## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mary Olson [mailto:maryo@nirs.org]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:03 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Mary Olson
PO BOX 7586
Asheville, NC 28802

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jeff Abare [mailto:jeffa1169@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 11:41 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Jeff Abare
4916 Gastman Way
Fair Oaks, CA 95628

From: Marrisha Abbot [mailto:marrishaa@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:42 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Marrisha Abbot
1112 Pilger Rd
Boulder Creek, CA 95006

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Linda Abbott [mailto:Lindabbott@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:20 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Linda Abbott
541 East 20th Street
apt 4b
New York, NY 10010

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Judith Abel [mailto:mohawkwoman2@ymail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:57 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Judith Abel
4183 Wellman Road
McLouth, KS 66054

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joan Abruzzo [mailto:joanbayside@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:58 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Joan Abruzzo
1815 215 ST.
APT. 4K
BAYSIDE, NY 11360

## Consent-Based Siting

From: robert aceto [mailto:robbyaceto@mac.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:54 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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robert aceto
336 forest home drive
ithaca, NY 14850

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Frank Adamick [mailto:frankadamick@rcn.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:01 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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Frank Adamick
4824 43rd Street
Apt. 7G
Woodside, NY 11377

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Elaine Adamo [mailto:ebuttas@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:32 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Elaine Adamo
119 Pinnacle Mountain Rd
Leicester, NC 28748

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Christine Adams [mailto:adamsherbbarn@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:26 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,
End nuclear power!!! We must stop ALL SUBSIDIES NOW!!!
Nuclear power is STILL FOSSIL FUEL! IT IS DANGEROUS!!!
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Christine Adams
2841 Pine Run Road
Mayport, PA 16240

## Consent-Based Siting

From: A Adams [mailto:mailndp-gop@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 6:49 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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A Adams
20415 Via Paviso
Cupertino, CA 95014

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Christine Adams
2841 Pine Run Road
Mayport, PA 16240

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ruth Adams [mailto:tsmass@aol.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 9:12 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Ruth Adams
22 Midgley Lane
Worcester, MA 01604

From: Barry Eshkol Adelman [mailto:snortar@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:01 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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Barry Eshkol Adelman
7825 101st Ave
Vero Beach, FL 32967

From: Julie Adelson [mailto:jpadelson@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:33 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Julie Adelson
2810 6th Street
Santa Monica, CA 90405

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kenneth Adler [mailto:khadler@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 11:21 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Kenneth Adler
4913 Harroun Rd
4913 Harroun Rd
Sylvania, OH 43560

From: willy aenlle [mailto:willyaenlle@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:42 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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willy aenlle
573 alameda st
altadena, CA 91001

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lloyd Affholter [mailto:laffhol@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:18 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Lloyd Affholter
41 McCoppin St.
41 McCoppin St. 94103
San Francisco, CA 94103

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ruth Agius [mailto:latifa.agius@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:12 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

PLEASE STOP PRODUCING NUCLEAR ANYTHING! WE HAVE NO WAY TO HONESLTY DEAL WIHT THE WASTE AND IT LASTS FOR 200,000 YEARS!!!!
I live in New Mexico where WIPP is and leaks!
I live 45 minutes just over the hill from LANL< LOS ALAMOS BOMB FACTORY! NO MORE NUKES EVWER DISMANTLE THEM PLEASE !! We need peace on earth!

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Ruth Agius
506 Onate Place
Santa Fe, NM 87501

From: Kate Ague [mailto:kateague@earthlink.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 11:52 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Kate Ague
491 Sherwood Way
Menlo Park, CA 94025

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Margaret Aguilar [mailto:almanest@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:02 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been

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Margaret Aguilar
1846 W. Belle Plaine Ave.
1846 W. Belle Plaine Ave.
Chicago, IL 60613

From: Victor Ahern [mailto:zenbluesky@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:36 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Victor Ahern
930 Quince Ave
930 Quince Ave
Boulder, CO 80304

From: Brian Ainsley [mailto:Brian.Ainsley@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:20 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Brian Ainsley
9201 Summit Centre Way
Apt 307
Altamonte Springs, FL 32714

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Geraldine Aird [mailto:geri@aird.us]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:53 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Geraldine Aird
41 Ely Drive
Fayetteville, NY 13066

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Peter Ajemian [mailto:JLPJTK@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:09 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Peter Ajemian
221 Aldrich Rd.
Bridgewater, MA 02324

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dawn Albanese [mailto:dawnie_angel@hotmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 3:26 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Dawn Albanese
156 Basswood Dr.
Elk Grove Village, IL 60007

From: Mike Albar [mailto:malbar2001@hushmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 10:51 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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Mike Albar
251 Gemini Drive
Hillsborough, NJ 08844

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Gwendolyn Albert [mailto:gwendolyn.albert@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:20 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

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Gwendolyn Albert
227 Elm, Imperial Beach, CA
Imperial Beach, CA 91932

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Don Albrecht [mailto:dalbrecht@progresscil.org]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:05 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Don Albrecht
223 W. Grand Ave.
Northlake, IL 60164

## Consent-Based Siting

From: lynn albrecht [mailto:lynnalbrecht@frontiernet.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:03 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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lynn albrecht
24785 chatfield drive
24785 chatfield drive
belle plaine, MN 56011

From: Rory Alden [mailto:raw94704@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:18 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Rory Alden
2709 Dwight Way
Berkeley, CA 94704

From: Mick Alderman [mailto:veriscollatum@hotmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:49 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Mick Alderman
PO Box 1205
Astoria, OR 97103

From: Frances Alet [mailto:fmalet@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:30 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Frances Alet
5324 Parkmor Rd.
Calabasas, CA 91302

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Robin Alexander [mailto:robindalexa@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:30 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Robin Alexander
1926 Perrysville Ave.
Pittsburgh, PA 15214

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mait Alexander [mailto:mba2233@me.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:15 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Mait Alexander
4175 Shawnee St
Moorpark, CA 93021

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mait Alexander [mailto:mba2233@me.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Mait Alexander
4175 Shawnee St
Moorpark, CA 93021

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Charlotte Alexandre [mailto:CharlotteRN@juno.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:47 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Charlotte Alexandre
10345 Adams Pl
5732 E. 62nd Place, Tulsa, OK 74136
Thornton, CO 80229

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Charlotte Alexandre [mailto:CharlotteRN@juno.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:57 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Charlotte Alexandre
10345 Adams Pl
5732 E. 62nd Place, Tulsa, OK 74136
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From: Paul Allard [mailto:paul_allard@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:33 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Paul Allard
Main Street
Lullington, ot DE12 8EG

From: dennis allen [mailto:dallen4191@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:17 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

dennis allen
1427 Tunnel Road
Santa Barbara, CA 93105

From: dennis allen [mailto:dallen4191@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 9:39 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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dennis allen
1427 Tunnel Road
Santa Barbara, CA 93105

# Consent-Based Siting

From: M Allen [mailto:m.dehuszar@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:18 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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M Allen
1735 Chicago Avenue
Evanston, IL 60201

From: Tami Allen [mailto:tamila1020@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:02 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Tami Allen
3311 Holly Grove Street
Westlake Village, CA 91362

From: Millicent Allenby [mailto:mitallenby@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:44 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Millicent Allenby
4A Hillside Rd.
Greenbelt, MD 20770

From: Millicent Allenby [mailto:mitallenby@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:24 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Millicent Allenby
4A Hillside Rd.
Greenbelt, MD 20770

From: Jim Allyn [mailto:jimallyn@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:01 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Jim Allyn
4190 #2 Canyon Rd.
Wenatchee, WA 98801

From: Ms. Lucy M. Almasy [mailto:lemtiltw@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:42 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Ms. Lucy M. Almasy
9652 E. Stella Rd.
Tucson, AZ 85730

From: Timothy Alstrum [mailto:pitatimo@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:45 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Timothy Alstrum
34 Jefferson Lane
34 Jefferson Lane
East Hartford, CT 06118

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Anne Ambler [mailto:anambler@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:04 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

Please act in the best interests of the American people, present and future. We have no safe place to put existing nuclear waste. We do NOT want it deposited in our communities and we do NOT want it transported across the country, endangering everyone along the way. Clean energy does NOT include nuclear waste. Our task, as citizens of this planet, is to move quickly to clean, renewable energy. The U.S. Department of Energy's obligation is to foster development of clean energy.

On the contrary, the Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future. Why? What rational person, not in line to reap huge financial benefits, could possibly think this is a good idea, given the tremendous risk of widespread annihilation, and even when all works as intended, large quantities of radioactive waste to dispose of? Especially when clean energy sources are now at hand.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

Anne Ambler
12505 Kuhl Road
12505 Kuhl Road
Silver Spring, MD 20902

# Consent-Based Siting

From: Alexandra Amonette [mailto:abamonette@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:10 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Alexandra Amonette
1939 Marshall Ave.
Richland, WA 99354

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jerry Amos [mailto:jerrylamos@netscape net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:45 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Jerry Amos
65A Laurel Hill Rd
Hollis, NH 03049

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jerry Amos [mailto:jerrylamos@netscape.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 7:17 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Jerry Amos
65A Laurel Hill Rd
Hollis, NH 03049

From: Philip Amos [mailto:blueberry0149@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 9:26 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Philip Amos
103 - 33710 Marshall Road
Abbotsford, BC 33322

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Louise Amyot [mailto:lamyot@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:48 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Louise Amyot
Madison Circle
Greenfield, MA 01301

From: Larry Anderberg [mailto:larrberg@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:48 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Larry Anderberg
43 Grimes Hill Rd.
Newfane, VT 05345

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Karen Andersen [mailto:showya@mybluelight.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:10 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Karen Andersen
55 Columbia Ave.
Paterson, NJ 07503

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Glen Anderson [mailto:glenanderson@integra.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:40 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: I STRONGLY OPPOSE DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

SHAME ON YOU FOR RECKLESSLY ENDANGERING THE PUBLIC!!!!!!!!!

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Glen Anderson
5015 15th Ave SE
Lacey, WA 98503

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Carl Anderson [mailto:carl907anderson@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 3:45 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Carl Anderson
907 Bullock Ave.
Yeadon, PA 19050

From: Philip Anderson [mailto:anderp14@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 8:54 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Philip Anderson
12969 E. County Rd FF
Maple, WI 54854

## Consent-Based Siting

From: David Anderson [mailto:dandersop51@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:53 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

David Anderson
2735 Benvenue Avenue
Berkeley, CA 94705

From: David Anderson [mailto:dandersop51@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 2:05 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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David Anderson
2735 Benvenue Avenue
Berkeley, CA 94705

## Consent-Based Siting

From: David Anderson [mailto:dandersop51@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:54 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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David Anderson
2735 Benvenue Avenue
Berkeley, CA 94705

From: Karen Anderson [mailto:keanderson17@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:57 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Karen Anderson
17760 Bayberry Dr
Aberdeen, MI 49456

From: Nancy Anderson [mailto:canders8@san.rr.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 11:07 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Nancy Anderson
16226 Avenida Suavidad
San Diego, CA 92128

From: seth anderson [mailto:rightwith@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:10 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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seth anderson
2655 nyhus st
westport, WA 98595

From: Saliane Anderssen [mailto:zigdan@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:55 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Saliane Anderssen
7140 N. Guthrie Rd
7140 N. Guthrie Rd
Tucson, AZ 85743

From: Joan Andersson [mailto:joan@zimark.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:26 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Joan Andersson
1521 N Topanga Cyn
Topanga, CA 90290

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Linda Andersson [mailto:llandersson4@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:39 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

Nuclear energy was truly the end of humankind and all life on this planet --if used in the wrong way, as well as needing to dispose of the waste. What have our profiteers done to us and our planet?

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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Linda Andersson
2424 79th Ave NE
Medina, WA 98039

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Paul Andrade [mailto:greenfire999@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:12 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Paul Andrade
119 Coral St
Santa Cruz, CA 95060

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Paul Andrade [mailto:greenfire999@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:38 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Paul Andrade
119 Coral St
Santa Cruz, CA 95060

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Susan Andrews [mailto:slandrew2@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:00 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Susan Andrews
260 Riverside Drive #1G
NYC, NY
New York, NY 10025

From: Sara Andrews [mailto:sandrews@sover.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:44 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Sara Andrews
631 Stearns Hill Road
Brattleboro, VT 05301

From: gregory andronaco [mailto:gregory.andronaco@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 3:03 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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gregory andronaco
717 west clay st
1350 Bon Ave
ukiah, CA 95482

From: j angell [mailto:jangell@earthlink.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:33 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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j angell
ponderosa rd
rescue, CA 95672

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Doni Angell [mailto:donitim@wildblue.net]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 10:16 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Doni Angell
596 Allen Road
Canon City, CO 81212

From: Joan Angelosanto [mailto:joana0319@verizon.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
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Joan Angelosanto
202 Franklin Street
Stoneham, MA 02180

From: Joshua Angelus [mailto:joshuaangelus@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:13 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Joshua Angelus
67 Hillside Avenue
Waterbury, CT 06710

From: Joshua Angelus [mailto:joshuaangelus@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:41 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Joshua Angelus
67 Hillside Avenue
Waterbury, CT 06710

From: Billy Angus [mailto:wizardofhamilton@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:09 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Billy Angus
604 North 2nd St.
Hamilton, MT 59840

From: Peter Angus [mailto:nangus1207@hotmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 8:47 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Peter Angus
Whippoorwill Blvd
Whippoorwill
Punta Gorda, FL 33950

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Peter Angus [mailto:nangus1207@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:39 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Peter Angus
Whippoorwill Blvd
Whippoorwill
Punta Gorda, FL 33950

From: Tina Ann [mailto:8tinaann@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:13 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Tina Ann
p.o. box 265
Bolinas, CA 94924

From: Tina Ann [mailto:8tinaann@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 2:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Tina Ann
p.o. box 265
Bolinas, CA 94924

From: Patrick Annabel [mailto:parzival1@inbox.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:43 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Patrick Annabel
1329 University St.
1329 University St
Walla Walla, WA 99362

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lynn R. Anner-Bolieu [mailto:lannerbolieu@gmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 5:32 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Lynn R. Anner-Bolieu
P.O. Box 3642
Gallup, NM 87305

From: smirsky7@gmail.com [mailto:smirsky7@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:56 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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MA 02461

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Chip ww2buff39_45@msn.com [mailto:ww2buff39_45@msn.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:49 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Chip ww2buff39_45@msn.com
3117 Orson F Dr
Layton, UT 84040

## Consent-Based Siting

From: leslie143@gmail.ecom [mailto:leslie143@gmail.ecom]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:09 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

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IL 60450

From: jzika.hoagland@gmail.com [mailto:jzika.hoagland@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 8:32 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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TN 37205

From: Raul Anorve [mailto:ranorve0810@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 5:37 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Raul Anorve
4401 Berkshire Ave
Los Angeles, CA 90032

From: Rose Ansbro [mailto:ransbro17@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:34 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Rose Ansbro
2060  Larue Street
Philadelphia, PA 19124

From: Hal Anthony [mailto:threepines@jeffnet.org]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:26 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Hal Anthony
3995 Russell Rd.
Grants Pass, OR 97526

From: Hal Anthony [mailto:threepines@jeffnet.org]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:51 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Hal Anthony
3995 Russell Rd.
Grants Pass, OR 97526

## Consent-Based Siting

From: pratap Antony [mailto:pratapantony@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:46 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

pratap Antony
West Marredpally
7/5 Rukmini Devi Colony, West Marredpally
Secunderabad A.P., ot 500026

From: Barbara Antonoplos [mailto:superwoman50@bellsouth.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:18 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Barbara Antonoplos
369 Bass St., S.E.
369 Bass St., S.E., Atlanta, GA  30315
Atlanta, GA 30315

## Consent-Based Siting

From: enri mac aodha [mailto:enrijun123@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:22 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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enri mac aodha
inch road
burnfoot, ot lifford

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Stephen Appell [mailto:BigRed1965@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Stephen Appell
15 Wellington Court
Brooklyn, NY 11230

From: Doris Applebaum [mailto:ibis4247@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:40 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Doris Applebaum
13680 Winchester
Oak Park, MI 48237

From: Lisa Appleton [mailto:lisabeth46@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:25 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Lisa Appleton
204-A Deer Haven Rd NE
204A Deer Haven Rd NE
Pilot, VA 24138

From: Susaan Aram [mailto:mermaidlaguna@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:12 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Susaan Aram
1361 Terrace Way
Laguna Beach, CA 92651

From: Susaan Aram [mailto:mermaidlaguna@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 5:20 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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Susaan Aram
1361 Terrace Way
Laguna Beach, CA 92651

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Robert Arango [mailto:bobarango@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:28 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Robert Arango
275 Santa Rosa ave.
Sausalito, CA 94965

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Phyllis Arist [mailto:lesmotsdujour@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:08 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Phyllis Arist
945 Ridge
Evanston, IL 60202

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Andrea Armin [mailto:andrea.gale.ag@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 11:52 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Andrea Armin
2364 Graham Rd.
2364 Graham Rd.
Bayside, CA 95524

From: Rose Armin-Hoiland [mailto:rose.arminhoiland@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 2:38 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Rose Armin-Hoiland
Graham
2364 Graham Rd.
Bayside, CA 95524

From: Chris Armitage [mailto:1582881@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 6:47 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Chris Armitage
7400 s state st
midvale, UT 84047

From: Jon Armstrong [mailto:jf_armstrong@msn.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:43 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

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Jon Armstrong
60346 Onaga Trail
Joshua Tree, CA 92252

From: Charles Arnold [mailto:qdv2000@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:15 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Charles Arnold
PO Box 1672
Manchester, NH 03105

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Charles Arnold [mailto:qdv2000@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 5:28 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Charles Arnold
PO Box 1672
Manchester, NH 03105

From: Gab865riela Arnon [mailto:g.arnon@wanadoo.fr]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 3:30 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Gab865riela Arnon
865 West End Ave.
20 Hameau du Danube
NY, NY 10025

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Madeline Aron [mailto:madelinearon@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 4:10 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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1006 Richmond NE
1006 Richmond NE
Albuquerque, NM 87106

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Madeline Aron
1006 Richmond NE
1006 Richmond NE
Albuquerque, NM 87106

## Consent-Based Siting

From: peter aronson [mailto:aronson@humboldt1.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:22 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment.

You, DOE and NRC have had 70 years to deal with HLNW - TO NO AVAIL!

There's still NO PLACE TO PUT IT, so STOP MAKING IT!!!

Factoring in the unending costs of storage tells us nuclear energy is, and has been, COST PROHIBITIVE (forget about health and environmental risks).

Man-made accidents WILL occur (again).

Do your job!

peter aronson
4220 browns road
4220 browns road
eureka, CA 95503

From: Oneida Arosarena [mailto:oneida@temple.edu]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:22 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Oneida Arosarena
635 DuPont St
Philadelphia, PA 19128

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Oneida Arosarena [mailto:oneida@temple.edu]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:52 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Oneida Arosarena
635 DuPont St
Philadelphia, PA 19128

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Thomas Artin [mailto:tom@artinarts.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:12 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Thomas Artin
240 King's Highway
Sparkill, NY 10976

From: vinu arumugham [mailto:vinucube@yahoo.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 8:14 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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vinu arumugham
4859 rahway dr
San Jose, CA 95111

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Akira Asada [mailto:asada-a@poporo.ne.jp]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:57 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Akira Asada
3-6-21 NOgami
Takarazuka, ot 00000

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Judy Asbury [mailto:judyasbury@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:08 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Judy Asbury
PO Box 170
Jemez Pueblo,  NM 87024
Jemez Pueblo, NM 87024

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Karin Ascot [mailto:Karin.ascot@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 11:44 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Karin Ascot
405 Academy Drive
Austin, TX 78704

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Karin Ascot [mailto:Karin.ascot@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:40 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Karin Ascot
405 Academy Drive
Austin, TX 78704

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Moira Ashleigh [mailto:moira@solsticesun.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:46 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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Moira Ashleigh
9 Buck St
Woburn, MA, MA 01801

From: Moira Ashleigh [mailto:moira@solsticesun.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:28 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Moira Ashleigh
9 Buck St
Woburn, MA, MA 01801

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Margalo Ashley-Farrand [mailto:margalo@earthlink.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:47 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Margalo Ashley-Farrand
3300 NW 185th Ave, 92
Portland, OR 87105

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Frank Asturino [mailto:tt.id70@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Frank Asturino
5679 Steubenville Pike
Mc Kees Rocks, PA 15136

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lynne Atherton-Dat [mailto:lynneadat@aol.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 7:14 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

We, the people, need to be able to trust our government agencies to act responsibly on our behalf. The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Lynne Atherton-Dat
5300 Columbia Pike #804
Arlington, VA 22204

From: ed atkins [mailto:hearthdance@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 8:09 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

ed atkins
araki rd
boulder creek, CA 95006

## Consent-Based Siting

From: ed atkins [mailto:hearthdance@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 10:45 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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ed atkins
araki rd
boulder creek, CA 95006

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ellen Atkinson [mailto:Jeanne184490@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 11:58 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Ellen Atkinson
2115 Gridley Ave
Reno, NV 89503

## Consent-Based Siting

From: John Atkinson [mailto:johndee16@juno.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:44 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy is not enforcing the cleaning up of the present holding places, allowing the contractors to drag their fee.  Until they get their act together we don't need more trouble.

Think you  John P. Atkinson

John Atkinson
12728 Greenwood Ave N
Seattle, WA 98133

From: Bob Atwood [mailto:bobatwood60@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:18 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Bob Atwood
248 Boulder Cr Dr Dr #8
Redding, CA 96003

From: David Audette [mailto:daudette66@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:43 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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David Audette
33100 Freds Row Lane
Saint Helens, OR 97051

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Tupefaavae Auelua [mailto:tupeauelua@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:37 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Tupefaavae Auelua
12549 Heron Street
92392, CA 92392

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Marilyn Auer [mailto:bloomsb@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:20 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Marilyn Auer
1245 Elizabeth St
Denver, CO 80206

From: Cassandra Auerbach [mailto:cassandra1444@verizon.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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Cassandra Auerbach
1444 Fordham Ave.
Thousand Oaks, CA 91360

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Irene Auerbach [mailto:roncle@pipeline.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 8:35 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Irene Auerbach
2123 E*th Street
2123 E8th Street
Brppl;yn, NY 11223

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joseph Auslander [mailto:jna@math.umd.edu]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:27 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Joseph Auslander
1634 R St.NW
Washington, D.C.,20009, DC 20009

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lynda Austin [mailto:lyndaaustin7@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:39 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Lynda Austin
4005 adelheid way
sacramento, CA 95821

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Renee Austin [mailto:neoludite0711@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:01 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Renee Austin
P. O. Box #142
P. O. Box #142
Birchrunville, PA 19421

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P. O. Box #142
P. O. Box #142
Birchrunville, PA 19421

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Czerny Auyang [mailto:czerny777@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 8:02 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Czerny Auyang
8th Ave
Brooklyn,  NY, NY 11215

## Consent-Based Siting

From: A.J. Averett [mailto:AJAverett@outlook.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:26 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz:

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in health physics, much less the public interest; it is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment.

In short, the DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse -- and they have no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to, and possession of, the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

The DOE have clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

Please be advised that I neither consent to this process, nor the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, or the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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Consolidated storage only further increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

A.J. Averett
4585 68th ST
La Mesa, CA 91942

From: Jayn Avery [mailto:jkontiki@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:42 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Jayn Avery
180 Zephyr Circle
Floyd, VA 24091

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Marilyn Joy Avery [mailto:Joyavery66@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 2:50 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Marilyn Joy Avery
1504 East 37th Street
Tulsa, OK 74105

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jayn Avery [mailto:jkontiki@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 5:44 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Jayn Avery
180 Zephyr Circle
Floyd, VA 24091

From: charles ayers [mailto:jeremyayres@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:54 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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charles ayers
450 Harris St
athens, GA 30601

From: Peter Ayres [mailto:peter_yrs@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:40 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Peter Ayres
25W640 Indian Hill Woods rd
Naperville, IL 60563

From: janet azarovitz [mailto:jazarovitz@comcast.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:33 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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janet azarovitz
20 shapquit bars circle
West Falmouth, MA 02574

## Consent-Based Siting

From: dennis b [mailto:dennisbgood@comcast.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:46 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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dennis b
street
city, CA 94087

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jill B. [mailto:jillkb@earthlink.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:24 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Jill B.
828 Bay St.
San Francisco, CA 94109

From: Katherine Babiak [mailto:kmbnyc@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:05 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Katherine Babiak
99 Bank St
New York, NY 10014

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Katherine Babiak [mailto:kmbnyc@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:22 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Katherine Babiak
99 Bank St
New York, NY 10014

From: Susan Babilon [mailto:babilos@whitman.edu]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:15 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Susan Babilon
1221 Alvarado Terrace
Walla Walla, WA 99362

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Leslie Babson [mailto:leslie143@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 7:40 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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Leslie Babson
533 Edgewater Dr
Morris, IL 60450

From: Phillip C'de Baca [mailto:phil@petsrest.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:07 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

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And lastly, why do I have to pay for all of this through my taxes?  The power companies and westinghouse and general electric have profited from the proliferation of nukes through out the world while sending the waste here to the United States and expect the taxpayers to deal with the expense of disposing of the waste.  Time has come for the stockholders and management of these companies be held accountable and pay the expenses of dealing with this waste.

Phillip C'de Baca
1905 Hillside Boulevard
Colma, CA 94014

From: Mary Ann Baier [mailto:maturtle@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:09 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Mary Ann Baier
2930 Geneva St
0
Dearborn, MI 48124

From: Lee Bailey [mailto:ladibg@earthlink.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 7:49 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Lee Bailey
700 Warren Rd
Ithaca, NY 14850

## Consent-Based Siting

From: B. Bailey [mailto:salim3796@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:26 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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B. Bailey
po box 556
Eastsound, WA 98245

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Susan Bailey-Pruc [mailto:Imexport1990@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

We can't continue with nuclear power - IT MUST BE PHASED OUT! We don't want the waste in our communities or our public lands!!!!!

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Susan Bailey-Pruc
1436 Reserve Drive
Akron, OH 44333

From: Kirk Bails [mailto:bailsjm@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 6:16 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Kirk Bails
35221 Brittany Pk. Dr. #305
Harrison Twp., MI 48045

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Thomas Bain [mailto:tbain117@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:51 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Thomas Bain
541 Marquart Drive
Webster, NY 14580

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Thomas Bain [mailto:tbain117@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:22 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Thomas Bain
541 Marquart Drive
Webster, NY 14580

From: Clifton Bain [mailto:cliftonbain33@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 11:41 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Clifton Bain
PO Box 297
Arroyo Hondo, NM 87513

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Clifton Bain [mailto:cliftonbain33@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:52 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Clifton Bain
PO Box 297
Arroyo Hondo, NM 87513

From: Jeffrey Bains [mailto:jebains@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:52 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Jeffrey Bains
1721 Myrtle Beach Drive
The Villages, FL 32159

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jeffrey Bains [mailto:jebains@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:11 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Jeffrey Bains
1721 Myrtle Beach Drive
The Villages, FL 32159

From: raghbir bajwa [mailto:raghbirkbajwa@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 12:59 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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raghbir bajwa
1461 W. Nancy Lane
Porterville, CA 93257

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Janine Baker [mailto:janineabaker@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:32 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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Janine Baker
2901 Annie Street
1576 Buckrake, Bozeman Montana
Bozeman, MT 59718

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Diana Baker [mailto:dianabaker105@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Diana Baker
105 la Joya Dr
Santa Fe, NM 87501

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Diana Baker [mailto:dianabaker105@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:32 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Diana Baker
105 la Joya Dr
Santa Fe, NM 87501

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Victoria Baker [mailto:vbaker722@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:44 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

I am old enough to remember the barrels of radioactive waste leaking where they had been dumped off the coast of California. I am aware today that Diablo Canyon reactor is shutting down, as have a number of other reactors since Fukushima. Nuclear Energy is no answer to our energy needs, despite its use in other countries. But I am writing today because I am extremely concerned that Nuclear Reactor owners are planning to offload nuclear waste to the taxpayers instead of it being properly stored. We see rail and highway accidents frequently that involve oil or highly toxic chemicals. It is not safe to routinely transport nuclear waste.

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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Victoria Baker
3043 N Rampart St
New Orleans, LA 70117

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Gerritt and Elizabet Baker-Smith [mailto:egbakersmith@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:50 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Gerritt and Elizabet Baker-Smith
338 Braeside Ave.
East Stroudsburg, PA 18301

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Brenda Balanda [mailto:brendabalanda@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:55 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Brenda Balanda
3 Drake Way
Inverness, CA 94937

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Natylie Baldwin [mailto:natyliesb@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:30 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Natylie Baldwin
20800 Lake Chabot Road #328
Castro Valley, CA 94521

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joan Balfour [mailto:solfjoanb@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:25 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Joan Balfour
6249 Copper Lake Ct
Boynton Beach, FL 33437

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Marsha Balian [mailto:marshabalian@earthlink.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:20 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Marsha Balian
5495 Kales Ave
Oakland, CA 94618

## Consent-Based Siting

From: David Ball [mailto:dball@smith.edu]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:20 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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David Ball
23 Cedar Street
Northampton, MA 01060

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jerome Ball [mailto:findjeromeo@yahoo.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 2:37 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Jerome Ball
PO Box 1193
Ashland, OR 97520

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Nancy Ball [mailto:ncb1927@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 11:50 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Nancy Ball
213 Fulton Street
Walla Walla, WA 99362

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Katherin Balles [mailto:kab2632@netzero.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:34 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Katherin Balles
2122 Brewster PL
Bremerton, WA 98310

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Stephen Bamford [mailto:stephenbamford@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 11:43 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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Stephen Bamford
1007 North Adams Street
Tallahassee, FL 32303
Tallahassee, FL 32303

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Felicia Bander [mailto:feliciabander@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:12 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Felicia Bander
3400 S. Barrington Ave.
Los Angeles, CA 90066

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Janice Banks [mailto:jabanks@tds.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 3:04 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Janice Banks
14 Maple St.
Center Barnstead, NH 03225

From: Greg Banks [mailto:vision74us@yahoo.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 8:40 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Greg Banks
7835 W. Lynmar Ct.
Milwaukee, WI 53222

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jason Banks [mailto:Fullspectrumdominance@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:20 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Jason Banks
22 bungalow ave
San rafael, CA 94901

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Wesley Banks [mailto:vancdanbanks@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:54 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Wesley Banks
P.O. Box 823234
Vancouver, WA 98682

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Julie Bannister [mailto:julie.m.bann@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 9:03 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Julie Bannister
5 Cold Spring Lane
East Falmouth, MA 02536

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Julie Bannister [mailto:julie.m.bann@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:20 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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5 Cold Spring Lane
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## Consent-Based Siting

From: Russ Bannon [mailto:russbannon@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:23 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Russ Bannon
69100 McCallum way
Cathedral, CA 92234

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Russ Bannon [mailto:russbannon@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:31 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Russ Bannon
69100 McCallum way
Cathedral, CA 92234

## Consent-Based Siting

From: joyce banzhaf [mailto:joycebanzhaf@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 11:25 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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joyce banzhaf
10041 Greenwood Rd
10041 greenwood
Grass Valley, CA 95945

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jeremy Baptist,MD, PhD [mailto:jebaptist@kc.rr.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:23 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Jeremy Baptist,MD, PhD
8700 Lamar Ave
Overland Park, KS 66207

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ellen Bardo [mailto:ellen.bardo@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:17 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Ellen Bardo
121 Creek Road
Muncy, PA 17756

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Eric Bare [mailto:Trebares@juno.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:52 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Eric Bare
1010 Powderhouse Rd.
Vestal, NY 13850

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jean Barker [mailto:jeanbarker14@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:56 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Jean Barker
127 Crosslands Drive
Kennett Square, PA 19348

## Consent-Based Siting

From: John Barkhausen [mailto:jsb@madriver.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:11 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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John Barkhausen
72 Lois Lane
72 Lois Lane
Warren, VT 05674

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Alex Barnes [mailto:alexbarnes1234@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:55 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Alex Barnes
7343 Cotherstone Ct
Indianapolis, IN 46256

From: Alex Barnes [mailto:alexbarnes1234@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:22 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Alex Barnes
7343 Cotherstone Ct
Indianapolis, IN 46256

## Consent-Based Siting

From: lois barnett [mailto:earthspring5@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:44 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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lois barnett
1603 Walnut St
619 clay st #106
port townsend, WA 98368

From: Sharon Barone [mailto:shanbarone@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:41 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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Sharon Barone
8237 E. Whispering Wind Drive
Scottsdale, AZ 85255

## Consent-Based Siting

From: David Barouh [mailto:dbarouh@fastmail.fm]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:09 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

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David Barouh
1350 East 5th Street
Apt 5N
Brooklyn, NY 11230

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Tim Barrington [mailto:Tim_barrington@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:38 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Tim Barrington
1487 w San Carlos st
San jose, CA 95126

From: Tiobe Barron [mailto:tiobeone@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:45 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Tiobe Barron
205 mahoney ave
oak view, CA 93022

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Tiobe Barron [mailto:tiobeone@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 8:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Tiobe Barron
205 mahoney ave
oak view, CA 93022

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Henry Barru [mailto:acupoint@earthlink.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:46 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Henry Barru
Glen Burnie MD 21060
Glen Burnie, MD 21060

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Barbara Barry [mailto:152e1d7f@opayq.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:46 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Barbara Barry
13516 95th Ave NE
kihei, HI 96753

## Consent-Based Siting

From: steven barry [mailto:swb7ster@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 11:34 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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steven barry
15 kemp circle
wellfleet, MA 02871

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jan Barshiis [mailto:janbar1@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 5:37 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Jan Barshiis
2344 Pomona Lane
Wilmette, IL 60091

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Alan Barthel [mailto:alnbarthel@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:02 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Alan Barthel
15 Lighthouse Pt
Fairfield, CT 06824

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Nick Bartol [mailto:nick@nickbartol.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 8:47 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

We don't need nuclear power. It is more expensive, more dangerous, and no one knows what to do with the waste (we have only been trying to solve this problem for 55 years so it is clear that there is NO solution).

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Nick Bartol
36 Greeley Hill Rd
Bedford, NH 03110

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Nick Bartol [mailto:nick@nickbartol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:12 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

Nuclear power makes no sense: 1. it is more expensive, 2. it is much more dangerous, 3. after try since 1965 to solve the nuclear waste problem no solution has been found. It is crazy to think that 50 years will be any different that then last!

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Nick Bartol
36 Greeley Hill Rd
Bedford, NH 03110

From: Kahleen Bartolomeo [mailto:kbartolo30@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:26 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Kahleen Bartolomeo
3365 cranberry south
Laurel, MD 20724

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Susie Barton [mailto:bartonsusie@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:18 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Susie Barton
2360 Ohara Ct
San Jose, CA 95133

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Karen Barton [mailto:astrique@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:11 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Karen Barton
714 Old Lancaster Road
714 Old Lancaster Road
Bryn Mawr, PA 19010

From: CATHY BARTON [mailto:cj_bart_2000@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:20 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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CATHY BARTON
517 Kansala Drive
Annapolis, MD 21401

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Damian Barton [mailto:daemondamian@optusnet.com.au]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 1:30 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Damian Barton
2 Sliedell Court
Yinnar, ot 3869

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Susie Barton [mailto:bartonsusie@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:30 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Susie Barton
2360 Ohara Ct
San Jose, CA 95133

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Janet Bartos [mailto:Jpbartos@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:46 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Janet Bartos
75 Chevaux Circle
Little Rock, AR 72223

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Janet Bartos [mailto:Jpbartos@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:10 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Janet Bartos
75 Chevaux Circle
Little Rock, AR 72223

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Barbara Bartschi [mailto:bartschi@imagina.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:54 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Barbara Bartschi
1220 NE 17th Ave.  #2F
Portland, OR 97267

From: Steve-nuc Bash-eff [mailto:steve@theinfoexchange.org]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 3:43 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Steve-nuc Bash-eff
8047 Forian
Fair Oaks, CA 95628

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ben Basin [mailto:ben_basin@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 6:26 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Ben Basin
515 SE 19th Ave.
Portland, OR 97214

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Nancy Bast [mailto:fairviewnancyb@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:29 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Nancy Bast
450 Fairview
Morro Bay, CA 93442

## Consent-Based Siting

From: anne bastian [mailto:bastian.anne@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:46 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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anne bastian
1523 Enyart Way
apt 303
Annapolis, MD 21409

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Tom Bates [mailto:tom@robertbatesco.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:30 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Tom Bates
106 Bannerbrook Drive
106 Bannerbrook Simpsonville 29680
Simpsonville, SC 29680

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Michaele Bates [mailto:shel@robertbatesco.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:00 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Michaele Bates
106 Bannerbrook Drive
Simpsonville, SC
Simpsonville, SC 29680

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sally Bates [mailto:salzies@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:33 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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Sally Bates
745153 Puuokaliu Pl
Kailua Kona, HI 96740

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Karin Batten [mailto:karin.batten@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:24 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Karin Batten
463 West St.
New York City, NY 10014

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Melissa Bauer [mailto:melissa@tinydesignstudio.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:28 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Melissa Bauer
2640 Spear Point Ct
Woodstock, GA 30188

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Cynthia Bauer [mailto:Crazyladych@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:18 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Cynthia Bauer
112 Snowden Drive
Pittsburgh, PA 15229

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Melissa Bauer [mailto:melissa@tinydesignstudio.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:29 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Melissa Bauer
2640 Spear Point Ct
Woodstock, GA 30188

## Consent-Based Siting

From: gary baugh [mailto:garyalan@comcast.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:34 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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gary baugh
2951 marina bay dr.  130-258
League City, TX 77573

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Miriam Baum [mailto:miriambaum@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:23 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Miriam Baum
6532 Peridot Ave.
Alta Loma, CA 91701

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Miriam Baum [mailto:miriambaum@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:11 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Miriam Baum
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## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joan-Marie Bauman [mailto:joanmariebauman@hughes.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:37 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Joan-Marie Bauman
106 Rupp Road
Monticello, NY 12701

From: Timothy Baures [mailto:tbaures6@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 9:22 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Timothy Baures
630 N 4th Street, Apt 705
Apt 316
Milwaukee, WI 53203

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Michelle Bava [mailto:raspberryrhubarb@yahoo.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 7:20 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Michelle Bava
524 AShbury St
SAn Francisco, CA 94117

From: Bea Baxter [mailto:thefordhams@roadrunner.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:52 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Bea Baxter
9 Oak Court
Candler, NC 28715

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Alex Bay [mailto:igakushi@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 11:52 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Alex Bay
1 University Drive
Orange, CA 92620

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Antonio Bayona [mailto:bayona5@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:12 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Antonio Bayona
12286 Amstater Cir
EL PASO, TX 79936

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Antonio Bayona [mailto:bayona5@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 5:33 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Antonio Bayona
12286 Amstater Cir
EL PASO, TX 79936

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Julia Bazar [mailto:jbbazar@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:52 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Julia Bazar
2951 Derby St Apt 219
Berkeley, CA 94705

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Pat Beach [mailto:thesethreeare1@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 8:42 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Pat Beach
17320 Quaker Lane
Apt B20
Sandy Spring, MD 20860

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Pat Beach [mailto:thesethreeare1@gmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 7:17 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Pat Beach
17320 Quaker Lane
Apt B20
Sandy Spring, MD 20860

## Consent-Based Siting

From: beantreefarm@gmail.com [mailto:beantreefarm@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:48 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The only safe nuclear energy device is a solar oven. I use mine every day to cook my food, and hope you do too! No waste is produced, unless you don't eat what you've cooked.

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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AZ 85743

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Steve Bear [mailto:bear@alpenfirecider.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:52 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Steve Bear
220 Pocket Lane
Port Townsend, WA 98368

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Steve Bear [mailto:bear@alpenfirecider.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:29 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Steve Bear
220 Pocket Lane
Port Townsend, WA 98368

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Valerie Beard [mailto:vebeard@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 10:50 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Valerie Beard
3909 50th Street
Sacramento, CA 95820

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Bekki Shining Bearheart [mailto:bekki@church-of-earth-healing.org]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 11:57 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Bekki Shining Bearheart
6560 State Route 356
6560 State route 356 New Marshfield OH
New Marshfield, OH 45766

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Maya Beatty-Hanko [mailto:mayaisnow@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 1:22 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Maya Beatty-Hanko
1011 Elk Valley Rd.
Crescent City, CA 95531

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Brenda Beaumier [mailto:bjb3612@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:39 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Brenda Beaumier
3612 N. 64th St.
Milwaukee, WI 53216

## Consent-Based Siting

From: John A Beavers [mailto:beavgodzilla@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:15 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

John A Beavers
4431 N Troy #2
Chicago, IL 60625

## Consent-Based Siting

From: John A Beavers [mailto:beavgodzilla@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:58 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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John A Beavers
4431 N Troy #2
Chicago, IL 60625

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Anthony Becker [mailto:anthonytvb@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:56 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Anthony Becker
311 Bay Drive
Massapequa, NY 11758

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Anthony Becker [mailto:anthonytvb@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 5:48 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Anthony Becker
311 Bay Drive
Massapequa, NY 11758

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Peter Becker [mailto:pjbeckerman@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 10:44 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Peter Becker
2335 NW Raleigh st
Apt 211
new York City, NY 11215

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mary Beckman [mailto:maryzoh@yahoo.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 2:30 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Mary Beckman
w road
Greenwood Lake, NY 10925

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Victoria Bedford [mailto:vbedford9@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:17 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Victoria Bedford
1701 Circle Dr
Bloomington, IN 47401

## Consent-Based Siting

From: adam beebe [mailto:mishapcollective@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:26 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

adam beebe
1343 grove st
san francisco, CA 94117

## Consent-Based Siting

From: adam beebe [mailto:mishapcollective@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 7:22 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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adam beebe
1343 grove st
san francisco, CA 94117

## Consent-Based Siting

From: David Beebe [mailto:fvjerryo@mac.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:28 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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David Beebe
PO Box 148
Petersburg, AK 99833

From: Meg Beeler [mailto:support@megbeeler.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 1:48 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Meg Beeler
16100 Sobre Vista Court
Sonoma, CA 95476

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Howard Beeman [mailto:grandma@beeman.org]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:19 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Howard Beeman
21024 Road 95
Woodland, CA 95695

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Diane Beeny [mailto:dianeb181@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 4:14 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Diane Beeny
181 Tudor Oval
Westfield, NJ 07090

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dan Behl [mailto:Dmb193@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 8:03 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Dan Behl
912 longfield Ed
Glen mills, PA 19342

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Alec Behr [mailto:alec@ime-usa.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:43 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Alec Behr
46
Conway NH, NH 03818

From: Tom Behrendt [mailto:tombehrendt4@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Tom Behrendt
869 ORANGE ST,
NEW HAVEN, CT 06511

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ann Behrmann [mailto:atbehrma@wisc.edu]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 4:29 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Ann Behrmann
2209 Chamberlain Ave.
Madison, WI 53726

## Consent-Based Siting

From: frank belcastro [mailto:fpbelcast@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:55 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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frank belcastro
285 north grandview avenue
none
dubuque, IA 52001

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Linda Bell [mailto:lbell@gsu.edu]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:45 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Linda Bell
349 Adams St.
Decatur, GA 30030

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Liz Bell [mailto:rebell2433@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 3:22 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Liz Bell
595 E. Lake St. #39
South Lyon, MI 48178

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Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:33 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Jim Bell
4862 Voltaire St.
4862 Voltaire St.
San Diego, CA 92107

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jim Bell [mailto:jimbellelsi@cox.net]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 2:21 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Jim Bell
4862 Voltaire St.
4862 Voltaire St.
San Diego, CA 92107

## Consent-Based Siting

From: James Belt [mailto:Jamesb@badgerbalm.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 6:47 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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James Belt
Po box 27
Gilsum, NH 03448

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Tom Bendert [mailto:tbender@nehalemtel.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 11:29 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Tom Bendert
38755 Reed Rd.
Nehalem, OR 97131

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Tom Bendert [mailto:tbender@nehalemtel.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 8:36 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Tom Bendert
38755 Reed Rd.
Nehalem, OR 97131

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Glen Benjamin [mailto:soulroll@comcast.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:34 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Glen Benjamin
140  Court Street apt 209
140 Court Street apt 209
Portsmoth, NH 03801

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Elaine Benjamin [mailto:ebalpine@flash.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:46 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Elaine Benjamin
2627 Eltinge Dr.
Alpine, CA 91901

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Elaine Benjamin [mailto:ebalpine@flash.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 8:52 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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Elaine Benjamin
2627 Eltinge Dr.
Alpine, CA 91901

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ed Benner [mailto:ebennr@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:47 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Ed Benner
1 Lane Drv
Goshen, IN 46528

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dick Bennett [mailto:jbennet@uark.edu]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:46 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Dick Bennett
2582 N. Jimmie Avenue
Fayetteville, AR 72703

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Virginia H. Bennett [mailto:vbennett@hawaii.edu]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:46 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Virginia H. Bennett
1201 Wilder Ave. #1704
#1704
Honolulu, HI 96822

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Stephanie Benson [mailto:stephanie@stephanie-benson.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:34 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Stephanie Benson
6808 Palomino Ridge Court
Summerfield, NC 27358

From: Stephen Benson [mailto:sbenson58@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 11:03 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Stephen Benson
PO Box 1257
Blue Hill, ME 04614

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kathleen Bentley [mailto:kbentley@sagallaw.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:52 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Kathleen Bentley
9502 Ridgely Ave
Baltimore, MD 21234

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kathleen Bentley [mailto:kbentley@sagallaw.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:15 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Kathleen Bentley
9502 Ridgely Ave
Baltimore, MD 21234

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Tim Benton [mailto:donitim@wildblue.net]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 10:17 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Tim Benton
596 Allen Rd
Canon City, CO 81212

From: Alan Bentz-Letts [mailto:alanbentzletts@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:48 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Alan Bentz-Letts
149-32A Union Turnpike
Flushing, NY 11367

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Heide Benveniste [mailto:aratiby@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:43 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Heide Benveniste
1329 Saltair Ave
Los Angeles, CA 90025

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Samuel Berg [mailto:sber6415@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:33 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Samuel Berg
29601 NE DAVID LANE
NEWBERG, OR 97132

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joanne Bergen [mailto:joadrianna@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:04 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Joanne Bergen
17 Falling Creek Roda
Pittsford, NY 14534

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Pat Berger [mailto:thepondrd@roadrunner.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:04 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Pat Berger
po box 667
Oakland, ME 04330

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Darcy Bergh [mailto:darcybergh@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:36 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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Darcy Bergh
1121 Hallam Ave N
1719 28th st
Mahtomedi, MN 55115

## Consent-Based Siting

From: marilyn berkon [mailto:marbkn@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:22 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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marilyn berkon
135 willow street
brooklyn, NY 11201

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Paul Berland [mailto:paul.berland@siliconengines.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 8:16 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Paul Berland
625 Walnut Ave
Elgin, IL 60123

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Randy Bernard [mailto:rbwnc@charter.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:38 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Randy Bernard
18 Plateau Road
Asheville, NC 28805

## Consent-Based Siting

From: John Bernard [mailto:johndbernard@earthlink.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:13 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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John Bernard
56 Mildred St.
South Portland, ME 04106

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mark Bernard [mailto:democracyinaction.org@embernet.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:32 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Mark Bernard
49 Fischer Ave
Kingston, NY 12401

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lou Bernieri [mailto:lbernieri@andover.edu]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:11 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Lou Bernieri
16 abbot street
Andover, MA 01810

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Midi Berry [mailto:midiberry@mac.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:58 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Midi Berry
Ember Court
Agoura Hills, CA 91301

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Evonn Berube-Reiersen [mailto:evonnb@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:49 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Evonn Berube-Reiersen
23 Sunset Drive
Boca Raton, FL 33487

## Consent-Based Siting

From: MATTHEW BESSELL, LCSW [mailto:Woofwow@aol.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 10:45 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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MATTHEW BESSELL, LCSW
P.O.Box 242
110 Harding Court
CEnterport, NY 11721

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Elizabeth Bettenhausen [mailto:elizabethbettenhausen@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:13 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Elizabeth Bettenhausen
345 Plymouth St.
Cambria, CA, CA 93428

## Consent-Based Siting

From: J Beverly [mailto:jbeverly@illinois.edu]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:44 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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J Beverly
803 Shurts Street
Urbana, IL 61801

## Consent-Based Siting

From: david bezansib [mailto:bezanpsy3506@hotmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:28 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Halt building new nuclear power plants until science discovers a safe way of transforming fissle waste into a harmless substance. Set and enforce more stringent safety measures at current nukes.

david bezansib
2212 shelter creek lane
san bruno, CA 94066

## Consent-Based Siting

From: david bezansib [mailto:bezanpsy3506@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:57 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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david bezansib
2212 shelter creek lane
san bruno, CA 94066

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sue Biederman [mailto:sbiederman@evertek.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:50 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Sue Biederman
207 E Wilson
Everly, IA 51338

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sue Biederman [mailto:sbiederman@evertek.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:15 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Sue Biederman
207 E Wilson
Everly, IA 51338

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Karen Biesanz [mailto:karenb@stny.rr.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 8:24 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Karen Biesanz
215 Watauga Abe.
Corning, NY 14830

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kim Bigley [mailto:turn2112@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:44 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Kim Bigley
1202 E 23Rd St
Houston, TX 77009

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Stephanie Bilenko [mailto:sbilenko@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:03 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Stephanie Bilenko
627 Barnsdale
LaGrange Park, IL 60526

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Gerard Billmeier [mailto:billmeier@comcast.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 11:35 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Gerard Billmeier
6465 Massey Lane
6465 Massey Lane
Memphis, TN 38120

## Consent-Based Siting

From: cathy bilsky [mailto:angeliteomm@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:01 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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cathy bilsky
453610 mamane
honokaa, HI 96727

## Consent-Based Siting

From: cathy bilsky [mailto:angeliteomm@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 5:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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cathy bilsky
453610 mamane
honokaa, HI 96727

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Caroline Binder [mailto:ms.c.binder@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:51 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Caroline Binder
1140 Union Church Rd
Mc Connellsburg, PA 17233

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Caroline Binder [mailto:ms.c.binder@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:04 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Caroline Binder
1140 Union Church Rd
Mc Connellsburg, PA 17233

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Vicki Bingo [mailto:Vicki.bingo@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:38 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Vicki Bingo
5550 Wilshire blvd apt 415
Los Angeles, CA 90036

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Melissa Bird [mailto:nursebird@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:11 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Melissa Bird
111 Depot Rd
Harwich, MA 02645

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Susan Bird [mailto:birdsusanmn@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 8:02 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Susan Bird
24 Maplewood Rd.
24 Maplewood Rd.
Asheville, NC 28804

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sandra Bisbey [mailto:sbisbey@usa.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:39 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Sandra Bisbey
8 W. Madison St. #25
8 W. Madison St. #25 Baltimore, MD
Baltimore, MD 21201

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Cori Bishop [mailto:animeluvr666@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:51 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Cori Bishop
617 S County Blvd
Egg Harbor City, NJ 08215

## Consent-Based Siting

From: J. Bishop [mailto:jobishop628@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:32 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

No More!

