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# **IEC 61850 Cybersecurity Acceleration R&D**

**Cybersecurity for Energy Delivery Systems Peer Review**  
**July 24-26, 2012**

# Summary: IEC 61850 Cybersecurity Acceleration R&D


- **Objectives**

- Goal of this project is to allow vendors to provide secure and interoperable control system solutions to the energy sector

- **Technical Approach**

- Work with vendors to create a holistic IEC 61850 security approach
- Develop a reference model to allow an independent test vehicle for the vendors to test

**IEC 61850 Models and the Common Information (CIM) Model**



- **Schedule**

- Key deliverables and dates expected/met

- **Performers:** PNNL, ANL, ORNL

- **Partners:** ABB, Alstom Grid, GE, Schneider-Electric, Siemens

# Technical Approach and Feasibility

- **Approach**

- Leverage existing work by IEC standards working groups draft technical standard on the communication security profiles specified within IEC 61850
  - Identify technical challenges, gaps, and mitigation
  - Creating a holistic security approach that allows vendors to implement security specified in IEC 61850 standard
  - Technical approach will be written in the IEC format and will be provided to IEC for integration into the IEC 62351 standards
  - Work with vendors to get devices compliant with IEC 61850 security and interoperability framework available for industry consumption
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# Technical Approach and Feasibility (contd.)

- **Challenges to Success**

- IEC 61850 does not have a defined implementation approach for cyber security and lack of consensus between Vendors
  - Challenge is to obtain Vendor and IEC commitments and resources to participate
    - Held a Vendors Workshop to solicit feedback, and document technical challenges and gaps
  - Creation of a reference model for an independent test vehicle for vendors to test
    - Write technical approach in the IEC format and submit to IEC for approval
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# Progress to Date

- **Progress to Date**

- Held IEC 61850 and 61970 CIM standards training at PNNL
  - Solicited Industry participation
  - Held Vendor workshop
  - Collected and distributed comments
  - Drafting plan for technical approach
  - Designing cybersecurity interoperability test framework
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# IEC 61850 Cyber security Acceleration Workshop

- Invited vendor representatives to participate in a face to face workshop
  - Convened at PNNL April 25, 2012, in conjunction with Secure Coding workshop April 24.
  - Participants from: ORNL, ABB, PNNL, Siemens, ANL and Alstom
  - We discussed challenges with implementing IEC 62351, Interoperability needs, and future efforts
  - Overall concerns: key management, sufficient interoperability, pace and motivation of adoption
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# Collaboration/Technology Transfer

- **Plans to gain industry input**
    - Discuss and solicit Vendor participation and agreement in the planned workshop
    - Held a first vendor workshop to identify challenges, issues, and gaps
    - Hold second workshop to discuss solutions to identified technical challenges and commitment to participate in testing the security under the proposed reference model
    - Solicit IEC input and approval on technology transfer and security framework
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# Collaboration/Technology Transfer (contd.)

- **Plans to transfer technology/knowledge to end user**
    - Energy Sector vendors can use this knowledge and apply the IEC 61850 technical security requirements in their products
    - Submit the reference model to IEC and obtain approval to gain industry acceptance
    - Solution allows vendors acceptance of IEC 62351-6 which specifies mechanisms for protecting IEC 61850 for substation communication security
    - Provides implementation of IEC 62351-6 without the overhead of cryptography in field equipment with severely constrained memory and processing power
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# IEC 61850 Cyber security Acceleration Impact

- **Year one solicited industry for challenges and roadblocks (This year we heard the demand at the workshop and individually)**
  - **Year two the laboratory team will design and develop a framework to provide *remote* security and interoperability testing to industry (high priority need identified in year 1)**
    - Like the TVA Bradley substation experience... We are providing access to interoperability, security and performance testing.
  - **Third year demonstrate framework capability with industry partners, by providing impartial access to the framework hosted at PNNL.**
    - **Another workshop with face to face for a plug fest.**
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# Next Steps

- **Approach for the next year or end of project**
    - Finalize the reference model software and testing plan
    - Identify issues with approach from vendor feedback
    - Introduce technical solution into the IEC process
  - **Project results that may form the basis of future control systems security work or link to other programs/organizations**
    - Develop business plan for the reference model and test results for using the reference model with vendors and obtain IEC approval
  - **Describe potential follow-on work, if any**
    - Setup a service center for cybersecurity interoperability tests
    - Define as part of the third year efforts
    - Cost to be included in existing third year plan
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# Argonne National Laboratory Collaboration

- **ANL collaboration activities to support PNNL and ORNL**
    - ANL participated in the IEC 61850 and IEC 61970 training at PNNL.
    - ANL supported the project team in soliciting select sector partners and vendors for the workshop. ANL participated in the IEC 61850 Standard Vendor and Secure Coding workshops
    - ANL will continue to assist team in the development of the security framework, solicit feedback, document challenges, and technical issues
    - ANL will continue to participate and support PNNL and ORNL in the development of a technical approach that addresses the vendor concerns, and security requirements submittal to IEC for approval
    - ANL continues to provide subject matter expertise from the oil and gas sector perspective in supporting the development of a reference model and to allow an independent test vehicle for the vendors to test their implementations against this model
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# Oak Ridge National Laboratory Collaboration

- **ORNL collaboration activities to support PNNL and ANL**
    - ORNL participated in the IEC 61850 and IEC 61970 training at PNNL.
    - ORNL supported the project team in soliciting select sector partners and vendors for the workshop. ORNL participated in the IEC 61850 Standard Vendor workshops
    - ORNL will continue to assist team in the development of the security framework, solicit feedback, document challenges, and technical issues
    - ORNL continues to provide subject matter expertise from the information security, cryptography and trusted computing perspective in supporting the development of a reference model and to allow an independent test vehicle for the vendors to test their implementations against this model
    - ORNL will continue to participate and support PNNL and ANL in the development of a technical approach that addresses the vendor concerns, and security requirements submittal to IEC for approval
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# Questions



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# IEC 61850/IEC 62351 Issues & Gaps

- Security standard for communication in substations and beyond
- The purpose of IEC 61850, as a whole, is to provide automation for heterogeneous Cyber-Physical Devices/Intelligent Electronic Device (IED) platforms
- Strictly application layer protocol (TCP/IP)
- IEC 61850 standard lacks an accepted security standard to support its functional capability
- IEC 61850, does not have a defined approach for cyber security that the vendors supplying the products have accepted
- IEC 62351 addresses information security for several protocols of IEC 61850 though at present it does not fully address security issues
- Specific needs include security for Generic Object Oriented Substation Event (GOOSE), Generic Substation Status Event (GSSE), and Sampled Measured Values (SMV) profiles
- Goose/SMV messaging not secured due to vendor resistance to existing IEC 62351 approaches

# IEC 61850/IEC 62351 Issues & Gaps (contd.)

- Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC) for message integrity and authenticity of data (IAD)
  - Galois Message Authentication Code (GMAC - is based on the Galois/Counter Mode) is faster and Galois based methods have been proven to be computationally more efficient
  - Message Authentication Code only provides (IAD) for message BUT how can we trust the sender and receiver
  - Group Domain of Interpretation (GDOI) at the router level (group key protocol whereby all group members register with a key server) strongly pushed by CISCO (can you say vendor lock)
  - Key Management protocol is unsolved
  - Backwards compatibility for different security levels and impacts heterogeneous computational elements
  - Secure Remote updates of Cyber-Physical Devices
  - Remote Attestation of integrity of software/hardware modules
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