PROTECTIVE FORCE ASSESSMENT GUIDE

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Acronyms

ARAPT Alarm Response and Assessment Performance Test
ATP Annual Training Plan
C2 Command and Control
CAS Central Alarm Station
CAT Composite Adversary Team
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
DOE U.S. Department of Energy
EA Office of Enterprise Assessments
EA-22 Office of Security Assessments
EEI Essential Elements of Information
EMETL Enterprise Mission Essential Task List
ESS Engagement Simulation System
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FOF Force on Force
GO General Order
IDS Intrusion Detection System
IFF Identifying Friendly Forces
JA Job Analysis
JTA Job Task Analysis
LLEA Local Law Enforcement Agency
LNPT Limited-Notice Performance Test
LSPT Limited-Scope Performance Test
MAA Material Access Area
MC&A Material Control and Accountability
MET Mission Essential Task
METL Mission Essential Task List
MILES Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System
MOU Memorandum of Understanding
NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration
NOD Night Optic Device
NTC DOE National Training Center
ODFSA Officially Designated Federal Security Authority
OJT On-the-Job Training
OPFOR Opposing Force
OPSEC Operations Security
OST Office of Secure Transportation
P Practice
PA Protected Area
PO Post Order
POC Point of Contact
ROE Rules of Engagement
## Acronyms continued

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<td>RST</td>
<td>Required Support Training</td>
<td>SSSP</td>
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<td>Special Nuclear Material</td>
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<td>Security Police Officer</td>
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<td>Special Response Team</td>
<td>VBIED</td>
<td>Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device</td>
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Definitions

Composite Adversary Team (CAT) – Individuals who play the part of adversaries/opposing forces (OPFOR) during performance tests.

Controller – An individual(s) assigned to assist a Test Director in conducting and controlling a performance test. Controllers are generally individually assigned to all participants taking part in a performance test.

Evaluator – An individual assigned the responsibility for formally evaluating the performance of protection system elements during a performance test.

Insider – For performance testing purposes, a person from an assessed facility who is assigned to assist the CAT, to the best of his/her abilities, in planning and executing their activities for a performance test. (The Office of Enterprise Assessments [EA] performance testing protocols provide a more detailed discussion of insider responsibilities.)

Limited-Notice Performance Test (LNPT) – An LSPT that is coordinated and scheduled with one or more site trusted agents but is conducted without prior announcement to other site personnel. LNPTs are intended to elicit the most accurate information regarding an individual’s knowledge or the performance of safeguards and security programs. In some instances, the nature of the test may require that the persons being tested (or those supporting the tests) are notified immediately preceding the conduct of the test. Generally, during these tests, persons and/or equipment are placed in situations where test responses can be observed while potential safety and routine site operational concerns are addressed because pertinent site personnel have been forewarned of the test.

Limited-Scope Performance Test (LSPT) – A performance test designed to evaluate specific skills, equipment, or procedures. An LSPT may involve engagement simulation system/multiple integrated laser engagement system (ESS/MILES) equipment and CAT adversaries or live fire. The events of an LSPT may be interrupted to facilitate data collection, and they may be purposely directed by EA in order to achieve certain evaluation goals.

Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES) (also referred to as engagement simulation system, or ESS) – Equipment consisting of weapons-mounted laser transmitters, as well as laser sensors that are mounted on potential targets (e.g., personnel, vehicles, buildings). MILES permits accurate assessment of the effects of weapons fire during simulated hostile engagements.

Observer – An individual who observes a performance test but does not take part in test planning, control, play, or evaluation.

Player – An active participant in a performance test, either as a person being tested or as a role player, such as an adversary or a bystander.

Shadow Force – Members of a facility protective force who are armed with live weapons and ammunition and are under the direct supervision of a controller who is responsible for isolating the shadow force from the performance test players. The purpose of the shadow force is to provide armed response to an actual security emergency if one occurs within the performance test boundaries during a performance test.

Test Coordinator – An individual assigned the primary responsibility for planning and conducting a performance test.

Trusted Agent – A technically knowledgeable individual from an assessed field element or facility who acts as a neutral party to assist in planning and conducting a performance test. (For a more detailed discussion of trusted agents and their responsibilities, see “Protective Force Protocols for ESS Supported Performance Tests and Exercises,” March 2007.)
Section 1: Introduction

Purpose

The Protective Force Assessment Guide provides a set of detailed tools and references that the assessor can use to plan, conduct, document, and close out an assessment of the protective force and/or Federal agent program. These tools serve to promote consistency, ensure thoroughness, and enhance the quality of the assessment process within the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Security Assessments.

The information in this guide is intended to be useful to both the novice and the experienced assessor. For the experienced assessor, detailed information is organized to be easily referenced and can serve as a reminder when conducting assessment activities. For the novice assessor, the information can serve as a valuable training tool. With the assistance of an experienced assessor, the novice should be able to use the tools and reference material to collect data more efficiently and effectively.

Organization

This introductory section (Section 1) describes the assessment tools and outlines their use. Sections 2 through 5 provide detailed guidance for assessing each of the following major protective force subtopics:

- Section 2 – Protective Force Management
- Section 3 – Training
- Section 4 – Equipment and Facilities
- Section 5 – Duties (Routine and Emergency).

Section 6 (Interfaces) contains guidelines to help assessors coordinate their activities, both within the protective force team and with other topic teams. The section emphasizes ways in which data gathering can be made more efficient by coordinating with other teams and by identifying data that have direct applicability to other topical areas so that assessors on those teams can pursue and collect the data. The end goal is to ensure thoroughness in data collection, avoid duplicated effort, and to ensure that potential vulnerabilities are adequately performance tested and analyzed.

Section 7 (Analyzing Data and Interpreting Results) contains guidelines on how to organize and analyze information gathered during data collection activities. These guidelines include likely impacts of particular information on other topics or subtopics, and a discussion of interpreting the significance of potential deficiencies.

Appendix A (Performance Test Protocols) discusses the procedures for planning and conducting protective force performance tests in general, without dealing with specific tests. The purpose, importance, scope, and goals of protective force performance testing are addressed, followed by a detailed discussion of the procedures and considerations involved in planning and conducting performance tests.

Appendix B (Performance Test Descriptions and Commentary) contains generic performance test descriptions and data collection worksheets for commonly used protective force performance tests in the Duties subtopic area.

Appendix C (Performance Test Safety Considerations for Assessment Activities) provides information on the performance test safety plan. In addition to numerous other safety considerations, the plan is designed to addresses safety equipment, test boundaries, engagement simulation system/multiple integrated laser engagement system (ESS/MILES) safety provisions, and safety for individual participants.
General Considerations

The tools contained in this guide are intended to be used at the discretion of the assessor. Typically, assessors select the tools that are applicable and most useful on a facility-specific and assessment-specific basis. Although the guidelines presented here cover a variety of assessment activities, they do not and cannot address all protection program variations, systems, and procedures used at all DOE facilities. The tools may have to be modified or adapted to meet assessment-specific needs, and in some instances, assessors may have to design new activities and new tools to collect information not specifically covered in this guide.

The information in this guide does not repeat all of the detailed information in DOE orders. Rather, it is intended to complement the orders by providing practical guidance for planning, collecting, and analyzing assessment data. Assessors should refer to this guide, as well as DOE orders and other guidance, at all stages of the assessment process.

Periodic updates to the assessors guides ensures that the collective knowledge of Security Assessments’ most valuable assessors is incorporated and that improved methods and tools are incorporated as they are developed. Every attempt has been made to develop specific guidelines that are as useful as possible to both novice and experienced assessors. In addition to guidelines for collecting information, the assessment tools provide aids for prioritizing and selecting activities, then analyzing and interpreting results. The specific guidelines should not be viewed as operational imperatives; instead, they must be critically examined and interpreted on an assessment-specific basis, taking into account site-specific factors.

Characterization of the Protective Force Topic

The basic mission of the protective force and/or Federal agent program is to protect DOE security interests from theft, sabotage, and other hostile acts that may adversely impact national security or the health and safety of the public, as well as life and property at DOE facilities or over-the-road missions. The manner in which a protective force accomplishes this mission depends upon the specific security interests it must protect; this process is defined in locally promulgated orders, procedures, plans, and mission statements. The assessment of this topic must determine the protective force/Federal agents’ ability to accomplish site-specific and convoy mission requirements, as well as the applicable DOE policy requirements.

One or more of the subtopics (Management, Training, Equipment and Facilities, and Duties) will be the subject of assessment activities, depending upon the goals of the assessment. All of the subtopics are closely related and interdependent. The Duties subtopic is the most important, because it is built on a series of performance-based tests and exercises (both routine duties and emergency duties) that indicate whether the protective force is adequately prepared to perform its protection mission. Results in the Duties subtopic will point to strengths and weaknesses in the other subtopical areas. For example, if a protective force element does not demonstrate proficiency with a deployed firearm, a weakness in training may be revealed. If a protective force responds effectively to an attack by adversary forces, management’s attention to the development of effective response plans and other deterrents may be highlighted. The assessment of the Duties subtopic results in collection of data pertaining to the other three subtopics. Figure 1 illustrates this point.

Assessment Goals

The primary assessment goal is to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the protective force is both adequately meeting the appropriate standards established by DOE policy and providing appropriate protection to DOE security interests. In other words, the assessment must determine to what degree the protective force is able to accomplish its mission. To achieve this goal, it is necessary to determine whether the protective force is adequately managed, trained, equipped, and capable of performing all mission-related tasks and duties.
Figure 1. Interrelationship of Protective Force Subtopics
Compliance Versus Performance

While a protective force assessment includes compliance and performance evaluations, a greater emphasis is placed on the performance aspect, as it is more useful in determining whether the protective force can perform its missions. Many of the DOE protective force policy requirements contained in current orders/directives are stated in performance terms: that is, they state a mission, duty, or set of duties that must be performed. Therefore, compliance requires effective performance. Even when dealing with policy requirements for which a compliance approach may seem appropriate (e.g., Does the training program contain the required elements? Are there post orders?), the Security Assessments approach for this topic is to go beyond compliance and determine the performance aspects of these requirements (e.g., Does the training program adequately prepare security police officers to perform their mission? Do post orders provide adequate and appropriate guidance?). Therefore, whenever possible, data collection activities for the protective force topic should be performance-oriented.

Planning Goals

The ultimate goal of planning is to anticipate and prepare for activities necessary to conduct the highest quality assessment possible with the resources available. To that end, it is useful to focus the planning process on a series of goals including:

- Understanding the characteristics of the protective force, including its size, composition, organization and mission; having a general familiarity with how it is trained, managed, and equipped; and understanding the environment in which it operates to include the target areas that it is charged with protecting
- Determining the subtopics to be assessed and the specific areas of focus for assessment activities
- Determining the specific data collection methods to be used, including any performance tests to be conducted
- Identifying and arranging for the provision of all personnel, administrative, safety, and logistical requirements necessary for data collection
- Producing necessary planning documents, such as the data call and the lines of inquiry (see Attachments 7-1 and 7-2, respectively, at the end of Section 7)
- Developing a plan for the equitable use of assessment resources and manpower to provide the maximum amount of data to support subtopical and overall assessment results
- Determining follow-up requirements (test plans, etc.) that must be accomplished prior to conducting the assessment.

Planning Decisions

Based on analysis of the information gained from the document reviews, discussions with other topic teams, and discussions with the points of contact (POCs) at the site/organization to be assessed, the topic team must make a number of decisions, including:

- Scope and emphasis of assessment activities (including final selection of subtopics)
- Data collection methods and tools to be employed, including performance tests
- Test samples and how they will be selected
- Composite Adversary Team support required
- Logistics, administrative, and personnel support required, and its sources
Team members and their data collection activities
A tentative schedule for data collection activities.

Once these decisions have been made, work assignments can be made and the detailed planning of data collection activities can proceed.

Using the Topic-Specific Tools

Sections 2 through 5, organized around the protective force subtopics, provide topic-specific information intended to help assessors collect and analyze assessment data. Each subtopic section is further divided into the following standard categories:

- General Information
- Common Deficiencies/Potential Concerns
- Planning Activities
- Performance Tests (if applicable)
- Data Collection Activities.

General Information

The General Information section defines the scope of the subtopic. It includes background information, guidelines, and commonly used terms intended to help assessors focus on the unique features and problems associated with the subtopic. It also identifies the different approaches that a facility might use to accomplish an objective and provides typical examples.

Common Deficiencies/Potential Concerns

This section addresses potential concerns or deficiencies that Security Assessments has noted on previous assessments. Accompanying each potential concern or common deficiency is a short discussion giving more detail. Information in this section is intended to help the assessor further focus assessment activities and identify site-specific factors that may indicate whether a particular deficiency is likely to be present. By reviewing the list of common deficiencies and potential concerns before gathering data, assessors can be aware of these deficiencies and concerns during interviews, tours, and other data gathering activities.

Planning Activities

This section identifies activities normally conducted during assessment planning. If applicable, specific activities or information available to assessors should be identified for all planning periods, including pre-planning, the planning meeting, and ongoing planning. Planning activities include reviews of general documents and interviews with the facility protective force managers. The detailed information in the Planning Activities section is intended to help ensure systematic data collection and to ensure that critical elements are not overlooked.

Performance Tests

Appendices A and B provide detailed information on protective force performance testing, including commonly used performance tests and scenarios that may be used as shown or modified to address site-specific conditions or procedures. Performance testing is the most important data collection activity used in evaluating the protective force (specifically the Duties subtopic); therefore, it is customarily the focus of most data collection efforts. Accordingly, the information on performance testing is provided in two appendices rather than in detail in the subtopic sections.
When compared to other data collection tools and methods, performance testing is the most labor- and time-intensive of all data collection activities. Performance testing places the greatest demands on the resources of the assessed site and requires the highest degree of coordination and planning. Performance testing also presents the greatest potential for generating safety or security problems. Thus, performance tests should not be used when other data collection tools can provide the relevant data. Also, the tests must be carefully planned and coordinated prior to arrival on site to ensure the most efficient use of time and resources. This planning and coordination process should continue after the assessors arrive at the site, often up to the moment the test is administered.

Most facilities have local requirements and procedures for planning, coordinating, and conducting performance tests. If the local procedures are acceptable to Security Assessments, considerable time and effort can usually be saved by having the facility plan, coordinate, and conduct specific performance tests (particularly more elaborate tests) in cooperation with Security Assessments.

**Data Collection Activities**

This section identifies activities that assessors may choose to perform during data collection. The information in this section is intended to be reasonably comprehensive, although it cannot address every conceivable variation. Typically, these activities are organized by functional element or by the type of system used to provide protection. Activities include tours, interviews, observations, and performance tests. Assessors do not normally perform every activity on every assessment. Most often, activities and performance tests are selected during the planning effort. The activities listed in this section include those most often conducted and reflect the highest level of Security Assessments data collection experience and expertise possible. Also, the activities are identified alphabetically for easy reference and for assigning data collection tasks.

**Validation**

Validation is the set of procedures Security Assessments assessors use to verify the accuracy of the information they have obtained during data collection activities. Security Assessments’ validation procedures include on-the-spot validations, daily validations, and summary validations. Effective validations are particularly important in the protective force review because of the extensive performance tests conducted by the protective force team and the inherent difficulties associated with evaluating the performance of protective force personnel. Further, the protective force team faces unique challenges because of the tendency for performance testing to extend past normal working hours; in such cases, the protective force team often must conduct the daily validations the next morning. Therefore, the protective force team must ensure that it places high priority on validation efforts, and that its efforts are effectively coordinated.

In the protective force reviews, on-the-spot validations are particularly critical because of the large number of people typically involved in performance tests, and because it is often difficult to reassemble all the people involved for the daily and summary validations. Therefore, the individual team members must take particular care to keep track of significant information covered in on-the-spot validations so it can be reiterated for the protective force managers during the daily and summary validations.

**Using the Tools in Each Assessment Phase**

The assessment tools are intended to be useful in all phases of the assessment. The following discussion summarizes the use of the assessment tools in the various phases.

In the **planning phase**, assessors:

- Use the General Information section under each subtopic to characterize the program and focus the assessment.
• Review the data call submissions from the site, and adjust the lines of inquiry if necessary.

• Review Common Deficiencies/Potential Concerns to help focus assessment activities, to determine whether any common deficiencies are apparent, and to identify site-specific features that may indicate a need for emphasis on selected areas or activities.

• Assign specific tasks to individual assessors (or small teams of assessors) by selecting performance tests and specific items from the Data Collection Activities section. The assignments should be made to optimize efficiency and to ensure that all high-priority activities are accomplished.

• Give appropriate consideration to the guidelines in Section 6 (Interfaces) when assigning tasks, to ensure that efforts are not duplicated and critical elements are not overlooked.

In the conduct phase, assessors:

• Use the detailed information in the Data Collection Activities section as guidelines for interviews and tours. Assessors may choose to make notes directly on photocopies of the applicable sections.

• Review Common Deficiencies/Potential Concerns after completing each data collection activity to determine whether any common deficiencies are apparent at the facility. If so, assessors should determine whether subsequent activities should be reprioritized.

• Review Section 7 (Analyzing Data and Interpreting Results) after completing each data collection activity to aid in evaluation and analysis of the data, and to determine whether additional data are needed to evaluate the program. If additional activities are needed, assessors should then determine whether subsequent activities should be re-prioritized.

In the closure phase, assessors:

• Refer to the appropriate policy references to determine whether the facility is complying with all applicable requirements, including those issued by DOE Headquarters.

• Use Section 7 (Analyzing Data and Interpreting Results) to help analyze the collected data and identify the impacts of identified deficiencies. Doing so will help determine the significance of findings, if any, and assist assessors in writing the analysis section of the assessment report.

• Have an obligation to prepare accurate, cogent, and complete narrative descriptions of their assessment activities and results. The principal writer(s) assigned to the protective force team will consolidate and edit the final draft copy to be reviewed by management and the Quality Review Board, but the assessors must provide the basic information in an acceptable form to facilitate preparation of the draft report.
Section 2: Protective Force Management

General Information

The protective force management standard emphasizes the effective application of protective force resources to perform the assigned mission. It stresses such specific items as careful planning, precise documentation, sufficiency of resources, effective command and control, coordination with outside agencies, and an organizational climate conducive to productivity and personal development. Specific elements essential to protective force management are:

- Supervision
- Plans, orders, and procedures
- Allocation of personnel resources
- Personnel administration.

These elements are listed in order of priority. Unless unusual factors exist, data collection priorities should reflect this hierarchy when resources are limited.

Supervision that is both competent and sufficient is essential to effective protective force mission accomplishment. A successful supervisory program usually includes procedures for assessing security police officers (SPOs) reporting for duty to determine job knowledge, fitness for duty, and adequacy of equipment. Also, procedures should be in place for contacting every SPO on duty several times during each shift to ensure that adequate security is being provided, equipment is functioning properly, and essential information is disseminated. It is important that a complete and accurate record of post visits, assessments, and incidents bearing on security is maintained, and that investigations of anomalies noted in recording visits and reporting are thorough and timely.

An important function of management is to ensure the presence of clear and concise plans, instructions, and orders. Typically, plans address potential contingencies, natural disasters, and emergencies; instructions implement the provisions of DOE orders; and special orders cover each post, patrol, or other position. It is essential that these instructions and orders be readily available to protective force personnel and management, and that a system is in place to ensure that reviews are conducted and changes are incorporated in a timely manner. It is important that memoranda of understanding (MOUs) with Federal, state, and military agencies and local law enforcement agencies (LLEAs) and other documents delineating agreements and outside assistance are current and have been exercised to determine their effectiveness. At DOE facilities and Office of Secure Transportation missions with special response teams (SRTs), plans are required to ensure adequate response to events involving sabotage or theft of nuclear weapons and other selected materials. Where the requirement for an SRT is met by an MOU with LLEAs, it is essential to ensure that the LLEAs possess the skills required by DOE policies.

The protective force must have sufficient personnel resources available to ensure an adequate response in the amount of time and with the number of personnel required to contain, deny, and/or neutralize the adversary as defined in approved site safeguards and security plans (SSSPs).

Before assessing a protective force’s management, an assessor should understand the protective force’s position within and relationship to the facility and other organizations. Knowing this information can have a significant impact on the protective force manager’s options. Three basic types of relationships are possible: a proprietary relationship, where the protective force is part of the facility prime contractor organization and protective force members are employees of the prime contractor; a subcontractor relationship, where the protective force contractor is a subcontractor to the facility prime contractor; and a prime contractor relationship, where the protective force contractor is a prime contractor directly to the DOE field element and does not work directly for the facility prime contractor.
Assessment of protective force management includes: reviewing directives, plans, orders, and related documentation; interviewing protective force management personnel; observing the conduct of supervisory functions and operations; reviewing the allocation of personnel resources available for normal and contingency operations; and analyzing the results of data collection in protective force management, training, equipment and facilities, and duties, to determine the effectiveness of programs to protect critical assets. Assessors must pay particular attention to DOE threat guidance and its potential impact on the protective force mission. When appropriate, Federal management and oversight roles should be examined.

If a collective bargaining agreement is in place on site, assessors should interview local union management on such topics as company/union interface, involvement in decision making processes concerning company and union members, and opportunities for equipment, training, and promotion. Other topics may also aid in the understanding of relationships between company and union members specific to the site.

Common Deficiencies/Potential Concerns

Line Management Responsibility for Safeguards and Security

Inadequate Operational Supervision. Sometimes, individual members of a protective force are not adequately supervised while on duty. Inadequate supervision may result from inattentive, overworked, improperly trained, or inadequate numbers of supervisors, or by inadequate policies defining supervisory responsibilities. Whatever the cause, the results can degrade the performance of the protective force. Lack of adequate supervision may result in failure to properly carry out duties and enforce policies; inadequate conduct on duty; inadequately informed or instructed personnel on duty; and the impression by protective personnel that management does not care what they do on duty. Indications that supervision may be inadequate include: supervisors’ spending most of their time at their desks, at headquarters, or doing administrative chores; poor housekeeping and equipment maintenance on posts; sloppy appearance or poor attitude by SPOs on post; protective personnel who are uninformed regarding current policies, procedures, or events (daily guard mount pass-on information); and comments from SPOs that they never see their supervisors during their shift.

Inadequate Tactical Supervision. Supervisors are sometimes so completely occupied with their routine operational responsibilities that they neglect to develop or maintain the tactical supervisory skills required in emergency situations. Such skills include those involved with the command, control, and tactical employment of the protective force or a protective force element. Lack of such skills can result in failure to establish control over and direct an appropriate protective force response to an emergency situation; such a failure can result in an ineffective response and can greatly diminish the protective force’s chances of accomplishing its mission. Indications of this condition include demonstration of poor leadership during performance tests; absence of appropriate tactical supervisory training in the training program; and supervisors’ failure to “play” (their leadership roles) during internal training exercises or performance tests.

Failure of Field Element to Approve Plans/Orders. Often, the DOE field element manager or designee does not approve protective force plans and orders or any changes to such plans and orders. In some cases, no one outside the protective force approves plans and orders. This practice makes it difficult for the responsible DOE managers to ensure that protective force practices adequately implement the required policies. In some cases, the DOE field element may indicate that it provides review and tacit approval of plans and orders during periodic security surveys. However, orders and changes thereto could be in effect for a year or longer before being subjected to a security survey.

Failure to Review Plans and Orders. Some protective force managers do not ensure that plans and orders are thoroughly reviewed and updated by supervisory personnel and/or subject matter experts on the required occasions. This lack of oversight is often a contributing factor to the other deficiencies indicated above. These reviews are required to be tracked, so the records readily reveal whether such reviews have been conducted. The adequacy of the reviews may be indicated by the number of other deficiencies contained in the plans/orders.
Inadequate Memoranda of Understanding. Some protective forces rely on assistance from other Federal agencies or LLEAs during unusual or emergency conditions. However, MOUs often do not exist or do not include sufficient detail to describe the support to be provided, the conditions under which it will be provided, command relationships, each party’s responsibilities, contact information, and similar important information. This condition can result from the Federal, state, military, or LLEA’s reluctance to commit themselves in writing to commitments they freely made orally, or the field element’s failure to identify all essential details and coordinate their inclusion in the agreement.

Deficient Personnel Policies. Protective force management may not have clearly established, fully explained, equitable personnel policies governing such issues as job and shift assignments, promotions, and overtime. It is important that personnel policies are equitable, generally understood by all protective force personnel, and strongly enforced by management. Deficiencies in personnel policies are of special concern and require close examination by assessors, because real or perceived inequities can adversely affect individual performance. Inappropriate application of policies may be indicated by lack of enthusiasm among protective personnel or complaints voiced during SPO interviews.

Inadequate Records. Occasionally, protective force management fails to provide for the effective maintenance of training and certification records for the general training program, the physical fitness program, or the various required specialized programs, such as central alarm station (CAS) operators, SRT members, or armorers. Lack of required records and certifications makes it difficult to track status and training needs, and makes it impossible to ensure that personnel are actually certified to perform their assigned tasks.

Lack of Management Coordination. Some facilities lack effective coordination between the protective force and the DOE field element and/or operating contractor, particularly those with an independent protective force contractor or subcontractor. Each of these organizations has significant security-related responsibilities, and each must be fully involved in establishing a coherent security plan for the facility. If the protective force is left out of the basic analysis and decision-making effort that determines the site’s security strategy, there is a reasonable possibility that the resulting strategy will be flawed. Indicators of this situation include lack of protective force representation on vulnerability assessment (VA) teams and security strategy and policy boards, and in daily decisions concerning implementation of security practices. If such conditions exist, assessors should look for protective force security concerns that are not addressed by the facility security strategy.

Personnel Competence and Training

Inappropriate Personnel Resources. Insufficient personnel resources may be a problem at some sites, often because of contractual restrictions, substandard working conditions, inappropriate management policies, lack of appropriate security clearances, or training program deficiencies. The effects on the protective force’s ability to accomplish routine and emergency missions are usually evident. Indications of insufficient personnel resources may include absenteeism at required posts or excessive overtime. Often, the lack of personnel resources pertains to a particular type of SPO or required skill; for example, the number of trainers or qualified trainers is often inadequate. On the other hand, some organizations are manned in excess of their needs, typically when there has been a recent change in site mission, a reduction in the threat, or the installation of improved physical security systems without a commensurate reduction in protective force personnel. Similarly, posts may be eliminated without eliminating supervisory positions, resulting in excessive layers of management and possible confusion as to roles and responsibilities. While such conditions do not necessarily represent a security concern, they may indicate that management is not using resources efficiently. This situation may prompt the assessors to coordinate with the protection program management assessors for a more detailed review of resource usage. (Also see Section 3, “Training,” for other relevant potential deficiencies/concerns.)
Inadequate Post/Patrol Orders. A commonly observed deficiency is the failure to adequately maintain and update post/patrol and general orders. This problem involves several specific deficiencies, including: orders not changed/updated to reflect current practices; compensatory protective force measures (for physical security system deficiencies, for example) not documented in orders; voluminous changes/modifications to an order, rather than a rewritten order; and changes that are not properly approved. Also, orders or portions of orders may be missing from the posts/patrols to which they apply. Failure to keep orders current makes it difficult for protective personnel to thoroughly understand their duties and responsibilities. In such an environment, they must rely on memory and word-of-mouth instructions, and if they do refer to and follow an outdated order, they may receive improper guidance. As a result, protective personnel may fail to properly carry out necessary duties or procedures, or may carry out duties or procedures that are no longer appropriate. Indications that this problem may exist include post orders not physically located on post; orders that are several years old; orders with many changes/modifications; orders that differ from observed practices; and orders that prescribe procedures different from those explained by SPOs and supervisors.

Incomplete or Inadequate Response Plans. Often, response or contingency plans do not provide adequate guidance for emergency response. Again, this may involve a number of specific deficiencies, such as plans that do not reflect actual response practices; plans that are obsolete; plans that provide insufficient detail to provide for a rapid, coordinated, effective response; plans that do not define rules of engagement or what would constitute hostile intent; plans that do not address the use of available offsite support; and plans that do not address the essential elements of an emergency response, such as command, control, and communications methods and procedures. One consequence of an inadequate response plan is that it limits the protective force’s ability to make a rapid, coordinated, appropriate, and successful response to an emergency condition. Review of the plans may reveal insufficient details or failure to address an important area. Other indicators include confusion or inadequate response during performance tests, or a response different from that called for in plans.

Failure to Test LLEA Support. The failure to adequately test the ability of LLEAs to actually provide promised support is common and has potentially serious consequences, particularly for facilities whose security plans rely heavily on such support. Most facilities rely on LLEA support to some extent, either for SRT, fresh pursuit, or other specialized emergency support, or for backup in serious situations. In order to truly count on receiving such support in a timely manner, the protective force must fully understand and test the capabilities of the supporting organizations and the abilities of both organizations to quickly and effectively integrate their resources to counter an emergency. Without detailed planning and periodic practice (testing), it is unlikely that effective support can be provided in a timely manner. Indicators that previously relied-upon support may exist only on paper include the lack of periodic, realistic exercises involving the facility and specific LLEA support promised; lack of specific planning and execution details in MOUs or supporting documents; and lack of detailed knowledge among protective force supervisors regarding the specific capabilities of supporting LLEA organizations or how those organizations would be summoned, would respond, and would be integrated into the protective force response.

Feedback and Improvement

Inadequate Self-Assessment Program. Not all protective forces have implemented a comprehensive self-assessment program involving a thorough internal review of capabilities using performance testing and other appropriate investigative tools. The lack of such a program can allow deficiencies to remain undetected and uncorrected for extended periods. Significant deficiencies or numerous minor deficiencies not already known to protective force managers are a clear indication that an effective self-assessment program is not in place.

Inadequate Corrective Action Plans. Inadequate corrective action plans also can result in deficiencies remaining uncorrected. However, once deficiencies have been identified (by whatever source), organizations frequently fail to accomplish one or more of the following actions: 1) prioritize deficiencies so resources can be used to correct the most serious first; 2) establish a corrective action schedule with milestones and an integral,
accurate tracking system so progress can be monitored and slippages can be identified early; 3) assign responsibility for completion to specific organizations or individuals; 4) continually update the plan as known deficiencies are corrected and new ones are identified; and 5) ensure that adequate resources are applied to correct deficiencies. This process helps eliminate the frequent mistake of devoting resources to “putting out fires” (i.e., correcting the most recently identified deficiency instead of the most serious).

No Root Cause Analysis of Deficiencies. Another common and related problem that can result in recurring deficiencies is that management does not determine and correct the underlying causes of identified deficiencies but instead addresses only the surface problem or symptom. Unless the root causes of identified deficiencies are corrected, it is likely that similar deficiencies will recur.

Planning Activities

During the planning meeting, assessors interview POCs and review documents. Specifically, assessors must:

- Review the protective force mission.
- Review target folders.
- Review appropriate documents to determine the site’s protection strategy.
- Review results of the Security Assessments pre-planning efforts and the facility characterization review, and coordinate with other topic teams to determine whether the site threat, VAs, and response plans bring any aspect of security into question. The questions raised here typically determine the scope and thrust of protective force performance tests.
- Review facility self-appraisals, site corrective programs showing action taken on previous assessment findings, and SSSP exceptions.
- Review post orders and plans for currency, accuracy, and completeness and review response plans and contingency plans, classified and unclassified, for security emergencies, environmental emergencies, natural disasters, civil emergencies, labor strikes by protective force personnel, and call-outs of off-duty protective personnel. Questions raised during this process should be resolved during site interviews and, in some cases, through performance testing.
- Determine what physical security and facility upgrades have recently been completed or are in progress, and how they affect training, security force manning, and allocation of resources.
- Characterize the site safeguards and security organizational structure; determine whether officer-to-supervisor ratios are adequate; and develop a list of questions and determine which supervisors and managers will be interviewed. Assign assessment responsibilities to members of the protective force topic team. For example, on a team of four, one team member may be assigned responsibility for the Management subtopic, another to Training, and the two remaining members to Facilities & Equipment and Duties.
- Plan to observe guard mounts and post inspections conducted by supervisors.
- Review MOUs or agreements with Federal, state, and local law enforcement and military organizations dealing with assistance to be provided to the protective force.
- Develop a tentative schedule for data collection activities, including the schedule for range activities, limited-scope performance tests (LSPTs), and other performance testing activities.
Data Collection Activities

Document reviews and interviews with management and supervisory personnel (including interviews with DOE field element personnel responsible for the administration of protective force and other security activities) are key methods of data collection for this subtopic. Many of the requirements in this area deal with establishing, publishing, and enforcing policies and procedures, and maintaining required records. Usually, document reviews and interviews are adequate for establishing compliance. Interviews provide a means of rounding out the picture of management activity and, in particular, of identifying those aspects of management performance that ordinarily escape documentation.

Observations and performance tests also provide data useful in evaluating this subtopic. For example, observation can indicate whether required supervisory contact is being provided to SPOs. Results of performance tests can indicate whether resources are properly allocated to protect security interests.

The ultimate measure of management performance, however, is overall protective force effectiveness. Thus, data collected in the other subtopic areas, particularly Duties, may be an extremely valuable source of data concerning management. Widespread or systemic problems are usually an indicator of management deficiencies and should be followed up accordingly.

Line Management Responsibility (Including Supervision and Allocation of Personnel Resources)

A. Assessors should determine whether adequate numbers of supervisors are assigned to all shifts. The first step is to determine the supervisory positions through review of job descriptions and interviews with the protective force manager/personnel manager. Procedures or post orders pertaining to supervisory positions can be reviewed to determine whether all members of each shift fall under a supervisor’s responsibility. Current and several recent duty rosters should then be examined to determine whether adequate supervisory personnel are assigned to each shift.

B. Assessors should determine whether supervisors actually provide the level of supervision required by local and DOE orders and policies.

- Attend guard mounts or pre-shift briefings for all shifts to determine whether supervisors conduct fitness-for-duty inspections and pass along necessary information and instructions. If certain personnel (e.g., CAS operators, SRT, dog handlers, training instructors, construction escorts) do not attend guard mounts, determine whether and when these personnel are contacted by supervisors.

- Observe supervisors from each shift for a portion of their shifts to determine how much direct contact they have with personnel, as opposed to time spent at their desks on administrative tasks. Not all supervisors need be observed, but practices on all shifts should be observed if possible.

- Review supervisors’ and post logs to determine whether supervisory visits are recorded. Supervisors’ logs can be reviewed while observing or interviewing supervisors. Post patrol logs can be reviewed during post visits conducted in conjunction with assessment of the Duties subtopic.

- Interview supervisors and SPOs. A sampling of supervisors will normally be interviewed during an assessment to elicit information on a number of topics. Some questions regarding their supervisory responsibilities and how they carry them out should be included in these interviews. A sample of SPOs should be interviewed to determine whether they receive supervisory visits on post/patrol and whether they believe they receive adequate supervision. These questions can be asked during interviews conducted at post visits, which are a normal assessment activity.
C. Assessors should determine whether the number of protective force personnel is adequate to effectively accomplish mission requirements. Conversely, assessors should examine the mission requirements to determine whether the protective force is over-manned.

- The adequacy of manning levels at routine posts can be determined during the course of observations, interviews, and performance tests conducted to evaluate skills and procedures. Assessors should ensure that they address this issue for all shifts and take into account special requirements pertaining to such events as general plant shift change and construction projects inside security areas.

- Manning adequacy for emergency duties can be evaluated during no-notice response tests and other emergency-mission-related performance tests. Properly designed performance tests can reveal whether sufficient resources are available for an adequate response to selected targets.

- Adequacy of manning levels in other areas should be examined in conjunction with other assessment activities. For example, sufficiency of training developers/instructors should be examined in conjunction with the training program.

D. If the protective force includes security officers (SOs), assessors should determine whether the SOs are properly employed. Orders pertaining to guard posts and duties should be examined, and SOs should be observed and interviewed to determine the actual scope of their duties. Results should be compared to policy limitations on the use of SOs.

E. Assessors should determine whether the protective force, as a significant element in the facility’s protection system, has an appropriate amount of input into facility protection strategy and policy decisions and directions.

- Interview protective force managers and DOE field element and facility safeguards and security managers to determine the protective force's level of participation in developing sitewide security policy and strategy.

- Review membership on and minutes of facility security policy boards or steering groups, VA teams, or special task forces for evidence of protective force participation or input.

F. Assessors should determine whether protective force managers have an open and frequently-used line of communication with appropriate DOE field element and facility safeguards and security managers and staff. The degree of communication can be determined during interviews of such managers and by a review of correspondence between the parties.

Personnel Competence and Training

G. Assessors should examine personnel administration policies and procedures to determine the presence of required elements, including pre-employment screening, job descriptions, position classifications, promotion policy, appropriate security clearances for SPOs, work scheduling policy, and overtime policy. Document reviews (of various policies, job descriptions, etc.) can provide much of this information. Interviews with managers can provide additional details regarding personnel policies and their implementation. Assessors should ask SPOs pertinent questions during interviews to determine whether the policies or procedures have actually been implemented as stated, and whether they have produced the desired results at the working level. Cumulatively, these activities also measure the effectiveness of protective force management in implementing formalized processes for developing and replenishing essential personnel. (Also see Section 3, “Training,” for other relevant data collection activities.)
Comprehensive Requirements (Including Plans, Orders, and Records)

H. Assessors should determine whether directives, plans, and general and special orders meet DOE requirements for currency, clarity, and applicability to site-specific standards.

- Review the directives management system. If a written policy exists, examine it to see whether it contains procedures for development, review, approval, distribution, and updating of plans and orders. If no written procedures exist, interview the responsible protective force manager to obtain this information. If no formal procedure exists, the adequacy of plans and orders should be given particularly close scrutiny during the assessment.

- Review response/contingency plans and general, special, and post/patrol orders. Review plans and orders to see whether they are comprehensive, detailed, understandable, and approved by the DOE field element or other appropriate manager, and whether they properly implement local and DOE policies. Generally, all response plans should be reviewed. These will cover protective force response to such events as natural disasters, labor disputes, demonstrations on security interests, and employment of offsite resources. All general orders should be reviewed. If the number of special and post/patrol orders is large, only a sample need be closely examined. The sample should include a cross-section of types of posts, such as CAS operators, SRT, fixed posts, construction escorts, and foot and vehicle patrols. Post orders can be reviewed during post visits, as each post/patrol should have all pertinent directives readily available.

- Interview SPOs to determine whether plans and orders are understandable, are readily available, contain sufficient guidance regarding their duties and responsibilities, and accurately reflect the way the protective force operates. These questions can be covered during SPO interviews conducted during post visits or other assessment activities.

I. Assessors should review MOUs with Federal, state, and military agencies and LLEAs to determine whether they are current, specific, and adequately detailed with regard to level of support, responsibilities, and implementation procedures. While the DOE field element is usually responsible for executing MOUs, the protective force should have copies on hand for planning purposes. Protective force managers and supervisors should be interviewed to determine their understanding of the support that the MOUs should provide and when and how the support is to be provided and integrated with the protective force. At times, it may be beneficial to interview managers from supporting agencies—e.g., Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), LLEA—to determine their interpretations of support levels, responsibilities, and procedures. Understanding these interpretations is especially necessary if the protective force relies heavily on outside support (e.g., to provide the facility’s SRT and/or recapture/fresh pursuit capabilities).

J. Assessors should check to determine whether the following required records are accurately maintained: event logs; medical, physical fitness, and firearms qualifications; firearms cards; and SPO, SRT, etc., certification records. Normally only a representative sample of these records needs to be examined. Several of these records are routinely checked, or may be checked, as part of other subtopic assessment activities. For example, training assessors normally check certification/qualification records in conjunction with examination of training records.

