UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Order No. 202-25-3B
ORDER ADDRESSING ARGUMENTS RAISED ON REHEARING

(Issued September 8, 2025)

1. On May 23, 2025, pursuant to section 202(c) of the Federal Power Act (FPA),[1] and section 301(b) of the Department of Energy Organization Act,[2] the Secretary of Energy (Secretary) issued an order (Emergency Order) determining that "an emergency exists in portions of the Midwest region of the United States due to a shortage of electric energy, a shortage of facilities for the generation of electric energy, and other causes . . . ."[3] In the Emergency Order, the Secretary determined that "additional dispatch of the Campbell Plant is necessary to best meet the emergency and serve the public interest for purposes of FPA section 202(c)."[4] Requests for rehearing were filed by Public Interest Organizations (PIOs);[5] Michigan Attorney General Dana Nessel (Michigan AG); the States of Minnesota and Illinois (Minnesota and Illinois); and the Organization of MISO States (OMS).[6] Comments were filed by the Michigan Public Power Agency (MPPA) and the Maryland Office of People's Counsel (Maryland OPC).

2. On July 28, 2025, the Department of Energy (DOE) issued a notice of denial of rehearing by operation of law and providing for further consideration (DOE Notice). However, as provided in sections 202(c) and 313(a) of the FPA,[7] we are modifying the discussion in the Emergency Order and continue to reach the same result in this Order, as discussed below.[8]

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[1] 16 U.S.C. § 824a(c).

[2] 42 U.S.C. § 7151(b)

[3] Department of Energy Order No. 202-25-3 (May 23, 2025) (Emergency Order).

[4] *Id.* at 2.

[5] Sierra Club, Natural Resources Defense Council, Michigan Environmental Council, Environmental Defense Fund, Environmental Law and Policy Center, Vote Solar, Public Citizen, Union of Concerned Scientists, the Ecology Center, and Urban Core Collective refer to themselves collectively as Public Interest Organizations.

[6] OMS also filed a notice of clarification to identify which of its members voted in support of filing only a petition to intervene and which of its members voted in support of filing a petition to intervene and a request for rehearing.

[7] 16 U.S.C. § 824a(c); 16 U.S.C. § 825*l*(a). In the context of FPA section 202(c) orders, the DOE interprets FPA section 313's references to "the Commission" to mean the DOE.

[8] *See Allegheny Def. Project v. FERC*, 964 F.3d 1, 16-17 (D.C. Cir. 2020). The Department is not

I. Background

3. In the Emergency Order, the Secretary determined that "an emergency exists in portions of the Midwest region of the United States due to a shortage of electric energy, a shortage of facilities for the generation of electric energy, and other causes, and that issuance of this Order will meet the emergency and serve the public interest."[9]

4. The Emergency Order provided substantial support for the Secretary's emergency determination. The Emergency Order explained that, in its 2025 Summer Reliability Assessment, the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) indicated that "[d]emand forecasts and resource data indicate that MISO is at elevated risk of operating reserve shortfalls during periods of high demand or low resource output."[10] The Emergency Order observed that multiple generation facilities in Michigan have retired in recent years, specifically identifying the closures of two nuclear plants—Big Rock Point and Palisades. The Emergency Order explained that the retirement of the Campbell Plant would further decrease the amount of available dispatchable generation in the Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc. (MISO) service territory, noting that a combined 1,575 MW of natural gas and coal-fired generation had retired since the summer of 2024.[11] The Emergency Order stated that MISO's 2025/2026 Planning Resource Auction results indicated that, for the North/Central sub-regions, "new capacity additions were insufficient to offset the negative impacts of accreditation, suspensions/retirements and external resources" and that, while the results "demonstrated sufficient capacity," the summer months reflected the "highest risk and a tighter supply-demand balance[;]" and the results "reinforce the need to increase capacity."[12]

5. In the Emergency Order, the Secretary determined that continued operation of the Campbell Plant is necessary to best meet the emergency and serve the public interest for purposes of FPA section 202(c). This determination was based on the insufficiency of dispatchable capacity

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changing the outcome of the Emergency Order. *See Smith Lake Improvement & Stakeholders Ass'n v. FERC*, 809 F.3d 55, 56-57 (D.C. Cir. 2015).

[9] Emergency Order at 1.

[10] *Id.* (quoting *2025 Summer Reliability Assessment*, North American Electric Reliability Corporation, at 16 (May 2025), https://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/NERC_SRA_2025.pdf (NERC 2025 Summer Reliability Assessment). The Emergency Order stated that NERC anticipates "elevated risk of operating shortfalls" notwithstanding Consumers Energy's acquisition of a 1,200 MW natural gas power plant in Covert, Michigan. *Id.* at 1-2.

[11] *Id.*

[12] *Id.* (citing MISO, *Planning Resource Auction Results for Planning Year 2025-26* (Apr. 2025). After the Emergency Order was issued, on May 29, 2025, MISO posted a corrected version of the presentation, which is available here: https://cdn.misoenergy.org/2025%20PRA%20Results%20Posting%2020250529_Corrections694160.pdf.

and an anticipated increase in demand during the summer months, resulting in a risk to public health and safety caused by the potential loss of power to homes and local businesses in areas that may be affected by curtailments or outages. The Emergency Order was limited in duration to align with the emergency circumstances. In recognition of potential conflict with environmental standards and requirements and consistent with FPA section 202(c), the Secretary placed specific conditions on the operation of this necessary additional generation.[13]

II. Discussion

1. The Secretary's Authority to Require the Campbell Plant to Continue to Operate

6. Michigan AG, PIOs, Minnesota and Illinois, and OMS argue that the Emergency Order impermissibly exceeds the Secretary's statutory authority under FPA section 202(c) in various respects.[14] For instance, Michigan AG and PIOs argue that the Emergency Order, in effect, impermissibly asserts the authority to further its policy decisions by managing issues unrelated to addressing emergencies but rather concerning resource adequacy and electric generation facilities—issues which are reserved for the states and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), pursuant to other provisions in the FPA.[15] Minnesota and Illinois additionally contend that the Emergency Order impermissibly intrudes on the states' authority to make plant retirement decisions.[16]

7. Minnesota and Illinois also assert that section 202(c) has been used sparingly to address retirements like the Campbell Plant, and "only when requested by the operator or local government" in the context of an emergency.[17]

8. In a related argument, OMS asserts that the Emergency Order did not adequately consult with or incorporate the findings of MISO and other relevant state regulatory bodies, which they claim have primary jurisdiction over resource planning, sitting, and cost recovery for utilities operating in their states.[18]

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[13] Emergency Order at 2-3.

[14] Michigan AG Pet. § IV.B; PIO Pet. § IV.C; Minnesota and Illinois Pet. § V.E; OMS Pet. § B.

[15] *See* Michigan AG Pet. § IV.B.i (citing 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) and 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d, 824e); PIO Pet. at 44 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 824(a)); *id*. at 45 (citing *FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass'n*, 577 U.S. 260, 281 (2016)).

