, 2015. REI2 CD-2/3 approval was received on October 31, 2016 with the Performance baseline established at $633,250K. CD-4 completion is scheduled for January 5, 2022.

PF-4 Equipment Installation Phase 1 (PEI1) Subproject (04-D-125-05): Maximizes use of PF-4 by decommissioning and decontaminating (D&D) old gloveboxes and equipment, reconfiguring and reusing existing gloveboxes, consolidating and relocating existing capabilities, and installing new gloveboxes and equipment for AC/MC capabilities. PEI1 will establish AC and MC capabilities that utilize larger amounts of nuclear materials and therefore are required to be in PF-4 operational space. CD-3A for long lead procurements for PEI1 was approved on March 18, 2015. CD-3B for additional long lead procurements was approved on December 22, 2015. PEI1 CD-2/3 approval was received on October 31, 2016 with the Performance Baseline established at $394,000K. CD-4 completion is scheduled for April 30, 2022.

PF-4 Equipment Installation Phase 2 (PEI2) Subproject (04-D-125-06)/(PF-4 Reconfiguration Project – 17-D-126): Maximize use of PF-4 by consolidating and relocating existing capabilities, replacing existing equipment, installing gloveboxes and equipment and D&D of existing laboratory space for AC/MC capabilities. PEI2 will establish enduring AC and MC capabilities for supporting NNSA actinide-based missions. The preliminary cost range for the work in this subproject is $523,000K - $675,340K; the cost estimate will be updated prior to CD-2/3 approval for this subproject. An integrated master schedule will be developed at CD-2/3.

Re-categorizing RLUOB to Hazard Category 3 (RC3) Subproject (04-D-125-07)/(RLUOB Reconfiguration Project – 17-D-125): Maximizes use of RLUOB by reconfiguring existing laboratory space and equipping the remaining empty laboratories with AC and MC capabilities, and enables the RLUOB to be re-categorized facility to a limited hazard category-3 nuclear facility. RC3 will establish enduring AC and MC capabilities for supporting NNSA actinide-based missions. The preliminary cost range for the work in this subproject is $208,000K - $339,335K; the cost estimate will be updated prior to CD-2/3 approval for this subproject. An integrated master schedule will be developed at CD-2/3.26

- End of extended excerpt -

26 NNSA FY 2019 Congressional Budget Request, pp. 365-366.
The interconnectedness of these subprojects is concretely demonstrated by NNSA’s own statement in its FY 2019 budget request:

Execution of the CMRR Project under the cost and schedule parameters established at CD-1 is principally dependent on predictable, stable appropriations at the CMRR project (04-D-125) level. Without the ability to move funds between subprojects, the completion dates for the PEI2 and RC3 subprojects will challenge the programmatic need dates associated with the LANL mission. This risk can be reduced by allocating funds at the CMRR project level in FY 2019, allowing any efficiencies realized on the REI2 and PEI1 subprojects to be used to advance the PEI2 and RC3 subprojects.27

In its budget request, NNSA continues:

To support programmatic milestones, baselining the RC3 subproject is prioritized ahead of PEI2. Fully outfitting the RLUOB provides Analytical Chemistry (AC) capabilities needed to support plutonium mission activities.28

First, NNSA argues that this Rad Lab EA is solely about relocating operations from the old deteriorating CMR Building so that LANL will have enduring AC and MC capabilities for its ongoing plutonium mission. However, NNSA has not justified how LANL’s present plutonium mission would not be served by the already raised limit of 38.6 grams Pu-239 equivalent for the Rad Lab (up from the original 8.4 grams). Instead, this proposal to now raise the Pu-239 equivalent to 400 grams for the Rad Lab is all about LANL’s future plutonium mission, over which there is no mystery. That future mission involves expanding plutonium pit production from the currently sanctioned level of 20 pits per year to demonstrating the capability by 2027 to produce 80 pits per year, which is statutorily required by the FY 2015 National Defense Authorization Act.29