K. Assessors should determine whether the strategies employed by the protective force (through policies, procedures, budget, personnel allocations, training, weapons, and equipment) appropriately complement the facility’s protection strategy and contribute adequately to the protection of the facility’s security interests.

- Determine the applicable security interests, threats, and vulnerabilities, and the protection strategy adopted by the facility. This determination can be made while reviewing SSSPs, associated VAs, and other related documents. Additional details can be provided through interviews with DOE field element and facility safeguards and security managers (which may be conducted by the protection program management team).
• Compare the protective force’s protection strategy and implementation procedures to determine whether they appropriately address the threat(s) and support the overall facility protection strategy. During the normal course of assessment activities, assessors interview protective force managers and supervisors, and review protective force policies and procedures. While doing so, they should be sure to collect the information required to make this comparison.

Feedback and Improvement

L. Assessors should determine whether the protective force’s self-assessment and corrective action programs are adequately implemented.

• Review self-assessment procedures and reports of past self-assessments to determine whether they are comprehensive; whether they involve performance testing where applicable; and whether analyses are conducted to determine the underlying causes of identified deficiencies.

• Review corrective action plans developed to correct deficiencies identified through self-assessments or other evaluations. A good self-assessment plan includes prioritization of deficiencies; a roadmap to correct each deficiency, with measurable milestones; a tracking system to monitor progress; assignment of responsibility for each corrective action; allocation of necessary resources; and a procedure to validate whether the problem has been corrected.

• Interview appropriate managers, supervisors, and staff personnel to obtain more details concerning the application of self-assessment and corrective action procedures.

• Examine applicable procedures, tracking databases, and records to ensure that feedback mechanisms are effective.
Section 3: Training

General Information

Protective force/Federal agent training in the DOE has been revised. To properly assess a training program, assessors must understand the traditional training model used for decades and the relatively new model known as Mission Essential Task List (METL)-based training. The traditional model is based on a system of job analyses (JAs) for various duty positions from which training programs are built to ensure that protective force members attain the knowledge, skills, and abilities to perform duties associated with their primary protection mission. Several years ago, a group of training professionals from the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) began to develop the METL-based model centered on the realization that JA-based programs across the Nuclear Security Enterprise were decentralized and widely divergent in their approach to training, even though their missions and the general characteristics of the sites were nearly identical. Because they were so different, funding for the various programs was likewise inconsistent and often expensive. METL-based training applies the same set of standards for all sites with the mission of protecting special nuclear material (SNM) of greater than Category II quantities. METL-based training applies to sustainment training of the protective force. JAs are still required for certain specialized duty positions, such as armorers and instructors. The METL training framework is codified in the recent revision to 10 CFR 1046 (effective March 10, 2014), and DOE Order 473.3A, Protection Program Operations, dated March 23, 2016, notes that “Knowledge, skills and abilities (KSAs) necessary to perform the tasks associated with assigned [protective force] duties must be identified based upon the Job Analysis (JA) and/or mission essential task list (METL) applicable for each job assignment” (see Attachment 3-2 at the end of Section 3 of this guide). The METL concept originated in NNSA and thus is used at NNSA sites and organizations. Some DOE sites (principally Environmental Management sites) have chosen to continue using the traditional JA-based methodology for developing training; therefore, assessors evaluating training programs must be familiar with the tenets of both. To assist assessors who are unfamiliar with the METL-based program, Attachment 3-1 at the end of Section 3 provides a program element overview, and Attachment 3-2 provides a METL description; both were extracted from a recent draft NNSA Supplemental Directive relating to the overall program.

Both training methodologies are fairly complex, and assessors should invest sufficient effort to understand all of the program elements and nuances. The remainder of this paragraph, and the next, offer a brief explanation to help distinguish between them. In the typical JA-based model, the JAs for all of the duty positions are reviewed and updated (normally in the middle of the fiscal year) in formal meetings that may include protective force supervisors, DOE field office personnel, instructors, curriculum developers, VA personnel, performance testing personnel, expert performers (such as SPOs), and other stakeholders. A training needs analysis (TNA) is conducted to decide which tasks need to be addressed by training, based on a number of factors (such as performance during force-on-force exercises, results of assessments, and time elapsed since the tasks were last trained). The goal is to identify the gap between desired competencies and existing competencies and to establish training objectives to close the gap. Management approves the tasks identified for training, and those tasks are converted to a task-to-training matrix that lays out the type of training (e.g., classroom, performance tests), venue, time period, assignment of trainer(s), and other relevant characteristics. An Annual Training Plan (ATP) is then written and approved by the cognizant security authority (normally at the beginning of the fiscal year), and the training calendar for the year is executed in accordance with the plan. Changes may occur during the year if some event precipitates a requirement for a revision.

The METL-based approach is considerably more complex in that it seeks to make more effective use of training resources by aligning them with validated mission performance priorities or Mission Essential Tasks (METs). Six Collective tasks are derived from the METS: Deter, Detect, Deny, Recapture, Recover, and Reconstitute (refer to Attachment 3-1 for further discussion). Individual, Leader, and Site Specific Supporting Tasks (SSSTs), discussed below, are derived from the Collective tasks. NNSA Enterprise Mission Essential Task Lists (EMETLs), which are essentially synonymous with JAs, are then developed to support the METs and are further refined into Collective, Leader, and Individual tasks that are compiled in the NNSA EMETL Field Manual (the current Version 2 was
published in October 2013), along with conditions under which the task must be performed, the performance standards that must be met, performance steps for the tasks, references, and supporting narrative descriptions. All NNSA sites use the EMETL Collective, Leader, and Individual tasks, whereas in JA-based programs, there may be considerable variance in the tasks selected for training at any particular site. Because the EMETL Field Manual cannot capture every site-specific training requirement, every site develops a series of SSSTs that are added to its field manual: they are often tied to specific weapons systems and local equipment used by the protective force. In addition, training requirements mandated by Federal and state laws, as well as local requirements, must be included in the training program (e.g., human relations, safety requirements, general employee training). These Required Support Training (RST) requirements are also added to the site field manuals. The available time, resources, and availability of trainees generally limit the site’s ability to train on every task and performance test cited in the field manual, so sites must assess the tasks to be trained and adjust their training accordingly. Again, a TNA is developed and leads to the prioritization of the tasks to be trained. Training content and context are developed using the field manual as guiding curriculum. Training is scheduled and performed. From the execution of a scenario, training is evaluated and assessed (generally on a “go” or “no-go” basis), and the results are provided to Training and Operations. Herein lies the most significant difference between the two methodologies. Under the METL approach, stakeholders (generally Protective Force Operations, Protective Force Training, Protective Force Performance Assurance/Testing, VA, and the DOE field office) must collaborate on identifying, planning, and conducting performance assessments that are designed to improve mission performance, and they must meet on a quarterly basis to discuss the METL assessment results, reach consensus on recent training and performance results, and make adjustments for future training activity as necessary. Such assessments assign a qualitative value to the performance of the training tasks: “T” for trained (demonstrated proficiency); “P” for demonstrates proficiency but had some difficulty with some of the performance steps and needs practice; and “U” for untrained (either did not demonstrate an acceptable level of proficiency or has not been trained on the given task). Training performance with ratings of “P” or “U” then receive priority during the TNA. Under the METL-based approach, analysis of training needs is an ongoing and continuous process based on a qualitative analysis of demonstrated performance of EMETL tasks. Both training methods must also be developed to meet all DOE compliance requirements (semi-annual firearms qualifications, physical fitness testing, and other requirements).

Notwithstanding the differences inherent in the two methodologies, the protective force training standard objective is rooted in the effective and efficient development and maintenance of the capability to perform the tasks required to fulfill the protective force mission. Effective training programs for protective forces are:

- Mission oriented
- Based on a valid and complete set of job tasks or METL-based requirements
- Directed by appropriate training objectives and/or the assessment of task performance
- Aimed at achieving the level of competency required to perform each job task
- Designed so that training activities make optimum use of available resources
- Implemented so that competency is attained by all qualified trainees
- Accomplished on a timely basis by highly qualified and certified instructors
- Carried out in tactical training areas, including facilities, buildings, firing ranges, and other venues that facilitate safe and realistic training.

DOE sites using the traditional training approach must design and develop the training program based on a complete and essential set of job tasks that directly contribute to the accomplishment of the primary protection mission. The JA review and validation should result in clearly described and documented tasks that include measurable performance criteria. Training objectives must capture the overall goals for the training program during the year, and the TNA should clearly reflect the gap between desired competencies and existing competencies. Feedback emanating from a number of sources (e.g., qualification scores, physical fitness testing, force-on-force performance tests, LSPTs) should be systematically applied to training development and implementation so that the ATP correctly reflects a schedule designed to address performance gaps and meet individual and job requirements. NNSA sites (and others that may wish to adopt the METL-based approach)
must also use a systematic approach to identify performance gaps. Design, development, and implementation of training should result from the periodic review of performance and adjustment of training needs. Training scenarios must consider collective, leader, and individual performance and make appropriate changes through the TNA process. For example, a protective force unit may receive an overall satisfactory rating during an EMETL assessment, but poor individual tactical movement and inappropriate use of cover and concealment observed during the same assessment might result in a “P” rating for individual task performance and might require an adjustment in the training schedule to address the shortfall during the quarterly TNA.

To achieve its organizational training goals, management needs sufficient resources and authority. Successful training programs are based on management providing a sufficient number of qualified training staff and being involved in the development, execution, and evaluation of the training program. In addition, management must provide effective oversight of the training staff and must also give the training staff the necessary authority and responsibility for implementing the training plan.

The specialized nature of the Training subtopic and the range of activities included in the process of gathering data usually requires at least one member of the assessment team to work full-time on this subtopic during the data collection phase. This requirement must be considered in both the team selection and planning phases. If the scope of the Training subtopic assessment must be limited for any reason, the most important elements to evaluate are the annual needs assessment processes, training effectiveness, program delivery structure, instructor qualifications, and individual training records.

**Common Deficiencies/Potential Concerns**

**Lack of Adequate Staffing**

Recent assessment activities indicate that in some instances, training instructors and training staff member positions have been reduced to unacceptably low levels, causing personal hardships for the personnel involved and, in a worst case scenario, causing those individuals to seek employment elsewhere. Training instructors who make up DOE complex training cadres are generally highly motivated, and quite experienced, and they clearly understand that their workdays will be long, physically demanding, and often performed in less than ideal weather. However, when reduced numbers with no concomitant reduction in the workload begin to adversely impact such factors as family life, health, and safety, the assessor is obligated to point out the need to re-examine staffing levels. Further, in such cases, it is permissible to compare sites in terms of the number of training staff members versus the number of personnel to be trained. It is also advisable to conduct one-on-one interviews with training staff members and to ask specifically about workload and the impact of reductions in staffing. In addition, an insufficient number of curriculum developers to ensure that training materials are adequate to support trainers can be an issue. When curriculum development resources are inadequate, the tasks associated with creating and maintaining course material generally falls to instructors as an additional duty. Shortages in administrative staff members to perform such functions as record keeping, scheduling, correspondence, and training tracking (ensuring that qualifications are current) and trending (preparing reports and providing data as needed) can degrade the overall performance of the training mission.

**Lack of a Comprehensive Training Plan**

Protective force training organizations across the DOE complex produce and publish training plans (or ATPs), but those documents are not always comprehensive in that they do not fully address the training needs and objectives of the protective force or outline the strategy, methods, and resources to be used in executing the overall training program. Moreover, there is no specified format for the plans, and they may vary widely in content, length, level of detail, and clarity. Before assessing a training program, assessors will find it useful to thoroughly review the training plan (which should be requested in the data call) to determine the efficacy of the training program, the level of expertise, and whether those designated to operate and evaluate the program have an adequate understanding of training program management. In addition, assessors evaluating a METL-based program may
wish to review the 2013 EMETL Field Manual to become familiar with the methodology for evaluating and assessing Collective (unit), Leader, and Individual training.

**Inadequate Job Tasks or Job Task Analyses**

Although the sites using the JA process as the basis for training program development have acquired a reasonable level of programmatic maturity, assessors should verify that site-specific job tasks are complete, are essential to fulfilling the protective force mission, and include all critical tasks. Assessors should ensure that task statements represent “real life” tasks, including specific actions performed by individuals or groups with definite beginning and end points. They should also be observable events, with measurable performance and success criteria. JAs or job task analyses (JTAs) must be completed for all identifiable jobs. Development of thorough, comprehensive JAs is key to preparing training that will prepare the protective force to perform mission requirements. Assessors should also ensure that sites using the METL-based approach have developed viable SSSTs, because many EMETL tasks (that support the six METs) cannot be accomplished independent of the SSSTs, especially where specialized weapons system and technology are being used. For example, one site uses a specialized piece of badge reading equipment to verify entrance authorization to its Protected Area, and SSSTs were developed to support training on the device to supplement the generic task requirements for access control.

**Lesson Plans Inconsistent with Tasks or Needs**

Protective force training organizations often use lesson plans supplied by the DOE National Training Center (NTC) and may adapt materials from military and law enforcement entities, such as the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center. Use of these lesson plans is acceptable as long as the content is compatible with the training needs identified on site. In most cases, such training materials have been fully examined and subjected to quality and content scrutiny. In some cases (especially for site-specific requirements), a site creates a lesson plan independently. Assessors should not be reluctant to ask to see any independently created lesson plans or any that have been modified from other known suppliers to ensure that they meet quality and content standards, clearly support training objectives, and/or appropriately support the training tasks, conditions, and standards cited in the EMETL Field Manual.

**Lack of Qualified Training Instructors/Developers**

At some sites, Protective Force Operations supervisors are responsible for providing on-the-job or in-service training; however, they may not be professional or certified trainers. Although untrained or uncertified instructors may be very good SPOs, their training skills may vary considerably, so they may provide inconsistent training to the protective force. Instructor certification is easy to verify; instructor performance is more difficult to determine. Lack of adequate performance throughout the force in specific skills, or significant differences in skill levels between shifts (or other subgroups), may indicate inconsistent quality of instruction. At a minimum, any supervisor conducting on-the-job or on-shift training, adjunct trainers, or SPOs pressed into an instructor role due to their background and skills should have completed the NTC’s Basic Instructor Training course and should be periodically evaluated to ensure that the quality of the training presented meets acceptable standards. DOE training organizations frequently use adjunct instructors (generally from Operations) to assist with firearms training and qualifications (including assistance with various courses of fire during Security Assessments assessments), and anyone so employed should be appropriately qualified by successful completion of the NTC Firearms Instructor Course and any other qualification required for specialized training (such as live-fire exercises in the live-fire shoot house). DOE orders and directives also set out specific requirements for intermediate force and ground control instructors, periodic evaluations of all instructors, and professional development opportunities for instructors every 36 months. Assessors must be cognizant of all requirements pertaining to the permanent and part-time instructor cadre and must verify that those requirements are met during their review of training records and certification documents.
Lack of Interface Between Operations and Training

In some instances, there may be insufficient communication and feedback between the operations and training elements within a protective force. It is essential that Operations supervisors inform trainers of operational training needs and give trainers feedback regarding performance problems and concerns. It is also essential for trainers to ensure that any training, including exercises, that is provided or conducted by Operations personnel meets the appropriate training needs, objectives, and standards. Without this essential interface and feedback, the effectiveness of the training program will suffer. Organizational, physical, or attitudinal isolation of the operations and training elements are obvious indications that this situation may exist. Training program assessors should be alert to subtle manifestations of this condition, such as training personnel’s lack of involvement in training-related management activities, e.g., performance testing, force-on-force and other exercises, and self-assessments.

Insufficient Training Resources

Some training programs lack the resources to meet all necessary training objectives. The shortfall in certified training developers/instructors was mentioned previously. In addition, the absence of adequate classroom, range, and field training facilities (sometimes coupled with the lack of maintenance and deterioration of such facilities), funds, or availability of protective personnel for training session attendance can degrade a training program and affect the protective force’s mission performance.

Lack of Adequate Supervisor Training

Some protective forces do not provide adequate mission-oriented supervisor training. While some use the NTC leadership training package, it is not sufficient in scope or site-specificity to fully train supervisors. Similarly, general (not specific to the protective force) management or supervisory training cannot fully meet the mission-related needs of protective force supervisors. The lack of comprehensive supervisor training can have adverse effects on training and the force-wide performance of routine and emergency duties. The METL-based approach addresses this issue with the specific leader training requirements that are fully described, assessed, and evaluated in the context of routine and emergency duties.

Inadequate Tactical Skills Training

Unrealistic training in tactical skills can be problematic. Since September 11, 2001, significantly more emphasis has been given to performance-based training, especially on-shift training. While some elements of tactical skills/knowledge can be taught in the classroom, the proper application of most tactical skills can only be learned by repetitive practice in an appropriately realistic setting. Some sites minimize this type of training, because it requires more time, planning, instructor skill, and logistical support than classroom training. However, a lack of adequate, realistic tactical training is likely to result in a protective force that cannot adequately perform in an emergency situation that requires the application of tactical skills. Assessors should emphasize and assess the site’s performance testing of tactical skills during all assessments. In addition, those responsible for protective force training programs must be cautious about developing and implementing training that is solely oriented toward SNM protection to the exclusion of other potential threats. Recent history clearly indicates that preparation for such situations as “active shooters,” demonstrators, trespassers, and mentally impaired persons is necessary because they represent more likely events than a multi-party assault on fortified locations. While SNM protection is the primary mission, training programs should provide some balance in training for lower-level threats. Assessors should assess whether those considerations are addressed in the development and implementation of training plans.

Response Plans and Training Not Complementary

Emergency response training does not always reflect the guidance provided in response/contingency plans. Protective forces normally publish response/contingency plans to govern responses to various types of
emergencies. However, sometimes the training conducted by the protective force does not support, or even follow, the response guidance or procedures dictated by the plans. As a result, there could be at least two different ways to respond to an emergency—that prescribed by the plan, and that practiced in training—possibly leading to mission-endangering confusion during an actual emergency. When possible, assessors should determine whether training activities are compatible with published and approved plans.

**Unqualified Physical Fitness Trainers**

While all protective forces are required to have a physical fitness program, some forces do not provide a qualified individual to administer or monitor their program. As a result, physical training may not be realistic or sufficient for helping individual SPOs achieve and maintain required physical standards. Some sites have also abandoned on-shift/onsite physical fitness programs and opted to contract with offsite fitness facilities to allow SPOs to maintain the level of fitness required for their duty positions. In some cases, SPOs are expected to work 12 hour shifts (not counting travel time) and then find the time for a physical workout. Assessors should examine and report on the conditions at assessment sites. Where possible, physical fitness testing should be part of the assessment of Routine Duties.

**Inadequate Individual Training Records**

In recent assessment activities, many of the previously noted deficiencies in training records had been addressed, usually by the addition of highly competent and well-trained administrators who have effectively used various records databases that provide near instantaneous data output for verifying individual qualifications and certifications and/or identifying training trends and other data (such as flags for dates when individual protective force members must be retrained or fall out of qualification). Assessors should pre-plan various tests to extract data (e.g., “Show me when B Shift SRT members last completed shoot house qualifications” or “Show me how you know who is within 60 days of falling outside a qualification requirement”). An appropriately skilled administrator should be able to provide a printout of the data an assessor requests in a matter of minutes. If the database is up and running, failure to extract the data in near real time is a significant issue that warrants additional performance testing and validation. Training organizations should also retain secondary (backup) records, which are generally paper (hard copy) records, and assessors should spot check to ensure that these records are well-organized and complete. Most weaknesses noted in the recently assessed database systems stem from the fact that the database needs to be updated to increase speed, storage capacity, and user friendly execution of operations. Databases attached to another site-wide system are most prone to operational difficulty. If records are not appropriately maintained and the data needed for verification of training is not readily available, site management and DOE are in a position of liability for failure to provide qualified and trained forces to protect critical assets. Therefore, insufficient confidence in the maintenance and availability of these records constitutes a significant issue.

If neither database nor hard copy records can verify that training events have been completed, assessors may ask for instructor-authenticated training rosters, which may verify that the training was done. However, this verification does not mitigate questions about whether the records database can supply the data or whether the hard copy records are complete.

**Planning Activities**

During assessment planning activities, assessors should review available documents, and organize notes to provide a reminder of those elements to review, including:

- Statement of training objectives (normally part of the ATP).
- The ATP.
- Curricula for basic and refresher training.
Letter of training approval program approval issued by NTC (good for five years from date of issue).

Field office approval letter for the SRT training program (annual requirement).

JTAs – pay attention to the methodology used to develop JTAs; in particular, do operational supervisors participate in the development of job tasks to ensure that all critical skills are captured? Review the EMETL Field Manual and the SSSTs for compatibility.

On-the-job training (OJT) procedures – pay attention to the qualifications of those who deliver OJT: Have they completed Basic Instructor Training? Does anyone evaluate their OJT performance?

Written tests currently in use, with answers; these usually accompany lesson plans.

Student feedback forms – determine what is done with them, who reviews them, and what actions result from them. Also determine trainees’ receptiveness to subjects taught and instructor competency.

A number of representative lesson plans (especially those that were locally produced) – determine the process for development and for annual updates.

A list of protective force instructors and their qualifications, with an indication of whether they are NTC-certified.

A list of protective force firearms instructors and their qualifications/certifications.

Recent training schedules and annotated class rosters or attendance sheets.

The training records system used for the protective force – develop a strategy for testing the system.

Achievement or performance standards and their rationale, especially for critical tasks.

Note: This list is not all inclusive; assessors must develop a complete list of requirements by reviewing applicable DOE orders and directives.

Assessors should also:

Interview site personnel to identify the characteristics of the program and corroborate documentation.

Identify training activities scheduled during the assessment and arrange to observe some or all of these activities. (Activities conducted during the assessment of Routine Duties provide numerous opportunities to observe the instructor staff.)

Coordinate all Training assessment activities with other protective force subtopical areas to minimize effort (and impact on the site) while also ensuring that all aspects are assessed. For example, if site armorer are assigned to the training section, ensure that the Facilities & Equipment subtopical area assessors and the Training area assessors do not duplicate assessments of the site armory and its personnel.

**Performance Tests**

Performance tests conducted in the Duties subtopic are valuable in determining the effectiveness of the protective force training program. In general, when interviews or observations are conducted with protective force personnel, questions related to training facilities, instructors, and training programs should be reviewed as part of
the overall evaluation. If the assessment team decides that this analysis will be part of the overall evaluation, the team should inform site protective force managers of that fact.

Data Collection Activities

One of the key elements of data gathering for the assessment of a training program is an in-depth interview with the Training Manager, focusing on program organization and structure, training resources, and management involvement in the TNA process. Additional interviews may be conducted with the instructor staff, curriculum developers, and administrative staff to identify how the program operates, the responsibilities for training development and delivery, program strengths and weaknesses, and how weaknesses are addressed and mitigated. Interviews with supervisors, subject matter experts, or experienced protective force members who have OJT responsibilities are also important. In addition, it is advisable to interview the SPOs and supervisors for whom the training is designed, developed, and delivered. Methods for achieving that end include specific questions during on-shift post assessments conducted as part of the Routine Duties evaluation. These interviews (coupled with training feedback/critique forms filled out following training events) will indicate how the end users perceive the training program in terms of content, quality, and value in preparing them to perform their primary protection mission.

When possible, assessors should observe training activities. Observation of training in progress provides information about the effectiveness and appropriateness of the instructors and instructional methods. Observation of SPOs performing their duties provides an indication of the effectiveness of training. Written knowledge tests developed by the site can be used to test training effectiveness and SPOs’ retention of the information contained in the SPO lesson plans. Additionally, the overall results of performance tests, whether administered specifically as part of the training assessment or as part of the assessment of other subtopical areas (typically Duties), provide one of the most important indicators of the effectiveness of skill training.

Training Program Development and Structure

A. Assessors should review the JTAs for protective force members. At DOE sites using the traditional training program model, things to look for include:

- Have all jobs been subject to a JTA? A comprehensive training program requires JTAs for all positions, not just for basic SPOs. Look for JTAs for SRT, supervisors, CAS operators, dog handlers, armorers, etc. Look for a JTA for every position description.

- Have the JTAs been thorough in identifying and prioritizing all tasks associated with a job? Although it is not practical to thoroughly study JTAs during an assessment, assessors should review the JTA methodology with the appropriate personnel and determine whether the necessary areas are covered. For example, in addition to entry control and tactical tasks, are such tasks as vehicle operation, report writing, and running one mile identified?

- Are the JTAs site-specific? Some generic JTAs have been developed (for example, for basic SPOs), and some organizations operating protective forces at several facilities have developed common JTAs. To be fully effective, these generic JTAs usually require some modification for site-specific conditions. Checking job descriptions or seeing whether facility-unique activities have been incorporated will quickly answer this question.

At NNSA sites (and DOE sites choosing to use the METL-based approach to training), assessors should examine the TNA process, determine how the training requirements were prioritized, and determine which tasks were selected from the EMETL Field Manual. Assessors should also ensure that the SSSTs supporting the METL tasks are appropriate. Assessors should review training schedules and training rosters (to determine whether the training was conducted) and evaluation sheets (to ensure that the “go/no go” criteria were applied).
B. Assessors should determine whether the site has systems to identify annual refresher training and in-service training requirements. An effective TNA process can identify these requirements. Assessors should interview training personnel, review documentation pertinent to the methodology for determining training needs, and review the most recent example of work done in this area.

C. Assessors should review the training plan and discuss it with training managers to determine whether it provides a clear roadmap for accomplishing the organization's training. This information may be contained in one or more documents, such as a training plan, a training order, an ATP, or a standard operating procedure for training supported by one of the above. Whatever the form, essential ingredients of a good plan include:

- Identification of site-specific training needs and goals (at least for the period being addressed)
- Description of training resources and an explanation of how they will be used to meet the training needs and goals
- All basic training requirements, both general (SPO) and specialized (SRT, CAS operator, health physics, etc.)
- All required and necessary annual refresher training, both general and specialized (normally based on a TNA or similar evaluation)
- All training exercise requirements for the protective force in general, SRT, and supporting FBI/LLEA
- Identification of resources committed to OJT: how OJT is used, who provides the training, whether they have appropriate qualifications as OJT instructors, and how OJT is scheduled.

D. Assessors should review training schedules and other associated documents that implement the training plan to determine whether training is actually scheduled and conducted so as to meet the identified needs and goals. Training schedules are normally published on a monthly or weekly basis. Assessors need not review an entire year's training schedules; randomly selecting a few monthly or several weekly schedules is usually adequate. Another option is to select one (or more) training item(s) from the ATP and track it through all training schedules to see whether they collectively serve to achieve the goal.

E. Assessors should examine the lesson plans currently in use to determine their adequacy in supporting training goals. A review of six to ten lesson plans should be adequate unless assessors discover that lesson plans are inconsistent in format, detail, and quality; in such a case, a more extensive look may be needed. If training is going to be observed during the assessment, it is a good idea to include lesson plans for the class(es) to be observed among those reviewed. Assessors should look for consistency in format, appropriate level of detail, and site-specificity. If lesson plans produced by other organizations, such as the NTC, are used, assessors should determine whether they have been modified, as appropriate, for site-specific needs.

**Training Records**

F. Assessors should select and review a sample of class rosters and compare them with training schedules to determine whether scheduled training was actually conducted and whether the required personnel attended. A review of 10 or 12 rosters is usually adequate, although more may be reviewed if necessary. Another approach is to select a particular class (or several) and look at the entire year's rosters for that class to determine whether all scheduled classes were held and all required personnel attended.

G. Assessors should review the individual training records of a random sample of protective force personnel. Sample size may vary; for example, it may be 10 percent, or it may be based on a formal population-based sample size table. Records of specialists (SRT, CAS operator, etc.), as well as basic SPOs and supervisors, should be
included in the sample. If one or more samples of personnel are selected for other purposes during the assessment, such as performance tests or written tests, training records of the same personnel may be reviewed. Records should be reviewed for:

- Accessibility – information in the records should be easily retrievable, readily available to those who need it, and in a useful format.
- Currency – cross-check records against recent class rosters to see whether training received has been recorded. Also check to see that credit was not given for training not attended.
- Completeness – check to see whether all required training, evaluation, and certification information is included in the records to provide trainers/managers with an accurate and complete picture of the individual's training performance history.

H. Assessors should review certification records to ensure that personnel who are on the job have met all pertinent certification requirements. From a training standpoint, these would include physical fitness, firearms qualification, and competency certifications for basic SPOs and specialized duties for SRTs and CAS operators. These records may be consolidated with training records or kept separately. A sample of individual training records may be used, and it is usually most convenient to review all individual records at the same time. Certification records should be compared with training and testing records to validate that the individual has actually completed all certification requirements.

Instructor Qualifications

I. Assessors should review the certifications of all training instructors. Documents should be reviewed to determine whether each instructor has been trained and certified through an approved program or process.

J. Assessors should evaluate the proficiency of instructors. Depending on the number of instructors, assessors may evaluate all or just a sample. If supervisors or other operations personnel not on the training staff are used as instructors, they should be included in the sample. Several techniques are useful in this evaluation, including:

- Instructors can be interviewed to ascertain the scope and depth of their knowledge related to training development and instructional techniques.
- Assessors can review instructor products, such as lesson plans, instructional aids, and exams or performance tests for completeness, appropriateness, site-specificity, etc.
- Assessors can observe an instructor teaching a class or directing a training event. Observation is a very effective way to evaluate an instructor, because it involves performance of instructional skills under real conditions. It also affords an opportunity to observe and evaluate teaching methods, instructional techniques, establishment of rapport with students, use of student feedback, and testing methods.
- Assessors can review competency evaluations, which must be completed for each instructor once every 36 months.

Training Aids, Equipment, and Facilities

K. Assessors should examine the training aids and support equipment available to the training program to determine whether training objectives and instructional techniques are adequately supported. Availability and functioning of the equipment should be included. Typical items to examine include:
Audiovisual equipment
- Facilities for making viewgraphs, slides, etc.
- Security training and evaluation shooting system (stress) or other interactive shooting systems and simulators
- ESS/MILES equipment
- Various mockups and props called for in lesson plans
- Physical fitness exercise equipment.

L. Assessors should examine the availability and adequacy of training facilities. When appropriate, such attributes as space, climate control, and lighting should be checked. Ideally, facility attributes and availability should support the training needs; training should not be artificially designed to fit inadequate training facilities. Facilities normally necessary to support an adequate training program include:

- Classrooms
- Live-fire ranges (for day/night firing and qualifications with all weapons in use by the protective force)
- Tactical training areas, including facilities/buildings for realistic training
- Physical fitness training facilities, including a running track or alternative safe running course.

Training Effectiveness

M. Assessors should determine how well the training program prepares the protective force for mission accomplishment (that is, assessors should determine how well trained the protective force is). This question can only be answered by assimilating information collected by various means throughout the assessment:

- Interviews of personnel at all levels of the protective force should include appropriate questions to provide indications of general job knowledge and an overall sense of how well personnel believe the training program serves their needs.

- Oral and written knowledge tests should provide evidence of how well the training program has imparted the necessary general and specialized knowledge. Knowledge tests will be assembled by assessors and validated with specific trusted agents at the assessment site. Limited distribution will be enforced to prevent compromise of the test material. Although the tests may be administered by the Training assessors, they more likely will be administered as part of the assessment of the Duties subtopic.

- The most telling and useful information regarding training effectiveness comes from the performance test results. While training assessors may conduct some performance tests, usually involving training staff members and training-specific tasks, most performance tests are conducted during the assessment of the Duties subtopic. Training assessors should observe as many such performance tests as practical; detailed results of all performance tests and their training implications should be discussed among site training personnel and assessors who evaluated the performance tests.

Management Support of Training Program

N. Throughout the assessment process, assessors should be alert for indications of the level and adequacy of management support for the training program. Indicators include the availability of adequate resources of all kinds, including funding; training staff and their development; facilities and equipment; and training time for all protective force members. Most data collection activities described above can contribute some information about the level of management support.
1. METL PROGRAM ELEMENTS OVERVIEW

   a. **Mission Essential Task List:** A list of tasks required for the protective force to accomplish its mission. Within NNSA, the METL contains mission-essential Collective, Leader, and Individual tasks. The METL serves as the direct linkage between mission accomplishment and training. It is a mission-down analysis of requirements that is performance-focused and serves as the common operating language for protective force programs across the Nuclear Security Enterprise. A METL analysis must be based on a valid and complete set of job tasks with identified levels of skills and knowledge needed to competently perform the tasks associated with assigned protective force duties; therefore, it is synonymous with the term “job analysis” as defined and referred to in Federal law and DOE policy.

   b. **Enterprise Mission Essential Task List:** The EMETL is a list of Collective, Leader, and Individual tasks common to all protective forces within the Nuclear Security Enterprise (“Recapture” and “Recovery” Enterprise METs are not applicable at sites not possessing Category II or greater quantities of SNM, or other specifically-designated national security critical assets). This list serves as the foundation for the complete METL.

   c. **Site-Specific Supporting Tasks:** Each site must identify site-specific tasks not included within the EMETL but directly tied to one of the Collective tasks (mission) or MET. Typically these tasks are associated with specialized equipment or procedures unique to that site. Sites are required to identify conditions, standards, performance steps, references, and a narrative explanation for each SSST for inclusion in their field manual (see Section 3, Introduction). Sites may also include site-specific performance steps within current EMETL tasks.

   d. **Required Supporting Training:** In addition to security mission-specific tasks are Federal, state, local, and site training requirements that must be satisfied (e.g., human relations, safety requirements, equal opportunity training, and general employee training). Also included within the RST are traditional “job analyses” for protective force instructors and armormers, as well as any other identified training items that are important/required but not tied directly to Collective task accomplishment.

   e. **Stakeholder Organizations:** These are the organizations that have a vested interest in how the protective force performs its mission. They are generally identified as Protective Force Operations, Protective Force Training, Protective Force Performance Assurance/Testing, Risk/Vulnerability Assessment, and the field office. It is imperative these organizations collaborate on identifying, planning, and conducting performance assessments that are designed to achieve a common objective: improving mission performance. To this end, stakeholders are required to meet on a recurring basis to discuss METL assessment results, provide comments and feedback on recent training/operations, and collaboratively determine future actions.

   f. **EMETL Field Manual:** This document is a compilation of Collective, Leader, and Individual tasks with conditions, standards, performance steps, references, and supporting narrative descriptions. The information was aggregated from NTC/DOE and U.S. military doctrine. This manual serves as the common operating language among stakeholder organizations and must be used by each. However, it does NOT dictate how each task is to be specifically performed: if a site has a different tactic, technique, or procedure based upon site-specific methods required for effectively accomplishing a given task, then the site should use that approach and document it.
accordingly in the SSST. The EMETL Field Manual is a comprehensive guide to facilitate the development and execution of mission-related training, assessment, and evaluation activities. It is reasonable that restrictions in time, personnel, and resources will limit the quantity of tasks that can be trained in a given year; therefore, there is no requirement, written or implied, that protective force organizations either conduct or be assessed upon the totality of tasks or performance steps within the EMETL Field Manual.

2. **MISSION ESSENTIAL TASKS:** All Collective tasks are derived from the following six METs. Individual tasks, Leader tasks, and SSSTs are derived from the Collective tasks.

   a. **DETER** - Discourage and interrupt progress of threat through active and passive means using human and technological assets.

   b. **DETECT** - Identify, locate, and assess threat through active and passive means using human and technological assets and programmatic processes.

   c. **DENY** - Engage, interdict, and neutralize threat through active means using human and technological assets.

   d. **RECAPTURE** - Repossess and secure asset on site through active means using human and technological assets.

   e. **RECOVER** - Repossess and secure asset off site through active means using human and technological assets while in contact with threat.

   f. **RECONSTITUTE** - Ensure continuity of protection and restore normal operations following an emergency situation.
1. PROCESS OVERVIEW: Task evaluations and task assessments are processes used to measure performance proficiency (knowledge, skills, and abilities) and to guide the training program in determining and adjusting training content and priority. Task evaluation is essentially the “testing” of task performance. Task assessment is a qualitative judgment—part of an ongoing, working process—to determine the current demonstrated level of proficiency and to identify what specific follow-on training is essential to reinforce and/or build upon current levels of demonstrated proficiency. All tasks are assessed and evaluated based on task-specific conditions and standards.

The EMETL program uses the Instructional Systems Design model for analysis, design, development, implementation, and evaluation, as stated in each site’s ATP. Since the METL at each site is assessed quarterly, it is crucial that each ATP contain the appropriate amount of flexibility to address emerging and changing needs throughout the training year. Sites do not necessarily train or test every METL task each year; training managers prioritize tasks by considering the needs identified in TNAs and by stakeholders during quarterly assessments, with consideration of the available resources.

a. METL Tasks, Conditions, and Standards:

(1) Task Identification: Each of the METs and all subordinate supporting tasks are identified using a systematic process. Tasks are clearly defined, observable, and measurable actions described by action verbs. A task usually has a specific beginning and end state, and may support—or be supported by—other tasks. A task should explicitly state what person, element, or organizational entity is responsible for task performance. By limiting METs to essential tasks only, the focus remains where it should: on those tasks that are absolutely necessary to ensure accomplishment of the tactical mission.

(2) Conditions: Conditions are used in the METL development process to express environmental variables that affect task performance. Conditions are applied to specific tasks and not overall missions because conditions may affect tasks differently within the overall context of a mission. If the condition does not affect how to train, organize, or equip the protective force to effectively perform a task, then it is not relevant and should not be used. It is important to take into account and document changing conditions and training context when conducting assessments, since the same task could be performed quite differently under different conditions.

(3) Standards: Standards identify necessary performance criteria consistent with the concept of operations for the mission under a specified set of conditions. A standard consists of one or more performance measures (derived from references, directives, etc.) and defines the minimum acceptable level of performance required to validate capability and proficiency. All regular/contingency mission performance objectives must be considered when identifying and setting requisite performance standards, including the assessment/grading/scoring criterion used (where applicable) to accurately and honestly capture and report results. The integrity of this data is absolutely imperative to improving the integrated, programmatic processes used to support an ongoing, systematic approach to continued improvement. The standards statements contained in the EMETL refer to site directives and techniques, tactics, and procedures, so sites must ensure all that personnel involved in assessment/evaluation are familiar with the relevant site doctrine.
b. **Levels of Evaluation and Assessment:**

(1) **MET Evaluations/Assessments:** MET evaluations/assessments are used to determine the status and predicted effectiveness of the protective force in response to an adversary action. The Training Manager and Protective Force Manager conduct MET evaluations/assessments in order to assign a training priority to supporting tasks in each EMETL category. The evaluations/assessments should be conducted by a thorough review of Collective, Leader, and Individual Task assessments/evaluations, along with after-action reviews derived from exercise activities and LSPTs conducted by protective force, training, and performance testing personnel. MET review should be conducted quarterly to ultimately support the assignment of training priority during the ATP development process.

(2) **Collective Task Evaluations/Assessments:** Collective tasks directly support the accomplishment of the METs. Collective task assessments/evaluations are used to determine the proficiency of a team. Collective tasks are trained, assessed, and evaluated by protective force leaders and instructors. Collective task assessments/evaluations feed directly into the METL evaluation matrix for determining overall protective force proficiency and for determining and establishing training priorities.

(3) **Leader Task Evaluations/Assessments:** Leader tasks directly support the accomplishment of Collective tasks. Leader task assessments/evaluations are used to determine the proficiency of small unit leaders. Leader tasks are trained, assessed, and evaluated by protective force shift leaders and instructors. Additionally, Leader task assessments/evaluations identify any leader who needs remedial training, so they ultimately support the overall METL training effort.