[16] Minnesota and Illinois Pet. at 27.

[17] *Id.* at 24.

[18] *Id.* at 30-31.

9. Minnesota and Illinois also assert that the Emergency Order, subparagraph E, impermissibly calls for state governments to assist in its execution.[19] In particular, Minnesota and Illinois claim that the Emergency Order's directive that "the relevant governmental authorities are directed to take such action"—*i.e.*, effectuate the dispatch and operation of the Campbell Plant's units—unlawfully violates the Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.[20]

The DOE's Determination

10. There is no dispute that the Secretary has the statutory authority under FPA section 202(c) to (1) determine that an emergency exists, and then (2) exercise his judgment to address that emergency. Rather, Petitioners claim that the Secretary exceeded that authority in directing MISO and Consumers Energy to undertake specific actions to keep the Campbell Plant in operation. As explained below, these claims have no merit.

11. Section 201(b)(1) of the FPA specifically reserves authority over "facilities used for the generation of electric energy" for the states "*except as specifically provided* in this subchapter."[21] Section 202(c) constitutes one such carve out. It grants the Secretary the "authority, either upon [the Secretary's] own motion or upon complaint, with or without notice, hearing, or report, to require by order such temporary connections of facilities and such generation, delivery, interchange, or transmission of electric energy as in [the Secretary's] judgment will best meet the emergency and serve the public interest." Congress thus purposely provided discretion in section 202(c) to require changes to the operation of the U.S. electricity system on a temporary basis, including changes to the operations of electric generation facilities.

12. Michigan AG and PIOs attempt to avoid this clear grant of authority by arguing that the Emergency Order addresses issues unrelated to emergencies but rather concern resource adequacy.[22] But placing a different label on the Secretary's action cannot change the fact that actions taken in the Emergency Order fall squarely within the authority granted by section 202(c). By its terms, that section specifically applies to the potential "shortage of electric energy or of facilities for the generation or transmission of electric energy," which is exactly the situation that led to the issuance of the Emergency Order. And section 202(c) specifically authorizes the Secretary to "require by order . . . such generation . . . of electric energy as in [the Secretary's] judgment will best meet the emergency and serve the public interest," which is exactly the action the Emergency Order requires.

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[19] *Id.* at 31.

[20] *Id.*

[21] 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (emphasis added).

[22] *See* Michigan AG Pet. § IV.B.i (citing 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) and 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d, 824e); PIO Pet. at 44 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 824(a)); *id*. at 45 (citing *FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass'n*, 577 U.S. 260, 281 (2016)).

13. Nor is there any requirement under section 202(c), as Minnesota and Illinois and OMS suggest,[23] for the Secretary to consult with the impacted states prior to issuing a section 202(c) order. Section 103 of the DOE Organization Act requires consultation with states "where practicable."[24] In an emergency situation, it is often not practicable to consult with the states and relevant state agencies prior to taking emergency action. This point is further supported by the plain language of section 202(c), which specifically authorizes DOE to issue an emergency order "with or *without notice*."[25]

14. Finally, the argument that the Emergency Order violates the Tenth Amendment[26] is incorrect. The Emergency Order provides that "[t]he extent to which MISO's current Tariff provisions are inapposite to effectuate the dispatch and operation of the units for the reasons specified herein, the relevant governmental authorities are directed to take such action and make accommodations as may be necessary to do so."[27] Had the Emergency Order directed State governments or their instruments to take such an action, there would, of course, be a constitutional issue, grounded perhaps in regards to the 10th Amendment, but even more directly in the anti-commandeering clause. But that was not the intended endpoint, however, for the avoidance of doubt, we provide clarification that the Order does not direct State governments or their instrumentalities to take such actions.

15. Here, there is no state tariff provision which governs wholesale energy sales. DOE clarifies that the relevant authorities to which the Emergency Order refers are MISO and FERC. DOE is not requiring state governmental authorities to take any action with respect to the Emergency Order.

2. The Secretary's Authority to Determine the Existence of an Emergency

16. Michigan AG, PIOs, Minnesota and Illinois, and OMS each raise similar arguments that the Emergency Order failed to meet the legal definition of an "emergency" within the meaning of FPA section 202(c).[28] For instance, Michigan AG argues that, while section 202(c) "permits some measure of flexibility with respect to what type of events may cause the emergency, allowing for 'other causes' beyond those enumerated," it only authorizes action during extraordinary

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[23] *See, e.g.*, Minnesota and Illinois Pet. § V.E; OMS Pet. at 4.

[24] 42 U.S.C. § 7113.

[25] 16 U.S.C. § 824a(c)(1) (emphasis added).

[26] Minnesota and Illinois Pet. at 31-32.

[27] Emergency Order at 3.

[28] Michigan AG Pet. § IV.A; PIO Pet. § IV.A.1; Minnesota and Illinois Pet. § V.B; OMS Pet. §§ II.A, D.

circumstances.[29] Michigan AG,[30] PIOs,[31] and Minnesota and Illinois[32] cite to the definition of "emergency" in DOE's regulations at 10 C.F.R. § 205.371 and argue that the Emergency Order exceeded the scope of that definition. Michigan AG[33] and PIOs[34] also cite to various dictionary definitions of "emergency" to assert the same point.

17. Further, Michigan AG,[35] PIOs,[36] and Minnesota and Illinois[37] each rely on *Richmond Power and Light v. FERC*, 574 F.2d 610 (D.C. Cir. 1978), and *Otter Tail Power Co. v. Federal Power Commission*, 429 F.2d 232 (8th Cir. 1970), for the proposition that courts have interpreted section 202(c) narrowly to apply only to temporary emergencies requiring an imminent response.

The DOE's Determination

18. In enumerating emergency powers in section 202(c), Congress accorded the Secretary discretion to determine the existence of an emergency. The statute's plain text grants the Secretary authority to respond, in certain circumstances, to emergencies posing dire threats to the Nation's electric infrastructure. Specifically, the Secretary "*shall* have authority" to act "*whenever* the [Secretary] determines that an emergency exists."[38] Next, the statute sets forth three different categories of emergencies where section 202(c) action is permissible. An emergency may exist "by reason of [1] a sudden increase in the demand for electric energy, or [2] a shortage of electric energy or of facilities for the generation or transmission of electric energy, or of fuel or water for generating facilities, or [3] other causes."[39]

19. Section 202(c)(1) delegates a wide degree of latitude for the Secretary to determine the existence of an emergency, "either upon its own motion or upon complaint, with or without notice,

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[29] Michigan AG Pet. at 24.

[30] Michigan AG Pet. at 26.

[31] PIO Pet. at 28-29.

[32] Minnesota and Illinois Pet. at 22-23.

[33] Michigan AG Pet. at 25.

[34] PIO Pet. at 26.

[35] Michigan AG Pet. at 25-26.

[36] PIO Pet. 26-27.

[37] Minnesota and Illinois Pet. at 24.

[38] 16 U.S.C. § 824a(c)(1) (emphases added).

