



Independent Assessment of Safety Culture Survey Methods and Interpretation at the Savannah River Site

November 2023

Office of Enterprise Assessments
U.S. Department of Energy

Table of Contents

Acronyms.....	ii
Executive Summary.....	iii
1.0 Introduction.....	1
2.0 Methodology.....	1
3.0 Results.....	2
3.1 Valid and Reliable Methods to Maintain Cognizance of Safety Culture.....	2
3.2 DOE Oversight of Contractor Safety Culture Efforts.....	5
3.3 Summary.....	6
4.0 Best Practices.....	7
5.0 Opportunities for Improvement.....	7
Appendix A: Supplemental Information.....	A-1

Acronyms

BBS	Behavior Based Safety
DOE	U.S. Department of Energy
DOE-SR	DOE Savannah River Operations Office
EA	Office of Enterprise Assessments
EFCOG	Energy Facility Contractors Group
ISMS	Integrated Safety Management System
LSIT	Local Safety Improvement Team
MFO	Management Field Observation
OFI	Opportunity for Improvement
ORAU	Oak Ridge Associated Universities
SCIP	Safety Culture Improvement Panel
SCSC	Safety Culture Steering Committee
SRNS	Savannah River Nuclear Solutions, LLC
SRS	Savannah River Site
TSD	Technical Support Division

INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE SURVEY METHODS AND INTERPRETATION AT THE SAVANNAH RIVER SITE

Executive Summary

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Enterprise Assessments (EA) conducted an independent assessment of safety culture survey methods and interpretation at the Savannah River Site from August 7 to 31, 2023. Savannah River Nuclear Solutions, LLC (SRNS) is the management and operating contractor at the Savannah River Site. This assessment also evaluated the effectiveness of safety culture monitoring activities conducted by the DOE Office of Environmental Management Savannah River Operations Office (DOE-SR).

DOE allows each organization to determine how it will promote and maintain a strong safety culture and assess or monitor its culture. SRNS is renewing capabilities to monitor safety culture due to the significant changes in the site mission, the rapid influx of new personnel resulting in the relatively short experience tenures of a large percentage of the current personnel, and the organizational changes that occurred over the past five years.

EA identified the following positive attributes, including a best practice:

- SRNS invests in focus groups and interviews during ongoing safety culture monitoring to enhance the understanding of indicators and allow tailoring of improvement actions. (Best Practice)
- SRNS executive leadership is actively involved in safety culture monitoring, as evidenced by their reinvigoration of the Safety Culture Steering Committee (SCSC) and action on recommendations from safety culture monitoring.
- The SRNS SCSC triangulates safety culture data using cognitive trending, brings issues in need of sitewide resolution to senior leadership, and communicates through a variety of mechanisms to reach a wide range of employees. Additionally, the SRNS safety culture pulse survey data analysis combines quantitative results and qualitative comments.
- SRNS is planning for a comprehensive baseline safety culture assessment to be conducted by Oak Ridge Associated Universities. The reviewed Oak Ridge Associated Universities approach is a highly credible and well-established evaluation method for assessing safety culture at DOE sites.
- DOE-SR has a safety culture lead who periodically attends monthly status meetings with SRNS and participates in the DOE Safety Culture Improvement Panel working groups.

EA also identified some areas needing attention, as summarized below:

- The SRNS safety culture pulse survey process does not meet the criteria for scientifically designed organizational surveys of employee perceptions to support reliable decision-making, likely due to inadequate expertise in the science associated with designing and conducting surveys.
- The SCSC has not documented its analytical and decision processes to capture and preserve successful committee capabilities to support future efforts.
- DOE-SR does not have a safety culture monitoring framework, nor has it initiated a formal effort to ensure that newly hired DOE-SR staff members have safety culture training commensurate with their safety culture responsibilities.