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J. Bishop
30W020 Laurel Ct.
30W020 Laurel
Warrenville, IL 60185

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Scott Bishop [mailto:sbishop@oly-wa.us]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:52 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Scott Bishop
1710 Giles NW
Olympia, WA 98502

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Scott Bishop [mailto:sbishop@oly-wa.us]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:01 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Scott Bishop
1710 Giles NW
Olympia, WA 98502

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Anita Bixenstine [mailto:anitabix@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:54 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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Anita Bixenstine
407 wilson ave.
Kent, OH 44240-26

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Anita Bixenstine [mailto:anitabix@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:24 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

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Anita Bixenstine
407 wilson ave.
Kent, OH 44240-26

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Nils Bjork [mailto:nbjork@brentwoodhouse.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 4:39 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Nils Bjork
6633 Pelhams Trace
Centreville, VA 20120

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Len and Judy Bjorkman [mailto:LenandJudy@stny.rr.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:38 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Len and Judy Bjorkman
681 Ivory Foster Rd
681 Ivory Foster  Rd
Owego, NY 13827

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Janet Black [mailto:ecochristian@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 6:56 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Janet Black
2149 Pisgah Hwy
P.O. Box 1031
Candler, NC 28715

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lee Blackburn [mailto:leeblackburn@live.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:30 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Lee Blackburn
148 Pincott St SW
Pataskala, OH 43062

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Edmund Blackie [mailto:edmundssf@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 6:20 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Edmund Blackie
85, Crofton Rd
London, ot E13 8QT

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Edmund Blackie [mailto:edmundssf@gmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 6:39 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Edmund Blackie
85, Crofton Rd
London, ot E13 8QT

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Savannah Blackwell [mailto:savannah.blackwell@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 5:15 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Savannah Blackwell
330 Parnassus Avenue #102
San Francisco, CA 94117

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Pat Blackwell-Marchant [mailto:patmarchant@comcast.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:38 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Pat Blackwell-Marchant
5737 Medallion Court
Castro Valley, CA 94552

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jean Blackwood [mailto:blackwoodjean@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:43 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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The DOE must end its decades long support and subsidy of this dangerous, economically unfeasible means of energy production. Your focus needs to be on finding the safest possible storage for the waste already created and then work at fever-pitch to support clean, sustainable, non-nuclear energy production.

Jean Blackwood
2710 West Rollins Rd D16
Columbia, MO 65203

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Robert Blaedel [mailto:machinewayback@hotmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 11:13 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Robert Blaedel
20700 SE Curtis Road
Damascus, OR 97089

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Susan Blain [mailto:s_blain@mwcc mass.edu]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 5:55 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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It's hard to imagine anything more irresponsible that creating hazardous waste for which there is no safe disposal. Nuclear energy is not green or clean.

Susan Blain
156 Vernon Street
Gardner, MA 01440

## Consent-Based Siting

From: William Blair [mailto:wblair4318@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:19 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

William Blair
11561 W Colony
Boise, ID
Boise, ID 83709

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Pam Blake [mailto:pamblake@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:53 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Pam Blake
4 Starboard Ln
Freeport, ME 04032

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jonathan Blanton [mailto:coreyblanton@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:30 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Jonathan Blanton
Malabu
Lexington, KY 40502

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Thomas Blanton [mailto:tebmtn@embarqmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:40 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Thomas Blanton
2228 Russell Drive
Granite Falls, NC 28630

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dana Bleckinger [mailto:wooflevi@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:19 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Dana Bleckinger
P.O. Box 904
achats, OR 97498

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dana Bleckinger [mailto:wooflevi@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 8:28 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Dana Bleckinger
P.O. Box 904
achats, OR 97498

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Peter Blied [mailto:pblied04@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:40 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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Peter Blied
2641 Gregory Lane
2641 Gregory Lane
La Habra, CA 90631

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Valerie Bline [mailto:vblankb184@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:21 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Valerie Bline
2121 Hillside ave
2121 Hillside Ave
Williston Park, NY 11596

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Valerie Bline [mailto:vblankb184@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:50 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Valerie Bline
2121 Hillside ave
2121 Hillside Ave
Williston Park, NY 11596

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Robert T Block, MD [mailto:bobblock1014@att.net]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 10:41 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Robert T Block, MD
2237 Fox Av
Madison, WI 53711

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Larry Blood [mailto:larryb@cruzio.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:51 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Larry Blood
128 Anderson St.
santa cruz, CA 95060

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Martin Bloom [mailto:n3beekmanplace@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:34 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Martin Bloom
721 Gonzalez Dr.
San Francisco, CA 94132

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Linda Bloom [mailto:mbloom@windstream.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:00 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them. I do this on behalf of myself, my children, my grandchildren and the future of our country and planet. Pay attention!! This is not like dumping your household garbage in a ditch along the road. Which is disgusting and harmful, just not deadly dangerous to an extended environment for a hugely extended time frame.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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Linda Bloom
8477 Summer
Macedonia, OH 44056

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Martin Bloom [mailto:n3beekmanplace@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:15 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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Martin Bloom
721 Gonzalez Dr.
San Francisco, CA 94132

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Donna Blue [mailto:donnablue@twc.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:08 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Donna Blue
117 N. Hanover Avenue
Lexington, KY 40502

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Donna Blue [mailto:donnablue@twc.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:20 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Donna Blue
117 N. Hanover Avenue
Lexington, KY 40502

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Gerald and Louise Rose Blume [mailto:gblume1933@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 10:27 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Gerald and Louise Rose Blume
198 Keith Rd.
Clermont,, GA 30527

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From: Gerald and Louise Rose Blume [mailto:gblume1933@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 10:51 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Gerald and Louise Rose Blume
198 Keith Rd.
Clermont,, GA 30527

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Frances Blythe [mailto:francesb5601@att.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:59 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Frances Blythe
555 Morgan Lane
Dixon, CA 95620

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Frances Blythe [mailto:francesb5601@att.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:12 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Frances Blythe
555 Morgan Lane
Dixon, CA 95620

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ian Boardman [mailto:isb0459@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:23 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Ian Boardman
18 Linwood St.
Arlington, MA 02474

## Consent-Based Siting

From: James Bochenek [mailto:jbbob@earthlink.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 3:37 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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James Bochenek
226 Diamond Hill Rd
Delmar, NY 12054

From: R Boden [mailto:renaboden@aol.co.uk]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 2:10 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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R Boden
102 Lyttelton Road
Birmingham, ot B33 8BJ

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Barbara Bogard [mailto:barbogard@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:27 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Barbara Bogard
604 Amaranth Blvd
Amaranth Blvd
Mill Valley, CA 94941

From: Barbara Bogard [mailto:barbogard@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:06 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Barbara Bogard
604 Amaranth Blvd
Amaranth Blvd
Mill Valley, CA 94941

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Andrew Bogdan [mailto:abogdan1234@yahoo.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 11:19 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Andrew Bogdan
10400 Ruffner Ave
Granada Hills, CA 91344

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Emma Bogdan [mailto:emmabogdan@gmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 5:50 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Emma Bogdan
1201 Braeburn rd
Charlotte, NC 28211

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Doug Bogen [mailto:dbogen@metrocast net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 5:46 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment on DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

As Director of a regional environmental organization with hundreds of members affected by and concerned about current and potential future pollution from one of our nation's existing nuclear plants (Seabrook), I would like to register our objections to your "consent-based" siting initiative.

The Department of Energy's (DOE) initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

WE DO NOT CONSENT to this process - the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them. At our LOCAL nuclear facility, the rail transport route from the site has been abandoned and turned into bikepaths, and highway connections are challenging and congested. While this plant's waste will have to be moved eventually due to rising seas/storm surges, we do not see how shipment of any of this dangerous waste could possibly be done safely and responsibly any time in the near future.

Whatever future permanent or "interim" waste facility ever gets sited, we are likely at the "tail-end of the line" when it comes to transporting that waste. So in addition to concern over local impacts of shipping this waste, we are concerned about the injustice of subjecting hundreds of "downline" communities to the risks of such shipments. We thus also object that no consideration of the rights or consent of those along potential radioactive waste transport routes is being made or requested.

We also have had the experience of dealing with DOE's previous attempts 30 years ago to site a permanent waste repository in our region's granite bedrock. Local residents essentially "ran them out of town," while dozens of communities throughout our state passed resolutions objecting to and condemning the process. Please consider that history and DON'T try to foist that same sort of misguided attempt on us or any other region again!

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations, including ours, have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites - including ours - with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right to require DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and the third is to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only when scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—-and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there is public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy is wrong in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste accidents and exposure, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

We hope you'll consider these concerns in moving forward responsibly on this critical issue.

Doug Bogen
21 Lois Lane
Barrington, NH 03825

## Consent-Based Siting

From: George Boggs [mailto:GBoggs@suddenlink.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:30 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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George Boggs
# 2 Lazy Ridge Rd.
# 2 Lazy Ridge Rd.
Elkbiew, WV 25071

From: Arthur Bogie [mailto:fidalgo1.art@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:17 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

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Arthur Bogie
3020 R Ave #5
3030 R Ave apt 5
La Conner, WA 98257

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Gusti Bogok [mailto:jayagusti8@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:15 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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Gusti Bogok
130 W 16th St Apt 41
New York, NY 10011

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Renee Bogue [mailto:boguerrl@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Renee Bogue
204 Willow Ave. NE
Massillon, OH 44646

From: Diana Bohn [mailto:nicca@igc.org]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 11:24 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Diana Bohn
618 San Luis Road
Berkeley, CA 94707

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ruth Boice [mailto:rlboice2@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:57 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Ruth Boice
162 Willow Grove Rd
Shamong, NJ 08088

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Larwence Boisvert [mailto:boisvert@htva.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 10:45 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Larwence Boisvert
429 Hines Rd.
Newfield, NY 14867

## Consent-Based Siting

From: DK Bolen [mailto:dkbolen@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:26 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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DK Bolen
5600 - 59 Way N
St Petersburg, FL 33709

## Consent-Based Siting

From: deetje boler [mailto:deetje@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:19 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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deetje boler
1280 Laguna St.
1280 Laguna
san francisco, CA 94115

From: deetje boler [mailto:deetje@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 7:46 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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deetje boler
1280 Laguna St.
1280 Laguna
san francisco, CA 94115

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Emily Boliver [mailto:senilenurse@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 11:37 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Emily Boliver
52 Moores Circle
Laurel, MS 39443

From: Emily Boliver [mailto:senilenurse@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 9:33 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Emily Boliver
52 Moores Circle
Laurel, MS 39443

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Robert Bonazzi [mailto:latitudesinternational@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:38 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Robert Bonazzi
1911 W. Summit Ave.
San Antonio, TX 78201

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Karen Bonime [mailto:karenbonime@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 7:10 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Karen Bonime
715 Truman SE
Albuquerque, NM 87108

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jill Boniske [mailto:bonoix@mac.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:47 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Jill Boniske
56 C Starnes Ave
Asheville, NC 28801

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Patty Bonney [mailto:pattybonney@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:30 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Patty Bonney
8625 SW Oleson Road
Portland, OR 97223

From: Patty Bonney [mailto:pattybonney@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:45 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Patty Bonney
8625 SW Oleson Road
Portland, OR 97223

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Colleen Bonniwell [mailto:bonniwell.colleen@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 11:14 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Colleen Bonniwell
510 2nd Ave NW
New Prague, MN 56071

## Consent-Based Siting

From: A Bonvouloir [mailto:ra3ajw@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:37 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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A Bonvouloir
POB 70185
Sunnyvale, CA 94086

## Consent-Based Siting

From: A Bonvouloir [mailto:ra3ajw@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 10:46 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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A Bonvouloir
POB 70185
Sunnyvale, CA 94086

From: Vicki Bookless [mailto:vickib2004@charter.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:42 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Vicki Bookless
890 Del Rio Aven.
San Luis Obispo, CA 93405

From: Darryl & Diana Boom [mailto:diana@dboom.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:44 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Darryl & Diana Boom
PO Box 328
PO Box 328, Lake Oswego OR
Lake Oswego, OR 97034

## Consent-Based Siting

From: John Boomer [mailto:boomerart62@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:55 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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John Boomer
box 3207
Milan, NM 87021

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Emily Boone [mailto:emilyboone@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:45 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Emily Boone
102 Pope Street
102 Pope Street
Louisville, KY 40206

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Martha Booz [mailto:mlbooz@calnatives.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:07 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

I fully support this action by the Nuclear Information and Resource Service.

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Martha Booz
3823 Valley Lane
El Sobrante, CA 94803

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Margie Borchers [mailto:margieborchers@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:11 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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Margie Borchers
401 e micheltorena st
Apt. #2
santa barbara, CA 93101

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Margie Borchers [mailto:margieborchers@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:21 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Margie Borchers
401 e micheltorena st
Apt. #2
santa barbara, CA 93101

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Maray A Borchers [mailto:abigail@raven-villages.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:34 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Maray A Borchers
1801 Midde Ridge Rd
Romney, WV 26757

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dana Bordegaray [mailto:dbordegaray@att.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:11 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Dana Bordegaray
24th st
cayucos, CA 93430

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Tika Bordelon [mailto:tikab1@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:37 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Tika Bordelon
1400 Hubbell Pl.
Seattle, WA 98101

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Tika Bordelon [mailto:tikab1@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 9:55 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Tika Bordelon
1400 Hubbell Pl.
Seattle, WA 98101

From: Edith Borie [mailto:e.borie@ieee.org]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 6:56 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Edith Borie
6 Hickory Hill Rd.
New Paltz, NY 12561

From: Jenny Boris [mailto:jennyevab@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:07 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Jenny Boris
43562 EXCELSO DR
Fremont, CA 94539

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Gavin Bornholtz [mailto:gbglide@comcast.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:20 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Gavin Bornholtz
9090 CREEKWOOD LAKE TRL
GRAND BLANC, MI 48439

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Patricia Borri [mailto:patriciaaborri@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:24 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Patricia Borri
3341 Vivian Court
Wheat Ridge, CO 80033

From: Fr. Robert Bossie, SCJ [mailto:bobbossie@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:33 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Fr. Robert Bossie, SCJ
1421 E 53rd St
Chicago, IL 60615

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ken Bossong [mailto:kbossong@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:08 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Ken Bossong
8606 Greenwood Avenue
Apt. 2
Takoma Park, MD 20912

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Vic Bostock [mailto:care4animals@hotmail.co.uk]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 8:47 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Vic Bostock
Cliveden Green
Altadena, CA 91001

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Vic Bostock [mailto:care4animals@hotmail.co.uk]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:50 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Vic Bostock
Cliveden Green
Altadena, CA 91001

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Carol Bosworth [mailto:cbosworth@cmug.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:38 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Carol Bosworth
13505 SERiver Rd. #251
Portland, OR 97222

## Consent-Based Siting

From: William Boteler [mailto:bbot20008@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:14 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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William Boteler
627 Longfellow Street NW
Washington, DC 20011

From: victoria boucher [mailto:victoria.boucher@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:14 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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victoria boucher
4101 gallatin st.
Hyattsville, MD 20781

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Richard Bourgin [mailto:Rbourgin@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 7:59 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Richard Bourgin
POB 1007
Savage, MD 20763

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Charles Bouscaren [mailto:chuckbouscaren@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:17 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Charles Bouscaren
Po Box 219
Yermo, CA 92398

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Bob Bousquet [mailto:bousquetrb@comcast.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:56 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Bob Bousquet
PO Box 101
Bryantville, MA 02327

From: Louise Bower [mailto:lbower44@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 8:44 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Dear Secretary Morniz: Keep the waste in place. Until science can come up with a way to permanently dispose to it, it should remain with the people and facilities that created it. It would be outrageous to try and foist it off on uninformed communities...

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Louise Bower
POB 133
Ash, NC 28420

## Consent-Based Siting

From: MargaretAnn Bowers [mailto:mabowers11@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:41 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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MargaretAnn Bowers
433 N Geneva St
Ithaca, NY 14850

## Consent-Based Siting

From: MargaretAnn Bowers [mailto:mabowers11@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 6:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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MargaretAnn Bowers
433 N Geneva St
Ithaca, NY 14850

From: Kenneth Bowman [mailto:kbowman@prodigy.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:47 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Kenneth Bowman
2838 Rivers End Road
Orlando, FL 32817

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Candy Bowman [mailto:canbowring@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 8:09 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Candy Bowman
4361 Turnbridge Dr
# 1
Sacramento, CA 95823

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Candy Bowman [mailto:canbowring@yahoo.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 8:27 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Candy Bowman
4361 Turnbridge Dr
# 1
Sacramento, CA 95823

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jason Bowman [mailto:xyamuchax@care2.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 8:34 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Jason Bowman
1525 Cold Springs Rd SPC 52
SPC 52
Placerville, CA 95667

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kenneth Bowman [mailto:kbowman@prodigy.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 5:55 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Kenneth Bowman
2838 Rivers End Road
Orlando, FL 32817

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Alice Bowron [mailto:lupinsgalore@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:55 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Alice Bowron
3031 Ewing Av S, Apt 154
Apartment 337
Robbinsdale, MN 55422

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Alice Bowron [mailto:lupinsgalore@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:07 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Alice Bowron
3031 Ewing Av S, Apt 154
Apartment 337
Robbinsdale, MN 55422

From: Nancy Boyce [mailto:nancy_marinlink@comcast.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:41 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Nancy Boyce
275 Los Ranchitos Road
San Rafael, CA 94903

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Charlene Boydston [mailto:cdboydston@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:26 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Charlene Boydston
3951 Donner St
Pahrump, NV 89048

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Charlene Boydston [mailto:cdboydston@yahoo.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 6:40 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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Charlene Boydston
3951 Donner St
Pahrump, NV 89048

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kathleen Boyer [mailto:kboyer2@cox.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:45 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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Kathleen Boyer
86 timbre
Rancho Santa margarita, CA 92688

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kyle Bracken [mailto:kylebracken@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 10:22 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Kyle Bracken
12960 Greene Ave.#1
Los Angeles, CA 90066

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kyle Bracken [mailto:kylebracken@yahoo.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 10:52 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Kyle Bracken
12960 Greene Ave.#1
Los Angeles, CA 90066

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Michael Brackney [mailto:michaelbrackney@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 7:26 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Michael Brackney
3940 Park Blvd #410
San Diego, CA 92103

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joan Bradbury [mailto:joanbradbury@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:27 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Joan Bradbury
2923 N. Claremont
Chicago, IL 60618

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kathy Bradley [mailto:khayb55@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:53 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Kathy Bradley
1220 Fredericksburg Dr South
Lugoff, SC 29078

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kathy Bradley [mailto:khayb55@aol.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 3:37 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilities. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

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## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ryan Bradley [mailto:Cellq7@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:15 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Ryan Bradley
13 Laurel Hill Rd Unit B
Greenbelt, MD 20770

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ryan Bradley [mailto:Cellq7@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 8:15 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Ryan Bradley
13 Laurel Hill Rd Unit B
Greenbelt, MD 20770

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Emma Bradshaw [mailto:emmabradshaw@comcast.net]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 11:16 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Emma Bradshaw
2868 Valley Forge Road, Lisle, IL 60532
Lisle, IL 60532

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ann K Brady [mailto:yarrow48@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 9:46 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Ann K Brady
1238 Thomas Ave.
Saint Paul, MN 55104

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ann Brameier [mailto:snakeoil.works@verizon.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:12 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Ann Brameier
318 W. 14th St.
New York, NY 10014

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Diane Brancato [mailto:peacepony@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:36 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Diane Brancato
333 Candee Ave
Sayville, NY 11782

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jackson Brand [mailto:jackson.brand@ca.rr.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:50 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Jackson Brand
2330 Vanguard Way Q101, Costa Mesa, CA 92626
Costa Mesa, CA 922626, CA 92626

From: Anita Brandariz [mailto:Anna12lago16@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:13 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Anita Brandariz
13 Willow Place
Brooklyn, NY 11201

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Anita Brandariz [mailto:Anna12lago16@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 5:43 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Anita Brandariz
13 Willow Place
Brooklyn, NY 11201

From: Vicky Brandt [mailto:brandtv@mac.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:55 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Vicky Brandt
28 W. 10th St. 4R
New York, NY 10011

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Vicky Brandt [mailto:brandtv@mac.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:10 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Vicky Brandt
28 W. 10th St. 4R
New York, NY 10011

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joan Brannigan [mailto:joanbran@mac.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:40 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Joan Brannigan
9411 Cimarron Ct.
Olivette, MO 63132

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joye Braun [mailto:jmbraun57625@gmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 11:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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Joye Braun
Po box 484
Eagle Butte, SD 57625

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Brent Bray [mailto:brentster_1@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:32 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Brent Bray
802 Parkview Dr
Pflugerville, TX 78660

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Angie Bray [mailto:angie@angiebray.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:55 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Angie Bray
1040 victoria avenue venice ca 90291
Venice, CA 90291

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Shana Schwartzberg Brayton [mailto:shockop@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:06 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Shana Schwartzberg Brayton
670 Bryants Nursery Rd
Bryants Nursery Rd
Silver Spring, MD 20905

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Deena Brazy [mailto:dbrindl@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Deena Brazy
5305 Loruth Ter
Madison, WI 53711

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sandra Breakfield [mailto:breakfie_charles@att.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:34 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Sandra Breakfield
5610 Cliff Haven Dr
Dallas, TX 75236

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Bo Breda [mailto:bobreda@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:07 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Bo Breda
Kahukai St.
Pahoa, HI 96778

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Bo Breda [mailto:bobreda@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Bo Breda
Kahukai St.
Pahoa, HI 96778

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joan Breiding [mailto:liteuptheroom@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 6:34 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Joan Breiding
PO BOX 170625
San Francisco, CA 94117

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Allan Breit [mailto:allan@breitideas.ws]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:55 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Years I understood that "laser" technology could well provide a way to remove radioactive elements from nuclear waste. I think that spending funds on furthering such research and working to make the process and "plants" to do this would be both a boon to the economy and equally to the ecology both local and world wide.

Allan Breit
1036 N Spaulding Ave Apt 9
West Hollywood, CA 90046

From: Suzanne Bremmer [mailto:skb6@cornell.edu]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 10:15 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Suzanne Bremmer
8 Springhouse Road
Dryden, NY 13053

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Anne Brennan [mailto:redshaleab@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:28 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future. This is not safe and must stop!

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The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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Anne Brennan
1609 Rodman St.
Philadelphia, PA 19146

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Denise Brennan [mailto:dbre657144@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:36 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Denise Brennan
2692 Patrick Henry, Apt. 101
Auburn Hills, MI 48326

From: Thomas Brenner [mailto:voohoo@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:20 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Thomas Brenner
512 Bella St.
Hollidaysburg, PA 16648

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Isis Brenner-Ward [mailto:mityisis@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:44 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

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Isis Brenner-Ward
1027 N Pine St
Ukiah, CA 95482

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Isis Brenner-Ward [mailto:mityisis@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 7:09 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Isis Brenner-Ward
1027 N Pine St
Ukiah, CA 95482

From: John Brewer [mailto:brwrj1@msn.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:11 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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John Brewer
1001 Colonial Dr  Apt B3
Marietta, OH 45750

## Consent-Based Siting

From: John Brewer [mailto:brwrj1@msn.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:06 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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John Brewer
1001 Colonial Dr  Apt B3
Marietta, OH 45750

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Charles Brexel Sr. [mailto:cbrexel@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Charles Brexel Sr.
402 Abelia Court
Woodstock, GA 30188

From: Charles Brexel Sr. [mailto:cbrexel@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:15 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Charles Brexel Sr.
402 Abelia Court
Woodstock, GA 30188

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Judith Brey [mailto:jbrey1957@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 4:30 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Judith Brey
2101 Winfield Drive
Reedsburg, WI 53959

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Judith Brey [mailto:jbrey1957@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:45 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Judith Brey
2101 Winfield Drive
Reedsburg, WI 53959

From: Frank Briggs [mailto:frankbriggs07@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:53 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Frank Briggs
812 E. Washington St.
Tecumseh, OK 74873

## Consent-Based Siting

From: William C. Briggs, Jr. [mailto:megamax2@roadrunner.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:58 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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William C. Briggs, Jr.
46 - 20th Court
Hermosa Beach, CA 90254

## Consent-Based Siting

From: William C. Briggs, Jr. [mailto:megamax2@roadrunner.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 8:01 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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William C. Briggs, Jr.
46 - 20th Court
Hermosa Beach, CA 90254

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Barbara Brigham [mailto:barbaramms@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:56 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Barbara Brigham
150 E. Huntingdon St.
Philadelphia, PA 19125

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Barbara Brigham [mailto:barbaramms@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 5:46 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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Barbara Brigham
150 E. Huntingdon St.
Philadelphia, PA 19125

From: Bill Bright [mailto:brightideas98@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:19 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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Bill Bright
402 W MORGAN AVE
GALLUP,NM 87301, NM 87301

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Bill Bright [mailto:brightideas98@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Bill Bright
402 W MORGAN AVE
GALLUP,NM 87301, NM 87301

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mary Jo Brinker [mailto:naacmail@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 6:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Mary Jo Brinker
161 Leonhardt Lane
Ellwood City, PA 16117

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lisabette Brinkman [mailto:brinkstock@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:32 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Lisabette Brinkman
308 E. Anapamu Street
Santa Barbara, CA 93101

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kenneth Brinnick [mailto:cgenera1@maine.rr.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:03 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Kenneth Brinnick
65 Lewiston Road
New Gloucester, ME 04260

From: Bob Brister [mailto:bbrister@q.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 3:02 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Bob Brister
1102 South 800 East
Apt A
Salt Lake City, UT 84105

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Yolanda Stern Broad Ph.D. [mailto:ybroad1326@earthlink.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:28 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

I have a clear memory of white trains rumbling down dilapidated train tracks in the middle of the night, past my home in Waverly IA, back in the 1980's. They were terrifying then and they remain terrifying now.

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and SOCIALLY JUST AND EQUITABLE methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage facilities. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to REMOVE YUCCA MOUNTAIN from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Yolanda Stern Broad Ph.D.
215 N 4th St
Indiana, PA 15701

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Charles Brobst [mailto:cabrobst@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:32 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Charles Brobst
17 Tracy St
Binghamton, NY 13905

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Stephen Brockmann [mailto:s.brockmann@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 10:58 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Stephen Brockmann
9440 Barr Dr
Indianapolis, IN 46229

## Consent-Based Siting

From: dallas brockton [mailto:dbl20012000@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 11:01 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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dallas brockton
general delivery
effingham, IL 62414

## Consent-Based Siting

From: dallas brockton [mailto:dbl20012000@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 2:59 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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THERE ARE POWER PLANTS THAT CAN USE THIS "WASTE" TO GENERATE ENERGY!!!

dallas brockton
general delivery
beecher city, IL 62414

## Consent-Based Siting

From: John Bromer [mailto:jbromer@optonline.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 5:19 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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John Bromer
325 Silver Hill Rd
325 Silver Hill Rd. Easton, CT 06612
Easton, CT 06612

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Louise Brooke [mailto:lbrooke60@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 4:23 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Louise Brooke
1460 Quince Ave. #201
Boulder, CO 80304

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Gary Brooker [mailto:garybrooker@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:38 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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Gary Brooker
550 Canyon Rd
Santa Fe, NM 87501

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jann Brooks [mailto:jannwarrboyz@comcast.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:27 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Jann Brooks
4480 Boxwood Court
Rochester, MI  48306, MI 48306

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Marie Broudy [mailto:mariebroudy@yahoo.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 10:29 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Marie Broudy
31 Ryder Beach Rd.
Truro, MA 02666

From: Rev. Raymond Brown [mailto:rlbro@ptd.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:30 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Rev. Raymond Brown
1999 W. Sassafras St.,
Selinsgrove, PA 17870

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Charles Brown [mailto:charleybrown60@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 2:55 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Charles Brown
10 Perry Street
10 perry
saratoga springs, NY 12866

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Craig Brown [mailto:cbrown@monkeybridge.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:48 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Craig Brown
2908 Southbrook Drive
Bloomington, MN 55431

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Craig Brown [mailto:cbrown@monkeybridge.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:09 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Craig Brown
2908 Southbrook Drive
Bloomington, MN 55431

From: Deb Brown [mailto:deb@econweb.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 3:33 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Deb Brown
PO Box 98964
Raleigh, NC 27624

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jon Brown [mailto:blackandthick@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:03 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Jon Brown
1484 Stewart Drive
Rockwall, TX 75032

## Consent-Based Siting

From: john brown [mailto:jbrown@lisco.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:21 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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john brown
1501 wonder way
fairfield, IA 52556

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kathleen Brown [mailto:kbrown567@covad.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 11:45 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Kathleen Brown
1245 California St.
San Francisco, CA 94109

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Loren Brown [mailto:lorishpottery@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 6:58 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Loren Brown
151 New Road
Nassau, NY 12123

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Robert Brown [mailto:larkbrown@comcast.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:46 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Robert Brown
1443 Edwards Avenue
Fircrest, WA 98466

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Roya Brown [mailto:royanyan@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 9:42 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Roya Brown
2061 S. Xenia Way
Denver, CO 80231

## Consent-Based Siting

From: tom brown [mailto:barisaxual@hotmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 8:07 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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tom brown
365D chesterfield court
lakewood, NJ 08701

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Duncan Brown [mailto:dbuteob@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:14 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Duncan Brown
8122 E. Sundew Dr.
Tucson, AZ 85710

From: Donna Browne [mailto:dsbh25@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 11:51 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Donna Browne
336 aldeberan dr
sewell, NJ 08080

From: Donna Browne [mailto:dsbh25@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 12:02 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Donna Browne
336 aldeberan dr
sewell, NJ 08080

From: Deirdre Brownell [mailto:Dbdc125731@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:54 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Deirdre Brownell
333 Andover dr. Apt. 108
Burbank, CA 91504

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joan Brown,osf [mailto:joankansas@swcp.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:59 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Joan Brown,osf
1004 Major Ave. NW
Albuquerque, NM 87107

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lawrence R. Brown Jr. [mailto:groovenblue@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:58 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

*The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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*I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Lawrence R. Brown Jr.
975 Old Walpole Road #2
Surry, NH 03431

From: Cathy Brownlee [mailto:serendipitycat@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:19 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

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Cathy Brownlee
41 Lobo Lane
Paragould, AR 72450

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Cathy Brownlee [mailto:serendipitycat@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:07 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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Cathy Brownlee
41 Lobo Lane
Paragould, AR 72450

## Consent-Based Siting

From: sarah brownrigg [mailto:sabrownrigg@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:48 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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sarah brownrigg
4821 solecito cir
santa fe, NM 87507

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sharon Brown [mailto:darshar@juno.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:28 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

I completely oppose nuclear fission.  It is NOT a clean energy source, and should not be treated like one.

In addition,the Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

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Sharon Brown
119 Little Bay Rd
119 Little Bay Rd
Newington, NH 03801

From: Stephanie Bruder [mailto:steph.bruder@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:19 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Against Siting Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy and is not in the public interest. DOE has no authority to pursue a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste.

DOE supports the production of nuclear waste into the future.

I do not consent to the continued generation of nuclear waste, nor the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

I support the following:

- Terminate the production of nuclear waste
- Secure interim storage near the site of generation
- Discovery of viable, responsible, and socially just methods for long-term management and isolation

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS).

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made. The third step is to develop technologies for isolating the radioactive materials for a million years.

Only once viable and responsible storage methods are developed can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management is deceptive and irresponsible.

Stephanie Bruder
26 Bedford Street Apt C

New York, NY 10014

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dorothy Brundrett [mailto:dottidotti@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:39 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

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I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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Dorothy Brundrett
300 Kerrville South Drive
Kerrville, TX 78028

From: Dorothy Brundrett [mailto:dottidotti@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 9:59 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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Dorothy Brundrett
300 Kerrville South Drive
Kerrville, TX 78028

From: James Brunkow [mailto:jbrunkow@pmug.org]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 7:06 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Really.

James Brunkow
4267 NE Ainsworth St.
PORTLAND, OR 97218

## Consent-Based Siting

From: carol Bruns [mailto:carolmkt@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:32 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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carol Bruns
956 Lange Ave
Beecher, IL 60401

## Consent-Based Siting

From: terry creech brunt [mailto:dtbrunt@centurylink.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:47 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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terry creech brunt
14473 s elk rd
pine, CO 80470

From: Babette Bruton [mailto:bbruton3@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 10:01 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Babette Bruton
12470 6th St. E.
Treasure Island, FL 33706

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Babette Bruton [mailto:bbruton3@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Babette Bruton
12470 6th St. E.
Treasure Island, FL 33706

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lori Bryan [mailto:rivercat62@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:37 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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Lori Bryan
PO Box 2353
Durango, CO 81302

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lori Bryan [mailto:rivercat62@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:21 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Lori Bryan
PO Box 2353
Durango, CO 81302

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Alex Bryant [mailto:abbryant@uwalumni.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 10:33 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Alex Bryant
2712 marshall ct
suite 2
Madison, WI 53705

## Consent-Based Siting

From: ELIZABETH BRYANT [mailto:ELIZBRYANT@AOL.COM]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:37 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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ELIZABETH BRYANT
632 W ELIAS ST
MERIDIAN, ID 83642

From: ELIZABETH BRYANT [mailto:ELIZBRYANT@AOL.COM]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 6:48 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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632 W ELIAS ST
MERIDIAN, ID 83642

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ken and Donna Bubb [mailto:kenbubb1@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:47 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Ken and Donna Bubb
2520 Libretto Ave., Henderson, NV 89052
Henderson, NV, NV 89052

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Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:48 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Ken and Donna Bubb
2520 Libretto Ave., Henderson, NV 89052
Henderson, NV, NV 89052

## Consent-Based Siting

From: jack bubenick [mailto:jbubenick@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 8:17 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

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jack bubenick
fries bay rd
loris, SC 29569

## Consent-Based Siting

From: jack bubenick [mailto:jbubenick@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:06 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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jack bubenick
fries bay rd
loris, SC 29569

## Consent-Based Siting

From: jack bubenick [mailto:jbubenick@yahoo.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 9:09 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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jack bubenick
fries bay rd
loris, SC 29569

## Consent-Based Siting

From: betty buchanan [mailto:sisseycollins1@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:40 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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betty buchanan
1010
bakersfield, CA 93308

## Consent-Based Siting

From: betty buchanan [mailto:sisseycollins1@gmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 10:33 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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betty buchanan
1010
bakersfield, CA 93308

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Betty Buckley [mailto:buckleybh@earthlink.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 8:36 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Betty Buckley
2549 Eudora ST
Denver, CO 80207

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Debra Budd [mailto:djbsgb123@yahoo.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 1:31 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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Debra Budd
7439 Pipers Creek
San Antonio, TX 78251

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Michelle Buerger [mailto:stargirl_46@hotmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 5:39 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

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Thank you.

Michelle Buerger
50 Schroeder Ct. #104
Fort Atkinson, WI 53562

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joe Buhowsky [mailto:jbuhowsky@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:26 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Joe Buhowsky
83 Tahoe Court
San Ramon, CA 94582

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joe Buhowsky [mailto:jbuhowsky@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:10 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Joe Buhowsky
83 Tahoe Court
San Ramon, CA 94582

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Pat Bulla [mailto:pat-bulla@pobox.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:53 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Pat Bulla
7202 Foxtree Cove
Austin, TX 78750

From: Kathleen Bungarz [mailto:kathleenbungarz@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:52 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
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Kathleen Bungarz
P.O.Box 30227
Walnut Creek, CA 94598

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jane Bunin [mailto:buninj@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:39 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Jane Bunin
4814 W. Moorhead Cir
Boulder, CO 80305

## Consent-Based Siting

From: E Bunting [mailto:ebunting@mwt.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:19 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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The generation and storage of nuclear waste has been nothing  but a disaster from the moment the uranium was first mined and it continues. There is no way to safely store the radioactive waste for the time periods required and we should admit that and stop making plans to create more.  It's expensive, it's dangerous and there is no way to "consent" to its storage.  Commercial energy companies should not be allowed to saddle us with any more.

E Bunting
13625 Goose Creek Rd
Viola, WI 54664

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Carmen Dello Buono [mailto:cdellob@att.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:43 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Carmen Dello Buono
5770 Winfield Blvd spc 166
San Jose, CA 95123

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sherry Bupp [mailto:sherry_bupp@joimail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 5:14 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Sherry Bupp
8208 161st Ave NE, Apt A110
Redmond, WA 98052

## Consent-Based Siting

From: MaryAnn Burch [mailto:maryannils@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:18 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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MaryAnn Burch
93 Sherwood rd
Aurora, NY 13026

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Peter Burchard [mailto:peterdb@sonic.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:37 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Peter Burchard
33 Meernaa Ave.
Fairfax, CA 94930

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Peter Burchard [mailto:peterdb@sonic.net]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 12:39 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Peter Burchard
33 Meernaa Ave.
Fairfax, CA 94930

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Karolyn Burdick [mailto:jckburdick@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:41 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

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Karolyn Burdick
25293 Highway 112
Clallam Bay, WA 98326

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Karolyn Burdick [mailto:jckburdick@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:06 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Karolyn Burdick
25293 Highway 112
Clallam Bay, WA 98326

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Barbara Burgess [mailto:salukimom@ymail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:28 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Barbara Burgess
2064 Lernhart st.
Napa, CA 94559

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Barbara Burgess [mailto:salukimom@ymail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 2:02 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Barbara Burgess
2064 Lernhart st.
Napa, CA 94559

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Vivian S. Valtri Burgess [mailto:valtriburgess@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:06 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Vivian S. Valtri Burgess
249 Buttolph Drive, Apt 222
Middlebury, VT 05753

From: Robert Burk [mailto:bobbajo@aol.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:30 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Robert Burk
Woodruff Ave.
Los Angeeles, AR 90024

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Robert Burk [mailto:bobbajo@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 8:55 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Robert Burk
Woodruff Ave.
Los Angeeles, AR 90024

## Consent-Based Siting

From: John Burke [mailto:dadsolar@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:14 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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John Burke
74 Laurel Av, Sea Cliff, NY
Sea Cliff, NY 11579

## Consent-Based Siting

From: David Burkhart [mailto:merlinbirdhawk@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:03 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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David Burkhart
Sunnyside Road
none
Salem, OR 97306

## Consent-Based Siting

From: David Burkhart [mailto:merlinbirdhawk@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:17 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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David Burkhart
Sunnyside Road
none
Salem, OR 97306

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Paul Burks [mailto:paulburks1@mac.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:55 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Paul Burks
574 Woodbine Drive
San Rafael, CA 94903

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Eduard Burle [mailto:eddips@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Eduard Burle
street 1
Cramond Road
Cape Town, OR ?

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Bruce Burns [mailto:burnsb319@earthlink.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:25 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Bruce Burns
11441 N IH-35 #19105
Austin, TX 78753

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Janna Burt [mailto:JannaBannana@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:47 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Janna Burt
1412 Lakewood Dr.
West Sacramento, CA 95691

## Consent-Based Siting

From: John Burt [mailto:2ndchancejohn@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:07 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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John Burt
11757 S. 700 E.
Draper, UT 84020

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Nancy Burton [mailto:NancyBurtonCT@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:21 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Nancy Burton
147 Cross Highway
147 Cross Highway
Redding, CT 06896

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Matthew Burton [mailto:mattheweburton@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:37 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Matthew Burton
1225 Jackson St Apt 8
Cincinnati, OH 45202

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Nanct Burton [mailto:NancyBurtonCT@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:23 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Nanct Burton
147 Cross Highway
147 Cross Highway
Redding, CT 06896

From: Canary Burton [mailto:Canary@seabirdstudio.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:12 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Canary Burton
30 Marsh View
Wellfleet, MA 02667

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Vic Burton [mailto:cvburton@swbell.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:29 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Vic Burton
5837 Grand Ave.
Kansas City, MO 64113

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Vic Burton [mailto:cvburton@swbell.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:00 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Vic Burton
5837 Grand Ave.
Kansas City, MO 64113

From: Cara Busch [mailto:cara_busch@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:38 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Cara Busch
740 little rock creek rd
740 little rock creek rd
Cherry Log, GA 30522

From: Ray Bustos [mailto:rbustos@fullcoll.edu]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:54 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Ray Bustos
321 E Chapman Ave
Fullerton, CA 92832

From: Elizabeth Butler [mailto:littlegrove1110@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:16 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Elizabeth Butler
1110 S. Alves Street
Henderson, KY 42420

From: Elizabeth Butler [mailto:littlegrove1110@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:04 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Elizabeth Butler
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Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:14 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Edward Butler
36 E 69th St
#1B
New York, NY 10021

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Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 6:39 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Edward Butler
36 E 69th St
#1B
New York, NY 10021

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Peter Butt [mailto:peter314@earthlink.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:43 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Peter Butt
958 West 3rd Street
90009
San Pedro, CA 90731

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Leslie Butterworth [mailto:Lbrmt@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:58 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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I suggest they store the contaminated waste in the headquarters of the companies making money off the nuclear power plant.

Leslie Butterworth
125 Odell St
San Antonio, TX 78212

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Stephen Byrd [mailto:sbyrd2004@yahoo.com.mx]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 7:08 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Stephen Byrd
p.o. box 91
Santa Barbara, CA 93102

From: Denise Byrne [mailto:byrnedenise2@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:44 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Denise Byrne
1427 W Edgewater Ave #2E
Chicago, IL 60660

From: Charles Byrne [mailto:charles-byrne@rocketmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:39 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Charles Byrne
41 S. Naper Boulevard, Apt. 19
Naperville, IL 60540

## Consent-Based Siting

From: T C [mailto:matrixkittikat@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:56 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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T C
16 H ST
CREST HILL, IL 60403

## Consent-Based Siting

From: T C [mailto:matrixkittikat@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:12 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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T C
16 H ST
CREST HILL, IL 60403

## Consent-Based Siting

From: A C [mailto:ALIENC2000@JUNO.COM]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:48 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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A C
any street
Santa Ana, CA 92706

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joe C [mailto:ilraptoro@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:26 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Joe C
@^$^*^%$%
collegeville, PA 19426

From: Joe C [mailto:ilraptoro@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:09 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Joe C
@^$^*^%$%
collegeville, PA 19426

From: Nicole C [mailto:nikkimause21@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:15 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Nicole C
3451 Queens St
Sarasota, FL 34231

From: Sharron c [mailto:sharron.coontz@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 7:00 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Sharron c
3716 85th Ave. NW
Olympia, WA 98502

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Yvonne Cabrales [mailto:fsdyvonne@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Yvonne Cabrales
4724 Brookdale Ave
Oakland, CA 94619

## Consent-Based Siting

From: david caccia [mailto:dacaccia@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:38 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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david caccia
pob 1788
199 lakeshore dr
honokaa, HI 08037

From: david caccia [mailto:dacaccia@aol.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 8:36 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
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david caccia
pob 1788
199 lakeshore dr
honokaa, HI 08037

From: Judd Cady [mailto:superjudd@rcn.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:33 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
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Judd Cady
215 west 91st street
New York, NY 10024

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To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
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Ray W Cage
1923 Foothill Dr
Prescott, AZ 86303

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David Cain
1691 Cody Ct
Lafayette, CO 80026

From: Katherine Congdon Caldwell [mailto:katcong3@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:46 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Katherine Congdon Caldwell
3 Wood Drive
Oyster Bay, NY 11771

From: Jerry Calhoun [mailto:justsayknowtobs@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:44 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Jerry Calhoun
P.O. Box 2098
P.O. Box 2098
Lakeside, AZ 85929

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jerry Calhoun [mailto:justsayknowtobs@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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Lakeside, AZ 85929

From: Amalie Callahan [mailto:Amalie.Callahan@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:15 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Amalie Callahan
1522-36th St.
Rock Island, IL 61201

From: Lucy Calvillo [mailto:lcalvillo@sanpedro.org]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Lucy Calvillo
1307 Alabama St.
San Francisco, CA 94110

From: Lucy Calvillo [mailto:lcalvillo@sanpedro.org]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:27 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Lucy Calvillo
1307 Alabama St.
San Francisco, CA 94110

From: Gail Camhi [mailto:gailcamhi24@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:07 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The DOE's consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest. Rather, it is a vehicle to place short-term nuclear power interests and radioactive waste industries before public health and safety -- jeopardizing the environment.