This is perhaps made even clearer by NNSA’s own “Highlights and Major Changes in the FY 2019 Budget.” It states:

Increases for Plutonium Sustainment30 support fabrication of four to five development (DEV) W87 pits, continue investments to replace end-of-life equipment for pit production, installation of critical equipment to increase production capacity, and Other Project Costs associated with pre-conceptual design efforts supporting the selection of a single preferred alternative for plutonium pit production beyond 30 war reserve pits per year.31

Finally, this is really driven home by this extended passage from NNSA’s FY 2018 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan:

27 Ibid.
28 Ibid. “programmatic” bolded for future reference in these comments.
30 NNSA’s budget category Plutonium Sustainment jumps from $183.7 million in FY 2018 to $362 million in FY 2019. It is separate from CMRR construction/upgrade costs, but constitutes the operational missions that would take place in the new/upgraded CMRR facilities.
31 NNSA FY 2019 Congressional Budget Request, p. 57, emphasis added.
2.4.1.2 Plutonium Challenges

• NNSA must ramp up pit production over the next decade to meet the required capacity by FY 2030. Meeting these deliverables remains a challenge as LANL continues to invest in manufacturing equipment and associated facilities to reach capability, capacity, and reliability.

• NNSA continues to execute the CMRR project to maintain continuity in analytical chemistry and materials characterization capabilities. NNSA is transitioning these activities out of the Cold War-era Chemistry and Metallurgy Research facility…

2.4.1.3 Plutonium Long-term Sustainment Strategy

NNSA invests in these areas of infrastructure, equipment, and critical skills to meet its plutonium mission requirements. These investments are detailed below.

Plutonium Sustainment Program

The Plutonium Sustainment program provides the production equipment and necessary skills to manufacture pits in support of stockpile requirements. These requirements are outlined in both internal programmatic documents (e.g., the Requirements and Planning Document) and external documents (e.g., the current and prior versions of the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act]). The program supports the production plan to meet these requirements, as shown in Table 2–3.

Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Project (Line-Item Construction Project)

The CMRR project optimizes the use of LANL’s existing facilities by reconstituting analytical chemistry and materials characterization capabilities previously performed in the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research facility into laboratory space in PF-4 and the RLUOB. The first two phases of equipment installation subprojects (RLUOB Equipment Installation Phase 2 and PF-4 Equipment Installation Phase 1) achieved CD-2/3 (Approve Performance Baseline/Approve Start of Construction) in October 2016.

Pit Production

Additional infrastructure is needed to support increased pit production and plutonium mission requirements. CD-0 (Approve Mission Need) for the Plutonium Modular Approach was approved in November 2015, and an AoA [analysis of alternatives] is underway to consider a range of infrastructure options across DOE and NNSA that can support capabilities for increased pit production capacity and enduring plutonium mission needs. The AoA is targeted for completion in early FY 2018.32

Therefore, the NNSA’s FY 2018 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan makes explicitly clear that LANL’s plutonium mission is expanded plutonium pit production, and the Plan squarely places the CMRR subprojects, including enhancing AC and MC capabilities at the Rad Lab, within that context. Having said that, the FY 2018 SSMP is outdated, lacking the new PF-4 Equipment Installation Phase 2 (PEI2) and Re-categorizing RLUOB to Hazard Category 3 (RC3) Subprojects. We argue that the RC3 subproject, interconnected to the others, clearly takes the Rad Lab far beyond merely maintaining enduring AC and MC capabilities at LANL, and directly into supporting expanded plutonium pit production.

