DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Intent To Prepare Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Reconfiguration of the Nuclear Weapons Complex

AGENCY: Department of Energy.

ACTION: Notice of intent to prepare a programmatic environmental impact statement for reconfiguration of the nuclear weapons complex.

SUMMARY: The Department of Energy (DOE) announces its intent to prepare a programmatic environmental impact statement (PEIS) for reconfiguring its nuclear weapons complex, pursuant to section 102(2)(C) of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, as amended (42 U.S.C. 4321 *et seq.*), and the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations (40 CFR parts 1500–1508). In order to assist with modernization, DOE proposes to reconfigure its existing nuclear weapons complex to create a smaller, less diverse, more efficient complex at the present sites, or at relocated or consolidated sites. The PEIS will analyze the environmental consequences of alternative long-term reconfiguration strategies for the DOE nuclear weapons complex, envisioned to be in place early in the 21st century ("Complex 21"), and weigh these against the consequences of maintaining the existing configuration. The PEIS also will be used to support DOE decisions regarding the configuration of its plutonium facilities in the mid-term (in about the year 2000).

Through the PEIS, DOE proposes to develop a comprehensive strategy to establish a long-range reconfiguration plan and avoid piecemeal improvements. If DOE decides to proceed with reconfiguration, the plan would detail how DOE would achieve Complex 21.

Concurrently with this Notice, DOE is issuing the Nuclear Weapons Complex Reconfiguration Study ("Reconfiguration Study") which reassesses the current problems facing the complex; DOE has prepared both a classified and an unclassified version. The Reconfiguration Study contains material which is expected to serve as a basis for certain assumptions and analyses in the PEIS. The unclassified version of the Reconfiguration Study is publicly available upon request at the address given below.

DATES: Written comments on the scope of the nuclear weapons complex PEIS are invited from the public. To ensure consideration in preparation of the PEIS, comments must be postmarked by September 30, 1991. Late comments will be considered to the extent practicable.

DOE will hold public scoping meetings near all sites analyzed in detail in the PEIS. DOE intends to announce the location, date and time for these public meetings in a Notice in the Federal Register in March 1991, and by other means as appropriate. The announcement of the meetings will be at least two weeks prior to any meetings. The public meetings will provide the public with an opportunity to present oral comments as well as written material.

ADDRESSES: Written comments on the scope of the PEIS, requests for copies of the unclassified Reconfiguration Study, requests for further information on the DOE nuclear weapons complex reconfiguration program, and requests for copies of the unclassified portion of the PEIS (when available) should be sent to: James R. Nicks, Deputy Director, Complex Reconfiguration Task Force, DP–27, room GA–045, U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20585, (202) 586–1537.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For general information on the DOE NEPA review process, please contact: Carol M. Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA Oversight, EH–25, U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington DC 20585, (202) 586–4600.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: *Purpose and need for this action.* DOE needs its nuclear weapons complex to be configured in such a way as to safely and reliably support whatever nuclear deterrent stockpile objectives are established in the future by the President and Congress. The purpose of DOE's proposal to reconfigure the existing complex is to achieve a complex that is smaller, less diverse, and less expensive to operate. Reconfiguring the nuclear weapons complex would serve as a means to maximize efficiency and minimize public health risks. DOE will use the PEIS to assess the environmental impacts of alternative options for configuring the nuclear weapons complex. In determining the configuration of the complex, DOE will ensure that regulatory and institutional requirements are met and DOE's national defense mission is satisfied.

DOE nuclear weapons complex. The DOE nuclear weapons complex consists of 13 major facilities located in 12 states. Major facilities, and their primary responsibilities within the complex, are listed in Table 1. The complex produces nuclear material; performs research, development, and testing of nuclear devices; designs and manufactures nuclear weapons; provides surveillance of and maintains nuclear weapons in the national stockpile; and retires and disposes of nuclear weapons. The complex is organized into three functional elements: (1) Plants for nuclear materials production and manufacturing; (2) plants for nonnuclear manufacturing; and (3) laboratories and test sites used for research development and testing. There is some functional overlap at individual sites (as noted in Table 1).

By law, DOE is charged with providing nuclear weapons to support the United States nuclear deterrent policy (the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2011 *et seq.*) The mission of the DOE nuclear weapons complex is to provide the Department of Defense with safe, secure, reliable, operative nuclear weapons and components so that the United States can maintain an effective, viable nuclear deterrent into the foreseeable future; and to accomplish this in a way that protects the health and safety of workers and the public, and protects the environment.