DOE is placing the nuclear cart before the horse: DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Gail Camhi
4 Fallen Leaf Way
Novato, CA 94949

From: Nancy Camorati [mailto:hpnancam@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 7:34 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Nancy Camorati
375 Tynan Rd
Cleveland, NY 13042

From: Michael Camp [mailto:madmiker5d4@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:08 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Michael Camp
92 E. Allen St.
Apt.4
Winooski, VT 05404

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Karen Campbell [mailto:karenpethelp@gwi.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:44 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Karen Campbell
43 Cumberland Avenue
43 Cumberland Ave.
Portland, ME 04101

From: Barbara Campbell [mailto:campbellbarbara76@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 2:13 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Barbara Campbell
485 S. Tannahill St.
Vidor, TX 77662

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Barbara Campbell [mailto:campbellbarbara76@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:48 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Barbara Campbell
485 S. Tannahill St.
Vidor, TX 77662

From: Benita J. Campbell [mailto:b_j_campbell@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:29 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Benita J. Campbell
23 Hindman Avenue
Burgettstown, PA 15021

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Barbara Campbell [mailto:campbellbarbara76@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:50 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Barbara Campbell
485 S. Tannahill St.
Vidor, TX 77662

From: Dudley and Candace Campbell [mailto:cdcampbl@roadrunner.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:46 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Dudley and Candace Campbell
13167 Ortley Place
Valley Glen, CA 91401

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Benita J. Campbell [mailto:b_j_campbell@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:35 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Benita J. Campbell
23 Hindman Avenue
Burgettstown, PA 15021

From: Thomas M. Canning [mailto:tmcanning@aol.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:03 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

I am writing to let you know my feeling that the Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Thomas M. Canning
25671 whittemore drive
25671 whittemore drive, CA 91302

## Consent-Based Siting

From: steve cannon [mailto:ketchicannon@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:45 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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steve cannon
2700 3rd ave upper
ketchikan, AK 99901

From: Dale Cannon [mailto:cannodw@wou.edu]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:54 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Dale Cannon
287 N Warren St.
Monmouth, OR 97361

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Marcia Cannon [mailto:MarciaCannon@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:16 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Marcia Cannon
13 Orchard Rd
Orinda, CA 94563

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Damian Cano [mailto:dicano@comcast.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:52 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Damian Cano
970 Leneve Place
El Cerrito, CA 94530

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Frank Cano [mailto:canosun33@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:22 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Frank Cano
6th street
Ridgefield Park, NJ 07660

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Roel Cantú [mailto:roelcan2@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Roel Cantú
1010 Hollyfield St
Mission, TX 78572

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Nancy Caponi [mailto:earthknwr@aol.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 7:45 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been

no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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We must instead limit the waste being made and make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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Nancy Caponi
225 W. Figueroa St
Santa Barbara, CA 93101

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Karen Cappa [mailto:kjcappico@earthlink.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:36 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Karen Cappa
581 Santa Alicia Dr.
Rohnert Park, CA 94928

## Consent-Based Siting

From: dan cappello [mailto:louis21329@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 8:40 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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dan cappello
2015 bandek
lawrence, PA 15055

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Barbara Capron [mailto:bcapron17@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:09 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Barbara Capron
58 Hampton Mdws
Hampton, NH 03842

## Consent-Based Siting

From: lyn capurro [mailto:datura101@excite.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 7:54 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

lyn capurro
8 valley
great, NY 11021

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mike Carberry [mailto:mikecarberry@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:51 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Mike Carberry
2029 Friendship St.
Iowa City, IA 52245

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sylvia Cardella [mailto:sylviadeer@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:51 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Sylvia Cardella
4570 Bluff Top
Hydesville, CA 95547

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Richard Cardella [mailto:rgcardella@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:40 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Richard Cardella
4570 Bluff Top Ln.
Hydesville, CA 95547

From: Neil Cardew-Fanning [mailto:ncf@mail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:08 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Neil Cardew-Fanning
947 Sacramento Street
Dutch Flat, CA 95714

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lynn Cardiff [mailto:lcardiff@comcast.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:42 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Lynn Cardiff
2625 Englewood Ave NE
none
Salem, OR 97301

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Richard Carling [mailto:parkwood43@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:40 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Richard Carling
25 Parkwood Blvd
Poughkeepsie, NY 12603

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joel Carlson [mailto:fox7799@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:33 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Joel Carlson
3634 Loren St NE
Lacey, WA 98516

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Catherine Carlson [mailto:hcaverly@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 6:16 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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I do not consent to any new nuclear waste being created.

Catherine Carlson
POBox 89
Ookala, HI 96774

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Bob Carlsten [mailto:bobcarlstendenver@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:48 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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Bob Carlsten
3741 W 20th Ave
Denver, CO 80211

From: Darry Carlstone [mailto:dscarlstone@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 8:44 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Darry Carlstone
14901 N. Penn.
Tahlequah, OK 73134

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Paul Carmi [mailto:dakid2542@charter.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:39 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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Paul Carmi
4516 Mattis RD
Saint Louis, MO 63128

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Cheryl Carnahan [mailto:crcarnahan@frii.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 10:59 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Cheryl Carnahan
328 Squareview Lane
Rochester, NY 14626

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Cheryl Carnahan [mailto:crcarnahan@frii.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:25 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Cheryl Carnahan
328 Squareview Lane
Rochester, NY 14626

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Cheryl Carney [mailto:carneyc86@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:37 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Cheryl Carney
1124 W. Granercy Place 78210
San Antonio, TX 78201

## Consent-Based Siting

From: L. Carpenter [mailto:ronylu@pacbell.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:18 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

NOone has figured out nuclear waste.  Why are we supporting such a filthy and dangerous industry?

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L. Carpenter
121 Devonshire Way
121 devonshire way
San Francisco, CA 94131

From: L. Carpenter [mailto:ronylu@pacbell.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:58 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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L. Carpenter
121 Devonshire Way
121 devonshire way
San Francisco, CA 94131

## Consent-Based Siting

From: benjamin carpenter [mailto:bcarpenter@meca.edu]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:21 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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benjamin carpenter
oak
oakland, CA 94607

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Donna Carr, M.D. [mailto:DonnaCarrMD@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 11:11 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Donna Carr, M.D.
1201 Sidonia St.
Encinitas, CA 92024

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Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 11:22 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
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Barbara Carr
8020 Bradshaw Road
Kingsville, MD 21087

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From: Barbara Carr [mailto:barbca@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 10:29 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Barbara Carr
8020 Bradshaw Road
Kingsville, MD 21087

From: Donna Carr, M.D. [mailto:DonnaCarrMD@aol.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 4:53 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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Donna Carr, M.D.
1201 Sidonia St.
Encinitas, CA 92024

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Renate Carreras [mailto:renatec_gisela@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:56 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Renate Carreras
509 Glenwood Ave, Apt 308
Raleigh, NC 27603

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Chris Carrick [mailto:tccarrick@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:15 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Chris Carrick
504 Crawford Avenue
Syracuse, NY 13224

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Milton Carrigan [mailto:mecarrigan@charter.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:13 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Milton Carrigan
2250 King Ct. #7
2250 King Ct. #7
San Luis Obispo, CA 93401

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Stephen Carrillo [mailto:scarrillo@earthlink.net]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 9:30 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Stephen Carrillo
907C Adams Street
Albany, CA 94706

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Peter Carr [mailto:petecarr@charter.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:06 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Peter Carr
4304 Marys Creek Dr
Benbrook, TX 76116

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Charles Carrutheers [mailto:cpc@cybermesa.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:32 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Charles Carrutheers
26A Quartz Trail
Santa Fe, NM 87505

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Marian Carter [mailto:carterwstcvn@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:13 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

In asking what it would take for us to consent to the dumping of nuclear waste in our communities' back yards, you have put before us a bogus proposal for which you have no authority to entertain. Not only that, it shows a paucity of judgment and common sense and appears to be completely lacking in merit.

I do not consent to any part of it.

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

Again, I do not consent to any part of this process: the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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Marian Carter
2149 E Norma Avenue
WestCovina, CA 91791

From: Michael Carter [mailto:incandescent.dusk@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:44 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Michael Carter
4263 SE Belmont St Apt 305
Apt 305
Portland, OR 97215

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Marian Carter [mailto:carterwstcvn@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:06 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Marian Carter
2149 E Norma Avenue
WestCovina, CA 91791

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Natalie A. Carter [mailto:ncarter79@hotmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 5:33 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Natalie A. Carter
562 Maple Avenue
562 Maple Avenue
Newark, OH 43055

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joyce Case [mailto:Jr46case@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:01 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Joyce Case
38W322 Berquist Dr
Geneva, IL 60134

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Robert Case, PhD [mailto:case@neu.edu]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:42 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Robert Case, PhD
149 Mass. Ave #3
149-3 Massachusetts Avenue
Boston, MA 02115

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Adam Casey [mailto:caseyadam7@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:26 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Adam Casey
30 Eastman Farm Road
Washington, ME 04574

## Consent-Based Siting

From: oracio casillas [mailto:printmasters@netzero.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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oracio casillas
po 24104 sb ca. 93121
santa barbara, CA 93121

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Chris Casper [mailto:casper4427@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:58 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Chris Casper
410 Green Ave
Stevens Point, WI 54481

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Chris Casper [mailto:casper4427@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:11 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Chris Casper
410 Green Ave
Stevens Point, WI 54481

## Consent-Based Siting

From: K Castelluccio [mailto:jcckdc@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 11:14 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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K Castelluccio
0S472 Circle Drive
West Chicago, IL 60185

From: Patricia L & Peter S. Castro [mailto:pcastro35@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:09 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Patricia L & Peter S. Castro
Madonna Way
Los Altos, CA 94024

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Deborah Cate [mailto:dfcate@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 5:03 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilities. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Deborah Cate
2499 N 50th St.
Philadelphia, PA 19131

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Linda Catlin [mailto:lscorey@earthlink.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:41 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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Linda Catlin
PO Box 773
Armonk, NY 10504

## Consent-Based Siting

From: June Cattell [mailto:cattellmail@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 9:30 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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June Cattell
200 Pineview Road
200 Pineview Rd
West Columbia, SC 29169

From: June Cattell [mailto:cattellmail@hotmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 6:38 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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June Cattell
200 Pineview Road
200 Pineview Rd
West Columbia, SC 29169

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lee Andrea Caulfield [mailto:userandrea1493@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:54 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Lee Andrea Caulfield
748  Lilac Drive
Los Osos, CA 93402

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Nazarius Cavan [mailto:ows@votersoccupy.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 4:36 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Nazarius Cavan
155  E 33st  apt 4R
New York, NY 10016

## Consent-Based Siting

From: elaine c [mailto:elaineconway67@yahoo.co.uk]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:39 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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elaine c
freeman road
didcot, ot ox117da

From: Sister Rose Marie Cecchini, MM [mailto:Officelpjcs@catholiccharitiesgallup.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 12:11 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Sister Rose Marie Cecchini, MM
506 W. Highway 66
506 West 66 Highway
Gallup, NM 87301

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jerry Cecere [mailto:skyy105@comcast.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:34 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Jerry Cecere
105 Lost Lake Court
105 Lost Lake Court
Folsom, CA 95630

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Frank Cerasuolo [mailto:fmcera@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:30 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Frank Cerasuolo
58 Bache Ave
58 Bache Ave
Staten Island, NY 10306

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Robert Cerello [mailto:dionor888@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:08 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has absolutely no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the corporate nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment.

In short, DO's leaders are putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future. That is scientifically preposterous, and ethically ridiculous. It is anarchism settling on the simpler of too alternatives--
doing nothing about a strong need for changed policies.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them. Nuclear
power does not belong on earth. Period. I told
Ayn Rand this nearly 50 years ago, in elation to the Tennesse nuclear plan then being proposed.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Robert Cerello
8070 Orange Avenue Apt. 705
8070 Orange Avenue Apt. 705
La Mesa, CA 91942

## Consent-Based Siting

From: john cevasco [mailto:johncevasco@comcast.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:00 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

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john cevasco
596 millers falls rd.,p.o.box 78
596 millers falls rd.,p.o.box 78
northfield, MA 01360

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Karen Chadwick [mailto:Karen.Chadwick@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:36 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Karen Chadwick
715 Regency Sq. #102
Kalamazoo, MI 49008

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joel Chaffee [mailto:jlchaffee@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:19 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

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Joel Chaffee
12 PUTNAM AVE APT 2B
BROOKLYN, NY 11238

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mikki Chalker [mailto:ravynsdaughter@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:27 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

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Mikki Chalker
119 Prospect St
na
Binghamton, NY 13905

From: sonja chan [mailto:sonjwal@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:47 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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sonja chan
944 w walnut st
kankakee, IL 60901

## Consent-Based Siting

From: sonja chan [mailto:sonjwal@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 7:32 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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sonja chan
944 w walnut st
kankakee, IL 60901

From: M Chapman [mailto:agw123@earthlink.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:16 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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M Chapman
22 Pine Crest Drive
Troy, VA 22974

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Marc Chapon [mailto:jaderabbit365@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 11:21 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Marc Chapon
391 29th Ave
San Francisco, CA 94121

From: Marc Chapon [mailto:shootingstarheadthreads@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:56 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Marc Chapon
391 29th Ave
San Francisco, CA 94121

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Rachel Chaput [mailto:rachel_chaput@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:37 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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Rachel Chaput
246 Hunters Ln
Apt/Suite
Dingmans Ferry, PA 18328

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ann Charland [mailto:charland4612@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:34 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Ann Charland
4612 Bears Paw Ct
Springfield, IL 62711

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kathy Chase [mailto:katch@prodigy.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:29 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Kathy Chase
Mohegan Rd
Shelton, CT 06484

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ana Chavez [mailto:Achavez1012@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:57 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Ana Chavez
18427 blue sky st
Riverside, CA 92508

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Patricia Chelmecki [mailto:patchel@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:36 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Patricia Chelmecki
4N696 Council Ct
Elburn, IL 60119

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From: Patricia Chelmecki [mailto:patchel@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:33 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Patricia Chelmecki
4N696 Council Ct
Elburn, IL 60119

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Deborah Childers [mailto:dachilders@csustan.edu]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:25 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Deborah Childers
1302 Theo Ave.
Modesto, CA 95350

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Deborah Childers [mailto:dachilders@csustan.edu]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:05 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

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Modesto, CA 95350

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Nat Childs [mailto:nat@asis.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:17 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Nat Childs
PO Box 511
Miranda, CA 95553

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Nat Childs [mailto:nat@asis.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:37 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Nat Childs
PO Box 511
Miranda, CA 95553

From: Peter Childs [mailto:poc@asis.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:12 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Peter Childs
3572 Thomas Rd.
3572 Thomas Rd.
Miranda, CA 95553

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Peter Childs [mailto:poc@asis.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 7:51 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Peter Childs
3572 Thomas Rd.
3572 Thomas Rd.
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From: Deborah Lee Chill [mailto:bubbalee58@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 4:12 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Deborah Lee Chill
34480 County Line Rd., #61
Yucaipa, CA 92399

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Deborah Lee Chill [mailto:bubbalee58@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 6:39 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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Deborah Lee Chill
34480 County Line Rd., #61
Yucaipa, CA 92399

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mary Chipman [mailto:patchipman@yahoo.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 11:50 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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Mary Chipman
3050 W Farm Rd 164
springfield, MO 65807

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jane Chischilly [mailto:claygoddess541@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:11 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Jane Chischilly
POB 1285
POB 1285
Bisbee, AZ 85603

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Nancy Chismar [mailto:nanlc999@optonline.net]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 3:26 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Nancy Chismar
6 York Dr  Apt 6A
Edison, NJ 08817

## Consent-Based Siting

From: T Cho [mailto:bronxtc@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:34 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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T Cho
388 Atlantic
Bklyn, NY 11217

From: T Cho [mailto:bronxtc@aol.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 3:15 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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T Cho
388 Atlantic
Bklyn, NY 11217

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Carole Chowen [mailto:carole_chowen@yahoo.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 7:18 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Carole Chowen
P.O. Box 2741
P.O. Box 2741
Grand Junction, CO 81502

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Carol Christ [mailto:cpc@otenet.gr]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:12 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

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Carol Christ
2147 Parker St.
2147bParker
Berkeley, CA 94704

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joan Christensen [mailto:jchristensen9@frontiernet.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:55 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Joan Christensen
3292 County Rd 24
Intl Falls, MN 56649

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Barbara Christwitz [mailto:bchristwitz@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 11:36 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Barbara Christwitz
3568 Vista Street
Clearlake, CA 95422

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Barbara Christwitz [mailto:bchristwitz@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 5:11 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Barbara Christwitz
3568 Vista Street
Clearlake, CA 95422

## Consent-Based Siting

From: EDWARD CIACCIO [mailto:ECVL@AOL.COM]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:45 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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EDWARD CIACCIO
248-15 RUSHMORE AVE.
DOUGLASTON, NY 11362

From: ClapSo . [mailto:clapso@netzero.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:57 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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ClapSo .
7 Devereux Street
Utica, NY 13501
Utica, NY 13501

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Morgan Clark [mailto:morgan.cl@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:44 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have

been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Morgan Clark
203 Academy St
South Orange, NJ 07079

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Susan Clark [mailto:susan.g.clark@embarqmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 7:57 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

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Susan Clark
168 W. Valley Brook Rd.
Califon, NJ 07830

## Consent-Based Siting

From: John Clark [mailto:hkyjck@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:18 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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John Clark
1455 2nd Avenue Apt 1105
San Diego, CA 92101

## Consent-Based Siting

From: James A Clark Jr [mailto:jcindyin@aol.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 11:28 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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James A Clark Jr
510 Quebec Pl
Colorado Springs, CO 80911

From: James A Clark Jr [mailto:jcindyin@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:50 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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James A Clark Jr
510 Quebec Pl
Colorado Springs, CO 80911

From: Lonnie Clark [mailto:nutzforart@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:58 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Lonnie Clark
PO Box 1495
Eugene, OR 97404

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Meg Clark [mailto:pennyb724@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:04 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Meg Clark
838 N Taylor Ave
Oak Park, IL 60302

From: Pamela Clark [mailto:pamelyns@yahoo.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 2:24 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Pamela Clark
1521 N Argonne Rd
Ste C 238
Spokane Valley, WA 99212

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Bobbie Clark [mailto:Bobbie@alphamagic.org]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:22 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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Bobbie Clark
1 Civic Center Plaza
Poughkeepsie, NY 12601

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dale Clark [mailto:tiedyeman@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:41 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilities. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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Furthermore, research should be made into building space elevators to remove all nuclear waste from the biosphere permanently so future generations are not affected by this ongoing hazard.

Dale Clark
20860 Caylor Dr.
Soulsbyville, CA 95372

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Rita Clarke [mailto:rwclarke09@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:12 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

There is no problem with nuclear waste. The DOE "decision-makers," and the attendant industries, will have the waste deposited next to their homes. If that isn't enough....go to their children's homes, their grandchildren's homes. There! All done.
On the other hand, the Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

It's 2016!  Why are we still allowing this destruction to continue?  Surely, we are smarter than this.

Rita Clarke
14244 Coral Harbour Ct
Dallas, TX 75234

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Rita Clarke [mailto:rwclarke09@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:14 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

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Rita Clarke
14244 Coral Harbour Ct
Dallas, TX 75234

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Carol Claus [mailto:cdclaus@mindspring.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:05 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Carol Claus
651 Foxcroft Circle SE
Marietta, GA 30067

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Anne Clawley [mailto:aclawley@msn.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:42 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Anne Clawley
1930 Seclusion Pt
Apt A
Colorado Springs, CO 80918

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Gretchen Clay [mailto:clay488@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 5:47 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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Gretchen Clay
2612 Utter St.
Bellingham, WA 98225

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ana Cleja [mailto:ana.cleja@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:38 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Ana Cleja
100 Avenue Gambetta
Fumel, ot 47500

From: Beatrice Clemens [mailto:BeatriceBC@aol.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 9:09 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Beatrice Clemens
309 Honeysuckle Lane
St. Louis, MO 63119

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Steve Clemens [mailto:Steveclemens@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 5:44 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Steve Clemens
2912 E. 24th Street
Minneapolis, MN 55406

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Matt Clements [mailto:mattyclem@gmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 10:24 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Matt Clements
763 19th Avenue
San Francisco, CA 94121

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ruth Clifford [mailto:ruthcliff@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:26 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Ruth Clifford
1505 DeRose Way
#94
San Jose, CA 95126

## Consent-Based Siting

From: William Cline [mailto:cline@wilmina.ac.jp]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:57 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

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- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

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William Cline
13375 Atlantic Rd.
Strongsville, OH 44149

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kate Cloud [mailto:kcloud@rcn.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:20 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Kate Cloud
42 Walnut St.
Walnut St.
Somerville, MA 02143

From: Devlon Clouser [mailto:devlon@me.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 11:20 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Devlon Clouser
10 Madrid Ct
Novato, CA 94949

From: K Clune [mailto:wastereductionservices@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:21 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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K Clune
325 Peter St N
Orillia, ON L3V5A4

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Arthur E. Coates [mailto:acoates@vermontel.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:33 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Arthur E. Coates
1296 Rt. 121 East
Grafton, VT 05146

From: josephine coatsworth [mailto:josephine.coatsworth@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:10 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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josephine coatsworth
65 oak ridge rd
65 Oak Ridge Rd
berkeley, CA 94705

From: Sandra Cobb [mailto:smcobb@beechmere.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 10:01 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Sandra Cobb
3880 Ellendale Road
Moreland Hills, OH 44022

From: Sandra Cobb [mailto:smcobb@beechmere.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:01 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

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Sandra Cobb
3880 Ellendale Road
Moreland Hills, OH 44022

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joyce Cochran [mailto:cochransci@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:48 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Joyce Cochran
411 15 Ave.
San Francisco, CA 94118

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mary Cody [mailto:marrcody@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:04 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Mary Cody
1251 Munson Drive
Ashland, OR 97520

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lynette Coffey [mailto:siabykatz@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:09 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Lynette Coffey
4059 La Mesa Ave.
Shasta Lake, CA 96019

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lynette Coffey [mailto:siabykatz@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:11 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Lynette Coffey
4059 La Mesa Ave.
Shasta Lake, CA 96019

From: Allen Cohen [mailto:ajc142@verizon.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:50 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

I oppose generating any more nuclear waste and I

oppose sending the current nuclear into our water supplies.

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Allen Cohen
142 S. Hoernerstown Rd.
hummelstown, PA 17036

From: E Cohen [mailto:elliecoh@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:21 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

E Cohen
907 Glendome Circle
Oakland, CA 94602

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Annapoorne Colangelo [mailto:anapurna@whidbey.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:05 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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Annapoorne Colangelo
7651 Scatchet Head Road
Clinton, WA 98236

From: Dori Cole [mailto:dpernicka@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:16 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Dori Cole
68 Sterling Circle #107
Wheaton, IL 60189

## Consent-Based Siting

From: John Coleman [mailto:hardknocks@windstream.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 3:18 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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John Coleman
PO Box 75
30 Coleman Rd
Springville, AL 35146

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Shay Coleman [mailto:rich.shaycoleman@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:29 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Shay Coleman
204 Longwood Avenue
Chatham, NJ 07928

From: Carol Colin [mailto:cjc4peace@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 10:41 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Carol Colin
1041 cayuga St.
Santa Cruz, CA 95062

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Carol Colin [mailto:cjc4peace@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 5:59 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Carol Colin
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Santa Cruz, CA 95062

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Geri Collecchia [mailto:GeriColle@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:00 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Geri Collecchia
1461 Lacosta Dr E
Pembroke Pines, FL 33027

From: Ken Collier [mailto:kcollier@shaw.ca]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:14 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Ken Collier
32883 Sylvia Ave, Mission, BC, Canada
Mission, BC V2V 0C9

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Fran Collier [mailto:fcollier70@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:05 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Fran Collier
926 Lombard St
San Francisco, CA 94133

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Greg Collins [mailto:gcollins@imperialmetalproducts.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:36 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Greg Collins
16850 88th Ave
Coopersville, MI 49404

From: Jessie Collins [mailto:jessiepauline@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 7:12 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Jessie Collins
17397 Five Points Street
Redford, MI 48240

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Carol Collins [mailto:ccollins54@msn.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:29 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Carol Collins
1935 Nault Road
Street Add
Dover, DE 19904

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kristi Collins [mailto:collins.kristi@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 5:33 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Kristi Collins
1500 Allegheny Dr.
Arlington, TX 76012

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Rita Collins [mailto:ritacollins1@gmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 7:19 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Rita Collins
645 Q St. NW
Washington DC, DC 20001

## Consent-Based Siting

From: William Combs [mailto:combslaw@vcn.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:15 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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William Combs
208 Main Street
Evanston, WY 82930

## Consent-Based Siting

From: John Comella [mailto:john.comella1@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 10:23 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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John Comella
1900 J F Kennedy Blvd
Apt 1624
Philadelphia, PA 19103

## Consent-Based Siting

From: John Comella [mailto:john.comella1@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:16 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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John Comella
1900 J F Kennedy Blvd
Apt 1624
Philadelphia, PA 19103

From: joan Cominos [mailto:gruenbergcominos@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:57 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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joan Cominos
l945 lakeview place
xxxxx
Martinez, CA 94553

From: LuMarion Conklin [mailto:conklinlu@npgcable.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:07 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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LuMarion Conklin
3114 Loma Vista Dr.
3114 Loma Vista Dr.
Flagstaff, AZ, AZ 86004

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mike Conlan [mailto:mickconlan@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:34 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Mike Conlan
6421 139th Place NE, #52
Redmond, WA 98052

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Patrick Conley [mailto:pconleyc@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:36 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

I assure you that those who promote nuclear energy in any form, the exception being concerted efforts to decommission plants and secure the highly dangerous residuals, will be seen by history as engaging in the most squalid and corrupt efforts to extend the life of an industry which has no legitimate commercial purpose.
The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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Patrick Conley
7527 Lone Eagle Drive
Murfreesboro, Tn, TN 37128

## Consent-Based Siting

From: David Connell [mailto:kcb7616@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:37 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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David Connell
2409 S. 12th St.
Springfield, IL 62703

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Brian Conner [mailto:connerbrianc@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:25 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Brian Conner
33rd Ave NE
Hickory, NC 28806

## Consent-Based Siting

From: James Connolly [mailto:jconnolly@csuchico.edu]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:29 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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James Connolly
1286 Glenn Haven Dr
Chico, CA 95926

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Arthur Connor [mailto:abconnor62@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 6:21 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Arthur Connor
54227 Pine Crest Avenue, PO Box 3317
Idyllwild, CA 92549

From: Thomas Connor [mailto:tconnor@hvc.rr.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:07 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Thomas Connor
17 Dubois Street
17 Dubois Street
Wallkill, NY 12589

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jack Conrad [mailto:phatjaxx@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:27 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Jack Conrad
2958 N Beachwood Dr
Los Angeles, CA 90068

## Consent-Based Siting

From: JAMES CONROY [mailto:JIM214COMRAD@GMAIL.COM]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 11:37 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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JAMES CONROY
214 NINTH STREET
NINTH STREET
HICKSVILLE, NY 11801

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Pam Constantine [mailto:pampaint@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 11:05 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Pam Constantine
258 Larch Lane
258 larch ln
Mahwah, NJ 07430

## Consent-Based Siting

From: nidhi contessa [mailto:heeheenothing@hotmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 8:43 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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nidhi contessa
823 vine st
aspen, CO 80304

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Craig Cook [mailto:craigecook@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:12 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Craig Cook
129 Sequoia Circle
Santa Rosa, CA 95401

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lorraine Cook [mailto:lorraine.r.cook@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:30 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Lorraine Cook
2928 Diane Street
Ashland, OR 97520

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Roberta Cook [mailto:robertajo.cook@gmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 5:57 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Roberta Cook
5911 Graywood Circle S.E.
true
MABLETON, GA 30126

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Marian Cooley [mailto:mariancooley@att.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 11:42 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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Marian Cooley
1400 N. Woodridge
Muncie, IN 47304

From: Marian Cooley [mailto:mariancooley@att.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Marian Cooley
1400 N. Woodridge
Muncie, IN 47304

From: margaret cooney [mailto:maggie@capecod.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:39 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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margaret cooney
Elgren Way
Plymouth, MA, MA 02360

From: John Cooper [mailto:jcooper@bucknell.edu]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:47 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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John Cooper
36 N 7th St.
Lewisburg, PA 17837

From: Betty Cooper [mailto:bettyfcooper@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:41 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Betty Cooper
2517 Portabello Pl.
Jefferson City, MO 65109

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Betty Cooper [mailto:bettyfcooper@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:25 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Jefferson City, MO 65109

## Consent-Based Siting

From: John Cooper [mailto:jcooper@bucknell.edu]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:06 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

John Cooper
36 N 7th St.
Lewisburg, PA 17837

From: Trina Cooper [mailto:trina.cooper@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:49 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Trina Cooper
2239 sw 331st st
2239 sw 331st st
Federal Way, WA 98023

From: Margaret Copi [mailto:tango.lindygirl@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 4:33 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Margaret Copi
3426 Adell Ct
Oakland, CA 94602

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kathleen Corbett [mailto:kcsl78@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:29 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Kathleen Corbett
820 Fir Ave. Apt. B
P. O. Box 486
Las Cruces, NM 88001

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Anneke Corbett [mailto:anneketao@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:03 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Anneke Corbett
78 Chestnut St.
78 Chestnut St
Florence, MA 01062

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From: Anneke Corbett [mailto:anneketao@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 7:44 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
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Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:11 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Kathleen Corbett
820 Fir Ave. Apt. B
P. O. Box 486
Las Cruces, NM 88001

## Consent-Based Siting

From: David Corcoran [mailto:dave.barb.corcoran@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 3:08 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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David Corcoran
834 South Wolf Road
Des Plaines, IL 60016

From: Rita Coriell [mailto:ritadequercus@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 10:03 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Rita Coriell
PO Box 2543
PO Box 2543, Nevada City, CA
Nevada City, CA 95959

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jared Cornelia [mailto:jaredc1200@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:08 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Jared Cornelia
125 Denn Place
Wilmington, DE 19804

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jared Cornelia [mailto:jaredc1200@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 5:37 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Jared Cornelia
125 Denn Place
Wilmington, DE 19804

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lila Cornell [mailto:ginkgo@zoominternet.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:42 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Lila Cornell
338 Norman Dr
Cranberry Twp, PA 16066

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lila Cornell [mailto:ginkgo@zoominternet.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:25 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Lila Cornell
338 Norman Dr
Cranberry Twp, PA 16066

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Claude Cornett [mailto:LCORNETT@EN.COM]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:36 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. Hackers apparently affiliated with Russian intelligence have launched a cyberattack targeting donors to the Democratic Party's House campaign arm,

Read more: http://www.politico.com/story/2016/07/dccc-hack-fbi-226398#ixzz4FoJFFbnU
Follow us: @politico on Twitter | Politico on Facebook

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- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not

fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Claude Cornett
2450 W 6 St
Apt UPS
Cleveland, OH 44113

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Harry Corsover [mailto:harry@corsazzi.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:16 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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Harry Corsover
9850 Zenith Meridian Dr
Apt 12-203
Englewood, CO 80112

## Consent-Based Siting

From: John Cort [mailto:johnccort@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:02 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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John Cort
7483 Spy Glass Ct
Boulder, CO 80301

## Consent-Based Siting

From: John Cort [mailto:johnccort@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 5:04 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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John Cort
7483 Spy Glass Ct
Boulder, CO 80301

From: Judith Cosby [mailto:judithcosby@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:37 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Judith Cosby
542 Juniper St.
Walla Walla, WA 99362

## Consent-Based Siting

From: David Cosby [mailto:earthlightbooks@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:20 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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David Cosby
321 East Main Street
Walla Walla, WA 99362

From: Judith Cosby [mailto:judithcosby@gmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 11:18 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Judith Cosby
542 Juniper St.
Walla Walla, WA 99362

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mark Cosgriff [mailto:cosgriff0@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 9:46 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Mark Cosgriff
1180 Andrews Avenue
Lakewood, OH 44107

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Rachel Cosgrove [mailto:penrachel@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:44 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Rachel Cosgrove
300 Hinesburg Rd., Apt. 3
S. Burlington, VT 05403

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Pamela Cosgrove [mailto:pacosgrove@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:26 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Pamela Cosgrove
1913 Kynwyd Rd.
Wilmington, DE 19810

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Rachel Cosgrove [mailto:penrachel@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:24 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Rachel Cosgrove
300 Hinesburg Rd., Apt. 3
S. Burlington, VT 05403

## Consent-Based Siting

From: jo costion [mailto:vbsonhir@aol.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 7:43 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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jo costion
P.O. Box 3294
Flagstaff, AZ 86003

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sandra Couch [mailto:sndrcch@yahoo.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 5:51 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Sandra Couch
2903 Bartlett Court
Unit 201
Naperville, IL 60564

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Barbara Coulson [mailto:dixiespal@aol.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 4:49 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

I am really appalled that the Department of Energy would consider disposing of nuclear waste by using it on roadways and railroads. We have known for years that nuclear waste has toxic properties that will be around for many generations and causes cancer and other related diseases. The nuclear energy industries are focused only on disposing of this toxic waste and creating more, only to have the same dilemma. For several years they have released statements that nuclear waste "isn't so bad" and could be used in making pottery and other dishware with nuclear waste. I believe this is outrageous.The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future. To promote nuclear energy as 'clean and safe' neglects the reality that mining for the products that produce nuclear energy is dirty and their claim is disingenuous when we are concerned about climate change and the extreme weather events we have seen in the recent past.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Barbara Coulson
1001 Reemes Cove Rd.
none
Marshall, NC 28753

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Vera Cousins [mailto:vcousins1@iowatelecom.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:11 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

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Vera Cousins
903 16th Ave.
903 16th Ave.
Grinnell, IA 50112

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sandi Covell [mailto:scovell@earthlink.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 7:42 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Sandi Covell
1183 Alemany Blvd.
San Francisco, CA 94112

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Deborah Covi [mailto:debcovi@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:07 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Deborah Covi
25 The Ridge
Glenford, NY 12433

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Deborah Covi [mailto:debcovi@gmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 6:16 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Deborah Covi
25 The Ridge
Glenford, NY 12433

From: Linda Covington [mailto:lainie@828design.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:55 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Linda Covington
62 Beverly Road W
Asheville, NC 28806

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Elizabeth Covington [mailto:Eliz.covington@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 1:51 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Elizabeth Covington
6209 Three Chopt Road
Richmond, VA 23226

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Linda Covington [mailto:lainie@828design.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:59 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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Linda Covington
62 Beverly Road W
Asheville, NC 28806

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Caryn Cowin [mailto:caryn_cowin@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 11:29 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Caryn Cowin
317 Monterey Road
Apt. 15
South Pasadena, CA 91030

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Caryn Cowin [mailto:caryn_cowin@yahoo.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 4:02 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Caryn Cowin
317 Monterey Road
Apt. 15
South Pasadena, CA 91030

## Consent-Based Siting

From: lanie cox [mailto:laniecox@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:26 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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lanie cox
13625 S Sherman Rd
spokane, WA 99224

From: lanie cox [mailto:laniecox@yahoo.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 1:46 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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lanie cox
13625 S Sherman Rd
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## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sandra Cox [mailto:sandylist@dogculture.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:29 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Sandra Cox
11682 Holmes Pt. Dr. NE
Kirkland, WA 98034

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Susan Cox [mailto:dendrobian999999@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:08 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Susan Cox
321 East 71 Street
New York, NY 10021

From: Vince Coyle [mailto:vtcoyle@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:52 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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Vince Coyle
1267 Quail run dr.
Carson City, NV 89701

From: Anne Craig [mailto:ennagiarc@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 10:07 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Anne Craig
132 Murdock Ave.
132 Murdock Ave.
Asheville, NC 28801

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Frances Craig [mailto:francescraig02@yahoo.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 12:31 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Frances Craig
511 Rose Ln
Paso Robles, CA 93446

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Marie Craig [mailto:mariemnsn@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:16 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Marie Craig
99 Granger Dr.
Aiken, SC 29803

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Tom Craig [mailto:motgiarc@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:19 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Tom Craig
132 Murdock Ave
132 Murdock Ave.
Asheville, NC 28801

From: William Crane [mailto:wcrane@gmws.org]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:42 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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William Crane
183 Hungry Hollow Rd.
Chestnut Ridge, NY 10977

From: Julia Cranmer [mailto:jcranmer3@comcast.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:40 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Julia Cranmer
2393 Route 206
Southampton, NJ 08088

From: Bruce Cratty [mailto:brucecratty@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:16 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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Bruce Cratty
2525 S. Humboldt St.
Denver, CO 80210

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mark Creighton [mailto:DoktorWho@earthlink.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:03 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Mark Creighton
434 Palmer Rd
E Greenbush, NY 12061

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sam Crespi [mailto:samcrespi@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:37 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Sam Crespi
23824 SR 530 NE
Arlington, WA 98223

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sam Crespi [mailto:samcrespi@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:28 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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In the years, since the inception up to today and the near future, NO ONE has been able to solve the problem of nuclear waste.  The poisons that last for centuries.  We are at moment in time when our land, our soils need cleansing and support, not destructive policies that ensure a deadly future.

Sam Crespi
23824 SR 530 NE
Arlington, WA 98223

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Steve Crimmel [mailto:paintedskystudios@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:21 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Steve Crimmel
7110 Santa Rosa Creek Rd.
Cambria, CA 93428

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kathleen Crittenden [mailto:kcritt@frontiernet.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 9:55 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Kathleen Crittenden
e8022 Bakkom Road
Viroqua, WI
Viroqua, WI 54665

From: Mary Cronin [mailto:croninmm@optonline.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:39 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Mary Cronin
201 Cleveland Drive
Croton on Hudson, NY 10520

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Donald Cronin [mailto:donald.cronin@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:18 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Donald Cronin
251 Summer Street #1
Somerville, MA 02143

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Skip Cross [mailto:skipcross@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:37 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Skip Cross
7150 Windsor Mill Road
Baltimore, MD 21244

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dan Cross [mailto:dancross@bellsouth.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:29 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Dan Cross
1123 SW 5th. Pl.
1123 SW 5th Pl
Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33312

From: Dan Cross [mailto:dancross@bellsouth.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:39 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Dan Cross
1123 SW 5th. Pl.
1123 SW 5th Pl
Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33312

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Skip Cross [mailto:skipcross@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:57 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Skip Cross
7150 Windsor Mill Road
Baltimore, MD 21244

## Consent-Based Siting

From: John Crotty [mailto:jmcrotty1467@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:44 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

John Crotty
1467 Cherry Creek Lane
Manchester, MO 63021

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Maureen Stapler Crowell [mailto:staplercrowell@charter.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:27 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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Maureen Stapler Crowell
PO Box 1058
Grants Pass, OR 97528

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Saundra Crowell [mailto:saundramargot@optonline.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:42 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Saundra Crowell
44 Nowick lane
Nowick Lane
Smithtown, NY 11787

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lawrence Crowley [mailto:magic@ecentral.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Lawrence Crowley
441 Pheasant Run
Louisville, CO 80027

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Deborah Crown [mailto:debcrown@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:45 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Deborah Crown
p.o box 191
P.O. Box 191, Sharon, VT
Sharon, VT 05065

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Deborah Crown [mailto:debcrown@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:06 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Deborah Crown
p.o box 191
P.O. Box 191, Sharon, VT
Sharon, VT 05065

## Consent-Based Siting

From: KURT CRUGER [mailto:cruginator@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:30 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

KURT CRUGER
2845 MARIQUITA ST
LONG BEACH, CA 90803

## Consent-Based Siting

From: KURT CRUGER [mailto:cruginator@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 7:37 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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LONG BEACH, CA 90803

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Leuise Crumble [mailto:butterflypeace94@me.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:53 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Leuise Crumble
252 N Hamlin Blvd
Chicago, IL 60624

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From: Leuise Crumble [mailto:butterflypeace94@me.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 5:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Leuise Crumble
252 N Hamlin Blvd
Chicago, IL 60624

From: Catherine Hanlon Cruz [mailto:katiecruz@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:43 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Catherine Hanlon Cruz
Enos
Sebastopol, CA 95472

From: Terri Cuddy [mailto:tccuddy@optonline.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:05 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Terri Cuddy
21 Peggy Lane
Peekskill, NY 10566

From: Kermit Cuff [mailto:tierno23@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:31 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Kermit Cuff
338 Mariposa Ave. #2
338 Mariposa Ave. #2
Mountain View, CA 94041

From: Noreen Cullen [mailto:noreen@faeryspirit.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:34 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Noreen Cullen
30 Delmar Rd
30 Delmar Rd
Glastonbury, CT 06033

From: John Culloty [mailto:sculloty@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:52 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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John Culloty
PO Box 64
Ben Lomond, CA 95005

## Consent-Based Siting

From: John Culloty [mailto:sculloty@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:15 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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John Culloty
PO Box 64
Ben Lomond, CA 95005

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kay Cumbow [mailto:kcumbow@greatlakes.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:42 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest. Consent-based siting goes against the wisdom of scientifically-based siting for safety of the public and drinking water and other environmental issues that demand protection, as they are required for humanity to survive without deformities and cancers and other illnesses caused by both external and internal radioactive isotopes that will get loose in nature.

Consent-based siting is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. It is an unscientific scam against the public interests. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear siting before the science, which is unacceptable. This violates rational thinking and common sense.

DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future. This is irrational, based on the fact that the scientists have been researching to develop a safe solution for the nuclear waste for more than half a century but it does not exist. If it existed, they would have found it, but this didn't happen. Since a scientific solution could not be found in more than 6 decades of searching, there is no safe solution for the nuclear waste. It is crazy, insane, and against the best interests of the public to continue foolishly as if a scientific solution exists where humanity now and in the future would not get hurt from the inability to scientifically contain the very dangerous radioactive isotopes that are made into waste by nuclear power plants. It is crazy, insane, to try to adopt the most expensive, most dangerous form of electric power when very affordable alternative forms of electric energy power exist as wind and solar renewables. Those who propose this are clearly in violation of considering the best interests for the entire public that may be impacted.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them. All of these have serious unsolved vulnerabilities. Also industry has not appropriately invested in research to develop the best and safest products needed for all of these operations. The regulators make too many assumptions that do not have scientific validity. We must go forward into the 21st century with strong rigorous scientific analysis that looks at all assumptions and all alternatives, but this consent-based siting process obviously by its being consent-based siting, instead of scientific-based siting, does not place scientific-based siting as the top criterion. Since scientific-based siting is not the top criterion, but rather consent-based siting, it cannot be safe and must be rejected as a very poor idea that does not protect the public financially, health-wise, or property and asset-wise.

Our insurance policies for our assets, our cars, our real estate, our homes, all disqualify nuclear contamination from the coverage. We can not risk losing everything we worked hard all of our lives to accumulate because nobody will

actually pay out to compensate for the actual losses to land and property with memories, with organic food values, with ecosystem values and more to be restored to exactly what it was it was before, because this is impossible. Nuclear contamination is irreversible. It cannot be undone. If the culture at DOE promotes only positive thinking about nuclear plant expansion, DOE should be aware that is a biased and unscientific plan. Positive thinking sets people up for failure when they fail to consider the down-side, the disadvantages, for any project, which is occurring here. You must look seriously at the scientific downside, which says there is no safe solution. Therefore, consent-based siting should not be being proposed here, knowing already that the scientific analysis has already declared no siting to be safe. Those proposing unsafe consent-based siting need to be fired from the industry as unqualified and incompetent to be bringing such foolish ideas to the table as if human life and the precious nest we as humanity have to live in called planet earth can be replaced, when that is irrational, illogical, and incompetent thinking. It is one-sided biased job malfeasance going beyond negligence and stupidity.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

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can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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Kay Cumbow
15184 Dudley Road
Brown City, MI 48416

From: Johanna Cummings [mailto:jhcummings@frontiernet.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 3:32 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Johanna Cummings
88 Hickory Street
Rochester, NY 14620

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Johanna Cummings [mailto:jhcummings@frontiernet.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:16 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Johanna Cummings
88 Hickory Street
Rochester, NY 14620

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Carlos Cunha [mailto:cunhacdowling@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:14 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Carlos Cunha
54 Park Drive
Rocky Point, NY 11778

## Consent-Based Siting

From: James Cunningham [mailto:james.cunningham@earthlink.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:00 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the greed-driven nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future. Is this department actually funded by foreign terrorists? It sure sounds like it!

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Has Bin Laden been resurrected and taken over the DOE? Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

James Cunningham
938 Deacon Circle
n/a
Columbus, OH 43065

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jennifer Cunningham [mailto:sensei.jc@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:16 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Jennifer Cunningham
504 N. Elmwood Dr.
Aurora, IL 60506

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jennifer Cunningham [mailto:sensei.jc@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:15 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Jennifer Cunningham
504 N. Elmwood Dr.
Aurora, IL 60506

From: Deborah Cunningham [mailto:Deborah21209@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:11 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Deborah Cunningham
2524 Rellim Road
Baltimore, MD 21209

From: Deborah Cunningham [mailto:Deborah21209@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 9:11 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Deborah Cunningham
2524 Rellim Road
Baltimore, MD 21209

## Consent-Based Siting

From: William & Barbara Cunningham [mailto:Bcunningster@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:25 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

William & Barbara Cunningham
1550 Old Town Way
Hendersonville, NC 28739

From: william cuppoletti [mailto:cupp747@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:11 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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william cuppoletti
po box 927
penngrove, CA 94951

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Peter Curia [mailto:pgeometro@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:24 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Peter Curia
2048 N. 68Th Place
Scottsdale, AZ 85257

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Liz Curren [mailto:lizcurren@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 6:38 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Liz Curren
2045 Frean Avenue
Los Osos,, CA 93402

From: elaine currey [mailto:budelaine@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 7:46 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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elaine currey
8430 s mesa dr
sandy, UT 84093

From: Frank Curtis [mailto:tulldrivefrank@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:50 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Frank Curtis
2 Stanton St Apt 402
Troy, NY 12180

From: Connie Curtis [mailto:conniecurtis62@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 4:40 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Connie Curtis
3787 High St
Denver, CO 80205

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Frank Curtis [mailto:tulldrivefrank@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 6:04 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Frank Curtis
2 Stanton St Apt 402
Troy, NY 12180

From: Marnelle Curtis [mailto:marnellecurtis@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 10:44 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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Marnelle Curtis
116 S. Maple Ave., B3
Oak Park, IL 60302

From: Marie Curtis [mailto:Dandmcurt@optonline.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:34 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Marie Curtis
7 Robin drive
7 Robin Drive
Oakhurst, NJ 07755

## Consent-Based Siting

From: White Feather Curtiss [mailto:wfeather108@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:23 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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White Feather Curtiss
p.o.box 1426 olivebridge
Olivebridge, NY 12461

From: Pat Cuviello [mailto:pcuvie@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:01 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Pat Cuviello
Box 2834
Redwood City, CA 94064

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Siân Cwper [mailto:siancwper@yahoo.co.uk]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 6:46 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Siân Cwper
Bryn Derw
Llanfrothen, ot LL48 6LX

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Francis Czerniski [mailto:lycett8@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:37 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Storage of nuclear waste should never be allowed anywhere. The creation of nuclear products should completely cease until our scientific community has learned how to neutralize the radioactive aspects. Simply storing it is causing major health problems on a massive scale worldwide.

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Francis Czerniski
3953 S.Americus Street
Seattle, WA 98118

From: Letitia Dace [mailto:theatrejoy@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 8:12 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Letitia Dace
2217 Stone Post Rd
Manhattan, KS 66502

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Letitia Dace [mailto:theatrejoy@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:26 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Letitia Dace
2217 Stone Post Rd
Manhattan, KS 66502

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Leslie Dack [mailto:dacks2@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 7:34 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Leslie Dack
589 Coleman Bridge Rd
Aiken, SC 29805

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mr. Shelley Dahlgren, PhD [mailto:shelley@dahlgren.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:42 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Mr. Shelley Dahlgren, PhD
4449 242nd Ave. S. E.
Issaquah, WA 98029

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Deborah Dahlgren [mailto:dadahlgren@earthlink.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 11:06 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Deborah Dahlgren
17 Kirby Road
East Hartford, CT 06118

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mr. Shelley Dahlgren, PhD [mailto:shelley@dahlgren.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:28 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Mr. Shelley Dahlgren, PhD
4449 242nd Ave. S. E.
Issaquah, WA 98029

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Elizabeth Dailey [mailto:dailey.elizabeth@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:04 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest.

It is shortsighted to put the interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

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- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to halt the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment.

Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Thank you,
Elizabeth Dailey
Minneapolis, MN

Elizabeth Dailey
512 W 22nd St
Minneapolis, MN 55405

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ellen Dailey [mailto:Edailey@mac.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:05 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Ellen Dailey
2050 s shore dr.
Erie, PA 16505

## Consent-Based Siting

From: vergilia dakin [mailto:vdakin@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:07 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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No more nuclear plants, period!!! Dangerous!!! Extremely dangerous!!! No more waste!!!

vergilia dakin
345 n spring st
ukiah, CA 95482

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sandy Dalcais [mailto:plutonique@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Sandy Dalcais
4534 bliss street
Sunnyside, NY 11377

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Felicia Dale [mailto:felicia@pintndale.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:14 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Felicia Dale
1920 66th Pl NE
Tulalip, WA 98271

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Josephine Dalessandro [mailto:blubird5@ptd.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:33 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Josephine Dalessandro
169 Emery Road
Dingmans Ferry, PA 18328

From: Keith D'Alessandro [mailto:keith0305@netzero.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 4:09 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Keith D'Alessandro
42486 Saratoga
Canton, MI 48187

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jenette D'Alessandro [mailto:chitchat5158@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:46 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Jenette D'Alessandro
151-53 21st Avenue
Whitestone, NY 11357

From: Jenette D'Alessandro [mailto:chitchat5158@aol.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 4:01 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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Jenette D'Alessandro
151-53 21st Avenue
Whitestone, NY 11357

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Keith D'Alessandro [mailto:keith0305@netzero.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:12 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Keith D'Alessandro
42486 Saratoga
Canton, MI 48187

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Rose Dallal [mailto:searosed@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:50 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Rose Dallal
3747 Midvale Ave, Oakland CA
Oakland, CA 94602

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Stephen Damko [mailto:stephend672@roadrunner.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 5:50 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Stephen Damko
6942 East Winding Oak Drive
Middleburg Heights, OH 44130

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Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 11:21 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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David Damstrom
6750 19 Ave NW
Seattle, WA 98117

## Consent-Based Siting

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Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 2:26 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
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6750 19 Ave NW
Seattle, WA 98117

From: Courtney Daniels [mailto:heyshug@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:45 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Courtney Daniels
14542 Greenleaf Street
Sherman Oaks, CA 91403

From: Michael Daniels [mailto:michaelddaniels@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 9:14 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Michael Daniels
100 Lorenz Road #1110
San Antonio, TX 78209

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jane Danjin [mailto:jane_danjin@yahoo.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 11:58 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Jane Danjin
518 Rawlins St.  Apt. 3
Port Huron, MI 48060

From: Elizabeth Darden [mailto:Lisdarden56@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:37 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Elizabeth Darden
530 Magnolia st se
Aiken, SC 29801

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Cheryl Dare [mailto:cmdare38401@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:36 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Cheryl Dare
108 N. Auburndale #721
Memphis, TN 38104

From: Cheryl Dare [mailto:cmdare38401@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:05 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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108 N. Auburndale #721
Memphis, TN 38104

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Cindi Darling [mailto:darling339@earthlink.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:43 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Cindi Darling
339 Forrest Avenue
Fairfax, CA 94930

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Chris Darling [mailto:ammasdarling@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 11:44 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Chris Darling
634 South 15th St. #B
Richmond, CA 94804

## Consent-Based Siting

From: George Davenport [mailto:Powersoar@aol.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 2:34 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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George Davenport
P O Box 100342
Anchorage, AK 99510

From: Susan Davenport [mailto:suedcpa@hotmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 4:10 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Susan Davenport
1906 Rory Lane Unit 1
Simi Valley, CA 93063

From: Maggie Davidson [mailto:maggie_davidson@comcast.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:57 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Maggie Davidson
750 Pine Drive, Apt 11
Pompano Beach, FL 33060

## Consent-Based Siting

From: SUZANNE DAVIDSON [mailto:SYDAVIDSON@HOTMAIL.COM]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 5:10 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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SUZANNE DAVIDSON
318 MAJORCA AVE
coral gables
CORAL GABLES, FL 33134

From: sue davies [mailto:daviesue@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:20 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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sue davies
p.o. box 630
philo, CA 95466

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jill Davine [mailto:jsdavine@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:04 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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Jill Davine
4047 La Salle Avenue
4047 La Salle Avenue
Culver City, CA 90232

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jim Davis [mailto:bnbadenuf22@bresnan.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:28 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Jim Davis
2004 Phoebe Dr
Billings,, MT 59105

From: Laurence Davis [mailto:ldavis@oceanfree.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 5:02 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Laurence Davis
540 N. Neville Street
Pittsburgh, PA 15213

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Byron Davis [mailto:byron.davis@utah.edu]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 10:49 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Byron Davis
2035 Cresthill Dr.
Salt Lake City, UT 84117

From: chelsea davis [mailto:chelsea.davis@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:51 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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chelsea davis
4405 se 35th pl
portland, OR 97202

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Cynthia Davis [mailto:dovetwo@charter.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 11:07 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Cynthia Davis
452 Bay Hill Drive
Piney Flats, TN 37686

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Candace Davis [mailto:roundapes@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 10:46 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Candace Davis
1001 N. Bridge St.
Carbondale, IL 62901

## Consent-Based Siting

From: CARLA DAVIS [mailto:CMOUSE1945@AOL.COM]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 3:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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CARLA DAVIS
777 MEADOWSWEET DR
CORTE MADERA, CA 94925

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joan Davis [mailto:joantdavis31song@hotmail.comm]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 2:43 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Joan Davis
300 E. 39th St.
New york, NY 10016

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jennifer Davis [mailto:davisjenndavis@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:48 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Jennifer Davis
270 Greenwich Street 1N
New York, NY 10014

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Shellee Davis [mailto:colville@sonic.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:16 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Shellee Davis
8844 Cypress Ave.
Cotati, CA 94931

From: Virginia Davis [mailto:ginny1218@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:09 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Virginia Davis
17721 NE 156th St.
Woodinville, WA 98072

## Consent-Based Siting

From: L. G. Davison [mailto:LGDdavison@aol.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 12:11 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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L. G. Davison
3021 S. Parkview Ave
Springfield, MO 65804

## Consent-Based Siting

From: c day [mailto:cls3333@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 7:43 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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c day
2010 del mar ave
vero, FL 32960

From: c day [mailto:cls3333@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:04 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

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c day
2010 del mar ave
vero, FL 32960

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Emily Day [mailto:emilyday@dancingcolors.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:03 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Emily Day
5180 Nighthawk
Langley, WA 98260

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Susie Day [mailto:suzetski@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:29 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Susie Day
Cabrini Blvd.
New York, NY 10040

From: Joe De Hoyos [mailto:joe_dehoyos@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:57 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Joe De Hoyos
901 Kodak Drive
Los Angeles, CA 90026

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From: Joe De Hoyos [mailto:joe_dehoyos@yahoo.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 12:35 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
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Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:35 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

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## Consent-Based Siting

From: Thomas De Pree [mailto:tad2135@tc.columbia.edu]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:05 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Thomas De Pree
660 Riverside Dr.
New York, NY 10031

## Consent-Based Siting

From: marci de sart [mailto:mjdesart@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:30 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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183 nParadise Marsh Circle
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From: marci de sart [mailto:mjdesart@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:18 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jean de Smet [mailto:j.desmet@att.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:26 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Jean de Smet
39 Davis Street
na
Willimantic, CT 06226

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Susan De Vos [mailto:mabaa@tds.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 11:10 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Susan De Vos
610 N Midvale Blvd
Madison, WI 53705

From: Julia Dean [mailto:juliamdean@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 11:37 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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Julia Dean
125 Sunnyside Ave
Santa Cruz, CA 95062

From: Norma Dean [mailto:n-dean@sonic.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:47 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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Norma Dean
7420 Blossomwood Ave.
Sebastopol, CA 95472

From: D. DeBeer [mailto:Sddebeer18@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 5:04 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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D. DeBeer
170 rim lane
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Hicksville, NY 11801

From: Chris DeBruler [mailto:ososister@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:22 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Chris DeBruler
4 N. 10th St
Hood River, OR 97031

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Valeri DeCastris [mailto:daveandvaljunk@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:57 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Valeri DeCastris
918 cunningahm street
Rockford, IL 61102

## Consent-Based Siting

From: J Deem [mailto:mjandeem@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 3:46 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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J Deem
Camino Alto
Mill Valley, CA 94941

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Constance Del Nero [mailto:italophile13@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:57 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Constance Del Nero
610 South St
Easton, MD 21601

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- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Constance Del Nero
610 South St
Easton, MD 21601

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Anthony Del Plato [mailto:tonydelplato@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:33 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

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Anthony Del Plato
3509 West Ave
3509 West Avenue
Interlaken, NY 14847

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Susan Delattre [mailto:sbdelattre@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:50 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Susan Delattre
35 Windover Road
Randolph, VT 05060

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Claire Delevingne [mailto:Claire.delevingne@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:15 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Claire Delevingne
245 Beech st
Belmont, MA 02130

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Claire Delevingne [mailto:Claire.delevingne@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:59 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Claire Delevingne
245 Beech st
Belmont, MA 02130

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Julienne DeMarsh [mailto:juliennedemarsh@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 9:18 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Julienne DeMarsh
729 S. Main PMB 24
Myrtle Creek, OR 97457

From: Julienne DeMarsh [mailto:juliennedemarsh@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 9:51 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Julienne DeMarsh
729 S. Main PMB 24
Myrtle Creek, OR 97457

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Miriana Demas [mailto:mde218@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:54 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Miriana Demas
333 E 92 St
333 E 92 St
NY, NY 10128

## Consent-Based Siting

From: f Frank Demme [mailto:dembro@comcast.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:05 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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f Frank Demme
526 San Gabriel Dr.
526 San Gabriel Dr.
Sonoma, CA 95476

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sheila Dempsey [mailto:sdbrulee@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 9:50 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Sheila Dempsey
600 w 239 st
Bronx, NY 10463

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Tom Denison [mailto:denisont@peak.org]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:01 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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Tom Denison
1835 NE Steele Ave
Corvallis, OR 97330

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Philip Dennany [mailto:fil777@live.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:04 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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Philip Dennany
3718 Luewan Dr
3718 Luewan Dr
Indianapolis, IN 46235

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Philip Dennany [mailto:fil777@live.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:01 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I very pointedly do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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Philip Dennany
3718 Luewan Dr
3718 Luewan Dr
Indianapolis, IN 46235

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Bill Denneen [mailto:bdenneen25@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 3:58 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

As a Retired Bio.Prof: The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

Bill Denneen
1040 Cielo Lane
Nipomo, CA 93444

From: Bill Denneen [mailto:bdenneen25@gmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 4:01 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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Bill Denneen
1040 Cielo Lane
Nipomo, CA 93444

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joel Denney [mailto:joeldenney@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:13 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Joel Denney
2630 Best Ave
Oakland, CA 94619

From: Bruce Denny [mailto:bruce_denny@mac.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:33 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Bruce Denny
411 W 4th St.
Shawano, WI 54166

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Bruce Denny [mailto:bruce_denny@mac.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:10 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Bruce Denny
411 W 4th St.
Shawano, WI 54166

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lara Derasary [mailto:lara@livingrivers.org]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:42 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Lara Derasary
PO Box 445
Moab, UT 84532

From: Tiffaney Derreumaux [mailto:ctlmdx@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:54 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Tiffaney Derreumaux
Dryland Road
Molalla, OR 97038

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Tiffaney Derreumaux [mailto:ctlmdx@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:20 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Tiffaney Derreumaux
Dryland Road
Molalla, OR 97038

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Linda DeStefano [mailto:LDESTEFANO3@twcny.rr.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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Linda DeStefano
5031 Onondaga Rd.
5031 Onondaga Rd., Syracuse
Syracuse, NY 13215

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Penny Dever-Reynolds [mailto:pendever@comcast.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:38 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Penny Dever-Reynolds
Albuquerque
Albuquerque, NM 87109

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Carol Devoss [mailto:cadevo@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:33 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Carol Devoss
1003 Ash St.
St. Charles, IL 60174

From: Lloyd DeWald [mailto:ldewald@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:13 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Lloyd DeWald
12605 Colony Place NE
Albuquerque, NM 87122

From: ms ainsley dewitte [mailto:nyboyz@juno.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:48 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

NNOOOOooooooooo!
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ms ainsley dewitte
box 529
syracuse, ny  13206
syracuse, NY 13206

## Consent-Based Siting

From: ms ainsley dewitte [mailto:nyboyz@juno.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 8:00 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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ms ainsley dewitte
box 529
syracuse, ny  13206
syracuse, NY 13206

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Rainbow Di Benedetto [mailto:rainbow@alumni.utexas.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:56 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Rainbow Di Benedetto
7708 Waldon Drive
Austin, TX 78750

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mitchell Diamond [mailto:rainmac@sonic.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:55 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Mitchell Diamond
441 E Washington Ave
Sunnyvale, CA 94086

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mitchell Diamond [mailto:rainmac@sonic.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:55 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Mitchell Diamond
441 E Washington Ave
Sunnyvale, CA 94086

## Consent-Based Siting

From: diane diane [mailto:diane.connect@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:24 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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diane diane
112 Xiting
Prescott, AZ 86305

From: Carol Dibb- [mailto:carold2mail0-action@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:24 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Carol Dibb-
Private
Walnut Creek, CA 94598

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Margaret DiBenedetto [mailto:pegdib@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:26 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Margaret DiBenedetto
85 Hubbard Rd
Fleischmanns, NY 12430

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sue DiCara [mailto:sdbookgal@mac.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:53 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

This is simply unconscionable! The Department of Energy's (DOE) "consent-based" siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Sue DiCara
9138 Mt. San Berdu
El Paso, TX 79924

From: Cindy DiCarlo [mailto:cindy5659@cox.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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Cindy DiCarlo
10765 E. Wallflower Ln.
Florence, AZ 85132

From: Helen Dickey [mailto:hwdretired@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:23 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Helen Dickey
San Carlos Ave.
El Cerrito, CA 94530

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Helen Dickey [mailto:hwdretired@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 11:48 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Helen Dickey
San Carlos Ave.
El Cerrito, CA 94530

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Gerald Dickinson [mailto:dickinsonger@juno.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 8:00 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Gerald Dickinson
1110 Maple Lane
Davis, CA 95616

From: Don Dieckmann [mailto:dediec@charter.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:07 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Don Dieckmann
4614Wisteria r
lton, IL 62002

From: Martin Diedrich [mailto:martinrdiedrich@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:57 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Martin Diedrich
281 Magnolia St.
Costa Mesa, CA 92627

## Consent-Based Siting

From: ryk diemert [mailto:rykad00@att.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:12 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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ryk diemert
po box 534
perryville, MO 63775

From: B. Thomas Diener [mailto:texasbtdiener@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:43 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

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B. Thomas Diener
405 Zena Lona St N.E. Unit E.
Unit E
Albuquerque, NM 87123

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kerry Dietz [mailto:kwdietz56@comcast.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:07 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Kerry Dietz
126 Wiltshire Road
Claymont, DE 19703

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Gavin Dillard [mailto:gavco@me.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:28 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Gavin Dillard
528 Padgettown Rd
Black Mountain, NC 28711

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Gavin Dillard [mailto:gavco@me.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:10 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Gavin Dillard
528 Padgettown Rd
Black Mountain, NC 28711

## Consent-Based Siting

From: M S Dillon III [mailto:msdillon@earthlink.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 5:51 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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M S Dillon III
4100 Malaga Ave
Coconut Grove, FL 33133

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Corrine DiMarco [mailto:Corey517@cfl.rr.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:44 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Corrine DiMarco
4811 Fayann Street
Orlando, FL 32812

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Corrine DiMarco [mailto:Corey517@cfl.rr.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:39 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Corrine DiMarco
4811 Fayann Street
Orlando, FL 32812

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Richard DiMatteo [mailto:richarddimatteo@cox.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:39 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Richard DiMatteo
236 Kalmia St. #107
San Diego, CA 92101

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Carmen Dinescu [mailto:dinescu.carmen@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:23 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Carmen Dinescu
68 Sassafras Ct
North Brunswick, NJ 08902

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Carmen Dinescu [mailto:dinescu.carmen@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:18 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Carmen Dinescu
68 Sassafras Ct
North Brunswick, NJ 08902

From: J.A. Dingman [mailto:jdingman11@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:05 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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J.A. Dingman
P.O. Box 10796
2602 Gracewood Dr.
GREENSBORO, NC 27408

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Vincent DiTizio [mailto:theapocalypsewithin@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 7:13 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Vincent DiTizio
233 Ilyssa Way
Staten Island, NY 10312

From: Joanne Dixon [mailto:jvdix@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:36 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Joanne Dixon
216 Steven Dr
Colorado Springs, CO 80911

From: Charles Dixon [mailto:crdixon1@cobridge.tv]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:39 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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Charles Dixon
4406 John Reagan
Marshall, TX 75672

From: melba Dlugonski [mailto:melbajade@hotmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:00 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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melba Dlugonski
6735 SE 78th
6735 SE 78th
Portland, OR 97206

## Consent-Based Siting

From: melba Dlugonski [mailto:melbajade@hotmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 9:09 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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melba Dlugonski
6735 SE 78th
6735 SE 78th
Portland, OR 97206

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Janice Dlugosz [mailto:gjjak52@comcast.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:46 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Janice Dlugosz
409 Compass Ave
Beachwood, NJ 08722

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Bruce Dobson [mailto:hosho@whidbey.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:36 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Bruce Dobson
5026 Deer Trail Ln
Langley, WA 98260

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Bruce Dobson [mailto:hosho@whidbey.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:20 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Bruce Dobson
5026 Deer Trail Ln
Langley, WA 98260

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Merle Dockendorff [mailto:merleddc@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:22 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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Merle Dockendorff
600 W. Carpenter Ave.
Fairfield, IA 52556

From: Sarah Doenmez [mailto:Sdoenmez@dublinschool.org]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 3:10 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Sarah Doenmez
18 Lehmann Way
Dublin, NH 03444

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Linda Doherty [mailto:ldoherty333@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 4:27 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Linda Doherty
245 Cedar Wood Drive
Big Sandy, TN 38221

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Hollis Dolben [mailto:hollydolben@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 7:03 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Hollis Dolben
31 Montana St
Marshfield, MA 02050

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Carl Doll [mailto:boatdoll@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 10:00 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Carl Doll
5943 Crooked Creek Dr.
Manassas, VA 20112

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ellen Domke [mailto:domkone@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:16 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Ellen Domke
1301 Thorndale
Chicago, IL 60660

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From: Ellen Domke [mailto:domkone@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 8:00 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Ellen Domke
1301 Thorndale
Chicago, IL 60660

## Consent-Based Siting

From: patrick donaldson [mailto:pm.donaldson@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:32 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

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patrick donaldson
106 ne 61st ave
portland, OR 97213

## Consent-Based Siting

From: GLORIA Donn [mailto:GloDonn@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:00 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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GLORIA Donn
7300 W. McNab Rd
Tamarac, FL 33321

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Debbie Donnelly [mailto:donnelly.dj@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 10:28 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Debbie Donnelly
2231 Pleasant Drive
Catonsville, MD 21228

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Debbie Donnelly [mailto:donnelly.dj@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:18 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Debbie Donnelly
2231 Pleasant Drive
Catonsville, MD 21228

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Robert Donohue [mailto:donohuere@aol.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 4:24 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Robert Donohue
303 W 105 St
New York, NY 10025

From: Steve Donoso [mailto:stevedonoso@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 2:32 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Steve Donoso
PO Box 132
Terra Ceia, FL 34250

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Stephan Donovan [mailto:StephanDonovan@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:04 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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Stephan Donovan
4851 North Bernard Street
Chicago, IL 60625

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Stephan Donovan [mailto:StephanDonovan@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:28 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Stephan Donovan
4851 North Bernard Street
Chicago, IL 60625

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Gerald Dooley [mailto:gwdooley@msn.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:11 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Gerald Dooley
1085 Woodcock Ho;;ow Road
Kingston Springs, TN 37082

From: Robert Dornfeld [mailto:bisonbob09@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 10:13 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Robert Dornfeld
606 County Rd 100
Athens, TN 37303

From: Jeanette Dorsey [mailto:jad0430@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:09 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Jeanette Dorsey
4334 temecula
san diego, CA 92107

From: - Dorthee [mailto:dorwendl@icloud.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 10:10 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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- Dorthee
141Montague Rd
Wendell, MA 01379

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Gregory Doty [mailto:gregorydoty@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 8:44 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Gregory Doty
6153 Arrowroot Lane
Rancho Palos Verdes, CA 90275

From: gary dowling [mailto:garyb24s@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 10:42 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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gary dowling
po box 26
pope valley, CA 94567

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Rosemary Doyle [mailto:rdoyle@cheerful.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 11:00 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Rosemary Doyle
31648 Pembroke
Livonia, MI 48152

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Nancy Doyne [mailto:nedt23@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:02 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Nancy Doyne
333 CPW
NY, NY 10025

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Judy Dragon [mailto:jd@thetahealingintuitive.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 2:04 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Judy Dragon
193 Torzelli Ln
Santa Rosa, CA 95407

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Judy Dragon [mailto:jd@thetahealingintuitive.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Judy Dragon
193 Torzelli Ln
Santa Rosa, CA 95407

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kathryn Drake [mailto:plantshakti@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:07 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Kathryn Drake
Locust Street
Northampton, MA 01060

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lynne Draper [mailto:lynned09@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:12 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA.

Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Lynne Draper
26 North Main Street
Wilton, NH 03086

## Consent-Based Siting

From: John Dreiling [mailto:Johndrei@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:54 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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John Dreiling
312 Lyon Street
PO Box 1342
Lawrence, KS 66044

## Consent-Based Siting

From: arlene dreste [mailto:apdreste@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:06 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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arlene dreste
2461 rosser rd
2461 rosser rd
ajo, AZ 85321

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Chris Drumright [mailto:astrohoops@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:12 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Chris Drumright
1434 E. Main St.  #26
N/A
Murfreesboro, TN 37130

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kathleen Drury [mailto:japaneselindsay@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 10:14 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: My Comment: No DOE Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

I strongly urge you and your organization,the Department of Energy/DOE to not allow enactment of any, misleadingly-called by the way, consent-based siting initiative/CBSI.

CBSI does NOT put protecting public health first, by any means. In that same vein, immediately the making of nuclear waste should stop. Therefore, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act is correct since nuclear waste does exist.

Kathleen Drury
7661 N. Sheridan Rd.
Chicago, IL 60626

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Bob Druwing [mailto:bbobdruwing@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:23 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Bob Druwing
6633 Woodman Ave
Apt 20
Van Nuys, CA 91401

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Marilyn DuBois [mailto:wildirishmurphy@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:20 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Marilyn DuBois
4484 Ridge Rd
Scotia, NY 12302

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Brenda Duffey [mailto:duffey.brenda@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:38 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Brenda Duffey
4823 Gloria Gayle Way
Florence, OR 97439

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Michelle Dugan [mailto:mdugan1952@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 8:57 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Michelle Dugan
222 Maypole Road
Upper Darby, PA 19082

From: Anne Dugaw [mailto:adugaw@pacbell.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:56 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Anne Dugaw
385 Ogle Street #C
385 Ogle St # C
Costa Mesa, CA 92627

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Aaron Dukes [mailto:aarondukes@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:29 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Aaron Dukes
1767 12th St. #256
Hood River, OR 97031

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Scott Dulas [mailto:goodbubba@icloud.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 10:19 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Scott Dulas
5311 Greenwood Rd
Duluth, MN 55804

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sylvia Duncan [mailto:sduncan1949@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:41 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Sylvia Duncan
1117 Orlando Drive
Plano, TX 75075

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sylvia Duncan [mailto:sduncan1949@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:19 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Sylvia Duncan
1117 Orlando Drive
Plano, TX 75075

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Scott Duncan [mailto:scotch155@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:10 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest.
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DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.
More waste is unacceptable!

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT. Period.

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- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS).
HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste.

The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations.

Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

Scott Duncan
PO Box 15103
Asheville, NC 28813

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Patrick Dunlevy [mailto:pmarkd@aim.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:30 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only

substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Patrick Dunlevy
2239 Wanderer Dr.
San Pedro, CA 90732

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Connie Dunn [mailto:yogart@bellsouth.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:59 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Connie Dunn
467 Crattie
467 Crattie
Springville, TN 38256

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Margaret Dunn [mailto:dunrovin20032003@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 9:11 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Margaret Dunn
W4009 12th Rd.
307 N. Rush St.
Montello, WI 53949

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Elmo Dunn [mailto:russdunn63@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:05 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future. That is idiotic and absurd.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

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I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Elmo Dunn
208 Harrogate Pl
Longwood, FL 32779

From: John Dunn [mailto:jdunn936@yahoo.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 3:10 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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John Dunn
P.O. Box 1024
n/a
Vashon, WA 98070

From: Kim Dunn [mailto:Dunnmagic@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 8:36 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Commore predictable deceit from an industry that has never lived up to promises made DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Kim Dunn
736 quebrada ln
93420, CA 93420

From: Margaret Dunn [mailto:dunrovin20032003@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:30 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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Margaret Dunn
W4009 12th Rd.
307 N. Rush St.
Montello, WI 53949

## Consent-Based Siting

From: MARY DUNN [mailto:marydunn323tulsatodenver@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:03 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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MARY DUNN
13743 W 64TH DR
ARVADA, CO 80004

## Consent-Based Siting

From: MARY DUNN [mailto:marydunn323tulsatodenver@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 9:59 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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MARY DUNN
13743 W 64TH DR
ARVADA, CO 80004

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Samuel Durkin [mailto:samussr337@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Samuel Durkin
5048 lakeview Cir
5048 Lakeview Cir
Fairfield, CA 94534

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Samuel Durkin [mailto:samussr337@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 9:25 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Samuel Durkin
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Fairfield, CA 94534

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From: M. Dürrenberg [mailto:RubinaGh@googlemail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 11:01 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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M. Dürrenberg
Lohkoppelweg
Lohkoppelweg
Hamburg, ot 22529

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From: M. Dürrenberg [mailto:RubinaGh@googlemail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:43 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

M. Dürrenberg
Lohkoppelweg
Lohkoppelweg
Hamburg, ot 22529

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dr. William 'Skip' Dykoski [mailto:skipdykoski@usfamily.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 7:15 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Dr. William 'Skip' Dykoski
890 9th Ave NW
New Brighton, MN 55112

From: Stuart Dymzarov [mailto:sdymzarov@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 11:20 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Stuart Dymzarov
1537B Lake Shore Dr
Michigan CIty, IN 46360

From: B. E. [mailto:barerickson@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:26 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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B. E.
Village School
WLV, CA 91361

From: susan earle [mailto:susand.earle@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:12 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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susan earle
335A Harvard
cambridge, MA 02139

## Consent-Based Siting

From: susan earle [mailto:susand.earle@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:12 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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susan earle
335A Harvard
cambridge, MA 02139

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sylvia Eastman [mailto:seastman@cavtel.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:16 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Sylvia Eastman
5821 Halwyn Avenue
Baltimore, MD 21212

## Consent-Based Siting

From: nancy eberg [mailto:neberg@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:10 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

nancy eberg
Lynette drove
North haven, CT 06473

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Wendy Ebersberger [mailto:wsebersberger@earthlink.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 11:48 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative goes against the public interest by putting the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, or the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to stop creating it and to isolate existing waste from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent nuclear fuel is to:

- Terminate the production of nuclear waste;
- Provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation;
- Determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

Consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites must be prohibited until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities presently under consideration would use the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites. The only difference would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage facilities. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site, there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act is right in requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The United States must make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be "interim" on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management is irresponsible.

Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal nuclear waste management site. And in the meantime, the NWPA will continue to prohibit consolidated storage of nuclear waste, regardless of attempts to obtain public consent to site such storage.

Wendy Ebersberger
153 Chapman Ln
Front Royal, VA 22630

From: Curtis Eckstein [mailto:curt.eckstein@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 10:38 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

The people and organizations that profited off the creation of the waste should have to pay for the handling of the waste, not the american tax payers or the rate payers.

Curtis Eckstein
353 S. Vandenberg Rd.
Green Bay, WI 54311

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Judith Eda [mailto:judyeda@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 10:12 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

I write to say that I do not consent to the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The Department of Energy (DOE) has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future. But DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not

fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Judith Eda
4655 NE Killingsworth #33
Portland, OR 97218

## Consent-Based Siting

From: William Edelman [mailto:edelbill713@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:50 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

William Edelman
529 Simms Street
Philadelphia, PA 19116

From: Mark Ederer [mailto:mbederer@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 10:57 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Mark Ederer
54 Convent Ct
San Rafael, CA 94901

From: John Edman [mailto:westonedman@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:45 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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John Edman
19290 oak Glen Ave
Morgan Hill, CA 95037

From: Rick Edmondson [mailto:rickedmon@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:59 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Rick Edmondson
638 Sheri Lane
Danville, CA 94526

## Consent-Based Siting

From: jane edsall [mailto:jedsall2003@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:23 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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jane edsall
box 144
`
mt. sinai, NY 11766

From: bita edwards [mailto:greenbee79@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:59 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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bita edwards
box 122
woodacre, CA 94973

## Consent-Based Siting

From: bita edwards [mailto:greenbee79@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:32 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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woodacre, CA 94973

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Charlotte Edwards [mailto:chared178@gmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 8:44 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Charlotte Edwards
9639 S Carousel Cir
Summerville, SC, SC 29485

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Eric Edwards [mailto:eeguinness@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:01 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Eric Edwards
1373 Prairie Ct.
West Chicago, IL 60185

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Judi Edwards [mailto:edwards.jc@comcast.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:04 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Judi Edwards
5650 24th Ave. NW, Unit 402
Seattle, WA 98107

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lynne Eggers [mailto:elynne600@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:46 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Lynne Eggers
221 Mullen Ave
San Francisco, CA 94110

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Donj Eichelberger [mailto:done7777@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:23 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

We who have consistently opposed the creation of a central repository for high-level nuclear waste over these many years of the debate have done so with the protection of everyone in mind--even those who would choose to host such a site.

I know you do not share my concerns about the threats posed by nuclear energy and weapons through the production of their wastes since the Manhattan Project. It is scientifically clear that radioactive exposure in high enough doses--some would argue that any does is too much--can cause cancer and damage the human genetic pool.

Your agency holds the belief that it is possible to safely story--please stop using the misleading word "dispose of"--millions of tons of wastes, transported from all parts of the country, keeping it isolated from the environment for hundreds if not thousands of years.

It is a daunting promise; one I fear you are making without considering strongly enough the ramifications if you are wrong.

First, getting those hundreds of tons of wastes scattered around the country to a central site without accidents and worker contamination should signal a no-starter.

And the instability of the earth's crust, even in "stable" areas should signal another. Geographic and geologic changes can be great over a 1000 year time frame, where quake fissions form, rivers change route, salt formations collapse.

WIPP has shown deep geologic sites are not the answer. In an article in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, former DOE official, Bob Alvarez wrote of the 2014 incident at WIPP that "Wastes containing plutonium blew through the WIPP ventilation system, traveling 2,150 feet to the surface, contaminating at least 17 workers, and spreading small amounts of radioactive material into the environment."

It doesn't sound to me like wastes are "isolated" very well. I fear no place will be, and to concentrate wastes geographically is wrong on so many levels.

I strongly feel hat further nuclear waste production should be halted until a permanent solution can be identified.

Below are more specific concerns with the whole effort of trying to get a community to open itself up to the risks and challenges, and some suggestions on hw to proceed.

The Department of Energy’s (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste.

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Donj Eichelberger
628 Lyon St.
#1
San Francuisc, CA 94117

From: Tom Eickenberg [mailto:teickenberg50@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:28 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Tom Eickenberg
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725 Pinnacle Rd
Liberty, ME 04949

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jeffrey Eidson [mailto:mojochef@msn.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:27 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Jeffrey Eidson
101 Gwinnett Square Circle
Duluth, GA 30096

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Olivia Eielson [mailto:olivia2@sonic.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 8:50 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Olivia Eielson
6817 Colton Boulevard
Oakland, CA 94611

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From: Janet Eigner [mailto:danceeigner@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 2:23 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Janet Eigner
6 Verano Drive
Santa Fe, NM 87508

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Alisa Eilenberg [mailto:alisaeilenberg@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:13 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
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- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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Please do not visit untold environmental and health harm on the future generations through reckless nuclear waste transfer schemes!  The waste generation must be phased out while the existing waste is responsibly secured on site! Please act to protect the public now.  Thank you!

Alisa Eilenberg
3006 Arlington Ave.
Bronx, NY 10463

## Consent-Based Siting

From: EMIL EIMAN [mailto:emilreiman@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 10:50 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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EMIL EIMAN
634 SHOTWELL
SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94110

From: Leah Eister-Hargrave [mailto:leaheisterhargrave@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:34 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Leah Eister-Hargrave
2622 3rd Ave N
Seattle, WA 98103

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dave Elder [mailto:delderado@mail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:12 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Dave Elder
2005 Owego Road
Vestal, NY 13850

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dave Elder [mailto:delderado@mail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:30 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Dave Elder
2005 Owego Road
Vestal, NY 13850

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From: Robert Elder [mailto:rjelder@pacbell.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:28 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Robert Elder
4022 Braeburn Way
4022 Braeburn Way
Los Angeles, CA 90027

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From: Robert Elder [mailto:rjelder@pacbell.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:29 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Robert Elder
4022 Braeburn Way
4022 Braeburn Way
Los Angeles, CA 90027

## Consent-Based Siting

From: anaundda elijah [mailto:satchitananda3@att.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:53 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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anaundda elijah
898 calle del caminos
san luis obispo, CA 93401

From: Elizabeth Elkins [mailto:elkinsel1@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:52 PM
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Elizabeth Elkins
17111 Overhill Road
DERWOOD, MD 20855

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Nancy Ellingham [mailto:nancyee@comcast.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:37 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Nancy Ellingham
9106 Fortuna Drive, Apt. 4201
Mercer Island, WA 98040

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Julie Heath Elliott [mailto:jheathelliott@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:48 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Julie Heath Elliott
2749 Stoner Ave.
Los Angeles, CA 90064

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Julie Heath Elliott [mailto:jheathelliott@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 6:00 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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2749 Stoner Ave.
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From: cherry ellis [mailto:cherryellis5@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:01 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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cherry ellis
P O Box 221
P O Box 221
Sedalia, CO 80135

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sharon Ellis [mailto:fresh_dalliance@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:14 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Sharon Ellis
178 Jarvis St., #905
Toronto, ON M5B 2k7

## Consent-Based Siting

From: cherry ellis [mailto:cherryellis5@yahoo.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 10:49 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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cherry ellis
P O Box 221
P O Box 221
Sedalia, CO 80135

## Consent-Based Siting

**From:** David Ellison [mailto:david@dhellison.com]
**Sent:** Friday, July 29, 2016 1:47 PM
**To:** Consent Based Siting
**Subject:** DOE Consent-Based Siting

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The disposition of HLRW is too important to leave to "consenting" local communities because of the extremely long time period necessary for isolation of these wastes from the environment and the very high cost of their long term maintenance or removal. The decisions regarding long term disposition of HLRW must be made with the potential for environmental and geoologic effects over this long period as a driving force. The COMMUNITY of living creatures on the planet, including the human population, depend upon successful isolation of these materials in perpetuity. Any process that involves decision-making that does not take into account the likely long time periods and expenses involved or the entire living population, including non-human beings and future generations of biologic life will be incomplete and illegitimate. The first steps the DOE should take in regards to HLRW are to strictly limit the production of any more HLRW and eliminate any possibility of accidental criticality or uncontrolled reaction, human error or sabotage. The removal of fuel from reactors and fuel cooling ponds and the elimination of other active situations where it can potentially become critical and where any failing technology could cause criticality, uncontrolled reaction or dispersal of the material into the environment should be accomplished at once. Moving, shuffling, or relocating the fuel through local communities should NOT take place until no additional HLRW is being produced and only after formal consensus is reached by the larger community of global citizens on the questions of safe and secure transport and of long-term perpetual storage of the HLRW.

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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David Ellison, Architect

The D. H. Ellison Co.
2002 W. 41st St.
Cleveland, OH  44113

216-631-0557

www.dhellison.com

## Consent-Based Siting

From: shemayim elohim [mailto:the8th_chakra@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 10:37 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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shemayim elohim
213 32nd ave
seattle, WA 98122

From: shemayim elohim [mailto:the8th_chakra@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:20 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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shemayim elohim
213 32nd ave
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From: C Emerson [mailto:chelmybell@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:21 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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C Emerson
2320 n st
Sacramento, CA 95816

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Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 7:00 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

C Emerson
2320 n st
Sacramento, CA 95816

From: Jan Emerson [mailto:janemerson777@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:46 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Jan Emerson
250 Fort Washington Ave Apt 5B
New York, NY 10032

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jan Emerson [mailto:janemerson777@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:40 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Jan Emerson
250 Fort Washington Ave Apt 5B
New York, NY 10032

## Consent-Based Siting

From: norman emmons [mailto:norme@myfairpoint.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:57 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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norman emmons
p.o. box 1024
charlestown, NH 03603

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dee Emrich [mailto:demrich@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:56 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Dee Emrich
2205 River Ridge Road
Arlington, TX 76017

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dee Emrich [mailto:demrich@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 10:23 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Dee Emrich
2205 River Ridge Road
Arlington, TX 76017

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Richard Eng [mailto:nalle54@tds.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:37 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Richard Eng
Roods Creek Rd.
Hancock, NY 13783

## Consent-Based Siting

From: bonnie engelhardt [mailto:bonniegrps@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:20 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

bonnie engelhardt
Old Colony Way
Orleans, MA 02653

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Constance Engle [mailto:connie_engle@alumni.Brown.edu]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 5:01 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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Constance Engle
244 Englewood Drive
Hendersonville, NC 28739

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Cynthia Enlow [mailto:hienlow@msn.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:52 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Cynthia Enlow
1460 NW Ashley Dr
Albany, OR 97321

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Wayne Enos Jr [mailto:Waynejr2010@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:57 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Wayne Enos Jr
543 E Walnut
El Segundo, CA 90245

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Elizabeth Enright [mailto:eenright2@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:38 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Elizabeth Enright
6222 E. Avalon Dr
6222 E. Avalon Dr
Scottsdale, AZ 85251

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Elizabeth Enright [mailto:eenright2@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:14 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Elizabeth Enright
6222 E. Avalon Dr
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## Consent-Based Siting

From: Barbara Epstein [mailto:justbarb56@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:15 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Barbara Epstein
575 Esplanade, #202
Redondo Beach,, CA 90277

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ellen Epstein [mailto:ellenepstein@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 9:03 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Ellen Epstein
1931 4th St
Bremerton, WA 98337

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Harry Epstein [mailto:chickpeter@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:08 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Harry Epstein
2600 Henry Hudson Py.
Bronx, NY 10463

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lori Erbs [mailto:lorieji@cs.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:41 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Lori Erbs
PO Box 50
Acme, WA 98220

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Steve Erckson [mailto:wean@whidbey net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:14 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

Here in Washington State, we work under the principle of Best Available Science. The notion of "consent based" decision making absent Best Available Science is essentially a fraud.

Those of us who have had to deal with Hanford and the downwind/downstream effects of the failure to isolate radioactive wastes there, understand all too well the notion of "consent based siting." This is where the agency, DOE, finds those individuals and/or agencies which purport to speak for the entire populace, and then solicits their consent on behalf of that unwitting populace.

No thank you. Once you have demonstrated your ability to clean up your mess at Hanford (and other seriously contaminated facilities, then maybe we'll consider further options.

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Steve Erckson
Box53
box 53
Langley, WA 98260

From: Patricia Eskridge [mailto:Pattye3@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:29 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Patricia Eskridge
7912 Newton falls rd
Ravenna, OH 44266

From: Randall Esperas [mailto:resperas@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:37 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Randall Esperas
PO Box 4251
APT 211
Bend, OR 97707

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Gale Espinosa [mailto:galeny13@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:01 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Gale Espinosa
1722 West St Moritz Lane
Phoenix, AZ 85023

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Gale Espinosa [mailto:galeny13@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:44 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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Gale Espinosa
1722 West St Moritz Lane
Phoenix, AZ 85023

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Amanda Esposito [mailto:Esposito5585@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:27 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Amanda Esposito
17995 blackbird
Reno, NV 89508

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Amanda Esposito [mailto:Esposito5585@yahoo.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 2:09 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Amanda Esposito
17995 blackbird
Reno, NV 89508

From: Douglas Ettelson [mailto:levyhalem@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 3:47 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Douglas Ettelson
609 E. Simpson St.
Apt. 3
Lafayette, CO 80026

## Consent-Based Siting

From: bronwen evans [mailto:bronwynnevans@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:54 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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bronwen evans
#210-130 East 15th. Ave
cardiff
vancouver, WA 98101

From: Christopher Evans [mailto:dodges.unlimited.inc@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 5:04 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Christopher Evans
Lower Woodhouse
Near Byton Hand, ot HR6 9NL

## Consent-Based Siting

From: bronwen evans [mailto:bronwynnevans@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:26 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

bronwen evans
#210-130 East 15th. Ave
cardiff
vancouver, WA 98101

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Anna Evans [mailto:aj.evans94@btinternet.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:46 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Anna Evans
Cae Corn Hir
Caernarfon, ot LL55 2LQ

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Christopher Evans [mailto:dodges.unlimited.inc@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:13 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Christopher Evans
Lower Woodhouse
Near Byton Hand, ot HR6 9NL

From: pam evans [mailto:gardenqueen@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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pam evans
PO Box 644
Kemp, TX 75143

## Consent-Based Siting

From: pam evans [mailto:gardenqueen@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:26 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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pam evans
PO Box 644
Kemp, TX 75143

## Consent-Based Siting

-----Original Message-----
From: Mr. Evans [mailto:mrevansisnumber1@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:32 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: My Comment Opposing DOE'$ Con$ent-Ba$ed $hiting Proce$$ for Nuclear Wa$te

Ro: $ecretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) con$ent-ba$ed $hiting initiative ha$ no ba$i$ in policy or the public intere$t, and I$ $imply a vehicle to put the $hort-term intere$t$ of the nuclear power and radioactive wa$te indu$trie$ before the need to protect public health and $afety and the environment.

In short, DOE I$ putting the nuclear cart before the nuclear wa$te irradiated dead horse.

DOE ha$ no authority to pur$ue $uch a $hiting proce$$ for con$olidated $torage of commercial nuclear wa$te.

The Nuclear Wa$te Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generator$ explicitly $tate that the federal government may take title to and po$$e$$ion of the wa$te from commercial nuclear power generation when a repo$itory I$ in operation.

DOE ha$ clearly stated it intend$ to $upport the continued production of more nuclear wa$te into the di$tant future.

I do not consent to thi$ proce$$, the continued generation of nuclear wa$te, the $hiting of con$olidated $torage facilitie$, nor the ma$$ tran$portation of nuclear wa$te to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear wa$te mu$t be to $TOP MAKING ($)HIT and to I$olate the Highly Toxic, Deadly Poi$onou$ Wa$te we already have from the environment.

The only rational ba$i$ for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive $pent (irradiated) nuclear fuel I$ to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear wa$te.
- To provide for $ecure interim $torage at, or as clo$e a$ po$$ible to, the $hite of generation.
- To determine $cientifically viable, environmentally re$ponsible, and $ocially ju$st and equitable method$ for ($)hit$ long-term management and I$olation from the bio$phere.

More than 100 organization$ have endor$ed improving the $torage and $ecurity of nuclear wa$te at reactor $hites through Hardened On-Reactor-$hite $torage (HO$$). HO$$ would fir$t move wa$te (when $ufficiently cooled) out

of fuel pool$ to robu$t, hardened dry-ca$k $torage, reducing the hazard of doga$trophic fuel pool fire$ and better protecting the wa$te from natural di$a$ter$, indu$trial accident$, and military or terrori$t attack$.

HO$$ would improve the $afety and $ecurity of thi$ wa$te for interim $torage at, or a$ near a$ po$$ible to, the reactor $hites where it I$ generated.

I oppose the con$olidation and tran$portation of wa$te to new $hite$ unle$$ and until a viable long-term management facility I$ in operation, per the Nuclear Wa$te Policy Act.

The con$olidated $torage facilitie$ under con$ideration would u$e preci$ely the $ame technology and dry-ca$k$ currently available for $torage at reactor $ite$, with container$ on a concrete $lab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP.

The only $ub$tantive change$ would be the added hazard$ and in$ecurity of tran$portation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear wa$te to be $tored in thi$ configuration at one or more centralized additional $hite$, both of which are $ecurity ri$k$.

If the $hite I$ temporary a$ intended, then, by definition, each container will move at lea$t twice, compounding tran$portation hazard$.

Depending on how long the wa$te remain$ in an interim con$olidated $torage $y$tem, wa$te may need to be tran$ported multiple time$, a$ community con$ent period$ expire and require $hiting of new con$olidated $torage faciltie$.

Conversely, if the $hite devolve$ to a de facto long-term or even permanent wa$te $hite there would have been no technical qualification or $cientific ba$i$ for choo$ing the $hite; the willingne$$ of a community to $upport the $hiting of a temporary $torage facility would be violated; and the con$ent-ba$ed proce$$ would be meaningle$$, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Wa$te Policy Act wa$ right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licen$ed and in operation before the agency can take title to and tran$port civilian nuclear wa$te.

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Yucca Mountain wa$ cho$en by Regre$$ through an un$cientific and politicized proce$$ of elimination, excluding all other $hites before Yucca Mountain wa$ $tudied to determine whether the $hite could I$olate the radioactivity in thi$ wa$te.

The fir$t $tep to getting nuclear wa$te policy on track I$ to remove Yucca Mountain from the FMRU$ nuclear wa$te program.

The $econd $tep I$ to limit the wa$te being made and third to make energetic progre$$ on $cientific re$earch to identify fea$sible technologie$ and location$ for I$olating the radioactive material$ in nuclear wa$te from the environment for a million years, $o that $torage at reactor $hite$ will actually be “interim” on the $cale of human

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To pur$ue con$ent before there can be public confidence in nuclear wa$te management fir$t i$ deceptive and irre$pon$ible.

The Department of Energy ha$ gone rogue in pur$uing con$ent-ba$ed $iting for con$olidated $torage fir$t and $uggesting that the public'$ input ha$ any value when the agency ha$ no $tatutory authority to pur$ue $uch a program.

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Con$olidated $torage only increa$e$ the ri$k$ of nuclear wa$te, and doe$ nothing to advance credible $olution$ to the long-term management and I$olation of radioactive material$.

Mr. Evans
Somewhrerin,.....
.....
Clovis, CA 93612

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mr. Evans [mailto:mrevansisnumber1@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:52 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE'$ Con$ent-Bas$d $hiting Proce$$ for Nuclear Wa$te.

To: $ecretary Moniz,

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The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would

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I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Mr. Evans
Somewhrerin,.....
.....
Clovis, CA 93612

From: Rowan Everard [mailto:Wax.delerium@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:25 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

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Rowan Everard
7114 n Williams ave
Portland, OR 97217

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Margaret Eves [mailto:mae1969@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:04 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Margaret Eves
92 Streeter Hill Rd
West Chesterfield, NH 03466

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Suzanne; Ewing [mailto:ewingmom@gwi.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Suzanne; Ewing
94 Neal St
Portland, ME
Portland, ME 04102

From: T. F. [mailto:tacfig@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:05 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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T. F.
East 27 Street
New York, NY 10016

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dagmar Fabian [mailto:dagmarfabian@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:40 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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I DO NOT give consent to future nuclear waste production! Nuclear Power Plants need to be shut down one by one and soon. We need a plan for that immediately!
In addition you have NOT considered the rights of people along the transport routes. There are No Nuclear Disaster First Responders in our communities! You are following a route of deception and endangerment in regard to interim and permanent sites.

Dagmar Fabian
10 Warren Lodge 1c
Cockeysville, MD 98225

From: Donna Fabiano [mailto:dlfabiano@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 11:59 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Donna Fabiano
9651 Argonne Way
Forestville, CA 95436

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Donna Fabiano [mailto:dlfabiano@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:56 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Donna Fabiano
9651 Argonne Way
Forestville, CA 95436

From: BARRY FAHRER [mailto:landsurvey@aol.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:43 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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BARRY FAHRER
47 HOWARD AVENUE
47 HOWARD AVENUE
FREEPORT, NY 11520

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Richard fairfield [mailto:rafairfield12@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 5:22 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Richard fairfield
1107 Stanford Ave.
1107 stanford ave.
Oakland, CA 94608

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Richard fairfield [mailto:rafairfield12@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 6:24 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Richard fairfield
1107 Stanford Ave.
1107 stanford ave.
Oakland, CA 94608

From: Ruth Falcon [mailto:neuwald.falcon@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:50 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Ruth Falcon
13730 15th Ave NE #F203
Seattle, WA 98125

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jennifer Falk [mailto:Jennrugg@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 5:37 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Jennifer Falk
67-76 Boothy Street
Forest Hills, NY 11375

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jean Fallon [mailto:jfallon@mksisters.org]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:47 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Jean Fallon
10 Pinesbridge Road
no
Ossining, NY 10545

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jean Fallon [mailto:jfallon@mksisters.org]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 6:03 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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Jean Fallon
10 Pinesbridge Road
no
Ossining, NY 10545

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dave Fallow [mailto:dfallow@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:23 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Dave Fallow
102 Leon Street
Madison, WI 53714

From: Tom Falvey [mailto:tefalvey@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:01 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Tom Falvey
2576 Wightman St.
San Diego, CA 92104

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Tom Falvey [mailto:tefalvey@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:00 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

First we should stop creating any more nuclear waste.

