
Defense Board Recommendation 2014-1

BILL FROH OFFICE OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT DOE/NNSA

MAY 5, 2015

You are here



I am here



DNFSB Recommendation 2014-1 Parade of Documents

Wednesday, September 3rd, 2014

Recommendation Delivered to DOE

Tuesday, September 23rd, 2014

Rec 2014-1 Printed in Federal Register

Monday, December 1st, 2014

DOE Response Printed in Federal

Register

Wednesday, April 29th, 2015

DOE Implementation Plan Received

"Recent high visibility, high consequence accidents"

- March, 2014: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board communicates to the Secretary of Energy its concerns regarding shortcomings in the response to a truck fire and radioactive material release event at WIPP
- DOE Accident Investigation Board documented these shortcomings in its report
- Board says many of the site-specific response issues noted at WIPP also exist at other sites

"momentum for continuous improvement has faded"

- Board interest in state of emergency preparedness and response predates Fukushima
- 1998: Board issued Recommendation 98-1*
- 1999: Board published Tech-21**

^{*} Recommendation 98-1 is titled, Resolution of Issues Identified by Department of Energy (DOE) Internal Oversight.

^{**} Tech-21 is short for Technical Report -21, *Status of Emergency Management at Defense Nuclear Facilities of the Department of Energy.*

Fukushima March 11, 2011



The 3 Questions



The First Question

• Does DOE provide facility workers, response personnel, and emergency management decision makers with adequate direction and guidance to make timely, conservative emergency response decisions and take actions that focus on protection of the public and workers?



First Question: Observations

- Technical Planning Documents
 - Hazard Assessments
 - Emergency Action Levels
 - O Protective Actions
 - Severe Events
- Training and Drills
- Exercises

The Second Question

• Does DOE provide adequate equipment and hardened facilities that enable emergency response personnel and emergency management decision makers to effectively respond to emergencies and protect the public and workers?



Second Question: Observations

Facilities and Equipment

- o Problems with survivability, habitability, and maintenance
- Problems with communications and notification systems



The Third Question

• Do the contractor assurance systems and DOE oversight provide an effective performance assurance evaluation of emergency preparedness and response?




Third Question: Observations

Oversight and Assessment

- Federal Independent Oversight
- Federal Line Oversight
- Contractor Oversight


Severe Events



Asteroid?




Mars Attacks!?



Wildland Fire?




Wildfire Map



Hurricane?



Hurricane Map



Severe Events

Gaps in requirements and guidance:

- Clarify definition of "severe event", i.e. how much preparation is enough?
- Existing requirements focus on individual facilities- no direction on evaluating multi-facility events
- No methodology for prioritizing response to multi-facility events
- Need to incorporate self-help and basic preparedness training
- Need to develop logistical process for providing food, water, other essentials to on-site responders