[39] *Id.* (brackets added).

hearing, or report." Beyond providing exemplar categories of where an "emergency exists," the statute is silent on any additional requirements that must be satisfied. Here, as is evident from the face of the Emergency Order, and as is consistent with section 202(c)'s text and prior DOE practice, the Secretary exercised his authority under section 202(c) and determined, in his statutory discretion and substantive expertise, that "an emergency exists in portions of the Midwest region of the United States due to a shortage of electric energy, a shortage of facilities for the generation of electric energy, and other causes."[40]

20. The argument that the Secretary can act only when a shortage of electricity is "imminent" makes no sense in the context of his statutory authority under section 202(c) to act to address a "shortage of . . . facilities for the generation . . . of electric energy." As a general matter, some retired generation facilities generally cannot be brought back online in a matter of days. If the Secretary was required to wait until a blackout is "imminent" before addressing a shortage of generation facilities, he will be unable to take any meaningful action to address the blackout. Determining to take action before the retirement of the Campbell Plant, which was necessary to ensure that it would be available to produce electric energy to prevent blackouts in summer peak load periods, falls well within the Secretary's statutory discretion.

21. The definition of "emergency" contained in DOE's regulations at 10 C.F.R. § 205.371 does not supersede the discretion section 202(c) affords to the Secretary to "determine[] that an emergency exists." In any event, those regulations specifically provide that "[e]xtended periods of insufficient power supply as a result of inadequate planning or the failure to construct necessary facilities can result in an emergency as contemplated in these regulations." Accordingly, the Secretary's emergency determination is entirely consistent with the governing statutory requirements in section 202(c) and the DOE's regulations.

22. Similarly, the dictionary definitions cited by Michigan AG[41] and PIOs[42] are not persuasive. Those definitions cannot limit the discretion Congress expressly delegated to the Secretary in section 202(c).

23. The arguments made by Michigan AG,[43] PIOs,[44] and Minnesota and Illinois[45] based on the *Otter Tail Power* and *Richmond Power and Light* decisions likewise are misguided. *Otter Tail Power* did not limit the Secretary's section 202(c) discretion or the meaning of "emergency" because the court held that section 202(c) *did not apply* to the case. Instead, *Otter Trail Power*

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[40] *See* Emergency Order at 1.

[41] Michigan AG Pet. at 25.

[42] PIO Pet. at 26.

[43] Michigan AG Pet. at 25-26.

[44] PIO Pet. 26-27.

[45] Minnesota and Illinois Pet. at 24.

involved section 202(b) of the FPA dealing with permanent interconnection (and not an "emergency" within the meaning of section 202(c)).[46] In *Richmond Power and Light*, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that the Federal Power Commission (FPC) did not abuse its discretion in *declining* to invoke its emergency powers under section 202(c).[47] The court determined that the FPC had discretion to choose a temporary, voluntary program rather than issue an order pursuant to section 202(c), as the circumstance, in the FPC's discretion, did not warrant the use of emergency authority.[48]

24. A more relevant decision is *Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v. Commodity Futures Trading Commission*.[49] In that case, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recognized the broad powers of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) to issue emergency actions under section 8a(9) of the Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. § 12a(9)). Through section 8a(9), the CFTC issued an emergency order for the Board of Trade to suspend trading in a certain wheat futures contracts, citing transportation and warehouse shortages and potential market manipulation.[50] In response, the Board of Trade sought an injunction against the order, arguing that no emergency existed. The district court granted a preliminary injunction, and the CFTC appealed.[51] In its decision to vacate and remand the district court's preliminary injunction, the Seventh Circuit concluded that Congress intended to grant the CFTC discretion in making emergency determinations under the Commodity Exchange Act.[52] The court reasoned: "Congress recognized that regulation of the volatile futures markets could be accomplished effectively only through the use of an expert Commission, that situations could occur suddenly for which the traditional enforcement powers would be an inadequate response, and that therefore the Commission should have emergency powers, the exercise of which is committed to the expertise and discretion of the Commission."[53] In addition, "[t]he fact that the Commission is authorized by Congress to take emergency action is, in itself, a suggestion of Congressional intent to commit

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[46] *See Otter Tail Power Co. v. Federal Power Commission*, 429 F.2d 232 (8th Cir. 1970) (*Otter Tail Power)* (rejecting petitioner's contention that "any proceedings in the instant case must be dealt with in compliance with § 202(c)").

[47] *See Richmond Power and Light v. FERC*, 574 F.2d 610 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (*Richmond Power and Light*) at 615.

[48] *Id.* at 614-15.

[49] *Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v. Commodity Futures Trading Commission*, 605 F.2d 1016, 1025 (7th Cir. 1979)

[50] *See Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v. Commodity Futures Trading Commission*, 605 F.2d 1016, 1025 (7th Cir. 1979) at 1018.

[51] *Id.* at 1019-20.

[52] *Id.* at 1023-25.

[53] *Id.* at 1025.

such actions to the Commission's discretion."[54] Given the similarities between FPA section 202(c) and section 8a(9) of the Commodity Exchange Act, the *Board of Trade* decision confirms the conclusion that Congress intended to grant the Secretary broad discretion to determine when his emergency powers should be applied to protect the public interest.[55]

25. Finally, the assertion of Minnesota and Illinois that the Emergency Order is "novel" and contravenes prior practice wherein section 202(c) was used to address retirements "only when requested" has no merit.[56] On its face, section 202(c)(1) authorizes the Secretary to act "*either upon its own motion or upon complaint*." It is undisputed that section 202(c) has been used in the past to address generation retirements. Under the statute, it is irrelevant whether a utility requested that the Secretary take this action.

26. In sum, the Secretary acted within his authority to determine the existence of an emergency and the statutory meaning of "emergency" has been satisfied here. In its 90-year history, no court has questioned the Secretary's (or, prior to its dissolution in 1977, the FPC's)[57] discretion in this respect, much less overturned the Secretary's determination that an emergency exists. The absence of such circumstances underscores the Secretary's authority as expressly delegated in the statute.

3. The Factual Basis to Support the Secretary's Emergency Determination

27. Michigan AG, PIOs, Minnesota and Illinois, and OMS also raise similar objections that there is no factual basis to support the Emergency Order, and that the Secretary is required to submit substantial evidence in support of his emergency determination.[58]

28. *First*, Michigan AG, PIOs, Minnesota and Illinois, and OMS criticize the Emergency Order's references to the 2025 NERC Summer Reliability Assessment.[59] For instance, Michigan AG claims that the Emergency Order fails to explain (1) how NERC's assessment supports an emergency finding, as NERC did not put MISO in the high-risk category; (2) why NERC's designation of "elevated" risk represents a sudden or unexpected circumstance, as MISO has been

[54] *Id.* at 1023.

[55] *See id.* at 1023-25.

[56] *See* Minnesota and Illinois Pet. at 24.

[57] The FPC was dissolved in 1977, and the FPC's functions were split between FERC and the Department, with the Secretary retaining FPA section 202(c) power.