(4) **Individual Task Evaluations/Assessments:** Like Leader tasks, Individual tasks directly support the accomplishment of Collective tasks. These tasks are trained, assessed, and evaluated by leaders and instructors, as appropriate. Individual task assessments/evaluations assist in identifying officers who need remedial training and in focusing the overall training effort in support of MET accomplishment.

(5) **SSST Evaluations/Assessments:** SSSTs also directly support the accomplishment of Enterprise METs and/or Collective tasks. They are trained, assessed, and evaluated by leaders and instructors, as appropriate. SSST assessments/evaluations assist in identifying training needs and focusing the overall training effort in support of mission accomplishment.

c. **Task Evaluation:** Primarily protective force leaders, instructors, and performance testing personnel conduct task evaluations. Task evaluation is a formal process that is accomplished by measuring the observed performance against the task standard—including any specific measure and criterion. Task evaluation relies on an objective measure of a performed task and culminates in assigning a “go/no-go” for the evaluated Collective task. Sites develop their testing/evaluation programs according to local needs discerned by all involved stakeholders (protective force, performance testing, training, VA, and the field office). The results of all evaluations should be shared among the stakeholders and used in the ongoing TNA process.

d. **Task Assessment:** Task assessment is a qualitative judgment by the Protective Force Manager and Training Manager on the basis of subject matter experts (e.g., protective force leaders, performance testing personnel, VA personnel, and instructors) formally and informally measuring performance against the task standard—including any specific measure and criterion (all tasks)
and performance steps (leader and individual tasks). It is crucial that task assessments be completely honest and unvarnished to provide a valid and reliable set of results. Task assessment should take place whenever possible (even after an evaluation) and should take into account the context and conditions.

(1) Task assessment relies upon the expertise of the subject matter expert conducting the assessment and culminates in assigning a specific value (“T,” “P,” or “U”) for the assessed task.

(a) Trained (T) means the unit has demonstrated proficiency in accomplishing the task to standard.

(b) Practice (P) means the unit has demonstrated performance capable of completing the task but has some difficulty or has failed to perform some performance step(s) to standard and requires additional practice. This value does NOT imply that the unit cannot accomplish the mission.

(c) Untrained (U) means the unit has not demonstrated an ability to achieve proficiency to standard. This value may reflect substandard performance, or it may indicate that the individual or unit has never been trained on the given task.

(2) “T/P/U” is used to identify overall proficiency in the conduct of a task, and does not necessarily directly reflect the results of “go/no-go” ratings—e.g., a team can be assigned a rating of “Go” for a task and still receive a “P” assessment. High value, perishable skills/tasks must continually be trained, even though a unit has shown an acceptable level of proficiency.

(3) Narrative after-action statements should be provided for all tasks assessed as “P” or “U.” These statements are a critical component of the TNA process for determining needs and priorities with regard to future training on the same task. The statements need not be lengthy, but should include context/conditions and should point to which area and/or performance step(s) kept the rating from being a “T.”

(4) Training Program Task Prioritization: This is the TNA. On completion of an assessment of tasks (T, P, or U), training managers prioritize the training program based on performance-based connections to mission accomplishment and available resources, such as time, personnel, equipment, supplies, and funding. Prioritize training BASED ON ASSESSMENT:

(a) Priority 1 = “Will train.” These tasks are usually trained by professional trainers to ensure the quality and consistency of training across the entire protective force. This is also the mandatory training necessary to meet order requirements and for protective force members to maintain certifications.

(b) Priority 2 = “May train.” These tasks are usually trained by on-duty leaders in the field, as resources permit. Ideally, every applicable task should be trained and/or reviewed with subordinates, although this approach is not mandatory. The method of delivery is based on the resources available and operational requirements.

(c) Priority 3 = “May train or evaluate.” These tasks are normally tasks that have been assessed as “T” and thus should be performance tested, possibly during
regularly scheduled performance tests. The performance testing department should make every effort to evaluate all priority 3 tasks. However, some sites may not test or evaluate priority 3 tasks at all, based on available resources and needs.

(d) It is important to state that the METL is not prioritized; however, the training program is prioritized and allows the training staff to follow the Systematic Approach to Training for design, development, implementation, and evaluation of curricula and training.

2. **TRAINING/TESTING EXECUTION CYCLE**: The training/testing cycle is a continuous loop that follows the Systematic Approach to Training process (Analysis, Design, Development, Implementation, Evaluation):

   a. A thorough TNA is conducted and training priority is assigned. (Analysis)

   b. Context and conditions are added via scenario creation as training time approaches, using the NNSA EMETL Field Manual as guiding curriculum. (Design and Development)

   c. Training/testing is conducted. (Implementation)

   d. Evaluation and assessment results are documented, including amplifying narrative. (Evaluation)

   e. Results are given to Training and Operations for remedial training, reporting, etc., before being fed back into the TNA (#1 above).

   f. Results are shared and discussed during recurring stakeholder meetings.
Section 4: Equipment and Facilities

General Information

The protective force/Federal agent equipment standard requires that equipment and facilities enable the protective force/Federal agents to:

- Effectively, efficiently, and safely perform routine duties in daylight or under reduced visibility conditions.

- Effectively combat and defend against adversaries identified in the Graded Security Protection policy and site-specific threat guidance or as specified in the SSP under all environmental and tactical conditions with weapons, equipment, and communications systems specifically tailored to the site.

- Deploy with sufficient quantities of properly maintained equipment to support the protective force mission.

- Train in facilities suitable to support activities that meet mission-specific needs.

The most efficient use of assessment time and resources is achieved when data on equipment and facilities is collected in combination with data collection in other subtopical areas. For example, an assessment of an individual SPO’s personal equipment can be conducted as part of an interview with that SPO, or while observing the SPO performing routine duties during a post visit.

Maintenance of firearms and the effectiveness of communications equipment can be noted during post visits and performance tests. If time or resources are limited, assessment activities in this subtopic should concentrate on the equipment and facilities critical to the protection of the highest priority targets under routine and emergency conditions.

Observation is the primary method of determining whether the protective force has the required equipment, whether it is adequate and appropriate for their mission, and whether it is properly maintained. Examination of facilities and equipment will also provide significant data in this area.

Observation, however, must be supplemented with document reviews of inventory records, maintenance records, facility specification documentation, and work orders. When equipment or facility-related problems are identified, these problems demand more extensive investigation. For example, if random checks of auxiliary weapons at fixed posts indicate that proper maintenance is not being performed, a follow-up examination of armorer procedures and practices, and the assessment and test-firing of a broader sample of these weapons, may become necessary.

Typical elements under the Equipment and Facilities subtopic include:

- Weapons and explosives
- Protective force or Office of Secure Transportation vehicles
- Protective force communications equipment
- Individual special-purpose and duty equipment
- Facilities, including fixed posts, locker rooms, fitness facilities, etc.

To prevent adversaries (identified in the generic or site-specific threat guidance) from accomplishing their objectives, the protective force must be able to bring the necessary force to bear. Duty equipment issued to protective force personnel must be determined by assigned duties on a site-specific basis. The protective force must have appropriate and sufficient individual and auxiliary weapons and special purpose weapons.
Ammunition and explosive/pyrotechnic devices must be readily available and in sufficient quantities to support the mission. Designated fighting positions must be placed in locations that command significant fields of fire and must be able to serve as bases of maneuver for protective force tactical units. These positions must, as a minimum, have a bullet penetration resistance equivalent to .50 caliber armor piercing.

It is important that armories be well organized, properly maintained, conveniently located, and secure, and that they contain tools and gauges for servicing weapons. Out-of-service weapons are required to be tagged and segregated from operational weapons. ESS exercise weapons and ammunition must be properly identified and stored separately from live-fire firearms and ammunition. Certified and properly cleared armorers, in sufficient numbers, must assess all weapons semi-annually. Inventories of weapons, ammunition, explosives, and pyrotechnics must be conducted in accordance with DOE requirements.

It is essential that a sufficient number of vehicles be available to ensure that the required number of protective force personnel can respond according to plan. Vehicles must exhibit a degree of reliability commensurate with their intended function. Vehicles must be of a type and size suitable and equipped for the intended use and, in the case of armored vehicles, offer assurance of continued operation and a safe level of protection to occupants under small arms fire. Protective force vehicles must be maintained in good serviceable condition, readily accessible, and appropriately identified. Use of boats or helicopters by the protective force must be warranted by site-specific mission requirements.

At some facilities, both normal telephone and two-way radio communications are required. To be effective, protective force communications equipment must be operable, permit timely transmission of routine and emergency information, and be readily available for use. Radios are most effective when they provide multichannel capability and, when required, are equipped with a voice privacy or digital encryption capability. It is essential that a sufficient number of radio channels be dedicated for use by security personnel and that an effective redundant/backup communications capability exists (e.g., text pagers, cellular telephones, voice pagers, public address systems). Facilities with Protected Areas and material access areas must have duress notification capabilities for mobile and fixed posts and for the CAS/SAS. A continuous electronic recording system must be provided for all security radio traffic and telecommunications that provide support to the protective force. All protective force response vehicles used for pursuit/response/recovery must be capable of communicating with supporting law enforcement agencies.

The special-purpose and duty equipment issued to protective force personnel must be determined by assigned duties on a site-specific basis. At a minimum, the following duty equipment must be provided; firearm and ammunition, an ammunition carrying device of sufficient capacity, a portable radio with carrier, handcuffs (with case) or other restraining devices, an intermediate force weapon (with case, if applicable), a flashlight with carrier, and personal body armor and protective mask rated for radiological/biological/chemical protection and individually fit tested. Personnel assigned protective masks whose uncorrected distant vision in the better eye is less than 20/40 must be provided with corrective lens inserts that can be accommodated by the issued mask. Customarily, the uniform worn by protective force personnel is designed and tailored to enhance efficient performance of duties and promote a public image of professionalism.

Protective force facilities range from regular buildings and offices to specially constructed facilities that include hardened structures and protection features that provide specified bullet penetration resistance characteristics. It is essential that facilities permit protective force personnel to perform their duties efficiently, protect individual SPOs from weather and temperature variations, and provide for effective communication. When examining these areas, assessors must also be mindful of basic security concerns, such as the placement of obstacles or equipment that restrict access to shooting ports, limit egress and ingress, or inhibit communications. Suitable training facilities to support applicable protective force activities must be provided and maintained based on mission-specific needs. Local, state, and Federal law enforcement agencies and Department of Defense/National Guard training facilities are acceptable alternatives to DOE-owned facilities as long as required DOE certifications and safety guidelines are maintained.
Common Deficiencies/Potential Concerns

Inappropriate Weapons/Ammunition

Sometimes the weapons (particularly auxiliary weapons) and/or ammunition available to SPOs are inappropriate for their mission requirements, threat, or environment. For example, high-powered rifles may be inappropriate for use inside certain types of buildings, and shotguns may be of little use to a vehicle patrol operating in open country on the fringes of a facility. As site missions and facility usage change, or new facilities are constructed, protective forces may fail to re-analyze their weapons and ammunition requirements. Inappropriate weapons or ammunition can result in two types of problems: insufficient firepower to counter the threat, and unacceptable levels of collateral damage (to people and facilities). Assessors should be aware of the rationale behind weapon selection and look for the presence of inappropriate weapons that may not support mission requirements.

Lack of Post-Maintenance Weapon Check Procedures

Sometimes there are no procedures or practices in place to determine whether weapons are operable after being repaired or after undergoing routine maintenance. Weapons, including those worked on by offsite contract armorers, may be issued to SPOs or placed on posts with no live-fire functional check. As a result, the reliability of these weapons is unknown and will remain unknown until they are used. Security Assessments assessors should request post assigned/issued weapons and ammunition be used for live-fire LSPTs that support assessment activities.

Inadequate Numbers and Types of Vehicles

Assessors may find that protective force vehicles are not adequate to support mission requirements. Inadequacies may result from an insufficient number of vehicles, the wrong types of vehicles, or the failure to distinctly mark vehicles. A protective force obviously needs enough vehicles to cover all vehicle patrols, response requirements, and supervisory and transportation needs. Vehicle type and equipage are also important. Some off-road or four-wheel-drive vehicles may be needed, depending on terrain, roads, and weather. Motor pool vehicles that lack radios, gun racks, and other special equipment may not fully support protective force needs. Assessors should examine the rationale for the vehicle fleet mixture and determine whether the available vehicles are being used to best support mission requirements. (For example, is the supervisor driving the new four-wheel-drive on paved roads, while a patrol on dirt roads and open terrain is using an older sedan?)

Poor Vehicle Maintenance

Poor vehicle maintenance procedures and scheduling are sometimes observed and can contribute to the problem mentioned above by making vehicles unavailable for use. While maintenance problems may be directly related to the age of the fleet, other contributing factors include vehicle abuse, priority of maintenance, and quality of maintenance. Examination of vehicle treatment by SPOs, maintenance policies and priorities, and replacement schedules may reveal a lack of adequate supervision or management support for the vehicle fleet.

Insufficient Radio Frequencies/Lack of Redundant Communications

Most protective forces rely heavily on radios for both routine and emergency communications. However, some protective forces do not have enough radio frequencies available to effectively segregate communications functions, or they do not possess a backup communications capability. If sufficient frequencies are not available for all necessary uses, such as routine operations, tactical operations, training, or SRT, the primary frequency becomes cluttered, and the probability that important information will be lost increases. Similarly, a backup communications capability is needed in case the primary radio communications are malfunctioning, jammed, or otherwise disabled. Problems associated with inadequate communications are exacerbated during emergencies, when communications traffic normally increases. If the protective force does not have enough frequencies or
redundant communications, assessors should examine what is being done to manage the available frequencies and/or employ alternative communications methods.

**Unreliable Radio Communications**

The size and/or terrain of some facilities may result in “dead spots” where radio messages cannot be received and/or transmitted. Such “dead spots” can be either outside or inside buildings. Often this problem is intensified when radios are used in the encrypted mode, which may decrease range. The resulting inability of protective force personnel to communicate with each other can have serious consequences during both routine and emergency operations. When this problem exists, assessors should determine the extent and impact of the problem and identify protective force efforts to solve the problem (e.g., install repeaters, devise compensatory radio procedures, or use alternative means of communication).

**Inadequate Encryption Procedures**

As protective forces have moved to comply with the requirement to provide encrypted radios to their SRTs, several problems have been observed. Even with appropriate radios in hand, some protective forces have been slow to develop procedures to install the encryption codes. Others have not established clear procedures for switching to the secure mode when necessary, or for communicating between the SRT (in the secure mode) and the rest of the protective force (in the clear mode). Assessors should determine whether the various complications inherent in the use of encrypted radios by all or part of the protective force have been identified, analyzed, and adequately managed.

**Storage and Issue of Extra/Special Equipment**

Remote or inaccessible storage locations and/or problems with issue procedures (or lack of procedures) for extra or special equipment, weapons, and ammunition at some facilities decrease the availability of such resources, thus diminishing the ability to support emergency mission requirements. During an unexpected emergency, it may be necessary to distribute special equipment, additional ammunition, etc. If the equipment is not stored in an accessible location 24 hours a day, or if there are no procedures detailing how the equipment will be issued, by whom, to whom, and under what conditions, it is unlikely that the equipment will be readily available when needed. An indicator of this problem is that SPOs may be unsure about how they would get additional ammunition or a particular item of equipment when needed.

**Maintenance of Post/Patrol Equipment**

Equipment assigned to a post or vehicle is often not properly cleaned, maintained, or given functional checks. While procedures may call for periodic functional checks of such things as duress alarms, radios, telephones, and intercoms, they often do not address responsibilities for other items of equipment assigned to the post or vehicle. These could include auxiliary weapons, binoculars, night vision devices, respirators, flashlights, and so forth. Any of these items, under emergency conditions, may be mission-essential, yet it is not uncommon to find such items dirty, broken, with missing parts, or with dead batteries. If procedures do not clearly spell out responsibilities for these items and SPOs on post are vague about who is responsible for them, assessors should take a close look at the serviceability of these items.

**Individual Duty Equipment**

Frequently, assessors find that SPOs do not have or do not carry all necessary equipment, such as handcuff keys, operable flashlights, ammunition, extra eyeglasses, or equipment carriers. Assessors often find that SPOs do not carry protective masks, even when required by established procedures. During spot assessments, protective masks are sometimes found to be unserviceable or without necessary corrective lens inserts.
Inadequate Training Facilities

Training facilities may be unavailable or inadequate to support training requirements. These deficiencies most often involve live-fire ranges, tactical training areas, and physical fitness training facilities, but may even include lack of adequate classroom space at some sites. The training requirements imposed by DOE and the performance levels expected of SPOs make adequate training facilities essential.

Poorly Maintained Posts

Poorly maintained posts can be a problem, particularly in older structures. Observed problems may include such things as cracked or broken bullet-resistant glass; inoperable or inadequate climate control equipment; broken doors/locks; burned out lights; and a crowded, cluttered, or trashy appearance. Such conditions can adversely affect job performance by hampering movement and work in the post or providing inadequate ballistic protection.

Inadequate Fixed Posts

Some interior fixed posts are established at locations not designed or properly modified for the purpose. Some posts, including material access area entry/exit control posts, are established in halls or intersections of hallways with little or no modification to accommodate the necessary post equipment, SPO protection, or traffic control requirements. As a result, the SPOs and their weapons/equipment are accessible and vulnerable to passers-by; traffic flow (entry/egress) is difficult to control, particularly during heavy traffic periods; and the orderly conduct of post business is difficult at best.

Planning Activities

Assessors should interview POCs and review equipment lists and facility projects (ongoing and planned). It is helpful to determine where equipment is stored to ensure that major facilities and equipment are assessed during data collection. Other elements to review include:

- Firearms assessment procedures

- A list of armorers who inspect, certify, maintain, or repair protective force weapons, and whether they are properly cleared, enrolled in the human reliability program, and certified by the NTC or another certifying organization

- A topographical map of the site, including all site property, and site map with all buildings, roads, security fences, and other significant features—e.g., the location and description of firing ranges, physical fitness areas, armories, equipment and weapon issue facilities, and maintenance sheds

- Inventories of significant protective force equipment, including:
  - Firearms, indicating type, manufacturer, serial number, and location
  - Vehicles (including air and water craft), indicating type and model
  - Protective masks, indicating type and location
  - Non-lethal weapons, indicating type
  - Chemical agents and dispersal devices
  - Body armor
  - Duty ammunition, pyrotechnics, and explosives, indicating type and caliber
  - Metal detectors and other contraband-detection devices, indicating type and location.
  - Radios, indicating manufacturer, model, number of channels, and duress feature and data encryption capability (if any).
Performance Tests

Performance testing and interviews with protective force personnel help determine whether facilities and equipment are functional and appropriate. Most performance tests conducted to evaluate the Duties subtopic require the use of equipment, and many require the use of facilities, offering an excellent opportunity to determine whether they are adequate and functional.

Assessors may be able to check the operation of radios, phones, and duress systems during post checks and while conducting exercises. Weapons in the armory can be randomly selected to check for operability, cleanliness, and other requirements (for example, whether the armorer set the correct “battle sight” on auxiliary weapons).

Protective force members can be asked to demonstrate deployment of their light machineguns and other auxiliary weapons, and exercises can be conducted that require the issue and deployment of stored, specialized equipment.

Data Collection Activities

Most data collection activities for this subtopic are normally conducted concurrently with data collection activities for the Duties subtopic. Most equipment and facilities are located with or in the immediate vicinity of the protective force members who use them in performing routine and emergency duties. Therefore, most equipment and facilities can be assessed and tested while protective force personnel’s knowledge and skills are being assessed. Only a few activities, such as reviewing records and examining the armory and other storage and maintenance locations, need be conducted separately.

Weapons and Explosives

A. Assessors should determine whether the protective force has adequate numbers of the appropriate types of weapons and ammunition (and explosives, if appropriate) properly located to comply with local and DOE requirements and to support routine and emergency missions. This information can be collected in several ways:

- Review documents, such as weapons inventories and general, special, and post orders, to determine the types of weapons and ammunition available and where they are normally located.

- Observe the types, numbers, and locations of individually assigned and post/auxiliary weapons during all assessment activities, such as post visits and tours. Post/patrol visits provide an excellent opportunity to see what weapons are where.

- Performance tests, including no-notice response tests, conducted to evaluate performance and procedures provide an excellent opportunity to determine whether adequate numbers of the appropriate types of weapons are available in a timely manner. The collection of this data should be considered during performance test planning.

B. Assessors should determine whether weapons and ammunition are controlled and stored safely and securely in accordance with DOE and local requirements. Armory procedures should be reviewed and their implementation observed during all shifts. During post/patrol visits, weapon/ammunition carriage and storage should be noted. If auxiliary weapons and ammunition are stored for ready access in locations other than the armory or at posts, assessors should examine those storage locations. If the protective force has long-term bulk storage of weapons, ammunition, or explosives, storage facilities and procedures should be checked for compliance with DOE Standard 1212, Explosives Safety. It should be noted that long-term storage of excess weapons should be held to a minimum. Large numbers of excess weapons can affect efficient armory operations and burden inventory processes.
C. Assessors should determine the operability of weapons available for protective force use:

- During all live-fire assessment activities (qualification courses, stress courses, etc.), assessors should pay close attention to weapon functioning. During these activities, SPOs should be required to use their own weapons, including rifles, submachineguns, and shotguns, if individually assigned.

- A random sample of weapons assigned to posts/patrols should be selected, removed from post (replaced), and test fired. For weapons with adjustable sights, testing for proper battle sight setting should be included. All types of weapons available to the protective force should be included in the sample. If plans call for issuance of additional weapons from the armory during a response, armory weapons can be included in the sample. The size of the sample will depend on the total number of weapons and the time and facilities available for testing.

- Maintenance procedures should be reviewed to determine whether required preventive maintenance is programmed. Check to see whether procedures include verification of proper functioning before a repaired or inspected weapon is placed back into service. Qualifications or certifications of armorer and gunsmiths should be verified.

- Maintenance records should be checked to determine whether required inspections and maintenance are being conducted. The number of records checked will depend on the number of weapons and the time available.

- Weapons at any location may be spot-checked for cleanliness and obvious (visible) maintenance problems.

D. Assessors should determine whether the protective force is properly accounting for weapons, ammunition, and explosives. Assessors should review not only accountability and inventory procedures but also records of periodic inventories to determine whether they are thorough and timely. A good check of accountability practices can be made by generating a random sample of weapons, going to the locations where records indicate those specific weapons should be, and then verifying the weapons by serial number.

Vehicles

E. Assessors should determine whether the quantity and types of protective force vehicles are adequate to support routine and emergency mission requirements. The adequacy of integral vehicle equipment (light bars, radios, weapons racks, and distinctive markings) should be included in this evaluation.

- Interview managers and review any pertinent documentation that explains the rationale for the makeup of the vehicle fleet.

- Observe, during routine operations and performance tests of emergency operations (or actual responses), whether the available vehicles are adequate to support the necessary tasks.

- Assessors should determine whether adequate vehicle maintenance support is provided.

- Assessors should observe the condition of every protective force vehicle they encounter during the course of the assessment. Cleanliness, care, and general condition can be observed by visual assessment.

- Assessors should review protective force and motor pool maintenance schedules to determine whether routine, scheduled maintenance is appropriate. Maintenance records should be checked for a sample of vehicles to determine whether scheduled maintenance is performed. Assessors should also check records for excessive unscheduled vehicle down time, which might indicate inadequate maintenance or careless operation.
SPO interviews should include questions regarding their opinions about the suitability and reliability of the vehicle fleet. Interviews of protective force and vehicle maintenance (motor pool) managers can reveal maintenance priorities afforded protective force vehicles.

**Communications Equipment**

**F.** Assessors should determine whether the protective force has sufficient numbers of the appropriate types of communications devices required by DOE and local policies. This can be accomplished through a combination of SPO interviews, observation of routine operations, and performance tests of emergency operations to determine whether the protective force has adequate communications equipment to perform its mission requirements.

**G.** Assessors should determine the reliability of communications equipment, particularly of radios. This may be accomplished by reviewing maintenance records and observing the ability of the protective force to communicate during routine operations and performance tests simulating routine or emergency operations. Interviews with SPOs, including CAS operators, can provide added data about communications reliability.

**H.** Assessors should determine whether maintenance and testing of communications equipment are adequate. Maintenance and testing, and to some degree suitability, of radios is normally assessed by the physical security systems topic team, and assessors should coordinate with that team in this area. Procedures and practices for the operational testing of other communications devices, such as telephones, intercoms, and duress alarms, should be assessed by review of procedures, observation of tests, and review of test records.

**Individual Special Purpose and Duty Equipment**

**I.** Assessors should determine whether the uniforms and equipment required by DOE and local policies are available, appropriate, functional, and reliable. Numerous items could be included in this category, including such things as uniforms, load-bearing equipment, sidearms, handcuffs, flashlights, body armor, hand-held metal detectors, protective masks, extra eyeglasses, and mask inserts as needed.

- Assessors should review appropriate protective force policies, orders, and equipment lists to determine what equipment is required and where it should be located.

- Information regarding availability, suitability, reliability, and functioning can be obtained through SPO interviews, observations of routine operations, and performance testing. In addition to observing equipment during performance tests of SPOs, assessors may also select items of equipment to be performance tested for proper operation. The particular items and the size of the sample to be tested will vary with the circumstances.

**Facilities**

**J.** Fixed posts should be assessed to determine whether they meet the minimum requirements for their use. Specific things to look for include:

- Adequate environmental controls and protection from the weather
- Adequate human engineering features
- Design and equipment suitable to facilitate the SPOs’ performance of required duties.

Generally, all fixed posts should be examined. If time is limited, posts should be selected on the basis of their importance to the facility protection strategy.
K. Assessors should determine whether the fixed posts that DOE policy requires to be hardened do in fact meet the appropriate construction and materials requirements. This should be determined in coordination with the physical security systems topic team, which normally assesses this area.

L. Assessors must determine whether fixed posts and tactical fighting positions are positioned at key locations (i.e., near likely avenues of approach with optimal fields of observation) and in a manner that provides mutually supporting and/or overlapping fields of fire with adjacent posts and patrols.
Section 5: Duties

General Information

All protective force members and Federal agents must be able to effectively and efficiently operate all equipment assigned to them for the performance of routine and emergency duties. Individual and team skills must enable the protective force/Federal agents to protect DOE security interests from theft, sabotage, and other hostile acts that may adversely affect national security, program continuity, or the health and safety of employees and the public. The ability to effectively perform these functions is the most important measure of the ability of the protective force/Federal agents to fulfill its mission and is thus, customarily, the focal point of any assessment.

Assessment priorities should be established to ensure that data is collected for critical areas, including the duties involving protection, under routine and emergency conditions, of the highest priority targets. Specific duties that are normally always assessed include those associated with access controls, weapons handling, tactical response, use of deadly force, and the fundamental ability to identify key SNM assets.

Although document reviews, interviews, observation, and knowledge tests are all employed in collecting data on the performance of duties, one key data collection tool is performance testing. It is only by means of testing that reasonable conclusions can be drawn concerning the overall ability of the protective force to meet the Duties requirements.

Document reviews are important in preparing to assess this subtopic, but they play a small role in actual data collection during the assessment visit. Some records and log books may need to be examined to determine whether SPOs routinely perform various required functions.

Observation provides accurate data regarding actual performance of some routine duties, and in some cases may provide similar data regarding some emergency duties. Knowledge tests and interviews provide data concerning knowledge of laws, policies, and procedures. This type of data is often useful to assessors, particularly when assessment activities do not afford the opportunity to test the actual application of this knowledge by means of performance tests.

Data collection activities should strike a balance between examination of routine and emergency duties. The ability of the protective force to respond in a tactically effective manner to a major adversarial threat may be the ultimate test of its ability, but its ability to perform routine patrols or access control is of equal importance in providing ongoing protection to DOE security interests. The selection of performance tests to be administered during a given assessment must also take into consideration the time and manpower requirements for a particular test and its impact on the overall objectives of the assessment. A large-scale tactical performance test may absorb more resources, without necessarily yielding more relevant data, than a series of smaller-scale performance tests. If the assessment team decides that a large-scale tactical performance test should be conducted, adequate manpower resources should be made available to ensure that the conduct of routine duties is not adversely impacted. Also, allowance must be made for the greater level of planning and onsite coordination required to conduct such large-scale exercises successfully.

Specific elements of protective force duties typically examined include:

- General knowledge, skills, and abilities:
  - SNM recognition
  - Observation, assessment, and reporting
  - Use of force
  - Individual and/or team tactics
- Use of individual special-purpose and duty equipment
- Driving skills (routine and stress)
- Communications skills
- First aid and fire protection
- Access and egress controls
- Alarm station operation
- Self-defense
- Intermediate-force weapon/aerosol
- Knowledge of laws, policies, regulations, and orders
- Weapons-related skills, with specific attention to enhanced weapons systems, such as light machineguns, grenade launchers, and other force multipliers

- Canine handling
- Aviation
- Explosive/mechanical entry techniques
- Planning tactical assaults
- Sniper/observer teams.

Although competency levels vary throughout the complex, SPOs and SOs must have the general skills and knowledge required to effectively accomplish their duties at any particular site. Basic observation and reporting skills provide the foundation for the remaining, more demanding skills. The SO must be able to identify potential problems, details of events, or potential evidence and provide clear and accurate reports involving these occurrences.

At facilities requiring armed protective forces, the SPOs must effectively master targeting skills and the use of firearms. Proficiency with firearms requires a detailed knowledge of their mechanical operation, assembly, maintenance requirements, and deployment. SPOs must be able to qualify, under both day and night conditions, with all firearms they may be required to employ while on duty. In addition to the customary handgun and rifle, individual qualifications may include belt-fed weapons, anti-tank weapons, grenade launchers, and precision rifles. Also, SPOs may be required to be proficient in the use of the baton, explosives, or other specialized equipment.

SPOs must also be knowledgeable in the use of radios and other communications equipment. In addition, they may have to be familiar with the use of special purpose equipment, such as aerosol irritant systems, night vision devices, protective masks, or self-contained breathing devices. In some cases, protective force personnel are involved with aviation, canine handling, demolitions, and sniper/observer team techniques.

Access and egress control is usually one of the most important routine functions performed by protective force personnel. To perform this function effectively, SPOs must be able to operate all items of detection equipment, perform effective searches, and apply knowledge of the policies and guidelines governing access and visitor control.

At most sites, the CAS operators are considered essential personnel in the successful accomplishment of the protective force mission. These individuals must be able to effectively operate and monitor all phases of the alarm system, initiate immediate protective force response, and maintain accurate reports and records.

Critical to all protective force operations is the effectiveness of its supervision. Supervisors must be well trained, possess good leadership skills, and be thoroughly knowledgeable of all pertinent policies, orders, and regulations. Typically, the supervisors are key elements in ensuring that protective force personnel sustain necessary skill levels, remain informed, operate as a team, and display a professional image.
Common Deficiencies/Potential Concerns

Ineffective Personnel Identification Skills

Perhaps the most commonly observed set of duty-related deficiencies involves access/egress control skills. One of the most common involves failure to positively identify personnel entering or exiting security areas. Unauthorized persons, or persons with improper badges, manage to gain entrance to security areas at an unacceptable rate during performance tests. This problem is most often observed at facilities that rely solely on the SPO visually examining a badge and comparing the picture and description on the badge with the person presenting the badge.

Searches Not Conducted Properly

The inability to conduct thorough entry and exit searches of vehicles, personnel, and hand-carried items is a recurring problem. Frequently, as the result of a superficial or careless search, SPOs do not find contraband items. Inadequate searching is also common during arrest procedures and suspect-handling performance tests. Further, during the search of suspects, SPOs often unsafely pass the line of fire of cover SPOs.

Inability to Use Post Equipment Properly

Another problem often observed is SPOs’ inability to properly operate all equipment available to them on various posts. While most items of post equipment are fairly simple, others are more complex, and they all require some level of skill to place them in operation and use them properly. Generally, more problems are observed with activating, checking, and employing such items as night vision devices, metal detectors, explosive detectors, and SNM detectors rather than with flashlights, protective masks, and communications devices.

Inadequate Understanding/Application of Deadly Force Policy

Problems with the application of deadly force policy are still encountered. Past training methods emphasized the ability to memorize the DOE deadly force policy and did not address the ability to apply it properly in realistic circumstances. While knowledge of the policy is necessary in order to apply it properly, knowledge does not ensure proper application. Some sites have not developed site-specific rules of engagement or clearly defined examples of actions that would constitute hostile intent. As a result, SPOs who can recite the policy often cannot properly apply the policy (that is, make correct deadly-force decisions) in scenarios representing real-world situations. Deficient skills in this area are extremely serious because SPOs are always armed with deadly force ability while on duty, and misapplication of deadly force can have fatal consequences for the SPO, a suspect, or innocent bystanders.

Lack of Knowledge of Mission-Essential Information

A very basic problem, still encountered, involves SPOs’ inability to identify what they are protecting. For example, they may not know what SNM, SNM containers, or key weapons components look like. Further, SPOs may not be intimately familiar with the storage locations or pathways to these key assets. Consequently, they may not take the necessary measures to protect something that requires protection, or they may use deadly force to protect something that does not warrant that level of protection.

Deficient Tactical Weapons Skills

When using individual and auxiliary weapons, SPOs frequently fail to demonstrate proficiency in tactical weapons skills, such as proper weapon employment, fire discipline/control, clearing malfunctions, use of sights, tactical reloading, and firing while wearing a protective mask. Enhanced weaponry, such as light machineguns,
grenade launchers, and heavy-caliber sniper rifles, requires special training that is difficult to accommodate and is therefore frequently postponed.

**Deficient Tactical Communications Skills**

Other frequently observed problems involve communications skills in a tactical environment. Specific problems include an inability to deal effectively with jamming or other interference; inadequate reporting techniques and procedures; compromising friendly positions either through communicated information or loud volume settings on hand-held radios; lack of, or improper use of, a personal ear communication device; and/or failure to use alternative forms of communication (other than the radio) when appropriate.

**Inadequate Tactical Skills**

A common area of deficiency involves the inability to properly employ sound tactical principles. This encompasses a broad range of skills, and deficiencies are not uncommon in any of the specific skill areas. Deficiencies are encountered in all positions, from basic SPOs to SRT members. Typical deficiencies include failure to employ proper or adequate techniques in tactical movement, use of cover or concealment, tactical driving, arrest and handcuffing procedures, and other personal survival measures.

**Inability to Implement Protection Strategy**

For all applicable DOE sites and facilities, the protection strategy and threat are described in the approved SSSP. It is of primary concern that the appropriate organizations be able to successfully implement the protection strategy, and that the strategy be sufficient to fully defend against the adversary threats and capabilities as identified in the current threat guidance. Performance tests should be used to ensure that the facility can effectively accomplish these objectives.

**Insufficient Control of Construction Personnel**

It is often necessary for uncleared contractor and construction personnel to enter secured areas. Procedures must be in place to maintain positive control of these individuals to preclude unauthorized access to classified matter. Occasionally, the protective force (or other responsible organization) fails to establish effective procedures for this purpose, or fails to maintain effective control over these individuals throughout their stay.

**Planning Activities**

Assessors should interview POCs and review documents. Elements to cover include:

- General and special orders
- Protective force post orders and other written procedures regarding performance of duties on posts/patrols
- Response and contingency plans for security emergencies
- MOUs with law enforcement and military organizations
- Current deviations and equivalencies
- Current rosters of all personnel, including managers, supervisors, staff members, and SPOs (indicating those authorized to carry firearms)
• Rosters of SRT personnel

• Protective force shift rosters showing all post assignments

• List of protective force personnel performing crucial, high-risk functions

• List of protective force personnel scheduled to be on vacation or known to be on medical restriction during the period of the onsite assessment

• Description of protective force hiring and selection procedures and criteria

• Corrective action plans and closure packets from the last assessment

• Descriptions of approved initial qualification courses and requalification courses for all protective force duty firearms

• Descriptions of any live-fire stress courses used by the protective force.

Planning for the Duties subtopic presents the greatest challenge to the protective force topic team. It is important to focus the assessment and performance tests on the appropriate areas, and ensure that sufficient information is collected to allow the team to draw reasonable conclusions on the protective force’s ability to accomplish its mission. Review of past assessment report deficiencies and other pertinent documents and discussions with the Assessment Chief and with other topic teams help focus the activities of the protective force topic team.

Once focused, the performance tests selected should, to the extent possible, have some interrelationship, in order to provide more data points for drawing conclusions. Responsibility for planning and conducting the performance tests should be determined as early in the planning process as possible. It may be appropriate to place the major planning and coordination responsibilities on the assessed facility. Ideally, all selected performance tests will be fleshed out during the planning phase; however, final planning must often be completed on site.

Performance Tests

Performance tests can range from a single SPO/Federal agent demonstrating gas mask donning procedures, to alarm response exercises, to a full scale force-on-force exercise utilizing ESS/MILES equipment. A balanced approach will result in a mix of tests that evaluate individual and team skills, and together help provide the big picture on the ability of the protective force to accomplish duties.

Assessors can choose from a variety of performance tests when planning for an assessment. These tests may be broadly categorized as LSPTs, individual performance tests that lend themselves to the “round robin” type of testing, and isolated, individual performance tests. The following performance tests are commonly used in the assessment of duties:

• LSPTs
  - Limited-notice response (alarm or duress)
  - Limited-notice explosive detection (mechanical/canine)
  - Area or building containment (MILES)
  - Building/room clearing (MILES)
  - Demonstration control
  - Convoy/SNM movement (MILES)
  - Bomb threat
  - Weapons handling/individual tactical skills (live fire or MILES)
• Individual performance tests/shift readiness
  - Weapons qualification course
  - Live-fire obstacle course
  - Live fire with protective mask
  - Range estimation
  - Vehicle search
  - Arrest procedures and suspect handling
  - Observation, assessment, and reporting
  - Night vision device operation
  - Baton or aerosol proficiency
  - Donning and clearing protective mask (within established timelines)
  - Donning ballistic vest (if not worn)

• Individual performance tests
  - Interior patrol
  - Exterior patrol
  - Parcel search
  - Badge checks
  - Metal, SNM, explosives, and x-ray detectors
  - Sniper/observer
  - Canine handling
  - Post/patrol (observation and equipment operation)
  - Tactical movement.

To make the best use of available time and resources, the protective force topic team usually schedules performance tests to evaluate as many skill and knowledge requirements as possible for both protective force and SRT personnel, or to evaluate specific deficiencies or areas of concern identified during previous assessments or assessment planning. Figure 2 shows a number of performance tests by type (LSPT, round-robin, and individual) with the corresponding skill and knowledge requirements that may be evaluated when using one or more of these tests.

Data Collection Activities

A detailed list of general skills and knowledge areas required by DOE policy appears under General Information earlier in this section. Local requirements may amend or increase this list. Assessors use four types of data collection methods to gather information about performance of duties: interviews, observations, knowledge tests, and performance tests. These methods are discussed below, followed by a list of specific data collection activities.
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Figure 2. Performance Tests for Skills and Knowledge
Interviews

Interviews provide the assessor with valuable information regarding protective force personnel’s understanding of policies, procedures, and responsibilities, as well as insight into attitudes. Interviews need not always be formal or scheduled activities; every conversation an assessor has with an SPO is essentially an interview in which data is being collected. Since interviews are an important source of information, they should be conducted with deliberation and purpose. Several things should be considered when conducting interviews:

- The sample of SPOs interviewed should be as large as time permits. The sample should include a representative cross-section of jobs (basic SPOs, supervisors, SRT, CAS operators, etc.) and encompass all shifts. A stratified sample can be taken from the protective force roster. However, a more common method is to conduct most formal interviews during post/patrol visits; whoever happens to be on post during the visit is interviewed. If this method is used, posts should be visited on all shifts, and categories of personnel who do not stand posts/patrols should not be overlooked. The sample is usually increased through ad hoc interviews conducted during performance tests, while entering/exiting posts, and during the many contacts with SPOs during the course of the assessment.