Table 1

The DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex

Functional Element: Nuclear Materials Production and Manufacturing Sites[1]

Hanford Site (Richland, Washington) [2]—Chemical separations (spent fuel reprocessing) and plutonium production support.

Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (Idaho Falls, Idaho)—Chemical processing of naval reactor spent fuel to recover enriched uranium for use as fuel in production reactors.

Pantex Plant (Amarillo, Texas) [3]—Assembling high explosives, nuclear

[1] Prior to October 1, 1990, the Feed Materials Production Center, Fernald, Ohio, was part of the nuclear weapons complex. It was used for producing uranium metal cores for nuclear material production reactors. It is now managed by DOE's Office of Environmental Restoration and Waste Management.

[2] Management of some nuclear weapons complex aspects of the Hanford Site is expected to be transferred to DOE's Office of Environmental Restoration and Waste Management in 1991; if so, these aspects may not be addressed in this PEIS. In that event, they would be addressed, as appropriate, in NEPA documents prepared by DOE's Office of Environmental Restoration and Waste Management.

[3] These sites have overlapping assignments for both the nuclear materials production and manufacturing functional element and the nonnuclear manufacturing functional element.

components, and nonnuclear components into nuclear weapons; repairing and modifying weapons; disassembling and retiring weapons; and evaluating and testing nuclear stockpile.

Rocky Flats Plant (Denver, Colorado) [3]—Fabricating plutonium and uranium components; recovering/recycling plutonium.

Savannah River Site (Aiken, South Carolina)—Chemical separations (spent fuel reprocessing), producing weapons-grade plutonium, tritium, and other special isotopes; fabricating reactor fuel and targets; tritium loading facility; and research and development process support.

Y–12 Plant (Oak Ridge, Tennessee) [3]—Producing weapons components, producing and blending uranium alloys, and producing lithium compounds; recovering materials from fabrication process and retired weapons.

Functional Element: Nonnuclear Manufacturing Sites

Kansas City Plant (Kansas City, Missouri)—Manufacturing, surveillance, and evaluating nuclear weapons components.

Mound Plant (Dayton, Ohio)—Manufacturing, surveillance, and evaluating nuclear weapons components; recovering and purifying tritium wastes and providing backup tritium loading capability.

Pantex Plant (Amarillo, Texas)[3]—Fabricating high explosives components.

Pinellas Plant (Clearwater, Florida)—Producing miniaturized neutron generators, radioisotope thermoelectric generators, thermal batteries, and other weapons components.

Rocky Flats Plant (Denver, Colorado)[3]—Fabricating beryllium components and other nonnuclear metal parts.

Y–12 Plant (Oak Ridge, Tennessee) [3]—Producing and assembling nonnuclear weapons components.

Functional Element: Weapons Research, Development and Testing Sites

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (Livermore, California)—Research and development of nuclear warheads; designing and testing advanced technology concepts; maintaining weapons design program.

Los Alamos National Laboratory (Los Alamos, New Mexico)—Research and development of nuclear warheads; designing and testing advanced technology concepts; maintaining weapons design program.

Sandia National Laboratories (Albuquerque, New Mexico)—Engineering nuclear weapons systems ordnance; designing and developing nonnuclear components; field and laboratory testing; and manufacturing engineering.

Nevada Test Site (Las Vegas, Nevada)—Underground nuclear testing.

To meet this mission DOE's nuclear weapons complex must maintain the nuclear weapons stockpile in readiness, certify the reliability and safety of nuclear weapons, and modernize the stockpile based on requirements approved by the President. The nuclear weapons stockpile is established by the President to meet Department of Defense requirements for national security; short-term requirements are documented annually through the President's Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum.

The NEPA process. NEPA requires review of any major Federal action which may significantly affect the quality of the human environment. The review is documented through an EIS. The NEPA process is described in the CEQ regulations implementing NEPA (40 CFR parts 1500–1508). DOE has issued additional NEPA procedures (DOE NEPA regulations at 10 CFR part 1021, DOE NEPA Guidelines (52 FR 47661, December 15, 1987), as amended (54 FR 12474, March 27, 1989, and 55 FR 37174, September 7, 1990), DOE Order 5440.1C, and Secretary of Energy Notice 15–90). The draft and final PEIS will be prepared in accordance with these requirements.