[58] Michigan AG Pet. §§ IV.A(ii), IV.C; PIO Pet. § IV.A.2; Minnesota and Illinois Pet. § V.A; OMS Pet. § II.A.

[59] Michigan AG Pet. at 27-29, 37; PIO Pet. 32-35; Minnesota and Illinois Pet. at 19-20; OMS Pet. at 2-3. OMS also contends that NERC's long-term and seasonal assessments are unreliable and inconsistent. OMS Pet. at 3.

at this risk level or higher for years; and (3) why the "potential tight reserve margins" identified by NERC constitute an emergency, as MISO exceeded the NERC reference margin level in the 2020-2025 period.[60]

29. *Second*, Michigan AG and PIOs contend that the retirement of the Campbell Plant was not unexpected or sudden, and that generation retirement does not constitute an emergency.[61] Michigan AG further states that MISO approved the retirement of the Campbell Plant after an extensive process.[62]

30. *Third*, Michigan AG, PIOs, and Minnesota and Illinois also assert that the April 2025 MISO Planning Resource Auction does not demonstrate the existence of an emergency.[63] For example, according to Michigan AG, the Emergency Order ignored MISO's conclusion that the 2025/2026 Planning Resource Auction "demonstrated sufficient capacity at the regional, subregional and zonal levels."[64]

31. Minnesota and Illinois also contend that the Emergency Order failed to consider MISO's purported history of performance in several extreme weather events and, according to Minnesota and Illinois, MISO currently is not afflicted by any unexpected outage or extreme weather event.[65]

The DOE's Determination

32. The exigencies that Section 202(c) is designed to address necessarily require that the Secretary's determination is informed by the facts available at the time and by his sound expert judgment as to what situations constitute an emergency. The statute's express exclusion of any notice, hearing, or report requirements prior to issuance of a section 202(c) order confirms the commonsense fact that the Secretary must exercise his section 202(c) authority expeditiously and with broad discretion in responding to emergency situations.

33. In any event, the Secretary's determination that an emergency exists is supported by the factual evidence and the exercise of the Secretary's judgment. The Emergency Order identified the ongoing emergency "in portions of the Midwest region of the United States due to a shortage

[60] Michigan AG Pet. at 37.

[61] *Id.* at 30, 37; PIO Pet. 29-30.

[62] Michigan AG Pet. at 39

[63] *Id.* at 30-32, 38; PIO Pet. at 30-32; Minnesota and Illinois Pet. at 20-21.

[64] Michigan AG Pet. at 39 (citing Attachment B, MISO, Planning Resource Auction, Results for Planning Year 2025 – 2026 (April 2025) at 12).

[65] Minnesota and Illinois Pet. at 22.

of electric energy, a shortage of facilities for the generation of electric energy, and other causes."[66] Consistent with this determination, the Emergency Order explains the need to increase capacity to meet the increasingly high demands and decreasing generation output.[67]

34. In 2021, Consumers Energy announced that it planned a "speed closure" of the Campbell Plant in 2025, years before the end of its scheduled design life.[68] Specifically, the Campbell Plant was scheduled to retire on May 31, 2025, and thus would not be operational in August, the month the Secretary anticipated heightened demand on the grid.[69] In the Emergency Order, the Secretary noted that the Campbell Plant's retirement was part of an ongoing trend, which has seen 1,575 MW of natural gas and coal-fired generation retired since the summer of 2024, further decreasing the amount of dispatchable generation within MISO's service territory.[70] Although MISO and Consumers Energy have incorporated the Campbell Plant's planned retirement into their supply forecasts, as well as Consumers Energy's acquisition of an existing 1,200 MW natural gas power plant in Covert, Michigan, NERC's 2025 Summer Reliability Assessment still anticipated "elevated risk of operating reserve shortfalls."[71]

35. Michigan AG, PIOs, Minnesota and Illinois, and OMS mischaracterize the 2025 NERC Summer Reliability Assessment's designation of "elevated risk" for the MISO region. This assessment reflects NERC's determination that "resources will not be sufficient to meet operating reserves" in the event of "extreme peak-day demand with normal resource scenarios" or "normal peak-day demand with reduced resources."[72] The NERC assessment of "elevated risk" suggests that there will be significant strain on the grid in the MISO service area even in normal operating conditions. If the Secretary had waited to act until the conditions identified by NERC arose, it would have been too late for him to take any effective action.

36. Petitioners note that MISO and Consumers Energy have incorporated the Campbell Plant's planned retirement into their supply forecasts and acquired a 1,200 MW natural gas power plant in Covert, Michigan. However, NERC's 2025 Summer Reliability Assessment anticipated

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[66] *See* Emergency Order at 1.

[67] *See id.* (noting recent closures of generation facilities in Michigan and uncertain near-term future of generation from the Palisades nuclear power plant).

[68] *See Consumers Energy Announces Plan to End Coal Use by 2025; Lead Michigan's Clean Energy Transformation*, Consumers Energy (June 23, 2021), https://www.consumersenergy.com/news-releases/news-release-details/2021/06/23/consumers-energy-announces-plan-to-end-coal-use-by-2025-lead-michigans-clean-energy-transformation.

[69] Emergency Order at 1.

[70] *Id*.

[71] *Id.* (citing NERC 2025 Assessment).

[72] NERC 2025 Assessment at 10.

"elevated risk of operating reserve shortfalls" even including the Covert Plant's capacity.[73] The fact that Consumers Energy acquired this existing plant to replace the Campbell Plant did not forestall the emergency.

37. Similarly, MISO's approval of the retirement of the Campbell Plant came before NERC's 2025 Summer Reliability Assessment, which took into account increased demand projections.

38. Michigan AG, PIOs, and Minnesota and Illinois' respective criticisms[74] of the Secretary's reliance on the April 2025 MISO Planning Resource Auction ignore that MISO stated that the summer months reflected the "highest risk and a tighter supply-demand balance" and the results of the auction "reinforce the need to increase capacity."[75] In addition, the May 2025 NERC assessment referenced a Seasonal Outlook issued by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) on April 17, 2025, which estimated that much of the Midwest had a 33%-40% chance to experience above-normal temperatures in the summer.[76] DOE also notes that a Seasonal Outlook released by the NOAA on June 19, 2025 increased this estimate to a 40%-50% chance of above-normal temperatures.[77]

39. Similarly, the argument of Minnesota and Illinois that the MISO region does not face current "extreme" weather events misses the mark.[78] The Emergency Order was based on the facts known at the time it was issued in May 2025, including the projected potential for a shortage of capacity in the summer identified by NERC. In other words, the Secretary was required to act before the shortage actually occurred. Moreover, contrary to the contentions of Minnesota and Illinois, the conditions that actually existed in the summer following issuance of the Emergency Order further confirm the ongoing emergency and sudden increased threats to energy reliability. In June 2025, MISO issued alerts affecting the Central Region on 18 days. For instance, on June 23, 2025, MISO issued an Energy Emergency Alert 1 for the North and Central Regions "[d]ue to the hot weather and high demand" during a heat dome over the eastern portion of the United States.[79] In fact, between June 11 and August 18, MISO issued dozens of alerts to manage grid

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[73] Emergency Order at 1 (citing to NERC 2025 Assessment).