- At least for the formal, planned interviews, assessors should know what they are going to ask and the types of information they are going to try to elicit. Since several assessors will normally conduct interviews and post visits simultaneously, a list of core interview questions should be used so that desired topics are covered uniformly in all interviews. However, assessors may always ask additional questions or further pursue a line of questioning.

- Post visits/interviews should be conducted in a conversational and non-threatening manner. Much of the interview is essentially an oral knowledge test, and the person being interviewed will consider every question to be a test. The interviewer should not be bound by the text of prepared questions. Questions may have to be phrased and rephrased, as necessary, to elicit the desired information. The goal is to determine the SPO’s true perception or understanding of the subject matter; it will take more effort to elicit that information from some people than from others.

Observations

Observation is a good way to see how personnel perform their routine duties. Observations may be either deliberate or ad hoc. For example, entry control procedures may be observed for 30 minutes during shift change to see whether proper procedures are followed; however, entry control procedures may also be observed every time the assessor passes through or by an entry control point.

- The time and location of deliberate observations should be carefully planned to provide representative and sufficient data. They should be limited to instances where the activity to be observed will definitely occur. It is a waste of time for an assessor to stand around in the hope that something will happen.

- Ad hoc observations can provide valuable information. Assessors should be alert at all times while on site and actively pursue, as appropriate, anything they observe that is pertinent to protective force duty performance.

- For best results, the assessor should position himself/herself so that the subject being observed is unaware that he/she is being observed. In all cases, the assessor should be positioned so as not to interfere with the function being observed.

Knowledge Testing

Knowledge testing is useful to determine whether protective force personnel know and understand policies and procedures. Its use should be limited to that purpose, since it cannot reveal whether personnel can actually apply the policies or execute the procedures.
Random sampling techniques will be used to determine who will take the test. The sample size and target population (entire force, CAS operators only, etc.) will vary with the test objectives.

A portion of the written test questions and answers will be taken from existing protective force tests and validated by the protective force trusted agents before being administered. Trusted agents must complete Trusted Agent forms and strictly follow the provisions attached to the form before the assessment team shares draft tests for validation purposes. Failure to follow the provisions of the Trusted Agent form will invalidate the knowledge test and require a rewrite of the test questions that site security personnel may not have the opportunity to review before the test is re-administered.

Assessors will schedule, administer, and correct the tests. The test questions must be closely guarded.

**Performance Testing**

Performance testing is the best way to evaluate skills and determine whether procedures are adequate and whether protective force personnel can perform the duties required of them. A list of common performance tests appears earlier in this section. Detailed information and tools applicable to performance testing are provided in Appendices A through C. Additional things to keep in mind are:

- Performance testing should be the assessor's primary means of data collection. If a skill or duty can be performance tested (and most can), it should be performance tested.
- If the whole population or a significant portion of the population cannot be tested, use random sampling techniques to decide who to test. Make sure the sample is selected from the correct population. For example, the population for firearms testing should be all armed personnel; the population for SRT building clearing testing should be all SRT members. Minitab, Microsoft Excel, or other similar software should be utilized for randomly selecting performance test participants.

**Specific Activities**

The major protective force duty areas are summarized below, with indications of the applicable and recommended data collection activities for each.

**A.** Assessors should determine whether SPOs have adequate observation, assessment, patrolling, and reporting skills. This is best determined by performance testing. They may be evaluated by specific tests designed for this purpose. Pertinent skills can usually also be observed in most larger-scale performance tests that involve a tactical scenario and the use of adversaries. For example, protective force fratricide during a force-on-force exercise is an indicator that protective force personnel have not been adequately trained or equipped to effectively identify friendly forces.

**B.** Assessors should determine whether armed personnel possess adequate weapons handling skills. The required skills include basic marksmanship abilities, tactical weapons handling skills, field firing techniques, and weapon safety habits. The best way to test these skills is through live-fire performance testing. Tactical weapons handling, field firing techniques, and, to a lesser extent, weapons safety can also be evaluated during non-live-fire, MILES-enhanced tactical performance tests.

**C.** Assessors should determine whether SPOs possess tactical skills adequate for mission performance. These skills should be evaluated through performance testing. Most Security Assessments performance tests address at least some tactical skills, either through team or individual tactical testing activities.
D. Assessors should determine whether SPOs can properly operate all equipment available for their use. The routine operation of some equipment can be evaluated by observation. Skill in operating virtually all equipment can be determined by performance testing. Some tests may be specifically limited to the operation of a particular piece of equipment. However, most performance tests afford the opportunity to observe SPOs operating some items of equipment.

E. Assessors should determine whether personnel can properly operate assigned vehicles, including appropriate equipment on the vehicles. Routine vehicle operation skills and some emergency operation skills can be evaluated by observation. Specific driving skills may be performance tested, and many tactical performance tests provide an opportunity to evaluate driving skills under emergency conditions. If facilities have armored vehicles, special off-road vehicles, watercraft, or aircraft, pertinent skills related to these vehicles should be tested, along with any weapon system(s) deployed from these vehicles.

F. Assessors should determine whether SPOs possess adequate communications skills (that is, operating communications equipment and using appropriate communications procedures). Routine communications skills can be evaluated by observation, including monitoring of radio nets. Tactical and special communications skills can be evaluated by performance testing. Again, both specialized tests and many emergency/tactically-oriented performance tests provide opportunities to evaluate communications skills.

G. Assessors may wish to determine whether protective force personnel have the required first aid and fire protection skills, including the ability to operate appropriate equipment. These areas can be evaluated by knowledge testing (including interviews) and performance testing, with performance testing providing the most useful data.

H. Assessors should determine whether protective force personnel can properly perform access control duties, including personnel identification, searches, and operation of available detection equipment. Assessors can determine knowledge of access control procedures through interviews. Observations allow evaluation of application of routine procedures. Performance testing is necessary to determine skills in detecting and dealing with entry attempts by unauthorized personnel, contraband items, etc.

I. Assessors should determine whether alarm station operators can adequately perform their assigned duties. Pertinent data can be collected by observation, knowledge testing, and performance testing.

J. Assessors should determine whether SPOs understand and are capable of applying pertinent laws, policies, regulations, and orders, including those pertaining to the use of deadly force. This data can be gathered through knowledge testing, either written or oral. Oral testing (including during interviews) is usually preferred when trying to determine an individual’s understanding of a concept, because it allows more latitude to get at the depth of the person’s knowledge. The ability to apply policies can be determined only through observation or performance testing.

K. Assessors should determine whether supervisors have the appropriate skills and knowledge to perform their supervisory duties. Appropriate data can be collected through observation, knowledge testing, and performance testing. Assessors can evaluate both routine supervisory skills by observation and tactical leadership skills during performance tests.

L. Assessors should determine whether the appropriate personnel have the necessary skills and knowledge to perform special duties that may be required on a site-specific basis. Such special duties include dog handling, flight operations, explosive entry, and sniper operations. All data collection methods may be applicable to these areas, but observation and performance testing are most useful, with emphasis on performance testing.
Section 6: Interfaces

Integration

Integration involves the coordination and interfaces among assessment team members to achieve a more effective and organized assessment effort. Integration is possibly the most important and productive element within the assessment process. Thorough integration creates a synergism and enhances the quality and validity of the assessment report which, when combined with other unique attributes, strengthens Security Assessments’ overall capacity to provide significant, value-added contributions to the safeguards and security community, as well as to DOE as a whole.

In order to take into account the interdependency of elements of the overall protection system, the integration process between topic teams must continue throughout all assessment phases to ensure that all pertinent assessment data has been shared. This level of integration simply involves an exchange of information among different topic teams and an accompanying discussion of how information developed by one topic team influences the adequacy of the performance observed in another topical area. Information obtained through integration with other topic teams should be included with other information considered during analysis.

The fundamental goal of the integration effort is to ensure that potential systemic vulnerabilities are identified, adequately performance tested and analyzed. The topic team's objectives in support of this goal contribute to the effectiveness and efficiency of the assessment process.

From the topic team’s point of view, there are several major objectives of integration. First, integration allows topic teams to align their efforts so their activities complement, rather than detract from, one another. It would be non-productive to assess physical security systems at one location, control of classified documents and material at a different remote location, and the protective force at a third location; using this approach, assessors would accumulate a collection of unrelated facts. Therefore, topic teams must cooperate to make the best choices regarding what should be assessed at which locations. Early and continuing integration ensures that the activities of all topic teams are unified and contribute to the overall goal.

A second objective of integration is to allow topic teams to benefit from the knowledge, experience, and efforts of other topic teams. Sometimes ideas from one topic team can help another topic team focus assessment activities in a more productive and meaningful direction. For example, the physical security systems topic team may indicate that their planning efforts led them to the conclusion that the physical protection systems at a particular location are weak, resulting in heavy reliance on the protective force. Therefore, it may be useful for the protective force topic team to plan to spend more time assessing protective force capabilities as they relate to this weakness, rather than focusing on other areas.

The third objective of integration is to prevent topic teams from interfering with each other. Often, several topic teams concentrate their activities at the same location, resulting in multiple visits over time or a number of visits at the same time. This approach may unduly disrupt the assessed facility and its personnel. Integration among topic teams can preclude this problem by having one or two topic teams visit a particular location and collect the data for several. All topic teams should be aware of what all other topic teams are doing, where they are doing it, and how it will affect their own activities.

Integration of data collection activities for performance testing is imperative. If the protective force topic team schedules a performance test that results in the prolonged lockdown or evacuation of a building, and the material control and accountability (MC&A) topic team schedules a performance test involving an emergency inventory or transfer of material in the same building at the same time, the resulting problem is obvious.
Integration by the Protective Force Topic Team

A protective force, by its very nature, does not function in a vacuum. It is an integral part of the overall protection system at a facility and therefore must interact with other elements of that system. For this reason, the protective force should not be assessed in isolation. Assessment activities must acknowledge and reflect this interaction to determine how well the required interfaces are accomplished. This requires integration with assessment teams responsible for other areas. Information developed by the protective force topic team may affect how the results of assessment activities in other topics are viewed. Similarly, results in other topical areas may have some bearing on how the adequacy of protective force performance is viewed.

Figure 3 outlines the general scope of the protective force topic and the direct interfaces with other topics and subtopics.

Planning Phase

Throughout the planning phase, the protective force topic team must integrate its planned activities with various other topic teams. Interaction is most frequent with physical security systems, MC&A, information security, and protection program management. Some level of integration with all other topic teams is usually required. As noted, such integration allows the protective force topic team to benefit from the expertise of members of other topic teams, examine deficiencies emanating from document reviews or DOE management, focus assessment activities, and select performance tests.

Once the performance tests have been selected, it is important to discuss those that may have implications for other topic teams. The topic teams may provide important supplemental information to the protective force topic team, desire to participate in the test, or modify the exercise so that both teams can better use the information gained from the test. A further aim of these discussions should be to coordinate exercises. Without coordination, the assessed organization may be overloaded or the test may interfere with the data collection activities of other teams. Finally, some operations may require joint evaluation by members of several topic teams. For example, vault opening and closing and the intra-site movement of SNM usually require the participation of the protective force team, the physical security systems team, and the MC&A team.

Conduct Phase

Close integration with other topic teams is essential during data collection activities. An assessment is a complex, integrated effort, and the onsite portion of the assessment involves intensive, concurrent data collection activities by several topic teams during a limited period of time. To achieve maximum benefit from onsite data collection, close cooperation between topic teams is essential. Therefore, throughout the conduct phase of the assessment, it is important that the protective force topic team discuss findings and deficiencies with the other teams.

Occasionally, tests conducted by the physical security systems topic team directly overlap with tests conducted by the protective force topic team. For example, when the protective force topic team plans tests of badge checks, they must complement the tests conducted by the physical security systems topic team and must not duplicate or interfere with those tests. Also, testing of various alarms and sensors by the physical security systems topic team provides an opportunity for protective force assessors to observe the reaction and/or response of SPOs to normal and abnormal sensor indications.

Another example of interface between the protective force and the physical security systems topic teams might be if site representatives indicate to the physical security systems team that a system weakness at an access portal is compensated for by posting supplementary protective force personnel at that location. In this case, the physical security systems team may ask the protective force team to determine whether the compensatory measure is sufficient to effectively offset the weakness.
Figure 3. Areas of Direct Interface for the Protective Force Topic Team
At most locations, protective force personnel are involved in access controls and physical checks of tamper-indicating devices on facilities or containers. In addition, some sites use protective force personnel as second persons in material surveillance programs. Moreover, the MC&A topic team conducts performance tests, such as missing-item exercises and threat message exercises that normally require a response from the protective force. The protective force is also responsible for implementing procedures for material containment, including controlling access at portals, conducting searches, and responding to SNM alarms. Any of these procedures could be tested by the MC&A team during an assessment. In addition, SPOs are often required to maintain security during MC&A tests, open secure doors and security locks, and explain protective force roles in MC&A.

The site protective force often participates in integrated exercises with MC&A. Examples of these exercises are:

- Mock shipment of SNM
- Testing of SNM and metal detector operations
- Emergency response exercises
- Review of routine duties (observations)
- Material control exercises requiring a protective force response.

Issues raised during these exercises may necessitate changes in assessment focus, additional performance tests, or further document reviews. The bottom line is to consider the impact of every issue raised and its relevance to other topics, and to maintain a flexible approach during data collection activities.

**Closure Phase**

It is imperative that deficiencies involving several topic teams be resolved, that impacts be clearly understood, and that a preliminary decision be made as to how and by whom the deficiency will be reported.

**Interface with Other Subtopic Areas**

Assessors of the protective force Training subtopic must determine whether management provides adequate resources to support training. Protective force assessors must also determine whether management ensures that training is integrated with operations so that training, especially in-service training, is needs-based. If the assessor of the Training subtopic discovers evidence of inadequate support in the form of insufficient equipment or inadequate numbers of qualified training personnel, the causes must be investigated with protective force management.

Deficiencies in proficiency with protective force equipment are usually attributable at least in part to deficiencies in training. Deficiencies noted in the use of equipment should be followed up by an assessment of appropriate lesson plans and an assessment of the training schedule, to determine whether adequate plans exist to teach the material.

Any inadequacies in protective force performance during LSPTs probably have their cause as well as their remedy in protective force training. Assessors of the Training subtopic should be involved in the various components of the assessment involving duties.
Section 7: Analyzing Data and Interpreting Results

Introduction

This section provides guidelines to help assessors analyze data and interpret the results of data collection activities. Information is also included on the significance of potential deficiencies and suggestions for additional activities that may be appropriate if deficiencies are identified in a particular area.

When analyzing the data collected on a particular aspect of the site protection system, it is important to consider both the individual facets of the protection system and the system as a whole. In other words, failure of a single facet of a protection system does not necessarily mean the protection system failed. The assessment team must analyze the failure in terms of the entire protection system.

Analysis of Results

The analysis process involves the critical consideration by topic team members of all assessment results, particularly identified strengths and weaknesses (deficiencies). Analysis will lead to a logical, supportable conclusion regarding how well the protective force is meeting requirements and satisfying the intent of DOE policy. If more than one subtopic has been assessed, a workable approach is to analyze each subtopic individually and integrate the results of the individual analyses to determine the effects of subtopic results on each other and the overall status of the topic.

If there are no deficiencies, the analysis is a simple matter. If there are negative findings, weaknesses, deficiencies, or requirements that are not fully met, the analysis must consider the importance and impact of those conditions. Deficiencies must be analyzed both individually and in concert with other deficiencies, and balanced against any strengths and mitigating factors to determine their overall impact on the protective force’s ability to meet protection requirements. Factors that should be considered during analysis include:

- Whether the deficiency is isolated or systemic
- Whether the protective force, contractor, and/or DOE field element management previously knew of the deficiency, and what action was taken
- The importance or significance of the requirements affected by the deficiency
- Mitigating factors, such as the effectiveness of other protection elements that could compensate for the deficiency
- The deficiency's actual or potential effect on mission performance or accomplishment
- The magnitude and significance of the actual or potential vulnerability of DOE security interests resulting from the deficiency.

Interpreting Results

Management

Most management deficiencies have the potential to reduce the protective force’s ability to accomplish its mission. Lack of adequate supervision, comprehensive planning, appropriate policies and orders, personnel resources, or an adequate training program usually indicates that management is deficient in one or more of its
responsibilities. When assessors encounter problems in these areas, they should devote additional attention to management practices to determine the full impact on protection effectiveness.

Inadequate supervision is usually a significant deficiency and can normally be traced directly to management. Indicators such as delayed review of reports, unresponsive SPOs, lack of essential equipment, ineffective command and control during performance tests, or poor SPO appearance usually signify deficiencies in supervision. The combined effect of these deficiencies may result in the inability of the protective force to provide adequate protection for vital DOE interests. When inadequate supervision is evident, assessors should focus on the programs designed to provide for, manage, and supervise the protective force to determine why supervision is inadequate. Assessors may consider conducting additional interviews with managers and supervisors, reviewing management oversight procedures, examining supervisor qualifications, and reviewing hiring and compensation practices.

The lack of comprehensive plans and orders normally has an adverse effect on the fulfillment of DOE requirements, the ability of protective force personnel to accomplish their assigned duties, and LLEA support during emergencies. Management may fail to adequately consider the threat, understate or fail to consider all site vulnerabilities, or overestimate the capabilities of their response forces in preparing comprehensive plans and orders. Assessors should compare management plans and orders with DOE policies, local requirements, and the site protection strategy to determine whether they are appropriate and sufficiently detailed to facilitate implementation.

The failure of management to provide sufficient personnel resources can result from contractual arrangements, personnel policies, compensation, or other factors. Whatever the cause, lack of sufficient personnel resources usually has a significant adverse impact on the performance capabilities of the protective force. Assessors should review policies and procedures governing personnel, conduct additional SPO interviews, and review contractual and payroll documents when determining the root cause of a lack of personnel resources.

**Training**

The failure of protective force personnel to adequately perform assigned duties can be an indication of a deficiency in training. Problems that appear to be related to training may result from the design of the training program itself or from management’s failure to provide adequate oversight and resources to guide and support the program. Nevertheless, a deficient training program can significantly degrade the performance capabilities of protective force supervisors and personnel alike. Assessors should closely examine all aspects of the training program, including management’s involvement in the program, to determine why training is inadequate.

Frequently, problems in the training program emanate from a failure to tailor the program around complete, accurate, site-specific job tasks. This systemic failure can have a notable adverse impact on a training program's capabilities and the abilities of individual protective force members. When it appears that training material is not in sync with site-specific conditions or individual SPO needs, assessors should examine site documents, such as SSSPs, local directives, training documents, and lesson plans, to determine whether they are consistent with job tasks and training needs.

A tendency to persist in “business as usual” can have a significant impact on protective force training programs. Most effective training programs are innovative, up-to-date, and designed to promote continuous improvement. They normally include interested and talented instructors who focus with enthusiasm on site-specific requirements and individual SPO training needs. Assessors should be aware that some training programs may meet the minimum requirements (mere compliance), but they may not fully satisfy site-specific conditions, site-specific local directives, training documents and/or the potential of the protective force.
Equipment and Facilities

It is important that weapons be appropriate to both the mission and the threat. Changes in mission and threat may lead to the protective force being armed with inappropriate weapons or weapons that are no longer effective against the threat. Such a development can result in a significant deficiency and could place DOE facilities, material, and interests at risk. Also, changes in the site-specific threats or mission may justify the removal of lethal weapons from protective forces. Assessors should be thoroughly familiar with the site mission, threat, and protection strategy in order to determine whether assigned weapons are appropriate.

The absence of adequate communications equipment or an insufficient number of radio channels dedicated to security use has a significant impact on the capabilities of the protective force. One of the most important factors in ensuring that the protective force responds in a timely, coordinated, and effective manner is the ability of its members to communicate. If deficiencies exist, assessors should determine the full extent of the problem (for example, lack of planning, budget constraints, or inadequate replacement policies).

Poor accountability practices, incomplete inventories, insufficient replacement parts, and missing items of critical equipment are indicators of a systemic problem that can usually be traced to inadequate supervision and a lack of management attention. Assessors should consider reviewing the relevant aspects of the management program to determine the root causes of these deficiencies.

Duties

In the Duties subtopic, identified deficiencies often have as their root cause deficiencies in training or supervision or both. If a significant number of deficiencies are identified in a specific area, it may be necessary to determine whether findings in Duties, Training, Management, or all three are appropriate. It is important for assessors to clearly determine the root cause to enable management to permanently address the deficiency.

Inability to properly use assigned equipment generally indicates inadequate training. Deficiencies in such skills as clearing of malfunctions and the proper use of weapon sights can usually be remedied by providing training on the use of the appropriate weapons. Also, SPOs’ failure to operate certain kinds of equipment, such as radiation, metal, and intrusion detection equipment, can be an indicator of deficient training.

Sometimes, inability to use auxiliary weapons may be related to a lack of policy guidance by management that would provide the opportunity to use and test the equipment. Without such guidance, these weapons may remain in storage without being used. Assessors should check management policies to determine whether provisions have been made for an adequate training program and whether the program is functioning properly.

Inability to properly conduct thorough entry and exit searches of vehicles, personnel, and hand-carried items usually results from a lack of proper training or supervision. When these conditions continue to recur, they may be directly attributable to the lack of management involvement.

Failure of the protective force to accomplish its denial/containment mission is a significant deficiency and usually results from a lack of management oversight, ineffective supervision, or inadequate training. Assessors should examine all aspects of the supervisory, management, and training programs to determine the root cause of this deficiency.

Protective force inability to gain control of SNM after a hostile takeover may result from a lack of adequate plans, a failure on the part of supervisors, a lack of management involvement, or a failure to adequately train response personnel in all of the environments they may encounter (smoke, gas, booby traps, etc.).

Inappropriate application of deadly force is usually related to a lack of proper training. Often, the rules governing the use of force are not clearly understood by the trainers or supervisors. It is essential that this condition be corrected through training and strong management intervention.
Integrated Safeguards and Security Management

DOE Policy 470.1A, *Safeguards and Security Program*, formally sets out an integrated management concept adapted from environment, safety, and health assessments. This framework encompasses all levels of activities and documentation related to DOE safeguards and security management.

As part of the analysis process, Security Assessments assessors should review the results (both positive aspects and weaknesses/findings) of the review of the protective force topic in the context of the integrated security management concept. Using this diagnostic process, assessors may determine that a number of weaknesses at a site or particular facility may have a common contributing factor that relates to one or more of the management principles. For example, a series of problems in protective force training could occur if line management has not placed sufficient priority on protective force training and has not provided adequate resources to implement an effective training program. In such cases, the analysis/conclusions section of the protective force report appendix could discuss the weaknesses in management systems as a contributing factor or root cause of identified deficiencies.

Performance-based evaluations focus on implementation of essential standards (DOE requirements that significantly contribute to SNM or information protection) within the various safeguards and security topics and subtopics to determine ratings. However, an accumulation of performance/compliance deficiencies of lesser standards may also impact rating determination.

At the direction of senior EA leadership, the team may use an “Issue Form” to inform site management of significant issues (such as an imminent danger or a major vulnerability) or to convey an emerging issue that may be more clearly or more effectively communicated in writing before the team’s report is developed and validated.

If ratings are to be assigned, the protective force assessment team will use the approach described in the Office of Enterprise Assessments (EA) protocols.
Items 1-20 must be available for immediate use in CD-ROM/electronic format. Classified responses should be provided only in hard copy, not in an electronic format.

Items 21-30 are to be available in hard copy for onsite review during the site visit. Whenever possible, this documentation should be placed in three ring binders and tabbed according to the numbering scheme below. If an item is unavailable, provide a contact name and telephone number for access to the document(s).

Questions regarding the data call for the Protective Force should be addressed to XXX at (XXX) XXX-XXX or through e-mail at xxxxxxx@hq.doe.gov

The following documents should be immediately available:

1. List of managers or points of contact, with telephone numbers and locations, responsible for the following areas: Protective Force Management, Protective Force Training, Protective Force Duties (Operations Manager), Protective Force Equipment and Facilities, and Protective Force Performance Testing.

2. A Protective Force organization diagram with positions and names.


5. Protective Force security emergency response plans (contingency/response/tactical) and memoranda of understanding (MOUs).


7. Most recent Protective Force self-assessment and corrective action plans (CAPs).

8. A current “On-Shift” Protective Force Duty Roster (spreadsheet format) that includes SPO level, rank (if applicable), and weapons used for the period XXX to XXX.

9. A representative sample of knowledge test questions used by the Protective Force Training Department.

10. Protective Force inventory lists of equipment, including vehicles, weapons with serial numbers, night vision gear (NVG), radios, non-lethal weapons, breaching equipment, etc.

11. Currently approved list of Protective Force deviations.

12. CAPs and closure packets associated with the last assessment conducted by EA or its predecessor organizations.

13. Performance test program procedures.


15. Fitness-for-duty assessment process used by Protective Force supervisors.

17. Copy of annual Special Response Team (SRT) program approval letter issued by the Site Office.

18. Current year training schedule.

19. Training Approval Plan Certification/Recertification letter from the National Training Center.

20. Annual performance testing schedule.

**The following documents should be available for review upon request:**

21. Individual SPO qualification records (weapons, physical fitness)

22. ARAPT/no-notice limited-scope performance test (LSPT) reports from the last 12 months

23. Certification records for instructors (classroom and range), armorer, Central/Secondary Alarm Station (CAS/SAS) operators, SRT members, part-time trainers.

24. Individual SPO training records.

25. SPO lesson plans.

26. Job task analyses for all positions.

27. CAS operator annual refresher training lesson plans.


29. Performance test results (force-on-force) for the last 12 months.

30. Sample of supervisor and post logs.
Management

1. Is the protective force organized in a manner that fosters effective mission performance?

2. Do protective force managers have the necessary experience/skills to effectively manage all aspects of protective force operations?

3. Has protective force management allocated the necessary resources (personnel and equipment) for the protective force to be successful in achieving its assigned mission?

4. Has protective force management developed plans, orders, and procedures that provide specific direction to enable the protective force to successfully perform routine and emergency duties, as well as address potential security emergencies? Are these plans, orders, and procedures periodically reviewed to ensure that they are comprehensive and accurately aligned with the Site Safeguards and Security Plan and site operations?

5. Does protective force management ensure that personnel meet established qualification requirements?

6. Does management have a method to monitor/assess levels of morale and discipline?

7. Do supervisors possess the necessary experience/skills?

8. Are supervisors trained in shift operations leadership (including tactical leadership) and management techniques?

9. Do supervisors adequately inspect protective force personnel prior to posting to determine fitness for duty?

10. Do supervisors adequately inspect personnel on post/patrol to ensure that personnel are knowledgeable of the duties they are to perform and proficient in the use of duty equipment? Do supervisors ensure that the post/patrol equipment is functioning properly, and that the orders/procedures at the post/patrol are current and complete?

Training

1. Is the training mission-oriented?

2. Are protective force Training Approval Program certifications current?

3. Has the protective force Special Response Team program been certified/recertified annually as required?

4. Are sufficient resources (qualified personnel and sufficient equipment) allocated to training to ensure program effectiveness?

5. Are supervisors provided training in tactical leadership and how to perform their supervisory duties?

6. Are supervisors qualified to conduct formal training activities/limited-scope performance tests on shift?

7. Do Special Response Team personnel receive adequate training regarding mechanical and explosive breaching, consistent with the Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures?
8. Do protective force personnel receive adequate training regarding the Graded Security Protection Policy and potential adversaries’ characteristics, tactics, and motives, and actions required of first responders to Weapons of Mass Destruction incidents?

9. Do protective force instructors attend at least one professional development course every three years? Is instructor refresher training administered as required?

10. Is there an established process for administering site-specific response plan training?

Equipment and Facilities

1. Is the protective force equipped to effectively, efficiently, and safely perform routine and emergency duties?

2. Are all armed protective force personnel issued equipment that provides an intermediate force capability (e.g., side-handle or collapsible baton or chemical agents)?

3. Are protective masks available for Security Police Officer I, II, and III personnel and Federal agents (i.e., masks must be carried by personnel or be stationed or positioned in such a manner to be quickly donned in support of response requirements without impact to response times)?

4. Are corrective eyeglass lenses worn by protective force personnel made of Z87.1 American National Standards Institute safety glass?

5. Is individually- and post-issued equipment stored and/or carried so that it is readily available in a manner that supports timely and effective response?

6. Does the protective force have a process/procedure for issuing, relinquishing, and destroying protective force shields/credentials?

7. Does the protective force have sufficient appropriate vehicles to perform its patrol and response missions?

8. Does the protective force have adequate and sufficient special equipment and radios to perform its mission?

9. Does the protective force have sufficient suppressive fire weapons and weapons that facilitate neutralization of armored threats?

10. Has the site established appropriate inventory and accountability protocols for the protective force armory/weapons?

Duties

1. Do protective force personnel possess the general skills and knowledge needed to perform routine and emergency duties, if required?

2. Are protective force personnel able to effectively and efficiently operate all equipment assigned to them for the performance of their duties?

3. Do protective force personnel possess knowledge of relevant laws, policies, and orders?

4. Can protective force personnel effectively execute a security emergency plan and respond in a tactically effective manner to satisfactorily address a major adversary threat?
5. Have comprehensive protocols been developed that support the safe conduct of realistic performance testing, and are those protocols implemented effectively?

6. Does the performance test program effectively integrate all forms of testing (no-notice alarm response and assessment exercises, individual and team limited-scope performance tests, and major Engagement Simulation Systems enhanced force-on-force exercises)?

7. Are major performance tests (e.g., force-on-force) conducted in the numbers and at the frequencies prescribed by current DOE policy?

8. Do the major tests incorporate/reflect testing against current Graded Security Protection Policy parameters? Are test scenarios restricted to worst-case pathways as established by vulnerability assessment modeling, or does the testing have the flexibility to accommodate other adversarial initiatives that might better stress the system?

9. Are response plans (including those for fresh pursuit, recapture, and recovery) fully tested during force-on-force exercises?
APPENDIX A

PERFORMANCE TEST PROTOCOLS

INTRODUCTION

This appendix provides a description of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Enterprise Assessments (EA), Office of Security Assessments (EA-22) performance testing program guidelines and protocols, and establishes a framework that supports the consistent planning, coordination, and conduct of associated activities and tests. This program consists of limited-scope performance tests (LSPTs) and large-scale force-on-force (FOF) performance tests. The use of standardized performance tests provides a consistent framework to govern the conduct of such tests in connection with EA assessments. The purpose, importance, and scope of protective force performance testing are addressed, followed by a detailed discussion of the protocols and considerations involved in planning and conducting performance tests.

Performance is the most accurate indicator for a program’s effectiveness, and the protective force must demonstrate that they can perform their emergency duties. EA conducts performance tests to provide opportunities to observe the protective force performing these various functions. The EA performance testing program does not make a simplistic win/lose interpretation of testing results; rather, testing evaluations are predicated on observed performance trends and corresponding criteria that are linked to DOE policy and DOE national training standards. The focused tests provide a more comprehensive approach for assessing performance because it allows EA to isolate and omit performance artificialities that sometimes come into play during engagement simulation system (ESS) supported tests; simplistic win/lose interpretations do not afford that same capability or level of confidence. The insights gained from performance tests are factored into the overall assessment evaluation and conclusions about the site’s protection system or its elements.

The FOF test scenarios are consistent with test objectives designed to ensure the generation of adequate data to permit evaluation of protective force performance as measured against the defined performance standards. For this reason, test scenarios are representative of current threats and not worst case. EA, as a standard practice, will only test representative adversary capabilities during EA FOF assessments. With that said, the EA program will maintain the capability to test the full range of the threat (e.g., single insider to transnational terrorist) to include sensitivity capabilities should there be a demonstrable need or request to do so. Furthermore, the EA FOF test scenarios are not to be construed as site validation FOF tests.

The consequences of NOT conducting protective force performance testing include:

- If emergency duties are seldom tested as a comprehensive total security system, there is a great risk that security staff will become complacent. Regularly testing against the threats described in current policy keeps the protective force from losing its edge and reverting to routine practices.

- Without regular performance testing, a security system becomes static and starts to lose the discipline it needs to apply continuous improvement. Without constant review and improvement, security systems soon become outdated and less likely to defeat the adversary.

- If regular performance testing and assessment activities are not conducted, senior leadership does not have the necessary information to assess the need for where and how to invest resources to improve security. Furthermore, understanding the value of such an investment is limited.
PURPOSE OF PERFORMANCE TESTING

The purpose of performance testing is to support the EA commitment to evaluate protective force effectiveness, in the context of policy, based on observed performance trends during limited-scope and FOF testing that indicate whether the protective force has the ability to accomplish its mission. Additionally, DOE’s policy framework provides the baseline level of protection required by the Secretary; therefore, the EA process provides the capability to interpret protective force effectiveness, in the context of policy, based on observed performance trends during testing.

Given the inherent dangers and safety issues related to performance tests that involve the protective force, the information contained in this appendix emphasizes safety considerations for choosing, planning, and conducting these types of tests. Achievement of these objectives relies heavily on the ability of facility safeguards and security directors and trusted agents to meet shared responsibilities in maintaining the propriety of performance testing information, and the facility’s ability to successfully and safely conduct these tests.

IMPORTANCE OF PERFORMANCE TESTING

Performance testing is critical for a valid evaluation of a protective force. Therefore, performance testing plays an important role in the data collection activities of the EA-22 protective force topic team. A protective force, including all of its elements, exists to perform its designated functions in its site-specific environment. A valid assessment of protective force capabilities requires a more comprehensive approach than simply reviewing documents and other information pertaining to force employment, training, procedures, equipment, facilities, and so on. Security police officers (SPOs) must demonstrate that they can carry out their routine and emergency duties by performing those duties in the actual facilities where protection operations occur. Equipment reliability and suitability must be demonstrated by actual operation in a realistic environment. Some performance can be observed under actual conditions; however, during the course of an assessment, chance does not allow the spontaneous observation of sufficient routine and emergency functions. Therefore, the topic team must stage performance tests to provide opportunities to observe the protective force performing its various functions.

SCOPE OF PERFORMANCE TESTING

Performance testing of a protective force involves a wide range of activities. Activities include both limited-notice and announced performance tests, involving both routine and emergency situations. Tests range from the simple (such as determining whether a weapon is operational or an SPO correctly performs entry control procedures), through moderately complex tests of individual or team tactical skills, to more complex, integrated, ESS/multiple integrated laser engagement system (MILES) enhanced tests conducted in conjunction with emergency management or material control and accountability performance tests. Almost any function that must be performed by a protective force or one of its elements can be tested, including:

- Individual routine and emergency duties
- Team routine and emergency duties
- Suitability of procedures
- Functionality and suitability of equipment
- Planning and plan execution
- Command, control, and communications.

GUIDING GOALS

Several goals that are important to valid, useful performance testing must be considered continuously throughout test planning and conduct, including:
• Realism: To elicit an accurate response, tests must be conducted under conditions that are as realistic as possible. It is often impossible or impractical to test under totally realistic conditions; however, a continuous effort must be made to make tests and test conditions as real as possible (“train the way you fight”) and to attempt to ensure that artificialities have a minimal impact on the outcome.

• Safety: The safety of personnel and facilities is as important as any other aspect of a performance test. No test conducted by EA is important enough to justify serious bodily injury or significant facility damage. However, there is always an element of risk in testing protective force functions, just as there is an element of risk in the protective force’s everyday activities. The challenge in performance testing is to find ways to conduct realistic and meaningful tests in as safe a manner as possible without exposing participants to undue hazard.

• Test the Right Thing: The objective of the performance test must be relevant to the assigned mission of the protective force. The objective of each performance test must be clearly understood, and each test must be conceived, planned, and conducted with the objective in mind.

• Collect the Necessary Data: The purpose of a test is to collect the required data. If a test does not yield the needed data, the time, effort, and money that went into the test are wasted. A data collection plan must be developed, and all test planning and conduct must support data collection requirements.

PLANNING

Planning is important to any performance test. No matter how simple or complex the test, the planners must determine who, what, when, where, why, and how before they can execute the test properly. When compared to other data collection tools and methods, performance testing is the most labor- and time-intensive of all data collection activities, places the greatest demands on the resources of the assessed site, and portends the greatest potential for generating safety or security problems. To ensure that these concerns are minimized to greatest extent possible, the tests must be carefully planned and coordinated prior to arrival on site and up to the moment the test is administered. Most facilities have local requirements and procedures for planning, coordinating, and conducting performance tests. If the local procedures support the objectives of the testing, considerable time and effort can usually be saved by having site personnel plan and coordinate the testing in cooperation with EA. The planning process establishes the foundation for the performance test through identification of objectives, scenario development, creation of documentation, coordination of logistics, planning exercise conduct, establishing safety and ESS controls, and selecting an evaluation and improvement methodology.

The planning considerations described below are comprehensive in scope and will accommodate planning needs for the most complex performance tests the protective force topic team will undertake. For simpler performance tests, some of the planning considerations may be accomplished quickly, while others may not be applicable at all.

The Planning Team

The planning team may choose to plan a test or may require the facility to plan a test in coordination with and using guidelines provided by the topic team. Typically, EA coordinates the various test conditions and parameters necessary to ensure a realistic and credible test environment; however, the assessed site is responsible for conducting testing, LSPTs, and alarm response and assessment tests. Responsibility for conducting FOF exercises rests with the assessed site, because EA-22 also evaluates sites’ ability to conduct an FOF test safely and effectively.

The EA-22 Test Director, Test Coordinator, and safety representative must work very closely with site personnel to convey specific evaluation criteria. During the planning phase, EA-22 agrees to provide any adversaries and MILES and/or associated equipment that the site might require, along with evaluators, attack scenarios, and safety considerations. (All of these activities are discussed in more detail below.) The planning team for each performance test is responsible for devising a test that achieves the stated test objectives fairly and realistically.
The size of the planning team depends on the complexity of the test. At a minimum, the team should include a Test Director, a Test Coordinator, and the site points of contact (POCs) who will be acting as the DOE field element’s and/or contractor’s trusted agents for the test. For most tests, a safety representative is part of the planning process as a trusted agent, but the safety representative usually provides only the safety approval of test plans, rather than participating as an active planner. For more complex performance tests, it may be necessary to include additional trusted agents, and one or more insiders.

The Test Director is ultimately responsible for coordinating with the site and planning the FOF exercises and LSPTs. The Test Coordinator is responsible for Composite Adversary Team (CAT) rehearsal and staging areas, evaluator assignments, and evaluator positions during the FOF test. Both the Test Director and the Test Coordinator work out the planning details with the trusted agents and other site personnel to ensure that the test objective(s) will be met through a fair and realistic test.

The protective force topic team leader must identify the necessary resources and arrange logistical support. If the topic team leader plans to use ESS/MILES equipment or other specialized equipment, he/she must alert the Assessment Team Chief. If the CAT will be needed, he/she must also alert the Assessment Team Chief and the CAT Coordinator to assist in CAT member selection and availability.

Site trusted agents represent their organizations (as illustrated in Table A-1) for the planning details of the performance test; provide site-specific knowledge; and are responsible for personnel, facilities, and logistical support for the conduct of the FOF tests and LSPTs. Each trusted agent signs the EA trusted agent form prior to any involvement or discussions of scenario details. EA retains the original forms and monitors the number of trusted agents, ensuring they are kept to a minimum.

Safety representatives, designated by both EA and the DOE field element, are responsible for ensuring that planned activities fall within acceptable safety limits. Their responsibilities include suggesting changes or compensatory measures that would facilitate both safety and realism. Safety representatives are treated as trusted agents for purposes of scenario confidentiality.

