# **Revolving Loan Fund Bootcamp**

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Presented by U.S. DOE and Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory





U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

#### **Facilitators**



Greg Leventis
Program Manger,
Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory



Jeff Pitkin, Former Treasurer / CFO, New York State Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSERDA)



Jeff Deason, Program Manger, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory

Other contributors: Sean Murphy, Berkeley Lab



#### **Training motivation**

- This training aims to help SEO staff maximize energy benefits to their states by leveraging IIJA funds and/or other capital sources to support revolving loan funds.
- Available Federal funding sources include:
  - □ IIJA Section 40109
  - IIJA Section 40502 (Revolving Loan Fund)
  - SEP Annual Appropriations
  - Unspent funds from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA)





#### **Training objectives**

- The bootcamp will help participants:
  - Understand the opportunities, needs and limitations of RLFs and other related financing mechanisms
  - Review examples of successful RLF program designs that they may wish to replicate or incorporate
  - Spur ideas on how maximize RLF impact





## **Agenda**

- Overview of revolving loan funds (RLFs)
- Setting goals and expectations
- RLF program design: Considerations and options
- Questions and discussion among states







#### **ELECTRICITY MARKETS & POLICY**

## Overview of revolving loan funds




#### **RLF** description

- States use energy revolving loan funds to support a variety of projects across multiple end use sectors
  - Projects: Energy efficiency, renewable energy, and water efficiency
  - Sectors: Residential, commercial, public/institutional; some funds serve only one sector, others serve multiple sectors
- States employ a variety of program administration structures
  - Discussed in detail later in this training
- States have leveraged multiple funding sources
  - Petroleum overcharge funds
  - Federal funding: American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (2010), [forthcoming: Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (2021)]
  - State funding appropriations, cap-and-trade revenues
  - Utility customer funds (less common)



#### **RLF** description







## **ELECTRICITY MARKETS & POLICY**

## **Setting goals and expectations**



#### **Goals and metrics**

- What are your goals for the RLF?
  - Clean energy (energy savings, decreased emissions, regulatory requirements)
  - Economic (economic development, workforce development)
  - Consumer (increased comfort, improved health outcomes, bill savings, improved asset value)
  - Societal (broader participation in the clean energy economy/transition, electric grid impacts, support for LMI households or small businesses)
  - Program self sufficiency and protecting the corpus
- How do you measure performance?
  - Clean energy: Number of projects? Size of project? Improvements with most savings (energy savings, emissions savings)? Meeting legislative or regulatory energy goals?
  - Economic: Dollars invested? Dollars leveraged? Jobs created?
  - Consumer: Dollar value of bill savings?
  - Societal: Number of participants from target groups?
  - Program sustainability: Minimizing losses? Preserving funds?



## Gap analysis

- A gap analysis identifies market need for clean energy financing in a given state by:
  - Reviewing existing sources of programmatic and private-sector financing
  - Consulting with stakeholders to determine suitability of existing sources
- Gaps may exist for multiple reasons
  - Access: Certain segments of a sector (e.g., small commercial, credit-challenged residential, local governments) may not be able to access capital at all
  - Terms: capital may be available, but may be expensive, require quick payback, or be otherwise be ill-suited to certain energy projects
- State RLFs that fill gaps tend to provide more value
  - Enable new projects rather than competing with or displacing other financing already available





#### **RLF** activity

- How much clean energy have RLF programs been able to fund?
- Who participates (income, credit)? How much do they borrow? How well have RLF participants repaid their loans?
- What are the lessons learned from programs created or enhanced under ARRA?