[74] Michigan AG Pet. at 30-32, 38; PIO Pet. at 30-32; Minnesota and Illinois Pet. at 20-21.

[75] *Planning Resource Auction Results for Planning Year 2025-26,* MISO (Apr. 2025). (Corrected and reissued on 05/29/25) available at https://cdn.misoenergy.org/2025%20PRA%20Results%20Posting%2020250529_Corrections694160.pdf.

[76] NERC 2025 Assessment at 9.

[77] *Seasonal Outlook*, NOAA Climate Prediction Ctr., (July 17, 2025), https://www.cpc.ncep.noaa.gov/products/predictions/long_range/seasonal.php?lead=1.

[78] Minnesota and Illinois Pet. at 22.

[79] *See* MISO Energy Emergency Alert 1 (June 23, 2025),

reliability in its Central Region in response to hot weather, severe weather, high customer load, forced generation outages, and transfer capability limits. MISO issued alerts for the Central Region on at least 40 of the 69 days between June 11 and August 18.

40. In addition, the Secretary took section 202(c) action in the context of a National Energy Emergency declared by the President in the months prior to the Emergency Order. In executive orders dated January 20, 2025, and April 8, 2025, the President underscored the dire energy challenges facing the Nation due to growing resource adequacy concerns. The President recognized, in Executive Order 14156, "Declaring a National Energy Emergency," that the "United States' insufficient energy production, transportation, refining, and generation constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to our Nation's economy, national security, and foreign policy."[80] In view of the National Energy Emergency, in Executive Order 14262, "Strengthening the Reliability and Security of the United States Electric Grid," the President explained that "the United States is experiencing an unprecedented surge in electricity demand driven by rapid technological advancements, including the expansion of artificial intelligence data centers and an increase in domestic manufacturing."[81] Significantly, Executive Order 14262 specifically ordered the Secretary to draw upon "all mechanisms available under applicable law, *including section 202(c) of the Federal Power Act*, to ensure any generation resource identified as critical within an at-risk region is appropriately retained as an available generation resource within the at-risk region."[82] The executive orders informed the Secretary's decision and action, in addition to the other factors outlined in the Emergency Order and this Order.

41. Grid operators, including MISO itself, have likewise acknowledged the Nation's current energy crisis. For instance, during a March 25, 2025 hearing before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Jennifer Curran, the Senior Vice President of Planning and Operations for MISO, testified that "the MISO region faces resource adequacy and reliability challenges due to the changing characteristics of the electric generating fleet, inadequate transmission system infrastructure, growing pressures from extreme weather, and rapid load growth."[83] Ms. Curran also described "much stronger growth [in demand for electricity] from continued electrification efforts, a resurgence in manufacturing, and an unexpected demand for energy-hungry data centers

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https://x.com/MISO_energy/status/1937172353118548150.

[80] Exec. Order No. 14156, 90 Fed. Reg. 8433 (Jan. 20, 2025).

[81] Exec. Order No. 14262, 90 Fed. Reg. 15521 (Apr. 8, 2025).

[82] *Id.* (emphasis added).

[83] Keeping the Lights On: Examining the State of Regional Grid Reliability Hearing Before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Energy, 119th Cong. (Mar. 25, 2025) (statement of Ms. Jennifer Curran, Senior Vice President for Planning and Operations, Midcontinent Independent System Operator), at 5, witness-testimony_curran_eng_gridoperators_03.25.2025.pdf.

to support artificial intelligence."[84] She added, "[a] growing reliability risk is that the rapid retirement of existing coal and gas power plants threatens to outpace the ability of new resources with the necessary operational characteristics to replace them."[85]

42. Finally, DOE's assessment reveals that, if current retirement schedules and incremental additions remain unchanged, most regions—including the MISO region relevant to the Emergency Order—will face unacceptable reliability risks within five years. The action taken in the Emergency Order requiring the Campbell Plant to continue to operate before its planned retirement on May 31, 2025 addresses that risk.[86]

43. In sum, the Secretary's determination in the Emergency Order that continued operations of the Campbell Plant fully complies with section 202(c).

4. Potential Environmental Impacts

44. Michigan AG and Minnesota and Illinois raise similar arguments that the Emergency Order fails to comply with section 202(c)'s requirement to ensure that any order "to the maximum extent practicable, is consistent with any applicable Federal, State, or local environmental law or regulation and minimizes any adverse environmental impacts."[87] In particular, Michigan AG and PIOs argue that the Emergency Order fails to identify any specific criteria or conditions for ensuring compliance with environmental regulations or limiting environmental impact.[88]

The DOE's Determination

45. Section 202(c)(2) requires the Secretary to ensure that any section 202(c) order that may result in a conflict with a requirement of any environmental law or regulation to the "maximum extent practicable, [be] consistent with any applicable . . . environmental law or regulation and minimize[] any adverse environmental impacts." Contrary to Michigan AG and Minnesota and Illinois' contentions, the Emergency Order contains certain limitations to minimize the hours of operation and adverse environmental impacts. Specifically, the Emergency Order requires that "[a]ll operation of the Campbell Plant must comply with applicable environmental requirements, including but not limited to monitoring, reporting, and recordkeeping requirements, to the maximum extent feasible,"[89] and requires daily reporting from MISO on "whether the Campbell

[84] *Id.* at 6.

[85] *Id.* at 7.

[86] NERC 2025 Summer Reliability Assessment

[87] Michigan AG Pet. at 52 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 824a(c)(2)); Minnesota and Illinois Pet. at 13 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 824a(c)(2)).

[88] Michigan AG Pet. at 54-55; PIO Pet. at 47.

[89] Emergency Order at 3, Ordering Paragraph C.

Plant has operated in compliance with the allowances contained in this Order."[90] These reporting requirements provide a mechanism for the DOE to obtain information concerning any adverse environmental impacts of the Emergency Order, and DOE may modify the Emergency Order to require additional actions as the Secretary deems appropriate.

46. Michigan AG and Minnesota and Illinois argue that the Emergency Order is not tailored to respect environmental considerations, of particular concern to Michigan AG and Minnesota and Illinois are the potential environmental impacts that may be produced by the Campbell Plant. [91] Michigan AG and Minnesota and Illinois provide examples of certain conditions that in their view would, presumably, satisfy the requirements of the statute (*e.g.*, direction to optimize use of pollution control equipment or avoid operations during air quality episodes).[92] These conditions, however, are not required by statute. Congress did not prescribe in section 202(c) how the Department was to fulfill its obligations concerning consistency with environmental laws and minimization of adverse effects. Moreover, Congress recognized, by including the phrase "to the maximum extent practicable," that emergency circumstances would at times make compliance with all Federal, state, and local environmental requirements and minimization of all potential adverse environmental impacts infeasible. This phrase provides the Secretary with discretion in fulfilling its obligations under section 202(c). Accordingly, the Emergency Order's limits on duration and the conditions that authorize only the additional generation necessary and require the operation of the plant to comply with environmental laws to the maximum extent feasible, as well as the reporting requirements that allow DOE to monitor MISO's compliance with the Emergency Order and the environmental impacts such that DOE could take additional action as the Secretary deems appropriate, were sufficient to satisfy its obligation under section 202(c)(2) to ensure that the Emergency Order, to the maximum extent practicable, is consistent with applicable environmental laws and minimizes adverse environmental impacts.