When necessary and appropriate, one or more members of the adversary team may be involved in planning specific scenario events for tabletop exercises.

A Performance Test Schedule, similar to the Table A-2 example at the end of this appendix, is provided to the site to help ensure comprehension of EA protective force assessment objectives.

**Determining Test Objectives**

All test objective(s) must be clearly defined and the evaluation criteria must support achieving those objectives. For every exercise, EA establishes both clear goals and a series of related objectives. The goals are linked to DOE requirements and the site’s security training program. For example, an entry control performance test could test the adequacy of entry control procedures, or it could test the SPOs’ ability to properly apply those procedures. Detailed planning must ensure that all test objectives can be met. Test objectives may focus on such items as equipment functionality, properly sighted weapons, SPO knowledge, and SPOs’ ability to perform specific tasks.
## Table A-1. Roles and Responsibilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Site</th>
<th>EA-22</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Exercise/Test Director</strong></td>
<td><strong>Test Director</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Has the authority and responsibility for coordinating and conducting EA FOF tests and LSPTs.</td>
<td>• During the conduct of the exercises, the EA Test Director is co-located with the site Test Director.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Ensures that test objectives are met during the development of FOF tests and LSPTs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Ensures that protocols are established and maintained during the development and conduct of the exercises.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Ensures that planning details and conduct procedures are agreed upon and support exercise goals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Ensures that test plans and conduct meet EA needs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Works with site Exercise/Test Director.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Senior Controller</strong></td>
<td><strong>Test Coordinator</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Responsible for exercise preparation and conduct.</td>
<td>• During the conduct of the exercises, the EA Test Coordinator is co-located with the Senior Controller.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Responsible for all controller activity.</td>
<td>• Works with Test Director to ensure continuity between assignments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Works with Senior Controller.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Ensures that planning details and conduct procedures are agreeable and support performance test goals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Assigns evaluators to key locations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Maintains trusted agent list.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Primary Trusted Agents/Exercise Planners</strong></td>
<td><strong>Primary Trusted Agents/Test Planners</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Agree upon scenario events, simulations, and other details of exercise conduct.</td>
<td>• Agree upon scenario events, simulations, and other details of test conduct.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The primary trusted agents are the Exercise Director and Senior Controller. (Primary trusted agents are individuals who are directly involved in the development and conduct of exercises, which must adhere to the plan and objectives previously established between EA and the site.)</td>
<td>• The primary trusted agents are the Test Director and the Exercise Coordinator. (Primary trusted agents are individuals who are directly involved in the development and conduct of the exercises, which must adhere to the plan and objectives previously established between EA and the site.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Safety Representative</strong></td>
<td><strong>Safety Representative</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Identifies and mitigates potential hazards and monitors exercise planning/conduct to ensure that accepted reasonable risk levels are not exceeded.</td>
<td>• Works with the site safety representative.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Coordinates/executes adequate safety walkdowns.</td>
<td>• Ensures that test planning and conduct address identified hazards and other safety issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Develops the safety plan.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**Note:**
- The roles and responsibilities outlined in this table are for illustrative purposes and may vary based on specific circumstances and requirements.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Responsibilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Protective Force</td>
<td>Plays the part of the Protective Force during the exercise.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Limited Trusted Agents        | • Accomplish planning and coordination details (e.g., facility managers, Safety Representative).  
                                 | • All other site personnel required to be present during performance tests to comply with site requirements or agreements (e.g., Shadow Force, building managers, emergency services). |
| Site POC for CAT              | • Perform assigned duties under the direction of the Senior Controller. This ensures that the test is conducted safely and according to approved plans. |
| CAT                           | • Plays the part of the adversaries during the performance test.                   
                                 | • After the test, briefs EA on how the scenario played out.                       |
| Evaluators                    | • Assess/evaluate performance during the test.                                    
                                 | • Perform assigned duties under the direction of the Test Director and Test Coordinator. |
| Controller/Evaluators         | • Perform assigned duties under the direction of the Senior Controller to ensure that the test is conducted safely and according to approved plans. 
                                 | • Assess/evaluate performance during the test.                                    |
| Adversaries                   | • Play the part of the adversaries during the exercise.                           |
| CAT                           | • Plays the part of the adversaries during the performance test.                   
                                 | • After the test, briefs EA on how the scenario played out.                       |
| Test Coordinator              | • Perform assigned duties under the direction of the Test Director.                |
| Insider                       | • If necessary, participates as a part of the CAT during planning and, if appropriate, during test conduct. |
| CAT Team Leader               | • Coordinates rehearsals and CAT assignments.                                    
                                 | • Performs assignments as instructed by the Test Director and Test Coordinator.      |
| Role Players                  | • If necessary, play the part of workers or any “players” in the test other than the protective force and adversary team players. Assist as needed/requested. |

Determining Test Attributes

After determining the test objectives, the test planners must select protocols that provide realism and safety, while also meeting the test objectives. This activity involves several components:

- **How to Test:** The type of performance test and specific testing techniques must be clearly defined. The test objective, realism, safety, available resources, and all other applicable variables must be considered in selecting an acceptable testing method. The planner must determine what skill, duty, or function is to be tested, and then devise the best method for testing it. The best way to test is to have the subject actually demonstrate the skill, task, or ability to perform the duty or operate the equipment under conditions that are as realistic as possible.

- **Where to Test:** Test location is important and can significantly affect the realism of the test. Generally, the best location for a test is the location where the event being tested would actually occur. For example, if the test is intended to evaluate the protective force’s tactical skills in protecting the vital areas of a reactor, the test should be conducted at the reactor. An acceptable alternative might be a similar reactor that is offline or shut down. A poor alternative would be a non-reactor building or a facility that does not resemble a reactor. Similarly, if entry control procedures are being tested, the testing should be conducted at actual entry portals, preferably at a representative sample of such portals.

- **When to Test:** The timing of the test also affects realism. For example, when testing night firing skills, it is best to test at night. When testing day-shift personnel on felony vehicle stop procedures, testing during daylight hours is best. When testing entry control procedures, the bulk of the tests should be conducted during normal working hours, including shift change, when most entries and exits occur. When testing an event that would normally take place at a crowded facility, the test should take place when the facility is crowded, not after hours when it is largely deserted.

- **How Many Tests to Conduct:** The number of necessary iterations of a particular performance test depends on the nature of the test and the available resources. The number of tests to be conducted should be determined early in the planning process, especially for complex tests and tests involving large numbers of personnel or use of scarce facilities. However, to better accommodate the identification of trends, multiple exercises or multiple iterations of scenarios should be conducted whenever possible.

Scenario Development

After preliminary decisions on test objectives, location, and time, planning of specific scenario events can begin. The scenario consists of the events that create the situation that will test the subject. The complexity of the scenario is directly related to the complexity of the test. For example, in an LSPT to determine whether flashlights work, the scenario would be as simple as switching on the selected flashlights to see whether they illuminate.

EA develops the test scenarios and directs the overall adversary planning for each scenario. The scenarios are established on the basis of DOE directives and related standards and evaluation criteria that will be applied in assessing tactical response performance. The primary trusted agents from both the site and EA must give written concurrence for each scenario. Every effort should be made by the site and EA planners to resolve impasses before elevating such issues. EA management will resolve any impasses with the appropriate site or program office managers. Officially Designated Federal Security Authority (ODFSA) disagreements involving the credibility of EA performance test scenarios (both at and above baseline threat levels) must be elevated through organizational management levels (up to the Deputy Secretary if necessary) until resolution is obtained.
Scenario development requires the planner to devise and think through a logical series of events that will elicit realistic responses and accomplish the test objective. More complex scenarios, particularly those involving adversaries and tactical procedures, provide a wide range of scenario event options. Planners must choose judiciously among the options to select events that are realistic, within the appropriate threat guidance, and logical (in the sense of the flow of scenario events), and that also fully satisfy the test objective. It is helpful to keep scenario events as simple and straightforward as possible unless there is a specific requirement to include intricate or complicated events.

Simulation

Most performance tests involve some simulation or artificiality, but to preserve realism, simulation should be kept at a minimum. Performance tests involving live adversaries usually require the most simulation, generally because of safety or test control requirements. Typical simulations encountered in protective force performance tests include:

- **Initial Player Positioning**: Adversaries are sometimes pre-positioned in the test area; for example, in Containment Performance Tests, it is common to place the adversaries inside the target building before the test. If this approach is taken, the protective force players must be briefed on the simulated events (through alarm chain, eyewitness observations, etc.) by which the adversaries entered the building. Similarly, as noted above, protective force players may be pre-positioned in their response positions or in a holding area for scheduled release.

- **Snapshot in Time**: The best way to determine initial player positioning and the release schedule is to conduct a limited-notice response test commonly referred to as a “snapshot-in-time” test. Initial player positions are typically assigned based on previous observation of a snapshot-in-time assessment during the planning visit, well in advance of the exercises, that establishes the protective force posture and readiness level. This activity is conducted by the site in coordination with EA and is used to pre-position protective force personnel prior to conduct of the exercise. It also records the actual response time (gear donning) for each responder. Prior to the snapshot in time, EA determines the notional adversary pathways and locations to pre-stage adversaries in places that they could likely have reached without detection (agreed upon by EA and the site planning team members). Using these start points for both the protective force and the adversaries mitigates artificialities associated with either of the forces performing any action that might constitute a tactical advantage before the test begins.

- **Response Times**: To keep all protective force players inside the test area, players who would normally respond from outside the test area must be assigned to a holding area and then released into test play according to a predetermined schedule.

- **Explosives**: Inert dummy explosives and related equipment are normally carried and deployed as actual explosives would be. When the dummy explosives are deployed, a trained controller must verify that they are properly placed, at which time he/she simulates the effects of the explosives (by, for example, throwing a grenade simulator or opening a door or gate), and then assesses casualties.

- **Personnel and Time Limits**: At most sites, more and more protective personnel and local law enforcement personnel would be able to respond as a security incident unfolds. For test purposes, it may be desirable to limit protective force players to a manageable yet realistic number; for example, limiting players to those initially in a target area and those who could respond to the area within 15 minutes. This strategy may reasonably include limitations on the running time of the test so that the protective force players do not have to continue long after more resources would have arrived.

- **Target Material**: If special nuclear material or other sensitive devices are involved in scenario play, other materials or devices of similar size, weight, and configuration are used for simulation.
• Location: If the actual facility or building cannot be used, the test must be conducted at an alternate location. The layout and attributes of the test facility should be as similar as possible to the actual facility.

• Controller Presence/Actions: The mere presence of controllers is artificial, but necessary. At times, controllers must simulate scenario events, such as alarms, explosive effects, and breaching of barriers, or they may have to intervene to enforce safety rules or rules of engagement. Generally, controllers should intervene in test play only when necessary and should otherwise avoid interfering with test play.

• Evaluator Presence/Actions: EA provides a cadre of trained evaluators to measure individual and collective protective force performance against established performance standards. After the snapshot in time, EA coordinates with the site test director on evaluator positions and may also assign an evaluator to maneuver with the CAT to evaluate site personnel assigned as the CAT controllers, as well as observe the exercises from a CAT perspective.

Control Measures

Conducting an orderly and safe test requires the planning and enforcement of various control measures. Some control measures are restrictive, so it is important to strike a balance between the need for realism and the need to control the test. Without being overly burdensome, sufficient control measures should be planned to ensure that the scenario can be executed properly and realistically, the test can be conducted safely, and the Test Coordinator can exert the necessary degree of control during the entire test. Control measures generally apply to both sides, and the desired condition is that the cumulative effect of all control measures should not favor either side. The following are some typical control measures:

• Boundaries: Boundaries establish the limits of the test area. Players are not allowed to leave the test area, and armed protective personnel are not allowed to enter the test area except under controlled conditions.

• Off-Limits Areas: At times, certain areas (rooms, buildings, rooftops, and excavations) within the test area boundaries must be placed off-limits, usually for safety or operational reasons. Radiation areas, construction areas, and rooms where armed protective personnel are sequestered are typically placed off-limits to players on both sides, and are frequently off-limits to controllers and other non-player participants as well. Locations of off-limits areas must be fully explained in the safety briefing, and those areas must be locked (if possible), marked, or otherwise physically identified to all participants. The number of off-limits areas should be kept to a minimum. As agreed to by safety and operational trusted agents, it is sometimes sufficient to caution participants about the hazards in an area rather than place the area off-limits.

• Rules of Engagement: This is a set of fair and unbiased ESS rules of engagement protocols that players on both sides must follow during tests involving live adversaries. The primary resources for this activity include site-specific safety risk assessments and the Performance Testing Working Group protocols for ESS Rules of Engagement. EA supports the use of this protocol as a guide for planning and adversary execution of test scenarios; however, EA remains independent from those practices and depending on the scope and objectives of the testing may establish and use other testing protocols. For more details on specific rules of engagement, see Protective Force Protocols and Rules of Engagement, March 12, 2007.

• Safety Rules: This is a set of safety-related rules that all test participants must follow. There is a fairly comprehensive set of standard safety rules, which are normally modified to accommodate the scope and nature of the specific performance test and site-specific safety requirements.

• Controller Actions: Controllers are responsible for enforcing the rules of engagement, conduct, and safety. They may also have specific pre-planned or spontaneous responsibilities, such as opening doors, passing messages to alarm station operators, releasing responders from a holding area, or assessing casualties.
• Communications: In any test where participants are at multiple restricted locations, reliable communication is essential. The Test Director must be able to communicate directly with all evaluators and either directly or indirectly with all controllers and players. Suitable methods of coordinating with the shadow force or summoning an ambulance, if necessary, must be established.

• Test Initiation and Termination: Conditions for starting and stopping the test must be established. Generally, a test is started when all participants are in place and all safety and other requirements are satisfied. Before the test begins, the conditions and procedures for temporarily stopping the test must be established and briefed to all participants. (Temporary delays should be avoided if possible, but they are occasionally necessary to address safety or security incidents or to implement administrative holds to re-position players during an FOF test.) A test is typically terminated when the test objectives are met or a pre-determined time limit is reached (established and coordinated earlier by the Test Director and the site Exercise/Test Director), but a test may also be terminated because of a major safety or security event at the site, whether or not it involves test participants.

Logistics

Some logistical planning is necessary for even the simplest performance test; complex tests may require extensive and detailed logistical planning. While the trusted agents are responsible for accomplishing most of the logistical tasks, the Senior Controller is responsible for ensuring that all logistical needs have been identified and that the trusted agents deliver the required support. Typical logistical planning considerations include:

• Personnel: The total number and attributes of participants must be identified, including the number of protective force personnel or other facility personnel and who they will be – that is, which individuals, shifts, and functions (e.g., special response team). The number of adversaries and their special qualifications must also be determined, as well as the required number of controllers and evaluators and their sources. Each controller and evaluator must be assigned a position and specific test responsibilities. All participants must be notified of their selection and told when and where to report and what to bring with them. It may also be necessary to provide a general notification to all personnel working in the vicinity of the test area.

• Facilities: All facilities necessary for test preparation and conduct must be identified and scheduled. These would include the test area, briefing rooms, weapon and equipment issue and recovery areas, and adversary training areas (if necessary).

• Equipment: All equipment that is to be used in the test must be identified, including the source of each item and responsibility for providing each item. Normal equipment categories are:
  - Props: Various props are needed for testing purposes. A prop could be almost anything, including false or real badges, simulated explosives, rubber knives, replica weapons, briefcases, furniture, or safes.
  - Weapons/MILES/Ammunition: Total numbers and types of weapons, ESS/MILES equipment, and blank ammunition must be determined. Protective force weapons and ammunition are generally limited to what protective force members actually have available while on duty. Adversary weapons and ammunition are limited only by the threat guidance, what can reasonably be made available to them, and what they can transport. Any pyrotechnics to be used by controllers must also be identified.
  - Duty Equipment: The protective force is limited to their normal duty equipment. The adversaries are unlimited, within reason and current threat guidance. Controllers will need radios, ESS/MILES controller guns, and perhaps flashlights and other items.
  - Vehicles: Types and numbers of test vehicles (either for use by players or for scenario play) must be determined. Also, any vehicles needed for test control purposes must be identified.
- Uniforms and Clothing: The protective force players usually wear their normal uniforms. Adversary uniforms or clothing will depend on the scenario. Controllers/evaluators/observers are issued some form of distinctive apparel, such as a traffic vest or cap. Weather conditions should be taken into account, and cold weather or rain gear should be available, if needed.

- Special Equipment: Special equipment for protective force players should be limited to the equipment they normally have available. Special adversary equipment items must generally be identified early, so that equipment can be located and obtained before it is needed.

- Transportation: As necessary, arrangements must be made to transport all test participants to briefing areas, the test area, and the sites of their specific assignments. Return transportation must also be identified and provided as necessary.

- Food/Drink: If the test involves outdoor activity in extreme weather conditions, either hot or cold, plans should be made to provide hot or cold drinks at appropriate places and times. Depending on the time and duration of the test, it may be appropriate to provide box meals to all test participants.

Safety

Safety must be considered during all planning activities. Safety considerations vary with the type of test activity, but may include general personal safety, weapons safety, vehicle safety, aircraft safety, and availability of medical, fire, and ambulance services.

Every assessment-related performance test that has any safety implications, including most protective force performance tests, requires review by EA and approval by DOE field element and/or site safety representatives. The safety representatives should be involved early and throughout the planning process so that potential safety problems can be solved in a timely manner without causing delay or cancellation of the test.

Standard safety plans and risk assessments exist for various types of performance tests, but the standard plans are frequently modified to accommodate the particular test and the site-specific conditions and requirements. Safety plans are developed by the site in accordance with local procedures. Safety plans are discussed in Appendix C.

Security

During any performance testing of protective force personnel or equipment, the security of the site must be considered. When personnel or equipment are taken off post or out of service for testing, or when personnel on post are carrying ESS/MILES weapons instead of live weapons, compensatory measures are frequently needed to provide for the security needs of the facility. Any test, even a simple one involving only one or two SPOs on post, may require compensatory measures if the test has the potential to divert the attention of on-duty personnel from their normal responsibilities.

For most performance testing, test subjects are either brought in from off duty for testing, or they are relieved from their posts during the testing period; in these situations, other on-duty personnel provide the needed security. For some tests, such as limited-notice tests at entry control portals, any needed compensatory measures must be more subtle, to avoid compromising the test element of surprise. For larger-scale tactical tests where all normal security posts in the test area are manned by players equipped with ESS/MILES weapons, the common compensatory measure is to place armed shadow force personnel in strategic locations in or adjacent to the test area. Shadow force locations must be off-limits areas, and all shadow force personnel must be under the positive control of a controller at all times.
The need for compensatory measures should be determined by the local operations office. Whether they are employed is a decision to be made by the trusted agent or his/her superiors. However, the Test Director/Test Coordinator does have an obligation to raise the question if he/she believes compensatory measures may be required. If compensatory measures are required, the Test Director/Test Coordinator or Senior Controller has a definite interest in what those measures will be and should be involved in their planning. As with any other planning consideration, the goal for these measures is to affect test realism and safety as little as possible. In this case, however, the final decision rests with the site, and the Test Director/Test Coordinator must rely on persuasion, if necessary, to influence a reasonable solution.

**Evaluation**

EA has ten Evaluation Criteria (plus an Aviation section as needed). Each criterion is defined with ten sub-criteria elements evaluated during performance tests. There are two distinct worksheets: one for fixed sites and one for the Office of Secure Transportation (OST).

Each sub-criterion is evaluated on a scale consisting of three performance levels: [1] Does not meet requirements, [2] Adequate, and [3] Highly Effective. Each of the three performance levels for each corresponding sub-criteria element includes a narrative “evaluator example” derived from DOE policy (OST Task Catalog for OST), technical standards, or National Training Center lesson plans. Evaluators use these evaluator examples as guides to maintain focus on the requirement and mitigate evaluator subjectivity.

Before the exercises, the EA Test Director briefs the EA evaluators in detail on the scenarios, test objectives, use of the evaluator worksheets, safety, and administrative information. The site also presents a brief on the protective force response and provides information to the evaluators on specific actions that may assist in understanding evaluator assignments.

EA provides an evaluator worksheet or data collection form to assist evaluators. Examples of evaluator worksheets are provided in Appendix B.

The responsible Test Director must make appropriate plans to debrief all evaluators, consolidate and reconcile their evaluations, and produce a report of the results of the performance test.

**Schedule of Events**

The test plan includes a schedule of events that identifies the time and place for every required major test activity to be conducted on the day of the test. Items on the schedule should include all preparatory briefings or classes, equipment issues, test windows, debriefings, and equipment turn-in.

**Briefings**

Except for protective force personnel being tested as part of a limited-notice test, all ESS participants should receive a briefing on the elements of the test and the participants’ responsibilities. Controller(s) and evaluator(s) must be briefed on the scenario and their responsibilities. Additional briefings include the protective force player briefing, the adversary player briefing, and the controller/evaluator/observer briefing. Each briefing should be prepared by the responsible topic team member and should be tailored to the specific audience.

Protective force players are briefed on the objective and scope of the test, how they will be evaluated, the simulations and control measures they need to be aware of, the allowable weapons and equipment, the schedule of events, the safety plan, and the rules of engagement. The protective force players receive no information about the adversary or about scenario events of which they would not be aware in an actual emergency situation.
Adversary players are briefed on the test objective, mission requirements, simulations and control measures, safety plan, rules of engagement, schedule of events, and scenario.

Controllers/evaluators/observers typically sit in on the protective force player briefing and are then separately briefed on their specific instructions and responsibilities, as well as more complete scenario details.

Planning Documents

The essential results of the planning activities described above are formally recorded in planning documents that are then approved and become official guidance for the conduct of the performance test. The size and complexity of the test determine the degree of complexity and customization need for the planning documents.

Performance Test Safety Plan. The Performance Test Safety Plan is a printed, formatted form that addresses how specific hazards will be mitigated during the test. Appendix C outlines the most common safety-related issues that must be addressed. Any necessary information not called for on the form may be added by attaching additional pages. This form is suitable for many of the performance tests conducted by the protective force topic team.

Performance Test Plan. Large-scale and complex performance tests require a formal plan that provides more detailed information than is included on the safety plan form. The Performance Test Plan, which is normally developed by the site, consists of a basic plan and several appendices, and it should be in accordance with DOE orders and/or manuals. The essential requirement is that the plan must include all necessary information.

Approvals

Before a performance test can be conducted, the scenarios and simulations are approved by the appropriate persons. Generally, signatures are required from:

Site:

- Exercise/Test Director
- Senior Controller
- ODFSA representative
- Vulnerability Assessment Representative.

Security Assessments:

- Test Director
- Test Coordinator.

Coordination

A final word on planning involves the absolute need for coordination. As noted above, planning for some performance tests involves working out many details concerning facilities, personnel from various organizations, large quantities of equipment from various sources, and so forth. It is essential that the topic team test planner monitor the progress of all items that are assigned to the trusted agents/limited trusted agents, coordinate the items that are assigned to EA-22 and its support contractors, and coordinate as necessary with other topic teams.

A Performance Test Planning Checklist is provided in Table A-3 at the end of this appendix to help ensure that all critical areas have been addressed. This checklist is designed for a complex performance test; for simpler tests, many of the entries will not be applicable.
CONDUCT

Although planning is the most difficult and time consuming part of many performance tests, test conduct is no less important. If the test plan is not properly carried out, the planning effort and all other resources spent on the test will have been wasted to some degree. The conduct of a test merely involves the execution of the performance test plan. If the plan is detailed and thorough, the test should run smoothly from a control standpoint, and there should be built-in capabilities to deal with most unexpected events. However, there are still a number of tasks for the Test Director and Test Coordinator to accomplish during test conduct, as outlined below. Tables A-3 and A-4 at the end of this appendix provide checklists for performance test planning and conduct to help ensure that necessary pre-initiation and post-test actions are accomplished.

The conduct phase involves the collection and validation of data obtained during performance testing activities. Although the majority of data collection activity is performed on site during the actual testing, some activities associated with evaluating the site’s planning and conduct of the testing will be accomplished via document reviews and interviews. While on site, EA assessors/evaluators are expected to comply with security-related postings and placards that indicate the boundaries of security areas, as well as rules regarding prohibited articles. Assessors/evaluators are also expected to comply with all information and cyber security policies regarding the use of classified and unclassified computers, and the control and handling of documents containing classified or controlled unclassified information. Conduct includes setup, briefings, facilitation, control, and wrap-up activities. The following steps describe the conduct of the performance test.

Briefings

The conduct phase of a performance test begins with the first briefing. The content of the various briefings, outlined above, varies with the type of test. The briefings are the best and often only opportunity to ensure that all test participants receive all necessary information and instructions. The briefing presenter should ensure that all personnel understand all of the essential information before a briefing is adjourned.

A “briefback” to the Site Test Director and primary trusted agents (target audience is site Test Director and Senior Controller) is typically conducted the day before the exercise and is presented by the CATs. It benefits the Site Test Director by confirming his/her understanding of the rehearsed scenarios and facilitates confirmation that the controllers are properly placed and that identified safety controls are adequate.

Final Coordination

Final coordination of all aspects of test preparation should be made before the test window is scheduled to open. This activity includes ensuring that all necessary participants are present, facility preparations are complete, and all logistical requirements have been met.

Control

Once the test begins, the Exercise Director, Test Director, Senior Controller, and Test Coordinator must monitor test events to ensure that:

- All pre-planned scenario events and injects are executed as planned.
- Controllers are provided necessary supervision and advice.
- Timely decisions are made to resolve any problems that may arise.
- Planned scenario events are adjusted as necessary.
- The test is conducted in a safe manner.
- The test is terminated when the appropriate conditions are met.
Debriefing and Analysis

When test play is terminated, participants should be debriefed. For larger-scale ESS tests, the debriefing may involve the Test Director, Test Coordinator, CAT members, and evaluators. During the debriefing, players and evaluators review the test events. The purpose of this important debriefing is to ensure that all relevant information regarding test events is revealed and understood. The debriefing is necessary to develop a clear understanding of test events, because in many tests, each participant is able to actually observe only a small part of the test activity. It is particularly important to evaluators, who must be able to place their own observations into the context of overall test events.

The analysis phase includes a formal evaluation of the results of each exercise, CAT and evaluator briefings on each individual observation, and an integrated analysis of the information. The purpose of the analysis is to identify the strengths in the site’s preparedness as well as its weaknesses. The following steps provide the basis of an effective analysis:

- Conducting a CAT recap of each exercise. This recap (normally) commences the day after the exercises. The CAT members are not evaluators but simply relay the events that occurred. The target audience for this brief is the EA Test Director and Test Coordinator; however, site primary trusted agents are invited as observers.

- Documenting evaluator observations. Evaluator comments are documented on standardized worksheets and are focused to support key performance factors through causal analysis for the condition observed, e.g., breakdowns in command and control led to friendly casualties. EA-22 also utilizes a test-scoring device (standard in the educational industry) called DataLink (made by Apperson) that scans fillable grade sheets (completed by the evaluators) and compiles statistical data for use in analyzing FOF results.

- Conducting an evaluator debriefing. Evaluators conduct a comprehensive oral debrief intended to provide a clear understanding of test events and facilitate evaluation of players’ actions. The target audience for this brief is the EA Test Director and Test Coordinator; however, site primary trusted agents are invited as observers.

- Reviewing the raw information from the CAT and evaluator debrief, ESS downloads, evaluator worksheets, statistical data from the DataLink, and other possible data sources such as radio/video/unmanned aerial systems recordings. EA-22 analyzes and summarizes the data to verify accuracy and conduct a trending analysis.

Reporting Process

A report outlining the results is written for inclusion in the overall assessment report for the site. The performance testing submission includes findings, deficiencies, strengths, weaknesses, and opportunities for improvement. Specific steps are:

- Drafting the emergency duties section of the report. This draft is written by the EA Test Director and reviewed by the EA protective force assessment topic lead with subsequent validation conducted with the site to relay preliminary results.

- Incorporating the report into the protective force section of the assessment report.
## Table A-2. Performance Test Schedule Example

### Scoping Week
- Badging/specific site training
- Introductions and meeting with site performance testing team and site primary trusted agents
- Review roles and responsibilities
- EA brief to site on assessment process and schedule
- Review evaluation criteria
- Walk down facility/areas (day/night)
- Protective force briefings
- Review of site documents
- Tour CAT rehearsal area, ESS issue area, offices, briefing areas
- Discuss test objectives/scenarios
- Develop scenarios and test objectives
- Continue discussions on scenarios to 80%, recap week, review schedule for next trip.

### Planning Week
- Meet with site to discuss updates and action items
- Discuss scenarios to 100%
- Walk areas
- Start writing scenarios
- Observe site conduct snapshot
- Get with site to review snapshot, assign evaluator positions
- Work on scenarios
- Site review draft scenarios
- Site signs concurrence on scenarios
- Review performance test week exercise timeline in detail.

### Performance Testing Week
- Warning order to CAT
- Detailed planning/rehearsals, link up with CAT controllers
- CAT briefback to trusted agents
- Evaluator brief
- Conduct of exercise
- CAT hotwash, comprehensive evaluator debrief.

### Analysis/Writing Week
- Analyze raw data (ESS downloads, CAT hotwash, evaluator debrief, etc.)
- Trending analysis
- Report writing
- Exercise validation
- Factual accuracy.
Table A-3. Performance Test Planning Checklist

**Planning/Scheduling**

- Identify site’s test director/safety rep/senior controller/CAT and ESS point of contact for coordination purposes.
- Obtain site’s FOF testing plan/procedure; review for thoroughness and acceptability.
- Review the protective force Security Incident Response Plan.
- Conduct day/night tours of site.
- Identify threat level to be tested against.
- View target locations to include initial safety walkdown.
- Obtain floor plans.
- Obtain listing of protective force posts, including protective force weapons/armor/ammunition, etc.
- Identify exercise command structure.
- Identify insider and level.
- Determine whether wounded players will be played.
- Note whether on-duty shift or volunteer overtime players will participate.
- Identify test objectives, scenario(s), and evaluation criteria.
- Identify critical safety concerns, e.g., smoke, contamination, carbon monoxide.
- Issue/collect/file trusted agent forms, keeping the number of trusted agents to a minimum.
- Identify protective force configuration (weapons, personal protective equipment, etc.) and review LSPT data indicating donning time for personal protective equipment.
- Coordinate agreement on the following and communicate to CATs/evaluators.
  - Task/delay times
  - Detection point
  - Use of red herrings
  - Rules of engagement
  - Objects to be used as targets
  - Simulations
  - Access to elevated positions
  - “Snapshot” for starting location of protective force (evaluators only)
  - Whether barriers will be breached or simulated
  - Tag-off process (as necessary)
  - Use of inject vs. actual alarm inputs
  - Whether a player is allowed to take other players’ equipment and/or ammo
  - Terminology of freeze, halt, hold, danger close, etc.
  - Use of smoke/bangs
  - Speed limits/safety requirements for vehicles
  - Contingency LSPTs if needed.
- Obtain copy of Performance Test Plan.
- Obtain written concurrence on scenarios, contingency LSPTs, and simulations.

**Logistical Support Activities**

- Identify and obtain site-specific training and dosimeters for CATs and evaluators.
- Coordinate scheduling of CATs.
- Coordinate radio frequencies.
- Identify and walk down rehearsal areas.
- Ensure safety brief for CATs includes smoke and stun grenades.
- Identify MILES/CAT equipment necessary (including ammo) and arrange for transport.
- Identify dud handling procedure/personnel.
- Issue equipment to CATs and verify that blank firing adaptors and live round inhibitors are installed.
- Identify and schedule areas for briefings, debriefs, briefbacks, etc.
- Identify and assign evaluators, including area evaluators.
- Ensure safety brief for evaluators.
- Identify and obtain radios for CATs and evaluators.
- Issue radios and any special equipment for evaluators.
- Obtain protective force radio for Test Coordinator/Test Director to monitor communications.
### Table A-4. Performance Test Conduct Checklist

**Evaluator Briefing**
- Test objectives and scenarios, including process (e.g., live ammo check, controller calls)
- Schedule of events
- Protective force anticipated actions
- Protective force codes and special call signs
- Evaluator assignments
- Radio channel
- Shadow force response process
- Shadow force locations
- Off-limits areas
- Worksheet instructions.

**Execute FOF**
- Conduct safety walkdown the day before.
- Conduct CAT briefback to the site the day before.
- Communicate danger/off-limits areas.
- Signal for shadow force response (e.g., lights and sirens for freeze).
- Conduct radio check of CATs and evaluators.
- Open performance test window.
- Radio roll call for freeze.
- Incorporate scenario changes based on assessment.
- Ensure adequate controllers for shadow force.
- Ensure that exercise control cell has communications to shadow force.
- Ensure live ammunition search.
- Ensure safe deployment of diversionary devices and smoke.
- Close performance test window.

**After Action**
- Download weapons turn-in data.
- Police area for brass/exercise equipment.
- Conduct “hot wash” and debrief.

**Analyze Data for Trends**
- Brief site personnel on initial comments.
- Conduct summary validation with site.
- Identify lessons learned.
- Finalize report.
## Appendix B: Performance Test Descriptions and Commentary

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### SAMPLE EVALUATOR DATA COLLECTION WORKSHEETS

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#### Force-on-Force Evaluator Worksheets

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INTRODUCTION

This appendix contains generic performance test descriptions for a representative selection of the most commonly performed performance tests for the Duties subtopic. When performance tests are conducted for other subtopical areas, they are usually adaptations of the Duties performance tests. The results of Duties performance tests are always analyzed for their implications in other areas and assessed accordingly.

The generic performance test descriptions follow the standard outline format employed by the Office of Security Assessments for protective force assessments. The level of detail included in each outline is the level customarily required. Each individual outline is followed by a brief commentary, which incorporates safety, planning, and conduct considerations that are not addressed in the outline descriptions. Test and safety plans will be developed by the site, or existing plans may be used. Examples of data collection evaluator forms have been attached for the performance tests that have been developed and are included after the Performance Test Descriptions and Commentary section. Additional data collection evaluator forms will be added as they are developed, and/or as needed.

The individual performance test descriptions are grouped according to the standard subheadings used in various policy documents that describe protective force duties. Some subheadings will contain no generic descriptions, because these represent areas where performance tests are not commonly administered or where the subject matter to be tested is ancillary to that of other areas. In these instances, the commentary discusses the alternative methods of data collection employed.

ACCESS AND EGRESS CONTROLS

Performance tests conducted in this area include identification of personnel (badge check), entry/exit search of hand-carried parcels, and vehicle search performance tests. These performance tests are usually supplemented with post visits to access control points, observation of personnel carrying out these tasks, and interviews with these personnel.

- Identification of Personnel Test
  - Objective: To evaluate the security police officers’ (SPOs’) adherence to specified badge check procedures and ability to prevent misuse of badges to evade access and egress controls.
  
  - Scenario: Two badged employees are directed to exchange valid badges before entering the security area. Alternatively, fake badges containing a variety of errors are employed in attempts to enter the security area. The assessment team will observe SPO performance at this control point before, during, and after these attempts. Such attempts will be repeated using various personnel at other access control points and on other shifts to form a representative evaluation.

  - Evaluation Criteria:
    1) Does the SPO understand and apply the identification of personnel procedures?
    2) Can the identification of personnel process be defeated by misuse of the badging system, permitting access of unauthorized personnel to critical areas?

  - Site Safety Plan: A safety plan will be completed for this performance test.
Commentary

Although these tests are among the simplest of performance tests to conduct, there are difficulties that must be overcome. First, assessors and Composite Adversary Team (CAT) members become well-known faces at access control points. For this reason, the most suitable role players for these tests are regular facility employees. However, care must be taken in selecting these personnel to ensure that their identities are not also well known to the SPO on post. The site point of contact should employ a suitable number and variety of personnel to permit a significant range of performance tests.

A second consideration is that the assessor and the point of contact must be near the test location to observe the test, but their presence tends to raise the alertness level of post personnel and can invalidate the test. Therefore, assessment personnel must attempt to maintain a low profile while observing these tests.

- Entry/Exit Search of Personnel and Hand-Carried Parcels Test

  - Objective: To evaluate the SPOs’ abilities to conduct an effective search of hand-carried parcels while processing pedestrian access.

  - Scenario: The assessment team places items of contraband, simulated classified information, and metal objects configured to represent special nuclear material (SNM) or instruments of sabotage in briefcases, lunch pails, and other hand-carried containers. These props will be carried by badged employees attempting to enter or exit appropriate security areas. The assessment team will observe the parcel search actions of the SPO during this attempt.

  - Evaluation Criteria:

    1) Does the SPO understand the procedures governing search of hand-carried parcels?

    2) Does the SPO make proper use of available search equipment (x-ray or metal detectors) as specified in post orders?

    3) Is the SPO conducting an effective search of a hand-carried parcel?

    4) Does the SPO understand the correct actions to be taken and notifications to be made when discovering:

      a) Contraband
      b) Controlled items
      c) Classified information
      d) SNM
      e) Weapons or explosives?

  - Site Safety Plan: A safety plan will be completed for this performance test.

Commentary

Most of the considerations discussed under identification of personnel tests also apply to the personnel search tests. In addition, great care must be exercised when the simulated prohibited item used during a test could represent an immediate threat to the protective force personnel on post (e.g., a weapon or explosive device). To minimize the risks, these performance tests are halted as soon as the item is detected. Once the SPO has been informed that a test has taken place, he/she may be allowed to continue with the notification portions of the test.
Vehicle Search Performance Test

- Objective: To determine the SPO’s understanding of search procedures and his/her ability to apply these procedures effectively.

- Scenario: An item of contraband is placed in a vehicle subject to search at an access control point. The assessment team will observe the actions of the SPO in conducting the search to determine whether correct procedures are followed and whether the item is discovered.

- Evaluation Criteria:

  1) Does the SPO demonstrate knowledge regarding which vehicles are to be searched?
  2) Does the SPO understand how to conduct a proper search?
  3) Does the SPO conduct an effective search?
  4) Does the SPO understand the proper procedures to be followed when a prohibited item is discovered?

- Site Safety Plan: A safety plan will be completed for this exercise.

There are two specialized variants of this plan for use in particular vehicle search conditions. The first focuses on the discovery of explosives, and the second focuses on attempts to conceal SNM on an exiting vehicle.

Vehicle Search Performance Test (explosives)

- Objective: To determine the SPO’s understanding of search procedures and of procedures to be followed when explosives are discovered, and to determine the SPO’s ability to take appropriate and effective action based on these procedures.

- Scenario: An immediately recognizable simulated explosive device is hidden in a vehicle subject to 100 percent search or random search. The SPO will search the vehicle in accordance with prescribed procedures. If the device is discovered during the search, the SPO will be given the opportunity to make the appropriate notifications. The assessment team will observe the actions of the SPO conducting the search, other SPOs on the scene, the central alarm station (CAS) operator, and the site security commander. If the device is not discovered during the search, the test will be halted and the device pointed out to the SPO on the scene, and the response and notification portions of the drill will then be completed as described above.

- Evaluation Criteria:

  1) Does the SPO understand how to conduct a proper vehicle search?
  2) Does the SPO understand the appropriate actions to be taken and notifications to be made when explosives are discovered?
  3) Does the SPO conduct an effective search?

- Site Safety Plan: A safety plan will be completed for this performance test.
Vehicle Search Performance Test (SNM theft)

- **Objective:** To determine the SPO’s understanding of vehicle search orders, regulations, and procedures, and the SPO’s ability to apply this understanding to prevent theft of SNM.

