



PG to Glycerin – Lessons Learned

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Protection Engineering

Y-12's AFLs

- Y-12 has 48 Antifreeze Loop (AFL) systems typically covering docks, sheds, penthouses, etc.
- 1 Safety-Significant AFL
- 10 others fed by SC/SS Wet Pipe System (WPS)
- Antifreeze solution recently <u>changed</u> from 50% Propylene Glycol to 48% Glycerin...

50% Propylene Glycol

- Y-12 has been using 50% solution of Propylene Glycol for the past 30+ years.
- Y-12 has not experienced any antifreeze system breaks due to freeze up in at least the past 15 years when using 50% PG. Even through the polar vortex of 2013/2014 winter.
- The 50% PG would typically test in the -30's to -40's^oF.

Why the Change?

Mandated by NFPA

- Aug 2009: Incident caused by improper design/maintenance
 - 1 killed and 4 injured.
 - Solution was found to be 71.2% concentrate
- Aug 2010: NFPA Issues Safety Alert and TIAs
 - Guidance limited to new installations in <u>residences</u>
 - Life safety concern not a system operability issue
- March 2011: NFPA Updates TIAs
 - Guidance now includes commercial application and is made retroactive to include existing systems
 - Proposal to exclude unoccupied spaces fails by one vote

The Incident

- The following information was obtained from the Fire and Explosion Investigation Report by Stephen Hart, Consultant dated September 17, 2009.
- The incident occurred on August 18, 2009 at the Henness Flats Apartments located in Truckee, CA
- The apartment was occupied by 5 individuals; husband and wife and three small children.
- The father was frying onions on an electric stove when a grease fire started. He turned 180 degrees to the sink with the flaming frying pan.
 - This report did not specifically state water was placed on the grease fire, I
 have read other articles that state water was placed on the fire.
- The sprinkler directly over him activated and a violent explosion resulted.

Explosion and Injuries

- The blast caused window glass to be blown more than 86-feet across the adjacent parking area of the complex.
- The force of the blast caused an interior door frame and attached door to an adjacent bathroom to be pulled out approximately 3-inches from the frame.
- Eight (8) out of the ten (10) sprinklers within the unit activated from the fire and explosion.
- All five occupants received burn injuries from the blast.
- The mother died from her injuries, shortly after being airlifted.
- The husband/father was burned over 40-45% of his body.
- Three small children were treated and released that evening.

Similar Case

- Occurred October 28, 2001 at the Windandsea Restaurant in Highlands, NJ.
- Three story wood structure, the second and third story were provided with Propylene Glycol filled antifreeze system.
- 155°F sidewall sprinklers were installed adjacent to multiple 25,000 BTU ceiling mounted heaters.
- Witnesses working or eating stated hearing a pop sound and a sprinkler activated and then saw a liquid spraying down from above. Followed by a fireball developing at the ceiling in the area where a ceiling mounted heater was located.
- 18 injuries were recorded from this incident.

Further Information

- One incident was with PG (NJ) and one with Glycerin (CA). However, both had concentrations greater than 60%.
- CA apartment fire was filled with in excess of 70% glycerin.
- Both incidents had a fire and explosion.
- Both incidents resulted in multiple injuries.
- Damage from the actual flash grease fire was minimal.
- Therefore, damage from both incidents would have been minimal with probably no or only minor injuries with a wet pipe system.

What to do for Existing Systems?

PG	Glycerin	
< 30% 30% FP = $+9^{0}$ F = Unusable	< 38%	Safe. No change.
30% - 40% $40\% FP = -6^{0}F =$ Unusable	38% - 50% $48\% FP = -16^{0}F =$ Usable	Perform a deterministic risk assessment. DRA determines if solution is safe to use in that area.
> 40%	> 50%	Drain. Refill with listed solution [*] or employ alternative methods ^{**} * "no listed solutions currently exist" – NFPA ** dry-pipe system, heat the area, etc.

Note: NFPA TIA also requires solutions to be factory pre-mixed

Y-12's Change

- July 2013: Letter from Contractor, stating we propose to change from PG to Glycerin in order to satisfy the life safety concern.
 - Not contractually required (newer edition NFPA 25)
 - Not required by NFPA 25 until 2022
- August 2013: Letter from Field Office, "Approve the Change."
- Spring/Summer of 2014: 45 of the 48 systems swapped PG for 48% pre-mixed glycerin
- Afterward: We pat ourselves on the back for being safety-minded and at the forefront of change.

What Happened?

