



Department of Energy

Washington, DC 20585

July 27, 2026

Dr. Thomas E. Mason
Laboratory Director
Triad National Security, LLC
Los Alamos National Laboratory
Post Office Box 1663
Los Alamos, New Mexico, 87545

WEL-2026-01

Dear Dr. Mason:

The Office of Enforcement has completed an evaluation into an August 15, 2025, event at Los Alamos National Laboratory in which a worker was injured during a material handling operation involving the removal of bagged gravel waste from a roof using a telehandler and hopper attachment. Based on this evaluation, the Office of Enforcement identified concerns that warrant management attention by Triad National Security, LLC (Triad).

On the day of the event, four workers used a telehandler and fork-mounted hopper to remove bagged gravel waste from a roof and transfer the waste to trash bins. The hopper, a Vestil D-Series, is a self-dumping design. Its manufacturer's operating instructions require confirmation that the hopper chute is securely latched to the base frame, preventing its release and rotation before filling the chute with refuse. Prior to the incident that caused the injury, an unintended release of the hopper occurred when workers reloaded it with double-bagged waste and attempted to raise it, which dumped the load onto the ground. Despite this first unintended release, workers resumed operations without securing the attachment. Triad's Integrated Work Documents (IWDs) did not require verification that the hopper tilt release mechanism was secured.

During the second lift, workers raised the unsecured loaded hopper. It tilted forward, fell, and struck one of the workers on their foot, causing a fracture. Subsequent discussion with the Office of Enforcement and the Los Alamos Field Office determined that workers used the Vestil D-Series hopper with the telehandler, even though the hopper manufacturer's specifications state the hopper is designed for use only with high lift fork trucks and must not be used with telehandlers.

Based on this evaluation, the Office of Enforcement identified concerns with Triad's implementation of 10 Code of Federal Regulations Part 851, *Worker Safety and Health Program* requirements. The specific concerns that warrant management attention include the following:

- Triad did not effectively manage the work planning process to ensure it developed an adequate Integrated Work Document (IWD) for the material handling activity. Specifically, the work was performed under two Integrated Work Documents (IWDs), *IWD – 46-0025-Roof Insulator Support TSR Leaking Roof* and *IWD-46-0025-Roof Roofers Support TSR Leaking Roof*. These IWDs did not identify the incompatibility between the Vestil D-Series hopper and the telehandler and subsequently did not identify, or address hazards associated with telehandler operations and attachment use. These IWDs did not address attachment compatibility, spotter responsibilities, or verification of proper attachment engagement prior to use. The absence of these critical elements in work planning directly contributed to the initial unintended hopper release and led to the subsequent injury.
- Triad did not provide adequate training to workers on the safe operation of the telehandler with the hopper, specifically regarding the critical importance of verifying equipment compatibility and adhering to manufacturer instructions for approved equipment. Furthermore, Triad did not ensure workers maintained a safe distance from the telehandler during operations, which allowed workers to be too close to the telehandler while in use. This inadequate training likely contributed to workers' inability to fully recognize the hazards associated with the equipment's incompatibility and to respond appropriately after the initial hopper release, ultimately increasing the risk of injury.

The Office of Enforcement acknowledges that Triad made timely notifications, paused work following the event, and conducted a fact finding. The fact finding identified concerns related to work planning and control, specifically in the development and execution of IWDs and in equipment selection and training associated with material handling activities. The Office of Enforcement recommends that Triad ensure IWDs identify potential equipment incompatibilities, identify all potential hazards, and define controls for equipment use. Training should emphasize adherence to manufacturer instructions, including use of equipment in accordance with user manuals, verification of attachment compatibility and capacity, and verification that attachments are secured in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions prior to operation.

The Office of Enforcement has elected to issue this Enforcement Letter to convey concerns with Triad's implementation of worker safety and health requirements. Issuance of this Enforcement Letter reflects DOE's decision to not pursue further enforcement activity against Triad at this time. In coordination with the DOE's National Nuclear Security Administration, the Office of Enforcement will continue to monitor Triad's efforts to maintain a safe workplace.

This letter imposes no requirements on Triad, and no response is required. If you have any questions, please contact me at (301) 903-7707, or your staff may contact Dr. Shannon Holman, Director, Office of Worker Safety and Health Enforcement, at (301) 903-0100.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Robin M. Keeler". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "Robin" and last name "Keeler" clearly legible, and "M." as a middle initial.

Robin M. Keeler
Acting Director
Office of Enforcement
Office of Enterprise Assessments

cc: Theodore Wyka, NA-LA
Tamara Greenwood, Triad National Security, LLC