SRNS has a well-structured safety culture monitoring program that triangulates data from a variety of sources, including surveys, metrics, focus groups, interviews, and observations. SRNS leadership actively uses insights from safety culture to inform decisions on improvement actions. Both DOE-SR and

SRNS leadership are focused on sustaining the safety culture in the rapidly changing workforce. However, the unvalidated design of the pulse surveys and the limited SRNS SCSC documentation create potential vulnerabilities that could result in important concerns or trends being missed, or reduced stakeholder confidence in survey conclusions.

INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE SURVEY METHODS AND INTERPRETATION AT THE SAVANNAH RIVER SITE

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Safety and Environmental Assessments, within the independent Office of Enterprise Assessments (EA), conducted an assessment of safety culture survey methods and interpretation used by Savannah River Nuclear Solutions, LLC (SRNS), the management and operating contractor at the Savannah River Site (SRS). Assessment activities were conducted remotely from August 7 to 25, 2023, and on site from August 28 to 31, 2023.

The EA report, *Assessment of Safety Culture Sustainment Processes at U.S. Department of Energy Sites – June 2020*, is a rollup report of eight safety culture assessments performed at a cross-section of DOE sites. The rollup report identified that one of the most significant areas of variance within the DOE complex is the quality of safety culture survey instruments and the proper interpretation of gathered survey data.¹ In consultation with the Office of Environment, Health, Safety and Security, program offices, and local DOE field offices, EA established the goal of conducting follow-up reviews of the quality of safety culture surveys used for safety culture decision-making, both of contractors that were assessed in the rollup report and some that were not. This series of follow-up reviews is being performed in accordance with the *Plan for the Enterprise-wide Assessment of Safety Culture Survey Methods and Interpretation – February 2022*. This assessment also evaluated the effectiveness of safety culture monitoring activities conducted by the DOE Savannah River Operations Office (DOE-SR).

DOE Policy 450.4A, *Integrated Safety Management Policy*, sets the expectation that all organizations embrace a strong safety culture where core values are safe work performance and worker involvement in all aspects of work performance. That culture includes, among other key considerations, establishing a safety conscious work environment in which employees feel free to raise safety concerns to management without fear of retaliation. While DOE does not set specific requirements for how organizations should promote and maintain a strong safety culture or how they should assess or monitor their culture, DOE and industry guidance documents present acceptable methods for safety culture evaluation as described in section 2.0 below.

2.0 METHODOLOGY

The DOE independent oversight program is described in and governed by DOE Order 227.1A, *Independent Oversight Program*, which is implemented through a comprehensive set of internal protocols, operating practices, assessment guides, and process guides. As identified in the assessment plan, EA used selected criteria from objectives SC.1 and SC.3 of EA Criteria and Review Approach Document 30-08, Revision 0, *Safety Culture Assessment*, to guide the assessment.

Because DOE provides guidance related to safety culture but expresses no specific requirements, EA referenced generally accepted standards and practices for safety culture surveys and monitoring. Core references used in this assessment included the DOE Safety Culture Improvement Panel's (SCIP's)

¹ Safety culture surveys, as discussed in the 2020 EA report, are quantitative instruments and associated administrative processes used to gather employee perceptions about factors important for the safe performance of work. To be helpful in decision-making, survey questions should be designed to measure the right factors, and the people participating in the survey should be representative of the full organization.

Tailoring the Analysis of Safety Culture Health Monitoring Means and Methods Working Group, January 2022; the Energy Facility Contractors Group's (EFCOG's) *A Guide to Safety Culture Evaluation*, Revision 0, September 2015; EFCOG's *Safety Culture Practitioner's Resources Guide*, Revision 1, September 2022; EFCOG's *Best Practice #249: Strategy and Design for Internal Surveys*, November 18, 2021; and the International Atomic Energy Agency's *Performing Safety Culture Self-Assessments*, Revision 0, June 2016.

