

# Toward Attack-Resilient PMU Data Analytics



*Mitigating  
hard-to-prevent  
system  
interference to  
expand and  
secure data  
analytics  
capabilities for  
energy delivery  
systems*

Phasor measurement units (PMU) stand out as the most popular data source for conducting advanced data analytics to aid decision making in power grid operations including system monitoring, control, and protection. PMUs provide high-frequency, high-resolution, direct measurements in real time, but their data are susceptible to falsification from attack vectors such as jamming or spoofing or GPS synchronization, which can be executed without triggering typical security controls. While some countermeasures exist to make GPS clock synchronization more robust to spoofing attacks, their performance and guarantees are limited, especially when the adversary can design and inject sophisticated spoofing signals at multiple PMU locations. This project develops and validates real-time data correction and adversarial machine learning techniques that leverage the physical grid model to mitigate the impact of spoofing attacks on PMU data analytics decisions. This technique distributes data correction capabilities across the power grid to accurately identify and correct falsified data, deploys machine learning capabilities to recognize and more effectively protect against adversarial attack approaches, and visualizes the results of PMU data correction to better understand attack behaviors and enhance preparedness measures.

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## KEY TAKEAWAYS

- Develops a data correction approach for mitigating phasor measurement unit GPS spoofing attacks
- Deploys adversarial machine learning to mitigate the impact of falsified data on energy delivery system performance
- Operationalizes a visualization platform to enable training and preparedness against future attacks

## OUTCOME

This project overcomes a critical barrier to securing and validating PMU data and increasing its reliability for power grid analytics and decision making. The developed techniques will be deployable on all Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories real-time automation controllers in operation across existing energy delivery infrastructure.

## PARTICIPANTS

## ROLE



The CREDC performs multidisciplinary research and development that focuses on the cybersecurity of energy delivery systems. The central project goal is to create an ecosystem where research results lead directly to the development of applications and methodologies, which are then validated in realistic contexts.



Leads research, development, and testing



Validates the techniques in practical environments; develops, tests, and verifies wide area monitoring application integration

## CONTACT INFORMATION

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This is a subproject sponsored by the CREDC academic consortium, led by the University of Illinois.

**CREDC Period of Performance:** October 2015 – May 2022

**CREDC Total Award Value:** \$28,099,258

DOE Share: \$22,476,290

Cost Share: \$5,622,968

### CYBERSECURITY FOR ENERGY DELIVERY SYSTEMS (CEDs)

CEDs projects are funded through DOE CESER, which aims to enhance the reliability and resilience of the nation's energy infrastructure by reducing the risk of energy disruptions due to cyberattacks.

Website: <https://www.energy.gov/ceser>

Date Written: June 2021