### RLF lending and sourcing

- Berkeley Lab studied 12 State Energy Office RLF programs. In 2014, those program invested approximately \$74M in energy efficiency.
- Where the funds went (investment by sector):

Total Loan Volume (\$M)	Residential Sector (\$M)	Number of Residential Loans	Commercial / Industrial Sector (\$M)	Public / Institutional Sector (\$M)	Number of Non- Residential Loans
\$74	\$17	1,595	\$12	\$45	92


Where the funds came from (capital source):

Utility (\$M)	Private Sector (\$M)	Public Sector (\$M)	Portfolio Sale (\$M)
\$10	\$9	\$44	\$12



#### Residential participant loan size

Loan principal amounts in the Connecticut Smart-E loan, Keystone HELP,
 Michigan Saves, and Green Jobs Green New York programs over 10 years:




Source: Long-Term Performance of Energy Efficiency Loan Portfolios SEE Action 2021



#### Residential participant credit

Borrower FICO scores in the Connecticut Smart-E loan, Keystone HELP,
 Michigan Saves, and Green Jobs Green New York programs over 10 years:




Source: Long-Term Performance of Energy Efficiency Loan Portfolios SEE Action 2021



#### Residential participant income

 Program participation in the Connecticut Smart-E loan, Michigan Saves, and Green Jobs Green New York programs by Area Median Income (AMI) bin over 10 years:



Source: Long-Term Performance of Energy Efficiency Loan Portfolios SEE Action 2021



## ARRA funding for RLFs: Facts and figures\*

- 35 states capitalized RLFs using funds from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act; total capitalization was \$566 million
- Most state RLFs have loaned out their initial capitalization amount
  - RLFs capitalized using these funds have loaned \$796 million
  - Some states have loaned out funds 2+ times
- Ten states account for 68% of this loan volume (\$)



<sup>\*</sup> Figures and statistics based on PAGE data (as of 6.1.22). PAGE data is self-reported by states.

#### **ARRA RLF success factors**

- Leverage: Funds with high lending volume either:
  - Used multiple sources of revolving capital (e.g., funds established before ARRA that used ARRA funds to supplement their existing resources);
  - Engaged private capital providers through co-lending models or by using federal money as a credit enhancement to spur private lending; or
  - Replenished capital via secondary market transactions
- Administration: Many successful funds engaged third parties to help with some aspects of program administration, rather than relying exclusively on SEO staff and resources
- Partnerships: Many successful funds partnered with contractors, community groups, local credit unions, or banks to help advertise the program and drive uptake






## **ELECTRICITY MARKETS & POLICY**

# RLF program design: Considerations and options



#### **RLF functions**

- Marketing and outreach
- Loan origination
- Loan servicing
- Monitoring and reporting





## Marketing and outreach

- Stimulate awareness and uptake of financing product
- May be most effective to integrate with contractor sales process





## Loan origination

- Process financing application
- Perform credit evaluation (e.g., loan origination/underwriting)
- Generate loan documents
- Disburse loan proceeds





## Loan servicing

- Collecting and processing loan repayments
- Sending out statements (if required)
- Delinquency collections
- Default collections





## Monitoring and reporting

- Regular and consistent process (monthly)
- Review applications received/processed, loan issued, repayments, and delinquencies/defaults
- Comply with reporting requirements from capital provider and Federal flow down requirements (where applicable)






## **Options for RLF lending structure**

- Direct lending
- Co-lending
- Interest rate buydown
- Credit enhancement (loan loss reserves)






## **Program structure: Direct lending**





## **Program structure: Co-lending**






#### Program structure: Interest rate buydown

Interest Rate Buydown (IRB) model 1. Federal (or other) funding 5. Repayments 2. Administration Program State Building Admin RLF 3. IRB Owner/ **Private** 4. Lending contractor Lending 4. Energy Partner \$\$ **Improvements** 



# Program structure: Credit enhancements (loan loss reserve)





#### **Options for RLF administration**

- Self-administered SEO performs all functions internally
  - Example: Texas State Energy Conservation Office LoanSTAR Program
- Partially Outsourced SEO contracts out for certain tasks (e.g. loan origination, loan servicing)
  - Example: NYSERDA Green Jobs-Green New York Program
- Fully Outsourced SEO contracts out for program delivery
  - Example: AlabamaSAVES Program