EA examined approximately 150 SRNS documents and exhibits related to safety culture management and surveys, including but not limited to program/process descriptions, self-assessment reports, performance evaluation reports, safety culture training material, and communication examples. EA also reviewed documents related to DOE-SR safety culture oversight. While on site, EA observed an SRNS Safety Culture Steering Committee (SCSC) meeting. EA interviewed SRNS and DOE-SR personnel responsible for monitoring topics related to safety culture and leadership responsible for acting on the results. The combination of document reviews, observations, and interviews with involved individuals provided the data for this assessment.

The members of the assessment team, the Quality Review Board, and management responsible for this assessment are listed in appendix A.

3.0 RESULTS

3.1 Valid and Reliable Methods to Maintain Cognizance of Safety Culture

Positive Attributes

Culture Survey Development and Survey Methods

SRNS in collaboration with DOE-SR uses a sustainment plan to strategize and manage safety culture monitoring and communication activities. The history and evolution of SRNS safety culture are described in the *SRNS Safety Culture Sustainment Plan*, October 2022.

SRNS uses two principal forms of assessment to promote and sustain a healthy safety culture. The first includes periodic formal assessments, or "baseline" assessments. SRNS contracted with Oak Ridge Associated Universities (ORAU) to conduct a comprehensive baseline safety culture assessment in 2018. SRNS is planning a second assessment to be conducted by ORAU in late 2023, based on the reviewed statement of work. EA reviewed ORAU's safety culture assessment approach used in 2018 and the planned approach to be used in 2023 and concluded that it is a highly credible and well-established evaluation method to assess safety culture at DOE nuclear sites.

For the second form of assessment, SRNS conducts ongoing safety culture monitoring to track progress and identify emerging issues between baseline assessments. A broad, comprehensive understanding of an organization's safety culture (or cultures) requires a range of assessment tools and a diverse assessment team. Because surveys provide only a partial view of the safety culture of an organization, SRNS conducts more comprehensive monitoring through its SCSC. In 2019, SRNS leadership reestablished the SCSC, which is led by senior operations management, and made up of selected SRNS leaders, to monitor and report on organizational drift in safety culture. The SCSC has a formal charter that identifies team members, periodicity of meetings, roles and responsibilities, and how to document recommended actions. The SCSC is authorized to take actions within each of the member's organizations and to propose recommendations to senior leadership to improve safety culture across SRNS. As the primary safety culture evaluation group, the SCSC is the central component of SRNS's safety culture monitoring efforts;

SCSC provides the two critical success factors for the safety culture monitoring process, as described in NEI 09-07, Revision 1, *Fostering a Healthy Nuclear Safety Culture*, March 2014. The SCSC reviews input from a variety of data sources to discern early signals of changes in safety culture. The SCSC also provides a forum for critical conversations, informed by the judgment and experience of its members, leading to insights about the culture.

The results of pulse surveys are included in the data sources the SCSC considers. The pulse surveys include a short series of questions with multiple-choice responses, as well as two open response questions, delivered to a smaller group of SRNS employees. Beginning in 2023, SRNS has been experimenting with adjustments to the frequency, format, and method of delivery for the pulse surveys to increase participation.

Culture Survey Results Analysis and Communication

Numerical responses to the monthly safety culture pulse surveys are statistically analyzed by a quality assurance specialist, who is properly trained in statistical analysis, and who has extensive operational knowledge of conducting data evaluations for numerous SRNS missions. Qualitative comments are coded, categorized, and analyzed for trends. Qualitative trends are used to help better understand the quantitative results. During an interview, the quality assurance specialist identified other data sources (Behavior Based Safety [BBS] peer safety observations, number of engagements in safety meetings, management field observations [MFOs], documentation of lessons learned, safety alert notifications, good catches, health and safety indicators, and “time outs not taken²”) used to compare to the pulse survey data.