- **Scenario:** A metal object or container, configured and labeled to represent shielded SNM, is placed in a contractor vehicle (i.e., a vehicle subject to 100 percent search upon leaving the Protected Area). The driver will present the vehicle for search at an appropriate portal, and the assessment team will observe the actions of the SPO at the portal during this event.

- **Evaluation Criteria:**
  1) Does the SPO understand when vehicles are to be inspected/searched?
  2) Does the SPO understand how to conduct a detailed and thorough inspection and search of a vehicle?
  3) Does the SPO understand the appropriate actions and notifications to be made when SNM is discovered?
  4) Does the SPO conduct an effective search?

- **Site Safety Plan:** A safety plan will be completed for this performance test.

**Commentary**

Most of the considerations concerning selection of role players to drive the vehicles during the performance tests are the same as those discussed in relation to the identification of personnel performance tests. Similar care must be exercised in the selection of vehicles that are both 1) subject to 100 percent search, and 2) not likely to arouse suspicion simply by virtue of their appearance.

The explosives variant of this test recognizes that procedures at many sites call for the SPO to immediately report the discovery of a prohibited item to a supervisor; this task is completed by radio at many vehicle search locations. However, procedures also call for radio silence in the presence of explosive devices and for the expeditious evacuation of the immediate area. This variant is designed to test not only the SPO’s ability to conduct a search, but also his/her ability to think clearly when the search uncovers a serious threat.

The SNM theft variant recognizes that special circumstances may apply at SNM portals and also emphasizes the importance of selecting test objects that present a fair test to the SPO, since SNM shielding could come in many innocent-looking shapes and sizes. (See Appendix B, Sample Evaluator Data Collection Worksheets section, for the associated worksheets.)

**ACTIVE SHOOTER**

Active shooter performance tests are critically important because recent history (Fort Hood shooting, Washington Naval Yard shooting, and numerous examples in the civilian community) indicates that an attack by a determined active shooter can occur without warning and in any location, including government facilities where entry requirements are monitored. Adequately preparing the protective force to respond to such emergencies is important because no law enforcement organization will likely have the capability to interdict an active shooter in time to prevent significant loss of life in the case of a shooter who is firing indiscriminately at personnel in the area.
Active Shooter Test

Objective: To evaluate the protective force’s ability to coordinate and execute a response to a direct threat. The second objective is to evaluate the responders’ actions once the shooter has been identified.

NOTE: Due to the inherent dangers involved with this type of exercise, all participants will either utilize mock weaponry (e.g., red guns) or all participants will employ multiple integrated laser engagement system (MILES)/engagement simulation system (ESS) weaponry. No live-fire weapons will be allowed in the play area during testing activities.

Scenario: Testing personnel will select a testing venue that replicates or actually occurs in an administrative building, and role players will be staged in the office environment. A role player will be selected (normally a member of the CAT team) to play the shooter, and he/she will be armed with a mock firearm (red gun or MILES/ESS). The limited-scope performance test (LSPT) will be initiated by a person playing the role of a witness to the shooting. That witness will call the CAS, immediately announce “this is an exercise” and provide information about the incident including the building number and/or location. The CAS will then initiate the protective force response. If the response is slow, the witness will again call the CAS (announce again that “this is an exercise”) and indicate that more personnel have been shot. When the protective force responders arrive, the calling witness will run out of the building. He/she will follow all instructions from the responders and will only provide additional information if asked. Once approached by the protective force responders, the “shooter” will follow all instructions, keep his/her hands in plain sight, and take no threatening actions. The shooter will leave a backpack in the building so that the effectiveness of protective force searches can be evaluated.

Evaluation Criteria:

1) Did the protective force responders use appropriate individual and small unit tactics, techniques, and procedures to respond to the location of the incident? Did a supervisor assume a command and control role, and did he/she devise and execute an ad hoc plan to address the immediate situation?

2) Did the SPOs demonstrate an understanding and apply limited arrest authority in accordance with 10 CFR 1047?

3) Did the SPOs demonstrate an understanding of and apply use of force in accordance with 10 CFR 1047 and the use of force continuum?

4) Did the SPOs demonstrate an understanding of and apply deadly force in accordance with 10 CFR 1047 and the use of force continuum?

5) Did the SPOs demonstrate proper techniques to segregate personnel and subdue/handcuff the shooter and other potential suspects in the area?

6) Were alternate means of communication in place?

Site Safety Plan: A safety plan will be completed for this performance test.

Commentary

A number of variations may be applied in the design of this performance test that will provide significant data on the ability of the protective force responders to perform individually and collectively. For example, rather than one
witness exiting the building, all personnel involved might be instructed to exit together to see how they are handled (the actual shooter might also exit with them). Each person exiting the building should be considered a potential threat and should be controlled, searched, and questioned. Whether one person or a number of persons exit the building, all of them have information about what went on inside. Failure to elicit as much information as possible from those sources would be a significant tactical error. Moreover, the generic performance test described above is not set in stone; any venue could be used. For example, a parking lot might be a place where two individuals are arguing when one retrieves a gun from his vehicle and shoots the other. The shooter in any scenario, when confronted, may behave passively or may raise or fire his/her weapon to determine whether the protective force reaction to a direct threat is appropriate under the tenets of 10 CRF 1047 and the use of force continuum. The shooter may be provided with other weapons (e.g., inert/rubber knives, additional red guns) hidden on his/her person or in a backpack to test search procedures. One or more shooting victims might be staged in the building to determine the protective force response to providing emergency medical services. Team tactics may be tested during entry into the test scenario building to determine whether room clearing and search procedures are adequate.

These exercises provide useful information on individual and team tactics, observation, assessment, and reporting. Reporting can be evaluated by having each participating SPO complete a protective force standard incident report at the scenario site. A comparison of the reports with the actual scenario events observed by controllers reveals the SPOs’ abilities in this area. (See Appendix B, Sample Evaluator Data Collection Worksheets section, for the associated worksheets.)

**ALARM STATION OPERATOR**

Performance testing of alarm station operators is generally carried out in conjunction with alarm response and other tactical performance tests. These tests are supplemented by post visits, observation, interviews, and document reviews. (Evaluator Data Collection Worksheets have not been developed for this test to date.)

**AVIATION**

Aviation operations are tested in conjunction with system performance tests and large-scale tactical LSPTs that require the employment of aviation assets. Further evaluation is conducted by reviewing certification records and other documents related to aviation personnel and by interviewing those personnel. (Evaluator Data Collection Worksheets have not been developed for this test to date.)

**CANINE HANDLING**

Evaluation of canine handling is generally performed by having the handler and his/her dog demonstrate their capabilities to an assessor. With appropriate safety precautions, canine team performance can also be tested in conjunction with other performance tests, such as building entry/clearing and vehicle search. (Evaluator Data Collection Worksheets have not been developed for this test to date.)

**COMMUNICATIONS SKILLS**

Communications skills are evaluated by observation during post visits. Further data in this area is generated during tactical exercises. (Evaluator Data Collection Worksheets have not been developed for this test to date.)

**DEMONSTRATORS**

Although demonstrations have been staged at U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) sites for years, they have generally been known events for which prior planning and response could be coordinated. In some cases, the demonstrators even met with and negotiated a demonstration format with a DOE site that provided the demonstrators with a location where they could hold their demonstration, and perhaps arrange for the symbolic
arrest of several of their numbers (who would later be released). Other demonstrations have not been as peaceful, but a common theme emerged that recognized that demonstrators had the right to peaceful assembly and free speech unless it was accompanied by trespass on government property (or other criminal activity). In July 2012, anti-nuclear demonstrators surreptitiously trespassed onto a site at night, penetrated various physical security systems, and entered a Protected Area where they defaced government property; this incident led to a heightened sensitivity concerning demonstrations and the need for protective forces throughout the DOE enterprise to be trained and prepared for spontaneous demonstrations and attempts at trespass whether covert or overt. Since the July 2012 incident, performance testing of protective forces in dealing with demonstrators has been conducted to ensure to the degree possible that no such incident will occur in the future.

- Demonstrators Test
  - Objective: To determine whether protective force units performing routine patrol functions notice the suspicious activities. A second objective is to evaluate the follow-on actions taken by the protective force once the demonstrators have been detected.
  - Scenario: A number of passive demonstrators (most often role players from the CAT) will attempt to gain access to a property protection area or Protected Area of a DOE facility. Demonstrators will not be armed in any manner, but will be allowed to carry signs and banners, bolt cutters for fences, bullhorns, and anti-nuclear literature. They will proceed to the Protected Area or some other sensitive area of the facility. If detected and challenged prior to reaching their objective, they will keep their hands in view of the responding officer(s) and make no threatening actions, but they may begin their demonstration (e.g., anti-nuclear chants, songs, speeches). If they reach their objective, they will begin their demonstration. If there is no protective force response, demonstrators will attempt to activate an alarm. When they are ultimately detected, they will keep their hands in view and make no threatening actions. Upon detection, the exercise will be announced.
  - Evaluation Criteria:
    1) Did the CAS receive an intrusion alarm? The perimeter intrusion detection and assessment system surrounding the Protected Area must be monitored in a continuously staffed CAS and secondary alarm station.
    2) Was intrusion detection and assessment immediate?
    3) Did SPOs respond to the demonstrators using individual and small unit tactics, techniques, and procedures, and perform appropriate actions to interdict the demonstrators’ intrusion into the area?
    4) Did SPOs demonstrate an understanding of and apply limited arrest authority in accordance with 10 CFR 1047?
    5) Did SPOs demonstrate an understanding of and apply use of force in accordance with 10 CFR 1047 and the use of force continuum?
  - Site Safety Plan: A site safety plan will be completed for this performance test.

When planning this type of exercise, there must be a significantly heightened awareness of the need to establish safety parameters and controls that mitigate any potential for a misunderstanding on the part of responders. Site planners should consider when likely detection would occur (i.e., camera at some distance or in close proximity to a protective force member). It is important to ascertain whether such detection would provide time for positive identification of demonstrators, or if detection would occur in an area that would require a more immediate
reaction and response (in the latter instance, the potential for a safety issue would be exacerbated unless tight controls are assured). It is also imperative that pre-exercise briefings and the safety risk assessment cover the types of equipment that the mock demonstrators will be carrying and the movement routes that they will use. Role players representing demonstrators must understand their roles and should not deviate from such routes for any reason. Role players should be easily identified as demonstrators (using banners, signs, chants, etc.), and their actions should be passive and non-threatening. Announcements that “this is an exercise” should be made using multiple means (radio, public address system, voice) immediately upon detection of the role players. The trusted agent shift commander should position himself/herself in close proximity to the probable location of first detection and should acquire verbal confirmation from the initial responders that they understand that “this is an exercise.”

**Commentary**

When conducting this type of performance test, it is important to assess the level of sensitivity SPO supervisors and SPO responders have for the inherent danger in a demonstration scenario. While the demonstrators may indeed be passive and non-threatening, there is always the possibility that a demonstration is a ruse or diversionary tactic to occupy a portion of the protective force while another element conducts an overt attack in another location. It is also possible that forces are being drawn into a demonstration area so that an ambush can be sprung. Any person(s) not lawfully on a site, no matter what their actual intent is, must be considered a threat and treated accordingly. A great deal of valuable data can be gleaned from this type of performance test. In addition to assessing arrest authority and use of force, search procedures (personnel, backpacks, and vehicles), handcuffing techniques, and segregation of participants can be observed. Other questions related to the scenario can also be addressed. For example, if a single unit initially discovered the demonstrators:

1. Did the unit immediately report the discovery to the CAS?
2. Did the unit wait for backup (or immediately confront the demonstrators)?
3. Did a supervisor take command and control and call in sufficient forces to deal with the situation?
4. Did units involved in the performance test maintain observation of the demonstrators at all times?
5. How effective were communications during the scenario?
6. If the site has a site-specific plan or procedure for dealing with trespassers and/or demonstrators, how closely was it followed and was the response effective in interdicting intrusion into the secure area(s) of the site?

- **Shoot and No-Shoot Tabletop Performance Test**

  - **Objective:** To evaluate the SPOs’ abilities to apply DOE policy on the use of force in a tabletop scenario.

  - **Scenario:** Individually and in a notional tabletop forum, SPOs receive a detailed scenario briefing that includes types of alarms that have been communicated by the CAS and other pertinent environmental descriptors. As the scenario unfolds, the SPO is shown several photographs of adversaries in the context of varying threat levels.

  - **Evaluation Criteria:**

    1) Given a photograph and a scenario briefing, the SPO must correctly identify the appropriate level of force by responding with “shoot” or “no-shoot” for each photograph/scenario within a predetermined time period (two to three seconds).

- **Site Safety Plan:** A safety plan is not needed for this performance test.
This test may also be configured to test the entire force continuum simply by incorporating varying levels of threat. Other than the obvious safety benefits gained when compared to the practical format, this method of testing provides assessors the ability to test a significantly larger pool of participants with fewer resources and within tighter time constraints. (See Appendix B, Sample Evaluator Data Collection Worksheets section, for the associated worksheets.)

**DRIVING SKILLS**

Routine driving skills are observed during visits to roving vehicle posts. Emergency driving skills are evaluated by observation during the course of tactical exercises. Document review may also be employed to check emergency vehicle operator certification training records. (Evaluator Data Collection Worksheets have not been developed for this test to date.)

**EXPLOSIVE ENTRY TECHNIQUES**

The tactical context of explosive entry techniques is generally simulated as part of other tactical exercises. Further evaluation is conducted by interviewing protective force explosives technicians and tactical personnel. (Evaluator Data Collection Worksheets have not been developed for this test to date.)

**FIRST AID AND FIRE PROTECTION**

Document review is employed to evaluate training and certification in the areas of first aid and fire protection. Protective force personnel may also be interviewed concerning their knowledge in these areas and may be asked to demonstrate specific first aid techniques for first responders. Formal performance tests are generally not employed for data collection in this area. (Evaluator Data Collection Worksheets have not been developed for this test to date.)

**IDENTIFICATION, OBSERVATION, ASSESSMENT, AND REPORTING**

The three standard performance tests in the area of identification, observation, assessment, and reporting include two patrol and observation tests (interior and exterior) and the critical asset identification test. Many different variations can be developed from these tests to provide data on identification, observation, assessment, and reporting skills. Many other performance tests (chiefly those discussed under the headings of Individual and Team Tactics and Access and Egress Control) also contribute useful data related to these criteria.

- Exterior Patrol and Observation Test
  - Objective: To test the awareness and capacity for observation of mobile exterior patrols and fixed-post personnel.
  - Scenario: An item of equipment, such as a ladder, is placed adjacent to the perimeter fence, in a location that can be observed by fixed-post personnel or roving patrols. The item will be clearly located within the designated clear zone. A label will be affixed to the item, identifying it as a performance test item and instructing the finder to complete all necessary notifications, clearly indicating that these notifications are in response to an exercise situation.
  - Evaluation Criteria:
    1) Do patrol personnel maintain proper patrol routes and observe irregularities within their patrol areas?
2) Do fixed-post personnel properly observe irregularities within their assigned areas of observation?

3) Do these personnel take proper action and make appropriate notifications when irregularities or violations are observed?

- Site Safety Plan: A safety plan will be completed for this performance test.

**Commentary**

This test is relatively simple to organize and administer. The primary difficulty encountered is the placement of the test object in the clear zone without being detected by non-protective force personnel (which invalidates the test). This difficulty is compounded by the need to run multiple iterations of this test, at different locations and on different shifts, in order to create a representative sample. The most effective procedure for overcoming the first difficulty is to run these tests at the end of the day shift, particularly during shift change operations when the attentions of non-security personnel are focused on other matters, and to have the site point of contact arrange for the item to actually be placed by site construction or maintenance personnel, whose movements near the perimeter area tend to arouse less notice.

This test may be easily adapted to fit a variety of locations other than a Protected Area perimeter, and can also provide useful information on equipment (for example, effectiveness of perimeter lighting or the capability of night-vision devices) and facilities (fields of observation from fixed posts).

- **Critical Asset Identification**

  - Objective: To evaluate critical asset identification capabilities of individual protective force personnel.

  - Scenario: Protective force personnel are required to identify photographs of authentic critical assets, which are intermingled among numerous other photographs of spurious nuclear weapons components, nuclear devices, SNM, or other material resembling critical assets stored at the respective site. The test should not be limited to identification, but should also require personnel to identify likely storage locations and indicators for unauthorized movements/shipments of critical assets.

  - Evaluation Criteria:

    1) Are protective force personnel able to quickly identify critical assets?
    2) Are protective force personnel familiar with likely storage locations of critical assets?
    3) Are protective force personnel able to identify indicators of unauthorized movements/shipments of critical assets (e.g., lack of specified paperwork or dispatch to a particular type of alarm)?

  - Site Safety Plan: A safety plan is not needed for this performance test.

**Commentary**

This test is relatively simple to organize and administer. The primary difficulty encountered is displaying all photographs in a manner that does not indicate which photographs are false. This difficulty is compounded by the fact that many photographs of critical assets are classified. One method of circumventing this obstacle is to place all photographs in identical document protectors and place opaque tape over portions of the document protector where classification markings are visible. This performance test may be employed as part of a larger “shift
“readiness” performance test, which typically includes numerous, easily administered performance tests where a representative sample of the protective force is selected for participation.

INDIVIDUAL AND TEAM TACTICS

The performance tests discussed in this section include duress response, alarm response, containment operations, denial operations, and building entry/clearing. These performance tests can be performed on a very limited scale, may be made more elaborate, or combined to create large-scale exercises that test a broad range of protective force capabilities (with appropriate planning and coordination). Limited-scale duress response and alarm response tests are frequently run as limited-notice tests. Tests involving an adversary element are generally ESS/MILES enhanced and therefore subject to the standard ESS/MILES safety plans and rules of engagement. Individual and team tactics tests represent an extremely useful and flexible set of assessments that can yield worthwhile data in this area and in many other Duties areas.

- Duress Response Test
  - Objective: To determine whether the CAS operator is able to perform required response functions and whether the protective force can conduct an effective response, using sound individual and team tactics.
  
  - Scenario: The assessment team initiates a limited-notice duress test by having an on-duty SPO activate his/her duress instrument for any variety of reasons. Receipt of the duress alarm, reporting, and dispatch of protective forces will be monitored at the CAS. Actions of the responding forces will be evaluated at the scene.
  
  - Evaluation Criteria:
    1) Is the CAS properly monitored?
    2) Is dispatch of security patrols prompt?
    3) Are protective force communications effective?
    4) Are proper individual and team tactics demonstrated?

  - Site Safety Plan: A safety plan will be completed for this performance test.

Commentary

Properly conducted, even a small-scale, limited-resource duress response test can yield data on a wide range of areas such as command and control; alarm station operation; individual tactics; team tactics; communications; and observation, assessment, and reporting. The use of an on-duty SPO obviates the need for additional role players, yet gives responders something concrete to assess (for example, do they observe the SPO slumped at his/her post, do they attempt to raise him/her on the radio, what conclusions do they draw?). Depending on response procedures at the site and additional scenario inputs, the test can also drive a broader range of tactical actions.

It is vital to stress that both the initial duress alarm and all subsequent communications be accompanied by appropriate notification that these are exercise-related activities. It is also necessary to ensure that appropriate response exercise safety procedures are carefully reviewed for each oncoming shift during the period in which test exercises are to be conducted.
• Alarm Response Performance Test

- **Objective:** To evaluate the ability of the protective force to respond to an alarm in a safe, effective manner.

- **Scenario:** An alarm will be activated by a trusted agent. When the alarm annunciates at the CAS, the CAS operator will be advised by a controller that a test is taking place. Alternatively, the controller at the CAS may simply advise the CAS operator to dispatch patrols to an interior motion alarm within a critical structure as a scenario input. The CAS operator will initiate alarm procedures (with an accompanying notification that this is a drill). The protective force will then respond in accordance with established procedures.

- **Evaluation Criteria:**

  1) Is the alarm received by the CAS?

  2) Is the alarm processed in a timely manner?

  3) Did protective force personnel don tactical equipment prior to response?

  4) Do protective force personnel use proper individual and team tactics?

  5) Are the numbers of responding personnel adequate and is their response timely (as indicated in the response plan)?

  6) Is the alarm adequately assessed before being reported as cleared?

  7) If the alarm was an interior motion alarm, did protective force personnel fully attempt to identify possible breach points (i.e., breach points through walls to avoid causing a door alarm)?

- **Site Safety Plan:** A safety plan will be completed for this performance test.

**Commentary**

Regardless of how the alarm is initiated, the Duress Response and Alarm Response performance tests have few significant differences, mostly involving the scale of the tests. In small-scale, limited-notice versions, there will be no role player (which is a positive safety factor). In larger-scale, ESS/MILES-enhanced tests, CAT role players may be used.

Other considerations are noted in the Commentary section under Duress Response.

• Building Entry/Clearing Performance Test

- **Objective:** To evaluate the effectiveness of the special response team in planning and executing a building entry and clearing operation.

- **Scenario:** In a simulated containment situation, the special response team is required to plan and execute a building entry and clearance mission against a simulated adversary force.
Evaluation Criteria:

1) Are command and control effective?
2) Are planning and coordination effective?
3) Are individual and team tactics conducted as trained?
4) Are individual and team tactics effective?

Site Safety Plan: A safety plan will be completed for this performance test.

Commentary

When this test is conducted as a standalone performance test, adversary elements are pre-positioned within the designated building, and protective force personnel begin from established containment positions around the building. When conducted as part of a sequence of Alarm Response/Containment/Building Clearing tests, the action may be allowed to flow in a less structured manner, although adversary elements must eventually barricade themselves in the target location to drive the scenario to the building entry stage. Building Entry/Clearing tests should be performed with active adversaries and ESS/MILES enhancement. This test yields data for a wide variety of areas other than individual tactics. (See Appendix B, Sample Evaluator Data Collection Worksheets section, for the associated worksheets.)

KNOWLEDGE OF LAWS, POLICIES, REGULATIONS, AND ORDERS

Knowledge of laws, policies, regulations, and orders is generally evaluated by observation during performance testing in other areas and during post visits. Interviews and written knowledge tests are also employed. (Evaluator Data Collection Worksheets have not been developed for this test to date.)

MARITIME

Maritime operations are tested in conjunction with system performance tests and large-scale tactical LSPTs that require the employment of maritime assets. Further evaluation is conducted by reviewing certification records and other documents of maritime personnel and by interviewing these personnel. (Evaluator Data Collection Worksheets have not been developed for this test to date.)

PLANNING TACTICAL ASSAULTS

The Planning Tactical Assaults area is evaluated as part of the various tactical exercises described in this appendix, supplemented by observation and interviews with shift supervisors and tactical team leaders. (Evaluator Data Collection Worksheets have not been developed for this test to date.)

PRECISION RIFLEMAN/OBSERVER TEAMS

Tactical criteria for assessing precision rifleman/observer teams involve observing the participation of these teams in tactical exercises. The marksmanship capabilities of these teams will be evaluated in an appropriate range environment, under the guidelines described in the Weapons-Related Skills section of this appendix. (Evaluator Data Collection Worksheets have not been developed for this test to date.)

SUPERVISORY SKILLS

Supervisory skills are evaluated using document reviews, interviews, and observation. Supervisory skills are also demonstrated during many of the performance tests described under Individual and Team Tactics and Access and Egress Control.
• Command and Control Tabletop Exercise

- Objective: To evaluate the notional command and control capabilities of protective force supervisors and other first responders to direct assets and implement site plans for a given security incident.

- Scenario: An evaluator will begin by reviewing objectives as well as detailed scenario scripts for a chemical attack, recapture/recovery of SNM, emergency evacuation, or similar incident with the two designated site controllers. Each site controller will then brief his/her personnel in separate locations. One site controller will brief the Command and Control element; this site controller will have a protective force radio and landline, and will be situated in the actual Command and Control room/area. If that is not possible, the site controller will be located in a notional tabletop forum, where he/she will be arranged around a sand/terrain table mock-up of site facilities and/or detailed facility maps. The site controller will be instructed to respond to calls from the protective force radio and/or landline. The second controller will brief his/her role players, who will portray and relay the actions of the protective force, CAS, and adversaries. The second controller will be located in a separate room and communicate to the Command and Control element via handheld radios and/or landline. As the scenario unfolds, scripts will include types of alarms that have been communicated by the CAS and other pertinent environmental descriptors that require an escalating level of response. The Command and Control element will be provided with key elements of information that involve specific response actions noted in site incident response plans. The participants should only be permitted a short amount of response time to realistically articulate response actions, issue orders, make notifications, deploy the protective force, and request information and intelligence, as appropriate. The Command and Control element should utilize the facility maps, plotting boards, and/or a sand table mock-up to illustrate response actions.

- Evaluation Criteria:
  1) Are participants able to quickly articulate required/appropriate response actions?
  2) Are participants familiar with associated plans, procedures, and memoranda of understanding?
  3) Are participants able to collectively execute response plans and/or formulate appropriate solutions?
  4) Are site test controllers refraining from coaching test participants?

- Site Safety Plan: A safety plan is not needed for this performance test.

Commentary

This test may be repeated with scenario variations to test many different responses. Reviewing a variety of response procedures and vulnerability assessments, and identifying specific actions required for a given incident will assist in the development of challenging scenarios. Great care should be taken to ensure that participants act independently and are not prompted or influenced to act upon the scenario injects. A comparison of test results with the actual events observed by controllers during the force-on-force exercise yields valuable data concerning the overall command and control capabilities of the protective force.

USE OF INDIVIDUAL SPECIAL PURPOSE AND DUTY EQUIPMENT

Typical performance tests in this area simply require that protective force personnel demonstrate the required skill in operating the specified items of equipment. Much performance testing in this area can be achieved indirectly
from exercises in the Individual and Team Tactics and Access and Egress Control areas. (Examples would include the employment of night-vision devices in tactical exercises or the use of metal detectors during search tests.) More systematic evaluation of the abilities of protective force personnel to use this equipment is usually conducted as part of post visits, with the individual SPO being interviewed concerning his/her knowledge of the use of the equipment and being observed demonstrating his/her understanding of the equipment. One such example is the Donning of Tactical Equipment Performance Test.

- **Donning of Tactical Equipment Performance Test**
  
  - **Objective:** To evaluate the speed and proficiency with which protective force personnel are able to don tactical equipment.
  
  - **Scenario:** During a two-part, timed exercise, protective force personnel are required to don tactical equipment from the same configuration as equipment normally available on post/patrol. Part one typically includes donning equipment such as body armor and a tactical vest with additional magazines, and assuming a low-ready position with the primary firearm. Part two of the timed exercise entails donning and clearing the chemical protective mask, and assuming a low-ready position with the primary firearm.
  
  - **Evaluation Criteria:**
    
    1) Are personnel able to easily and rapidly don tactical equipment?
    
    2) What are the time requirements for personnel to don tactical equipment and assume a low-ready position with the primary firearm?
    
    3) What are the time requirements for personnel to don and clear the chemical protective mask and assume a low-ready position with the primary firearm?

  - **Site Safety Plan:** A safety plan will be completed for this performance test.

*Commentary*

This performance test may be performed as part of a comprehensive shift readiness test or during post/patrol visits. Due to the obvious safety considerations and as a proactive safety measure, a training aid may be utilized in lieu of actual firearms. The data collected as part of the test provides realistic equipment donning timelines for protective forces, which may be used to supply appropriate delay times during force-on-force exercises. (Evaluator Data Collection Worksheets have not been developed for this test to date.)

**WEAPONS-RELATED SKILLS**

Numerous performance tests can be used to assess weapons-related skills; however, most tests are variations on a single theme, which is summarized in the firearms proficiency test outlined below. Many of the criteria in this area relate to skills such as weapons handling and target identification, which can be tested without the use of live fire. Additionally, many of the Individual and Team Tactics performance tests can provide data relating to weapons-related skills criteria.

- **Firearms Proficiency Test**
  
  - **Objective:** To evaluate the ability of the protective force to meet DOE-established firearms proficiency standards.
- Scenario: A representative sample of SPOs is selected to fire the DOE-approved courses of fire for the firearms employed by the protective force. Shooters will be under the direction of site firearms instructors and range safety officers. The courses of fire will consist of the DOE-approved day- and/or low-light handgun/rifle courses. Other specialty firearms may be performance tested in the same manner (e.g., machineguns, grenade launchers).

- Evaluation Criteria:

  1) Is the range operated in accordance with accepted safety procedures?
  2) Do the instructors manage the qualification course in an appropriate and effective manner?
  3) Are shooters capable of passing the qualification course?

- Site Safety Plan: A safety plan will be completed for this performance test. The performance test will be conducted in accordance with all site-approved range safety procedures.

Commentary

This basic performance test outline is adaptable to virtually all live-fire LSPTs. The outline appears very simple, almost cursory, but it fully expresses the most important underlying premises for these performance tests. First, assessors, no matter how qualified, do not supervise shooters. Supervision is provided by the site’s qualified firearms instructors, who are most familiar with the facilities and whose terminology is that with which the shooters are most familiar. Second, the course of fire is one for which the shooters have been trained. Acting upon these premises should eliminate any controversy about safety, provided the site itself is currently operating a safe firearms training program. If assessors have any doubt about the safety of the test, no firearms testing should be performed.

This approach also permits the performance test to serve data collection needs in the Training area, as well as weapons-related skills under the Duties area. If shooters cannot meet the site’s own approved standard, there is reasonable evidence of a training problem.

The outline can also be adapted to courses of fire other than qualification-type courses. For example, the test outline can also be used in the case of live-fire “stress” courses, obstacle courses, tactical live-fire exercises, or other specialized courses of fire. Since these courses are not standardized at most DOE facilities, course development and detailed safety plans must be developed in conjunction with site firearms instructors and safety personnel. As in all live-fire activities, safety is the highest priority. (Evaluator Data Collection Worksheets have not been developed for this test to date.)
EVALUATION CRITERIA

Evaluation of protective force performance during performance tests is normally based on the requirements of U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) policies, the Code of Federal Regulations (CFRs), the United States Code (USC), as well as other applicable documents and site-specific requirements.

EVALUATOR WORKSHEETS

It is often helpful, even necessary, to develop Evaluator Worksheets to assist evaluators in recording, analyzing, and evaluating performance. These worksheets are particularly useful for complex performance tests and those that employ numerous evaluators. Worksheets help to ensure that all evaluators know which criteria are applicable to the specific test and assist in achieving complete evaluation coverage. This appendix provides examples of Evaluator Worksheets currently in use. As previously noted, not all assessment activities have a specific worksheet developed for all testing iterations, primarily due to the infrequency of some testing activities and site-specific testing. Assessors should develop Evaluator Worksheets prior to conducting some of these less common testing activities.

Once the appropriate evaluation criteria and associated requirements have been identified for a particular performance test, it is a simple matter to construct an Evaluator Worksheet. Evaluator Worksheets may be constructed for any type of performance test.

The Evaluator Worksheets provided here are for two types of evaluations of protective force performance:

- Limited-notice performance tests (LNPTs)/limited-scope performance tests (LSPTs)
- Full-scale force-on-force exercises.

The worksheets for the LNPTs/LSPTs are marked with “Trusted Agent Information - Do Not Disseminate.” It is imperative that all worksheets are appropriately protected so that only evaluators and specific site trusted agents have prior information as to what, when, and how these and other tests are administered.

The worksheets for the force-on-force exercises are marked with “When Filled in Handle as Secret Draft/Working Paper.” As with the LNPTs/LSPTs, it is imperative that all worksheets are appropriately protected so that only evaluators and specific site trusted agents have prior information as to what, when, and how these and other tests are administered.
**Task:** Respond to an active shooter

**Condition:** As members of a protective force and given issued equipment and routine conditions, respond to a direct threat (active shooter) at a known location.

**Standards:** Personnel must appropriately respond to (locate and contain and/or neutralize) an active shooter. Effective completion of performance objectives 1-5 (bolded below) represents the minimum standard for response to an active shooter.

## Evaluation Criteria and Related Criteria:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EVALUATION CRITERIA (and other information)</th>
<th>Meets requirement</th>
<th>Does not meet requirement</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Did security police officers (SPOs) respond using individual and small unit/team tactics, techniques, and procedures to respond to and assess alarm announcements (or other indications of intrusion), and implement containment, denial, recapture, recovery, and pursuit strategies? [DOE O 473.3A, Attachment 2, Section F, Paragraph 1.e.]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Did SPOs demonstrate an understanding and apply limited arrest authority in accordance with 10 CFR 1047 and Title 42 USC 2201(k), the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 161k?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Did SPOs demonstrate an understanding and apply use of force in accordance with 10 CFR 1047 and the use of force continuum?</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Did SPOs demonstrate an understanding and apply deadly force in accordance with 10 CFR 1047 and the use of force continuum?</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Were alternative means of communication in place? [DOE O 473.3A, Attachment 3, Section C., Chapter III., Paragraph 1.b.(3)]</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**RELATED CRITERIA (and other information)**

Reference: DOE NTC TRF-100 Lesson 64: Direct Threat Tactics, Version 2.0, last modified 4/05/13, and DOE NTC TRF-100D Lesson 28: Crime Scene Preservation, Version 2.0, last modified 4/14/11

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RELATED CRITERIA (and other information)</th>
<th>Meets requirement</th>
<th>Does not meet requirement</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Did the central alarm station (CAS) receive information about an active shooter and dispatch units in a timely manner?</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Was the caller kept on the phone to continue to pass on information?</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Did first responders on scene take immediate action?</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Did CAS continue to pass situational information to responding patrols?</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Did protective force personnel don tactical equipment and bring necessary equipment to respond?</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Was the protective force supervisor dispatched to the incident location and did he/she assume command and control?</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Was an inner and outer perimeter established?</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Were personnel evacuated from the area or otherwise protected?</td>
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<tr>
<td>9. Were on-scene witnesses searched and questioned (number of suspects, types of weapons, location, number of victims)?</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>10. Did command and control send in an immediate action team (response must use speed, security, and violence of action)?</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11. Was building entry and tactical movement conducted directly to the immediate area of the active shooter (bypassing rooms and victims to rapidly engage the threat)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Were the five rules of clearing a room performed, i.e., 1) through the doorway, 2) clear your near corner, 3) run the walls, 4) clear to center, 5) communicate?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Did protective forces communicate instructions to shooter?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Was the shooter apprehended in a timely fashion?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Was the shooter segregated, secured (handcuffed), and searched?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Were the shooter’s backpacks (equipment) separated and searched?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Was unknown equipment (backpacks) treated as possible explosive devices (visually inspect, cease radio use, mark and report location, do NOT touch)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Was a local law enforcement agency/Federal law enforcement agency contacted (simulated)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Was a search initiated for additional shooters? Was the area and building cleared?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Were emergency medical resources requested and medical attention provided for victims?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Were provisions made to secure the crime scene (secure evidence of value, avoid contamination, protect area)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Is there a site-specific procedure for response to an active shooter and is it followed?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Sequence of Activity:

The first objective of this LSPT is to evaluate the protective force’s ability to coordinate and execute a response to a direct threat. A second objective is to evaluate the responders’ actions once the active shooter has been identified. Role players will be staged in an administrative building where the LSPT will be conducted. The LSPT will be initiated by a person playing the role of a witness to the shooting. This person will contact the CAS, immediately announce that this is an exercise, and then provide information about the incident, including the building location. If the response does not appear timely, in order to expedite a response, the individual (witness/role player) will call the CAS again, announce that this is an exercise, and state that additional personnel have been shot. When protective force units arrive, the reporting individual will run out of the building. He/she will follow all instructions from responders and only provide additional information if asked. Once approached by protective force responders, the “shooter” will follow all instructions, keep his/her hands in view, and make no threatening actions. The “shooter” will leave an empty backpack in the building so that the effectiveness of protective force searches can be evaluated.

### Evaluation (explanation of why the requirements were not met/identify trends):

____________________________________________________________________________________

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____________________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________________
Safety Review/Risk Assessment: Office of Security Assessments evaluators will coordinate with site trusted agents/safety personnel to obtain a site-developed risk assessment. Typical considerations and/or safety controls include informing a shift supervisor of this test immediately prior to its start. Since the shift supervisor is in the officer’s chain of command, he/she would be able to confirm to the officer that an LSPT is being conducted and that the officer should follow appropriate operating procedures. The CAS will make an announcement over the radio “this is an exercise” prior to protective force response and receive confirmation from the responding forces. The trusted agent will be in communication with the test controller, who will be in communication with protective force operations so that the exercise can be cancelled if necessary. This will be a limited-notice LSPT, so controllers/evaluators will not be wearing safety vests and will not be in the area of the LSPT until after it is announced.

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**Trusted Agent Information Do Not Disseminate**

**ARAPT Limited-Scope Performance Test (LSPT)**

**Data Collection Form**

**Task:** Conduct an alarm response and assessment performance test (ARAPT)

**Condition:** As members of a protective force and given issued equipment, routine conditions, and an alarm

**Standards:** Personnel must appropriately respond to an alarm. Effective completion of performance objectives 1-3 (bolded below) represents the minimum standard for ARAPT response conduct.

**Evaluation Criteria and Related Criteria:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EVALUATION CRITERIA (and other information)</th>
<th>Meets requirement</th>
<th>Does not meet requirement</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Was the ARAPT conducted with no prior notice to evaluate protective force response to a specific location under alarm protection (e.g., a building, vault/vault-type room, or other area that has a site-specific security interest identified in the SSP)? [DOE O 473.3A, Annex 2, Paragraph 1.b.(1)]</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Was protective force readiness and response to alarm conditions evaluated? Did tests consider all aspects of response including communications, personal protective measures, equipment availability and serviceability, and any protective force and facility coordination activities that may be necessary to mitigate a security incident? [DOE O 473.3A, Annex 2, Paragraph 1.b.(2)]</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Was the ARAPT coordinated with facility representatives and trusted agents to ensure that safety requirements were fulfilled, security was not compromised, and operational disruption was minimized? Were protective force personnel advised of the test, were handguns holstered, and were any auxiliary weapons maintained without a round in the chamber? [DOE O 473.3A, Annex 2, Paragraph 1.b.(3)]</td>
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</table>

**RELATED CRITERIA** (and other information)

Reference: DOE NTC TRF-100, Lesson 45: Patrol Techniques and Tactics; Lesson 46: Individual and Team Tactical Movement; Lesson 52: Containment Strategies and Operations; Lesson 58: Denial Strategies and Operations (all last modified 4/05/13)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RELATED CRITERIA (and other information)</th>
<th>Meets requirement</th>
<th>Does not meet requirement</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Did the protective force respond to the proper location?</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Did the central alarm station (CAS)/secondary alarm station (SAS) provide conditions at the alarm point utilizing video assessment?</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Was the protective force response timely? Was the protective force response performed in accordance with site timelines?</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Did protective force personnel don tactical equipment prior to response?</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Did responders use effective individual tactics and team tactics during their approach to the alarm location?</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Did responders use terrain to conceal their approach routes?</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Did the protective force supervisor provide clear direction?</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Were overall communications effective?</td>
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<tr>
<td>9. Was containment/denial established?</td>
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<tr>
<td>10. Is there a site-specific procedure for conducting an ARAPT and was it followed?</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Sequence of Activity: The objective is to evaluate protective force readiness and response to alarm conditions. A trusted agent will be in position to generate an alarm at a set location. Upon the trusted agent’s discretion, he/she will don a controller vest and generate the alarm. As soon as the CAS broadcasts the alarm, the ARAPT will be announced by a predesignated trusted agent. Other evaluators will be pre-positioned in the vicinity of expected responses and don their vests as soon as the ARAPT is announced. Alternatively, the test can be initiated by way of a cue card to the CAS/SAS operator stating the ARAPT and the alarm location.