A PEIS is a broad-scope environmental analysis of a program or policy (40 CFR 1500.4(i)). A PEIS provides an opportunity for NEPA review to coincide with meaningful points in agency planning and decisionmaking (40 CFR 1502.4(b)). A PEIS may be used to support later NEPA documents of narrower scope (called "tiering"), such as site-specific or project-specific NEPA reviews. NEPA documents tiered from the PEIS would focus on specific actions when they are ripe for review (40 CFR 1502.20).

Following preparation of an EIS, an agency issues a Record of Decision (ROD) to document its decision (40 CFR 1505.2). The ROD explains how the EIS analysis was balanced against other factors leading to the agency's decision.

Nuclear weapons complex reconfiguration PEIS. DOE has determined that reconfiguration of the nuclear weapons complex would be a major Federal action within the meaning of NEPA; and that the several actions anticipated under the reconfiguration effort are connected (40 CFR 1508.25) and would constitute a broad agency program (40 CFR 1502.4). Accordingly, DOE has decided that a PEIS is appropriate to analyze the environmental consequences of reconfiguring the nuclear weapons complex and to factor environmental considerations into DOE decisions regarding this program.

Reconfiguration plan. DOE will use the decisions arising from the PEIS to develop a comprehensive reconfiguration plan to guide DOE in implementing the nuclear weapons complex of the 21st century, called Complex 21. The plan will cover such things as identifying sites to carry out (maintain, relinquish or acquire) specific nuclear weapons complex functions now performed at the sites listed in Table 1; schedules for transferring responsibilities from one location to another or bringing new facilities (if any) on-line; and the extent of government-owned and private facilities to be used. The plan will be consistent with the emerging international security environment and flexible enough to accommodate the likely range of deterrent contingencies. As announced by DOE on August 14, 1990, the Secretary of Energy has directed that DOE use the following principles to guide development of the plan; therefore these principles will guide development of reconfiguration alternatives considered in the PEIS.

In reconfiguring the nuclear weapons complex, DOE will:

- Emphasize compliance with laws, regulations and accepted practices regarding industrial and weapons safety; safeguarding the health of complex workers and the general public; protecting the environment; and security of nuclear materials and weapons components.
- Safely and reliably maintain the nuclear weapons stockpile as directed by the President and funded by Congress.
- Minimize costs associated with the weapons stockpile.
- Minimize the number of weapons production sites and the size of individual sites.
- Maximize transfer of nonnuclear materials production activities to the private sector.
- Maintain redundancy in key capabilities that could significantly and rapidly degrade the effectiveness of the complex if lost.
- Minimize the use of hazardous materials and the number and size of waste streams.
- Provide for proper disposal of hazardous and radioactive waste.
- Emphasize the use of modular construction where feasible to promote minimum environment, safety and health impacts and maximum flexibility to increase complex capacity should the requirement arise.
- Identify existing nuclear weapons complex sites that may be transferred to DOE's Office of Environmental Restoration

and Waste Management for eventual decommissioning, or conversion to inactive standby status, while ensuring the flexibility to respond to potential nuclear weapons stockpile requirements.

• Maintain the capability to retire large numbers of nuclear weapons if required by stockpile downsizing.

DOE will make certain other assumptions to guide development of both the reconfiguration alternatives in the PEIS and the reconfiguration plan. Preliminary assumptions include:

• Nuclear weapons will remain a prime component of national security for the foreseeable future; DOE must maintain the nuclear weapons complex so that it is capable of reliably responding to potential national security needs, including the capability to produce nuclear materials and other components needed for the manufacture of nuclear weapons.

• Maintenance and operation of the complex must comply with all applicable laws, regulations, and Federal policy over which DOE has no control, existing at the time the PEIS is prepared.

• Adequate facilities will be provided for disposal of nuclear, hazardous and mixed waste. This is being addressed in a separate DOE environmental restoration and waste management PEIS.

The PEIS will not address issues and concerns that are either outside the control of DOE or do not bear on the decisions regarding nuclear weapons complex reconfiguration now before DOE. Specifically, the following items are considered beyond the scope of this PEIS:

• The need for nuclear weapons, or impacts of their use.