The SCSC reviews safety culture data from a variety of quantitative and qualitative sources. The quantitative sources are derived from safety culture pulse surveys, contractor assurance system metrics, and human resources’ statistics on workforce tenure. The qualitative sources are gathered from discussions with Local Safety Improvement Team (LSIT) leads, focus groups and interviews, pulse survey comment reviews, and team member perspectives. The SCSC engages in constructive self-critical dialogue about safety culture data input to gain insights and identify areas in need of attention, as demonstrated by interviews and an observed SCSC meeting. The SCSC’s principal approach is cognitive trending based on the team members’ collective expertise and experience. Cognitive trending is a process of maintaining a mental awareness of recent events and identifying trends via association of like items. SRNS accomplishes cognitive trending through the use of constructive dialogue and consensus decisions for early action on perceived trends. Recommendations are assigned, internally tracked to completion, documented in meeting minutes, and reported to SRNS executive leadership for approval. In addition, the SCSC is piloting and improving the safety culture monitoring roadmaps developed by the DOE SCIP Monitoring Means and Methods Working Group.

The SRNS President and leadership team are actively engaged in safety culture monitoring, as evidenced by their reinvigorating the SCSC and maintaining awareness of safety culture assessment and monitoring activities along with other safety performance data through routine briefings. The SRNS leadership team uses safety culture insights to inform decisions on improvement actions. As a recent example, at the recommendation from the President in response to a review of data, the Back-to-Basics Safety Task Team was formed to “determine how well safety culture is communicated and retained among new employees as well as more seasoned personnel.” The task team used focus groups and interviews to solicit feedback from employees and conducted a review of recent injury data. One of the task team’s findings included the presence of information overload during onboarding of new employees. To address this finding, the

² Issue analysts may assign a more significant issue a code of “time out not taken” if there are indications that someone suspected there was a problem before the issue occurred but did not request a time out/stop work.

SCSC developed several recommendations, which were approved by the President. These included the use of new employee lanyards to encourage mentoring from seasoned employees, addition and creation of safety culture training tailored to specific job roles, improving communication to new employees about LSITs, mandating individual hazard training, and providing subsequent refresher training for new employees. EA considers the investment in focus groups and interviews to be a **Best Practice** because they enhance the understanding of indicators and allow tailoring of improvement actions. (See **BP-SRNS-1.**)

To communicate its activities and actions to employees, the SCSC uses safety meetings and LSIT leadership day presentations, a SRNS Now video, and the internal website, along with other communication methods. SRNS takes appropriate actions to make employees aware of upcoming surveys to increase participation. This was evidenced in the pre-survey communication efforts for a recent survey of employee satisfaction where communications by the SRNS President and Chief Operating Officer were effective in achieving a 70% survey participation rate.

Qualification of Responsible Personnel

The SRNS Director of Safety and Health is the program lead and is supported by a safety culture facilitator to coordinate all activities and a data analyst to collect and process all safety culture-related data. The chair of the SCSC was selected from senior operations management to provide the appropriate line management focus. Members of the SCSC come from various disciplines and are chosen based on their knowledge and experience, and to represent a cross-section of the organization.

As the SRNS independent contractor for safety culture assessment, ORAU's staff has expertise in safety culture evaluations, qualitative data analysis, statistical analysis, survey administration and evaluation design, and project management. The use of a third-party organization to conduct a safety culture assessment particularly one that has designed, planned, and conducted nuclear safety culture evaluations for several similar organizations, can increase employee confidence in the validity of the results.

Areas Needing Attention

Culture Survey Development and Survey Methods

Documentation and interviews indicated that the primary focus of SRNS safety culture monitoring has been worker safety. However, the scope of work for the ORAU survey to be conducted in the fall of 2023 states that "Safety culture in this context includes the broad umbrella of SRNS's Nuclear Safety Culture which addresses Integrated Safety Management [System] (ISMS) and associated safety management programs including but not limited to Nuclear Safety Culture, Industrial Safety, Industrial Hygiene, Radiological Safety, Chemical Safety, etc." (See **OFI-SRNS-1.**)