This is further reinforced by going back in time into the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Project’s troubled history, which deserves broader context. Briefly, NNSA has repeatedly sought through various NEPA processes to raise the limit on plutonium pit production from that originally set by the 1996 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS), but repeatedly failed. The 1996 SSM PEIS, which relocated the plutonium pit production mission to LANL after a 1989 FBI investigating environmental crimes at the Rocky Flats Plant abruptly stopped production, specifically limited pit production to 20 pits per year because of the deteriorated conditions at the old CMR Building. Those conditions limited analytical chemistry and materials characterization operations, which in turn limited production to 20 pits per year. NNSA has been trying to rectify that ever since.

In 2004 NNSA issued a draft environmental impact statement for a Modern Pit Facility designed to produce 450 pits per year. That never reached a final EIS, mostly due to congressional questioning of the need for that level of pit production. NNSA subsequently proposed a “Consolidated Plutonium Center” for 250 pits per year, later dropped to 125 pits per year after more congressional questioning. NNSA finally settled on 80 pits per year at existing Los Alamos Lab facilities, with a 2008 LANL Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement (SWEIS) as the NEPA vehicle for approving it. However, Nuclear Watch and others argued that a decision to expand plutonium pit production to 80 pits per year should await completion of a nation-wide Complex Transformation PEIS that was underway, which NNSA ultimately agreed to. However, the 2008 Record of Decision for the Complex Transformation PEIS deferred any decision on expanded plutonium pit production, leaving the existing cap of 20 pits per year in place.

To complete this snapshot of NEPA processes revolving around expanded plutonium pit production, it should also be noted that NNSA completed a CMRR-Nuclear Facility Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement in 2011, only to cancel the Nuclear Facility in 2012 after its estimated costs soared to $6.5 billion. NNSA’s current attempt to raise the plutonium-239E limit in the Rad Lab, along with the other contemporaneous CMRR subprojects, are a direct consequence of canceling the CMRR-Nuclear Facility, with the agency seeking alternative ways to replace that canceled project’s AC and MC capabilities.

One of the Complex Transformation PEIS’ crucial supporting documents is relevant here. It demonstrated that the CMRR Nuclear Facility was being specifically sized to support pit production capability of 50-80 pits per year. An internal NNSA study of planned alternatives

33 The 20 pits per year production cap was also explicitly reaffirmed in the September 2008 Record of Decision (ROD) for the LANL Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement (SWEIS) and implied in the December 2008 ROD for the Complex Transformation Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement, which considered but deferred a decision to expand production beyond 20 pits per year.
advocated for a “baseline version (22,500 ft² of Pu lab space) of the CMRR-NF… resulting in a production capacity of 50-80 ppy” [pits per year].

This Draft Rad Lab EA states: “Completed in 2011, RLUOB provides about 19,500 square feet of laboratory space…” (p. 12) The Draft Rad Lab EA further states, “The proposed additional changes for RLUOB include outfitting and refurbishing approximately 3,000 square feet of unequipped laboratory space with enclosures and AC and MC equipment…” (Pages 15-16). Thus we arrive at the 22,500 square feet of AC and MC processing space needed to support expanded production of 80 pits per year in the Rad Lab alone. This will be further augmented by additional AC and MC processing space in PF-4, which after all can handle larger volumes than the Rad Lab.

NNSA’s FY 2018 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan also makes clear in the following extended passage that future expanded plutonium pit production is for W87-like pits for the Interoperable Warhead:

IW1 [Interoperable Warhead-1] Accomplishments

- IW1 activities are scheduled to restart in FY 2020 to achieve a first production unit in FY 2030.
- PF-4 at LANL resumed operations and fabricated a W87 pit as part of the planned development series.
- NNSA and the Nuclear Weapons Council approved the selection of the W87 pit for the IW1.

The Interoperable Warhead is supposed to be interoperable between the Air Force’s land-based ICBMs and the Navy’s sub-launched ballistic missiles. Ironically the Navy does not want the Interoperable Warhead. In fact, because of that lack of Navy support, the Obama Administration delayed the Interoperable Warhead for five years.