• Actions of the President, Congress, Department of Defense, or other (non-DOE) Federal agencies.

• DOE projects or facilities which are not part of the nuclear weapons complex.

• Management and disposition of waste. This is being addressed in a separate DOE environmental restoration and waste management PEIS.

PEIS alternatives. The PEIS will examine alternative configurations for the nuclear weapons complex, developed in accordance with the above principles. Although DOE has not yet developed a preferred alternative for the PEIS, the preferred alternative will embody those principles. Specifically, the perferred alternative will include: (1) Relocating the nuclear weapons functions now assigned to the Rocky Flats Plant near Denver, Colorado, and closing the nuclear weapons complex facilities at that plant; and (2) maximizing consolidation of the nonnuclear manufacturing complex with the goal of having only one dedicated nonnuclear manufacturing site within Complex 21. The perferred alternative will also address consolidation of other nuclear materials production and manufacturing functions, and consolidation of functions now performed at the nuclear weapons complex research, development and testing facilities.

DOE plans to examine consolidation possibilities for all weapons complex functions through the PEIS, including shifting certain activities to other sites within the complex and transferring certain nonnuclear activities to the private sector; however, it would not be feasible or prudent to relocate some weapons complex facilities. DOE is looking at candidate sites to identify reasonable alternatives for maximum consolidation within the nuclear materials production and manufacturing functional area of the nuclear weapons complex. In determining the alternative configurations for this function of the nuclear weapons complex, among other things DOE will examine candidate sites to determine if any are suitable for: (1) Receiving the nuclear weapons functions now assigned to the Rocky Flats Plant; or (2) co-locating nuclear materials production and manufacturing functions now assigned to other sites with the relocated Rocky Flats Plant functions. It is possible that the range of existing weapons complex sites does not include all reasonable options; therefore DOE will evaluate additional sites for relocation of these facilities. In addition, the PEIS may examine mission changes or relocation of certain facilities now located at the Savannah River Site near Aiken, South Carolina, depending on the outcome of decisions related to new production reactor capacity, currently being addressed by DOE in a separate EIS.

To assist with the development of the alternatives to be analyzed in the PEIS, DOE has established a Site Evaluation Panel to review candidate DOE and non-DOE sites for the potential relocation of nuclear materials production and manufacturing functions currently located at the Rocky Flats Plant, and the potential co-location of other facilities. Concurrently with this Notice of Intent, DOE is publishing in the **Federal Register** a Notice of Availability of an Invitation for Site Proposals ("Invitation") for reconfiguring the nuclear weapons complex. The Invitation solicits proposals for a site to receive relocated nuclear materials production and manufacturing facilities, explains the criteria which the Site Evaluation Panel will use to qualify and evaluate proposed sites, and provides a list of information requirements. The Invitation allows non-DOE entities to submit non-DOE sites for consideration, and specifies candidate DOE sites that will be considered for potential relocation of nuclear materials production and manufacturing facilities.

Table 2 lists the candidate DOE sites, identified by DOE, which meet the initial screening criteria (sites which contain a minimum of 5,000 contiguous acres of Federally-owned, unobstructed land, and have adequate resources to meet electrical power and potable water requirements, as discussed in detail in the Invitation) and have no inherent mission incompatibility. DOE will compile information packages for these candidate sites to meet the information requirements listed in the Invitation. The Site Evaluation Panel will evaluate both the DOE sites listed in Table 2 and non-DOE sites proposed in response to the Invitation, using the same information requirements and qualification and evaluation criteria (provided in the Invitation), to determine whether any would be reasonable alternatives to receive relocated nuclear materials production and manufacturing functions; reasonable alternatives will be analyzed in the PEIS.

DOE and non-DOE sites which qualify for further consideration will be announced in a **Federal Register** notice on or about **July 1, 1991**, and will be subject to further evaluation by the Site Evaluation Panel and DOE management to determine the set of reasonable alternatives for inclusion in the PEIS analysis. The decision whether or not to relocate any facilities, and selection of a relocation site (if any), will be included in the ROD ensuing from this PEIS.