Evaluation (explanation of why the requirements were not met/identify trends):
____________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________

Safety Review/Risk Assessment: Office of Security Assessments evaluators will coordinate with site trusted agents/safety personnel to obtain a site-developed risk assessment. Typical considerations and/or safety controls include an announcement of the ARAPT by the CAS when the alarm point is initially broadcast and informing a shift supervisor of this test immediately prior to its start. Since the shift supervisor is in the officers’ chain of command, he or she would be able to confirm to the officers that an ARAPT is being conducted and that officers should follow appropriate operating procedures. The trusted agent will be in communication with the test controller, who will be in communication with protective force operations so that the exercise can be cancelled if necessary.

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## Trusted Agent Information Do Not Disseminate

### Call-in Plan Limited-Scope Performance Test (LSPT)

#### Data Collection Form

**Task:** Conduct a site protective force call-in

**Condition:** As a shift commander and given a situation that requires protective force reinforcements

**Standards:** Personnel must appropriately conduct a call-in procedure. Effective completion of performance objectives 1-2 (bolded below) represents the minimum standard for call-in conduct.

### Evaluation Criteria and Related Criteria:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EVALUATION CRITERIA (and other information)</th>
<th>Meets requirement</th>
<th>Does not meet requirement</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Is the site protective force staffed and deployed in sufficient strength to ensure the protection of sensitive assets? Is the dedicated SRT [special response team] established with additional resources sufficient to ensure that recapture capabilities continue to exist in the event that the denial strategy fails? [DOE O 470.4B, Attachment 4, Paragraph 3.c.(5)(a)]</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Have both the contractor and Federal site security offices developed SECON [security condition] response plans that can be immediately implemented when there is a change in either the Department’s or a specific facility/site’s SECON status? Each facility or site must identify the specific measures that will most efficiently and effectively implement the required increases in readiness at each SECON level. [DOE O 470.4B, Appendix A, Section 1, Chapter II., Paragraph 3.]</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**RELATED CRITERIA (and other information)**

Reference: DOE NTC TRF-100D Lesson 03: Report Fit for Duty, Version 2.0, last modified 4/14/11

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RELATED CRITERIA (and other information)</th>
<th>Meets requirement</th>
<th>Does not meet requirement</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Is there an automatic calling capability?</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Are phone numbers up to date?</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. How many calls are made?</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. How many security police officers (SPOs) responded? Sufficient numbers? Response times per individual (logged below or attached)?</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Did responders report fit for duty?</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Is information provided to the SPOs as to avenues of approach?</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Are arrangements made for issue of weapons, radios, etc.?</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Was there a confirmed mission for reinforcing elements?</td>
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<tr>
<td>9. Were responders confirmed and provided with call signs, codes, frequencies, identification of friendly forces identifiers?</td>
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<tr>
<td>10. Are vehicles available for SPO deployment?</td>
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<tr>
<td>11. Is deployment coordinated effectively?</td>
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<tr>
<td>12. Are overall communications effective?</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
13. Is command and control effective?

14. Is there a site-specific procedure for the call-in plan and is it followed?

| Sequence of Activity: | The objective is to determine a representative amount of off-duty SPOs who would be able to respond to assist in an emergency situation and the length of time it would take to have them in position. The shift commander will be informed that there has been an attack (simulated) at an area of the site and that the protective force has sustained high casualties. The shift commander will further be informed that adversaries are still on site and actively engaging protective force personnel, and that it appears that the adversaries are overwhelming protective forces and reinforcements will be needed. When the shift commander initiates the call-in process, the clock will be started; individual times will be recorded indicating when the protective force officer arrived on site and when the protective force officer was armed and ready to deploy. |
| Evaluation (explanation of why the requirements were not met/identify trends): |
| Safety Review/Risk Assessment: | Office of Security Assessments evaluators will coordinate with site trusted agents/safety personnel to obtain a site-developed risk assessment. Typical considerations and/or safety controls include provisions to alert called-in SPOs that a limited-notice LSPT is being conducted and that all motor vehicle laws should be followed. |

Trusted Agent Information Do Not Disseminate
**Task:** Conduct routine patrols and respond to unknown personnel

**Condition:** As members of a protective force, given issued equipment and routine conditions, respond to unknown personnel.

**Standards:** Personnel must appropriately respond to unknown personnel/demonstrators. Effective completion of performance objectives 1-5 (bolded below) represents the minimum standard for protester/demonstrator conduct.

**Evaluation Criteria and Related Criteria:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EVALUATION CRITERIA (and other information)</th>
<th>Meets requirement</th>
<th>Does not meet requirement</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Did the central alarm station (CAS) receive intrusion alarm? The perimeter intrusion detection and assessment system (PIDAS) surrounding the protected area must be monitored in a continuously manned CAS and a secondary alarm station. [DOE O 473.3A, Attachment 3, Section C., Chapter IV., Paragraph 2.b.]</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Was intrusion detection and assessment timely? [DOE O 473.3A, Attachment 3, Section C., Chapter IV., Paragraph 1a.(2)]</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Did security police officers (SPOs) respond to demonstrators using individual and small unit/team tactics, techniques, and procedures to respond to and assess alarm annunciations (or other indications of intrusion), and implement containment, denial, recapture, recovery, and pursuit strategies? [DOE O 473.3A, Attachment 2, Section F., Paragraph 1.c. and 10 CFR 1046, Subpart B, Appendix B (4)(c)i.]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Did SPOs demonstrate an understanding and apply limited arrest authority in accordance with 10 CFR 1047 and Title 42 USC 2201(k), the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 161k?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Did SPOs demonstrate an understanding and apply use of force in accordance with 10 CFR 1047 and the use of force continuum?</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**RELATED CRITERIA (and other information)**

Reference: DOE NTC TRF-100 Lesson 09: Handcuffing, Version 2.0; Lesson 15: Demonstrator Control, Version 2.0 (both last modified 4/05/13); and DOE NTC TRF-100D Lesson 23: Use of Force, Version 2.0, last modified 4/14/11

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RELATED CRITERIA (and other information)</th>
<th>Meets requirement</th>
<th>Does not meet requirement</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Did the first unit in the vicinity identify unknowns on contact and report them to CAS/others?</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Did subsequent units in the vicinity observe and report (the demonstrators)?</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. How long did it take for demonstrators to be identified and reported?</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Did responders maintain continuous and active observation?</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Did the CAS/secondary alarm station pass on situational information to responding patrols?</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Did responding personnel communicate their actions appropriately?</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Was the protective force supervisor dispatched to the incident location, and did he/she assume command and control?</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Did the protective force verbalize instructions and question demonstrators?</td>
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<tr>
<td>9. Were the demonstrators segregated, secured (handcuffed), and searched?</td>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Were demonstrators’ backpacks (equipment) taken and searched?</td>
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<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Was a local law enforcement agency/Federal law enforcement agency contacted (simulated)?</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Were demonstrators questioned about other demonstrators’ participation?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Was a search initiated for additional demonstrators?</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Were the actions taken at the scene appropriate and effective?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Is there a site-specific procedure for response to demonstrators, and is it followed?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sequence of Activity:** The first objective is to determine whether protective force units performing routine patrol functions notice the suspicious activities. A second objective is to evaluate what follow-on actions are taken by the protective force once the demonstrators have been detected. A number of passive demonstrators will attempt to gain access into a property protection area or Protected Area of a DOE facility. The demonstrators will not be armed with any weapons and will only be allowed to carry items such as bolt cutters for fences, protest signs, bull horns, and anti-nuclear literature. The demonstrators will proceed to the Protected Area (or some other sensitive area). If detected and challenged prior to reaching their objective, they will keep their hands in view of the responding officer and make no threatening actions, but may initiate their “demonstration.” If the demonstrators reach their objective undetected, they will initiate their demonstration. If there is no response, demonstrators will attempt to activate an alarm. Whenever the demonstrators are detected, they will keep their hands in view, and make no threatening actions. When the demonstrators are detected, the LSPT will be announced.

**Evaluation (explanation of why the requirements were not met/identify trends):**

________________________________________________________________________

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**Safety Review/Risk Assessment:** Office of Security Assessments evaluators will coordinate with site trusted agents/safety personnel to obtain a site-developed risk assessment. Typical considerations and/or safety controls include informing a shift supervisor of this test immediately prior to its start. Since the shift supervisor is in the officer’s chain of command, he or she would be able to confirm to the officer that an LSPT is being conducted and that the officer should follow appropriate operating procedures. As soon as the protesters are detected, the LSPT will be announced by a predesignated trusted agent. The trusted agent will be in communication with the test controller, who will be in communication with protective force operations so that the exercise can be cancelled if necessary. This will be a limited-notice LSPT, so controllers/evaluators will not be wearing safety vests and will not be in the area of the LSPT until after it is announced.

**Trusted Agent Information Do Not Disseminate**

PF-114

Appendix B

Trusted Agent Information Do Not Disseminate

Explosives Detection Limited-Scope Performance Test (LSPT)

Data Collection Form

**Task:** Conduct explosives detection (vehicle or article)

**Condition:** As members of a protective force and given issued equipment, routine or suspicious conditions, and a known or unknown vehicle or hand-carried item

**Standards:** Personnel must appropriately conduct explosives detection and take appropriate action when explosives are discovered. Effective completion of performance objectives 1-9 (bolded below) represents the minimum standard for explosives detection.

**Evaluation Criteria and Related Criteria:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EVALUATION CRITERIA (and other information)</th>
<th>Meets requirement</th>
<th>Does not meet requirement</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Was the entrance inspection conducted in a manner that detected prohibited or controlled articles? [DOE O 473.3A, Attachment 3, Section A., Chapter X., Paragraph 1.c.]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Were prohibited articles detected and not introduced into the security area without authorization? [DOE O 473.3A, Attachment 3, Section C., Chapter V., Paragraph 3.a.]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Were a set of program standards developed, approved, implemented, enforced, and maintained to ensure canine programs are effective if canine teams are used to deter potential threats? [DOE O 473.3A, Attachment 2, Annex 3, Paragraph 1.]</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Was inspection equipment (e.g., explosive detectors, metal detectors, SNM detectors) available to assist security personnel in ensuring that prohibited and controlled articles were detected before being brought into or removed from DOE facilities? [DOE O 473.3A, Attachment 3, Section A., Chapter X., Paragraph 1.b.]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Were explosive vapor detectors and metal detectors used in a combination that precluded the opportunity to defeat the detectors individually at designated area boundaries and when used to inspect personnel for explosives or other prohibited/controlled articles? [DOE O 473.3A, Attachment 3, Section A., Chapter X., Paragraph 2.e.(1)]</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Was the specific location of the screening before gaining access to the protected area? Did explosive detection equipment ensure that explosives were not introduced without appropriate authorization? [DOE O 473.3A, Attachment 3, Section C., Chapter I., Paragraph 4.c.(4)(a) and (b)]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Was passage of individuals, vehicles, and/or packages or mail through entry control point inspection equipment observed and controlled by trained designated personnel? [DOE O 473.3A, Attachment 3, Section A., Chapter X., Paragraph 1.a.]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Were post orders (POs), general orders (GOs), and procedures covering protective force routine, emergency and administrative duties; tactical deployment and other operational requirements developed to ensure protective force assignments are oriented to allow maximum concentration of resources in a tactical posture? [DOE O 473.3A, Attachment 2, Section A., Paragraph 2.a.]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Were plans, POs, GOs, and procedures clear, concise, and current? [DOE O 473.3A, Attachment 2, Section A., Paragraph 2.a.]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
** RELATED CRITERIA (and other information) **

Reference: DOE NTC TRF-100 Lesson 48: Bomb Searching Methods, Version 2.0, last modified 4/05/13; DOE NTC TRF-100D Lesson 25: Prohibited and Controlled Articles and Inspections, Version 2.0, last modified 4/14/11; and Lesson 31: Access Control, Version 2.0, last modified 4/14/11

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Meets requirement</th>
<th>Does not meet requirement</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Was the scent of explosives detected?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Was the role player separated from the item?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Was backup requested?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Was the role player secured/searched after backup arrived?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Was the role player questioned?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Was the immediate area cleared of personnel?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Was the incident reported to the central alarm station (CAS)?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Was a secondary means of communication used (landlines rather than radios)?</td>
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<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Was the protective force supervisor dispatched to the incident location?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Did the protective force supervisor assume command and control?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Was communication between the protective force and the CAS appropriate?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Was a security perimeter established?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Were overall communications effective?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Is there a site-specific procedure for conducting explosives detection and is it followed?</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** Sequence of Activity:** The first objective of this LSPT is to determine the protective force’s ability to utilize explosives detection equipment, either canine or electronic, to detect the presence of explosives on the item being searched. A second objective of this LSPT is to evaluate the officer’s response once the explosives have been detected. A test source will be used to distribute explosives scent on the steering wheel of the vehicle or handle of a briefcase. The trusted agent (in the vehicle or carrying the briefcase, as appropriate) will proceed to the search area and follow all instructions from the security police officer (SPO). The evaluator will have previously reviewed site procedures regarding the expected protective force response to the incident and will be in the immediate area to observe all actions taken and to record data. Evaluators and controllers must ensure that the response initiated by the protective force is conducted safely and in a controlled manner. SPOs should respond within the timelines established for this LSPT, in sufficient numbers, and with all appropriate equipment. Command and control should be established at the incident point, and communications between protective force personnel at the site should not include the use of radios until it has been established that explosives are not present. Further actions may include a simulated site shutdown until it has been established that explosives are not present.
Safety Review/Risk Assessment: Office of Security Assessments evaluators will coordinate with site trusted agents/safety personnel to obtain a site-developed risk assessment. Typical considerations and/or safety controls include informing a shift supervisor of this test immediately prior to its start. Since the shift supervisor is in the officer’s chain of command, he or she would be able to confirm to the officer that an LSPT is being conducted and that the officer should follow appropriate operating procedures. As soon as the explosives are detected, the LSPT will be announced by a predesignated trusted agent. The trusted agent will be in communication with the test controller, who will be in communication with protective force operations so that the exercise can be cancelled if necessary. This will be a limited-notice LSPT, so controllers/evaluators will not be wearing safety vests and will not be in the area of the LSPT until after it is announced.
**Task:** Tactically respond to radio jamming

**Condition:** As a member of a protective force and given an operational communication device

**Standards:** Personnel must appropriately determine that their radios are being jammed and implement alternate communications. The central alarm station (CAS)/secondary alarm station (SAS) must isolate and disable the radio causing the jamming. Effective completion of performance objectives 1-5 (bolded below) represents the minimum standard for response to radio jamming.

**Evaluation Criteria and Related Criteria:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EVALUATION CRITERIA (and other information)</th>
<th>Meets requirement</th>
<th>Does not meet requirement</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Was communication equipment designed to provide command and control in routine and emergency situations? [DOE O 473.3A, Attachment 2, Section E, Paragraph 3.h.(9)(a)]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Did the protective force communications systems address resistance to eavesdropping, vulnerability to transmission of deceptive messages, and susceptibility to jamming? [DOE O 473.3A, Attachment 3, Section C., Chapter III, Paragraph 1.b.(1)]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Were alternate communications capabilities available immediately if the primary communications system failed? Did channels considered critical to protective force personnel communications have backup channels? [DOE O 473.3A, Attachment 3, Section C., Chapter III., Paragraph 1.a.(1)]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Were portable radios capable of two-way communication from within buildings and structures? If not, were alternative means of communication provided? [DOE O 473.3A, Attachment 3, Section C., Chapter III., Paragraph 1.d.(2)]</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

**RELATED CRITERIA** (and other information)

Reference: DOE NTC TRF-100D Lesson 16: Tactical Communication, Version 2.0, last modified 4/14/11

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Meets requirement</th>
<th>Does not meet requirement</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Did personnel identify the radio as unable to transmit or receive on a given frequency?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Remedial anti-jamming measures:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Did personnel determine the reason for interference? Within performance range of radio equipment and ground station equipment? Weather conditions? Nearby generator? Poor insulation on nearby high-tower electric lines? Friendly forces on same frequency?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Did personnel continue to operate in a normal manner so that the adversary will not know jamming is effective? Was jammed status mentioned on an unsecured radio frequency?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Did personnel make radio adjustments (squelch, channel, volume, etc.)?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>d. Did personnel switch to an alternate frequency?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>e. Did personnel reduce transmitting speed (i.e., may be able to talk through interference)?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Did personnel request that the identified radio be disabled?</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Sequence of Activity: The objectives are to evaluate the protective force’s ability to determine that the radio is being jammed and their ability to implement alternate communications. Further objectives include determining whether the CAS/SAS can isolate and disable the radio causing the jamming, and assessing the overall effectiveness of their actions. The tester will approach any mobile patrol assigned to the property protection area, and advise the driver and any passengers that a limited-notice LSPT is being conducted. The LSPT requires the driver and any passengers in the mobile patrol to surrender both hand-held and mobile radios (simulating neutralization by an adversary force). The tester will attempt to jam the protective force radios through a number of techniques: 1) keying the microphone on the mobile or hand-held radio to simulate a “hot mic” (to be effective, the tester should carry on a conversation with the radio held at waist level); 2) keying the microphone with no background noise; and/or 3) jamming using the mobile and hand-held radios to determine whether a kill capability exists and is implemented.

Evaluation (explanation of why the requirements were not met/identify trends):

Safety Review/Risk Assessment: Office of Security Assessments evaluators will coordinate with site trusted agents/safety personnel to obtain a site-developed risk assessment. Typical considerations and/or safety controls include informing a shift supervisor of this test immediately prior to its start. Since the shift supervisor is in the officer’s chain of command, he or she would be able to confirm to the officer that an LSPT is being conducted and that the officer should follow appropriate operating procedures. The tester will be in communication with the test controller, who will be in communication with protective force operations so that the exercise can be cancelled if necessary. This will be a limited-notice LSPT, so controllers/evaluators will not be wearing safety vests.

Trusted Agent Information Do Not Disseminate
**Task:** Entry control point routine duties

**Condition:** As a member of a protective force manning an entry control point and given issued equipment, routine conditions, and an unknown person

**Standards:** Personnel must appropriately conduct a security badge inspection of an individual at an entry control point. Effective completion of performance objectives 1-8 (**bolded below**) represents the minimum standard for access control conduct.

**Evaluation Criteria and Related Criteria:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EVALUATION CRITERIA (and other information)</th>
<th>Meets requirement</th>
<th>Does not meet requirement</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Were access controls in place to ensure that only appropriately cleared and authorized personnel are permitted unescorted access to the limited area? Was access based on an individual’s need to know to perform official duties, validation of the individual’s security clearance, and the presentation of an approved security badge? [DOE O 473.3A, Attachment 3, Section A., Chapter II., Paragraph 4.b.]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Were there procedures that required protective force or assigned security personnel to validate the DOE security badge, including those worn by pedestrians or vehicle occupants, and to ensure that the badge photo matches the presenter’s face and that the badge has not been altered? [DOE O 473.3A, Attachment 3, Section A., Chapter XI, Paragraph 6.]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Was passage of individuals, vehicles, and/or packages or mail through entry control point inspection equipment observed and controlled by trained designated personnel? [DOE O 473.3A, Attachment 3, Section A., Chapter X., Paragraph 1.a.]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Was the DOE security badge confiscated if the individual’s appearance changed significantly; i.e., no longer resembles the person in the photograph? [DOE O 473.3A, Attachment 3, Section A., Chapter XI, Paragraph 3.f.]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Was communication equipment designed to provide command and control in routine and emergency situations? [DOE O 473.3A, Attachment 2, Section E., Paragraph 3.b.(9)(a)]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Were ingress/egress points designed to preclude commingling of inspected and un-inspected personnel? [DOE O 473.3A, Attachment 3, Section A., Chapter X., Paragraph 1.c.(5)]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Were post orders (POs), general orders (GOs), and procedures covering protective force routine, emergency and administrative duties; tactical deployment and other operational requirements developed to ensure protective force assignments are oriented to allow maximum concentration of resources in a tactical posture? [DOE O 473.3A, Attachment 2, Section A., Paragraph 2.a.]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Were plans, POs, GOs, and procedures clear, concise, and current? [DOE O 473.3A, Attachment 2, Section A., Paragraph 2.a.]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### RELATED CRITERIA (and other information)
Reference: DOE NTC TRF-100D Lesson 25: Prohibited and Controlled Articles and Inspection, Version 2.0; Lesson 31: Access Control, Version 2.0; Lesson 32: Badging and Passes, Version 2.0 (all last modified 4/14/11)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Meets requirement</th>
<th>Does not meet requirement</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Did personnel perform a badge check (physically grasp the badge, compare the bearer’s face to the photograph, inspect written badge information)?</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Did personnel detect the badge discrepancy?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Did personnel query the role player about the badge and/or follow site procedures regarding the security badges?</td>
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<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Did personnel confiscate the badge?</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Did personnel detain the bearer and notify supervision?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Did personnel request that the protective force supervisor come to the incident location?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Did the protective force supervisor assume command and control?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Were overall communications effective?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Was appropriate action taken for the security violation?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Were any after actions witnessed and/or discussed?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Is there a site-specific procedure for conducting a badge inspection and is it followed?</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Sequence of Activity:** The first objective is to determine whether the officer is able to detect that the picture on the badge does not match the face of the person presenting it. A second objective is to determine whether the officer follows existing procedures for handling the discrepancy and whether those procedures are adequate. The role player will approach the entry control point (role player will have his/her actual badge in his/her pocket for identification) and greet the security police officer (SPO) in a friendly manner. He/she will provide the SPO with a badge that has a photo on it that bears some resemblance to the role player but is clearly not the same person. If the SPO recognizes that the badge is incorrect, the exercise will be announced by a trusted agent (in the immediate area) and the SPO will be told to continue with the appropriate actions he/she would take in response to an actual situation.

**Evaluation (explanation of why the requirements were not met/identify trends):**

___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________

**Safety Review/Risk Assessment:** Office of Security Assessments evaluators will coordinate with site trusted agents/safety personnel to obtain a site-developed risk assessment. Typical considerations and/or safety controls include informing a shift supervisor of this test immediately prior to its start. Since the shift supervisor is in the officer’s chain of command, he or she would be able to confirm to the officer that an LSPT is being conducted and that the officer should follow appropriate operating procedures. As soon as the security badge is detected, the LSPT will be announced by a trusted agent in the immediate area. The trusted agent will be in communication with the test controller, who will be in communication with protective force operations so that the exercise can be cancelled if necessary. This will be a limited-notice LSPT, so controllers/evaluators will not be wearing safety vests and will not be in the area of the LSPT until after it is announced.

**Trusted Agent Information Do Not Disseminate**
Trusted Agent Information Do Not Disseminate

SNM (Special Nuclear Material) Detection Limited-Scope Performance Test (LSPT)

Data Collection Form

Task: Conduct SNM inspection/detection at a security area entry/exit control point

Condition: As a member of a protective force and given issued equipment, routine conditions, and SNM detector equipment

Standards: Personnel must appropriately conduct an SNM assessment/detection and operate SNM equipment on an item at a security area entry/exit control point. Effective completion of performance objectives 1-10 (bolded below) represents the minimum standard for SNM assessment/detection conduct.

Evaluation Criteria and Related Criteria:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EVALUATION CRITERIA (and other information)</th>
<th>Meets requirement</th>
<th>Does not meet requirement</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Was passage of individuals, vehicles, and/or packages or mail through entry control point inspection equipment observed and controlled by trained designated personnel? [DOE O 473.3A, Attachment 3, Section A., Chapter X., Paragraph 1.a.]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Did SNM detection system assist security personnel to ensure that critical assets were detected before being brought into or removed from the facility? [DOE O 473.3A, Attachment 3, Section A., Chapter X., Paragraph 1.b.]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Were bypass routes around inspection equipment closed or monitored to deter unauthorized passage of personnel and hand carried articles? [DOE O 473.3A, Attachment 3, Section A., Chapter X., Paragraph 1.c.(1)]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Was uninterrupted power provided to all inspection equipment? If uninterrupted power was not practical, were there locally developed procedures to provide alternative measures for conducting entry/exit screening when loss of electrical power occurs? [DOE O 473.3A, Attachment 3, Section A., Chapter X., Paragraph 1.c.(2)]</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Were measures instituted to correctly maintain control settings on all entry/exit control point inspection equipment? [DOE O 473.3A, Attachment 3, Section A., Chapter X., Paragraph 1.c.(3)]</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Did equipment have audible and visual alarms monitored by on-post trained personnel? [DOE O 473.3A, Attachment 3, Section A., Chapter X., Paragraph 1.c.(4)]</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Were ingress/egress points designed to preclude commingling of searched and unsearched personnel? [DOE O 473.3A, Attachment 3, Section A., Chapter X., Paragraph 1.c.(5)]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Did screening equipment (e.g., explosive detectors, metal detectors, x-ray systems, and SNM detectors) ensure that prohibited and controlled articles were detected before being permitted into the facility? [DOE O 473.3A, Attachment 3, Section C., Chapter X., Paragraph 4.]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Were post orders (POs), general orders (GOs), and procedures covering protective force routine, emergency and administrative duties; tactical deployment and other operational requirements developed to ensure protective force assignments are oriented to allow maximum concentration of resources in a tactical posture? [DOE O 473.3A, Attachment 2, Section A., Paragraph 2.a.]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Were plans, POs, GOs, and procedures clear, concise, and current? [DOE O 473.3A, Attachment 2, Section A., Paragraph 2.a.]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
RELATED CRITERIA (and other information)
Reference: DOE NTC TRF-100D Lesson 25: Prohibited and Controlled Articles and Inspection, Version 2.0; Lesson 31: Access Control, Version 2.0 (both last modified 4/14/11)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Meets requirement</th>
<th>Does not meet requirement</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Was the SNM material identified?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Did the protective force officer(s) react rationally, calmly, and decisively?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Did the protective force officer(s) determine whether an imminent or unknown threat exists?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a.</td>
<td>Did the protective force officer(s) take actions to neutralize the threat?</td>
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<tr>
<td>b.</td>
<td>Did the protective force officer(s) report the situation to the command element?</td>
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<td>4.</td>
<td>If no imminent threat exists?</td>
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<tr>
<td>a.</td>
<td>Did the protective force officer(s) control the immediate area by directing all persons to a specific location away from the suspected article/material?</td>
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<td>b.</td>
<td>Did the protective force officer(s) safely notify the command element of the situation?</td>
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<tr>
<td>c.</td>
<td>Did the protective force officer(s) avoid touching or moving the item, or disrupting the environment around/near the item?</td>
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<tr>
<td>d.</td>
<td>Did the protective force officer(s) note any details and descriptions of the article/material?</td>
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<tr>
<td>e.</td>
<td>Did the protective force officer(s) control access to the scene and take appropriate action to preserve evidence?</td>
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<tr>
<td>f.</td>
<td>Did the protective force officer(s) work with responding elements to maintain control until resolution?</td>
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<tr>
<td>g.</td>
<td>Did the protective force officer(s) follow site policy to dispose of the article/material?</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Did the protective force officer(s) take appropriate actions for the security violation?</td>
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<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Were after actions witnessed and/or discussed?</td>
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<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Is there a site-specific procedure for conducting an x-ray inspection, and is it followed?</td>
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</table>

Sequence of Activity: The objective is to determine whether the protective force officer operating the SNM detector equipment can detect the presence of SNM (radioactive source). A second objective is to evaluate the protective force officer's response once the item is detected. A trusted agent role player (fully authorized to make entry into the area) will attempt entry through a security post that conducts SNM screening. The role player will have a hand-carried item, such as a briefcase or lunchbox, to process through the SNM detector. The radioactive source will have been previously positioned in the hand-carried item. No other prohibited items will be present in the hand-carried item. The role player will announce the LSPT as soon as protective force actions indicate that the source has been identified. The role player will then follow all instructions from the protective force officers and make no threatening actions toward the security police officers. In the event the radioactive source is not identified, the trusted agent will contact the shift supervisor to respond to the location. The role player will then position the item through the detector in the same configuration as before to determine whether the SNM unit is working properly.
Evaluation (explanation of why the requirements were not met/identify trends):

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Safety Review/Risk Assessment: Office of Security Assessments evaluators will coordinate with site trusted agents/safety personnel to obtain a site-developed risk assessment. Typical considerations and/or safety controls include informing a shift supervisor of this test immediately prior to its start. Since the shift supervisor is in the officer’s chain of command, he or she would be able to confirm to the officer that an LSPT is being conducted and that the officer should follow appropriate operating procedures. As soon as SNM is detected, the LSPT will be announced. The trusted agent will be in communication with the test controller, who will be in communication with protective force operations so that the exercise can be cancelled if necessary. This will be a limited-notice LSPT, so controllers/evaluators will not be wearing safety vests and will not be in the area of the LSPT until after it is announced.

Trusted Agent Information Do Not Disseminate
**Trusted Agent Information Do Not Disseminate**

**Suspicious Vehicle Limited-Scope Performance Test (LSPT)**

**Data Collection Form**

**Task:** Conduct routine patrol and respond to a suspicious vehicle

**Condition:** As a member of a protective force and given issued equipment in a mounted or dismounted situation and a suspicious vehicle

**Standards:** Personnel must appropriately observe, identify, report, and respond to a potential vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) threat. Effective completion of performance objectives 1-6 (bolded below) represents the minimum standard for suspicious vehicle conduct.

**Evaluation Criteria and Related Criteria:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EVALUATION CRITERIA (and other information)</th>
<th>Meets requirement</th>
<th>Does not meet requirement</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Did protective force satisfactorily perform access control, facility patrol, alarm assessment and monitoring, and dispatch duties? [DOE O 473.3A, Attachment 2, Section D, Paragraph 1.a.]</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Have sufficient protective measures been implemented to result in a low risk of a successful attack? [DOE O 473.3A, Attachment 3, Section A., Chapter X., Paragraph 2.a.(1)]</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Was communication equipment designed to provide command and control in routine and emergency situations? [DOE O 473.3A, Attachment 2, Section E., Paragraph 3.b.(9)(a)]</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Were alternative means of communication in place? [DOE O 473.3A, Attachment 3, Section C., Chapter III., Paragraph 1.b.(3)]</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Were post orders (POs), general orders (GOs), and procedures covering protective force routine, emergency and administrative duties; tactical deployment and other operational requirements developed to ensure protective force assignments are oriented to allow maximum concentration of resources in a tactical posture? [DOE O 473.3A, Attachment 2, Section A., Paragraph 2.a.]</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Were plans, POs, GOs, and procedures clear, concise, and current? [DOE O 473.3A, Attachment 2, Section A., Paragraph 2.a.]</td>
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</table>

**RELATED CRITERIA (and other information)**

Reference: DOE NTC TRF-100 Lesson 45: Patrol Techniques and Tactics, Version 2.0, last modified 4/05/13, and DOE NTC TRF-100D Lesson 16: Tactical Communication, Version 2.0, last modified 4/14/11

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RELATED CRITERIA (and other information)</th>
<th>Meets requirement</th>
<th>Does not meet requirement</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Did the first unit in the vicinity observe and report the suspicious vehicle?</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Did subsequent units in the vicinity observe and report the suspicious vehicle?</td>
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<td>3. Was continuous and active observation maintained?</td>
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<td>4. Did the protective force report the situation and all suspicious activities to the central alarm station (CAS)/others?</td>
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<td>5. Did CAS/secondary alarm station relay situational information to responding patrols?</td>
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<td>6. Did protective force personnel don tactical equipment prior to response?</td>
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<td>7. Was the immediate area evacuated?</td>
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<td>8. Did responding personnel communicate their actions appropriately?</td>
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</table>
9. When responding units communicated, did they use their radios or a hard-wired telephone?

10. Was the protective force supervisor dispatched to the incident location and did he/she assume command and control?

11. Did responding patrols approach the vehicle?

12. Did responding patrols call for explosive detection units?

13. Were the explosive detection unit’s actions appropriate and effective?

14. Did the protective force secure the suspicious vehicle after the search?

15. Were the actions taken at the scene appropriate and effective?

16. Is there a site-specific procedure for response to a suspicious vehicle and is it followed?

Sequence of Activity: The objective is to determine whether security police officers on routine patrol duty are observant enough to identify a potential VBIED threat and then take appropriate action. A suspicious-looking vehicle (e.g., loaded with enough weight to be noticeable, multiple barrels in the truck bed, windows obscured) will be driven onto the site and continue to a sensitive building where it will be parked illegally. At this point, the driver (trusted agent) will exit the vehicle and position himself at a close proximity (with the evaluators/controllers) to observe the detection and response. As soon as the suspicious vehicle is observed/reported, the exercise will be announced by a predesignated trusted agent.

Evaluation (explanation of why the requirements were not met/identify trends):

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Safety Review/Risk Assessment: Office of Security Assessments evaluators will coordinate with site trusted agents/safety personnel to obtain a site-developed risk assessment. Typical considerations and/or safety controls include informing a shift supervisor of this test immediately prior to its start. Since the shift supervisor is in the officer’s chain of command, he or she would be able to confirm to the officer that an LSPT is being conducted and that the officer should follow appropriate operating procedures. As soon as the potential VBIED is detected, the LSPT will be announced by a predesignated trusted agent. The trusted agent will be in communication with the test controller, who will be in communication with protective force operations so that the exercise can be cancelled if necessary. This will be a limited-notice LSPT, so controllers/evaluators will not be wearing safety vests and will not be in the area of the LSPT until after it is announced.

Trusted Agent Information Do Not Disseminate
Trusted Agent Information Do Not Disseminate

Vehicle Entrance/Exit Inspections Limited-Scope Performance Test (LSPT)

Data Collection Form

**Task:** Conduct a vehicle inspection at a security area entry/exit portal

**Condition:** As a member of a protective force and given issued equipment, routine or suspicious conditions, and a known or unknown vehicle

**Standards:** Personnel must appropriately conduct a thorough inspection of a vehicle at a Protected Area (PA)/material access area (MAA) security area entry portal. Effective completion of performance objectives 1-8 (bolded below) represents the minimum standard for vehicle inspection conduct.

**Evaluation Criteria and Related Criteria:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EVALUATION CRITERIA (and other information)</th>
<th>Meets requirement</th>
<th>Does not meet requirement</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1. Was the vehicle inspection conducted in a manner that deterred and detected the introduction of prohibited and controlled articles; did the inspection ensure prohibited articles were detected and not introduced into the security area without authorization? [DOE O 473.3A, Attachment 3, Section A., Chapter X., Paragraph 1.c. and Attachment 3, Section C., Chapter V., Paragraph 3.a.]
| 2. Did exit inspections ensure safeguards and security interests were not removed without authorization? [DOE O 473.3A, Attachment 3, Section C., Chapter V., Paragraph 3.b.]
| 3. Was uninterrupted power provided to all inspection equipment? If uninterrupted power was not practical, were there locally developed procedures to provide alternative measures for conducting entry/exit screening when loss of electrical power occurs? [DOE O 473.3A, Attachment 3, Section A., Chapter X., Paragraph 1.c.(2)]
| 4. Did equipment have audible and visual alarms monitored by on-post trained personnel? [DOE O 473.3A, Attachment 3, Section A., Chapter X., Paragraph 1.c.(4)]
| 5. Were ingress/egress points designed to preclude commingling of searched and unsearched personnel? [DOE O 473.3A, Attachment 3, Section A., Chapter X., Paragraph 1.c.(5)]
| 6. If utilized, did x-ray equipment provide a discernible image of the prohibited and controlled article? [DOE O 473.3A, Attachment 3, Section A., Chapter X., Paragraph 2.c.]
| 7. Were post orders (POs), general orders (GOs), and procedures covering protective force routine, emergency and administrative duties; tactical deployment and other operational requirements developed to ensure protective force assignments are oriented to allow maximum concentration of resources in a tactical posture? [DOE O 473.3A, Attachment 2, Section A., Paragraph 2.a.]
| 8. Were plans, POs, GOs, and procedures clear, concise, and current? [DOE O 473.3A, Attachment 2, Section A., Paragraph 2.a.]

**RELATED CRITERIA (and other information)**

Reference: DOE NTC TRF-100D Lesson 22, Version 2.0: Search and Seizure, and Lesson 25, Version 2.0: Prohibited and Controlled Articles and Inspections (both last modified 4/14/11)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RELATED CRITERIA (and other information)</th>
<th>Meets requirement</th>
<th>Does not meet requirement</th>
<th>Notes</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Did the protective force officer(s) perform a badge check and notify the driver of the inspection requirement?</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Did the protective force officer(s) set up an inspection area and allow the vehicle into the inspection area?</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
3. Did the protective force officer(s) direct the driver to turn off the engine, apply the parking brake, and give the key to the officer?  

4. Did the protective force officer(s) direct the occupant(s) to exit the vehicle, and did the officer open all packages/containers and vehicle compartments?  

5. Did the protective force officer(s) instruct the occupants to remain in a designated area during the inspection?  

6. Did the protective force officer(s) inspect the exterior of the vehicle in a clockwise system to include undercarriage and engine compartment?  

7. Did the protective force officer(s) inspect the interior of the vehicle to include the trunk and glove box?  

8. Did the protective force officer(s) discover the test item (prohibited or controlled article)?  

9. Did the protective force officer(s) take required action for the controlled or prohibited items in the vehicle?  

10. Did the protective force officer(s) request backup and make proper notification of the discovery?  

11. Did the protective force officer(s) request a supervisor to the location?  

12. Was a secondary means of communication used (if explosives suspected/found)?  

13. Was explosives detection conducted on the vehicle (if required)?  

14. Did the protective force officer(s) continue to inspect the rest of the vehicle?  

15. Did the supervisor assume command and control?  

16. Were the actions taken at the scene appropriate and effective?  

17. Is there a site-specific procedure for conducting a vehicle inspection and is it followed?  

**Sequence of Activity:** The objective is to evaluate the thoroughness of a vehicle search routinely conducted at an entry portal. A prohibited article (e.g., recording device under seat, camera in glove box, baggie with black powdery substance taped inside the engine compartment) will be positioned in a vehicle that is otherwise authorized to enter the area requiring the inspection. The trusted agent (also duly authorized into the area but unknown to the security police officer or SPO) will drive the vehicle to the inspection point and then follow the directions given by the SPO. When/if the prohibited/controlled article is identified, the LSPT will be announced by a predesignated trusted agent.
Evaluation (explanation of why the requirements were not met/identify trends):

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**Safety Review/Risk Assessment:** Office of Security Assessments evaluators will coordinate with site trusted agents/safety personnel to obtain a site-developed risk assessment. Typical considerations and/or safety controls include informing a shift supervisor of this test immediately prior to its start. Since the shift supervisor is in the officer’s chain of command, he or she would be able to confirm to the officer that an LSPT is being conducted and that the officer should follow appropriate operating procedures. As soon as the prohibited item is detected, the LSPT will be announced by a predesignated trusted agent. The trusted agent will be in communication with the test controller, who will be in communication with protective force operations so that the exercise can be cancelled if necessary. This will be a limited-notice LSPT, so controllers/evaluators will not be wearing safety vests and will not be in the area of the LSPT until after it is announced.

**Trusted Agent Information Do Not Disseminate**
**Task:** Conduct an x-ray inspection at a security area entry control point

**Condition:** As a member of a protective force and given issued equipment, routine conditions, and x-ray equipment

**Standards:** Personnel must appropriately conduct an x-ray inspection and operate x-ray equipment on an item at a security area entry control point. Effective completion of performance objectives 1-12 (bolded below) represents the minimum standard for x-ray inspection conduct.