However, NNSA and the Labs are now bringing it back in the FY 2019 budget request, arguably as make-work. But the ultimate point here for these comments is that the Interoperable Warhead is far from being a done deal, and therefore there may be no need for expanded plutonium pit production to begin with. It is notable that no pit production is scheduled for maintenance of the safety and reliability of the existing nuclear weapons stockpile. Instead, future expanded plutonium pit production is all about speculative future new-design nuclear weapons.

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Commenter No. 42 (cont’d): Jay Coghlan, Director, Nuclear Watch New Mexico

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The Draft Rad Lab EA and Expanded Plutonium Pit Production

On April 19, 2018, the NNSA Los Alamos Field Office (LAFO) announced that it had performed a Supplement Analysis examining whether or not the 2008 LANL Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement (SWEIS) should be updated. LAFO decided not to update the LANL SWEIS, but at the same time stated:

This announcement is not related to NNSA’s ongoing review of the plutonium pit mission. Should NNSA determine that LANL is the preferred alternative for that work, a separate determination regarding a NEPA analysis for the necessary facilities would be needed.37

NNSA has previously declared that it will announce on May 11 where future pit production will take place, either at LANL or the Savannah River Site (SRS), or both. But the point here in these comments is that at least NNSA recognizes that it must consider completing more NEPA analyses for expanded plutonium pit production. By extension, this would carry over to the Savannah River Site, if NNSA decides to produce pits there. Nuclear Watch predicts that NNSA will produce pits at both LANL (up to 30 pits per year) and SRS (the remainder up to 125 pits per year). This cries out for a nation-wide programmatic environmental impact statement. For one thing, in order to expand plutonium pit production, NNSA has to raise the current cap of 20 pits per year in another Record of Decision following completion of NEPA review.

Should NNSA decide on May 11 to perform future plutonium pit production at SRS, or perhaps also at LANL, then clearly a programmatic environmental impact statement (PEIS) is needed, or alternatively a PEIS “supplemental” to the 2008 Complex Transformation PEIS. We also note that any decision to expand plutonium pit production above the 20 pits per year sanctioned in the 1996 Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS would require a new or supplemental PEIS, regardless of future location(s).

That new or supplemental programmatic environmental impact statement will also have to critically examine the mission need for expanded plutonium pit production. It is no secret that it is to produce “W87-like”38 plutonium pits for the speculative Interoperable Warhead,39 which the Navy doesn’t want.40 In short, there is arguably no need for expanded plutonium pit production, and therefore no need to re-categorize the Rad Lab as a Hazard Category-3 nuclear facility.

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Commenter No. 42 (cont’d): Jay Coghlan, Director,
Nuclear Watch New Mexico

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38 There are four references to “W87-like” pits in the FY 2019 NNSA Congressional Budget Request, beginning at page 70. The fact that these won’t be exact replicas could be of supreme importance. Should these “W87-like” pits be significantly different from the tested, true pedigree, there could be a loss of confidence in their reliability because they cannot be full-scale tested. Or alternatively, they could prompt the U.S. to return to full-scale testing with potentially grave international proliferation consequences.
39 Supposedly interoperable between the Air Force’s Minuteman III ICBM and the Navy’s sub-launched Trident missiles. At best these warheads could have a common nuclear explosives package, while little else would be truly interoperable.
40 See 2012 Navy memo at https://www.nukewatch.org/importantdocs/resources/Navy-Memo-W87W88.pdf. Moreover, of the Navy’s two sub-launched warheads, a Life Extension Program for its W76 will be completed in a few years, and a major “alteration” is about to begin that will give the W88 warhead a new
Jobs, Jobs, Jobs (not many)

Often the argument “jobs, jobs, jobs” is used to partially justify expanded nuclear weapons programs in New Mexico. The Draft EA states:

Under the Proposed Action Alternative, AC and MC operations would involve an estimated 135 radiation workers at RLUOB and 48 radiation workers at PF-4. Most workers would come from existing jobs at the CMR Building, RLUOB, and PF-4. Approximately 30 full-time equivalent (FTE) staff would be new employees. It takes all four CMRR subprojects, that is to say $2 billion, to create those 30 new jobs, which is a lousy return on taxpayers’ investment. Thus the jobs argument can’t be used by NNSA or the New Mexico congressional delegation to justify raising the plutonium limit in the Rad Lab. Genuine, comprehensive cleanup at LANL would be a real win-win for New Mexicans, creating hundreds of high-paying jobs while permanently protecting the environment and our precious water resources.