5. Authority to Order Economic Dispatch

47. Michigan AG and Minnesota and Illinois assert that DOE does not have the authority under 202(c)(1) to order the utilization of economic dispatch of the Campbell Plant as a response to an emergency, and that economic dispatch is not an effective or rational measure to address resource shortages.[93] Accordingly, Michigan AG and Minnesota and Illinois contend that economic dispatch is not in the "public interest," as required under section 202(c).[94] In addition, PIOs contend that the Emergency Order's economic dispatch requirement is ambiguous and vague.[95]

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[90] *Id.*, Ordering Paragraph B.

[91] Michigan AG Pet. at 54-55; Minnesota and Illinois Mot. at 26-27.

[92] Michigan AG Pet. at 54; Minnesota and Illinois Mot. at 26-27.

[93] Michigan AG Pet. § IV.D; Minnesota and Illinois Pet. § V.G.

[94] Michigan AG Pet. At

[95] PIO Pet. at 42-43.

Michigan AG asserts that Consumers Energy can subvert the economic dispatch requirement by offering the Campbell Plant on a "must run" status.[96] Michigan AG asserts that, if this happens, the costs to ratepayers will not have been minimized.[97]

The DOE's Determination

48. As noted, section 202(c)(1) affords the Secretary discretion as to what remedy "will best meet the emergency and serve the public interest." The statute expressly delegates the decision on the appropriate remedy to the Secretary's "judgment" (similar to the express delegation to "determine[] that an emergency exists"). In the Emergency Order, the Secretary soundly exercised his judgment in directing "additional dispatch of the Campbell Plant [] necessary to best meet the emergency and serve the public interest for purposes of FPA section 202(c)."[98] "This determination [was] based on the insufficiency of dispatchable capacity and anticipated demand during the summer months, and the potential loss of power to homes and local businesses in the areas that may be affected by curtailments or outages, presenting a risk to public health and safety," as discussed above.[99]

49. The Emergency Order directs MISO and Consumers Energy to "take all measures necessary to ensure that the Campbell Plant is available to operate."[100] The Emergency Order then directs MISO "to take every step to employ economic dispatch of the [facility] to minimize [the] cost to ratepayers."[101] The DOE disagrees with arguments that economic dispatch is not effective or rational in this case. The directive regarding economic dispatch ensures that the Campbell Plant can be dispatched instead of more costly generation (if available), reducing electricity costs and serving the public interest. The directive recognizes the fact that MISO uses "a production cost modeling software that produces a unit commitment and security-constrained economic dispatch while optimizing production costs."[102] DOE clarifies, however, that to the extent operational (including safety) limitations prevent the Campbell Plant from being economically dispatched, offering the Campbell Plant on a must run basis may be necessary to ensure the units are available to operate. Under those circumstances, such operation would be consistent with

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[96] Michigan AG Pet. at 49.

[97] *Id.*

[98] Emergency Order at 2.

[99] *Id.*

[100] *Id.*, Ordering Paragraph A.

[101] *Id*.

[102] *MISO Economic Planning Whitepaper* (Oct. 3, 2024), at 3, https://cdn.misoenergy.org/MISO%20Economic%20Planning%20Whitepaper651689.pdf

minimizing the cost to ratepayers because a price taker can decrease (but cannot increase) the market price.

6. Best and Appropriate Means for Addressing the Emergency

50. The Michigan AG and PIOs raise similar arguments that the Campbell Plant is neither the best nor an appropriate means of alleviating the capacity shortfall addressed by the Emergency Order.[103] In particular, Michigan AG and PIOs argue that DOE was required to consider alternatives and evaluate other possible methods for addressing the emergency, which they argue the Emergency Order failed to do.[104] They further argue that there are alternative means by which DOE could have addressed the emergency.[105]

51. PIOs additionally argue that the Emergency Order fails to consider the various policies of the FPA.[106] Specifically, PIO's argue that the Emergency Order fails to provide a reasoned basis for its determination that additional dispatch of the Campbell Plant is necessary to best meet the emergency.[107] PIOs further contend that the Emergency Order does not examine the expense or environmental impact of running the Campbell Plant, or address how the Campbell Plant can meet the emergency.[108]

The DOE's Determination

52. The Secretary, in issuing the Emergency Order, adhered to the process established in FPA section 202(c) in exercising his judgment in directing MISO and Consumers Energy to undertake specific actions as to the Campbell Plant.[109] There is no dispute that the Secretary, as the presidentially-appointed and Senate-confirmed head of the Department (*see* 42 U.S.C. § 7131), is the appropriate individual to determine the existence of an emergency within the meaning of section 202(c) and exercise "[the Secretary's] judgment" as to what Department actions "best meet the emergency and serve the public interest."[110] As discussed above, the Secretary exercised his discretion in responding to an emergency pursuant to an express delegation of authority under

[103] Michigan AG Pet. at 41; PIO Pet. at 36-37.

[104] Michigan AG Pet. at 41; PIO Pet. at 36-37.

[105] Michigan AG Pet. at 41; PIO Pet. at 41.

[106] PIO Pet. at 37.

[107] *Id.* at 37-41.

[108] *Id.*

[109] *See generally* Emergency Order.

[110] 16 U.S.C. § 824a(c)(1).

section 202(c). Further, as explained below, there is no basis to grant rehearing to review the Secretary's exercise of his judgment in prescribing the required response to the emergency.

53. As noted above, section 202(c)(1) affords the Secretary discretion as to what remedy "will best meet the emergency and serve the public interest." The statute expressly delegates the decision on the appropriate remedy to the Secretary's "judgment" (similar to the express delegation to "determine[] that an emergency exists"). Here, the Secretary soundly exercised his judgment in directing "additional dispatch of the Campbell Plant [] necessary to best meet the emergency and serve the public interest for purposes of FPA section 202(c)."[111] "This determination [was] based on the insufficiency of dispatchable capacity and anticipated demand during the summer months, and the potential loss of power to homes and local businesses in the areas that may be affected by curtailments or outages, presenting a risk to public health and safety."[112]

54. That Petitioners have now, after the fact, identified alternatives they deem to be better and more appropriate solutions to the emergency is irrelevant. Section 202(c)(1) delegates a wide degree of latitude for the Secretary to determine the existence of an emergency and to order the means to address such emergency. It does not require the Secretary to engage in a lengthy weighing of options or explanation of the Secretary's actions prior to issuing an emergency order. Indeed, such a process would defeat the very purpose of the emergency power.