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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Tom Falvey
2576 Wightman St.
San Diego, CA 92104

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Audrey Famette [mailto:Audrehas@sover.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:03 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Audrey Famette
2004 Elm St
Montpelier, VT 05602

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Valerie Fannin [mailto:osdawesa@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:55 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Valerie Fannin
2601 Nord Ave.
Chico, CA 95973

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Valerie Fannin [mailto:osdawesa@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:07 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Valerie Fannin
2601 Nord Ave.
Chico, CA 95973

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joyce R. Farber [mailto:jfarber77@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:36 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Joyce R. Farber
2874 Jackson Street
San Francisco, CA 94115

## Consent-Based Siting

From: James Faris [mailto:jcfaris@comcast.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 9:13 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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James Faris
990 Camino San Acacio
Santa Fe, NM 87505

From: Janice and Larry Faris [mailto:jandlfaris@comcast.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 2:09 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Janice and Larry Faris
318 Rosario Pl NE
318 Rosario PL NE
Renton, WA 98059

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mike Farrell [mailto:mfocontact@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:18 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Mike Farrell
11333 Moorpark St., #509
Studio City, CA 91602

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Nancy Farrell [mailto:nfarrellwa@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 7:36 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Nancy Farrell
4005 N. 24th St.
Tacoma, WA 98406

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Raymond Farrington [mailto:teachart@juno.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 10:32 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Raymond Farrington
2103 South Ave.
Syracuse, NY 13207

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Diane Fascione [mailto:slicendice@earthlink.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:25 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Diane Fascione
528 Woodbine Ave
Oak Park, IL 60302

From: Wendy Fast [mailto:ttouch22@me.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:19 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Wendy Fast
8406 Green Rd.
Dansville, NY 14437

From: Wendy Fast [mailto:ttouch22@me.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 7:46 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Wendy Fast
8406 Green Rd.
Dansville, NY 14437

From: Susan Fasten [mailto:smfasten@aol.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 2:18 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Susan Fasten
Linden St.
72 Linden St. Wellesley, MA
Wellesley, MA 02482

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Susan Fasten [mailto:smfasten@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:42 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Susan Fasten
Linden St.
72 Linden St. Wellesley, MA
Wellesley, MA 02482

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Susan Fasten [mailto:smfasten@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:46 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Linden St.
72 Linden St. Wellesley, MA
Wellesley, MA 02482

From: Dennis Faulkner [mailto:appleimacdude@mac.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 3:40 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Dennis Faulkner
9737 Wintergardens Blvd
# 26
Lakeside, CA 92040

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Josan Feathers, Registered Civil Engineer [mailto:josan.dem@cox.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:50 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,
As a Registered Civil Engineer, I believe that the Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

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Josan Feathers, Registered Civil Engineer
4025 Corte Tierra Alta
La Mesa, CA 91941

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Karen Fedorov [mailto:karen.fedorov@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:26 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Karen Fedorov
8044 Tackett Ln
Bealeton, VA 22712

From: Karen Fedorov [mailto:karen.fedorov@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:21 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Karen Fedorov
8044 Tackett Ln
Bealeton, VA 22712

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sharon Feissel [mailto:stardust@sonic.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:39 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

Does it take a US Fukushima for us to admit that nuclear plants and nuclear waste represent public health hazards?

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Sharon Feissel
5895 Mountain Hawk
Santa Rosa, CA 95409

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sharon Feissel [mailto:stardust@sonic.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:58 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Sharon Feissel
5895 Mountain Hawk
Santa Rosa, CA 95409

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Tracy Feldman [mailto:tracysfeldman@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:19 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Tracy Feldman
2117 Strebor Street
Durham, NC 27713

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Tracy Feldman [mailto:tracysfeldman@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:06 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Tracy Feldman
2117 Strebor Street
Durham, NC 27713

## Consent-Based Siting

From: barbara feldstein [mailto:barbarafae@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:58 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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barbara feldstein
1475 2nd ave
6a
new york, NY 10075

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lauren Fenenbock [mailto:shainablue@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Lauren Fenenbock
519 Mississippi Ave
El Paso, TX 79902

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lauren Fenenbock [mailto:shainablue@gmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 3:43 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Lauren Fenenbock
519 Mississippi Ave
El Paso, TX 79902

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Reed Fenton [mailto:reefen@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Reed Fenton
7327 Forbes Ave.
Lake Balboa, CA 91406

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Cheryl Fergeson [mailto:cfxena888@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:33 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Cheryl Fergeson
185 N. 1850 W.
West Point, UT 84015

From: Cheryl Fergeson [mailto:cfxena888@gmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 2:19 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Cheryl Fergeson
185 N. 1850 W.
West Point, UT 84015

From: Julia Ferguson [mailto:jferguson@megagate.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:19 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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Julia Ferguson
1770 Dupont Road
Poplarville, MS 30470

## Consent-Based Siting

From: tom ferguson [mailto:tf@thinkspeak.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:24 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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tom ferguson
372 oakland ave se
atlanta, GA 30312

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Julia Ferguson [mailto:jferguson@megagate.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 6:18 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Julia Ferguson
1770 Dupont Road
Poplarville, MS 30470

## Consent-Based Siting

From: nina fergusson [mailto:nina.fergusson@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 2:44 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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nina fergusson
2254 farmington ln
charlotte, NC 28205

## Consent-Based Siting

From: nina fergusson [mailto:nina.fergusson@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:22 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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nina fergusson
2254 farmington ln
charlotte, NC 28205

From: James Fering [mailto:jfering@charter.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:26 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

Although you will see the message below many times, I want you to know that I concur with it in its entirety! Absolutely and completely! This earth is no place for that kind of waste. So, we must STOP PRODUCING IT! PERIOD!

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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James Fering
2914 Green View Dr
Eau Claire, WI 54703

From: M Fernald [mailto:mfernald@panax.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 7:40 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to eliminate the waste being made; and third is to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

M Fernald
38 Strawberry Rd
Orland, ME 04472

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Howard Fernandez [mailto:ferhow@earthlink.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:24 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Howard Fernandez
3398 California St. #4
S. F., CA 94118

## Consent-Based Siting

From: T. Fernandez [mailto:unitedwithall@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 7:05 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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T. Fernandez
P O Box 7541
Burbank, CA 91510

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From: T. Fernandez [mailto:unitedwithall@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:20 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
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T. Fernandez
P O Box 7541
Burbank, CA 91510

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Daniel Ferra [mailto:danielferra58@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 5:58 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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"We fool ourselves if we are not deeply alarmed by the recent news about the state of global warming. According to new data released by the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, measurements taken at the Mauna Loa Observatory in Hawaii show that carbon dioxide (CO2) concentrations jumped by 3.05 parts per million (ppm) during 2015, the largest year-to-year increase in 56 years of research. 2015 was the fourth consecutive year that CO2 grew more than 2 ppm.

Scientists say they are shocked and stunned by the “unprecedented” NASA temperature figures for February 2016, which are 1.65°C higher than the beginning of the twentieth century and around 1.9°C warmer than the pre-industrial level." Climate Red Alert

We Are All Ready Baked in to a Record Breaking Temps., Wind, Rain and Snow That are HIGHER, Than EXPECTED ! We are going to go Off the Charts !

GREENLAND !

The Koch bros. Warren Buffet, and Bill Gates and Their Fossil Fuel Agenda,

Killing us And Destroying Our Life Sustaining Fragile Eco-Systems !

There is No Atmospheric Budget of Carbon, Methane, or Nuclear !

by Lowana Veal, November 23, 2015
Reykjavik, Iceland - Over the past year, a number of giant, mysterious holes have emerged in Siberia, some as deep as 200 metres.

Scientists say the craters may be emerging because the frozen ground, or "permafrost," that covers much of Siberia has been thawing due to climate change.

Allowing methane gases trapped underground to build up and explode !

Permafrost is ground that is permanently frozen, where the ground temperature has remained below 0 °C (32 °F) for at least two years. It covers about a quarter of the northern hemisphere's land surface.

"Permafrost soils contain vast amounts of carbon, nearly twice as much as is currently in the atmosphere.

As the permafrost thaws in a warming climate, the soil decomposes and releases carbon to the atmosphere as carbon dioxide and methane. These are greenhouse gases, and they warm the Earth even more.

This leads to more permafrost thawing, more carbon release, and so the cycle continues," Chadburn said.

At the recent Arctic Circle Assembly in Reykjavik, Iceland, Max Holmes from the US-based Woods Hole Research Center (WHRC) said in a presentation that the Siberian sinkholes "are an additional indication that vast changes are under way in the Arctic."

We must Stop the Koch bros, Warren Buffets, Bill Gates, and their Fossil Fuel allies from FUKUSHIMIATIZING Us !

Greenland is Melting and Calving Now, Jonas just went over Greenland at above Freezing Temps, for the first Time.

"And for the Winter of 2016 it’s possible that the Arctic may never experience typical conditions.

For, according to NOAA, the first half of February saw this record, Spring-like, warmth extend on through today.

It’s as if these coldest zones in the Northern Hemisphere haven’t yet experienced Winter

— as if the freak storm that drove Arctic temperatures to record levels during late December has, ever since, jammed the thermometer into typical April levels and left it stuck there. " Robert Scribbler

Greenland has 20 Feet of Sea Level Rise !

Now is the Time for Feed in Tariff Clean Kilowatts, Home Owners and Commercial Business owners selling Renewable Energy, Wind and Solar to the Utility !

Dump Net Metering (Second Utility) Third Party Leasing.

Protect Our Communities with Solar Policies that keep the Money in the Wallets and Purses of Head of House Holds.

In Order to Ready Themselves for coming, Record Breaking Rain, Wind and Snow.

Food Shortages, High Temps, Floods, Fire, Quakes, and Sea Level Rising 220 feet !

With Ca. Residential and Commercial Feed in Tariff

Help Protect Hard Working, Tax Paying, Voting, Citizens from our Koch Bros, Warren Buffet, Warren Gates, Fossil Fueled Energy and Water Policies !

Each 1C. Temp Rise, Atmospheric Moisture increases 7%

We have increased Temp 1.4C. and Climbing

1850 ppm Carbon 270

1980 ppm carbon 350

2015 ppm of Carbon 405 and Rising

What will the ppm of Carbon be when Greenland All Melts ?

Diablo Nuclear, San Onofre Fuel Rods, and All Nuclear needs to be relocated to 3000 feet above Sea Level

Over 3 Million Years of Waxing and Waning From the Poles, with the Arctic Keeping North America Cool, Now it is Greenland Because of Fossil Fuels !

Massive Sea Life Die Off on Pacific and Atlantic Coast !

Pacific and Atlantic Oceans 4 - 18 degrees warmer than Normal

Antarctica has 200 feet of Sea Level Rise

Arctic Region Warming Twice as fast as the rest of the planet !

Over 400 Nuclear Reactors at Sea Level Now !

Sign and Share for a Ca. Residential Feed in Tariff. Go to the youtube site, look six inches below video, click on Show More, then click on blue link to sign the petition.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v9GRkZMTqCs
Attachments area
Preview YouTube video We Need To Ban Fracking.
We Need To Ban Fracking.
Attachments area
Preview YouTube video We Need To Ban Fracking.

Daniel Ferra
1268 E. Ramon Rd. Unit 11
Palm Springs, CA 92264

From: Mary Ferraro [mailto:ferrarmt@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:43 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Mary Ferraro
718 Fulton
Aurora, CO 80010

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kathleen Ferris [mailto:k.r.ferris@comcast.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 2:09 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Kathleen Ferris
3210 E. Compton Rd.
Murfreesboro, TN 37130

From: Deborah Ferruccio [mailto:deborahferruccio@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:49 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Deborah Ferruccio
297 DAVIS HYMAN RD
Norlina, NC 27563

## Consent-Based Siting

From: J. Allen Feryok [mailto:aferyok@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 11:26 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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J. Allen Feryok
1520 Jones St
Monessen, PA 15062

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ed Fiedler [mailto:sparkplug2525@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:57 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Ed Fiedler
12325 Limerick Ave
Austin, TX 78758

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ed Fiedler [mailto:sparkplug2525@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 8:23 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Ed Fiedler
12325 Limerick Ave
Austin, TX 78758

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Patricia Fiedler [mailto:pimar361@msn.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:05 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Patricia Fiedler
27 Stream Lane
Levittown, PA 19055

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Patricia Fiedler [mailto:pimar361@msn.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:54 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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Patricia Fiedler
27 Stream Lane
Levittown, PA 19055

## Consent-Based Siting

From: marilyn field [mailto:mfield1@san.rr.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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marilyn field
apt. 208
1101 first street
coronado, CA 92118

From: Rodger Field [mailto:rodger.field@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:43 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Rodger Field
5523 So. Harper Ave.
Chicago, IL 60637

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Aixa Fielder [mailto:aixa1@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:34 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Aixa Fielder
4749 W. Washington Bl.
Los Angeles, CA 90016

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Craig Fiels [mailto:Craig@SustainableEconomicSolutions.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:43 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Craig Fiels
4605 Park Blvd
Oakland, CA 94602

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Clayton Cunha Filho [mailto:clayton.filho@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Clayton Cunha Filho
Rua Dr José Lourenço, 3308
Fortaleza, ot 60115-282

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kathleen Findlay [mailto:kathleen.findlay48@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 10:45 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Kathleen Findlay
PO Box 485
Lebanon, OR 97355

From: Helen Findley [mailto:hcfindley@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:03 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Helen Findley
6225 Mineral Point Road, C61
#1206
Madison, WI 53705

From: Mary Fineran [mailto:yarmaf0@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:23 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Mary Fineran
110 W. Wissahickon Ave;
Flourtown, PA 19031

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jeannie Finlay-Kochanowski [mailto:clannadrocks@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:17 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Jeannie Finlay-Kochanowski
229 Majestic Drive
Toledo, OH 43608

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jeannie Finlay-Kochanowski [mailto:clannadrocks@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:30 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Jeannie Finlay-Kochanowski
229 Majestic Drive
Toledo, OH 43608

From: Mary Lou Finley [mailto:celticwomanwicklow@hotmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 11:09 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Mary Lou Finley
5041 Guava Ave.
Apt. 110
La  Mesa, CA 91942

From: Mary Lou Finley [mailto:celticwomanwicklow@hotmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 9:48 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Mary Lou Finley
5041 Guava Ave.
Apt. 110
La  Mesa, CA 91942

From: Paula Fischer [mailto:pfischer@comcast.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:41 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Paula Fischer
3406 E 40th St.
Minneapolis, MN 55406

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Elaine Fischer [mailto:efischer@workmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 4:04 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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Elaine Fischer
2514 Sharmar Rd.
Roanoke, VA 24018

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Elaine Fischer [mailto:efischer@workmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 11:59 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Elaine Fischer
2514 Sharmar Rd.
Roanoke, VA 24018

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Quentin Fischer [mailto:fischerq@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:39 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Quentin Fischer
2514 Sharmar Rd.
Roanoke, VA 24018

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Deane Fischer [mailto:dd.fischer@comcast.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:40 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Deane Fischer
1745 Old Stage Rd
Colorado Springs, CO 80906

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Robert Fischoff [mailto:robertfischoff@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:04 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Robert Fischoff
313 W 10th Street
Silver City, NM 88061

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Robert Fischoff [mailto:robertfischoff@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:55 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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313 W 10th Street
Silver City, NM 88061

From: Edward Fisher [mailto:eofisher@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:48 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment.

In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future. I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks.

HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated. I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations.

Only after scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site.

The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Edward Fisher
619 East California Boulevard
Pasadena, CA 91106

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Edward Fisher [mailto:eofisher@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 1:44 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest. It's simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment.

In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we already have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is:

- to terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- to provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- to determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks.

HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which pose significant security risks. If the site is temporary, as intended, then by definition each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made, and the third is to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations.

Only when scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed--and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site.

The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of acknowledging that the Department of Energy has failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Edward Fisher
619 East California Boulevard
Pasadena, CA 91106

From: Ted Fishman [mailto:ted10000@hotmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 12:34 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Ted Fishman
790 Villa Teresa Way
san Jose, CA 95123

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Bradley Fitzgerald [mailto:brad@andro-tech.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:51 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

Bradley Fitzgerald
8337 Silo Court
Sarasota, FL 34240

From: Judy Fitzgerald [mailto:fitzjud@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 3:29 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Judy Fitzgerald
88 Woodcrest Blvd
Buffalo, NY 14223

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ned Flaherty [mailto:ned_flaherty@msn.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:25 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: I OPPOSE DOE's Consent-Based Nuclear Waste Siting Process

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and just boosts profits for the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries, while endangering public health / safety / environment.

DOE isn't authorized to pursue this siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators let the federal government control commercial nuclear power generation waste whenever a repository is in operation.

DOE insists that it will keep producing more nuclear waste indefinitely.

I OBJECT to this process: nuclear waste generation, consolidated storage facility siting, and the mass transportation of nuclear waste.

The FIRST goal for managing nuclear waste must be to JUST STOP MAKING IT. The SECOND goal must be to isolate the waste we already have.

The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:
• terminate the production of nuclear waste;
• use on-site/near-site secure interim storage at;
• identify scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

Over 100 organizations endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS also would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The proposed consolidated storage facilities would use the exact same technology and dry-casks currently used at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards of transport, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste stored at risky centralized sites. As a temporary site, each container would move at least twice, and aggravate transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be

transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a licensed, operating long-term management facility before it takes over civilian nuclear waste. For U.S. nuclear waste, the core problem is using only Yucca Mountain for a repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific, politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether it could isolate the radioactivity.

The first step is to remove Yucca Mountain from the U.S. nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made. The third is to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating radioactive materials from the environment for one million years, making reactor site storage an “interim” approach on the scale of human generations.

Only after scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed — the risks identified — can the public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities. Pursuing consent before there's any public confidence in the approach is deceptive and irresponsible.

The DoE has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first, and in suggesting that the public’s input is valuable when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program.

Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site.

DoE must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of just admitting that the DoE failed to implement NWPA.

Ned Flaherty
75 Clarendon Street, #508
Boston, MA 02116

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ned Flaherty [mailto:ned_flaherty@msn.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:52 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The DoE consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy, or in the public interest, and just boosts fossil and nuclear radioactive waste industry profits --- at the expense of public health, public safety, and the environment.

DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste, because the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE Standard Contract with nuclear power generators allow the federal government to take title to and possession of commercial nuclear waste only when a repository is in operation.

DOE insists it will support producing more nuclear waste indefinitely.

I OPPOSE: (1) this process, (2) the continued generation of nuclear waste(3) , the siting of consolidated storage facilities, and (4) mass transportation of nuclear waste.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT, and to isolate existing waste. The only rational basis for an “integrated management plan” for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:
• terminate the production of nuclear waste;
• provide for secure interim storage at or near a generation site;
• determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially equitable methods for its long-term management.

Over 100 organizations support improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires, and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at or near the reactor sites where it is generated.

Per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation.

The proposed consolidated storage facilities would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, except with added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste stored in this configuration, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, it may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require new storage sites. And when a site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site, that would happen without any technical qualification or scientific basis; community sentiment would be ignored; and the consent-based process would be meaningless or even

fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right: DoE must have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before DoE can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The main problem afflicting U.S. nuclear waste policy is Yucca Mountain being the sole site. It was chosen by Congress through an unscientific, politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before it was considered.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to stop using Yucca Mountain. The second step is to limit the waste being made. The third is to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be "interim" on the scale of human generations. Only after viable, responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed — and the options and risks of nuclear waste storage are known — can the public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities, much less participate in the process. Pursuing content without any public confidence is deceptive and irresponsible.

The DoE is pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first, and suggesting that the public's input is valuable even though DoE has no statutory authority to do so.

Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the DoE failed in its effort to implement NWPA.

Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Ned Flaherty
75 Clarendon Street, #508
Boston, MA 02116

From: Tim Fleischer [mailto:timfle@netzero.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:22 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Tim Fleischer
1332 winter ave
Louisville, KY 40204

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Robert Fletcher [mailto:PookaFletch@PookaPress.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 2:09 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

Radioactive waste is forever. It affects all of us, including politicians and people in corporations.

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Robert Fletcher
150 Mt Olympus Dr NW
Issaquah, WA 98027

From: Robert Fletcher [mailto:PookaFletch@PookaPress.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 3:14 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

Let's get this right for the long term.

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Robert Fletcher
150 Mt Olympus Dr NW
Issaquah, WA 98027

## Consent-Based Siting

From: DAWN FLORIO [mailto:FLORIOSKI@YAHOO.COM]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 9:27 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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DAWN FLORIO
8136 maplegrove
North Royalton, OH 41133

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Bobbie Flowers [mailto:bobbie_flowers@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:11 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Bobbie Flowers
418 West 17th Street, Apt. 22A
Apt. 22A
New York, NY 10011

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dan Fogarty [mailto:fogarty830@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:50 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Dan Fogarty
5423 Yerba Buena Rd.
Santa Rosa, CA 95409

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ken Fogel [mailto:kfogel7@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:20 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Ken Fogel
338 Valley Lake Dr.
Stone Mtn., GA 30087

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ken Fogel [mailto:kfogel7@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:16 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Ken Fogel
338 Valley Lake Dr.
Stone Mtn., GA 30087

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joyce Follingstad [mailto:joyfoll@teleport.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:20 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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Joyce Follingstad
2123 NE 53rd Ave
Portland, OR 97213

From: Sandra Folzer [mailto:sfolzer@verizon.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:57 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Sandra Folzer
209 Rex Ave
Philadelphia, PA 19118

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jessica Fondy [mailto:j_fondy@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:09 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Jessica Fondy
1835 Arlington Ave
Pittsburgh, PA 15210

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Adrienne Fong [mailto:afong@jps.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:16 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Adrienne Fong
750 Presidio Ave., #207
San Francisco, CA 94115

From: Leslie Ford [mailto:leslie4d@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:47 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Leslie Ford
shannock road
Wakefield, RI 02879

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Julie Ford [mailto:jford29105@aol.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:25 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Julie Ford
16222 Monterey Lane #223
Huntington Beach, CA 92649

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sharon Ford [mailto:sharon_ford1@att.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:20 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based SitingN Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

No way! No how!

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- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Sharon Ford
13028 Aetna St
Valley Glen, CA 91401

From: Deborah Forman [mailto:derbcanada@yahoo.ca]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 9:02 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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Deborah Forman
3656 jennylind ave.
north highlands, CA 95660

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Katherine Forrest [mailto:kaforrest@earthlink.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:55 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Katherine Forrest
451 Calderon Avenue
Mountain View, CA 94041

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Hal Forsen [mailto:glassics1@cox.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:11 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Hal Forsen
204 Avenida Sierra
San Clemente, CA 92672

## Consent-Based Siting

From: annette forslund [mailto:ampsal91@comcast.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:12 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

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annette forslund
1088 robertts
313 W. State, Geneva, IL
b atavia, IL 60510

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Margaret Forsythe [mailto:mollyhforsythe@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 7:34 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: DOE's community consent on interim storage of nuclear waste.

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) is working to get communities to consent to Nuclear Waste consolidation in their communities. This is an effort to move waste and consolidate it without thinking fully about protecting the health of people and the environment.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation. Movement of nuclear waste should not happen until a safe repository is in operation, and safe ways of transport are developed.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future. We do not have a solution for nuclear waste. We should not be producing more without long term storage solutions in hand.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

To managing nuclear waste with concern for human health and the health of the earth we must :
* STOP producing nuclear waste
* Isolate the waste we have from the environment, by:
- Providing secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- Developing scientifically viable, long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, as per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence. With the added hazards of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored at one or more centralized sites.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the

siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste.

Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible.
To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

Margaret Forsythe
Small Meadows Lane
Putney, VT 05346

## Consent-Based Siting

From: lorraine foster [mailto:lorraine@spiretech.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:37 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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lorraine foster
8205 se 9th ave
8205 se 9th ave
portland, OR 97202

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Beverly Foster [mailto:hwlyfstr@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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Beverly Foster
364 Conestoga Road
Wayne, PA 19087

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Beverly Foster [mailto:hwlyfstr@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:06 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Beverly Foster
364 Conestoga Road
Wayne, PA 19087

From: Merle Foster [mailto:grannydurban2@hotmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 7:27 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Merle Foster
Roger Pl.
Durban, ot 04051

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Winnie Foster [mailto:wfoster26@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:03 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Winnie Foster
311 57th Ave So
St. Petersburg, FL 33705

## Consent-Based Siting

From: James Fox [mailto:coachjimfox@cox.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:39 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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James Fox
10209 Grovewood Way
Fairfax, VA 22032

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Martin Fox [mailto:Martythyle@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:13 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Martin Fox
36 Hidden Pasture Lane
Wiscasset, ME 04578

## Consent-Based Siting

From: louis fox [mailto:louis@freerangestudios.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:19 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

louis fox
451 meadow way
san geronimo, CA 94963

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Eleanor Fox [mailto:efox@rscj.org]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:41 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Eleanor Fox
515 East 118 St. NYC
New York, NY 10035

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Cathy Foxhoven [mailto:iambasque@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:13 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Cathy Foxhoven
295 Vallejo Court
Millbrae, CA 94030

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Cassandra Fralix [mailto:Cfralix@windstream.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:55 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

I do not consent to the consent-based siting process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

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Cassandra Fralix
1038 Corley Mill
Lexington, SC 29206

From: Irena Franchi [mailto:bluabirdo@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:45 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Irena Franchi
301 174 St 2206
Sunny Isle Beac, FL 33160

From: Irena Franchi [mailto:bluabirdo@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:19 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Irena Franchi
301 174 St 2206
Sunny Isle Beac, FL 33160

From: sharon Frank [mailto:featherlover59@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:59 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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sharon Frank
2006 pheasant dr
Lewisville, TX 75077

From: doug franklin [mailto:ldfranklinxx@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:42 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

doug franklin
195 D. C. lane
hayesville, NC 28904

## Consent-Based Siting

From: doug franklin [mailto:ldfranklinxx@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:18 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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doug franklin
195 D. C. lane
hayesville, NC 28904

From: Audrey Franklin [mailto:acab38@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:43 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Audrey Franklin
14360 Meadowlark Lane
Brighton, CO 80601

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Claudia Frantz [mailto:caofrantz@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:48 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Claudia Frantz
9344 Winding Oak Drive
Fair Oaks, CA 95628

From: Claudia Frantz [mailto:caofrantz@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:16 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Claudia Frantz
9344 Winding Oak Drive
Fair Oaks, CA 95628

From: Sandra Franz [mailto:sfranz7@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:41 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Sandra Franz
1130 W Cornelia
Chicago, IL 60657

From: Shirley Frawley [mailto:sfrawley@Knowledge-Discovery.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Shirley Frawley
68 Potter Pond
Lexington, MA 02421

From: shelley frazier [mailto:fshell1602@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

shelley frazier
609 S. Boylan Ave.
Raleigh, NC 27705

## Consent-Based Siting

From: shelley frazier [mailto:fshell1602@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:04 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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shelley frazier
609 S. Boylan Ave.
Raleigh, NC 27705

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Frank Fredenburg [mailto:flf1955@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:36 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Frank Fredenburg
188 Spruce Lake Drive
Milford, PA 18337

From: ruth ann fredenthal [mailto:raf@onemain.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 9:27 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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ruth ann fredenthal
438 west 37th
New York, NY 10018

## Consent-Based Siting

From: PJ Frederick [mailto:XHIPPY249@AOL.COM]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:07 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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PJ Frederick
120 Newry
Hollidaysburg, PA 16648

From: James Freeberg [mailto:jfreeberg0@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:15 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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James Freeberg
POB 938
POB 938
Ashland, OR 97520

From: James Freeberg [mailto:jfreeberg0@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:42 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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James Freeberg
POB 938
POB 938
Ashland, OR 97520

From: Ken Freedman [mailto:linfree@mwt.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:40 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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Ken Freedman
16163 Moldrem Rd.
Ferryville, WI 54628

From: Alan Freedman [mailto:Alanlfreedman@att.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:52 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Alan Freedman
185 Pier Ace
Santa Monica, CA 90405

## Consent-Based Siting

From: claudia freeman [mailto:forfrostfreeman@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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claudia freeman
116 masonic hall rd
PORT HADLOCK, WA 98339

From: Gregory Freeman [mailto:ashcreekgreg@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:21 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Gregory Freeman
6333 E Apache Dr.
Pearce, AZ 85625

From: Kristin Freeman [mailto:snicklefritzin43@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:21 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Kristin Freeman
1346 River Street
Missoula, MT 59801

From: Beth Jane Freeman [mailto:bethjane1220@netscape.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:45 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Beth Jane Freeman
1265 Hawthorne Drive East
Wantagh, NY 11793

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Beth Jane Freeman [mailto:bethjane1220@netscape.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:01 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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Beth Jane Freeman
1265 Hawthorne Drive East
Wantagh, NY 11793

From: claudia freeman [mailto:forfrostfreeman@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 6:16 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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claudia freeman
116 masonic hall rd
PORT HADLOCK, WA 98339

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Carl Freeman [mailto:csfreeman@comcast.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 7:32 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Carl Freeman
5876 N. Golden Eagle Dr.
Tucson, AZ 85750

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dan Freeman [mailto:dan@elementalcorp.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:16 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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As a species we have no choice but to eliminate nuclear energy from "energy options" and to focus on solar and wind as the only real alternatives to our energy needs. Contrary to "popular notions" nuclear is not clean energy.

Dan Freeman
4395 Rollinghill Road
Rollinghill Road
Clinton, WA 98236

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Gregory Freeman [mailto:ashcreekgreg@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:40 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Gregory Freeman
6333 E Apache Dr.
Pearce, AZ 85625

From: Lee Fremault [mailto:Leemo1952@aol.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 2:53 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Lee Fremault
46 Pine Street
Apt. 321
Attleboro, MA 02703

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lee Fremault [mailto:Leemo1952@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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46 Pine Street
Apt. 321
Attleboro, MA 02703

## Consent-Based Siting

From: James French [mailto:forrestfrench@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:39 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

James French
Apt #301
9233 Interlake Avenue North
Seattle, WA 98103

## Consent-Based Siting

From: James French [mailto:forrestfrench@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 7:47 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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From: Neil Freson [mailto:nfreson@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:30 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Neil Freson
26 Bitternell Lane
Henrietta, NY 14467

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Neil Freson [mailto:nfreson@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:16 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Neil Freson
26 Bitternell Lane
Henrietta, NY 14467

From: Patricia fREY [mailto:tefpwf62@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:34 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Patricia fREY
30424 mARINA rOAD
dAGSBORO, DE 19939

## Consent-Based Siting

From: John Frey [mailto:jwfrey2@aol.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 3:56 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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John Frey
1133 Massachusetts Av
Lexington, MA 02420

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From: Patricia fREY [mailto:tefpwf62@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:29 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Patricia fREY
30424 mARINA rOAD
dAGSBORO, DE 19939

## Consent-Based Siting

From: CArolyn Honey Friedman [mailto:honey.friedman@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:44 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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CArolyn Honey Friedman
9605 Jefferson Highway,  Suite I #133
New Orleans, LA 70123

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Susan Friedwald [mailto:Babey10@earthlink.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:56 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Susan Friedwald
145 East 27th Street
145 East 27th Street
New York, NY 10016

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Tracy Frisch [mailto:tracy.frisch@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:56 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Tracy Frisch
1293 McClay Rd.
Greenwich, NY 12834

From: Barbara Frische [mailto:barbfrische@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 2:03 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Barbara Frische
Graugans 4
Wurster Nordseeküste, ot 27639

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Alyce Fritch [mailto:alycej@uw.edu]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 7:32 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Alyce Fritch
2160 N.E. 100th Street
Seattle, WA 98125

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Rev. Ellen Frith, M.Div. [mailto:ellenfrith@post.harvard.edu]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:04 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Rev. Ellen Frith, M.Div.
163 Summer St
Somerville, MA 02143

From: Mary Froehlich [mailto:mefroehlich@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:02 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Mary Froehlich
73 LADY DIANA CIR
MARLTON, NJ 08053

From: Karen Froiland [mailto:kfroiland@sonic.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:10 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Karen Froiland
Santander Ct
Rohnert Park, CA 94928

From: John Frumento [mailto:jafru@ca.rr.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:34 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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John Frumento
9743 Richeon Ave
Downey, CA 90240

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lisa Fues [mailto:ljfues@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:34 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Lisa Fues
9a W Caton Ave
Alexandria, VA 22301

From: Lisa Fues [mailto:ljfues@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:12 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Lisa Fues
9a W Caton Ave
Alexandria, VA 22301

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Peggy Fugate [mailto:westernbabe001@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 8:42 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Peggy Fugate
6685 Stillwell-Beckett
Oxford, OH 45056

From: Victoria Fuller [mailto:vfullerart@comcast.net]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 10:04 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Victoria Fuller
1949 W. Wabansia Ave.
Chicago, IL 60622

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dan Fullerton [mailto:dan.fmpc@mail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 11:54 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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In short, stop making more waste.  Pursue credible ways to store nuclear waste, and then seek consent for siting.

Dan Fullerton
70 Spring Pond Drive
Ossining, NY 10562

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lyle Funderburk [mailto:lyle.funderburk@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:13 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Lyle Funderburk
10003 SE Foster
Portland, OR 97266

From: Lyle Funderburk [mailto:lyle.funderburk@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 7:30 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Lyle Funderburk
10003 SE Foster
Portland, OR 97266

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Rob Fursich [mailto:rof9038@nyp.org]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 11:41 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Rob Fursich
9 longfellow st
hartsdale, NY 10530

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Rob Fursich [mailto:rof9038@nyp.org]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:10 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Rob Fursich
9 longfellow st
hartsdale, NY 10530

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Carol Anne Fusco [mailto:earthdiamond4@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:22 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Carol Anne Fusco
50 Del Mar Ave
Berkeley, CA 94708

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sherrill Futrell [mailto:safutrell@ucdavis.edu]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 5:38 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Sherrill Futrell
151 Inner Cir
Davis, CA 95618

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Nancy Piotrowski [mailto:nap@snoozebutton.org]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 1:17 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Updated Comment - General Opposition to Siting for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

I want to make clear that I really do not support further development of nuclear energy. We need to use renewable sources, not sources that develop toxic waste.

While on one hand having a thorough consent-based process is imperative IF such siting is absolutely necessary, in general, this type of energy is outdated and maladaptive. Energy sources that develop such toxic by-products are not sustainable.

To this end, the Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative seems like a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment in the long term.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

So again, to be clear --I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

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Nancy Piotrowski
3450 Geary Boulevard
Suite #107
San Francisco, CA 94590

## Consent-Based Siting

From: S G [mailto:princess.of.llyr@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:20 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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S G
320 N Belmont St
Glendale, CA 91206

## Consent-Based Siting

From: S G [mailto:princess.of.llyr@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:40 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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S G
320 N Belmont St
Glendale, CA 91206

From: d g [mailto:dgeare@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:27 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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d g
p.o. box 1008
porterville, CA 93258

From: Robert Gabriel [mailto:doctorob@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:51 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Robert Gabriel
3125C 36th Ave NE
Olympia, WA 98506

From: Nick Gaetano [mailto:nic1@cox.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:08 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Nick Gaetano
430 Ashton Dr
Laguna Beach, CA 92651

From: Nick Gaetano [mailto:nic1@cox.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:38 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

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Laguna Beach, CA 92651

## Consent-Based Siting

From: James Galbreath [mailto:jtgalbreath17@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:40 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

Since the nuclear age began, people have raised the question about disposal of nuclear waste, and now, decades later, there is STILL no safe answer. "Interim Storage" is absolutely dishonest and dangerous, since there is not time-limit to "interim." How many chemical hazardous waste sites are still in an "interim" storage situation? Nuclear waste would be even worse.
The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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James Galbreath
6688 FOXTREE AVE
Woodridge, IL 60517

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Querido Galdo [mailto:querido@queridomundo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 2:58 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Querido Galdo
3009 E. 29th Street
Oakland, CA 94601

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Querido Galdo [mailto:querido@queridomundo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 8:19 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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3009 E. 29th Street
Oakland, CA 94601

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ron Galen [mailto:rongalen@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:38 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Personal NOTE:
I understand France REUSES it's nuclear waste to generate more electrical power. This means there are more options than you are discussing. Let's explore ALL viable options.

Ron Galen
2543 Gaynor Avenue
Richmond, CA 94804

## Consent-Based Siting

From: John Gallagher [mailto:ga_architect@juno.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:40 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
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John Gallagher
16-20 160th St
Whitestone, NY 11357

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

John Gallagher
16-20 160th St
Whitestone, NY 11357

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Thomas Gallagher [mailto:gallagherlaw@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:23 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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Thomas Gallagher
3417 Girard Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55408

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Monica M Gallicho [mailto:monicaeve@astound.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:30 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Monica M Gallicho
5476 Roundtree Place, Unit D
Concord, CA 94521

From: M.Sharon Gambocorto [mailto:msharong@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:15 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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M.Sharon Gambocorto
7626-7 Highbridge Rd.
Manlius, NY 13104

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Rhett Gambol [mailto:russofile@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:57 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Rhett Gambol
318 10th Ave E #B10
Seattle, WA 98102

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mary Gamson [mailto:maryedda@verizon.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:41 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Mary Gamson
1520 Glen Oaks Dr. E.
Sarasota, FL 34232

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Croitiene ganMoryn [mailto:adanto@jps.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:30 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Croitiene ganMoryn
6211 SE 24th Avenue
6211 SE 24th Avenue
Ocala, FL 34480

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Carol Gantt [mailto:msfarmgirl@myfrontiermail.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 2:47 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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Carol Gantt
155 Wild Forest Rd
Hot Springs, NC 28743

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kelly Garbato [mailto:kelly.garbato@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:03 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Kelly Garbato
147 SE 260th ST
Plattsburg, MO 64477

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Armando A. Garcia [mailto:mondopwr@aim.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:59 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Armando A. Garcia
16710 Orange Ave Unit F35
Paramount, CA 90723

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Armando A. Garcia
16710 Orange Ave Unit F35
Paramount, CA 90723

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jeffery Garcia [mailto:jeffery@mcn.org]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 2:01 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Jeffery Garcia
PO Box 1166
Mendocino, CA 95460

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From: Armando A. Garcia [mailto:mondopwr@aim.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:59 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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16710 Orange Ave Unit F35
Paramount, CA 90723

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Constance Garcia [mailto:katgood2go@swbell.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:13 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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Constance Garcia
560
Wichita, KS 67212

From: erin garcia [mailto:airingrc2@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:01 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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erin garcia
14924 dickens
sherman oaks, CA 91403

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jeffery Garcia [mailto:jeffery@mcn.org]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:45 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Jeffery Garcia
PO Box 1166
Mendocino, CA 95460

From: Constance Garcia [mailto:katgood2go@swbell.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:51 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Constance Garcia
560
Wichita, KS 67212

From: Claire Garden [mailto:clairenova@juno.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:26 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Claire Garden
1404 Gary
Columbia, MO 65203

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Claire Garden [mailto:clairenova@juno.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 9:30 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Claire Garden
1404 Gary
Columbia, MO 65203

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Annah Gardner [mailto:ajgardner@stthomas.edu]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:22 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Annah Gardner
1906 1st ave s
Minneapolis, MN 55403

From: Michael Garitty [mailto:garitty@nccn.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 11:14 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Michael Garitty
13088 Vista Knolls
Nevada City, CA 95959

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Michael Garitty [mailto:garitty@nccn.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:26 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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Michael Garitty
13088 Vista Knolls
Nevada City, CA 95959

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Patrick Garner [mailto:pdamerica.org@patgarner.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:23 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Patrick Garner
4290 NW 151st Street
Reddick, FL 32686

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Patrick Garner [mailto:pdamerica.org@patgarner.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Patrick Garner
4290 NW 151st Street
Reddick, FL 32686

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Liz Garratt [mailto:erpeldinggarratt@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:41 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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Liz Garratt
10270 Noble Ct
Apt 23
Indianapolis, IN 46234

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Liz Garratt [mailto:erpeldinggarratt@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:46 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Liz Garratt
10270 Noble Ct
Apt 23
Indianapolis, IN 46234

## Consent-Based Siting

From: D Garratt [mailto:Erpelding@excite.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:48 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Indianapolis, IN 46234

## Consent-Based Siting

From: D Garratt [mailto:erpelding@excite.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:42 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

D Garratt
10270 Noble Ct
Indianapolis, IN 46234

## Consent-Based Siting

From: jamila garrecht [mailto:jamila@sonic.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:38 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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jamila garrecht
620 E St
Petaluma, AR 94952

## Consent-Based Siting

From: jamila garrecht [mailto:jamila@sonic.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:45 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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jamila garrecht
620 E St
Petaluma, AR 94952

From: Michael Garrison [mailto:ig.gi@frontier.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 4:40 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Michael Garrison
1312 S.E. Olvera Place
Gresham, OR 97080

## Consent-Based Siting

From: lydia garvey [mailto:wolfhowlmama@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:06 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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lydia garvey
429 s 24th st
clinton, OK 73601

## Consent-Based Siting

From: lydia garvey [mailto:wolfhowlmama@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 7:19 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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lydia garvey
429 s 24th st
clinton, OK 73601

From: Laurie Gates [mailto:Wilpf88@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:12 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Laurie Gates
38 Dusty Miller Lane
S. Chatham, MA 02659

From: Gerard F. Gaudin [mailto:gerard16@juno.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:51 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Gerard F. Gaudin
P.O. BOX 191
Metairie, LA 70004

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Talon Gaudio [mailto:talongd@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Talon Gaudio
talongd@yahoo.com
Snohomish, WA 98296

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Alexander Gaya [mailto:alexgaya@me.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:22 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Alexander Gaya
18 Bridge Sqaure
Northfield, MN 55057

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Aaron Gayken [mailto:agayken75@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:30 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Aaron Gayken
310 W. 21st St. #9
Sioux Falls, SD 57105

From: Anne Gayler [mailto:agayler@optonline.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:10 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Anne Gayler
148 Prospect Road
Monroe, NY 10950

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Steve. Gaylord [mailto:snakebellysg@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 5:34 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Steve. Gaylord
37132 coyote lake rd
Newberry Springs, CA 92311

## Consent-Based Siting

From: B. Geary [mailto:thinkcivic@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:39 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

Let's be clear. WE DO NOT WANT NUCLEAR ENERGY IN OUR FUTURE. So please don't think anyone will cry when the industry ceases TO EXIST!

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE HAS NO AUTHORITY to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.
Stop Making Nuclear Waste!
I DO NOT CONSENT to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

WE DO NOT WANT NUCLEAR ENERGY IN OUR FUTURE.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

Stop Making Nuclear Waste!
More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.
Stop Making Nuclear Waste!
The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites,

both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

WE DO NOT WANT NUCLEAR ENERGY IN OUR FUTURE.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage facilities. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.
Stop Making Nuclear Waste!
The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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The Department of Energy HAS GONE ROGUE in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

B. Geary
2545 S. Birmingham Pl.
13743 W. 64th Dr.,
Tulsa, OK 74114

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dr. Peter Geidel [mailto:drpg23@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:08 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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Dr. Peter Geidel
418 17th Avenue
Paterson, NJ 07504

From: Barbara Geiger [mailto:mariebgeiger@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 8:32 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Barbara Geiger
943 riversedge circle
Annapolis, MD 21401

From: Becky Geiser [mailto:darbeyji@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:59 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Becky Geiser
4607 Hinson Place
San Diego, CA 92115

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sheila Geist [mailto:sheilag100@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:55 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Sheila Geist
100 LaSalle Street, Apt. 17H
100 LaSalle St. NYC 10027
New York, NY 10027

From: Ronald Gelden [mailto:ronaldgelden@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:22 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Ronald Gelden
PO Box 721
Longmont, CO 80502

## Consent-Based Siting

From: carol gelfand [mailto:carolgelfand@mac.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:14 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

carol gelfand
478 BURLEE DR
PITTSBURGH, PA 15237

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sally Jane Gellert [mailto:SJGUU@aol.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 2:51 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has absolutely no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear-power and radioactive-waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. This is not government of, by, and for the people; this is government for corporate interest. We do NOT consent to this entire process, let alone the proposals. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has absolutely NO authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste; this is an industry problem demanding an industry solution. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future. I oppose that position; I live within 40 miles of a leaky nuclear plant, strontium is at higher levels in my water than in the water of those living further away, and I absolutely do NOT want any more waste made or moved.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. We surely do NOT need to move it around the country on trucks, barges, or trains; that simply puts at risk every waterway, highway, railroad track over which it travels, puts at risk every community and wildlife habitat (marine or terrestrial, or avian or butterfly flyway) through which it passes. Will all first responders in all of those communities and natural areas be completely trained in responding to nuclear/radioactive disasters? I have not heard anything of such a plan; in fact, I am not sure that anyone will get notice of such shipments. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated. At my local nuclear reactors, at Indian Point in Buchanan, N.Y., waste pools are 5x more crowded than they were designed to be—making the risk of a serious accident way greater than it should be; the risk of a cooling failure much smaller than designed.

