

Secure Time-Critical Communications



Assessing the resilience of time- critical communications in electric substations to cyberattacks

Critical control messages in electric substations need to be delivered extremely fast. Such communications are vulnerable to flooding attacks that can delay messages. The team is experimentally studying how flooding attacks affect the delivery of time-critical messages protected by commonly used authentication schemes in wireless and wired networks. The team has discovered that a practical intelligent attack can significantly increase the delivery delay in a wired network with a very small number of attack packets. Building on this discovery, the team is developing a scheme to detect intelligent, delay-increasing attacks. This scheme will be integrated into a detection tool that will be implemented and tested.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

- Develops solutions to remediate flooding attacks against time-critical communications within electric substations

OUTCOME

The detection method for intelligent delay-increasing attacks has very high accuracy (over 95% in practical settings). It will be able to detect multiple coordinated attackers. The tool is easy to integrate into existing network security and intrusion detection devices/software.

PARTICIPANTS

ROLE



This project is part of the Secure Evolvable Energy Delivery Systems (SEEDS) academic consortium. SEEDS researches and develops innovative cybersecurity technologies, tools, and methodologies to advance the energy sector's ability to survive cyber incidents while sustaining critical functions.



Research, development, and testing

CONTACT INFORMATION

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Cost Share: \$3,082,610

CYBERSECURITY FOR ENERGY DELIVERY SYSTEMS (CEDS)

CEDS projects are funded through DOE CESER, which aims to enhance the reliability and resilience of the nation's energy infrastructure by reducing the risk of energy disruptions due to cyberattacks.

Website: <https://www.energy.gov/ceser>

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