Accepted standards and practices for safety culture analysis recommend that baseline safety culture assessments be performed every two to three years. SRNS acknowledges that it lacks a current safety culture baseline because of the significant organizational changes, the significant shifts in the site mission focus, and the changing composition of the work force (including loss of personnel due to retirements and large numbers of new hires) since the 2018 ORAU safety culture assessment. (See **OFI-SRNS-2.**)

The safety culture pulse survey process does not meet the criteria for scientifically designed organizational surveys of employee perceptions to support reliable decision-making because the sample includes too few employees, the response rate average of 34% is inadequate, and the validity and reliability of survey instruments were indeterminate. (See **OFI-SRNS-3** and **OFI-SRNS-4.**)

Culture Survey Results Analysis and Communication

Interviews on SCSC decision-making approaches suggest that the SCSC's current success is due in large part to cognitive trending, which relies on the experience and expertise of the SCSC members, enabled by their collaborative approach and senior leadership support. Since there are many employees with three years or fewer of SRNS experience, and there are many new hires, the expertise that supports cognitive trending is vulnerable unless steps are taken to preserve key process knowledge. (See **OFI-SRNS-5**.)

Participation in pulse surveys has been low, averaging 34%. This contrasts with the 70% participation in the recent survey of employee satisfaction. The SCSC has an action in the safety culture sustainment plan to enhance communications and is evaluating different strategies (e.g., targeting only one organization at a time for monthly pulse surveys, so that communications can be more tailored).

SRNS prepares detailed written reports to document quantitative pulse survey findings. However, the reports do not include several important details about the survey instrument, how the survey was administered, or the implications of the results. SRNS's monthly and annual rollup reports present the quantitative findings adequately. However, the reports include neither text to explain or highlight the most important findings nor the implications of the charts and tables of numbers. Explaining what the survey numbers indicate in positive or negative terms and the logic for such conclusions helps communicate the reasons behind the actions taken in response to the survey. (See **OFI-SRNS-6**.)

Qualification of Responsible Personnel

SRNS safety culture program personnel have experience applying safety culture and worker safety principles in work environments. Because SRNS is using in-house pulse surveys that they develop and conduct, this experience is not sufficient. Personnel involved in the development of pulse surveys for safety culture monitoring do not have technical knowledge of survey development or training in recognized culture assessment instruments and methods. (See **OFI-SRNS-7**.)

Although current SCSC processes are understood by members, and followed, SRNS does not have a standard orientation for new SCSC members on the concepts of safety culture or on the processes used to evaluate the site's current culture to ensure continued effective operations.

3.2 DOE Oversight of Contractor Safety Culture Efforts

Positive Attributes

Culture Monitoring Framework

Each of several DOE-SR staff members interviewed considered safety culture to inform all of their oversight activities. The Office of Safety and Quality Assurance has assigned a staff member as the DOE-SR safety culture lead. The lead is responsible for monitoring contractor safety culture initiatives identified as performance objectives, measures, and commitments (POMCs), under DOE Order 450.2, *Integrated Safety Management*. These initiatives include developing a sustainment plan, conducting monthly safety culture pulse surveys, holding quarterly meetings to assess safety culture improvements, and developing a strategy to conduct a third-party, company-wide assessment of safety culture. The DOE-SR safety culture lead periodically attends monthly status meetings with SRNS to review the status of safety culture initiatives and POMCs. The DOE-SR safety culture lead also completed assessments in fiscal years 2022 and 2023 to ensure that SRNS was meeting POMCs.

Interviewed DOE-SR Facility Representatives discussed how they maintain good rapport with contractors to facilitate informal oversight and consider safety culture in their daily oversight activities. The Facility Representatives mentioned that they routinely monitor safety culture by observing how the contractor integrates safety into daily work activities, including pre-job briefings, facility walkdowns, incident investigations, BBS observations, and contractor assurance system oversight.

DOE-SR leadership stated that safety culture is engrained into all SRS activities and cited BBS, MFOs, LSITs, the employee concerns program, management open door policy, and ISMS as examples of strong programs that promote a healthy safety culture.