Conclusion

NNSA should proceed with a broader environmental impact statement after NNSA’s May 11 decision on the future of expanded plutonium pit production. First, the draft Rad Lab EA’s deficiencies concerning lack of proper analyses of seismic risks, potential beryllium exposures and Intentional Destructive Acts must be corrected in a fuller EIS. Further, that EIS needs to include the current interconnected four subprojects related to relocating analytical chemistry and materials characterization operations involving plutonium at LANL, which altogether will cost 2 billion irretrievable taxpayer dollars. NNSA does not make the case why the first two subprojects are NOT sufficient to maintain AC and MC capabilities at LANL, especially since the plutonium-239 (or equivalent) limit in the Rad Lab has already been raised from 8.4 grams to 38.6 grams. And perhaps in a demonstration of its bias, NNSA fails to include in this draft Rad Lab EA expanded plutonium pit production as a “reasonably foreseeable action” affecting other actions at LANL. That is preposterous given that expanded plutonium pit production is already statutorily required and LANL is actively planning for it.

Environmental cleanup at LANL is progressing in accordance with a Compliance Order on Consent entered into by DOE and the New Mexico Environment Department. Environmental cleanup at LANL was extensively addressed in the 2008 LANL SWEIS (DOE 2008a). Additional information about environmental cleanup at LANL is available in subsequent LANL SWEIS yearbooks and other material, which can be found at http://www.lanl.gov/environment/protection/compliance/sweis.php.

NNSA prepared this EA to determine whether or not the Proposed Action has the potential to cause significant environmental effects. Based on the EA analysis, NNSA has determined that a Finding of No Significant Impact is appropriate and an EIS is not necessary. The Proposed Action is limited to the recategorization of RLUOB as a MAR-limited Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility with more AC and MC operations being performed at RLUOB and less AC and MC operations at PF-4; it is not tied to any specific level of pit production activity at LANL or any other site across the DOE Complex. The need for continued AC and MC capabilities is independent of the level of pit production. The current EA appropriately addresses issues raised by the commenter such as seismic risks, potential beryllium exposures, and intentional destructive acts (see the responses to comments 42-6, 42-7, and 42-8). As noted in the response to comment 42-13, the same AC and MC capabilities and operations that were evaluated in the 2015 Supplement Analysis are evaluated.
If NNSA’s May 11 decision is to have expanded pit production at both LANL and SRS (which we consider likely), the agency should then proceed with a new or supplemental programmatic environmental impact statement. After all, the 1996 Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS and 2008 LANL Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement limited plutonium pit production at the Lab to no more than 20 pits per year. Despite repeated attempts, NNSA has not formally raised that production limit in a NEPA document, which Nuclear Watch asserts NNSA is legally required to do.

Following a programmatic environmental impact statement on expanded plutonium pit production, site-specific NEPA documents implementing that decision will need to be completed for SRS and LANL, as the case may be. The contents of this draft Rad Lab EA should be subsumed in all that.