7. NEPA Concerns

55. Michigan AG claims that the Emergency Order violates the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), as any orders issued under section 202(c) that affect the quality of the environment are considered "major federal actions"[113] that require compliance with NEPA standards and requirements.[114] According to the Michigan AG, these requirements include the "issuance of an environmental impact statement, environmental assessment, categorical exclusion, or special environmental analysis."[115]

56. Michigan AG further asserts that in other section 202(c) orders, DOE has previously sought to comply with NEPA through categorical exclusions, such as categorical exclusion B4.4 for "power management activities," or special environmental assessments—neither of which has been undertaken nor would apply in this instance.[116] Lastly, Michigan AG argues that DOE would not be justified in seeking an extension of the Emergency Order beyond 90 days under section

[111] Emergency Order at 2.

[112] *Id.*

[113] Michigan AG Pet. at 55-56 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 4336e(10)).

[114] *Id*. at 55-56.

[115] *Id*. at 56 (citing 10 C.F.R. § 1021.102(b)).

[116] *See id*.

202(c)(3), considering "[a]ny justification that NEPA can be sidestepped to address an emergency need fades as DOE's orders extend beyond the initial 90-day period."[117]

The DOE's Determination

57. We disagree with Michigan AG's contention that the DOE "is acting contrary to its own NEPA regulations and to its obligations under NEPA."[118] Although DOE has previously followed the procedures provided in the Department's NEPA regulations governing emergency actions, as described in 10 C.F.R. § 1021.343 (for example, by preparing a special environmental analysis after the issuance of a section 202(c) order), recent amendments to NEPA clarify that agencies are "not required to prepare an environmental document with respect to a proposed agency action if… the preparation of such document would clearly and fundamentally conflict with the requirements of another provision of law."[119] As DOE recently explained in its NEPA Implementing Procedures, "NEPA does not apply to DOE's issuance of emergency Orders pursuant to section 202(c) of the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. 824a(c)) because preparing an environmental document under NEPA's generally applicable provisions would clearly and fundamentally conflict with the emergency provisions in the Federal Power Act."[120]

58. As discussed above, under FPA section 202(c), Congress explicitly authorized the Secretary to "with or without . . . report" exercise certain emergency authorities. Requiring compliance with the analytic and procedural demands of preparing an environmental document under NEPA prior to issuing a section 202(c) emergency order fundamentally conflicts with the authorization for emergency action contemplated by FPA section 202(c) and the Congressional authorization to exercise such authorities without report. Accordingly, DOE has determined, in consultation with the Council on Environmental Quality, that "NEPA does not apply to DOE's issuance of emergency orders pursuant to section 202(c) . . . because preparing an environmental document under NEPA's generally applicable provisions would clearly and fundamentally conflict with the emergency provisions in the Federal Power Act."[121]

59. Furthermore, as stated above, section 202(c) specifically provides alternative measures for affording environmental protection by requiring the Secretary to ensure that any such order "to the maximum extent practicable, is consistent with any applicable Federal, state, or local

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[117] *Id*. at 57-58.

[118] *Id.* at 56.

[119] *See* 42 U.S.C. § 4336(a)(3); *see also* Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023, Pub. L. No. 188-5, § 321(b), 137 Stat. 10, 39 (2023).

[120] *National Environmental Policy Act* (*NEPA) Implementing Procedures*, U.S. Department of Energy, 6 (June 30, 2025), https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2025-06/2025-06-30-DOE-NEPA-Procedures.pdf.

[121] *See id.*

environmental law or regulation and minimizes any adverse environmental impacts."[122] Again, those environmental obligations were met through the conditions imposed via the Emergency Order's limitation on the duration of the emergency operations, authorization of only the additional generation necessary, requirement that the operation of the plant to comply with environmental laws to the maximum extent feasible, and the requirement that MISO reports to the Department on MISO's compliance with the Emergency Order and corresponding environmental impacts, if any.

8. Deprivation of Fair Notice and Adequate Record

60. PIOs claim that DOE failed to comply with its own procedures to post filings on DOE's 202(c) website within twenty-four hours of receipt, depriving the public of fair notice and a meaningful opportunity to comment.[123] According to PIOs, DOE has not posted materials related to the Emergency Order that it has received, such as "a letter from counsel for Consumers Energy, which stated that MISO and Consumers Energy have not been able to reach agreement on the rate issues relating to the May 23, 2025 Order," among other things.[124] PIOs also argue that DOE's failure to follow these procedures "deprives the public and Public Interest Organizations of fair notice and an adequate record."[125]

The DOE's Determination

61. The subject of the letter PIOs reference was certain rate issues relating to the Emergency Order, as Consumers Energy and MISO have not been able to agree on appropriate rate issues relating to Emergency Order. Because the letter pertained to rate issues, DOE referred the issues to FERC pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 205.376, by its own letter dated June 13, 2025.[126] Moreover, the letter and other materials identified by PIOs were submitted to the Department after the Emergency Order was issued and, as a result, had no bearing on the issuance of the Emergency Order.

9. Lack of Cost Allocation and Cost Recovery Framework

62. OMS claims that the Emergency Order disclaims responsibility for cost recovery to the FERC, while directly incurring costs through the continued operation of the Campbell Plant. OMS argues that this creates legal, jurisdictional, and equity concerns, by assigning costs to those not

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[122] 16 U.S.C. § 824a(c)(2).

[123] PIO Pet. at 50.

[124] *Id*.

[125] *Id.* (citing *United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp.*, 568 F.2d 240, 249 (2d Cir. 1977)).

[126] *See* Ltr. from DOE to FERC, *Consumers Energy Company et al. v. Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc.*, FERC Docket. No. EL25-90 (June 13, 2025). In its letter, DOE described the contents of the prior letter from Consumers Energy, explaining that, "[o]n June 10, 2025, DOE received a letter from counsel for Consumers which stated that MISO and Consumers have not been able to reach agreement on the rate issues relating to the [Emergency Order]." *Id.* at 2.

causing the costs or receiving the benefits.[127] Further, OMS alleges the Emergency Order violates FPA sections 205 and 206, which OMS characterizes as requiring rates to be "just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential."[128] Lastly, OMS alleges the Emergency Order violates "Cost Causation Principles" as held by courts.[129]

63. MPPA similarly claims it must be able to recover costs incurred due to compliance with the Emergency Order and operating the Campbell Plant beyond the retirement date of May 31, 2025, considering MPPA owns 4.80% of Unit No. 3 of the Campbell Plant and is therefore responsible for a portion of its operating and maintenance costs.[130]

64. According to MPPA, any alterations to the original directive could impact its financial recovery.[131] Additionally, MPPA is an intervenor in a related FERC complaint seeking cost recovery for the Campbell Plant owners and actively supports that complaint.[132] As such, MPPA's interests are unique and not adequately represented by other parties, and it requests party status in this DOE proceeding to ensure its concerns are addressed.[133]

The DOE's Determination

65. Petitioners' arguments are misguided. FPA section 202(c) does not impose any obligation on the Secretary to address cost allocation issues on the face of an emergency order. In any event, MISO's existing tariff already establishes how the costs of all generators dispatched by MISO ordinarily are to be allocated. Nothing in the Emergency Order held otherwise.