Table 2

Candidate DOE Sites To Be Considered for Potential Relocation of Nuclear Materials Production and Manufacturing Facilities

Site
Hanford Site, Richland, Washington
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Idaho Falls, Idaho
Oak Ridge Reservation, Oak Ridge, Tennessee
Pentex Site, Amarillo, Texas
Savannah River Site, Aiken, South Carolina

Note: DOE will examine these candidate DOE sites to determine if any are suitable for: (1) Receiving the nuclear weapons functions now assigned to the Rocky Flats Plant; or (2) co-locating nuclear materials production and manufacturing functions now assigned to other sites with the relocated Rocky Flats Plant functions. The listed DOE sites contain a minimum of 5,000 contiguous acres of Federally-owned, unobstructed land; and have adequate resources to meet electrical

power and potable water requirements (as discussed in detail in the Invitation) and have no inherent mission incompatibility. Inclusion on this list does not imply that DOE or the SEP have concluded that these sites have been qualified under the terms of the Invitation or are reasonable siting alternatives for analysis in the PEIS; nor does it preclude additional DOE sites from being considered reasonable as a result of the public scoping process.

PEIS alternatives will be sufficiently detailed to allow for meaningful consideration of their comparative merits. This will include, but is not limited to, consideration of constructing and operating additional projects and facilities; using private sector facilities; moving existing facilities; decommissioning and decontaminating existing facilities; and phasing these actions over time. However, following completion of the PEIS and the associated ROD, DOE intends to prepare subsequent site-specific NEPA reviews for construction and operation of individual projects, if any, identified in the ROD. Decommissioning and decontamination projects, if any, will be considered in subsequent project-specific NEPA reviews in accordance with the enviromental restoration and waste management PEIS and its related ROD.

The CEQ regulations require evaluation of a "No Action" alternative in the PEIS. Under the No Action alternative for reconfiguration, Complex 21 would not be developed and the existing configuration would continue. However, the complex would not be static: DOE would continue to make those modifications and upgrades necessary to ensure compliance with Federal, State, and local laws and regulations. If Complex 21 were not developed, DOE proposals to address facility deterioration or technical obsolescence, and the potential for closure of, addition to, or relocation of current complex functions, would continue to be considered over time on a case-by-case basis; however, specific project proposals would not be projected or assessed under the No Action alternative in this PEIS.

DOE is developing a Capital Asset Management Process for managing its capital-related funding for the nuclear weapons complex. Through this process, DOE plans to indentify certain maintenance, repair and renovation actions that would take place regardless of the alternative selected. Some of these are continuation of ongoing actions, and some are revised procedures needed to achieve environmental, health, safety, or regulatory compliance. Together, these actions are considered to be common to any alternatives and form a technical baseline. Their impacts will be analyzed under the No Action alternative in the PEIS.

Mid-term configuration. In addition to the alternatives for the long-term configuration of Complex 21, the PEIS will also examine alternatives for a mid-term configuration for the plutonium fabrication functions of the existing complex in about the year 2000. This analysis is predicated on the potential need for a means to supply plutonium weapons components in the event that DOE elects to cease operation of these functions at the Rocky Flats Plant prior to implementing Complex 21. Alternatives would include accelerating constructing, testing, and operating plutonium fabrication functions for Complex 21; constructing an interim facility; retrofitting an existing facility; or No Action (continue to operate the Rocky Flats Plant until Complex 21 is in place). The analysis will be sufficiently detailed to support decisions regarding siting and constructing (if appropriate) plutonium facilities to meet mid-term needs.

Enviromental issues. The PEIS will identify and analyze direct, indirect, and cumulative effects resulting from the configuration of the complex, including potential effects from constructing and operating proposed support facilities (if any), and transporting radioactive, hazardous or mixed (both radioactive and hazardous) materials. The PEIS will consider impacts to public and worker health and safety; natural ecosystems including, but not limited to, air quality, water resources, plants and animals; the cultural environment including, but not limited to, land use, historic resources and archaeological sites; and the socioeconomic situation. The PEIS will address the potential consequences of both normal and accidental radiological and nonradiological releases. The PEIS will examine other relevant issues identified by DOE or the public through the scoping process.

Configuration decisions. Following preparation of the final PEIS, DOE will issue a ROD to document its decisions on the long-term configuration of the nuclear weapons complex and how DOE will accomplish this. The ROD will explain how DOE has balanced environmental considerations against other factors, such as cost and engineering feasibility, in reaching its decision. Among other things, the ROD will include a decision regarding the siting of weapons complex facilities, now located at the Rocky Flats Plant, and co-location of other facilities.