## Advantages/disadvantages of administration options

Option	Advantages	Disadvantages
Self- administered	Control program delivery	<ul> <li>Requires expertise that may not be available in house</li> <li>May compete with other staff and program priorities</li> </ul>
Partially Outsourced	<ul> <li>Access external expertise         (particularly important for         compliance with         federal/state regulations for         lending and loan servicing)</li> <li>Alleviate some staff burden</li> </ul>	Small number of fee-for-service providers (except servicing)
Fully Outsourced	<ul><li>Same as Partially outsourced</li><li>Alleviate more staff burden</li></ul>	<ul><li>Same as Partially outsourced</li><li>Less control over program delivery</li></ul>



## RLF program design tradeoffs

- Risk tolerance
- Beat the market or complement the market
- Broadening access to underserved borrowers
- Policy goals vs financial goals





## **RLF** program design elements

- Project eligibility
- Borrower eligibility
- Loan underwriting standards
- Types of loans
- Loan terms





#### Leveraging partnerships

- Engaging private capital can dramatically expand the potential volume of lending and resultant energy impacts that a RLF can achieve
  - Many RLFs that have attained high volumes (though not all) have engaged private capital
- Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act directs that State shall, to maximum extent practicable, use the grant to leverage private capital
- How to do this?
  - Listening sessions with stakeholders contractors; lenders; utilities
  - Deliberately and persistently build partnerships
  - Attract private capital avoid competing with it
  - Cross-promotion opportunities





#### Financial terms

- The financial terms offered to customers impact fund uptake, fund sustainability
- Balancing act
  - Low interest rates = higher demand, potential run on the money; high interest rates may result in little demand

Long loan terms = more projects that pencil out for borrowers, but slow repayment; some private capital providers will be unwilling to offer longer terms

Changes to terms create timing considerations





#### **Protecting the corpus**

- Successful RLFs often face challenges in maintaining available funding
  - Unavailability could have negative market impacts (e.g., frustrated program partners, frustrated program participants/potential participants, and reputational impacts that could hinder participation in future program initiatives)
- Factors that can improve fund sustainability:
  - Strong underwriting criteria
  - Effective servicing and monitoring
  - Setting interest rates sufficient to cover anticipated losses and expenses, including administration costs
    - IIJA RLF provision caps administrative costs at 10%



#### **Generating program participation**

- Determine who is best equipped to be responsible for lead generation
  - Contractors
  - Program staff
  - Community organizations
- Integrated approach to project generation financing is one piece
- Community-based participation





#### Resources


- NASEO State Energy Revolving Loan Fund resources
  - www.naseo.org/issues/energy-financing/revolving-loan-funds
- NASEO Energy Finance
  - https://www.naseo.org/issues/energy-financing
- DOE resources
  - https://www.energy.gov/eere/slsc/revolving-loan-funds
- Berkeley Lab research on energy efficiency financing
  - https://emp.lbl.gov/projects/financing-energy
- Specific Berkeley Lab reports:
  - Long-term Performance of Energy Efficiency Loan Portfolios <a href="https://emp.lbl.gov/publications/long-term-performance-energy">https://emp.lbl.gov/publications/long-term-performance-energy</a>
  - Energy Efficiency Program Financing
     <a href="https://emp.lbl.gov/publications/energy-efficiency-program-financing">https://emp.lbl.gov/publications/energy-efficiency-program-financing</a>
  - Energy Efficiency Financing Program Implementation Primer <a href="https://emp.lbl.gov/publications/energy-efficiency-financing-program">https://emp.lbl.gov/publications/energy-efficiency-financing-program</a>
- NYSERDA Green Jobs-Green New York loan data
  - <u>www.nyserda.ny.gov/Researchers-and-Policymakers/Green-Jobs-Green-New-York/Data-and-Trends</u>
- Minnesota Trillion BTU application document
  - https://www.sppa.com/wp-content/uploads/Trillion-BTU-Loan-Application.pdf





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## Questions and discussion among states





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#### **ELECTRICITY MARKETS & POLICY**

#### **Contacts**

Greg Leventis: <a href="mailto:gleventis@lbl.gov">gleventis@lbl.gov</a>
Jeff Pitkin: <a href="mailto:jeff.pitkin@outlook.com">jeff.pitkin@outlook.com</a>

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