- End of Comments -

These comments respectfully submitted,

Jay Coghlan      Scott Kovac
Director      Research Director

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42-14 cont’d

Commenter No. 42 (cont’d): Jay Coghlan, Director,
Nuclear Watch New Mexico

in the current EA, except that under the Proposed Action in the current EA, fewer AC and MC operations would take place at PF-4 and more AC and MC operations would take place at RLUOB. The Proposed Action would provide a variety of environmental and other benefits such as fewer worker radiation exposures, less waste generation, lower costs, and improved laboratory efficiency. As noted in the response to comment 42-5, NNSA will determine the appropriate level of NEPA documentation to support the recent announcement regarding the recapitalization of defense plutonium capabilities, which includes a proposal for an increased level of pit production at LANL (NNSA 2018), and complete the necessary analyses and RODs prior to proceeding with actions related to increases above currently authorized pit production levels. Because the recent announcement makes increased pit production a reasonably foreseeable action, the cumulative impacts analysis for the final EA was revised to reflect a potential increase from the currently authorized 20 pits per year production level as a reasonably foreseeable future action. However, detailed strategies, production planning, and supportive politics, as well as appropriations, will need to occur to increase the level of pit production. This particular cumulative analysis is more appropriate for future actions requiring a pit production NEPA analysis. NNSA does not have the detailed information as to what is required in terms of planning in order to conduct an accurate non-speculative cumulative impacts analysis from increased operations other than to say that the RLUOB and PF-4 process improvements would result in safer more efficient operations regardless of production level. Regardless of the level of pit production at LANL, NNSA has an enduring need for AC and MC capabilities, which is the subject of the current EA.

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43 We note that site-specific NEPA documents for plutonium pit production at SRS will necessarily need to be lengthy and complex, with little reliance on previous NEPA documents, given that pit production will be an entirely new mission at SRS. Although SRS handles and stores many tons of plutonium, there is no existing infrastructure for pit production and therefore the site will be starting virtually from scratch. Of particular interest will be how the highly flawed MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility might be converted to pit production.
Commenter No. 43: Jay Coghlan, Director, Nuclear Watch New Mexico

April 27, 2018

NNSA Los Alamos Field Office
ATTN: CMRR Project Management Office
3747 West Jemez Road
Los Alamos, NM 87544

Via email to RLUOBEA@hq.doe.gov

Re: Additional comments on the Draft Environmental Assessment of Proposed Changes for Analytical Chemistry and Materials Characterization at the Radiological Laboratory/Utility/Office Building, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico
(Hereinafter “Draft Rad Lab EA”)

Dear CMRR Project Management Office:

Please accept for consideration these additional comments by Nuclear Watch New Mexico. We acknowledge the obvious: we are submitting them two days after the April 25th expiration of the comment period. However, only yesterday we ran across what we believe is pertinent information that the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and others should consider. Please be assured that we will submit no further comments after this.

Specifically what prompted us to submit these additional comments is this 2015 weekly report by the independent Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB):

Plutonium Infrastructure Strategy: Late last month, the Deputy Secretary of Energy approved a restructuring of the subprojects covered under the CMR Replacement project. There are now four subprojects: (1) RLUOB Equipment Installation, Phase 2; (2) Plutonium Facility Equipment Installation, Phase 1; (3) Plutonium Facility Equipment Installation, Phase 2; and (4) Re-categorizing the RLUOB to Hazard Category 3 with a material-at-risk limit of 400 g plutonium-239 equivalent. The first two subprojects enable LANL to cease programmatic activities in the CMR by 2019, while the latter two subprojects primarily support the increased capacity required for larger pit manufacturing rates.

We believe this is strong corroboration from an unimpeachable source of one of our central points in our previous comments. Specifically, NNSA’s current proposal to re-categorize the Rad Lab into a Hazard Category-3 nuclear facility by raising its administrative limit to 400

1 Available electronically at https://energy.gov/node/2501991
3 Our extended comments submitted on April 25, 2018 are available at https://nukewatch.org/importeddocs/resources/NWNM-Rad-Lab-comments-4-25-18.pdf