It is anticipated that the ROD will serve as the basis for a final reconfiguration plan for Complex 21. The plan will help guide DOE in future site-specific and project-specific decisionmaking. If necessary, the PEIS and the reconfiguration plan may be supplemented later, if there is a need to change or augment the programmatic decisions.

In addition to the ROD on the configuration of Complex 21, DOE will prepare a ROD to address the mid-term configuration for the plutonium fabrication functions of the weapons complex. If DOE determines that there is a need to establish a means to manufacture plutonium parts prior to implementing Complex 21, this ROD would establish the timing and method to meet that need. The ROD will address whether replacement plutonium facilities would be needed in the mid-term, and, if so, siting and construction considerations for those facilities. The ROD on the mid-term configuration may be issued independently from the ROD on Complex 21.

Interim actions. DOE may propose, analyze, and implement some actions pertaining to the nuclear weapons complex in the interim while the PEIS is being prepared. However, under the provisions of the CEQ regulations, while the PEIS is in progress DOE may not:

> Undertake in the interim any major Federal action covered by the program which may significantly affect the quality of the human environment unless such action:
>
> (1) Is justified independently of the program;
>
> (2) Is itself accompanied by an adequate environmental impact statement; and
>
> (3) Will not prejudice the ultimate decision on this program. Interim action prejudices the ultimate decision on the program when it tends to determine subsequent development or limit alternatives.
>
> (40 CFR 1506.1(c))

DOE is currently in the process of preparing or contemplating several EISs on actions related to those covered by this PEIS. There are listed in Table 3, with an explanation of their relationship to this PEIS. DOE intends to complete related EISs according to their current schedules. As part of the EISs listed in Table 3, DOE has requested (or will soon request) public comment on the scope of the NEPA review; their scope will not be revisited in this PEIS.

Classified material. DOE will review classified material, including the classified version of the Reconfiguration Study, while preparing the PEIS. DOE anticipates that the completed PEIS, and its associated ROD, may include classified material which will not be available for general public review. This material would, however, be considered

by DOE in reaching a decision on configuration of the complex. The ensuring nuclear weapons complex reconfiguration plan would include an unclassified summary document which would be available for public distribution and a classified report which would not be made available to the general public.

Table 3

Related DOE Environmental Impact Statements (EISs) in Preparation or Under Consideration

Programmatic EISs

Environmental restoration and waste management PEIS—Current status: Notice of Intent (NOI) published on October 22, 1990 (55 FR 42633).

Relationship to reconfiguration PEIS: Will analyze alternative means for managing DOE's nuclear, hazardous, mixed, and other wastes; transportation implications of waste disposal; and environmental restoration at DOE sites. Will address the waste management implications of activities within the nuclear weapons complex; however the volume of waste generated by the nuclear weapons complex is a small portion of the total volume of waste considered. Will describe environmental restoration activitives which would be required for the eventual decontamination and decommissioning of DOE facilities, including those at weapons complex sites.

New production reactor EIS—Current status: NOI published on September 16, 1988 (53 FR 36094); draft EIS scheduled to be issued early in 1991.

Relationship to reconfiguration PEIS: Will analyze alternative means of providing tritium capacity to meet the nation's defense requirements well into the 21st century, including selection of one or more sites and/or technologies for production reactors. Would be an "interim action" under the CEQ regulations; serves as the DOE's programmatic look at new tritium production capacity. Project-specific siting and technology decisions made through this EIS will be considered to be part of Complex 21, and would serve as part of the "no action" alternative in the PEIS.

Site-wide EISs

Lawrence Livermore site-wide EIS—Current status: NOI published on October 5, 1990 (55 FR 41048); draft EIS scheduled to be issued by December 1991.

Relationship to reconfiguration PEIS: Will analyze impacts of continuing near-term operations at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Sandia National Laboratory, Livermore, to meet the requirements of both NEPA and the California Environmental Quality Act. Will look at alternative locations for activities that are not part of the weapons complex; consideration of relocating weapons functions will be examined in the PEIS.

Rocky Flats site-wide EIS—Current status: Authorized by Secretary on September 24, 1990; NOI scheduled to be published in early 1991.

Relationship to reconfiguration PEIS: Will analyze impacts of managment of the Rocky Flats Plant until Complex 21 is implemented; consideration of relocating plutonium facilities in the mid-term, and all weapons facilities in the long-term, will be examined in the PEIS.