- Nov 19, 2014: Fire Department responded to a water flow alarm.
 - Found an antifreeze system had frozen.
 - 2 sprinklers had damage
 - No piping was found to be damaged
- Temp low that day was 18°F
- A limited number of antifreeze systems were tested to see if we had a site wide issue.
- Results suggested there was site wide issue.

Immediate Term Actions

1. Establish interim guidance to address impending freeze conditions

- < 0⁰F = "pass"
- $>0^{\circ}F$ = isolate the system, replace solution if possible, drain the solution if possible, and implement appropriate compensatory measures

2. Test the 45 systems which have been converted to Glycerin

- 14 Tested acceptable <-10⁰F
- 31 tested unacceptable per procedure >-10⁰F
- 18 tested >0⁰F
 - 29 drained and refilled
 - 2 in heated area (no action)

Why the Dilution?

- System not fully pressurized when filling? (tooling issue)
- Not fully vented due to configuration?
- Forward-flow test of the backflow preventer impacting solution?
- Water migration through the backflow preventer?
- Solution deteriorating/solution separating?
- Manufacturer not mixing AFL thoroughly?
- Others?

What to do now?

Dedicated a FPE to look into the issue.

- Review procedures
 - Any steps that should be added or deleted?
- Review field work
 - Are there any steps that are allowing water intrusion?
- Review system designs
 - Are the systems designed correctly?
- Speak with manufacturers of solution
 - Anyone else having similar issues?
- Reach out to other DOE sites as well as local jurisdictions
- Interview maintenance staff
 - Are they aware of any issues that could be creating this problem
- Review if any systems can be eliminated

Pump Questions

Looked into the pump that is pressurizing the system

- Deadheaded at approximately 40 psi
- No gauge on the pump
- Average System pressure is approximately 80 psi
- This left us with a delta of approximately 40 psi between our supply side and antifreeze loop.
- Was water entering the AFL to equalize the pressure difference?

New pumps

• Purchased new pumps with gauges that can pump in excess of 120 psi.

System Design

Systems had limited high-point vents

- Some systems were only provided with one high-point vent
- Systems had multiple branch lines with no venting
- How many air pockets existed?

Location of high-point vents

 Most high-point vents required scaffolding or are located in hard to reach places.

• How much solution?

- There was no data of the volume of the system
- How much solution needed to be added?
- This was mainly guess work and it appears some systems were under filled due to trapped air in the system.

Forward-Flow of Backflow Preventer

• NFPA 25 requires annual forward-flow testing of the backflow preventer.

Configuration of the system

- Majority of our BFP are located between the WPS and AFL
- Water is introduced to the antifreeze system during testing


• Timing of the test

Most of the testing took place after the new solution was added to the system

Volume of the System

• Most of our antifreeze systems are small systems

Typical Backflow Preventer Configuration



18

Procedure Review

- A detailed review of the procedures, including in the field reviews were conducted.
- Emphasis was placed on operation of valves when adding new solution.
- Similar to the backflow preventer forward flow test, opportunities for water to enter the system based upon the valve sequence were identified.
- Other procedural items were reviewed and changes are being incorporated.

Water Migration

Surge Problems

- Y-12 has a number of water surges
- Would a surge allow water to enter the AFL?

• Trapped Air

• Were the air pockets within the system allowing water to enter?

• Other Causes?

• What else could be allowing water migration?

Issues with the Solution?

- Is the solution deteriorating?
 - The solution from the barrel was being tested every time before use.
 - Solution was consistently testing at -16⁰F

Is the solution separating?

- Again the solution was consistently testing at -16^oF in the barrels even after sitting for months.
- Spoke with manufacturers and all stated they have not heard of any issues

Is the solution mixed properly?

- Two manufacturers contradicted on how the solution is mixed.
- One stated the glycerin and water mixture will not come out of solution and it requires a large amount of agitation to create the solution
- Other stated it takes very little agitation for water and the glycerin to mix

Temporary Success

- No other freeze issues experienced.
- Y-12 ended up having a low temperature of 0 degrees, with below freezing conditions for 2+ days.

Further Work

1. Answer the questions,

- "For how long is this data applicable?"
- "What are we now compelled to do?"
- 2. Implement procedural and further tooling fixes
- **3.** System specific evaluation
 - System still necessary or can it be eliminated?
 - System configuration fixes
 - Convert to dry-pipe/wet-pipe when cost effective to do so
 - Explore use of dry-type sidewall heads
- 4. Test more frequently until we are satisfied that fixes have worked
- 5. If all else fails, revisit the NFPA guidance and determine if it is right for the plant.

Questions?