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Please refer to the response to your earlier letter and to Section C.2.3, “General Concerns that the EA Approach Results in Segmentation of the NEPA Process and a Programmatic EIS Is Needed,” of this CRD for NNSA’s response to this comment. As indicated in Chapter 1 of the EA, the overall AC and MC mission remains the same and the Proposed Action only identifies a more efficient approach to meeting the mission. The difference is that under the Proposed Action addressed in the current EA, fewer AC and MC operations would take place at PF-4 and more AC and MC operations would take place at RLUOB. As addressed in Section 2.1 of the EA, the Proposed Action would provide a variety of environmental and other benefits such as fewer worker radiation exposures, less waste generation, lower costs, and improved laboratory efficiency. The AC and MC capabilities provide in RLUOB and PF-4 support a variety of project including pit production, pit surveillance, plutonium science, and other national security programs.
Commenter No. 43 (cont’d): Jay Coghlan, Director,
Nuclear Watch New Mexico

grams of plutonium-239 (or the equivalent) is NOT just to maintain analytical chemistry (AC) and materials characterization capabilities at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), as this Draft Rad Lab EA claims. Instead, it is to directly support expanded plutonium pit production, which as explained in our earlier comments leads to a whole nest of issues under the National Environmental Policy Act.

Data from the NNSA’s FY 2019 Congressional Budget Request (CBR) are instructive. The “Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Project” construction line item has four active subprojects, all focused on relocating LANL’s AC and MC capabilities from the old, deteriorating Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Building to the Rad Lab and PF-4 (the Lab’s facility for plutonium pit production). The first two subprojects, RLUOB Equipment Installation Phase 2 (REI2) and PF-4 Equipment Installation Phase 1 (PEI1), are explicitly described as enabling that relocation by the end of 2021.

This aligns with a 2016 DNFSB weekly report:

Plutonium Facility Infrastructure: On Monday, the NNSA Administrator approved Critical Decision (CD)-2/3, Performance Baseline and Start of Construction, for the Radiological Laboratory Utility Office Building (RLUOB) Equipment Installation Phase 2 (REI-2) and Plutonium Facility Equipment Installation Phase 1 (PEI-1). These subprojects of the CMR Replacement project (see 12/18/15 weekly) are needed to move the remaining analytical chemistry and material characterization activities out of CMR. The CD-2/3 approval letter identifies the scope of the subprojects to include outfitting or repurposing 10,000 square feet of laboratory space in RLUOB and 2,800 square feet of space in the Plutonium Facility. Additionally, the letter indicates these projects are scheduled to receive approval for CD-4, Start of Operations, in early calendar year 2022. 4

In a different 2016 DNFSB weekly report, the Safety Board noted how LANL’s schedule for moving out of the old CMR Building had slipped from the original 2019 to 2021. 5 The key thing here is the revised target year of 2021 for moving out of the old CMR Building.

According to NNSA’s FY 2019 budget request, funding for REI2 ends in 2021, the old CMR Building’s end date for AC and MC operations, as shown in these excerpts:

• REI Phase 2 (REI2) Subproject (04-D-125-04): Maximizes the use of RLUOB laboratories by both reconfiguring some existing laboratory space and equipping empty laboratories with AC and MC capabilities. The RLUOB will operate at the increased radiological limit, 38.6 g of Pu-239 equivalent, consistent with the new limit established by NNSA Supplemental Guidance NA-1 SD G 1027, which enables additional AC and MC operations to move in. New gloveboxes/hoods and equipment will be installed in RLUOB through this subproject. This project makes progress toward ceasing program operations in CMR.

Similarly, funding for PEI1 ends in 2021, the old CMR Building’s end date for AC and MC operations, as shown in these excerpts from the NNSA’s FY 2019 budget request:

- **PF-4 Equipment Installation Phase 1 (PEI1) Subproject (04-D-125-05):** The PEI1 subproject involves the following: relocation of existing PF-4 processes to create open consolidated space, reusing existing gloveboxes/equipment in PF-4 to create open laboratory space; and, installation of new gloveboxes/equipment in the created open space. PEI1 will support the AC and MC capabilities that require the processing of larger amounts of nuclear material. This project makes progress toward ceasing program operations in CMR. These capabilities support pit production, pit surveillance, plutonium science and other national security programs.