Project-specific EISs

Plutonium Recovery Modification Project—Current status: NOI published on May 30, 1990 (55 FR 21919); schedule for issuing the draft EIS depends on project funding.

Relationship to reconfiguration PEIS: Will analyze impacts of constructing and operating the project at the Rocky Flats Plant, either solely as a means to process plutonium residues now stored on-site, or, in addition to reprocessing, as a means for recovering plutonium metal from scrap and returned weapons components. Would be an "interim action" under the CEQ regulations. Consideration of relocating plutonium facilities in both the mid-term and long-term will be examined in the PEIS.

Savannah River reactor operation EIS—*Current Status:* Draft EIS published in May 1990; final EIS issued in December 1990 (DOE/EIS–0147); ROD issued on February 4, 1991.

Relationship to reconfiguration PEIS: Analyzes impacts of continued operation of one, two, and/or three existing production reactors at the Savannah River Site, at least until new production reactor capacity is demonstrated. Serves as the basis for the "no action" alternative in the New Production Reactor EIS. Could serve as part of the environmental baseline for the "no action" alternative in the PEIS, depending on DOE decisions regarding the New Production Reactor EIS. The PEIS will examine the future long-term mission of the production reactors as will as other nuclear weapons complex functions now located at the site.

Special nuclear materials laboratory—Current status: NOI published on January 12, 1990 (55 FR 1251); schedule for issuing the draft EIS depends on project funding.

Relationship to reconfiguration PEIS: Will analyze impacts of constructing and operating a new laboratory building at Los Alamos National Laboratory. The new laboratory would replace an older, obsolete building and consolidate certain functions currently performed to support the Low Alamos Plutonium Facility. Would be an "interim action" under the CEQ regulations.

Note: DOE's Office of Environmental Restoration and Waste Management may prepare other, project-specific NEPA reviews of environmental restoration, waste management, or decommissioning and decontamination; these are not listed here.

DOE Configuration Review Committee. In 1988, through the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988/1989 (Pub. L. 100–180), Congress directed that a study be conducted and a plan prepared by the President "for the modernization of the nuclear weapons complex that takes into account the overall size, productive capacity, technology base, and investment strategy necessary to support long-term security objectives." The product of that study, the "Nuclear Weapons Complex Modernization Report," was submitted to Congress by the President on January 12, 1989. It called for extensive modernization of DOE nuclear weapons complex facilities over the next 15 to 20 years, and a major program of environmental restoration and waste management.

After the report was submitted to Congress, DOE identified additional problems at its facilities, particularly with respect to environmental compliance and waste management issues. As a result, the Secretary of Energy established the Configuration Review Committee in September 1989 to examine the assumptions and conclusions of the President's report to Congress pertaining to modernization of the nuclear weapons complex. (The Secretary formed a separate Departmental organization, the Office of Environmental Restoration and Waste Management, to address those problems on a programmatic basis. As noted above, DOE is preparing a separate PEIS to examine environmental restoration and waste management issues.)

The Configuration Review Committee has prepared a Reconfiguration Study which presents a reassessment of the current problems facing the complex, outlines expectations for the complex of the 21st century, and charts a proposed course for achieving Complex 21. The study examines the requirements needed to ensure that DOE's national security responsibilities will be carried out efficiently, and in a manner that will

protect the environment and safeguard the health and safety of employees and public. The Reconfiguration Study contains material which is expected to serve as a basis for certain assumptions and analyses in the PEIS, although the PEIS may analyze a broader range of issues and alternatives. DOE has prepared both a classified and an unclassified version of the Reconfiguration Study; DOE will consider the classification material while preparing the PEIS. The unclassified version of the Reconfiguration Study is publicly available from DOE upon request.

Invitation to comment. DOE invites comments on the scope of this PEIS from all interested parties, including affected Federal, State and local agencies and Indian tribes. DOE solicits comments regarding the scope of the PEIS analysis, suggestions on significant environmental issues, alternatives to be included in the PEIS, and other content.

To ensure consideration in preparing the draft PEIS, written comments must be postmarked by the date indicated above. Late comments will be considered to the extent practicable.

Agencies, organizations, and the general public are invited to present oral comments pertinent to preparation of the PEIS at public scoping meetings. DOE will also accept written material at the meetings. Written and oral comments will be given equal weight in the scoping process.