66. To the extent that the owners of the Campbell Plant desired additional compensation beyond what MISO's existing tariff provides, FPA section 202(c)(1) provides that: "[i]f the parties affected by [an emergency order issued pursuant to section 202(c)] fail to agree upon the terms of any arrangement between them in carrying out such order, the Commission, after hearing held either before or after such order takes effect, may prescribe by supplemental order such terms as it finds to be just and reasonable, including the compensation or reimbursement which should be paid to or by any such party."

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[127] OMS Pet. at 4.

[128] *Id*. at 5.

[129] *Id*.

[130] MPPA Comments at 1-2.

[131] *Id*. at 2.

[132] *Id*.

[133] *Id*.

67. Consistent with this statutory provision, DOE's regulations concerning generation of electricity to alleviate an emergency shortage of electric power address the procedures that DOE will follow when relevant entities are not able to agree on the rate issues arising from an order issued by DOE pursuant to section 202(c):

> The applicant and the generating or transmitting systems from which emergency service is requested are encouraged to utilize the rates and charges contained in approved existing rate schedules or to negotiate mutually satisfactory rates for the proposed transactions. In the event that the DOE determines that an emergency exists under section 202(c), and the "entities" are unable to agree on the rates to be charged, the DOE shall prescribe the conditions of service and refer the rate issues to the [FERC] for determination by that agency in accordance with its standards and procedures.[134]

68. On June 6, 2025, Consumers Energy filed a complaint (Complaint) pursuant to sections 202(c), 306, and 309 of the FPA and Rule 206 of FERC's Rule of Practice and Procedure, proposing revisions to the MISO Open Access Transmission, Energy and Operating Reserve Markets Tariff (Tariff) to add a provision (Proposed Tariff Provision) to allocate the costs of keeping the Campbell Plant in operation, in response to the Emergency Order.[135] On June 13, 2025, DOE promptly issued a referral on cost allocation to FERC, pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 205.376, in Docket Nos. EL25-90 and AD25-14.[136] The referral letter specified that "DOE is not referring to the Commission any other matters, including, but not limited to, DOE's finding of an emergency, the prescription of conditions of service, or any other matter arising from DOE's exercise of its authority under section 202(c). In an order issued August 15, 2025, in Docket Nos. EL25-90 and AD25-14, FERC granted the Complaint and determined that the Proposed Tariff Provision is just and reasonable.[137] FERC directed MISO to make a compliance filing, within 30 days of the date of the order, and to adopt the Proposed Tariff Provision.[138]

69. Thus, the cost allocation process established in the Emergency Order worked exactly as contemplated by section 202(c) and DOE's implementing regulations.

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[134] 10 C.F.R. § 205.376.

[135] *Consumers Energy Company et al. v. Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc.*, FERC Docket No. EL25-90 (June 6, 2025) (*citing* 16 U.S.C. §§ 824a(c), 825e, 825h, and 18 C.F.R. § 385.206 (2024) (Consumers Energy argued FPA sections 202(c) and 309 provide ample support for their request but moved for Section 206 relief in the alternative)).

[136] *See* Ltr. from DOE to FERC, *Consumers Energy Company et al. v. Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc.*, FERC Docket Nos. EL25-90 and AD25-14 (June 13, 2025).

[137] *See Consumers Energy Co. v. Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc.*, 192 FERC ¶ 61,158 (2025).

[138] *Id.* at 18.

III. Procedural Issues

1. PIOs' Request for a Stay

70. PIOs move for a stay of the Emergency Order pending resolution of judicial review. In support of their request, PIOs contend that (i) absent a stay, they will be irreparably harmed by the Emergency Order, (ii) a stay will not harm any other interested parties, and (iii) the public interest favors a stay.[139]

The DOE's Determination

71. In considering a request for a stay, agencies consider (1) whether the party requesting the stay will suffer irreparable injury without a stay; (2) whether issuing a stay may substantially harm other parties; and (3) whether a stay is in the public interest.[140]

72. By its terms, the Emergency Order terminated on August 21, 2025. Consequently, the stay request is now moot.

73. In any case, DOE finds that a stay is not warranted here because issuing a stay will substantially harm other parties and therefore is not within the public interest. Specifically, the Emergency Order was issued to address a shortage of electric energy, a shortage of facilities for the generation of electric energy in the Midwest region of the United States. As discussed above, this determination is based on the insufficiency of dispatchable capacity and anticipated demand, and the risk to public health and safety presented by the potential loss of power to homes and local businesses in areas that may be affected by curtailments or outages. Imposition of a stay undoubtedly may harm those citizens residing in the Midwest region of the United States who would face potentially critical electric energy shortages, and therefore the stay is contrary to the public interest.

2. Motions to Intervene

74. Michigan AG, PIOs, Minnesota and Illinois, MPPA, and Maryland OPC each moved to intervene in this proceeding, citing various alleged interests which may be affected by the outcome of this proceeding.[141]

The DOE's Determination

75. The motions to intervene are hereby granted for Michigan AG, PIOs, Minnesota and Illinois, and MPPA, but DOE takes no position on whether they are "aggrieved" parties for

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[139] PIO Pet. at 51-53.

[140] *Nken v. Holder*, 556 U.S. 418, 434, 436 (2010); *Ohio v. EPA*, 603 U.S. 279, 291 (2024).

[141] *See* Michigan AG Pet. at 2-3; PIO Pet. at 5-11; Minnesota & Illinois Pet. at 3-8; OMS Pet. at 1-2; Maryland OPC Comments at 1-3; MPPA Comments at 1-2.

purposes of FPA section 313.[142] The motion to intervene by Maryland OPC is denied as DOE maintains that Maryland OPC is not an "aggrieved" party for purposes of FPA section 313.[143]

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The Emergency Order is hereby modified upon the issuance of this Order and the result sustained, as discussed in the body of this Order.

Issued at 6:40pm Eastern Daylight Time on this 8th day of September 2025.

Chris Wright

Chris Wright

Secretary of Energy

[142] *See* 16 U.S.C. § 825*l*(b) ("Any party to a proceeding under this chapter aggrieved by an order issued by the Commission in such proceeding may obtain a review of such order in the United States court of appeals for any circuit wherein the licensee or public utility to which the order relates is located or has its principal place of business, or in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, by filing in such court, within sixty days after the order of the Commission upon the application for rehearing, a written petition praying that the order of the Commission be modified or set aside in whole or in part.").

[143] *See,* Resp. in Opp'n to Maryland Office of People's Counsel Mot. to Intervene. *People of the State of Michigan v. U.S. Department of Energy*, No. 25-1162 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 4, 2025).