### Total Project Cost (TPC)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Project Cost (TPC)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 2017</td>
<td>44,189</td>
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<tr>
<td>FY 2026</td>
<td>83,250</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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However, in marked contrast, funding for Re-categorizing the RLUOB to Hazard Category 3 (RC3) continues until 2024, as documented below. This is three years after AC and MC operations are terminated in the old CMR Building. Therefore, this can’t possibly be just to maintain LANL’s AC and MC capabilities as the Draft Rad EA claims, when those capabilities are scheduled to be relocated to the Rad Lab and PF-4 by 2021.

- Re-categorizing RLUOB to Hazard Category 3 (RC3) Subproject (04-D-125-07)/(RLUOB Reconfiguration Project – 17-D-125): Maximize use of RLUOB by reconfiguring existing laboratory space, equipping the remaining empty laboratories with AC and MC capabilities, and re-categorizing RLUOB to a hazard category-3 facility with a material limit. RC3 will establish enduring AC and MC capabilities for supporting NNSA actinide-based missions.

This is also true for PEI2, as documented here:

- PF-4 Equipment Installation Phase 2 (PEI2) Subproject (04-D-125-06)/(PF-4 Reconfiguration Project – 17-D-126): Maximize use of PF-4 by consolidating and relocating existing capabilities, replacing existing equipment, installing gloveboxes and equipment and D&D of existing laboratory space for AC/MC capabilities. PEI2 will establish enduring AC and MC capabilities for supporting NNSA actinide-based missions.

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Ibid, pp. 373 & 384, emphasis added.

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Thus we have around a billion taxpayer dollars spent to get AC and MC capabilities out of the old CMR Building and relocated to the Rad Lab and PF-4 by 2012. Then we have another billion taxpayer dollars spent on subprojects to augment AC and MC capabilities after CMR is operationally closed in 2021. Money talks, and that money spent after 2021 tells us that it’s not just about maintaining LANL’s AC and MC capabilities, as NNSA claims in this Draft Rad Lab EA.

Concerning “RC3 [and PE12] will establish enduring AC and MC capabilities for supporting NNSA actinide-based missions”. As extensively covered in our previous comments, NNSA’s primary actinide-based mission is no mystery. It is expanded production of plutonium pits, as already statutorily required by the FY 2015 Defense Authorization Act. But this whole thing is a house of cards, since future plutonium pit production is NOT to maintain the safety and reliability of the existing nuclear weapons stockpile, but rather is for speculative future “Interoperable Warheads” that the Navy doesn’t even want.11

In conclusion: NNSA needs to prepare a new or supplemental programmatic environmental impact statement covering all aspects of expanded plutonium pit production. We believe that need will only be reinforced by NNSA’s pending decision on the future of expanded plutonium pit production, reportedly to be announced on May 11. In any event, this draft Rad Lab Environmental assessment is clearly grossly premature before that decision.

- End of Added Comments -

Jay Coghlan
Director

Scott Kovac
Research Director

NNSA prepared this EA to determine whether or not the Proposed Action has the potential to cause significant environmental effects. Based on the EA analysis; NNSA has determined that a Finding of No Significant Impact is appropriate and an EIS is not necessary. The Proposed Action is limited to the recategorization of RLUOB as a MAR-limited Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility with more AC and MC operations taking place in RLUOB and less AC and MC operations at PF-4. The Proposed Action and the need for continued AC and MC capabilities is independent of any level of pit production at LANL or at any other DOE site. Please refer to Section C.2.3, “General Concerns that the EA Approach Results in Segmentation of the NEPA Process and a Programmatic EIS Is Needed,” of this CRD for NNSA’s response to this comment.