I COMPLETELY OPPOSE the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-

term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. I am not sure that such a facility is possible, but I know categorically that moving radioactive waste BEFORE it is in operation is a recipe for a disaster, a Highway Hiroshima.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes are completely negative and unacceptable: added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. We do not need to increase the number of targets for terrorists and deranged criminals. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire (i.e., the bribes lose effectiveness; I cannot imagine any responsible local government giving consent without a massive cash influx) and require siting of new consolidated storage facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site, there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, probably fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right in requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the U.S. nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made; the third is to make energetic, high-priority progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known and clearly communicated to all residents in nontechnical, easily-understandable language, at a 6th-grade reading level in multiple languages—will the public even be able to give real consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository. It must instead candidly admit that the Department of Energy has utterly failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste; it does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Sally Jane Gellert
210 Broadway
Woodcliff Lake, NJ 07677

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Robert Gemmill [mailto:farmerblue@msn.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 2:18 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Robert Gemmill
101 Sandy Bottom Drive
Deltaville, VA 23043

From: Meredith George [mailto:mergeorge@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:48 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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Meredith George
5430 n magnolia
Chicago, IL 60640

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Gordon Gerbitz [mailto:gforce1@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:43 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

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Gordon Gerbitz
535 E Yanonali Street
535 E Yanonali St
Santa Barbara, CA 93120

From: Gordon Gerbitz [mailto:gforce1@aol.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 3:19 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

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Gordon Gerbitz
535 E Yanonali Street
535 E Yanonali St
Santa Barbara, CA 93120

From: Lolly & Tom Gerhardstein [mailto:globalmktggroup@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:39 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Lolly & Tom Gerhardstein
1039 Woodbridge
St. Clair Shores, MI 48080

From: Kelly Gerhold [mailto:k_gerhold@u.pacific.edu]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:07 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Kelly Gerhold
9506 Staffordshire Way
Bakersfield, CA, CA 93312

## Consent-Based Siting

From: David Gerke [mailto:dggerke@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:12 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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David Gerke
880 White Oaks Rd.
White Oaks, NM 88301

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Steven Gersman [mailto:sgersman@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Steven Gersman
4443 248th Lane SE
Issaquah, WA 98029

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Paul Ghenoiu [mailto:peghen3@operamail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 5:01 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Paul Ghenoiu
33 West Hill Rd
Plattsburgh, NY 12901

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lisa Gherardi [mailto:Gherardi2@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:47 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Lisa Gherardi
435 Alberto Way Unit 16
435 Alberto Way, #16
Los Gatos, CA 95032

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Janet Giamanco [mailto:jjgiamanco@cox.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:14 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Janet Giamanco
3315 Juanita St
San Diego, CA 92105

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joe Giambrone [mailto:mail4joeg@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:57 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Joe Giambrone
3748 Pluto
Redding, CA 96002

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ken Gibb [mailto:kengibb@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:58 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Ken Gibb
PO Box 11616
Zephyr Cove, NV 89448

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Robert Gibb [mailto:rngibb@earthlink.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:45 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Robert Gibb
5036 Revenue Street
Homestead, PA 15120

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Wayne Gibb [mailto:wdgibb@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:15 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Wayne Gibb
8425 Spring Dr.
8690 Trenton Road
Forestville, CA 95436

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Wayne Gibb [mailto:wdgibb@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:21 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Wayne Gibb
8425 Spring Dr.
8690 Trenton Road
Forestville, CA 95436

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Pamela Gibberman [mailto:pgibberman@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 3:20 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Pamela Gibberman
9209 Kester Ave.
Panorama City, CA 91402

From: Covelo Gibbs [mailto:Covelogibbs@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:48 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Covelo Gibbs
P.O. box 514
Whitethorn, CA 95589

From: Sara Gibson [mailto:Sara7gib@mac.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 11:49 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Sara Gibson
2100 N Fremont
Flagstaff, AZ 86001

From: Claudia Gibson [mailto:redzone22@me.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:22 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Claudia Gibson
Cascade dr
Fairfax, CA 94930

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Claudia Gibson [mailto:redzone22@me.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:23 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Claudia Gibson
Cascade dr
Fairfax, CA 94930

From: Jody Gibson [mailto:jodyg8@msn.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:42 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Jody Gibson
317 E. Wall Ave.
Des Moines, IA 50315

From: Jody Gibson [mailto:jodyg8@msn.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 12:21 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Jody Gibson
317 E. Wall Ave.
Des Moines, IA 50315

From: Mark M Giese [mailto:m.mk@juno.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 5:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Mark M Giese
1520 Bryn Mawr Ave
--
Racine, WI 53403

From: Theo Giesy [mailto:tedslioness@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:16 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Theo Giesy
4411 Colonial Ave.
Norfolk, VA 23508

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Theo Giesy [mailto:tedslioness@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:28 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Theo Giesy
4411 Colonial Ave.
Norfolk, VA 23508

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Gary Gilardi [mailto:gary.gilardi@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:40 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Gary Gilardi
1132 8th Street
1132 8th Street
Hood River, OR 97031

From: Gary Gilardi [mailto:gary.gilardi@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:42 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Gary Gilardi
1132 8th Street
1132 8th Street
Hood River, OR 97031

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Elizabeth Gilarowski [mailto:lizg53@yahoo.ca]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:30 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Elizabeth Gilarowski
230 Campbell Avenue Toronto Ontario M6P 3V4 Canada
Toronto, ON M6P 3V4

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Elizabeth Gilarowski [mailto:lizg53@yahoo.ca]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:21 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Elizabeth Gilarowski
230 Campbell Avenue  Toronto  Ontario  M6P 3V4  Canada
Toronto, ON M6P 3V4

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sheldon Gilbert [mailto:eggcream35@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:25 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Sheldon Gilbert
20 Stratford Ridge
Mashpee, MA 02649

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Camille Gilbert [mailto:camillegilbert@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:24 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Camille Gilbert
1923 San Andres St Apt F
Santa Barbara, CA 93101

## Consent-Based Siting

From: David Gilbert [mailto:david_gilbert2002@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 5:55 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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David Gilbert
103 Grandview Ave
Nanuet, NY 10954

## Consent-Based Siting

From: David Gilbert [mailto:david_gilbert2002@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:32 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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David Gilbert
103 Grandview Ave
Nanuet, NY 10954

## Consent-Based Siting

From: valerie gilbert [mailto:weareallone@verizon.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:57 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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valerie gilbert
no snail mail
new york, NY 10022

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Camille Gilbert [mailto:camillegilbert@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:28 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Camille Gilbert
1923 San Andres St Apt F
Santa Barbara, CA 93101

## Consent-Based Siting

From: William Gilbert [mailto:wilgilb@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:21 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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William Gilbert
7517 Jomel Dr
7517 Jomel Dr, 34607
Weeki Wachee, FL 34607

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Karen Giles [mailto:fernwoods@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:16 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Karen Giles
127 Fernwood Dr
127 Fernwood Dr
Portage, PA 15946

From: Karen Giles [mailto:fernwoods@aol.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:18 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

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## Consent-Based Siting

From: Karen Giles [mailto:fernwoods@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:02 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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## Consent-Based Siting

From: Glenn Gill [mailto:ggglenngi@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:42 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Glenn Gill
O st
Carson, NM 87517

From: Julia Marie Gillett [mailto:equanimous1@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:19 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Julia Marie Gillett
P O Box 681
151 South Cora St
Ridgway, CO 81432

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Julia Marie Gillett [mailto:equanimous1@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 7:39 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Julia Marie Gillett
P O Box 681
151 South Cora St
Ridgway, CO 81432

From: Thomas Gilmore [mailto:tgilmore66@comcast.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 2:10 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Thomas Gilmore
317 Parkridge Rd
Bellingham, WA 98225

## Consent-Based Siting

From: John Gilpin [mailto:john.b.gilpin@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:40 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

John Gilpin
818 W Columbia
Champaign, IL 61820

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Arthur Gilroy [mailto:agilroy@earthlink.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 8:58 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Arthur Gilroy
18 West Sterling St
Wharton, NJ 07885

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Abigail Gindele [mailto:agindele@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:32 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Abigail Gindele
229 Clinton St
Portsmouth, NH 03801

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Abigail Gindele [mailto:agindele@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:52 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Abigail Gindele
229 Clinton St
Portsmouth, NH 03801

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Brian Gingras [mailto:briangin54@held.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:24 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Brian Gingras
52 Bradford Commons Lane
Braintree, MA 02184

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Brian Gingras [mailto:briangin54@held.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:08 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Brian Gingras
52 Bradford Commons Lane
Braintree, MA 02184

From: Tom Gingrich [mailto:tomocaster@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:14 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Tom Gingrich
9 Spinet St
Asheville, NC 28806

From: R Gladish [mailto:davinci79@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:51 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

R Gladish
1836 Hunsaker St.
Oceanside, CA 92054

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lynne Glaeske [mailto:lglaeske@comcast.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:41 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

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Lynne Glaeske
3945 S Uinta St
Denver, CO 80237

From: Kiwibob Glanzman [mailto:kiwibob@scn.org]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:16 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Kiwibob Glanzman
1220 NE 90th
1220 NE 90th
Seattle, WA 98115

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kiwibob Glanzman [mailto:kiwibob@scn.org]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 9:12 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Kiwibob Glanzman
1220 NE 90th
1220 NE 90th
Seattle, WA 98115

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Helene Glaser [mailto:Hakebe1@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:46 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Helene Glaser
2077 Edgehill Drive
Furlong, PA 18925

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jean Glassman [mailto:jeg220@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 5:42 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Jean Glassman
89 Newport St
Arlington, MA 02476

## Consent-Based Siting

From: MaryAnne Glazar [mailto:maryanneglazar48@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:28 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

The short-term "convenience" proposed here is not worth long-term devastation.

MaryAnne Glazar
2531 Regent St. #4
Berkeley, CA 94704

## Consent-Based Siting

From: MaryAnne Glazar [mailto:maryanneglazar48@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 10:23 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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MaryAnne Glazar
2531 Regent St. #4
Berkeley, CA 94704

## Consent-Based Siting

From: MaryAnne Glazar [mailto:maryanneglazar48@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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MaryAnne Glazar
2531 Regent St. #4
Berkeley, CA 94704

## Consent-Based Siting

From: ingeborg glier [mailto:inggli64@mac.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:34 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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ingeborg glier
2228 Night Parrot Ave
North Las Vegas, NV 89084

From: Stephen Gliva [mailto:steveillini@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:37 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Stephen Gliva
713 Mulford St
1A
Evanston, IL 60202

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Stephen Gliva [mailto:steveillini@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:51 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Stephen Gliva
713 Mulford St
1A
Evanston, IL 60202

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dr. Prisca Gloor [mailto:priscagl@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:52 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Dr. Prisca Gloor
4055 Coolidge Ave.
Los Angeles, CA 90066

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Erma Gluck [mailto:egbgcats@optonline.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:47 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Erma Gluck
236 Birchwood Rd.
236 Birchwood Rd., Coram, NY  11727
Coram, NY 11727

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Paul Goedinghaus [mailto:pgoeden@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:21 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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Paul Goedinghaus
Chino, CA
Chino, CA 91710

## Consent-Based Siting

-----Original Message-----
From: Linda Goetz [mailto:linda_goetz@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:34 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

We don't need this!! There are alternatives! Why does everyone keep trying to preserve the status quo when the status quo is terrible?!!

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Linda Goetz
1030 W Huntington Dr Apt 16
Arcadia, AZ 91007

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Frances Goff [mailto:frananth@netzero.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:03 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Frances Goff
5311 Corteen Pl #32
Valley Village, CA 91607

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Frances Goff [mailto:frananth@netzero.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:05 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Frances Goff
5311 Corteen Pl #32
Valley Village, CA 91607

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ernest Goitein [mailto:fego@pacbell.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:51 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Ernest Goitein
167 Almendral Ave
167 Almendral Ave
Atherton, CA 94027

From: Leslie Gold [mailto:goldoftheforest@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:49 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Leslie Gold
40 Downing St.
NYC, NY 10014

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Andrew Gold [mailto:rosemount@newmexico.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 11:55 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Andrew Gold
6545 Richards Ave, Santa Fe
Santa Fe, NM 87508

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Carol Gold [mailto:carolgold@earthlink.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:54 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Carol Gold
2901a Sir Francis Drake Blvd.
Fairfax, CA 94930

From: Leslie Gold [mailto:goldoftheforest@yahoo.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 6:47 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Leslie Gold
40 Downing St.
NYC, NY 10014

From: Vicki Gold [mailto:victoria7@snowcrest.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:15 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Vicki Gold
2102 Tanager Lane
Mount Shasta, CA 96067

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Stephanie Goldbach [mailto:tierbefreier-berlin@gmx.de]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 5:19 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: DOE: We Say NO to Nuclear Waste!

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Stephanie Goldbach
Germany
Berlin, NY 10629

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Rich Goldberg [mailto:rgclimber@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:00 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Rich Goldberg
118 Highland Ave.
Penngrove, CA 94951

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Gene Golden [mailto:spredndjoy@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:41 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Gene Golden
45 segada
Rancho Santa Margarita, CA 92688

From: Margo Golden [mailto:olarm@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:15 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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Margo Golden
Belvidere Street
Boston, MA 02199

From: Gene Golden [mailto:spredndjoy@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:32 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Gene Golden
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Rancho Santa Margarita, CA 92688

From: julia Golden [mailto:jadeinsf@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:55 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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julia Golden
750 gonzalez
san francisco, CA 94132

## Consent-Based Siting

From: john golding [mailto:ivang333@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:19 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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john golding
3706 quigley
oakland, CA 94619

## Consent-Based Siting

From: john golding [mailto:ivang333@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 9:10 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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john golding
3706 quigley
oakland, CA 94619

## Consent-Based Siting

From: d goldsmith [mailto:dell.goldsmith@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:07 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,
We need your help. We don't want to be another Fukishima. Big nuclear industry wants tax payers to clean up their messes. Say NO!

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d goldsmith
7150 sw newton pl
Portland, OR 97225

## Consent-Based Siting

From: d goldsmith [mailto:dell.goldsmith@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:44 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

d goldsmith
7150 sw newton pl
Portland, OR 97225

From: Sharon Goldstein [mailto:sharongoldstein123@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 2:30 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Sharon Goldstein
71 E 4th St # 4B, ny,ny 10003
New York, NY 10003

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Freya Goldstein [mailto:goldsteinfreya@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:56 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Freya Goldstein
250 West 104th Street Apartment
New York, NY 10025

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Michael Gomel [mailto:unk4jazz@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:43 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Michael Gomel
4321 52nd St #321
San Diego, CA 92115

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Michael Gomel [mailto:unk4jazz@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:16 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
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Frank Gonzales Jr.
14030 Brougham Ct. Apt. 6
Plymouth, MI 48170

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Frank Gonzales Jr. [mailto:ydeepsg@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:29 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Frank Gonzales Jr.
14030 Brougham Ct. Apt. 6
Plymouth, MI 48170

From: Rick Gonzalez [mailto:mrrickgonzalez@mac.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:37 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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Rick Gonzalez
2846 E. Sierra Dr
Thousand Oaks, CA 91362

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Yazmin Gonzalez [mailto:evaunit2001@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:04 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Yazmin Gonzalez
9627 Maple St.
Bellflower, CA 90706

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Maria Gonzalez [mailto:tracyg36@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:23 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Maria Gonzalez
5117 N East River Rd - Unit 1G
Chicago, IL 60656

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Beth Goode [mailto:goodeb22@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:44 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Beth Goode
101 S. Topanga Canyon Blvd., 1104
Topanga, CA 90290

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Susan Goodell [mailto:goodellsue@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:07 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Susan Goodell
2140 Via Mar Valle
Del Mar, CA 92014

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Margaret Goodman [mailto:messgwg@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:47 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Margaret Goodman
51 Broomall Lane
Glen Mills, PA 19342

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Margaret Goodman [mailto:messgwg@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:21 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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Margaret Goodman
51 Broomall Lane
Glen Mills, PA 19342

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Elizabeth Goodwin [mailto:gdplusgd@pacbell.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:21 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Elizabeth Goodwin
2062 Vine St.
Hollywood, CA 90068

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kahlil Goodwyn [mailto:ktgoodwyn@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:40 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Kahlil Goodwyn
30 Montrose Ave. #22Q
Brooklyn, NY 11206

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Alexandra Gordon [mailto:alixg1@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:28 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Alexandra Gordon
11701 S.W. 80 Rd.
Miami, FL 33156

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Bradley Gordon [mailto:beardedrainbow@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:03 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Bradley Gordon
PO Box 113
PO Box 113
Sebastopol, CA 95473

From: Carol Gordon [mailto:Thecarolanngordon@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 6:40 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Carol Gordon
2801 glendower ave
los angeles, CA 90027

## Consent-Based Siting

From: jon gordon [mailto:jongordonmusic@excite.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:15 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

jon gordon
351 marine ave apt F9
351 marine ave
bklyn, NY 11209

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jacki Gordon [mailto:jgordonextra@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

I have read and endorse this statement!

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Jacki Gordon
1602 Abaco Drive
Coconut Creek, FL 33066

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Debra Gordon-Hellman [mailto:debragh1@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:05 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

I have been opposed to muclear power my entire adult life,,since the age of 20 and I am now 64. Why? The number one reason was also health and safety. How could we continue promoting and building energy systems when there was no known way to successfully deal with the incredibly long, serious, potentially deadly waste storage issues.
However the government and the NRC continued to move forward. It would be an unconscionable move to allow your current initiative.

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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Debra Gordon-Hellman
680 Red Maple Rd.
Blountsville, AL 35031

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Arnold Gore [mailto:arnoldgore@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:36 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Arnold Gore
44 Butler Place
Brooklyn, NY 11238

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jean Gore [mailto:jeangore@comcast.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:03 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Jean Gore
350 Ponca Pl. #175
Boulder, CO 80303

## Consent-Based Siting

From: will gorenfeld [mailto:gorenfeld@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:03 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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will gorenfeld
gothic
novato, CA 94947

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Bonnie Gorman [mailto:bonniegorman1@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:45 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Bonnie Gorman
222 rock island rd
Quincy, MA 02169

From: Bonnie Gorman [mailto:bonniegorman1@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:47 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Bonnie Gorman
222 rock island rd
Quincy, MA 02169

From: Isabelle Gorndt [mailto:belletold@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:47 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

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Isabelle Gorndt
6623 De Celis
Van Nuys, CA 91406

-----Original Message-----
From: Michael Gorr [mailto:mjgorr@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:32 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Michael Gorr
8 Deer Run
Skaneateles, NY 13152

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Eugene Gorrin [mailto:egorrin@comcast.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:40 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process For Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz:

The Department of Energy's ("DOE") consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment.

In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse.

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The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the

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Thank you for considering my comment.

Eugene Gorrin
2607 Frederick Terrace
Union, NJ 07083

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Bob Gorringe [mailto:bob71947@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:24 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Bob Gorringe
19 Knollview Way
San Francisco, CA 94131

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Alice Goss [mailto:allie@whidbey.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:34 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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I agree with this letter and believe that the public is aware of the danger of nuclear waste  to their communities and it would be foolish to agree to interim storage. It is seventy years now with no expert solution for a material that will be dangerous for thousands of years. It is also wrong minded to make more nuclear waste without a secure environmental solution. I am sure you all have heard of "putting the cart before the horse." The answer is no nuclear=no waste.

Alice Goss
3885 Campbell Rd
Clinton, WA 98236

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Alice Goss [mailto:allie@whidbey.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:39 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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I wrote to you a few days ago about nuclear waste and said no to interim storage in communities. I also said no to more nuclear without reliable long term storage which has not happened in 70 years. I wanted to add that the Hanford nuclear facility in my state is a mess of inept cleanup. Since the inception of our nuclear program until today it is a disgrace. Why would any sane person trust interim storage, transporting nuclear waste over our highways or new efforts at nuclear power. It is telling that employees at Hanford are poorly treated for instances of exposure or injury at the facility. It leaves us to believe these workers are disposable and so our communities are viewed in the same way. The risks you propose are to great and the history is to sorted to trust such a plan.

Alice Goss
3885 Campbell Rd
Clinton, WA 98236

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Gordon Gottbeheut [mailto:gordyg@solarus.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:28 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Gordon Gottbeheut
361 Plank Hill Ln.
Nekoosa, WI 54457

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Deborah Gouge [mailto:DeborahBahara@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:44 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Deborah Gouge
7524 Carriage Lane
7524 Carriage Lane
Pittsburgh, PA 15221

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Deborah Gouge [mailto:DeborahBahara@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 6:23 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Deborah Gouge
7524 Carriage Lane
7524 Carriage Lane
Pittsburgh, PA 15221

From: Thomas Gourley [mailto:twgourley1100@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:53 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Thomas Gourley
414 41st Ave
San Francisco, CA 94121

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Karli Grace [mailto:gracekarli@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:16 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Karli Grace
6229 Misty Pines Dr Unit 2
Tinley Park, IL 60477

From: Carol Gracie [mailto:cgracie@optonline.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:53 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Carol Gracie
19 North Lake Circle
South Salem, NY 10590

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jess Graffell [mailto:boxerguy@roadrunner.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:56 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Jess Graffell
37444 Ironwood Drive
YUCAIPA, CA 92399

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jess Graffell [mailto:hoxerguy@roadrunner.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 6:13 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Jess Graffell
37444 Ironwood Drive
Yucaipa, CA 92399

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jennifer Graham [mailto:leonesse56@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Jennifer Graham
5873 Wild Olive Terrace
Fort Myers, NY 33919

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joyce Grajczyk [mailto:jag4848@comcast.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:01 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Joyce Grajczyk
12026 SE 216th St.
Kent, WA 98031

From: Jean Gramlich [mailto:jeangramlich@msn.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 10:12 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Jean Gramlich
18060 Tipsico Lake Rd
18060 Tipsico Lake Rd., Fenton MI 48430
Fenton, MI 48430

From: Alice Granahan [mailto:windmillpat@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:19 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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following reasons: I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Alice Granahan
51 Croyden Rd.
Hingham, MA 02043

## Consent-Based Siting

From: William Granche [mailto:billgranche@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 10:43 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

William Granche
24 Lincoln St.
Ridgway, PA 15853

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Elizabeth Grant [mailto:kundrol@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:57 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

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Elizabeth Grant
P.O. Box 43
Ukiah, CA 95482

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Troy Grant [mailto:Ezeflyer@comcast.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:22 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Troy Grant
East Atlantic blvd
east atlantic blvd
Pompano, FL 33060

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Pamela Grant-Ryan [mailto:spamelams@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:23 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Pamela Grant-Ryan
24 santa rosa avenue
san francisco, CA 94112

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Troy Grant [mailto:Ezeflyer@comcast.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:45 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Troy Grant
East Atlantic blvd
east atlantic blvd
Pompano, FL 33060

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Marya Grathwohl [mailto:earthope@vcn.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:26 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Marya Grathwohl
P.O. Box 489
Dayton, WY 82836

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Judith Gratz [mailto:judithgratz@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:25 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Judith Gratz
510 E. Glenside Ave.
Wyncote, PA 19095

From: David Grau [mailto:david@valleyoaktool.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:24 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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David Grau
773 Sierra View Wau
773 Sierra View Way
Chico, CA 95926

From: Chuck Graver [mailto:cgraver@msn.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:10 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

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Chuck Graver
32 Cotherstone Dr.
Southampton, NJ, NJ 08088

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Brian Gray [mailto:bgraystar@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:02 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Brian Gray
7540 Amy Avenue
Fair Oaks, CA 95628

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To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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David Gray
1729 Arlington Blvd
El Cerrito, CA 94530

From: Marian Grebanier [mailto:mgrebanier@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:23 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Marian Grebanier
5738 SW Brugger St
Portland, OR 997219

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jeane Green [mailto:montrose.girl@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:34 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Jeane Green
1125 East Main
Montrose, CO 81401

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dan & Ann Green [mailto:dhgreen@comcast.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:25 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Dan & Ann Green
83 Dutcher St.
Hopedale, MA 01747

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jeane Green [mailto:montrose.girl@yahoo.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 2:20 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Jeane Green
1125 East Main
Montrose, CO 81401

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lee Greenawalt [mailto:Leegshack@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:06 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Lee Greenawalt
1076 137th Ave
w, CA 95340

## Consent-Based Siting

From: stuart greenburg [mailto:flugel@dslextreme.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:15 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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stuart greenburg
25948 voltaire place
stevenson ranch, CA 91381

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dan & Ann Green [mailto:dhgreen@comcast.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:38 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Dan & Ann Green
83 Dutcher St.
Hopedale, MA 01747

From: Linda Greene [mailto:greenepeace@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:51 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Linda Greene
15313 E Jacobs Rd
15313 E Jacobs Rd
Spokane, WA 99217

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Linda Greene [mailto:lgreene@bloomington.in.us]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 8:53 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Linda Greene
7487 N. John Young Rd.
none
Unionville, IN 47468

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kathy Greene [mailto:kathy.greene@usa.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:42 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Kathy Greene
58 Plotts Rd
Newton, NJ 07860

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Amy Greene [mailto:yogamom32@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:53 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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Amy Greene
80 N. Miami
Wabash, IN 46992

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Laurel Green [mailto:growing.mexico@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:55 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Laurel Green
15 Reynolds Dr
Rockingham, VT 05143

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Emily Greenspan [mailto:ergreenspan@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:06 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Emily Greenspan
42 Montgomery Place
Brooklyn, NY 11215

## Consent-Based Siting

From: amy greer [mailto:gotardbk@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:45 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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amy greer
537 Clinton ave 3c
Brooklyn, NY 11238

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Bobby Greg [mailto:bobbygreg@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 5:43 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

I was living 125 miles north of TMI in 1979 - the US government, the NY State government, the local government, and the nuclear industry all told lies - they were dishonest with what was happening, about the risks, about what people could do, and what people should not do. We were collectively lied to by dishonest industry and government officials. Look up lies and TMI on google and you will find plenty of citations - that came out 20 years after the event. Consequently, the DOE as far as I am concerned is filled with lying dishonest corrupt people who care nothing for human health, for honest communication, or for doing something positive about the disaster that radiation has now given us all. Liars, corrupt, dishonest - that is what you are.

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Bobby Greg
20 Horseheads
Harrigan, NY 14845

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Daria Gregg [mailto:Dariaweb@Verizon.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:30 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Daria Gregg
51 Old Albany Post Rd.
Ossining, NY 10562

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Arthur Gregorian [mailto:raffi_g@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:51 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Arthur Gregorian
3906 Linwood Ave
Oakland, CA 94602

From: Arthur Gregorian [mailto:raffi_g@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 7:08 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Arthur Gregorian
3906 Linwood Ave
Oakland, CA 94602

From: Joan Gregory [mailto:joanmzg13@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:32 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Joan Gregory
916 S Nerual Circle
Salt Lake City, UT 84108

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Pamylle Greinke [mailto:pamylle1@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Pamylle Greinke
P.O. Box 456
Peconic, NY 11958

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sylvan Grey [mailto:lenrivers@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:25 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Sylvan Grey
4826 SE 76th Ave
Portland,, OR 97205

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mercy Grieco [mailto:mercy.grieco@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:17 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Mercy Grieco
1692 E Richmond ave
Fresno, CA 93720

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Carroll Griesedieck [mailto:carrollandsam@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 7:58 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Carroll Griesedieck
PO Box 1346
PO Box 1346, NM 87529

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Edith Griffin [mailto:edith.griffin@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:59 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future. This is not a sane policy.

I totally oppose the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities anywhere on this planet, and the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them. As a matter of fact, I think radioactive waste should be put on a rocket and blasted into outer space, if the rocket could be guaranteed not to blow up on take-off.

The absolute most important goal at this point should be to STOP GENERATING NUCLEAR WASTE altogether, and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be

transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Wake up to reality.  Nuclear power has no place in our world.  If the risks and costs of dealing with the waste generated by nuclear plants had been taken into account when estimating the economic benefits of nuclear power, no nuclear plants would ever have been built.

Edith Griffin
65 West Street
Groton, MA 01450

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Nancy Griffith [mailto:ngrifbeauty11@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 2:40 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Nancy Griffith
7130 W 29th Pl
Wheat Ridge, CO 80033

## Consent-Based Siting

From: John Grillo [mailto:john.grillo@maine.edu]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:11 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety[,] and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation. DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them. The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT[,] and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

• To terminate the production of nuclear waste.

• To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible[,] to[ ] the site of generation.

• To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protect[ ] the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks.

HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible[,] to[ ] the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites[,] unless[,] and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, [and a] PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized[,] additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, [thereby] compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire[,] and [therefore] require siting of new consolidated storage facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term[,] or even permanent waste site[,] there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; [additionally,] the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain [in the state of Nevada] as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the U[.]S[.] nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third[,] to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations.

Only [when] scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible[....] To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first[,] is deceptive and irresponsible.

The [U.S.] Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless[,] and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site.

The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

John Grillo
3 Marsh Lane Apt. 21
Orono, ME 04473

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Scott Grinthal [mailto:sgrinthal@yahoo.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 8:27 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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Scott Grinthal
1721 Los Altos Drive
San Mateo, CA 94402

From: Kathy Gritz [mailto:kgritz8@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 8:54 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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Kathy Gritz
72 Lakeshore Park Rd
Boulder, CO 80302

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Robert Groff [mailto:rw_groff@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:37 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, it appears dumping nuclear waste on the citizens is the aim. DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

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I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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Robert Groff
1222 Arnold Bay Road
Panton, VT 05491

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Norda Gromoll [mailto:gromoll@nnex.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:32 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Norda Gromoll
1717 Watersmeet Lake Rd.
Eagle River, WI 54521

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Norda Gromoll [mailto:gromoll@nnex.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:08 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Norda Gromoll
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Eagle River, WI 54521

## Consent-Based Siting

From: edith groner [mailto:ediegroner@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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edith groner
230 parkside dr.
palo alto, CA 94306

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Henriette Groot PhD [mailto:hplgroot@kchx.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 10:57 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Henriette Groot PhD
1940 Tapidero Ave
1000 Montecito Rd
Los Osos, CA 93402

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Judy Grosch [mailto:KNgrosch@aol.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 3:25 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Judy Grosch
1117 wyeth Dr.
Bernried, ot 34292

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Barbara Grosh [mailto:barbara@grosh.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:12 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Barbara Grosh
12 Whittlers Ridge
p, NY 14534

## Consent-Based Siting

From: William Grosh [mailto:groshjrw@earthlink.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:40 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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William Grosh
1750 W Main St
El Centro, CA 92243

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Richard Grossman [mailto:mail@population-matters.org]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:39 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Richard Grossman
800 Heartwood Lane
800 Heartwood Lane
Bayfield, CO 81122

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kathleen Grossman [mailto:kgtigerlily@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:59 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Kathleen Grossman
225 Shadow Creek Lane
Anderson, SC 29621

From: Steve Grundy [mailto:spacekestrel@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 4:27 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Steve Grundy
Manor Farm Annexe
Lower Godney
Nr wells, ot BA5 1RZ

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Babette Grunow [mailto:babette37@sbcglobal net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:06 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future. We need to say no to this. We need to cut down on and hopefully end the production of more nuclear waste.

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The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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No consideration of the rights or consent of communities along transport routes is being made or requested. Although one of the greatest dangers to the most people, environments and ecosystems is the movement of tens of thousands of tons of nuclear waste on roads, rails and waterways, DOE has stated that there is complete federal preemption over transport of nuclear waste, so states and communities along the transport routes would have no voice, no matter how much waste DOE plans to move through them. This could affect the entire country and not just the isolated areas where it is stored. That concerns me greatly.

Babette Grunow
2132 N. 33 St, Milwaukee WI 53208
Milwaukee, WI 53208

From: Valerie Guinan [mailto:vguinan@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:37 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Valerie Guinan
PO Box 4251
APT 211
Bend, OR 97707

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ronald Gulla [mailto:fight848@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:34 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Ronald Gulla
302 Linden Creek Road
Canonsburg, PA 15317

## Consent-Based Siting

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Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

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Ronald Gulla
302 Linden Creek Road
Canonsburg, PA 15317

## Consent-Based Siting

From: jon gulledge [mailto:jongul@whidbey.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:04 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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jon gulledge
3961 saratoga rd.
Langley, WA 98260

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jana Gunnell [mailto:grateful2b@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:04 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Jana Gunnell
1919 College Dr.
Gallup, NM 87301

From: Peter Gunther [mailto:avengethecathars@juno.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:59 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Peter Gunther
5636 N. Spaulding 1B
Chicago, IL 60659

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Amy Gustin [mailto:amyacorneater@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 5:27 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Amy Gustin
P.O. Box 2301
Redway, CA 95560

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From: Cesar Gutierrez El [mailto:gutiece@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:05 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
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Cesar Gutierrez El
60 Warrington Place
East Orange, NJ 07017

From: Nancy Gutierrez [mailto:Lilgutz11@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:50 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Nancy Gutierrez
45825 abronia trail
Palm desert, CA 92260

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Michael Gutleber [mailto:michaeljgut@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 8:42 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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Michael Gutleber
13055 118TH ST
SOUTH OZONE PARK, NY 11420

From: Marta Guttenberg [mailto:martaguttenberg@comcast.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:21 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Marta Guttenberg
226 West Rittenhouse Square
Philadelphia, PA 19103

## Consent-Based Siting

From: kerry guy [mailto:kerryguygardens@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:12 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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kerry guy
1 St. Medard Road
Wedmore, ot BS28 4AY

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Liz h [mailto:deejayliz@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:32 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Liz h
Box 1276
Mendocino, CA 95460

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Evelyn Haas [mailto:oldleft@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 5:10 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Evelyn Haas
7832 Lister St.
Phila., PA 19152

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Arnold Haber [mailto:arne@arnoldhaber.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:57 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Arnold Haber
224-09 Horace Harding Exp
Oakland Gardens, NY 11364

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Gary Hackenberg [mailto:garyhack@ptd.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:39 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

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Gary Hackenberg
204 St. Louis Street
Lewisburg, PA 17837

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Randi Hacker [mailto:tweenmom@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:07 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Randi Hacker
1400 Jayhawk Blvd.
Lawrence, KS 66046

From: BOB HAGELE [mailto:bobhagele@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:32 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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BOB HAGELE
222 N COLUMBUS DR
CHICAGO, IL 60601

## Consent-Based Siting

From: BOB HAGELE [mailto:bobhagele@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:32 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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BOB HAGELE
222 N COLUMBUS DR
CHICAGO, IL 60601

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jon Hager [mailto:stormcrow60@xmission.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:12 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Jon Hager
11760 S 1300 W
Riverton, UT 84065

From: Jon Hager [mailto:stormcrow60@xmission.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 9:13 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Jon Hager
11760 S 1300 W
Riverton, UT 84065

## Consent-Based Siting

From: MC Hagerty [mailto:mc@matrixmasters.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:24 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

MC Hagerty
POBox 131133
Catlsbad, CA 92013

From: MC Hagerty [mailto:mc@matrixmasters.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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MC Hagerty
POBox 131133
Catlsbad, CA 92013

From: Sean Hagstrom [mailto:mortsgahd@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:02 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Sean Hagstrom
151 N Center St
Redlands, CA 92373

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sean Hagstrom [mailto:mortsgahd@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:06 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Sean Hagstrom
151 N Center St
Redlands, CA 92373

From: John and Janice Hahn [mailto:jandjhahn@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 8:19 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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John and Janice Hahn
159 West Shore Road
159 West Shore Road, Shohola, PA 18458
Shohola, PA 18458

From: Roselene Haines [mailto:Rhaines15@tampabay.rr.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:36 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Roselene Haines
2559 Dale Ann Dr
None
Haines City, FL 33844

From: Ellen Halbert [mailto:ellenhalbert@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:55 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Ellen Halbert
46454 Cherryfield Ln
Drayden, MD 20630

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jen Halbert [mailto:jen.halbert@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:11 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Jen Halbert
8415 4th Ave, Apt E5
Brooklyn, NY 11209

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ellen Halbert [mailto:ellenhalbert@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:52 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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Ellen Halbert
46454 Cherryfield Ln
Drayden, MD 20630

From: Helen Hale [mailto:elenia3@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:15 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Helen Hale
Bass Street
Atlanta, GA 30315

From: Jennifer Hall [mailto:solitarydragon77@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 11:02 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Jennifer Hall
345 Doughtys Chapel RD
Greeneville, TN 37745

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Robert Hall [mailto:rh@solaritis.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 6:17 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

If it were possible for nuclear waste to come home to roost, I guess this is that time.

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Robert Hall
15531 42nd Rd N
Loxahatchee, FL 33470

From: Joyce Hall [mailto:hallmj@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:59 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Joyce Hall
4330 Crowley Drive
Dallas, TX 75229

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Zack Hall [mailto:hall.zack@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 7:26 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Zack Hall
1909 N Beachwood Dr. #18
Los Angeles, CA 90068

From: Sue Halligan [mailto:tokyosue@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:38 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Sue Halligan
1190 Schooner Way
Woodbury, MN 55125

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sue Halligan [mailto:tokyosue@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 5:53 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Sue Halligan
1190 Schooner Way
Woodbury, MN 55125

From: Janice Hallman [mailto:jrhallman2@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:54 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Janice Hallman
5355 Anderlie Lane
St. Paul, MN 55110

From: Janice Hallman [mailto:jrhallman2@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 4:23 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Janice Hallman
5355 Anderlie Lane
St. Paul, MN 55110

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Shawn Hall [mailto:shall@pietystreet.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Shawn Hall
3211 Dauphine St
New Orleans, LA 70117

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From: Zack Hall [mailto:hall.zack@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:22 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Zack Hall
1909 N Beachwood Dr. #18
Los Angeles, CA 90068

## Consent-Based Siting

From: B. Ham [mailto:bethham@dnet.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:27 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

B. Ham
537 Hickory St.
NC, NC 28741

From: Bob Hamburg [mailto:bhanomalous7@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:13 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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Bob Hamburg
532 Georgian Rd.
532 Georgian Road
Glenside, PA 19038

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Pecola Hamilton [mailto:loonytoon60@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:44 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Pecola Hamilton
11710 342nd Ave NE
342nd Ave NE
Carnation, WA 98014

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Abigail Hamilton-Claus2 [mailto:ab40@pacbell.net]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 10:48 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Abigail Hamilton-Claus2
10 Clover Court
Woodland, CA 95695

From: Mary Hamlett [mailto:MaryEHamlett@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Mary Hamlett
P.O. Box 2904
Sacramento, CA 95812

From: Penny Hammack [mailto:penny.hammack@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Penny Hammack
6350 Winter Park Dr Apt 350
North Richland Hills, TX 76180

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Penny Hammack [mailto:penny.hammack@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:16 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Penny Hammack
6350 Winter Park Dr Apt 350
North Richland Hills, TX 76180

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Bryn Hammarstrom [mailto:bryn@epix.net]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 1:01 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

As a parent and RN, I believe the Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Bryn Hammarstrom
R.D.#2
Middlebury Ctr, PA 16935

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Bryn Hammarstrom [mailto:bryn@epix.net]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 11:05 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

Unfortunately, many people know that the Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

As a father and RN, I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

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I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Bryn Hammarstrom
R.D.#2
Middlebury Ctr, PA 16935

From: John Hammel [mailto:jhammel77@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 11:21 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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John Hammel
312 McBrien Rd. Apt 338
Chattanooga, TN 37411

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Marcella Hammond [mailto:shyviola@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Marcella Hammond
4365 Alabama St. #1
San Diego, CA 91977

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Christopher Hammond [mailto:leandog1@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 5:03 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Christopher Hammond
2278 Rose rd.
Loveland, OH 45140

From: Marcella Hammond [mailto:shyviola@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:19 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Marcella Hammond
4365 Alabama St. #1
San Diego, CA 91977

From: Hugh Hampton [mailto:adfoffice1@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:52 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Hugh Hampton
4057 E Monte Vista Drive
Tucson, AZ 85712

From: Lana Hampton [mailto:lanah1224@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 10:17 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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Lana Hampton
6057 N. Lincoln Ave.
Apt. 501
Chicago, IL 60659

From: Judith Hancock [mailto:hancpicc@airbaud.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:53 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Judith Hancock
1415 W 95th Pl Crown Point
Crown Point, IN 46307

From: Robert Handelsman [mailto:trtfmnlwr@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Robert Handelsman
2643 Central Park
2643 Central Park
Evanston, IL 60201

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Robert Handelsman [mailto:trtfmnlwr@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:52 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Robert Handelsman
2643 Central Park
2643 Central Park
Evanston, IL 60201

From: Janet Handford [mailto:handfordjn@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:40 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Janet Handford
55 Kristee Circle
West Warwick, RI 02893

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Janet Handford [mailto:handfordjn@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 6:54 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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55 Kristee Circle
West Warwick, RI 02893

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Steven Handwerker [mailto:drstevenehandwerker@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:20 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Steven Handwerker
6465 Via Benita
6465 Via Benita
Boca Raton, FL 33488

## Consent-Based Siting

From: glen hanko [mailto:congruentworks@gmai.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:56 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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glen hanko
1011 elk valley rd
crescent city, CA 95531

From: Laura Hanks [mailto:laura.hanks@comcast.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 3:21 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Laura Hanks
7634 SE Alder
7634 SE Alder
Portland, OR 97215

From: Jalna Hanmer [mailto:jalna@hanmer.plus.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 10:57 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Jalna Hanmer
1A Moorland Leys
Leeds, ot LS17 5BD

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jalna Hanmer [mailto:jalna@hanmer.plus.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:23 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Jalna Hanmer
1A Moorland Leys
Leeds, ot LS17 5BD

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Helen Hanna [mailto:helenhanna@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:27 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest. Your job, as I have always understood it, is NOT to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment.

As a concerned American and taxpayer, I do not consent in any way to the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them. The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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I strongly oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage facilities. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act rightly requires the DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting

nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

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Helen Hanna
183 Gifford Way
none
Sacramento, CA 95864

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Rob Hanna [mailto:rghanna@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:39 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Rob Hanna
137 Palm St #707
Ventura, CA 93001

## Consent-Based Siting

From: jeannette hanna [mailto:jhannafirst@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 7:07 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

jeannette hanna
1401 glenwood rd
sacramento, CA 95864

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Helen Hanna [mailto:helenhanna@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:40 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative is clearly a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In other words, DOR intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

Among many other Americans,I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made. The third step is to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years. Only then can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has no statutory authority to pursue any other program. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Helen Hanna
183 Gifford Way
none
Sacramento, CA 95864

From: Sandra Hansen [mailto:s.hansen@comcast.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:24 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Sandra Hansen
401 So Fifth St
St Joseph, IL 61873

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Art Hanson [mailto:ahanson47@comcast.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:02 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has NO basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has NO authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do NOT consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The ONLY RATIONAL basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To TERMINATE the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I strongly OPPOSE the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to REMOVE Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has NO statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be NO progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration MUST STOP scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage ONLY increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does NOTHING to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Art Hanson
1815 Briarwood Dr.
Lansing, MI 48917

From: Edward Hanson [mailto:hansbear@centurylink.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:57 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Edward Hanson
Leyden
CC, CO 80022

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Larry Hanson [mailto:larryjhanson@comcast.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:41 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

This is a new day. Fukushima has shown us the old way. The old way also includes trying to deal with nuclear waste that has no solution for its radioactivity far into the future. It is time to give it up and use the technologies that are safe and sustainable. I support the message below as well.

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at

least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Larry Hanson
10448 Scenic Drive
Forestville, CA 95436

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mary Hanson [mailto:hansonmary@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 6:21 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

I count on you to use science, not politics, in your decisions regarding safety and health. The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be

transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Mary Hanson
4701 38th Ave NE
Seattle, WA 98105

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Natalie Hanson [mailto:nhanson48@comcast.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:09 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has NO basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has NO authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do NOT consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The ONLY RATIONAL basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To TERMINATE the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I strongly OPPOSE the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to REMOVE Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has NO statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be NO progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration MUST STOP scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage ONLY increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does NOTHING to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Natalie Hanson
1815 Briarwood Dr.
Lansing, MI 48917

From: Gregory Harder [mailto:grharder@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:26 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Gregory Harder
9043474684
St. Augustine, FL 32086

From: Kate Harder [mailto:myshadowinil@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 9:53 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Kate Harder
1N186 Main Street
Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

From: Cheryl Harding [mailto:cfharding9@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:54 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Cheryl Harding
Box 309
box 309
Stanton, NJ 08885

From: Vincent Hardt [mailto:vvince2001@hotmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 4:49 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Vincent Hardt
29w424 Butternut Ln
Warrenville, IL 60555

From: Merja Harju [mailto:merjas006@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:18 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Merja Harju
Varisselänkatu 35 C 20
Vaasa, FL 65200

From: Merja Harju [mailto:merjas006@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 11:46 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Merja Harju
Varisselänkatu 35 C 20
Vaasa, FL 65200

From: Miriam Harlan [mailto:miriamharlan@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:03 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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Miriam Harlan
1929 Spruce Street
Philadelphia, PA 19103

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Miriam Harlan [mailto:miriamharlan@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:16 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Miriam Harlan
1929 Spruce Street
Philadelphia, PA 19103

From: Amy Harlib [mailto:aharlib@earthlink.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:33 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

NO TO THIS NUCLEAR INSANITY!

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Amy Harlib
212 West 22nd St. #2N
New York, NY 10011

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Amy Harlib [mailto:aharlib@earthlink.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:06 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Amy Harlib
212 West 22nd St. #2N
New York, NY 10011

From: susan harnisch [mailto:susanjh@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:36 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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susan harnisch
p.o. box 7846
menlo park, CA 93430

## Consent-Based Siting

From: susan harnisch [mailto:susanjh@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:09 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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susan harnisch
p.o. box 7846
menlo park, CA 93430

From: Wende Harper [mailto:wendeharp@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:58 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Wende Harper
218 Four Brooks Rd.
2222218 Four Brooks Rd.
Stamford, CT 06903

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Diane Harper [mailto:dianecropper@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:33 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

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Diane Harper
2840 E 6th St #1
Long Beach, CA 90814

From: Diane Harper [mailto:dianecropper@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 9:30 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

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Diane Harper
2840 E 6th St #1
Long Beach, CA 90814

From: Roger H. Harrell [mailto:rhharrell@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:33 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Roger H. Harrell
514  24th Street
514  24th Street
Hermosa Beach, CA 90254

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Roger H. Harrell [mailto:rhharrell@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:03 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Roger H. Harrell
514  24th Street
514  24th Street
Hermosa Beach, CA 90254

From: Sue Harrington [mailto:wldwmn53@hotmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:44 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Sue Harrington
Randall Drive N.W.
Gig Harbor, WA 98332

## Consent-Based Siting

From: David Harris [mailto:open7oceans@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:42 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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David Harris
4485 Hope St.
Ventura, CA 93003

From: Deborah W. Harris [mailto:trailflyer@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:53 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Deborah W. Harris
POB 602
Floyd, VA 24091

From: Beverly Harris [mailto:homestayny@msn.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 11:27 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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Beverly Harris
23 Spring Street
Ossining, NY 10562

From: Daniel L. Harris [mailto:youthgoji@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:55 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Daniel L. Harris
142 Richmond Avenue
Medford, NY 11763

## Consent-Based Siting

From: David Harris [mailto:open7oceans@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 7:12 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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David Harris
4485 Hope St.
Ventura, CA 93003

From: Daniel L. Harris [mailto:youthgoji@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:19 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Daniel L. Harris
142 Richmond Avenue
Medford, NY 11763

From: Debra Harris [mailto:dharris0220@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:22 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Debra Harris
9630 Keeler Ave
Skokie, IL 60076

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Deborah W. Harris [mailto:trailflyer@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:02 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

It is blatantly obvious that there is nothing CLEAN about nuclear energy.

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Deborah W. Harris
POB 602
Floyd, VA 24091

From: Jeane Harrison [mailto:jlhggy@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:51 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Jeane Harrison
3445 S W 31st Street
Des Moines, IA 50321

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jeane Harrison [mailto:jlhggy@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 8:14 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Jeane Harrison
3445 S W 31st Street
Des Moines, IA 50321

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lisa Harrison [mailto:Harrison333@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:41 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Lisa Harrison
212 w 105
NY, NY 10025

From: Randy Harrison [mailto:ran6711@comcast.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Randy Harrison
4051 Wagner St
Eugene, OR 97402

From: Susan Harrison [mailto:smhboston@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 4:38 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Susan Harrison
150 Erie Street
Erie Street
Cambridge, MA 02139

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lisa Harrison [mailto:Harrison333@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:13 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Lisa Harrison
212 w 105
NY, NY 10025

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Rachel Hart [mailto:itnbs8@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:21 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Rachel Hart
4311 San Pedro Dr NE Apt b110
Albuquerque, NM 87109

## Consent-Based Siting

From: M. Hart [mailto:winxgrrl22@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 9:42 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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M. Hart
5943 Balboa Ave.
Ste. 100
San Diego, CA 92111

From: Margaret Hart [mailto:marghart@a-znet.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:46 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Margaret Hart
23 Collins Terrace
Central Square, NY 13036

From: Rachel Hart [mailto:itnbs8@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 6:20 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Rachel Hart
4311 San Pedro Dr NE Apt b110
Albuquerque, NM 87109

From: James Hartley [mailto:jwhartley77@msn.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:56 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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James Hartley
6027 N. 26th Street
Arlington, VA 22207

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Rick Hartley [mailto:Blueshawk95@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 5:12 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Rick Hartley
655 Parkman Rd., Warren, Ohio
Warren, OH 44485

From: Brenda Hartman [mailto:hartman_brenda@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:45 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Brenda Hartman
1138 Douglass St.
1138 Douglass St.
Reading, PA 19604

## Consent-Based Siting

From: James Hartman [mailto:vwgrandpa@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 7:22 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

James Hartman
4800 s pine island rd 25
davie, FL 33328

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lorraine Hartmann [mailto:lorrainehartmann@comcast.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:42 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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Lorraine Hartmann
10627 Durland NE
10627 Durtand NE
Seattle, WA 98125

From: Av Harville [mailto:aaharvy@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:22 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Av Harville
215 San Angelo Ave Ste B
Benbrook, TX 76126

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Robert Haslag [mailto:bobhaslag@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:19 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Robert Haslag
10513 Bryant Rd.
Centertown, MO 65023

From: Robert Haslag [mailto:bobhaslag@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 2:30 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Robert Haslag
10513 Bryant Rd.
Centertown, MO 65023

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Malissa Haslam [mailto:mha6445010@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:02 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Malissa Haslam
2598 Calle Delfino
2598 cALLE dELFINO
Santa Fe, NM 87505

From: William Hassig [mailto:williamhassig@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 7:52 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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William Hassig
102 N. Russel st.
Mt. Prospect, IL 60056

From: susan hastings [mailto:sustings@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:36 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

susan hastings
1070 Novelly Dr.
Reno, NV 89503

From: Barbara Hauck [mailto:figarosings@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:27 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
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Barbara Hauck
10912 124 Ave
Largo, FL 33778

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Barbara Hauck [mailto:figarosings@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:05 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Barbara Hauck
10912 124 Ave
Largo, FL 33778

From: Margarita Haugaard [mailto:margarita-h@cox.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:42 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Margarita Haugaard
36060 indiana street
san diego, CA 92103

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Carolyn Haupt [mailto:carolynh41@earthlink.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:41 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Carolyn Haupt
51 Villa View Drive
Staunton, VA 24401

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From: Leigh Hauter [mailto:bullrunfarm@novecnet.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:13 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Leigh Hauter
4362 Highpoint Ln
The Plains, VA 20198

## Consent-Based Siting

From: CAROLYN HAWK [mailto:PELE46@AOL.COM]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:00 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

CAROLYN HAWK
3680 ALGOMA ROAD
NEW FRANKEN, WI 54229

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Don Hawkins [mailto:hawk6977@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:23 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Don Hawkins
515 52nd St
Pittsburgh, PA 15201

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Don Hawkins [mailto:hawk6977@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:15 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Don Hawkins
515 52nd St
Pittsburgh, PA 15201

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Salome Hawkins [mailto:LadySalome257@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:11 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Salome Hawkins
6159 E Calle Pantano
Anaheim, CA 92807

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Carol Hay [mailto:cmhay.lessmess@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:05 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Carol Hay
3929-A Red Hawk Rd
Hillsborough, NC 27516

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jennifer Hayes [mailto:xandysmom@aol.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:08 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Jennifer Hayes
2312 St. James Pl.
Modesto, CA 95350

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jennifer Hayes [mailto:xandysmom@aol.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 1:04 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Jennifer Hayes
2312 St. James Pl.
Modesto, CA 95350

From: Joseph Hayes [mailto:jth815@earthlink.net]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 3:28 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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Joseph Hayes
185 Rainbow Dr
Grand Junction, CO 81503

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sarah Hayes [mailto:slhayes01@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:37 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Sarah Hayes
1055 Agate Street
Saint Paul, MN 55117

From: Helen Logan Hays [mailto:hlhays@ccgmail.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:13 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Helen Logan Hays
18553 S Ferguson Rd
Oregon City, OR 97045

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Helen Logan Hays [mailto:hlhays@ccgmail.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:00 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Helen Logan Hays
18553 S Ferguson Rd
Oregon City, OR 97045

## Consent-Based Siting

From: mike hayward [mailto:mike7873@GMAIL.COM]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:19 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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mike hayward
pobox755
east marion, NY 11939

## Consent-Based Siting

From: chris hazynski [mailto:mchazy77@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:43 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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chris hazynski
12 cypress ct.
bordentown, NJ 08505

## Consent-Based Siting

From: chris hazynski [mailto:mchazy77@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:25 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

chris hazynski
12 cypress ct.
bordentown, NJ 08505

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lorraine Heagy [mailto:lmheagy@ptd net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:48 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Lorraine Heagy
6 Sussex Place
Lititz, PA 17543

From: Lorraine Heagy [mailto:lmheagy@ptd.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:26 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Lorraine Heagy
6 Sussex Place
Lititz, PA 17543

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mark Heald [mailto:mheald@frontiernet.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:51 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Mark Heald
PO Box 284
Pleasant Hill, TN 38578

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mark Heald [mailto:mheald@frontiernet.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:03 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Mark Heald
PO Box 284
Pleasant Hill, TN 38578

From: shannon Healey [mailto:sh2424@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:38 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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shannon Healey
San Carlos, CA 94070
Apt 1
San Carlos, CA 94070

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Helgaleena Healingline [mailto:helgaleenas@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:36 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Helgaleena Healingline
box 6121
Monona, WI 53716

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ray Hearne [mailto:rayforpeace@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 5:50 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Ray Hearne
91 Bald Crk Rd
91 BaldCreek Rd
Leicester, NC 28748

From: joshua heffron [mailto:Piratedragon73@aol.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 3:27 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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joshua heffron
8 east 83 st
nyc, NY 10028

From: Richard Heggen [mailto:tubegeek@nventure.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:29 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Richard Heggen
6444 Five Views Rd
Tacoma, WA 98407

From: Andra Heide [mailto:ajheide@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:11 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Andra Heide
2712 Southern Oaks Drive
2712 Southern Oaks Drive
Cantonment, FL 32571

From: Andra Heide [mailto:ajheide@yahoo.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 7:44 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Andra Heide
2712 Southern Oaks Drive
2712 Southern Oaks Drive
Cantonment, FL 32571

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Valerie Heinonen [mailto:heinonenv@juno.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 8:27 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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STOP THE PRODUCTION OF WASTE.