Development of Safety Culture Competencies

In general, DOE-SR leadership is supportive of improving the safety culture at SRS. The safety culture lead has attended TLP-100, *Safety Culture Leadership Fundamentals (for employees)*, participates in SCIP meetings, and currently serves on the SCIP Monitoring Means and Methods Working Group subcommittee. TLP-200, *Safety Culture Leadership for DOE and DOE Contractor Senior Leaders*, and TLP-150, *Safety Culture Training for Front Line Leaders*, were offered at SRS in 2018 and were attended by approximately 15 to 20 DOE-SR staff members.

Areas Needing Attention

Culture Monitoring Framework

DOE-SR does not have any specific framework, procedures, or guidance for monitoring contractor safety culture. Consequently, formal assessments of safety culture-specific topics, beyond the annual assessments of the POMCs, are not part of the DOE-SR annual assessment plan. (See **OFI-DOE-SR-1.**) DOE-SR leadership expressed a desire for formal assessment guidance.

The DOE-SR safety culture lead has had reduced involvement in safety culture in the past few years due to other priorities. The need to identify a future safety culture lead for environmental management oversight was also expressed by the Director of the Technical Support Division (TSD) because the current safety culture lead will transition over to the National Nuclear Security Administration Savannah River Field Office in 2025 as part of the planned change in SRS management and operations oversight responsibilities.

Development of Safety Culture Competencies

DOE-SR has not initiated a formal effort to ensure that staff members have safety culture training commensurate with their safety culture responsibilities. The last time formal safety culture training was offered onsite to DOE-SR staff was in 2018. DOE-SR leadership acknowledges that there has been a significant turnover in staffing since 2018 and that additional training is needed. (See **OFI-DOE-SR-2.**)

3.3 SUMMARY

SRNS is in the process of renewing its capability to monitor and improve safety culture. This renewal is a function of transition in major missions, operational pauses during COVID-19, and significant transitions in the employee populations; transitions include loss of long-term personnel due to retirements, large numbers of employees with three years or fewer of SRNS experience, and large numbers of new hires currently and in the near-term future. As a result, SRNS recognizes the need to re-baseline its safety culture status, as well as identify ways to improve and sustain the safety culture.

Likewise, DOE-SR recognizes the need to renew its safety culture monitoring capability, with a large number of new hires and an upcoming transition of many staff members over to the National Nuclear Security Administration Savannah River Field Office in light of the changing mission of the site.

SRNS is well situated to meet this challenge by virtue of a strong historical dedication to safety, a leadership commitment to a safety culture supporting future critical missions, and a current capability to sustain ongoing safe operations while preparing to meet changing future needs. EA identified three areas for focused SRNS attention to improve its safety culture monitoring: (1) expanding safety culture monitoring approaches to enable the identification of emerging trends in hazard/discipline-specific domains; (2) documenting SCSC collaborative and analytical processes to capture and transfer valuable knowledge to help foster the competence of future SCSCs; and (3) supplementing sound practical safety culture knowledge with credible scientific knowledge of safety culture surveys and assessment.

4.0 BEST PRACTICES

Best practices are safety-related practices, techniques, processes, or program attributes observed during an assessment that may merit consideration by other DOE and contractor organizations for implementation. The following best practice was identified as part of this assessment:

Savannah River Nuclear Solutions, LLC

BP-SRNS-1: SRNS invests in focus groups and interviews during ongoing safety culture monitoring to enhance the understanding of indicators and allow tailoring of improvement actions (e.g., Back-to-Basics Safety Task Team).

5.0 OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT

EA identified opportunities for improvement (OFIs) as shown below. These OFIs are offered only as recommendations for line management consideration; they do not require formal resolution by management through a corrective action process and are not intended to be prescriptive or mandatory. Rather, they are suggestions that may assist site management in implementing best practices or provide potential solutions to issues identified during the assessment.