**Evaluation Criteria and Related Criteria:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EVALUATION CRITERIA (and other information)</th>
<th>Meets requirement</th>
<th>Does not meet requirement</th>
<th>Notes</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Was passage of individuals and/or packages or mail through entry control point inspection equipment observed and controlled by trained designated personnel? [DOE O 473.3A, Attachment 3, Section A., Chapter X., Paragraph 1.a.]</td>
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<td>2. Did x-ray system assist security personnel to ensure that prohibited and controlled articles were detected before being brought into or removed from the facility? [DOE O 473.3A, Attachment 3, Section A., Chapter X., Paragraph 1.b.]</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Were entrance inspections of personnel, packages and hand carried items performed to deter and detect prohibited and controlled articles? [DOE O 473.3A, Attachment 3, Section A., Chapter X., Paragraph 1.c.]</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Were bypass routes around inspection equipment closed or monitored to deter unauthorized passage of personnel and hand carried articles? [DOE O 473.3A, Attachment 3, Section A., Chapter X., Paragraph 1.c.(1)]</td>
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<td>5. Was uninterrupted power provided to all inspection equipment? If uninterrupted power was not practical, were there locally developed procedures to provide alternative measures for conducting entry/exit screening when loss of electrical power occurs? [DOE O 473.3A, Attachment 3, Section A., Chapter X., Paragraph 1.c.(2)]</td>
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<td>6. Were measures instituted to correctly maintain control settings on all entry/exit control point inspection equipment? [DOE O 473.3A, Attachment 3, Section A., Chapter X., Paragraph 1.c.(3)]</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Did equipment have audible and visual alarms monitored by on-post trained personnel? [DOE O 473.3A, Attachment 3, Section A., Chapter X., Paragraph 1.c.(4)]</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Were ingress/egress points designed to preclude commingling of searched and unsearched personnel? [DOE O 473.3A, Attachment 3, Section A., Chapter X., Paragraph 1.c.(5)]</td>
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<tr>
<td>9. Did x-ray equipment provide a discernible image of the prohibited and controlled article? [DOE O 473.3A, Attachment 3, Section A., Chapter X., Paragraph 2.c.]</td>
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<tr>
<td>10. Did screening equipment (e.g., explosive detectors, metal detectors, x-ray systems, and SNM detectors) ensure that prohibited and controlled articles were detected before being permitted into the facility? [DOE O 473.3A, Attachment 3, Section C., Chapter X., Paragraph 4.]</td>
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</table>
11. Were post orders (POs), general orders (GOs), and procedures covering protective force routine, emergency and administrative duties; tactical deployment and other operational requirements developed to ensure protective force assignments are oriented to allow maximum concentration of resources in a tactical posture? [DOE O 473.3A, Attachment 2, Section A., Paragraph 2.a.]

12. Were plans, POs, GOs, and procedures clear, concise, and current? [DOE O 473.3A, Attachment 2, Section A., Paragraph 2.a.]

### RELATED CRITERIA (and other information)

Reference: DOE NTC TRF-100D Lesson 25: Prohibited and Controlled Articles and Inspection, Version 2.0; Lesson 31: Access Control, Version 2.0 (both last modified 4/14/11)

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Meets requirement</th>
<th>Does not meet requirement</th>
<th>Notes</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Was the prohibited article identified?</td>
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<td>2.</td>
<td>Did the protective force officer(s) react rationally, calmly, and decisively?</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Did the protective force officer(s) determine whether an imminent or unknown threat exists?</td>
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<td>4.</td>
<td>Did the protective force officer(s) take actions to neutralize the threat?</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Did the protective force officer(s) report the situation to the command element?</td>
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<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Did the protective force officer(s) avoid using duty radio or cellular phones that may trigger improvised explosive devices?</td>
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<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>If no imminent threat exists?</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a.</td>
<td>Did the protective force officer(s) control the immediate area by directing all persons to a specific location away from the suspected article/material?</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>b.</td>
<td>Did the protective force officer(s) safely notify the command element of the situation?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>c.</td>
<td>Did the protective force officer(s) avoid touching or moving the item, or disrupting the environment around/near the item?</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d.</td>
<td>Did the protective force officer(s) note any details and descriptions of the article/material?</td>
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<tr>
<td>e.</td>
<td>Did the protective force officer(s) control access to the scene and take appropriate action to preserve evidence?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>f.</td>
<td>Did the protective force officer(s) work with responding elements to maintain control until resolution?</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>g.</td>
<td>Did the protective force officer(s) follow site policy to dispose of the article/material?</td>
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<tr>
<td>h.</td>
<td>Did the protective force officer(s) take appropriate actions for the security violation?</td>
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<tr>
<td>i.</td>
<td>Were after actions witnessed and/or discussed?</td>
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<tr>
<td>j.</td>
<td>Is there a site-specific procedure for conducting an x-ray inspection, and is it followed?</td>
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</table>

**Sequence of Activity:** The objective is to determine whether the protective force officer operating the x-ray equipment can detect the presence of a prohibited article (encapsulated weapon). A second objective is to evaluate the protective force officer’s response once the prohibited item has been detected. A trusted agent role player (fully authorized to make entry into the area) will attempt entry through a security post that conducts x-ray screening. The role player will have a hand-carried item, such as a briefcase or lunchbox, to process through the x-ray. The encapsulated weapon will have been previously positioned in the hand-carried item. No other prohibited items will be present in the hand-carried item. The role player will announce the LSPT as soon as protective force actions indicate that the weapon has been identified. The role player will then follow all instructions from the protective force officers and make no threatening actions toward the security police officers. In the event the prohibited item is not identified, the trusted agent will contact the shift supervisor to respond to
the location. The role player will then position the item on the x-ray belt in the same configuration as before to determine whether the x-ray unit is working properly.

**Evaluation (explanation of why the requirements were not met/identify trends):**

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**Safety Review/Risk Assessment:** Office of Security Assessments evaluators will coordinate with site trusted agents/safety personnel to obtain a site-developed risk assessment. Typical considerations and/or safety controls include informing a shift supervisor of this test immediately prior to its start. Since the shift supervisor is in the officer’s chain of command, he or she would be able to confirm to the officer that an LSPT is being conducted and that the officer should follow appropriate operating procedures. As soon as the weapon is detected, the LSPT will be announced. The trusted agent will be in communication with the test controller, who will be in communication with protective force operations so that the exercise can be cancelled if necessary. This will be a limited-notice LSPT, so controllers/evaluators will not be wearing safety vests and will not be in the area of the LSPT until after it is announced.

**Trusted Agent Information Do Not Disseminate**
Evaluator Name (printed) ________________________________________________

Rate each criteria and sub criteria: 1 (Does not meet requirements), 2 (Adequate), 3 (Highly effective), or N/O (Not observed). Any rating of 1 or 3 REQUIRES explanation in the Notes column. Insert and rate additional sub criteria as observed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task: Planning and Response Plan Execution</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Condition: As a member of a protective force, under routine and emergency exercise conditions, provided training and equipment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard: Planning - Effective planning provides predetermined sets of activities and orders to accomplish the overall security mission in any situation that could reasonably be anticipated; to provide for the expeditious and orderly development of ad hoc plans to address situations that could not have been reasonably anticipated; and to enable the protective force to act and react in a confident, effective, and timely manner. Response Plan Execution - Responding protective force personnel are well versed in protection objectives delineated in approved site protection policies and plans (e.g., denial of the adversaries’ access to target and/or containment of intruders to preclude the removal of nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons components, or special nuclear material) and effectively execute (in a timely manner and with appropriate forces) the response.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub Criteria</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Were responders knowledgeable of the tactical response plan and their role in the plan?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 2 3 N/O</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 2. Were adversaries engaged at barriers and/or by interlocking fields of fire? |       |
| 1 2 3 N/O |       |

| 3. Was key terrain/high ground controlled by protective force physical presence or by weapons fire? |       |
| 1 2 3 N/O |       |

<p>| 4. Were appropriate weapons available and used in accordance with weapons capabilities? |       |
| 1 2 3 N/O |       |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 2 3 N/O</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 2 3 N/O</td>
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<td>1 2 3 N/O</td>
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<td>1 2 3 N/O</td>
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<td>1 2 3 N/O</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1 2 3 N/O</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
Rate each criteria and sub criteria: 1 (Does not meet requirements), 2 (Adequate), 3 (Highly effective), or N/O (Not observed). Any rating of 1 or 3 REQUIRES explanation in the Notes column. Insert and rate additional sub criteria as observed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task: Communications</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Condition: As a member of a protective force, under routine and emergency exercise conditions, provided training and operational communications equipment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard: Communications provide secure, rapid, accurate, and understandable exchange of essential information between members of a protective force element, elements of the protective force, and appropriate C2 agencies without compromising friendly information or allowing the successful injection of spurious information.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub Criteria</strong></td>
<td><strong>Notes</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 2 3 N/O</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 1 2 3 N/O |   |   |   |   |

| 1 2 3 N/O |   |   |   |   |

Notes:
Rate each criteria and sub criteria: 1 (Does not meet requirements), 2 (Adequate), 3 (Highly effective), or N/O (Not observed). Any rating of 1 or 3 REQUIRES explanation in the Notes column. Insert and rate additional sub criteria as observed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task: Command and Control</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Condition: As a member of a protective force C2 element, under routine and emergency exercise conditions, provided training, equipment, and personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard: C2 directs, provides, and communicates clear, effective, and in-depth control, coordination, and utilization of the protective force and other security assets in the pursuit of mission accomplishment.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub Criteria</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21. Did responder have or assume C2 responsibilities?</td>
<td>Explain:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What kind? overall tactical commander / team lead / vehicle / through attrition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Did commander clearly understand and control situation?</td>
<td>Circle one and Explain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 2 3 N/O</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Was commander aware of locations and actions of responders and adversaries?</td>
<td>Circle one and Explain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 2 3 N/O</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Was chain of command and succession of command understood?</td>
<td>Circle one and Explain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 2 3 N/O</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Were EEI communicated up and down the chain of command?</td>
<td>Circle one and Explain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 2 3 N/O</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. Did commander direct/redirect responders to engage adversaries?</td>
<td>Circle one and Explain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 2 3 N/O</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

WHEN FILLED IN HANDLE AS SECRET DRAFT / WORKING PAPER
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Explaination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Was C2 of special teams (snipers, breachers, assaulters, recapture</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>recovery team) effective?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 2 3 N/O</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Was the commander knowledgeable and did he effectively use the tools    |        |                               |
| and equipment to support C2?                                            |        |                               |
| 1 2 3 N/O                                                              |        |                               |

| Was coordination of external assets (e.g., LLEA) and appropriate contacts|        |                               |
| made?                                                                  |        |                               |
| 1 2 3 N/O                                                              |        |                               |

| Did commander make timely decisions and communicate the sense of urgency |        |                               |
| needed?                                                                |        |                               |
| 1 2 3 N/O                                                              |        |                               |

Notes:

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Rate each criteria and sub criteria: 1 (Does not meet requirements), 2 (Adequate), 3 (Highly effective), or N/O (Not observed). Any rating of 1 or 3 REQUIRES explanation in the Notes column. Insert and rate additional sub criteria as observed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task: Individual Tactical Skills</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Condition:</strong> As a member of a protective force, under routine and emergency exercise conditions, given a mounted or dismounted area of responsibility, provided training and equipment.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Standard:</strong> Individual tactics are used to tactically move, occupy positions, observe, and/or deliver fire in a manner that is effective in neutralizing the effect of adversary observation, movement, and fire.</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub Criteria</th>
<th>Notes</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 2 3 N/O</td>
<td>Circle one and Explain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>barricades, obstacles)?</td>
<td>Circle one and Explain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 2 3 N/O</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 2 3 N/O</td>
<td>Circle one and Explain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>selection, cover to cover, danger areas, formations) considered?</td>
<td>Circle one and Explain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 2 3 N/O</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 2 3 N/O</td>
<td>Circle one and Explain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 2 3 N/O</td>
<td>Circle one and Explain</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Rating Options</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>37. Was SA maintained?</td>
<td>1 2 3 N/O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38. Was light and noise discipline maintained?</td>
<td>1 2 3 N/O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39. Was interior building movement effective?</td>
<td>1 2 3 N/O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40. Was responder proficient in suspect control?</td>
<td>1 2 3 N/O</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
### Rate each criteria and sub criteria: 1 (Does not meet requirements), 2 (Adequate), 3 (Highly effective), or N/O (Not observed). Any rating of 1 or 3 REQUIRES explanation in the Notes column. Insert and rate additional sub criteria as observed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task: Team Tactical Skills</th>
<th>Condition: As a member of a protective force team or squad (two or more personnel), under routine and emergency exercise conditions, provided training and equipment. Standard: Team tactics are used to tactically move and deliver fire in a coordinated team effort that provides for mutual support; minimizes exposure to adversary observation, detection, or fire; and brings the maximum force practical to bear on the adversary at the optimum time and place for mission accomplishment.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub Criteria</strong></td>
<td><strong>Notes</strong></td>
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<td>Question</td>
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<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>Was SA (360 degree coverage, adjacent units, adversaries, tactical link-ups) maintained?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Rate each criteria and sub criteria:** 1 (Does not meet requirements), 2 (Adequate), 3 (Highly effective), or N/O (Not observed). Any rating of 1 or 3 REQUIRES explanation in the Notes column. Insert and rate additional sub criteria as observed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task: Special Response Team Tactical Skills</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Condition: As a member of an SRT, under routine and emergency exercise conditions, provided specialized training and equipment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard: The SRT must resolve incidents that require force options that exceed the capability of SPO I and II personnel and/or existing physical security systems. The SRT must be capable of effective and ready response, and must be trained and equipped to conduct interdiction, interruption, and neutralization operations and containment, denial, recapture, recovery, and pursuit strategies directed against an adversary.</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub Criteria</th>
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<tr>
<td>60.</td>
<td>Was movement coordinated (covered by observation and/or supporting cover fire and/or interlocking fields of fire)?</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Notes: WHEN FILLED IN HANDLE AS SECRET DRAFT / WORKING PAPER
Rate each criteria and sub criteria: 1 (Does not meet requirements), 2 (Adequate), 3 (Highly effective), or N/O (Not observed). Any rating of 1 or 3 REQUIRES explanation in the Notes column. Insert and rate additional sub criteria as observed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub Criteria</th>
<th>Notes</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Notes:</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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Rate each criteria and sub criteria: 1 (Does not meet requirements), 2 (Adequate), 3 (Highly effective), or N/O (Not observed). Any rating of 1 or 3 REQUIRES explanation in the Notes column. Insert and rate additional sub criteria as observed.

### Task: Conduct of Exercise

**Condition:** As a member of a protective force (controller and/or player), under routine and emergency exercise conditions, provided training and equipment

**Standard:** Performance tests must be conducted safely and realistically to evaluate and verify the effectiveness of protective force programs, identify needed training and provide training for personnel, identify areas requiring system improvements, validate implemented improvements, and motivate personnel.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub Criteria</th>
<th>Notes</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Question</td>
<td>Rating Options</td>
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<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77. Did controllers maintain radio/noise discipline?</td>
<td>1 Does not meet requirements 2 Adequate 3 Highly Effective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78. Were the scenarios compromised?</td>
<td>1 Does not meet requirements 2 Adequate 3 Highly Effective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79. Was control of the ESS issue area maintained?</td>
<td>1 Does not meet requirements 2 Adequate 3 Highly Effective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80. Was there any gaming or undue partisanship observed?</td>
<td>1 Does not meet requirements 2 Adequate 3 Highly Effective</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
Rate each criteria and sub criteria: 1 (Does not meet requirements), 2 (Adequate), 3 (Highly effective), or N/O (Not observed). Any rating of 1 or 3 REQUIRES explanation in the Notes column. Insert and rate additional sub criteria as observed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task: Central Alarm Station/Secondary Alarm Station</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Condition: As a CAS/SAS operator, under routine and emergency exercise conditions, provided training, equipment, and operational CAS/SAS systems</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard: Alarm stations must provide a capability for monitoring and assessing alarms and initiating responses to S&amp;S events.</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub Criteria</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 2 3 N/O</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1 2 3 N/O</td>
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<td>1 2 3 N/O</td>
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<td>1 2 3 N/O</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 2 3 N/O</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1 2 3 N/O</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question</td>
<td>Circle one and Explain</td>
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<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
**Task: Convoy Operations/Onsite Shipments**  
**Condition:** As a member of a protective force, under routine and emergency exercise conditions, given a mounted area of responsibility and/or operation, provided training and equipment.

**Standard:** Convoy operations/onsite shipments provide safe and secure movement of personnel and/or cargo via groups of tactical ground transportation assets in a secure manner to/from a destination under the control of a tactical commander. These operations provide safe and secure movement of onsite shipments of special nuclear material between Protected Areas at the same site or between Protected Areas and staging areas on the same site.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub Criteria</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Question</td>
<td>Rating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
Rate each criteria and sub criteria: 1 (Does not meet requirements), 2 (Adequate), 3 (Highly effective), or N/O (Not observed). Any rating of 1 or 3 REQUIRES explanation in the Notes column. Insert and rate additional sub criteria as observed.

**Task:** Security Helicopter Flight Operations  
**Condition:** As a member of a protective force conducting security helicopter flight operations, under routine and emergency exercise conditions, given an area of responsibility and/or operation, provided training and equipment  
**Standard:** Security helicopter crew and passengers must provide timely and effective aerial response to a security incident as directed by the senior on-scene commander and/or by standard operating procedures.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub Criteria</th>
<th>Performance Level Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 2 3 N/O</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1 2 3 N/O</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1 2 3 N/O</td>
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<td>1 2 3 N/O</td>
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<td>1 2 3 N/O</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 2 3 N/O</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix B

When filled in handle as secret draft / working paper

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Rating Options</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>107. Was fire control plan effective?</td>
<td>1: Does not meet requirements, 2: Adequate, 3: Highly Effective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1  2  3  N/O</td>
<td>Circle one and Explain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>108. Was special equipment used effectively?</td>
<td>1: Does not meet requirements, 2: Adequate, 3: Highly Effective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1  2  3  N/O</td>
<td>Circle one and Explain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>109. Were air-to-ground communications effective?</td>
<td>1: Does not meet requirements, 2: Adequate, 3: Highly Effective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1  2  3  N/O</td>
<td>Circle one and Explain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110. Did pilot and door gunner work together to identify and engage adversaries?</td>
<td>1: Does not meet requirements, 2: Adequate, 3: Highly Effective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1  2  3  N/O</td>
<td>Circle one and Explain</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:

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PF-154
Appendix B
Appendix C: Performance Test Safety Considerations for Assessment Activities

GENERAL INFORMATION

During assessments by the Office of Security Assessments, the site or organization where the assessment activities are conducted is responsible for safety planning, and Security Assessments assessors (particularly the performance testing team) work very closely with site safety officials, performance testing personnel, and protective force personnel to ensure that safety plans are developed, implemented, and executed for limited-scope performance tests (LSPTs), range operations, force-on-force performance tests, and other assessment activities. Nonetheless, over the past several years, assessors have discovered a number of safety issues, observed safety violations, halted activities to make instant corrections, and documented inadequate safety performance in the final assessment report. Some of those occurrences are enumerated in the ensuing narrative to assist assessors in identifying common faults and areas of concern. During the planning stage of performance testing and live-fire activities, numerous hazards must be considered, including: the potential for trips, slips, and falls; weather conditions; use of ladders and staging personnel at significant heights (e.g., rooftops and towers); poor visibility and inadequate lighting; vehicle operations and the potential for accidents; radiation areas; and exercise boundaries to avoid construction zones or other hazards.

While all of those conditions are important and certainly should be considered and addressed in safety plans, two main areas present the greatest potential for accidents and resultant injuries: performance testing activities involving live fire at the site or organization live-fire ranges, and activities that involve the issue and use of multiple integrated laser engagement systems (MILES), also referred to as engagement simulation system (ESS), and subsequent conduct of ESS enhanced performance testing.

LIVE-FIRE RANGE OPERATIONS

Where live-fire range operations are conducted, the site or organization may have a fully developed and wholly adequate range safety plan that is routinely adhered to and, over the course of many varied iterations of live fire, provides safe operation of the range. However, in rare instances, this routine safe operation can be threatened by a condition that is best described as “unintentional complacency.” Firearms instructors are only human, and their duties are among the most routinized of any member of a protective force operation (i.e., they essentially do the same things, the same way, day in and day out, often over an extended time period and often in climatic conditions, including extreme heat and extreme cold, that are physically demanding). There is no intention on the part of firearms instructors to let their vigilance for safety wane, but occasionally (though rather rarely), it does. Assessors rely on the sites/facilities to execute the safety plan, but when anomalies are noted, it is incumbent upon assessors to first ensure that an instant correction is made to mitigate any immediate hazard (by bringing the concern to the immediate attention of the range safety officer or lead instructor), to subsequently validate the anomaly with appropriate site management, and to annotate the problem in the assessment report (generally as a finding or deficiency, depending on the nature of the incident).

Common Deficiencies/Potential Concerns

During assessments over the past several years, Security Assessments has reported several less-than-adequate performance incidents with regard to live-fire range operations. The most common occurrence has involved personnel moving in front of the firing line before it has been officially declared safe. In one instance, the lead instructor moved in front of the firing line prematurely. More commonly, personnel move forward to retrieve dropped items. There have also been instances where the muzzles of firearms have been inadvertently (and in some cases unknowingly) pointed at other personnel on the line. It is irrelevant that in most of those cases the time that the muzzle covered another person was minuscule or that the firearm was at the time unloaded or on
“safe.” In a training situation, a firearm should never “cover” another living person. In another case, several personnel did not fire the final round from their rifle during a transition drill to the handgun; this decision made to save time resulted in leaving the rifle in the full firing mode (not on “safe”) with a round in the chamber while the rifle was carried (slung) on the person. In another instance, an instructor assisting a trainee somehow fired a round down range from a machinegun after the line had been declared clear. Live-fire range operations inherently contain risks and, despite the best efforts of all involved, something untoward will happen at some point, possibly involving equipment failure, human error, complacency, or inattention. Such instances may not occur for years and then may occur without notice. Errors in live-fire range operations may be inconsequential or very significant. For the assessor who is on the firing line, it is important to be attentive to the safety culture that exists at the firing range. The range safety culture will be obvious by the amount of control exercised by the range staff, the discipline enforced on the range, the attentiveness of the range staff, and the ability of the range staff to elicit compliant and cooperative behaviors from personnel during qualification or weapons training. No other venue in an assessment requires closer scrutiny than live-fire range operations.

**ESS ENHANCED PERFORMANCE TESTS**

Where ESS enhanced performance tests (including force-on-force tests) are conducted, the key issue is establishing with absolute assurance that live ammunition is excluded from the exercise area and that each participant is thoroughly “sanitized” to ensure that there is no live ammunition on the person or in any of the equipment that he or she will carry into the exercise area. In addition, live firearms must be excluded from the exercise area and there must be no contact, interaction, or even near proximity between exercise participants and members of the shadow force or protective force who are armed with live weapons. In December 1994, an incident occurred at a U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) site where inadequate procedures and precautions resulted in live ammunition being introduced into an ESS enhanced exercise that subsequently caused the gunshot death of one of the participants. Once again, the site/facility is responsible for the safety plan, but assessors and assigned safety officers (representing the site and the assessment team) must practice due diligence in reviewing and assessing procedures used to prepare personnel for ESS enhanced performance testing. This review and assessment is especially necessary for large-scale force-on-force exercises. Safety becomes a collaborative effort where the site and the Office of Security Assessments performance testing team consider a number of safety aspects, including those related to the activities of the Composite Adversary Team.

**Common Deficiencies/Potential Concerns**

While most sites have developed sophisticated and well-conceived plans for sanitizing players and for the issue/turn-in of ESS firearms and equipment, there have been occasions where shadow force/protective force firearms have been in close proximity to exercise participants. These instances include: 1) live ammunition was left in an area where the exercise participants were located; 2) an armed member of the shadow force entered an area where exercise participants were located in an attempt to reach his office in the area; and 3) a member of the armed protective force passed an exercise participant on foot in such proximity that normal conversation could occur. In all cases, the error was quickly resolved, and while these incidents may seem innocuous, they cannot be permitted. The exercise area where ESS firearms and ammunition will be used must be pristine in the exclusion of live ammunition and firearms. In other incidents, Security Assessments cited inappropriate performance by site controllers for activities involving the failure to abide by the tenets of the established rules of engagement (ROE), in some cases causing a safety issue; inappropriate controller calls (especially those related to weapons’ effects); and in at least one instance, a controller allowed his player to speed through the exercise in violation of the established speed limit for any vehicle in the exercise area. In the latter incident, both the player and controller were ejected from further play. Many other safety considerations are included in the plan developed for a full-scale exercise, and while a detailed discussion is beyond the scope of this guide, an outline of the overall plan is provided in the following narrative.
PLANNING LIVE-FIRE ACTIVITIES

When planning for live-fire range activities, it is important for assessors to pre-plan assessment activities and that planning is most successful and effective when a face-to-face meeting is conducted with the site’s managers (particularly the training manager), the range master, and any staff member who will be responsible for a particular portion of the overall performance testing (e.g., live-fire shoot house, breaching, combat stress course, square range qualifications). In addition to reviewing any available safety plans and procedures, assessors should walk the terrain where the live-fire performance testing will occur.

Safety in the Execution of Live-Fire Performance Testing and Data Collection

Most assessors are not school trained safety officers; however, there are a number of “common sense” observations that can be made during the course of live-fire range activities that will help to formulate an informed evaluation of the overall safety culture as it applies to the operation of the ranges where performance tests are conducted. The following data points are by no means all inclusive, and any attempt to extract all of the safety requirements from the applicable orders and directives goes far beyond the scope of this guide. The following list falls under the heading of “things to look for,” and when these concerns lead to obvious shortfalls and deficiencies, assessors should not be reticent in bringing the concerns to the attentions of appropriate Security Assessments and site leadership.

Range Facilities

1. Do range facilities support DOE and site-specific training requirements? Are provisions made for day and reduced lighting qualifications for all deployed firearms?

2. Are local ranges available to permit firing of all firearms deployed by the protective force?

3. Is the range well maintained, clean, and free of debris and/or non-essential items? Is the policing of brass conducted at the conclusion of firing, and is the process sufficient to clear the range of expended cartridges? Is there a method for checking collected brass to separate live rounds that may have been mixed with expended rounds?

4. Do target systems (turning targets, running man, pop-up, and steel) operate efficiently so that the continuity of a course of fire is not interrupted?

5. Does the public address system announcing the firing sequence operate so that participants on the firing line can clearly hear and respond to commands? Do range safety officers have a dedicated means of communicating with one another (e.g., hand-held radios)?

6. Are firing points adequately spaced to permit each shooter sufficient room to assume various firing positions without disturbing the shooter next to him/her?

7. Are combat stress courses and other tactical training areas well considered, challenging, and realistic in terms of testing participants in the individual and/or collective skills required by their primary protection mission?

8. Is the live-fire shoot house adequate for its intended use? Is there a means of reconfiguring the rooms so that participants are not pre-programmed to a single layout? Is lighting adequate? Does the overhead catwalk provide sufficient room for instructors to move with participants and controllers on the ground, and does it provide room for observers? Are targets covered or repositioned so that participants do not
have an opportunity to determine adversary or non-combatant positions before beginning a live-fire exercise?

9. Are ranges for specialty weapons (grenade launchers, Dillon miniguns, precision rifles) well configured, and do they support realistic training and qualification with the specialty weapons?

Range Operations

1. Are all live-fire activities preceded by a firearms safety briefing (assessors should make a special effort to attend these briefings)? Was the briefing adequate, comprehensive, and tailored to the specific course of fire that the participants will shoot? Were participants attentive, and did the briefer use interactive techniques (such as questions) to ensure that participants were engaged? Was roll call conducted to ensure that everyone scheduled to shoot attended the briefing?

2. Were shooters required to pass an LSPT based on an approved lesson plan to demonstrate that they could adequately operate the firearms before being allowed to shoot? Was the test annotated on the score sheet?

3. If the course of fire required participants to move tactically to engage targets, was a safety walkdown conducted with the participants (if the walkdown occurred in the live-fire shoot house, were targets covered or repositioned before the course of fire began)?

4. Was there an approved safety plan for the specific course of fire? Was it followed?

5. Are procedures in place to summon medical emergency personnel if needed?

6. Are first aid or trauma kits available for use until medical emergency personnel arrive on scene?

7. Were instructor-to-shooter ratios adequate? Were one-to-one ratios used for full automatic fire?

8. Were shooters on the firing line properly controlled by instructors and range safety officers? Were shooters required to maintain silence except to converse with instructors? Were firearms controlled (rifles slung, handguns holstered, at the ready or low ready as called for by the course of fire)? Were general commands (such as cease fire, hold position) and loading and unloading instructions clear, and did participants comply? After each string of fire, did instructors check to ensure that firearms were cleared out and on “safe” before allowing anyone to proceed down range?

9. Did each shooter wear personal protective equipment (safety glasses, hearing protection, gloves, and any additional items prescribed by site safety plans)?

10. Were all persons required to remain at or behind the firing line until range staff called “clear”? Were shooters instructed to leave dropped ammunition (including magazines) on the ground until instructed to retrieve it?

11. Were “alibis” properly resolved? In the live-fire shoot house, were standards fairly applied to all participants?

12. Were targets properly and accurately scored by instructors, and were shooters advised beforehand of the score needed to successfully complete the course of fire? Were field scores annotated on score sheets authenticated by a lead instructor? Were shooters who did not successfully complete a qualification course given an immediate opportunity to reshoot the course? If not, were they removed from armed duty status until retesting could be accomplished?
All of the foregoing conditions are integral to the safe conduct of live-fire operations and performance tests that are generally conducted as part of the “duties” portion of an assessment. A successful conclusion to these tests results in a series of completed firearms score sheets, shooters who have successfully completed the various courses of fire without accident or injury, and the assessors should have a strong sense that the site has a viable set of safety procedures and practices governing the operation of their various ranges and courses of fire.

SAFETY PLANNING FOR ESS ENHANCED PERFORMANCE TESTS

Planning for ESS enhanced full-scale force-on-force performance tests requires significant coordination between the Security Assessments performance testing team and site exercise planners. Such planning begins weeks in advance of the actual event. ESS enhanced performance tests directed to lower-level threats (e.g., active shooter or demonstrators/trespassers) may be planned in conjunction with a full-scale exercise. Such exercises are bound by the same rigid safety considerations and requirements as the full-scale force-on-force exercise. As the exercise scenarios are built, Security Assessments performance testing personnel, along with their site counterparts, develop the parameters of the exercises and safety representatives from both organizations conduct continuous reviews to ensure that the tests can be conducted safely. This coordination seeks to ensure that the performance tests are realistic and test the protective force’s ability to counter adversary actions and capabilities (as cited in the current Graded Security Protection policy) and to ensure that safety is a paramount consideration throughout the performance test(s). To that end, a site safety plan is developed and should contain the following elements:

1. Description of the Performance Test(s)
2. Performance Test Date and Time
3. Scenario
   - Step-by-step description of how the performance test will be conducted
4. Drill Announcements
   - How and when drill announcements will be conducted
5. Performance Test Boundaries
   - Restrictions on performance test participant movement
6. Off-Limits Areas
   - How off-limits areas will be designated
7. Required Safety Equipment
   - Safety equipment requirements for all participants (players, controllers, evaluators, etc.)
8. Specific Safety Hazards
   - Requirements for mitigating specific safety hazards
   - Requirements and restrictions for the area in which the performance test will be conducted
   - Hazardous areas to be avoided by exercise participants
   - Gas, smoke, explosive simulators, or other types of burning or exploding munitions to be used by exercise participants
   - Other personnel safety provisions as dictated by the scenarios

11. Environmental Conditions
   - Provisions for heat, cold, rain, lightning, physiological stress (such as movement over rough terrain), wildlife hazards, etc.

   - Speed limits in exercise areas, safe use of all-terrain vehicles and armored vehicles, etc.

   - Close adherence to existing procedures for the issue of ESS firearms and ammunition
   - Requirements for thorough safety briefings on use of ESS firearms

14. Personnel Assignments
   - Specific assignments and associated briefings with regard to safety (fire watch, event controllers)

   - How the shadow force will be segregated from exercise participants and exercise areas

   - If LLEA response is desired, LLEA should be notified that their response is part of a drill immediately after response is initiated.
   - If LLEA response is not desired, LLEA headquarters and LLEA units in the field should be notified that the exercise will not require their response.

17. Participant Holding Area Provisions
   - How participants will be segregated from any live weapons

18. Any other pertinent information specific to the safe execution of this performance test

19. Review and Concurrence
   - The document should be reviewed and signed by appropriate site personnel.
An individual assessor assigned to a specific position during a performance test exercise (particularly a full-scale force-on-force exercise) cannot monitor every aspect of safety performance for the entire exercise. However, he or she can have a working knowledge of overall safety plans and procedures, ROEs, the standard effects and effective ranges of exercise firearms, and can take a “common sense” approach to assessing and reporting what he or she sees and finds either acceptable or substandard. To assist in that task and to focus attention on the elements that apply to the assessor’s role as an evaluator, the following listing of requirements has been extracted and provided as a quick guide from DOE Order 473.3A, Attachment 2, Annex 2.

**Summary of Evaluation Criteria from DOE Order 473.3A, Attachment 2, Annex 2**

Are there **plans and procedures** that specifically address safety issues while remaining consistent with realistic evaluation and training? Are there **Risk Assessments** that include procedures for any materials, equipment, and/or operations that are identified as potential hazards during the conduct of any scenario? Do safety plans cover **facility safety** concerns specific to scenarios being conducted? *[DOE Order 473.3A, Attachment 2, Annex 2, Paragraph 8.a.(2)]*

- Are evaluators thoroughly briefed on the safety parameters of the exercise and the exercise area?

- Are parameters for exercise activities clearly explained (e.g., speed limits for any exercise vehicle; ROEs; distance at which “danger close” calls must be invoked; any radiological areas, construction areas, contaminated areas, identified; exercise boundaries and off-limits areas explained)?

- Is the location of the shadow force provided?

- Are the scenarios clearly explained, and are individual evaluators familiar with how their individual player(s) may become engaged in the exercise? Are evaluators familiar with the equipment, firearms, and munitions that the protective force may employ during an exercise? Are evaluators provided with a briefing on any unique equipment?

- Are evaluators provided with a windshield tour or terrain walk of the exercise area?

Are ESS performance testing and training activities regulated by **controllers and instructors** who have authority and responsibility for ensuring that all operations are conducted safely? *[DOE Order 473.3A, Attachment 2, Annex 2, Paragraph 8.a.(3)]*

- Has a formal and appropriately documented training course been provided to personnel who will act as controllers for ESS enhanced exercises?

- Do individual training records reflect that personnel have successfully completed the course (spot checks of records could be conducted during an evaluation of protective force training)?

- Do evaluator observations confirm that controllers go about their pre-exercise duties in a business-like and thorough manner? Do such observations confirm that controllers are adept at ensuring that their players are sanitized with regard to introduction of live ammunition in the exercise area?

- Are instructors certified and qualified to perform the duties associated with exercise performance? Training records and certifications will normally be assessed as part of a comprehensive assessment and may be spot checked for a particular exercise activity.
Are personnel acting as adversary/opposing force (OPFOR) and response force members briefed as to their individual responsibilities? [DOE Order 473.3A, Attachment 2, Annex 2, Paragraph 8.b(1-15)]

- In addition to briefings for adversary/OPFOR personnel, are such personnel provided with an appropriate area and sufficient time to conduct rehearsals and prepare for the exercise(s)?

- Are adversary and OPFOR forces well versed on their responsibilities to execute the approved scenario plan while also being allowed the flexibility to conduct ad hoc adjustments in response to protective force actions, as long as the established safety parameters are not violated?

- Are response forces fully briefed on the safety aspects of the exercise? Are requirements for live ammunition and sanitizing processes for the person and equipment emphasized?

Are specific ROE developed and documented for each force-on-force or man-on-man performance test/training activity, as applicable? [DOE Order 473.3A, Attachment 2, Annex 2, Paragraph 8.g.]

- Are the ROE fully covered in pre-exercise briefings?

Do controllers make appropriate calls regarding ROE, weapons effects, lethality of area weapons, and do controllers make logical judgments concerning exercise activities (e.g., is foliage called out as adequate cover; is a player within eight meters of a grenade detonation allowed to continue)? Are controller staffs organized in a manner that facilitate the control of all affected locations and the control and coordination of all events, and ensure the control for live rounds or other prohibited ammunition during ESS performance testing exercises? [DOE Order 473.3A, Appendix A, Annex 1, Paragraph 11.d.(1)]

- Is a controller provided for each player?

- Does each assigned controller take personal responsibility and appropriate actions to ensure that his/her player is sanitized before the exercise(s)? Does he/she personally verify that the ammunition issued to his/her player is blank ammunition? Does he/she personally examine any equipment his/her player is carrying into the exercise for live ammunition?

- Is the setup, flow, and organization of the ESS issue/turn-in area conducive to ensuring that safety aspects are accommodated?

Are all firearms and weapons used in ESS exercises and training activities permanently modified and dedicated for ESS use only? [DOE Order 473.3A, Attachment 2, Annex 2, Paragraph 8.c.(1)]

Are ESS MILES firearms equipped with approved blank fire adapters, blast deflectors, live round inhibiting devices or ported chambers, plus one or more additional engineered controls of safety, to prevent the accidental introduction of live rounds? [DOE Order 473.A3, Attachment 2, Annex 2, Paragraph 8.c.(2) and (4)]

Are ESS firearms clearly marked as exercise firearms, closely controlled, and kept separate from any firearms not associated with the exercise? [DOE Order 473.3A, Attachment 2, Annex 2, Paragraph 8.c.(6)]

Are ESS firearms checked and documented to ensure the presence of all required engineered safety controls before issuance for use (e.g., training exercises and performance tests)? [DOE Order 473.3A, Attachment 2, Annex 2, Paragraph 8.c.(6)]

Are ESS modified ammunition magazines, clips, and belts (first link) distinctively color coded orange? [DOE Order 473.3A, Attachment 2, Annex 2, Paragraph 8.d.(1)]
Are **firearms and ammunition inspected** at the beginning of each scenario by the responsible ESS controller/instructor and participants to ensure that approved ammunition and required ESS engineered controls are in use? [DOE Order 473.3A, Attachment 2, Annex 2, Paragraph 8.d.(4)(b)]

Are **controls** implemented to ensure that no live firearms or ammunition of any type are allowed within the ESS performance testing area, except those under the direct supervision of the shadow force controller? [DOE Order 473.3A, Attachment 2, Annex 2, Paragraph 6.b.(2)]

Are there **pre-activity safety briefings** that address safety concerns related to the use of smoke and obscurants, the controls for the deployment of smoke, and the safety controls established to control and limit personnel exposures? [DOE Order 473.3A, Attachment 2, Annex 2, Paragraph 8.e.(4)(f)]

- Are controllers fully versed in these safety requirements and familiar with conditions that would cause them to have their players don a protective mask in a smoke/obscurant environment?

**Are pyrotechnics, diversionary devices, and obscurants** deployed by persons trained in their safe deployment methods and knowledgeable of their potential hazards? [DOE Order 473.3A, Attachment 2, Annex 2, Paragraph 8.e.(5)(d)]

- Have personnel responsible for deploying pyrotechnics, diversionary devices, and obscurants attended a formal course of instruction provided by a qualified instructor to prepare them for these duties and responsibilities?

Are there written and approved procedures for **handling unexploded devices (duds)** and expended devices? [DOE Order 473.3A, Attachment 2, Annex 2, Paragraph 8.e.(2)]

- Have exercise participants been admonished to avoid contact with any unexploded device and to bring the device to the attention of a controller?

- Does the controller mark/note the location of the device and bring it to the attention of the exercise coordinator to ensure that personnel trained in handling the device safely remove it?

- Are expended devices detonated and removed by personnel trained for those duties?