DOE will hold public scoping meetings in Washington, DC., near each of the 13 major sites of the nuclear weapons complex, and near any other site identified by the Site Evaluation Panel for consideration for relocation of the weapons complex facilities now located at the Rocky Flats Plant, and co-located facilities. The time, date and location for these meetings will be announced by DOE in the **Federal Register** in about March 1991, and/or at the time DOE announces the list of qualified candidate sites identified by the Site Evaluation Panel (expected to be on or about July 1, 1991). Public meetings will be held at least two weeks after notice is given in the **Federal Register**. The meetings also will be publicized in local media and other means as appropriate.

The **Federal Register** Notice announcing the meetings will provide rules for conduct of the meetings. In general, DOE will designate a presiding officer to chair each meeting. The presiding officer will establish the order of speakers and any additional procedures necessary to conduct the meetings. Speakers will be asked to register to speak, and given equal time to present their remarks (approximately five minutes each). DOE will not question speakers; however, the presiding officer may ask speakers to clarify their statements to assure that DOE fully understands the comment. DOE will prepare transcripts of the scoping meetings and make these available for public review.

DOE will announce the availability of the draft PEIS, when completed, in the **Federal Register**, and will solicit public review and comment on the unclassified portion of the draft PEIS. Comments on the draft will be considered in preparing the final PEIS.

Supporting documents. The unclassified Reconfiguration Study, the EISs listed in Table 3, transcripts of the public scoping meetings, and other unclassified supporting information will be available for public review at the DOE public reading rooms listed below.

California

U.S. Department of Energy, San Francisco Operations Office, 1333 Broadway, Oakland, California 94612, (415) 273–4428.

Colorado

U.S. Department of Energy, Rocky Flats Public Reading Room, Front Range Community College Library, 3645 West 112th Avenue, Westminster, Colorado 80030, (303) 469–4435.

Idaho

U.S. Department of Energy, Idaho Operations Office, Public Reading Room, 1776 Science Center Drive, P.O. Box 1625, Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402, (208) 526–1191.

Illinois

U.S. Department of Energy, Chicago Operations Office, 9800 South Cass Avenue, Argonne, Illinois 60439, (708) 972–2010.

New Mexico

U.S. Department of Energy, Albuquerque Operations Office, Pennsylvania and 8th Streets, P.O. Box 5400, Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico 87115, (505) 845–5163.

Nevada

U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office, 2753 South Highland Drive, Las Vegas, Nevada 89193, (702) 295–1274.

South Carolina

U.S. Department of Energy Reading Room, University of South Carolina, Aiken Campus, Writing Center, 171 University Parkway, Aiken, South Carolina 29801, (803) 648–6851, Extension 3262.

Tennessee

U.S. Department of Energy, Oak Ridge Operations Office, Freedom of Information Officer, 200 Administration Road, room G–209, P.O. Box 2001, Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37831, (615) 576–9344 or 576–1216.

Washington

U.S. Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office, 825 Jadwin Avenue, room 157, P.O. Box 1970, Mail Stop A1–65, Richland, Washington 99352, (509) 376–8583.

Washington, DC

U.S. Department of Energy, Freedom of Information Reading Room, room 1E–190, Forrestal Building, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20585, (202) 586–6020.

For information on the availability of specific documents and hours of operation, please contact the reading rooms at the telephone numbers provided.

Signed in Washington, DC this 6th day of February, 1991, for the United States Department of Energy.

Paul L. Ziemer,

Assistant Secretary, Environment, Safety and Health.

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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Availability; Invitation for Site Proposals, Nuclear Weapons Complex Reconfiguration Site

AGENCY: Department of Energy.

ACTION: Notice of availability of an invitation for site proposals, nuclear weapons complex reconfiguration Site.

SUMMARY: The Department of Energy (DOE) announces the availability of its Invitation for Site Proposals to solicit offers of land to be used to construct and operate one or more nuclear weapons production facilities. DOE has proposed relocating the nuclear weapons facilities now located at the Rocky Flats Plant near Golden, Colorado. In addition, DOE is considering the feasibility of co-locating other nuclear weapons complex facilities on the site eventually chosen for relocating the Rocky Flats facilities.

DATES: The Invitation for Site Proposals is available on the date of this Notice. Proposals are due at the office in Washington DC on June 3, 1991.