Savannah River Nuclear Solutions, LLC

OFI-SRNS-1: Consider enhancing qualitative assessment methods to differentiate perspectives about hazard or technical discipline-specific issues. For engineering, as an example, consult the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations *Principles for Maintaining an Effective Technical Conscience* guidance for how culture principles can be communicated for engineering-specific issues.

OFI-SRNS-2: Consider enhancing the safety culture survey methodology through more frequent use of the ORAU assessment (or another reliable, validated method that can increase confidence in the credibility of the results and ensure employee confidentiality).

OFI-SRNS-3: Consider using alternative techniques to administer surveys to groups of employees who do not routinely have access to computers (e.g., craft or construction workers). Potential benefits include increased response rates and greater employee confidence in confidentiality.

OFI-SRNS-4: Consider building on the success of the communication for the 2023 employee engagement survey to increase the likelihood of participation in the monthly pulse surveys and for the upcoming ORAU assessment.

OFI-SRNS-5: Consider formalizing the composition of the SCSC to ensure the collective expertise is sufficient to support cognitive trending. Consider also developing and using a formal process for comparing the results from surveys to other data sources (e.g., MFO, BBS, focus groups), in addition to cognitive trending. Convergence in the findings from multiple types of assessment methods (both quantitative and qualitative) provides greater confidence in the validity of conclusions. Examples of credible reference sources include EFCOG's *Guide to Monitoring & Improving Safety Culture*, Revision 1, December 2020, and NEI 09-07, Revision 1, *Fostering a Healthy Nuclear Safety Culture*, March 2014.

OFI-SRNS-6: Consider reviewing DOE and industry guidance on suggested formats for safety culture reports. An adequate source of reference is EFCOG's *A Guide to Safety Culture Evaluation*, Revision 0, September 2015.

OFI-SRNS-7: Consider options to enhance SRNS organizational competency to conduct and analyze organizational surveys. Example considerations include providing college internships for students pursuing degrees in organizational or educational psychology to do research on SRNS's current methods and make improvement recommendations; supporting such research by allied college faculty members; and tasking the training organization to develop training on survey science and practice that could be provided to key staff and SCSC members. Consider using EFCOG's *Safety Culture Practitioner's Resources Guide* to improve knowledge and skills for in-house expertise.

DOE Savannah River Operations Office

OFI-DOE-SR-1: Consider developing a formal safety culture oversight monitoring strategy and providing guidance for DOE-SR staff on how to tailor their oversight efforts to inform that monitoring strategy on an ongoing basis, potentially including assessments of safety culture topics in the annual assessment plan.

OFI-DOE-SR-2: Consider making formal safety culture training available to DOE-SR staff periodically.

Appendix A Supplemental Information

Dates of Assessment

Remote Data Collection: August 7-25, 2023

Onsite Assessment: August 28-31, 2023

Office of Enterprise Assessments (EA) Management

John E. Dupuy, Director, Office of Enterprise Assessments

William F. West, Deputy Director, Office of Enterprise Assessments

Kevin G. Kilp, Director, Office of Environment, Safety and Health Assessments

David A. Young, Deputy Director, Office of Environment, Safety and Health Assessments

Thomas E. Sowinski, Director, Office of Nuclear Safety and Environmental Assessments

Kimberly G. Nelson, Director, Office of Worker Safety and Health Assessments

Jack E. Winston, Director, Office of Emergency Management Assessments

Brent L. Jones, Director, Office of Nuclear Engineering and Safety Basis Assessments

Quality Review Board

William F. West, Advisor

Kevin G. Kilp, Chair

Thomas C. Messer

Joseph E. Probst

Michael A. Kilpatrick

EA Site Lead for Savannah River Site

Brannen J. Adkins

EA Assessment Team

Sarah C.R. Gately, Lead

Brannen J. Adkins

W. Earl Carnes

Richard S. Hartley

Robert H. Peters

Thomas R. Staker