Thank you.

Valerie Heinonen
205 Ave C
205 Ave C
NY, NY 10009

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To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Hans-Peter Heinrich
Flensburger Str. 13
Frankfurt, ot 60435

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Hans-Peter Heinrich [mailto:hp_heinrich@yahoo.de]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 6:41 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

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Hans-Peter Heinrich
Flensburger Str. 13
Frankfurt, ot 60435

From: Penny Heintz [mailto:pennyheintz@att.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:21 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

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Penny Heintz
PO Box 362
Cedar Ridge, CA 95924

## Consent-Based Siting

From: David Helkenn [mailto:dhelkenn@san.rr.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:16 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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I strongly oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

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David Helkenn
6829 Beloit Avenue
San Diego, CA 92111

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Bill Helmer [mailto:amargosa23@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:09 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Bill Helmer
146 Whispering Pines Circle
Cohasset, CA 95973

From: J. Michael "Mike" Henderson [mailto:mhenderson13@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 11:22 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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J. Michael "Mike" Henderson
55 Broad Street
Apt. 252
San Luis Obispo, CA 93405

From: J. Michael "Mike" Henderson [mailto:mhenderson13@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:44 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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J. Michael "Mike" Henderson
55 Broad Street
Apt. 252
San Luis Obispo, CA 93405

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Diane Hendricks [mailto:ddhend@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:02 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Diane Hendricks
1316 Richmond Dr
Olney, TX 76374

From: Diane Hendricks [mailto:ddhend@hotmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 12:10 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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Diane Hendricks
1316 Richmond Dr
Olney, TX 76374

From: Charlene Henley [mailto:judgemoo@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:23 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Charlene Henley
Country Oak Court
San Jose, CA 95136

## Consent-Based Siting

From: David Henning [mailto:dghenning@tds.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 10:46 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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David Henning
9352 Eisenhower
Marshfield, WI 54449

From: David Henning [mailto:dghenning@tds.net]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 5:12 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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David Henning
9352 Eisenhower
Marshfield, WI 54449

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Paul Henry [mailto:crazyivan181@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:46 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Paul Henry
300 Park Dr
Stoneham, MA 02180

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mayellen Henry [mailto:mayellen@comcast.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:09 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

Nobody wants to be near nuclear waste, and for good reason. It isn't safe, and we should stop producing it immediately. There are safe and economical ways to produce the energy we need and nuclear energy is neither.

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Mayellen Henry
16651 SE 17th St
Bellevue, WA 98008

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Anne Henry [mailto:Cindalou5@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:24 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Anne Henry
4601 66th st w
Bradenton, FL 34210

From: Kathleen Henry [mailto:greenery3@earthlink.net]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 5:09 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Kathleen Henry
140 Valley Road
St. Louis, MO 63119

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lana Henson [mailto:lanarh@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:26 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Lana Henson
612 NW 34
Oklahoma City, OK 73106

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lana Henson [mailto:lanarh@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:11 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Lana Henson
612 NW 34
Oklahoma City, OK 73106

## Consent-Based Siting

From: William Herke, Ph. D. [mailto:jbherke@cox net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:18 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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The continuing production of nuclear waste is INSANITY.

William Herke, Ph. D.
555 Staring Lane
Baton Rouge, LA 70810

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Scott Herman [mailto:scott.herman@unconxio.us]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:17 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Scott Herman
1844 2nd Avenue
Sacramento, CA 95818

From: Colette Hernandez [mailto:coletteauxetoiles7@yahoo.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 4:34 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

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Colette Hernandez
271 Redbird Dr.
Loveland, OH 41015

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Peter Herring [mailto:pherringster@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:47 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

It would take a very, very frigid day in hell for me, or anyone in my community, to accept nuclear waste. We already live far too close (as the Columbia flows) to that non-planning disaster Hanford Nuclear Reservation.

There is, as yet, NO safe way to transport, dispose of or store highly radioactive waster. What's more, you know that. So what is this game about?

Find another energy source - hint, there are a lot of options.

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks

currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Peter Herring
3860 Elmran Dr
3860 Elmran Dr
West Linn, OR 97068

From: Marna Herrington [mailto:marnah@mindspring.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:14 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Marna Herrington
25 nw 23rd place suite 6
portland, OR 97210

From: Steve Hersch [mailto:sphhpsh@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:00 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Steve Hersch
4401 80th St NE
Unit 16
Marysville, WA 98270

## Consent-Based Siting

From: James Herther [mailto:jnherther48@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:16 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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We have trouble finding storage for our own nuclear waste,  why would we want more?
This is a very bad idea.

James Herther
1585 Cohansey St # 201
St Paul, MN 55117

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Susanne Hesse & Doug Dyer [mailto:bridgestohealth@windstream.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:37 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Susanne Hesse & Doug Dyer
29003 nw 182nd Terrace
Alachua, FL 32615

From: Susanne Hesse & Doug Dyer [mailto:bridgestohealth@windstream.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 7:08 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Susanne Hesse & Doug Dyer
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From: Christopher Heuman [mailto:chrisheuman@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:30 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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Christopher Heuman
1091 Pattee Ave.
Elburn, IL 60119

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Christopher Heuman [mailto:chrisheuman@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:40 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Christopher Heuman
1091 Pattee Ave.
Elburn, IL 60119

From: Richard Vanden Heuvel [mailto:dick1vh@comcast.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:56 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Richard Vanden Heuvel
123 Spruce Lane
Annapolis, MD 21403

## Consent-Based Siting

From: J.M. Hiatt [mailto:hiattjm@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:07 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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J.M. Hiatt
5415 Connecticut Ave, NW #735
#735
Washington, DC 20015

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mary Hicklin [mailto:mary@virgomoon.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:20 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Please STOP nuclear waste production immediately. Admit you have no idea how to handle it and never will. Don't make the problem worse with bad proposals like this.

Mary Hicklin
11770 Hi Ridge Rd
Lakeside, CA 92040

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Nancy Hiestand [mailto:nancya0624@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Nancy Hiestand
526 South Campus Way, Davis
Davis
Davis, CA 95616

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Nancy Hiestand [mailto:nancya0624@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:17 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Nancy Hiestand
526 South Campus Way, Davis
Davis
Davis, CA 95616

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ritsuko Higashi [mailto:ritsuritsu2001@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 8:10 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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Ritsuko Higashi
9963 66th Ave
Rego Park, NY 11374

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lisa Hildebrand [mailto:hildebrandlisa@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:48 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Lisa Hildebrand
1781 E 2100 S
Salt Lake City, UT 84106

From: Joel Hildebrandt [mailto:senorjoel@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 3:51 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Joel Hildebrandt
3044a Halcyon Ct.
Berkeley, CA 94705

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Todd Hildebrandt [mailto:hildegan@hughes.net]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 10:35 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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It is time to cease acting as boosters for the nuclear industry and start protecting the health and safety of the people of our nation. We are paying attention and we will not back down.

Todd Hildebrandt
P.O. Box 189
Elmira, OR 97437

From: Virginia Hilker [mailto:vthnews@verizon.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:49 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Virginia Hilker
421 Calle de Castellana
421 Calle de Castellana
Redondo Beach, CA 90277

From: Robert Hill [mailto:roberthill19@tds.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:18 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Robert Hill
6720 Century Ave.
Middleton, WI 53562

From: Michael Hill [mailto:theElbeHills@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:36 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Michael Hill
P.O. Box 323
Elbe, WA 98330

From: John Hill [mailto:johnhill@telus.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:15 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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John Hill
107 - 1045 haro St
Vancouver, BC V6E 3Z8

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Leigh Hill [mailto:leighsure@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Leigh Hill
8016 Pine Drive
Felton, CA 95018

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Michael Hill [mailto:MichaelLHill2006@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 7:02 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Michael Hill
5719 Harpers Farm Road Unit C
Columbia, FL 34203

From: Robert Hill [mailto:roberthill19@tds.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:18 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Robert Hill
6720 Century Ave.
Middleton, WI 53562

From: Roberta Hill [mailto:binkie@prismnet.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:07 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Roberta Hill
1812 Bremen Street
Austin, TX 78703

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ruthann Hilland [mailto:rfatlanta1@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:11 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Ruthann Hilland
312 Hazel Ave
Westville, NJ 08093

From: Susana Hillary [mailto:goshengreenfarms@aol.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 4:40 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

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Susana Hillary
3301A Route 207
Route 207
Goshen, NY 10924

From: Melissa Hillen [mailto:melissahillen@ymail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 3:29 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Melissa Hillen
Po Box 437
Romney, WV 26757

From: Miriam Hillson [mailto:mhmiriamh@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:54 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

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- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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Miriam Hillson
858 Copper Mountain Dr
Cripple Creek, CO 80813

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Frances Hinckley [mailto:francesbiz@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:26 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

NOBODY wants nuclear waste near them. It is extremely dangerous stuff. Nuclear waste puts any living creature within hundreds of miles at huge risk.

Therefore, moving nuclear waste puts an even larger area and population at risk. Have we learned nothing from unintended spills of oil and toxins? Accidents happen! Do NOT move nuclear waste.

Also, do NOT take possession of it. The nuclear industry created it. They own it. The D.O.E. should not take possession, nor ownership, of nuclear waste. The DOE regulates it. The creators own it.

For the DOE to take possession of, or move any nuclear waste is definitely not in the best interest of the general public in any way, shape or form.

The Department of Energy's "consent-based" siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation. Do not do this!!

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them. Nuclear power is not clean and the waste lasts for longer than is realistically conceivable to human consciousness. Ever ounce of nuclear waste that we create is a Damoclian Sword over the heads of all current and future lifeforms. It would seem that Damocles was smarter than we are!

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to protect all of us from it. The best way to do that is to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have as best we can from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of any nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation. Movement invites accidents!
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). So do I!

HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. Moving nuclear waste is dangerous and should only be done with extreme protection and only if it dramatically improves public safety.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence: this is basically a PARKING LOT DUMP!!! What about 'homeland security" ?!?!?

The only substantive changes would be the extreme added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are huge risks, to both security and safety. This is both unsafe and insecure!!

If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards and endangering many more, needlessly. Nuclear waste should only be minimally moved, and then only if necessary to achieve very big, longterm improvements in both safety and security in a well chosen location.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage facilties. It seems to me that people are likely to change their mind about keeping nuclear waste around (or find out too late to change the approval.)

Conversely, if any of these sites devolves into a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.  This is very important! Decades ago, Diablo Canyon was build in CA, surrounded by earthquake faults. Another was halted from being build near Bodega Bay, on top of the San Andreas Fault. Technical thoughtfulness is critical in choosing sites!

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste. As I pointed out, nobody wants nuclear waste! Yucca Mountain simply has the least political power to say no.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to stop making waste. That would probably take a little time.

So, the first step is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. Concurrently, start the ball rolling on what then becomes the second step: to limit the waste being made. The third step is to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for in excess of a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of thousands of human generations. This must also include a plan for checking status of the storage at regular intervals.

Only after rigorous, scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive, irresponsible and entails dangerous and

needless moving of nuclear waste.

The Department of Energy is being illogical in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy fell short in its effort to implement NWPA.

Consolidated storage of nuclear waste does nothing to advance well considered and thought out solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials. Unfortunately, consolidated storage, as proposed, does dramatically increases the risks of our nation's nuclear waste.

PLEASE, leave all nuclear waste where it is until we have a real longterm plan that maximizes safety for all, even those yet unborn. Let's really figure this out, rather than punting.

And, for the record, I do NOT consent to having nuclear waste within a thousand miles of me, or my underage children, in every direction, neither in storage nor in transport(by any means) for any length of time.

Frances Hinckley
9 pepper
corte madera, CA 94925

From: Mark Hinds [mailto:mark.hinds@comcast.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:15 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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Mark Hinds
524 Sandy Lane
524 Sandy Lane, Libertyville, IL
Libertyville, IL 60048

From: Eve Hinesley [mailto:evenjoe2@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:46 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Eve Hinesley
1419 Wellman Ave .
Huntsville, AL 35801

From: Lani Hink [mailto:Laptoplani@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 8:44 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Lani Hink
RR 3, Box 1256
Pahoa, HI 96778

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lani Hink [mailto:Laptoplani@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 6:06 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Lani Hink
RR 3, Box 1256
Pahoa, HI 96778

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Carol Hinkelman [mailto:carolh@rochester.rr.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:37 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Carol Hinkelman
348 Ripplewood Dr.
Rochester, NY 14616

From: James Hipp [mailto:jrhipp010@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 2:34 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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James Hipp
523 West Kellogg Rd
Bellingham, WA 98226

From: Harriet Hirsch [mailto:harrieth2@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:57 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Harriet Hirsch
Memory Ct.
Vienna, VA 22182

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Catherine Hirsch [mailto:chkh@earthlink.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:32 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Catherine Hirsch
PO Box 1543
Redway, CA 95560

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Harriet Hirsch [mailto:harrieth2@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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Harriet Hirsch
Memory Ct.
Vienna, VA 22182

From: Robin Hirsch [mailto:robinhirsch@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:22 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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Robin Hirsch
PO Box 193
520 Foster Point rd
Orcas, WA 98280-193

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Santi Hito [mailto:palisadesart@aol.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 4:40 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Santi Hito
34 Scenic Drive
3301A Route 207
Suffern, NY 10901

From: Susan Hito-Shapiro [mailto:susan@hitoshapirolaw.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 4:39 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Susan Hito-Shapiro
75 North Middletown Road
Nanuet, NY 10924

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Miriam Hochberg [mailto:mhochb@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:48 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Miriam Hochberg
6034 Kantor
San Diego, CA 92122

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Harry Hochheiser [mailto:hshoch@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Harry Hochheiser
5742 Woodmont St
Pittsburgh, PA 15217

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Harold T. Hodes [mailto:hth3@cornell.edu]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:48 PM
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Harold T. Hodes
102 Homestead Terrace
Ithaca, NY 14850

From: Harold T. Hodes [mailto:hth3@cornell.edu]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:49 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

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Harold T. Hodes
102 Homestead Terrace
Ithaca, NY 14850

From: Bruce Hodess [mailto:rico_ratso@yahoo.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 5:22 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Bruce Hodess
100 S Warren St Apt 107
Apt 107
Helena, MT 59601

From: Christina Hodges [mailto:christinakmh@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:33 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Christina Hodges
34606 Jerome St.
Chesterfield, MI 48047

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Irwin Hoenig [mailto:irwinhoenigcst@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:15 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Irwin Hoenig
PO Box 5292
Laurel, MD 20726

From: Irwin Hoenig [mailto:irwinhoenigcst@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:45 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Irwin Hoenig
PO Box 5292
Laurel, MD 20726

From: Joseph Hoess [mailto:josephhoess@yahoo.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 7:55 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Joseph Hoess
11183 Pottowatomie Trail
Walkerton, IN 46574

From: Michael Hogan [mailto:mghogan82@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:54 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Michael Hogan
Ladera Sarina
Del Mar, CA 92014

From: Marj Hogan [mailto:marj.hogan@gmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 12:25 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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Marj Hogan
8982 N Exeter Ave
Portland, OR 97203

From: dick hogle [mailto:dick.hogle@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 3:13 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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dick hogle
58 west arroyo alamo
Address Line 2
espanola, NM 87532

From: dick hogle [mailto:dick.hogle@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:14 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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dick hogle
58 west arroyo alamo
Address Line 2
espanola, NM 87532

From: Bill& Margot Holcomb [mailto:doslobos@charter.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 2:18 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Bill& Margot Holcomb
190 HAWKS' HAUNT LN
TRYON, NC 28782

From: Karen B Holden [mailto:kbhkbh.holden@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 7:34 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Karen B Holden
4924 Oakley St
Duluth, MN 55804

From: Karen B Holden [mailto:kbhkbh.holden@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 7:32 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Karen B Holden
4924 Oakley St
Duluth, MN 55804

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sam Holden [mailto:sirsambob@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:43 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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Sam Holden
27828 Gibralter Loop
Eugene, OR 97405

From: Sharon Holford [mailto:Watersong41@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Sharon Holford
2580 SE Courtney
5
Portland, OR 97222

From: Brett Holland [mailto:bahstar1@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:21 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Brett Holland
1217 Boston St.
Los Angeles, CA 90026

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Susan Holland [mailto:susan-holland@usa.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:34 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Susan Holland
243 Union Center Road
Ulster Park, NY 12487

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Patricia Hollenstein [mailto:p-hollenstein@orange.fr]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:15 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Patricia Hollenstein
Chemin de la Chèvre d'Or
Biot, ot 06410

From: Bill Holt [mailto:bill.holt@netzero.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:38 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Bill Holt
7407 SCENIC BROOK DR
AUSTIN, TX 78736

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Bill Holt
7407 SCENIC BROOK DR
AUSTIN, TX 78736

From: Kendra Holt [mailto:kendra_music@hotmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 5:13 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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Kendra Holt
1111W.Univ.blvd.
Wheaton, MD 20902

From: Tracy Holthaus [mailto:tholthaus@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 12:15 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Tracy Holthaus
8115 Nw 81St Ct
Kansas City, MO 64152

From: Sandra Holt [mailto:slholt@cfl.rr.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Sandra Holt
1132 Castle Wood Terrace
Casselberry, FL 32707

From: Casey Holtz [mailto:caseytron@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:21 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Casey Holtz
261 Bartlett
San Francisco, CA 94110

From: Casey Holtz [mailto:caseytron@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:06 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Casey Holtz
261 Bartlett
San Francisco, CA 94110

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dorothy Holtzman [mailto:starge1956@msn.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:19 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Dorothy Holtzman
1199A Shetland dr.
Lakewood, NJ 08701

From: Jed Holtzman [mailto:jed.holtzman@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 12:45 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Jed Holtzman
847 Scott St.
San Francisco, CA 94117

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Peter Homan [mailto:fpeterhoman@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:46 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

I have been writing your agency and predecessors over half my life, and my concerns are exactly the same as they were thirty plus years ago.

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

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Peter Homan
12535 se 143 ct
Ocklawaha, FL 32179

From: Peter Homan [mailto:fpeterhoman@gmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 9:20 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Peter Homan
12535 se 143 ct
Ocklawaha, FL 32179

From: Deanna Homer [mailto:deannahomer@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:54 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Deanna Homer
2105 E Marcus
Stillwater, OK 74075

From: Celeste Hong [mailto:celestehong@earthlink.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 4:21 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Celeste Hong
4758 Cromwell
L.A., CA 90027

From: Joseph HOOD [mailto:paininthea@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 7:12 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Joseph HOOD
44 Walnut Street
Ambler, PA 19002

From: Jack Hood [mailto:jackhood64@yahoo.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 8:43 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Jack Hood
18043 macy rd
brooksville, FL 34614

From: Nick Hood [mailto:foamyislord42@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 12:08 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Nick Hood
5036 Peppertree rd.
Clemmons, NC 27012

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Niels Henrik Hooge [mailto:nh_hooge@yahoo.dk]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:30 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Niels Henrik Hooge
Tyrolsgade 5, 4. th
Copenhagen, ot DK 2300 S

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Niels Henrik Hooge [mailto:nh_hooge@yahoo.dk]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 6:04 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Niels Henrik Hooge
Tyrolsgade 5, 4. th
Copenhagen, ot DK 2300 S

From: Pat Hook [mailto:dogwhisperer52@hotmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 12:30 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Pat Hook
6325 Lyndale Ave. S.
# 11
Richfield, MN 55423

From: Carol Hooker [mailto:Carol.june.hooker@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:25 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Carol Hooker
6928 Shepherd Street
Landover Hills, MD 20784

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joy Hoover [mailto:j.melba.hoover@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:36 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Joy Hoover
3395 Via Barba
3395 Via Barba
Lompoc, CA 93436

From: steve hopkins [mailto:sdhopkins29@aol.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 5:00 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

steve hopkins
6 peck ave  #62b
rye, NY 10580

From: Kirsten Hopkins [mailto:denimgirl@juno.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 10:50 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Kirsten Hopkins
115 Vermilyea Ave #5B
New York, NY 10034

From: steve hopkins [mailto:sdhopkins29@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:30 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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steve hopkins
6 peck ave  #62b
rye, NY 10580

From: Elke Hoppenbrouwers [mailto:ehoppenbrouwers@comcast.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:55 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Elke Hoppenbrouwers
152 Allison Way
East Haven, CT 06512

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lauri Horkitz [mailto:prolepses2@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:18 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Lauri Horkitz
4 Luther Road
Medford, MA 02155

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Roger Horn [mailto:rghorn_2000@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:08 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Roger Horn
32 Barber St
Clarion, PA 16214

From: tina horowitz [mailto:tinah53374@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:30 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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tina horowitz
4701 pine street m8
philadelphia, PA 19143

From: Laura Horowitz [mailto:12newmoons@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:48 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be

transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Laura Horowitz
6544 Darlington Rd
Pittsburgh, PA 15217

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Thomas Horsch [mailto:thorsch@ymail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:11 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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Thomas Horsch
6738 Willow Hill Rd.
Spring Grove, VA 23881

From: Susan Hoskam [mailto:susanhoskam@online.nl]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 5:25 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Susan Hoskam
Mainstreet 1234
Netherlands, ot 5324 AC

From: Steve Hosmer [mailto:midden26287@mypacks.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 10:03 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Steve Hosmer
1345 W. Cochran Ave.
Flagstaff, AZ 86005

From: Tom Hougham [mailto:annntom@hotmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 11:58 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Tom Hougham
4001 W Hougham Rd
Trafalgar, IN 46181

From: Natalie Houghton [mailto:tallyho4617@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:00 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy and certainly not in the public interest; it is just a way to put the interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries ahead of the need to protect public health and safety, and the environment. Basically, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation WHEN a repository is in operation.

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I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to such facilities.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT, and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is:

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Natalie Houghton
Woods Trl
Prescott, AZ 86305

From: David Houlton [mailto:schrachiee@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:45 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

David Houlton
1200 Byron Creek Rd.
Winston, OR 97496

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Nathan House [mailto:houselmbr@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:42 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Nathan House
103 E. Casebeer
106 E Casebeer
Newman, IL 61942

From: David Houseman [mailto:davidhouseman199@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 10:12 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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David Houseman
211 East South St.
Grand Ledge, MI 48837

From: David Houseman [mailto:davidhouseman199@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 4:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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211 East South St.
Grand Ledge, MI 48837

## Consent-Based Siting

From: David Houseman [mailto:davidhouseman199@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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David Houseman
211 East South St.
Grand Ledge, MI 48837

From: Larry Hovekamp [mailto:larryhovekamp@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 3:09 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Larry Hovekamp
3433 Newburg Rd.  #5
Louisville, KY 40218

From: Larry Hovekamp [mailto:larryhovekamp@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:08 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Larry Hovekamp
3433 Newburg Rd.  #5
Louisville, KY 40218

From: Frances Howard [mailto:fjhoward@att.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:59 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

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Frances Howard
4346 Campus Ave Unit 202
#202
San Diego, CA 92103

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Celeste Howard [mailto:celeste@pacifier.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:28 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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Celeste Howard
6525 NE Deer Run Street
6525 NE Deer Run St, Hillsboro 97124
Hillsboro, OR 97124

From: Bill and Laurel Howatt [mailto:billsbutterflynursery@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:43 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Bill and Laurel Howatt
PO BOX 700
Rutland, MA 01543

From: Brenda Howell [mailto:bhowell@infomagic.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:08 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Brenda Howell
1638 Avenida Selva
Fullerton, CA 92833

From: Margaret Howieson [mailto:prairiedragonfly@yahoo.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 6:03 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Margaret Howieson
6401 Reeds Drive
Mission, KS 66202

From: Dan Hubbard [mailto:danielhubbard@peoplepc.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:38 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Dan Hubbard
49 Ten Rod Road
Rochester, NH 03867

From: Monika Huber [mailto:monika.huber.vienna@gmx.at]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 2:11 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Springergasse 6/13
Vienna, ot A-1020

From: Monika Huber [mailto:monika.huber.vienna@gmx.at]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:40 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Monika Huber
Springergasse 6/13
Vienna, ot A-1020

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ron Hubert [mailto:rhubertaz@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:07 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Ron Hubert
6800 Virgil Way
Flagstaff, AZ 86001

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Molly Huddleston [mailto:mollyb@pacific net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:33 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Molly Huddleston
PO Box 1119
Santa Rosa, CA 95402

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Carole Huelsberg [mailto:photosandbooks@msn.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:23 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Carole Huelsberg
4807 Willamette
Port Townsend, WA 98368

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Eric Huerter [mailto:thezombie7@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:55 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Eric Huerter
6605 E 55th St
Tulsa, OK 74145

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ruth Hughes [mailto:bluemulexxpress@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 11:26 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Ruth Hughes
13094 Metzger Ln.
Brookville, IN 47012

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ruth Hughes [mailto:bluemulexxpress@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:01 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Ruth Hughes
13094 Metzger Ln.
Brookville, IN 47012

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Odile Hugonot Haber [mailto:odilehh@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:14 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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Odile Hugonot Haber
531 Third Street
Ann Arbor, MI 48103

## Consent-Based Siting

From: ACE HULL [mailto:yellowrabbit66@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 3:13 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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ACE HULL
2536 w Tanya rd
phoenix, AZ 94133

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Gilia Humrich [mailto:ghumrich@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:18 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Gilia Humrich
9887 HILLSIDE DR
FORESTVILLE, CA 95436

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ann Hunt [mailto:annie48632@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:45 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Ann Hunt
11463 Bringold Avenue
Lake Station, MI 48632

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Hariet Hunter [mailto:hhunter@hvc.rr.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 10:18 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Hariet Hunter
781 Zena Rd
Woodstock, NY 12498

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jacki Hunter [mailto:GatorGrrl27@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:09 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Jacki Hunter
1929 N. Whitley Ave., #505
Hollywood, CA, CA 90068

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kristin Huntoon [mailto:kristinhuntoon@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 10:16 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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Kristin Huntoon
522 Forest St
Columbus, OH 43206

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Carol Huntsman [mailto:chuntsman@san rr.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:41 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Carol Huntsman
2750 Wheatstone St.#30
San Diego, CA 92111

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Susan Hurwitz [mailto:Mommyleigh@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:29 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Susan Hurwitz
9 Irene Court
9 Irene Court
River Edge, NJ 07661

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jeffrey Hurwitz [mailto:jahurwitzhome@cs.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 7:00 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Jeffrey Hurwitz
582 - 42nd Avenue
San Fancisco, CA 94121

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jeffrey Hurwitz [mailto:jahurwitzhome@cs.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 2:10 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Jeffrey Hurwitz
582 - 42nd Avenue
San Fancisco, CA 94121

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From: Lee Hutchings [mailto:lehut@live.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:46 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Lee Hutchings
400 Burnett St., #101
Wichita Falls, TX 76301

From: Lee Hutchings [mailto:lehut@live.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:50 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Lee Hutchings
400 Burnett St., #101
Wichita Falls, TX 76301

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Judith Hutchison [mailto:judithhutchison@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:32 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Judith Hutchison
2495 Glenwood Drive
Boulder, CO 80304

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Judith Hutchison [mailto:judithhutchison@hotmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 11:34 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Judith Hutchison
2495 Glenwood Drive
Boulder, CO 80304

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kellie Huynh [mailto:kelliehuynh@yahoo.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 10:37 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Kellie Huynh
57 Dove St. 4th Floor
Charlottesville, VA 22903

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Richard & Joyce Hybil [mailto:rjhandjlh@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:34 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Richard & Joyce Hybil
999 Utsonati Ln
Brevard, NC 28712

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jim Hyder [mailto:Jims12n12@msn.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 2:44 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Jim Hyder
5131 Kell Lane
5131 Kell Lane, Las Vegas, NV 89156
Las Vegas, NV 89156

## Consent-Based Siting

From: tomiko ibser [mailto:tomiko.ibser@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 4:10 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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tomiko ibser
2670 Kadema Dr.
Sacramento, CA 95864

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Elizabeth Iglesias [mailto:Iglesias@law.miami.edu]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:40 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Elizabeth Iglesias
1311 Miller Dr 269G
Coral Gables, FL 33146

From: Judy Ilan [mailto:bandula77@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:18 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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Judy Ilan
Delaware St.
Berkeley, CA 94709

From: Mana Iluna [mailto:manailuna1@msn.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:59 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
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Mana Iluna
4415 145th Ave. NE
H-2
Bellevue, WA 98007

From: Mana Iluna [mailto:manailuna1@msn.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:02 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Mana Iluna
4415 145th Ave. NE
H-2
Bellevue, WA 98007

From: Chuck Infantino [mailto:cri1114@wowway.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:34 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Chuck Infantino
13084 concord
Sterling Hts., MI 48313

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Karen Ingenthron [mailto:karen.lewis44@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:49 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Karen Ingenthron
P.O. Box 13103, 94661
Oakland, CA 94661

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Gwen Ingram [mailto:gwen@yogaideas.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 11:53 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Gwen Ingram
208 e broadway
Drumright, OK 74030

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Marie Inserra [mailto:minsjsul@gmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 5:32 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Marie Inserra
735 Requa St
Peekskill, NY 10566

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sharon Intilli [mailto:greenbe8@warwick.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:44 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Sharon Intilli
260 pine island turnpike
260 Pine Island Tpke
warwick, NY 10990

From: Karen Irias [mailto:karenirias@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:55 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Karen Irias
1560 Candelero Dr.
Walnut Creek, CA 94598

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jennifer Irving [mailto:jipowers@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:53 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Jennifer Irving
510 N. Valentine
Little Rock, AR 72205

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jennifer Irving [mailto:jipowers@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 4:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Jennifer Irving
510 N. Valentine
Little Rock, AR 72205

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sumiko Ishikawa [mailto:sumiko.i.vanhoy@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:48 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Sumiko Ishikawa
315 Los Pinos Way
San Jose, CA 95119

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sumiko Ishikawa [mailto:sumiko.i.vanhoy@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:24 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Sumiko Ishikawa
315 Los Pinos Way
San Jose, CA 95119

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Anna Isis-Brown [mailto:a.isisbrown@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:47 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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Anna Isis-Brown
2145 Clinton St.
Los Angeles, CA 90026

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Martha Izzo [mailto:marthalovesoso@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:29 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Martha Izzo
Kinney Creek
Evergreen, CO 80439

## Consent-Based Siting

From: James Jachimiak [mailto:jjinfrk@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:15 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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James Jachimiak
835 S. Old U.S. 31 Lot 46
Franklin, IN 46131

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Anne Jackson [mailto:Buggarden@dejazzd.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 2:58 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

NO NO NO NO NO !!! :

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Anne Jackson
PO Box 516
Morgantown, PA 19543

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Alicia Jackson [mailto:Lametreza@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:09 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Alicia Jackson
401 Goheen Circle
Vallejo, CA 94591

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Anne Jackson [mailto:Buggarden@dejazzd.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 8:14 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Anne Jackson
PO Box 516
Morgantown, PA 19543

From: Karen Jackson [mailto:Klottalegs@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:08 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Karen Jackson
1105 Terminal Way, Ste 202
Reno, NV 89502

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lisa Jackson [mailto:ron3450@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 12:50 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Lisa Jackson
1106 2nd Street, PMB 332
Encinitas, CA 92024

From: Rena Jackson [mailto:thornyrrose@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 6:22 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Rena Jackson
Albuquerque
Albuquerque, NM 87110

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jo Ann Jackson-Holt [mailto:jjacksonholt@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:51 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Jo Ann Jackson-Holt
3309 Willow Lane
Anderson, CA 96007

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Judy Jacobs [mailto:judydewjacobs@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:09 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Judy Jacobs
8 Park Trail
Croton On Hudson, NY 10520

From: Lawrence Jacobson [mailto:LMJ-safe@comcast.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 10:32 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Lawrence Jacobson
1613 California Ave SW
#301
Seattle, WA 98116

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jennifer Jaeckel [mailto:spot12book@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:18 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Jennifer Jaeckel
390 W Stephenson
Ukiah, CA 95482

From: Gary Jaeger [mailto:gary111@mac.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 11:29 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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Gary Jaeger
4110 Stone Way N
Seattle, WA 98103

From: carol jagiello [mailto:cjags91@optonline.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:57 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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carol jagiello
91 wood pl
bloomingdale, NJ 07403

From: Paula Jain [mailto:jpjain@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:10 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Paula Jain
206 Park Avenue
Nevada City, CA 95959

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Paula Jain [mailto:jpjain@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:27 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Paula Jain
206 Park Avenue
Nevada City, CA 95959

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Darlene Jakusz [mailto:jdjakusz@wi-net.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:44 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Darlene Jakusz
8380 Ambrose Lane
Amherst Jct., WI 54407

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Darlene Jakusz [mailto:jdjakusz@wi-net.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:08 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Darlene Jakusz
8380 Ambrose Lane
Amherst Jct., WI 54407

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Rama Rao Jalagam [mailto:captjrrao@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 3:16 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

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Rama Rao Jalagam
Road No.12 . Banjara Hills
Hyderabad, ot 500034

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kate Jamal [mailto:katejamal73@yahoo.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 5:41 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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Kate Jamal
4 Bell Hill Rd
Wilmington, DE 19809

From: Brenda James [mailto:beastybren@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:28 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Brenda James
1915 19th Ave
Vero Beach, FL 32960

From: debaura james [mailto:debauraperu@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:03 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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debaura james
2232 Cottage San Rd. #9
Silver City, NM 88061

## Consent-Based Siting

From: H James [mailto:relating2u@yahoo.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 1:19 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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H James
4042 N Harding Ave
Chicago, IL 60618

From: Joanne M James [mailto:magicrealtor@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 6:07 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Joanne M James
4036 SE Francis St
Portland, OR 97202

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Philip Jamtaas [mailto:pj310@ca.rr.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:27 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Philip Jamtaas
Malcolm Ave
Los Angeles, CA 90034

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Barbara Jannicelli [mailto:barbar6305@aol.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 5:05 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Barbara Jannicelli
6305 Alderwood st
spring hill, FL 34606

From: Beverly Janowitz-Price [mailto:bevjano@msn.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:50 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Beverly Janowitz-Price
3020 N. 14th St.
Phoenix, AZ 85014

From: KAREN JANSEN [mailto:KARE76@COX.NET]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:50 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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KAREN JANSEN
3949 VIA VALMONTE
Palos Verdes Estates, CA 90274
PALOS VERDES ESTATES, CA 90274

## Consent-Based Siting

From: KAREN JANSEN [mailto:KARE76@COX.NET]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:51 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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KAREN JANSEN
3949 VIA VALMONTE
Palos Verdes Estates, CA 90274
PALOS VERDES ESTATES, CA 90274

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Paula Janu [mailto:pjanu@roadrunner.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:33 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Paula Janu
Po box 91133
Cleveland, OH 44113

From: Robert Janusko [mailto:482b71e1@opayq.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:32 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
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Robert Janusko
1329 Eaton Ave
Bethlehem, PA 18018

# Consent-Based Siting

From: Gayle Janzen [mailto:cgjanzen@comcast.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:33 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: I OPPOSE DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

As usual, instead of doing the right thing and admitting that the nuclear industry's waste is toxic and deal with it in a responsible manner, and eventually shut down the nuclear industry, the US govt is trying to somehow persuade the taxpayers that storing this toxic, dangerous nuclear waste in their backyard is a great idea. Wow, do you really think we're that stupid to buy into your latest scheme to pass the nuclear buck? This benefits no taxpayers and opens up the door of nuclear waste leaking in our neighborhoods, dangerously moving
this toxic waste from site to site and making it easily available for terroists to get their hands on. The fact that the DOE is so willing to put our health and safety at risk, is appalling. I'll bet the workers at Hanford who continue to get sick from the leaking nuclear waste there, wouldn't definitely be against this idea. I mention this to show you that the federal govt. continues to refuse to help these workers by cleaning up Hanford so the workers will stop betting sick. Instead of doing the right thing, the US govt. just ignores the problem, so you'll understand why nobody in their right mind would think that allowing the govt to wash their hands of the nuclear industry's waste problem will bode well for us.

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I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be "interim" on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public's input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Gayle Janzen
11232 Dayton Av N
Seattle, WA 98133

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Marsha Jarvis [mailto:marshaj11@comcast.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:42 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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Marsha Jarvis
512 Kenmare Ct
Pinole, CA 94564

From: Brian Jeffery [mailto:bcjeffery@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:23 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Brian Jeffery
933 Reed Avenue
Sunnyvale, CA 94086

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Brian Jeffery [mailto:bcjeffery@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:39 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Brian Jeffery
933 Reed Avenue
Sunnyvale, CA 94086

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Monroe Edwin Jeffrey, Without Prejudice ucc 1-207 [mailto:itbnla@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:38 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Monroe Edwin Jeffrey, Without Prejudice ucc 1-207
13 Father Joe Murphy Dr.
Shawnee, OK 74801

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Monroe Edwin Jeffrey, without prejudice ucc 1-207 [mailto:ita@operamail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:55 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Monroe Edwin Jeffrey, without prejudice ucc 1-207
13 Father Joe Murphy Dr
Shawnee, OK 74801

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mark Jeffries [mailto:markjef@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:15 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Mark Jeffries
71 28th St.
San Francisco, CA 94110

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Monica Jelonnek [mailto:jelmo456@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:27 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Monica Jelonnek
112 Thompson Ave.
Dover, NJ 07801

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Janie Jenkins [mailto:janie932@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:15 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Janie Jenkins
1550 Gulf Way
Round Rock, TX 78665

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Grace Jenkins [mailto:gemjenkins@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:27 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Grace Jenkins
451 Turner
Benicia, CA 94510

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Robert Jennik [mailto:rjennik@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:42 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Robert Jennik
4220 S. 57th St.
Milw, WI 53220

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Richard Jennings [mailto:rcj11@cam.ac.uk]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:28 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Richard Jennings
Father Zeiser Place
Cambridge, ot CB1 3AG

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dorothy Jensen [mailto:Dorothyl_jensen@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:43 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Dorothy Jensen
404 Dolan St. Unit H
Taos, NM 87571

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Victoria Jensen [mailto:vicster@init-6.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:23 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Victoria Jensen
2310 6th St. #3
Santa Monica, CA 90405

From: Cornelia Jensen [mailto:corneliajensen@yahoo.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 6:10 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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Cornelia Jensen
10 Ocean Parkway
Brooklyn, NY 11218

From: Victoria Jensen [mailto:vicster@init-6.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:45 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Victoria Jensen
2310 6th St. #3
Santa Monica, CA 90405

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Matthew Jerauld [mailto:mjjerauld@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:43 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Matthew Jerauld
2001 Danby Road
Apartment 2
Ithaca, NY 14850

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Margaret Jerinic [mailto:jerinicm@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 8:17 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Margaret Jerinic
1834 June Lake Drive
Henderson, NV 89052

From: Patricia Jerrells [mailto:trisha7of9@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:17 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Patricia Jerrells
320 SE NIghthawk Place
Shelton, WA 98584

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Adrian Jesaitis [mailto:adrianjesaitis@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:23 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Adrian Jesaitis
POB 623 winter park co
winter park, CO 80482

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Herbert Jeschke [mailto:lotus78611@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:43 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Herbert Jeschke
38 Aberdale Rd
Bala Cynwyd, PA 19004

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Richard Jessel [mailto:windsurf@gorge.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:48 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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Richard Jessel
120 nw jordan rd
stevenson, WA 98648

## Consent-Based Siting

From: d Jessop [mailto:darshanmay14@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 11:27 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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d Jessop
pob 2555
Espanola, NM 87532

## Consent-Based Siting

From: S Jitreun [mailto:sjitreun@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:59 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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S Jitreun
Sk
Ch, ot 86110

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joan t [mailto:alloday@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:17 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Joan t
1586 Dwelle Rd.
Old Joe, AR 72658

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Benjamin Joannou Jr [mailto:benjr@jbi.bike]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:44 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Anyway, we should never build any more nuclear power plants and we should plan on decommissioning the ones we have at the earliest possible time. I know the probability of a meltdown is low, but the consequences are unthinkable and catastrophic. Nuclear power is too expensive even without considering the meltdown risks. If we consider the meltdown risks, it is illogical to have any nuclear power whatsoever.

Consider a Coronal Mass Ejection event similar to the one that occurred in the late 1800s. If that were to occur now, all computers, controllers, electronics, electronic devices etc.would immediately fail, including those that control our nuclear reactors. While the failure of most electronic devices would not end our civilization, the meltdown of every nuclear reactor caused by the failure of those electronic devices certainly would end our civilization.

Benjamin Joannou Jr
6401 SW 134 Drive Pinecrest, FL. 33156
Pinecrest, FL 33156

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Helen Johns [mailto:hmjohns64@hotmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 1:42 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Helen Johns
42 Wern Tce
Swansea, ot SA1 8NT

From: Lorraine D. Johnson [mailto:lorraine.d.johnson@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:59 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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Lorraine D. Johnson
4858 s. Kenny St.
Seattle, WA 98118

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Charles Johnson [mailto:johnsonc20@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 5:04 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Charles Johnson
2206 SE Division St.
Portland, OR 97202

## Consent-Based Siting

From: DeDe Johnson [mailto:lechatquipeche@comcast.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:17 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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DeDe Johnson
5015 SE Knight St.
Portland, OR 97206

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kim Johnson [mailto:kijohnson1@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Kim Johnson
36955 W. Oliveto Ave.
36955 W. Oliveto Avenue
Maricopa, AZ 85138

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lorraine D. Johnson [mailto:lorraine.d.johnson@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 7:56 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Lorraine D. Johnson
4858 s. Kenny St.
Seattle, WA 98118

## Consent-Based Siting

From: MIchele Johnson [mailto:goldw36@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:28 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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MIchele Johnson
2764 Hedwig Drive
2764 Hedwig Drive
Yorktown Heights, NY 10598

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Pat Johnson [mailto:pawjohnson@wideopenwest.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:58 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Pat Johnson
864 Lakefield Drive
Galloway, OH 43119

From: Qayyum Johnson [mailto:qayyumjohnson@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:40 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Qayyum Johnson
1601 Shoreline
Sausalito, CA 94965

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Qayyum Johnson [mailto:qayyumjohnson@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:29 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Qayyum Johnson
1601 Shoreline
Sausalito, CA 94965

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Rebecca Johnson [mailto:johnson.rr@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:09 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Rebecca Johnson
1217 Kirby St NE
Albuquerque, NM 87112

From: Teresa Johnson [mailto:swingdanceforever@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:16 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Teresa Johnson
130 W Victoria St
Santa Barbara, CA 93101

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Teresa Johnson [mailto:swingdanceforever@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 6:12 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Teresa Johnson
130 W Victoria St
Santa Barbara, CA 93101

From: wendy johnson [mailto:wendy@designsforlivingvt.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:07 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

wendy johnson
205 Old Tavern Road
Weston, VT 05161

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Christopher Johnson [mailto:mars365@rocketmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:28 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Christopher Johnson
4940 Comanche Dr. #12
La Mesa, CA 91942

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Virginia Johnston [mailto:vjohn100@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:48 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Virginia Johnston
45 Bridge Street
Pelham, NH 03076

From: Allan Johnston [mailto:aj654321@hotmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 9:35 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Allan Johnston
548 Sheridan Road
1n
Evanston, IL 60202

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jeyn Johnston [mailto:jeanus606@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 10:08 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Jeyn Johnston
1922 River Bluff
Niles, MI 49120

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Leon Jolin [mailto:4ph4137@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:46 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Leon Jolin
1719 Wabash St.
Sioux City, IA 51103

From: Leon Jolin [mailto:4ph4137@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 5:52 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Leon Jolin
1719 Wabash St.
Sioux City, IA 51103

From: GARY JONES [mailto:GARYTJONES@SBCGLOBAL.NET]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:49 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

GARY JONES
2275 HUNTINGTON DRIVE
SAN MARINO, CA 91108

From: florence jones [mailto:florencewjones@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 6:13 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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florence jones
1520 8th
boulder, CO 80302

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Katharine Jones [mailto:kriverstyxus@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:24 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Katharine Jones
2606 Hidden Spring Lane
Wadsworth, OH 44281

## Consent-Based Siting

From: The Rev Allan B Jones [mailto:revabjones@att.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 8:52 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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The Rev Allan B Jones
722 Orchard Street #2
Santa Rosa, CA 95404

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Beth Jones [mailto:blj1@direkt.at]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 5:09 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: My Comment *Vigorously Opposing* DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term, profitmongering interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the *absolute need* to protect public health and safety and the environment.

In short, the DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

THAT IS UNACCEPTABLE AND IRRESPONSIBLE! Y'all have never heard of a "dirty bomb" have you...? Or maybe you don't care, which is WORSE. Ignorance will not save you from the pitchforks and torch-waving citizenry when (not if) your pet projects go south on us all...

I do not consent to ANY of this self-centered, willfully short-sighted process: from perpetuating the continued generation of nuclear waste (with NOwhere SAFE to put it all, HELLOOOOO!), to the hapless-dimwitted siting of consolidated storage facilities, and to the mass transportation of nuclear waste to those vulnerable sites.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment.

If you don't understand that, you should be fired.

The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To **terminate** the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for **secure** interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, **environmentally responsible**, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from our one and only and very vulnerable biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS).

HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I vigorously oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a truly viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP.

The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Just how STUPID do we have to be, to allow ANY of this?!

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage facilties.

Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been NO technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be flagrantly violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

If you think none of that matters, YOU'RE FIRED.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

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Beth Jones
Rettenpacherstrasse 19A
222 Southhaven Dr.
Salzburg, IA 52310

From: Carole Jones [mailto:cdjones555@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:23 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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Carole Jones
40 Vineyard Circle
Sonoma, CA 28716

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Carole Jones [mailto:cdjones555@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 8:14 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Carole Jones
40 Vineyard Circle
Sonoma, CA 28716

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kathryn Jones [mailto:kathrynjones7@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:17 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Kathryn Jones
1301 Grumman Drive
Richmond, VA 23229

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mary Ann Jones [mailto:blj_maj@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:47 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Mary Ann Jones
2295 Tolman Creek Rd.
Ashland, OR 97520

From: Richard Jones [mailto:mediabum@rcn.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:43 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Richard Jones
215 West 91st Street
New York, NY 10024

From: Dr. Virginia Jones [mailto:Jones1911@att.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 11:17 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Dr. Virginia Jones
5040 Coopers Landing Dr. Apt. 1-D
Apt. 1-D
Kalamazoo, MI 49004

From: Catherine Jones [mailto:catej@comcast.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:40 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Catherine Jones
40 Dodge Avenue
n/a
Portsmouth, NH 03801

From: Kathryn Jones [mailto:kathrynjones7@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:37 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Kathryn Jones
1301 Grumman Drive
Richmond, VA 23229

From: John Jongen [mailto:jjongen@rochester.rr.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:53 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

John Jongen
164 w church st
164 W Church
Fairport, NY 14450

From: Sandra Joos [mailto:joosgalefamily@comcast.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:56 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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Sandra Joos
4259 SW Patrick Pl
none
Portland, OR 97239

# Consent-Based Siting

From: Bob Jordan [mailto:edumage@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:08 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Bob Jordan
5370 Pershing, apt 300
St. Louis, MO 63112

From: Bob Jordan [mailto:edumage@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:59 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Bob Jordan
5370 Pershing, apt 300
St. Louis, MO 63112

From: alena jorgensen [mailto:aj.1156@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:48 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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alena jorgensen
5941 kauffman ave
temple city, CA 91780

From: alena jorgensen [mailto:aj.1156@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:07 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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alena jorgensen
5941 kauffman ave
temple city, CA 91780

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Claudia Joseph [mailto:permie@earthlink.net]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 11:47 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Claudia Joseph
375 2nd Street
Brooklyn, NY 11215

## Consent-Based Siting

From: lawrence josephs [mailto:lljosephs@comcast.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:32 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

lawrence josephs
165 con
pittsburgh, PA 15239

From: holly juch [mailto:holly.juch@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:13 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
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holly juch
6147 Homesweet Way
carmichael, CA 95608

From: Timothy Judson [mailto:judson.tim@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:20 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Timothy Judson
7333 New Hampshire Ave.
Takoma Park, MD 20912

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Brandon Juhl [mailto:brandon.juhl@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 11:38 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Brandon Juhl
8420 E Lowell Larimer Road
Snohomish, WA 98296

From: Barbara Julien [mailto:DJulien@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 7:15 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Barbara Julien
1190 17 Mile Road
1190 17 Mile Road
Kent City, MI 49330

From: John Jumonville [mailto:jobeville@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:50 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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John Jumonville
3852 Country View
Baton Rouge, LA 70816

From: Randy Juras [mailto:rcjuras@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:06 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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Randy Juras
14351 Oak Trail
Homer Glen, IL 60491

From: Rob Jursa [mailto:info@blakksphere.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:32 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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Rob Jursa
Liesingtalstrasse 117
Liesingtalstrasse 117
Breitenfurt, ot 2384

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Rob Jursa [mailto:info@blakksphere.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 5:46 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Rob Jursa
Liesingtalstrasse 117
Liesingtalstrasse 117
Breitenfurt, ot 2384

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Charlie K [mailto:ckuttner@mindspring.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:15 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Charlie K
17th St
San Francisco, CA 94114

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Moe Kafka [mailto:mokafka@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:06 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Moe Kafka
Livingston Ave.
New Brunswick, MA 02657

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Moe Kafka [mailto:mokafka@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:02 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Moe Kafka
Livingston Ave.
New Brunswick, MA 02657

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Katharine Kagel [mailto:kkagel@cybermesa.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 2:53 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Katharine Kagel
121 Don Gaspar Street
121 Don Gaspar
Santa Fe, NM 87501

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Katharine Kagel [mailto:kkagel@cybermesa.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:57 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Katharine Kagel
121 Don Gaspar Street
121 Don Gaspar
Santa Fe, NM 87501

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Marilyn Kaggen [mailto:mkaggen@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:32 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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Marilyn Kaggen
1910 Foster
Brooklyn, NY 11230

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Marilyn Kaggen [mailto:mkaggen@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 6:05 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Marilyn Kaggen
1910 Foster
Brooklyn, NY 11230

## Consent-Based Siting

From: M.J. Kahn [mailto mjkahn1@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:43 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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M.J. Kahn
2923 Stagecoach
Boulder, CO 80302

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Chris Kamlet [mailto:saileec@aol.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 2:56 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Chris Kamlet
Ogden Dr
Mountainville, NY 10953

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lacey Kammerer [mailto:laceyhicks@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:04 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Lacey Kammerer
440 Dixon Landing
G206
Milpitas, CA 94587

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lacey Kammerer [mailto:laceyhicks@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:20 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Lacey Kammerer
440 Dixon Landing
G206
Milpitas, CA 94587

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jan Kampa [mailto:happykampas@cruzio.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:37 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

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Jan Kampa
3120 Hardin Way
Soquel, CA 95073

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Catherine Kandefer-Lang [mailto:mbyd@ymail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 6:55 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Catherine Kandefer-Lang
11 Island Bay Circle
Guilford, CT 06437

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mona Kandeler [mailto:monakandeler@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:00 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Mona Kandeler
7731 Broadway
San Antonio, TX 78209

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mona Kandeler [mailto:monakandeler@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 10:47 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Mona Kandeler
7731 Broadway
San Antonio, TX 78209

## Consent-Based Siting

From: David Kannerstein [mailto:dkanner@comcast.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:16 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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David Kannerstein
4103 Fountain Green Road, Lafayette Hill, PA 19444
Lafayette Hill, PA 19444

## Consent-Based Siting

From: David Kanter [mailto:kanter.david@comcast net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:47 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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David Kanter
Bittersweet Dr
14489 Bittersweet Dr
Hughesville, MD 20637

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Edith Kantrowitz [mailto:reweaving@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:29 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Edith Kantrowitz
333 McDonald Avenue - #5D
Brooklyn, NY 11218

## Consent-Based Siting

From: adam kaplan [mailto:adamkaplan@cox.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:09 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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adam kaplan
1244 victory walk
Laguna Beach, CA 92651

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Eliot Kaplan [mailto:eliot@joslan.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:14 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Eliot Kaplan
2027 23rd Ave. East
Seattle, WA 98112

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Leslie Kappes [mailto:leskappes@optonline net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:19 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Leslie Kappes
728 Warwick Turnpike
Hewitt, NJ 07421

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mike Kappus [mailto mikek@rosebudus.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:37 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Mike Kappus
2328 12th Ave
2328 12th ave
San Francisco, CA 94116

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mike Kappus [mailto mikek@rosebudus.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:33 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Mike Kappus
2328 12th Ave
2328 12th ave
San Francisco, CA 94116

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dave Karasic [mailto:dave_karasic@comcast.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:48 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Dave Karasic
2 Bonnievale Dr
Bedford, MA 01730

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Theresa Kardos [mailto:Terrykardos@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:17 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

As an environmental educator and field biologist with a background in public health, a parent, and a citizen who cares deeply about the health of our planet and all its inhabitants, I believe that the Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

I live within a few miles of the Indian Point Nuclear Energy Center, an aging plant located on two geological faults that has experienced many problems since I moved into my home 30 years ago. The possibility of a 42 inch high pressure gas line expansion coming within 105 feet of this facility fills me with dread. The fact that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) refuses to grant permission for an independent risk assessment and cessation of construction during this process despite the pleas of New York's governor, two Senators, and 30,000 petitioners is terrifying. It is an abuse of authority that seemingly no one can do anything about.

Meanwhile, we co-exist with pools of spent radioactive fuel, hoping that no accident or terrorism will release the radioactivity. I certainly do not wish the situation of harboring nuclear waste in inadequately hardened storage facilities on any other community, and the thought of transporting nuclear waste around the country, especially without a permanent storage solution finalized, is completely irresponsible. Furthermore, rather than creating more nuclear fuel, which is energy-intensive and polluting, our nation must support renewable energy with research, development, and implementation, giving the sort of long-term financial incentives that the fossil fuel industry has benefited – and still benefits, unfortunately – from.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites

through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Theresa Kardos
26 Montrose Station Rd.
Cortlandt Manor, NY 10567

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kenyon Karl [mailto:kenyonkarl@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:01 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Kenyon Karl
110 Main St., #309
Saco, ME 04072

## Consent-Based Siting

From: fred karlson [mailto fkarlson@frontier.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:32 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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fred karlson
5779 vista dr
5779 Vista Drive, Ferndale WA 98248
Ferndale, WA 98248

From: fred karlson [mailto:fkarlson@frontier.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:42 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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fred karlson
5779 vista dr
5779 Vista Drive, Ferndale WA 98248
Ferndale, WA 98248

## Consent-Based Siting

From: William karr [mailto:konjola@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 8:29 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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William karr
19018 Jeanette St
Southfield, MI 48075

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Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:04 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
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William karr
19018 Jeanette St
Southfield, MI 48075

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Laurie Kasparian [mailto:Loddyg@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:08 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Laurie Kasparian
26526 Cardenio
Mission Viejo, CA 92691

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Michael Kast [mailto:michael_kast@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:58 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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Michael Kast
9158 Van Nuys Blvd. #4
Panorama City, CA 91402

## Consent-Based Siting

From: VICKI & ROD KASTLIE [mailto:CALLROD@COX.NET]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:23 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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VICKI & ROD KASTLIE
4473 MUIR AVE.
4473 MUIR AVE.
SAN DIEGO, CA 92107

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From: VICKI & ROD KASTLIE [mailto:CALLROD@COX.NET]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:17 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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## Consent-Based Siting

From: Bill Katakis [mailto:telomere@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:03 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,
Why aren't we spending any money on LENR? Navy has been saying it's a real and much safer nuclear reaction for 25 years and all have ignored them. We should not be ignoring a nuclear process just because it isn't the current and most dangerous favorite. NASA now too says it's a real reaction. Both Navy and NASA have repeatedly said it's real and they're arriving at the right theory for commercialization. No thanks to the DOE , nor NRC. You should be prodding the nukies familiar with LENR, because all current research says it will provide a drop in replacement for conventional reactor cores. LENR doesn't make nuclear waste, it remediates it. So instead of a 100 thousand years of guarding a concrete decommissioned tomb, you'll have a core that's transmuted into some other elements. You'll have chosen your core's material, knowing full well what it's ending composition will be, or since its so different, simply change the core in an hour. How can we ignore the 27 papers by Navy SPAWAR (NRL)? NASA is having a space plane designed around LENR technology. Navy and NASA both have some U.S. patents on the process. When the moneyed favoritism for fission is ended, you'll regulate this process to remediated both nuke waste and old reactor cores and parts, etc. Get some money to the effort, before we're patented out of the picture perhaps by other unfriendly countries. They are certainly funding LENR with reneewed funding. See Louis DeChiaro's slideshow from NRL/NAVSEA and read his 4 prerequisites for the LENR reaction to occur reliably. This should not be seen as an excuse to continue dangerous fission reactors, but instead, a rationale for funding LENR and getting rid of nuke waste that wouldn't be there had narrow thinkers not killed "cold fusion" in 1989. Now to nuke waste dumps into the human biosphere:
The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Bill Katakis
321 Venice

Northwood, OH 43619

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Bill Katakis
321 Venice
Northwood, OH 43619

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Tracey Katsouros [mailto:traceycsmallwood@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:10 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Tracey Katsouros
1322 Harwich Dr.
Waldorf, MD 20601

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Tracey Katsouros [mailto:traceycsmallwood@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 10:40 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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Tracey Katsouros
1322 Harwich Dr.
Waldorf, MD 20601

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Shari Katz [mailto:Shari katz@att net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 11:37 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Shari Katz
729 Megan ct
Westmont, IL 60559

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joanna Katz [mailto:joanna07@sonic net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:28 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Joanna Katz
1320 Addison A412
Berkeley, CA 94702

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joanna Katz [mailto:joanna07@sonic net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:38 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Joanna Katz
1320 Addison A412
Berkeley, CA 94702

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Patrice Kaufman [mailto mercurypub@sbcglobal net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:33 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Patrice Kaufman
2824 Cumberland
Berkley, MI 48072

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Alix Keast [mailto:Alixk3@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 2:19 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Alix Keast
214 Riverside Drive
New York, NY 10025

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Alix Keast [mailto:Alixk3@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:32 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Alix Keast
214 Riverside Drive
New York, NY 10025

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Timothy Keeler [mailto:timwsiy@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:22 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Timothy Keeler
16723 74th Ave NE
KENMORE, WA 98028

## Consent-Based Siting

From: JoAnn Keenan [mailto:keenanjam@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:04 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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JoAnn Keenan
3528 NE 92nd St, SEattle
SEattle, WA 98115

## Consent-Based Siting

From: JoAnn Keenan [mailto:keenanjam@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:57 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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JoAnn Keenan
3528 NE 92nd St, SEattle
SEattle, WA 98115

## Consent-Based Siting

From: robert keenan [mailto:robertlkeenan@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:47 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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robert keenan
23392 bolivar
mission viejo, CA 92691

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Linda Kehoe [mailto:lindalkehoe53@gmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 11:52 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Linda Kehoe
1076 Hawthorne Ave
Redding, CA 96002

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lisa Keim [mailto:andrews@chapman.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 4:37 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Lisa Keim
5940 W. 87th Place
Oak Lawn, IL 60453

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Peter J. Keiser [mailto:peterjkeiser@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:05 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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Peter J. Keiser
131 W Seneca St
Manlius, NY 13104

## Consent-Based Siting

From: John Keiser [mailto:jlck@nyc.rr.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:32 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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John Keiser
410 East 6 St., Apt. 17B
New York, NY 10009

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Peter J. Keiser [mailto:peterjkeiser@yahoo.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 1:03 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Peter J. Keiser
131 W Seneca St
Manlius, NY 13104

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Terri Keller [mailto:faith11@tds net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:59 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Terri Keller
P. O. Box 835
P. O. Box 835
Kingsland, GA 31548

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Martin Kellerman [mailto:mmkellerman@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:15 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Martin Kellerman
25 Edwards St
Apt 2F
Roslyn Heights, NY 11577

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Don Kelley [mailto:kim_don2001@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Don Kelley
12637 Merritt-Estes Rd.
Deadwood, SD 57732

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Alice Kelly [mailto:alicemarykelly@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:36 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Alice Kelly
6493 Cooper St.
Felton, CA 95018

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Florence Kelly [mailto:flokell@comcast.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:34 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Florence Kelly
139 Ellsworth St.
San Francisco, CA 94110

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Alice Kelly [mailto:alicemarykelly@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:16 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Alice Kelly
6493 Cooper St.
Felton, CA 95018

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mike Kelly [mailto:kokoek6@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:15 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Mike Kelly
808 s pine street
Horseheads, NY 14845

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mike Kelly [mailto:kokoek6@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:11 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Mike Kelly
808 s pine street
Horseheads, NY 14845

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Matt Kelly [mailto:veganpeace2@gmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 6:55 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Matt Kelly
116 North Shore Road
Petersburgh, NY 12138

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Matt Kelly [mailto:veganpeace2@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 6:45 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Matt Kelly
116 North Shore Road
Petersburgh, NY 12138

## Consent-Based Siting

From: David Kendall [mailto:davidrun2B@aol.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 9:44 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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David Kendall
23025 74th Ave West
Edmonds, WA 98026

## Consent-Based Siting

From: David Kendall [mailto:davidrun2B@aol.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 10:27 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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David Kendall
23025 74th Ave West
Edmonds, WA 98026

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sharon Kennedy [mailto:observernews@earthlink.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:33 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Sharon Kennedy
W Brookdale Place
Fullerton, CA 92832

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Arthur Kennedy [mailto:artkennedy1@cox.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 11:39 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Arthur Kennedy
6768 Sueno Road
Unit B
Isla Vista, CA 93117

## Consent-Based Siting

From: David Kennedy [mailto:dkanomaly@yahoo.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 2:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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David Kennedy
1714 W Indianola Ave
Phoenix, AZ 85015

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kate Kenner [mailto:faunesiegel@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:16 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Kate Kenner
31 Woodman St.
31 Woodman St.
Jamaica Plain, MA 02130

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kim Kensler [mailto:kkensler@msn.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 9:11 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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Kim Kensler
5215 secor Rd #8
Toledo, OH 43623

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Christine Kent [mailto:christine@wholewoman.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:28 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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Christine Kent
418 Central SE
Albuquerque NM 87102
Albuquerque, NM 87102

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Clarence&Carole Kent [mailto:wombatsfarm@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 1:20 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Clarence&Carole Kent
2059 Curry Ln.
Napa, Ca 94559, CA 94559

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From: m keough [mailto mkeough@madriver.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 7:20 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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m keough
fayston rd
moretown, VT 05660

## Consent-Based Siting

From: George Kerasiotis [mailto:georgekerasiotis@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 10:05 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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George Kerasiotis
1507 8th Ave
Brooklyn, NY 11215

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Suzanne Kercher [mailto:suzsophil@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:34 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Suzanne Kercher
1247 Summit Circle
1247 Summit Circle
Osage Beach, MO 65065

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Chris Kermiet [mailto:k1@indra.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:56 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Chris Kermiet
2267 Hudson St.
Denver, CO 80207

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Chris Kermiet [mailto:k1@indra.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:55 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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Chris Kermiet
2267 Hudson St.
Denver, CO 80207

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lindsay Hope Kern [mailto:belfayan@comcast net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:04 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Lindsay Hope Kern
Flat 39
33 Cliftonville Avenue
Belfast, ot 97213

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lindsay Hope Kern [mailto:belfayan@comcast net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:22 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Lindsay Hope Kern
Flat 39
33 Cliftonville Avenue
Belfast, ot 97213

## Consent-Based Siting

From: JAMES KERR [mailto:jkerr@pacific net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:59 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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JAMES KERR
PO Box 679
Redwood Valley, CT 95470

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Warren Kerrigan [mailto:doctorjake48@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:08 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Warren Kerrigan
460 Old Reservoir Road
Berea, OH 44017

## Consent-Based Siting

From: John Kerschbaum [mailto:john@gondolaromantica.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:47 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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John Kerschbaum
11251 Arcola Trail N.
Stillwater, MN 55082

## Consent-Based Siting

From: John Kersting [mailto:johnkersting@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:00 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

Dear EPA Acting Assistant Administrator for the Office of Air and Radiation Janet McCabe and the EPA Docket:

As a Parent, Journalist, Teacher and Community Leader as President of the Olympia Fraternal Organization of Eagles, I have been working on environmental issues for over 43 years. I remember back when our rivers were burning, Great Lakes dead and I am dead tired of corporate bullying in the name of profits for those who deserve none for poisoning our seas, air, food and lands. To that end, I'm asking you to immediately remove all support for the use of coal, nuclear, oil and gas energy use, development or storage that is not absolutely proven to be safe and permanent. So far, living in Washington State, I am horrified at the misdeeds of Hanford and the politically insane, suicidal Yucca Mountain proposals as well as the most recent proposal.

It is disturbingly hypocritical of our EPA, any governmental agency and/or any politician to have access to 40 years of unquestionable, peer-reviewed documented evidence of harm and danger with our energy sources particularly nuclear, oil, gas and coal- yet to give industry a pass on the true economic, environmental and health costs of these reckless methods of energy production. These industries must be held fully accountable for their devastating impact and make room for true progress in low impact energy sources.

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites

through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

John Kersting
2404 Olympia Ave NE
2404 Olympia Ave NE
Olympia, WA 98506

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Carol Kessler [mailto:clk12@igc.org]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:33 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Carol Kessler
15 Gates Ave
Ossining, NY 10562

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Astrid, Theo, Jonathan, Julius Keup [mailto:astridkeup@mac.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 11:20 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Astrid, Theo, Jonathan, Julius Keup
Loehrbachsgraben 5
Allendorf, ot 35469

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Josh Keyes [mailto:joshwkeyes@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:34 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Josh Keyes
945 Rose Dr
Ann Arbor, MI 48103

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Anne Keys [mailto:keysbalta@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:00 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Anne Keys
3836 Lywiski Rd
Collegeville, PA 19426

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mha Atma S. Khalsa [mailto:earthactionnetwork@earthlink.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:54 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Mha Atma S. Khalsa
1536 S Crest Dr
1536 Crest Dr.
Los Angeles, CA 90035

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mha Atma S. Khalsa [mailto:earthactionnetwork@earthlink.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:56 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: My Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

As a very concerned American citizen and taxpayer, it is my strong feeling that the DOE's consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Mha Atma S. Khalsa
1536 S Crest Dr
1536 Crest Dr.
Los Angeles, CA 90035

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Carol khan [mailto:carolkhan.007@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:55 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

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Carol khan
143 Toohey Rd.,
Tarragindi, ot 4121

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Robert Kiczula [mailto:papa9599@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 9:58 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Robert Kiczula
8521 W. Elizabeth
Niles, IL 60714

## Consent-Based Siting

From: d.s. KIEFER [mailto:dsk11@cornell.edu]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:48 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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d.s. KIEFER
629 highland rd.
...
ithaca, NY 14850

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joan Kiley [mailto:jlkiley@pacbell net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:03 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Joan Kiley
3792 Harrison St #32
Oakland, CA 94611

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Agoya Killeen [mailto:rawlove@att net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:16 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Agoya Killeen
PO Box 8179
Santa Cruz, CA 95060

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Agoya Killeen [mailto:rawlove@att net]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 3:33 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Agoya Killeen
PO Box 8179
Santa Cruz, CA 95060

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Andrew Kim [mailto:anskim@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:07 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Andrew Kim
2540 16th Ave
San Francisco, CA 94116

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Blakeley Kim [mailto:blakeleyk@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:15 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Blakeley Kim
838 Irving St., #4
San Francisco, CA 94122

From: toni kimball [mailto:2005nfg@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:48 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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toni kimball
2450 North Park Blvd
Santa Ana, CA 92706

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dawn Kimble [mailto:dawn kimble@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:59 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Dawn Kimble
3980 St. Petersburg St.
3980 St. Petersburg St.
Boulder, CO 80301

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dawn Kimble [mailto:dawn kimble@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:51 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Dawn Kimble
3980 St. Petersburg St.
3980 St. Petersburg St.
Boulder, CO 80301

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From: harold kimpel [mailto:haroldkimpel@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 5:10 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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harold kimpel
2917chandler st.
memphis, TN 38127

## Consent-Based Siting

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Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:09 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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harold kimpel
2917chandler st.
memphis, TN 38127

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Barbara King [mailto:Brb3Ki@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:57 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of

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Barbara King
PO Box 29448
Los Aneles, CA 90029

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Wendy King [mailto:wking@tulane.edu]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:32 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Forcing us to accept any nuclear waste anywhere is unacceptable. We will never accept this radioactive garbage (no matter what your agency calls it) anywhere in our cities, parishes/counties, or states.

Wendy King
2100 St. Charles Ave., #9J
New Orleans, LA 70130

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Tal Kinnersly [mailto:tal@kinnersly.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:08 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Tal Kinnersly
Sugawa
Itoigawa, CA 94913

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Tal Kinnersly [mailto:tal@kinnersly.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:49 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Tal Kinnersly
Sugawa
Itoigawa, CA 94913

## Consent-Based Siting

From: joana kirchhoff [mailto:joanakirchhoff@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 8:56 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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joana kirchhoff
16626 Bridger Canyon Rd
Portland, OR 97213

## Consent-Based Siting

From: John Kirchner [mailto:train462@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 6:32 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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John Kirchner
1002 Cottage Ave.
1002 Cottage Ave.
Fort Wayne, IN 46807

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Janet Vastine Kirchner [mailto:joyster@cheerful.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 7:56 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Janet Vastine Kirchner
132 Spruce Street
Middletown
Middletown, PA 17057

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Michael Kirkby [mailto:kirkbymichael@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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Michael Kirkby
9 Albany Ave
Toronto, ON M5R 3C2

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Michael Kirkby [mailto:kirkbymichael@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 7:18 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

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I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Michael Kirkby
9 Albany Ave
Toronto, ON M5R 3C2

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jerome Kirsling [mailto:Kirslingj@uwstout.edu]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:20 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I vehemently oppose and do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Jerome Kirsling
E4592 479th Avenue
Menomonie, WI 54751

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Norman Kjome [mailto:kjome@uwyo.edu]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 1:20 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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Norman Kjome
10730 E Fort Rd
Suttons Bay, MI 49682

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Robin Kladke [mailto:Rkladke@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:09 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Robin Kladke
725 w tipton drive
Tucson, AZ 85705

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lucas Klein [mailto:LKlein@cipherjournal.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:33 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Lucas Klein
720 W. Randolph
Hong Kong, ot 00000

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Daniel Klein [mailto:dlmkn@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 3:41 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Daniel Klein
326 12th St., Apt. 2R
Brooklyn, NY 11215

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lucas Klein [mailto:LKlein@cipherjournal.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:27 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Lucas Klein
720 W. Randolph
Hong Kong, ot 00000

## Consent-Based Siting

From: kevin klenner [mailto:kevinjjjk@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 4:23 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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kevin klenner
495 broome st
new york, NY 10013

## Consent-Based Siting

From: leona klerer [mailto:leona@klerer net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:41 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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leona klerer
straw hill ave
stamford, CT 06902

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Diana Kliche [mailto:klichediana@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:30 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Diana Kliche
3351 ridge pk ct
long beach, CA 90804

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jon Klingel [mailto:jon@klingel.name]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:15 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

We don't want any nuclear waste in our area (Northern New Mexico) or upwind. We already have Los Alamos and it hasn't been cleaned up yet even after 70 years!

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Jon Klingel
47 Star Vista Rd.
47 Star Vista Rd.
Santa Fe, NM 87505

## Consent-Based Siting

From: George F. Klipfel II, CLS [mailto:gklipfel@msn.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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George F. Klipfel II, CLS
67380 Garbino Road
Cathedral City, CA 92234

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Brian Klocke [mailto:bklocke@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:48 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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Brian Klocke
72 Ward St Apt A
Burlington, VT 05401

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Basey Klopp [mailto:bklopp@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Basey Klopp
1808 NW Vicksburg Ave.
Bend, OR 97703

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dean Knauer [mailto:deank@vcn.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:07 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Dean Knauer
38 Langdon Rd
Buffalo, WY 82834

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Donna Knipp [mailto:knipp.donna@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 11:32 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Donna Knipp
60 Seaman Ave., #2E
New York, NY 10034

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From: Donna Knipp [mailto:knipp.donna@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:38 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Donna Knipp
60 Seaman Ave., #2E
New York, NY 10034

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Annette Knitter [mailto:annetteknitter@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:23 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Annette Knitter
837 W. Montrose Ave
#301
Chicago, IL 60613

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Glenn Knoblock [mailto:glenndandy1@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 9:58 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Glenn Knoblock
12 Emery Street
Joliet, IL 60436

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lee Knohl [mailto:leroy knohl@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:36 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Lee Knohl
9221 Central Park Ave
Evanston, IL 60203

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Benjamin Knudstrup [mailto:tinreddrum@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 8:59 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Benjamin Knudstrup
2822 W. Main Street
Ionia, MI 48846

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Judy Knueven [mailto:judyknueven@comcast net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 6:56 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Judy Knueven
131 Dehaven Rd
Beaver Falls, PA 15010

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ruth Koblenz [mailto:rh.koblenz@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:51 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Ruth Koblenz
5431 Mardel Avenue
St. Louis, MO 63109

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joann Koch [mailto:jmjkla@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:33 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Joann Koch
134 Olenick Rd
Lebanon, CT, CT 06249

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Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 6:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Joann Koch
134 Olenick Rd
Lebanon, CT, CT 06249

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Bridget Koch-Timothy [mailto:Tegdirbsc@aol.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:25 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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Bridget Koch-Timothy
2100 24th St.
Sacramento, CA 95818

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Bridget Koch-Timothy [mailto:Tegdirbsc@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:37 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Bridget Koch-Timothy
2100 24th St.
Sacramento, CA 95818

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Maximilian Koczmajewski [mailto:Maxdermilian@posteo.de]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 11:57 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Maximilian Koczmajewski
Hölzlweg 15
München, ot 80939

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Maximilian Koczmajewski [mailto:Maxdermilian@posteo.de]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 9:13 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Maximilian Koczmajewski
Hölzlweg 15
München, ot 80939

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Karl Koessel [mailto:karl.koessel@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:56 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Karl Koessel
PO Box 257
Blue Lake, CA 95525

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Glenda Kohlhafer-Regan [mailto:gregan757@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:53 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Glenda Kohlhafer-Regan
409 Galies Pointe Ln
1420 Jury Rd
Chesapeake, VA 23322

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Teresa Kohn [mailto:tkohn@seattletimes.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Teresa Kohn
1204 N. 49th St.
Seattle, WA 98103

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joseph Kohn MD [mailto:Joseph@WeAreOne.cc]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 7:24 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Joseph Kohn MD
1268 W Hiahia Place
Wailuku, HI 96793

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ellen Koivisto [mailto:offstage@earthlink.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:57 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Ellen Koivisto
1556 Great Hwy #101
San Francisco, CA 94122

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Gary Kolb [mailto:gpkolb@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:04 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Gary Kolb
1 Southmoor Street
Carbondale, IL 62903

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Brian Kolek [mailto:bkolek@solzon.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:25 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Brian Kolek
143 Main Street
Westford, MA 01886

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Robert Kolkebeck [mailto:gkolkebeck@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:49 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

Shut down nuclear power plants.

They're not safe. They're not economical.

They are radioactive garbage cans.

A statement prepared by the Nuclear Information Resource Service (NIRS) follows. I support the position taken by NIRS.

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Robert Kolkebeck
131 Hay Street
Park Forest, IL 60466

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jeff Komisarof [mailto:jeffrey.komisarof@uphs.upenn.edu]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:42 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Jeff Komisarof
9033 Rouen Lane
Potomac, MD 20854

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jeff Komisarof [mailto:jeffrey.komisarof@uphs.upenn.edu]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:08 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

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Jeff Komisarof
9033 Rouen Lane
Potomac, MD 20854

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Carol Kommerstad-Reiche [mailto:cmkr@cox.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:32 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Carol Kommerstad-Reiche
358 Woodley Rd.
Santa Barbara, CA 93108

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Anna Konkurowich [mailto:anetsah@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 2:27 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Anna Konkurowich
99 Millbrook Road
Crowborough, ot TN6 2SB

## Consent-Based Siting

From: rebecca koo [mailto memoriesjc@hotmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 2:24 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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rebecca koo
1050 johnson ave
san diego, CA 92108

## Consent-Based Siting

From: rebecca koo [mailto memoriesjc@hotmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 1:56 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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rebecca koo
1050 johnson ave
san diego, CA 92108

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Marcia Koren [mailto:makoren@msn.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 9:12 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Marcia Koren
360 Lynn Street
Seattle, WA 98109

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Andrew Korkes [mailto:ark000@hotmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 1:20 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

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Andrew Korkes
fernriver avenue
Wayne, NJ 07470

## Consent-Based Siting

From: David Korman [mailto:davkor@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:08 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. This is unacceptable!

In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

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David Korman
435 W 46th St
New York, NY 10036

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Susan Kornfeld [mailto:suekorn@sbcglobal net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:59 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

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Susan Kornfeld
3724 Edenhurst Ave.
Los Angeles, CA 90039

## Consent-Based Siting

From: pat korzendorfer [mailto:jerpatkorzen@yahoo.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 1:16 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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pat korzendorfer
p o box 247
20 north court
fort atkinson, IA 52144

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Gene Kostruba [mailto:genekostruba@comcast.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:00 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Gene Kostruba
468 Sierra Vista Ave. #15
Mountain View, CA 94043

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lynn Kouzel [mailto:lynnkouzel@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:54 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Lynn Kouzel
779 W. 20th St. #5
San Pedro, CA 90731

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Cheryl Kozanitas [mailto:cherylkoz44@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 7:34 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

What public consent? I have learned of this issue through online groups opposed to nuclear reactors and power plants. I have NOT seen announcements in newspapers because I get my news online. I have not received a letter in the mail, phone call, or an email from DOE.

From reading on the subject, I think that some person or persons are planning a "sweet" deal for themselves to cash in on the transporting of nuclear waste, and the construction and maintenance of so called interim sites. Tell me where I'm wrong about this!

The danger to the residents of the United States does not seem to be a factor to those making the decisions.
If it were a factor, the HOSS solution would be the only solution.

I feel like the current and future citizens and residents of the United States are the WALKING DEAD! We act as the living, doing all the things of the living, but we are actually dead if your plans are carried out. You, apparently, do not worry about that.

FOR THE SAKE OF HUMANITY YOU MUST SERIOUSLY EVALUATE YOUR MORALS AT THIS MOMENT IN HISTORY.

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Cheryl Kozanitas
646 Pico Ave
San Mateo, CA 94403

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ted Kozlowski [mailto:thkoz78@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:17 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Ted Kozlowski
3300 Carpenter Rd SE #43
Lacey, WA 98503

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Judy Krach [mailto:JHawk3989@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:23 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Judy Krach
3517 Bordeaux Court
Hazel Crest, IL 60429

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ruth Kram [mailto:ruthkram@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:09 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Ruth Kram
111 coccio dr
west orange, NJ 07052

## Consent-Based Siting

From: julie Kramer [mailto:jekramer@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:30 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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julie Kramer
1288 church
san francisco, CA 94114

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Gay Kramer-Dodd [mailto:gaykramerdodd@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:34 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

Nuclear waste scares me nearly as much as nuclear bombs. The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Gay Kramer-Dodd
372 Lodenquai Ln.
Eugene, OR 97404

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Andrea Kraus [mailto:mikelorrig@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:58 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Andrea Kraus
1120 Hacienda Pl
West Hollywood, CA 90069

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Andrea Kraus [mailto:mikelorrig@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:14 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Andrea Kraus
1120 Hacienda Pl
West Hollywood, CA 90069

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jane Kreisman [mailto:janekreisman@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 9:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Jane Kreisman
2702 Wisconsin Ave NW
# 301
Washington, DC 20007

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ira Kriston [mailto:iragk@comcast.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:32 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Ira Kriston
900 Chicago Ave., #713
Evanston, IL 60202

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Rachel Krucoff [mailto:rkru@att net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:56 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Rachel Krucoff
5441 S. kenwood Ave.
Chicago, IL 60615

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Rachel Krucoff [mailto:rkru@att net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:38 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Rachel Krucoff
5441 S. kenwood Ave.
Chicago, IL 60615

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Suzanne Kruger [mailto:soozikruger@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:47 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Suzanne Kruger
rt.2, box 1008
harpers ferry, WV 25425

## Consent-Based Siting

From: K Krupinski [mailto:kkbluerose@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:40 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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K Krupinski
6124 Buena Vista Terrace
LA, CA 90042

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Iwona Krzeminska [mailto:iwa horowitz@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 3:27 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Iwona Krzeminska
Spokojna 5
Sosnowie, ot 41-200

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ria Tanz Kubota [mailto:RIA.TANZ.KUBOTA@comcast.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:48 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Ria Tanz Kubota
671 El Cerro Dr.
671 El Cerro Dr.
El Sobrante, CA 94803

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kathleen Kuczynski [mailto:katski47@cox net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 2:53 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Kathleen Kuczynski
25402 Shoshone Dr.
Lake Forest, CA 92630

## Consent-Based Siting

From: rosemarie kuhn [mailto:rkuhn@cvip.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:40 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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rosemarie kuhn
1655 w tenaya
fresno, CA 93711

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Peter Kuhn [mailto:peterkuhnxx@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:37 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Peter Kuhn
3611 vista de la bahia
san diego, CA 92117

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Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:29 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

rosemarie kuhn
1655 w tenaya
fresno, CA 93711

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Holly Kukkonen [mailto:Hakukkonen@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:08 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Holly Kukkonen
1607 Burns Ave.
1607 Burns Ave.
Wa City, IA 52240

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Holly Kukkonen [mailto:Hakukkonen@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Holly Kukkonen
1607 Burns Ave.
1607 Burns Ave.
Wa City, IA 52240

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Boguslaw Kulesza [mailto:bogdanku@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:49 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Boguslaw Kulesza
1057 second avenue
Franklin Sq, NY 11010

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Boguslaw Kulesza [mailto:bogdanku@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 5:06 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Boguslaw Kulesza
1057 second avenue
Franklin Sq, NY 11010

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Cara Kulwicki [mailto:doublefantasy@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 6:41 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Cara Kulwicki
202 East Squire Dr. Apt. 6
Rochester, NY 14623

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Michael and Miriam Kurland [mailto:mimbck@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:56 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Michael and Miriam Kurland
566 East St.
269 wormwood hill rd mansfield center, ct.
Williamsburg, MA 01096

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Nancy Kurtz [mailto:NancyStarjive@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:05 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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Nancy Kurtz
139 Arches Drive
Moab, UT 84532

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Daniel Kurz [mailto:dk_nj@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:32 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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Daniel Kurz
8B Rutland Lane
8B Rutland Lane
Monroe Twp., NJ 08831

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Daniel Kurz [mailto:dk_nj@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:03 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Daniel Kurz
8B Rutland Lane
8B Rutland Lane
Monroe Twp., NJ 08831

## Consent-Based Siting

From: christopher kustra [mailto:christopher kustra@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:34 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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christopher kustra
9 N. Western Av.
deerfield, wi 53531
Deerfield, WI 53531

## Consent-Based Siting

From: christopher kustra [mailto:christopher kustra@yahoo.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 12:52 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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christopher kustra
9 N. Western Av.
deerfield, wi 53531
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## Consent-Based Siting

From: ron kutch [mailto:rokut100@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:43 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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ron kutch
1279 ashcroft ln
san jose, ça, CA 95118

## Consent-Based Siting

From: ron kutch [mailto:rokut100@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:04 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

ron kutch
1279 ashcroft ln
san jose, ça, CA 95118

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jan Kutchen [mailto:jkutchen@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:15 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Jan Kutchen
3103 Eisenhauer Road, #K19
San Antonio, TX 78209

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Robert KWIECINSKI [mailto:rkwiec7372@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:29 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Robert KWIECINSKI
7 MERRITT AVE.
South Amboy, NJ 08879

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Robin Kyle [mailto:robinkyle@mac.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 5:43 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Robin Kyle
1814 Buchanan Street NE
Minneapolis, MN 55418

## Consent-Based Siting

From: A L [mailto:aalisbin@GMAIL.COM]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:55 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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A L
parker
avoca, NY 14809

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sharon Laabs [mailto:slaabs@spice-weasel.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:09 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Sharon Laabs
8193 Via Mallorca
La Jolla, CA 92037

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sharon Laabs [mailto:slaabs@spice-weasel.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:57 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Sharon Laabs
8193 Via Mallorca
La Jolla, CA 92037

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Marcey Lachance [mailto:mlachance@gmmsda.org]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:20 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Marcey Lachance
4 Broad View Ln.
Bailey Island, ME 04003

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Marcey Lachance [mailto:mlachance@gmmsda.org]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 5:08 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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Marcey Lachance
4 Broad View Ln.
Bailey Island, ME 04003

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mercedes Lackey [mailto:helloelsie@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:28 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Mercedes Lackey
16525 E 470 Rd
CLAREMORE, OK 74017

## Consent-Based Siting

From: brian laddy [mailto:nojunk07@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:37 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment OPPOSING DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Moniz,
IF YOU DO THIS, I HOPE YOUR FAMILY IS THE FIRST TO DIE IN A NUCLEAR INCIDENT.
The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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brian laddy
123 any st
ft mill, SC 29707

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Henry Lahey [mailto:hlahey@comcast net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:47 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Henry Lahey
2 cobblestone Way
cobblestone way
Exeter, NH 03833

## Consent-Based Siting

From: michael lahey [mailto:mlahey22@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:07 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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michael lahey
1504 W FARWELL AVE
chicago, IL 60626

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lynda LaHue [mailto:Lyndalahue9@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:43 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Lynda LaHue
5849 Topeka dr tarzana
Tarzana, CA 91356

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lynda LaHue [mailto:Lyndalahue9@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:47 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Lynda LaHue
5849 Topeka dr tarzana
Tarzana, CA 91356

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Marion Lakatos [mailto:mplakatos@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:02 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Marion Lakatos
120 truesdale
Croton, NY 10520

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Marion Lakatos [mailto:mplakatos@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 8:26 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Marion Lakatos
120 truesdale
Croton, NY 10520

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jennifer Lake [mailto:jenlakec21@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:10 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Jennifer Lake
6013 S. Redwood Rd.
Taylorsville, UT 84123

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jennifer Lake [mailto:jenlakec21@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 5:13 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Jennifer Lake
6013 S. Redwood Rd.
Taylorsville, UT 84123

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Edward Lally [mailto:jlally.csp@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:33 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Edward Lally
1120 4 Mile Rd. NE
Grand Rapids, MI 49525

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Eric Lambart [mailto:democrats@nomeaning.org]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Eric Lambart
N. Oatman Ave.
Portland, OR 97217

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sally Lambert [mailto:salam@volcano net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:13 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

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Sally Lambert
PO Box 215
Sutter Creek, CA 95685

## Consent-Based Siting

From: John LaMonica [mailto:jalamon@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:15 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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John LaMonica
395 Sylvan Byway
395 Sylvan Byway
Pisgah Forest, NC 28768

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Rebecca Lamoreaux [mailto:beckalamm@juno.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 6:54 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Rebecca Lamoreaux
Hurley Ave
Kingston, NY 12401

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Michael Lampi [mailto:politics@lampi.us]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:20 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to limit the waste being made and second to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for at least one thousand years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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Michael Lampi
2667 170th Ave SE
Bellevue, WA 98008

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Donald Lancaster [mailto:dlancaster09@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:02 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Donald Lancaster
643 Willow Ave
Indiana, PA 15701

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Marty Landa [mailto marty@faceuptopeace.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:49 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Marty Landa
Siesta Lane
2137 Savannah River Street
Sedona, AZ 86351

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Marty Landa [mailto marty@faceuptopeace.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:52 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Marty Landa
Siesta Lane
2137 Savannah River Street
Sedona, AZ 86351

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Doug Landau [mailto:popcomic@tampabay.rr.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:59 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Doug Landau
150 73rd St. S.
St. Petersburg, FL 33707

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Miriam Landman [mailto:ml@mlandman.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:06 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Miriam Landman
150 Wagnon Rd.
Sebastopol, CA 95472

## Consent-Based Siting

From: sherry landsman [mailto:sherry25@mac.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:39 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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sherry landsman
410  w. 24th st. #6J
NY, NY 10011

## Consent-Based Siting

From: sherry landsman [mailto:sherry25@mac.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 1:15 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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sherry landsman
410  w. 24th st. #6J
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Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:50 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Sandra Lane
4955 Twin Lakes Rd.
#59
Boulder, CO 80301

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dennis Lane [mailto:nitrox3@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 7:48 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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Dennis Lane
140 Wagon Wheel Lane
140 Wagon Wheel Ln.
Cutchogue, NY 11935

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Eric Lane [mailto:eflane@swbell net]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 8:31 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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Eric Lane
330 Quentin Dr.
330 Quentin Dr.
SAN ANTONIO, TX 78201

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sandra Lane [mailto:mlane78212@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:12 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Sandra Lane
1321 Upland Drive
Houston, TX 78028

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lama Lane [mailto:lc.lane@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:20 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Lama Lane
3941 S Bristol St D221
Santa Ana, CA 92627

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sandra Lane [mailto:jazlane@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:34 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Sandra Lane
4955 Twin Lakes Rd.
#59
Boulder, CO 80301

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lynn c. Lang [mailto:lynn_lang@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:15 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Lynn c. Lang
1721 Polaris Court
Saint Cloud, MN 56303

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joan Lang [mailto:jlang@csjoseph.org]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:31 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Joan Lang
3430 Rocky River Dr
Cleveland, OH 44111

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joan Lang [mailto:jlang@csjoseph.org]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:08 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Joan Lang
3430 Rocky River Dr
Cleveland, OH 44111

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mary E. Lang [mailto:hankisabelle@comcast net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:17 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Mary E. Lang
95
Centerbrook, CT 06409

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mary Anne Lang [mailto:milasarlan@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:17 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Mary Anne Lang
1526 Oakland St.
Bethlehem, PA 18017

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Marlena Lange [mailto:mar32123@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:59 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Marlena Lange
23 Royce Ave
Middletown
Middletown, NY 10940

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Cecelia Lanman [mailto:lunarphase@asis.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 2:16 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Cecelia Lanman
PO Box 1985
Redway, CA 95560

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Carol Lapetino [mailto:carolandkj@att.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 2:25 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Carol Lapetino
6441 Loomes Ave.
6441 Loomes Ave.
Downers Grove, IL 60516

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From: Carol Lapetino [mailto:carolandkj@att.net]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 3:00 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Carol Lapetino
6441 Loomes Ave.
6441 Loomes Ave.
Downers Grove, IL 60516

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Paul Lapidus [mailto:plapidus@ebold.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:18 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Paul Lapidus
2995 Rea Ct
Aromas, CA 95004

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mike LaPorte [mailto mikeclaporte@comcast.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:57 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

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Mike LaPorte
6488 sw midmar place portland, or 97223
Portland, OR 97223

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Larry Lapuyade [mailto:larrylapuyade@earthlink.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:40 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Larry Lapuyade
PO Box 81
San Anselmo, CA 94979

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Barbara Larcom [mailto:Barbara.Larcom@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:16 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Barbara Larcom
2743 Maryland Avenue
Baltimore, MD 21218

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Timothy Larkin [mailto:FlyBearSF@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:18 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Timothy Larkin
1515 Sutter Street
Apt. #210
San Francisco, CA 94109

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Karen Larsen [mailto:jdbfan@aol.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 3:38 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Karen Larsen
6857 S. Bannock St.
Littleton, CO 80120

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Brent Larsen [mailto:b.larz@larzequipment.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 1:14 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Brent Larsen
8320 Via Sonoma
# 82
La Jolla, CA 92103

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Karen Larsen [mailto:jdbfan@aol.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 2:59 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Karen Larsen
6857 S. Bannock St.
Littleton, CO 80120

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Elaine Larson [mailto:elainelars@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:33 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Elaine Larson
534 maria dr
Petaluma, CA 94954

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Elaine Larson [mailto:elainelars@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:28 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Elaine Larson
534 maria dr
Petaluma, CA 94954

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dona LaSchiava [mailto:dslaschiava@comcast.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:51 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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NO MORE FUKUSHIMAS!

Dona LaSchiava
4511 West Rockwood Drive
Tucson, AZ 85741

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Cheryl Laskasky [mailto:laskasky@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:33 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Cheryl Laskasky
120 N Grant Drive
Addison, IL 60101

## Consent-Based Siting

From: LESLEY LATHROP [mailto:lesl@cruzio.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:25 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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LESLEY LATHROP
4546 Arana Creek Way
SANTA CRUZ, CA 95065

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From: Cole Latimer [mailto:coleelectric@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:17 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Cole Latimer
4508 Merle Drive
Austin, TX 78745

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jane Latus [mailto:jelatus@comcast.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 7:55 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Jane Latus
8 Uplands Dr.
Canton, CT 06019

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Laurel Laughlin [mailto:laurelelle@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:08 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Laurel Laughlin
1060 N Eugene Dr Apt C
1060 eugene dr
Fullerton, CA 92832

## Consent-Based Siting

From: char laughon [mailto:charlaugh@sbcglobal net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:37 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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char laughon
236 fifth st,
montara, CA 94037

## Consent-Based Siting

From: char laughon [mailto:charlaugh@sbcglobal net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:22 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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char laughon
236 fifth st,
montara, CA 94037

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Chris Pan Launois [mailto:Panmail@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:30 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Chris Pan Launois
131 W. 85th.St. NYC, NY
New York, NY 10024

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Val Laurent [mailto:v.laurent@att net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:48 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Val Laurent
1680 clay street apt14
1680 clay street apt 14
San Fracisco, CA 94109

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Seth Laursen [mailto:sethlaursen@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:36 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Seth Laursen
2133 S Mansfield Ave.
Los Angeles, CA 90016

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Nadine Lauru [mailto:lauru0201@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:38 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Nadine Lauru
1243 N Kraemer Blvd
Placentia, CA 92870

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Gabriel Lautaro [mailto:djriddm@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:37 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Gabriel Lautaro
4
Oakland, CA 94610

## Consent-Based Siting

From: David Laux [mailto:dlaux3882@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:08 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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David Laux
4613 Randolph Dr
Annandale, VA 22003

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Rachel Lauze [mailto:rachel.lauzemm@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 4:31 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Rachel Lauze
100 Ryder Road
Ossining, NY 10545

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Charlene Lauzon [mailto:oceanlvr1111@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:45 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Charlene Lauzon
5715 202nd St. SW #3
Lynnwood, WA 98036

## Consent-Based Siting

From: David LaVerne [mailto:backpack2@comcast net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 8:04 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

David LaVerne
844 Lincoln Street
844 Lincoln Street
Dickson City, PA 18519

## Consent-Based Siting

From: E Lavery [mailto:herlizardness@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:06 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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E Lavery
102 Concord Road
102 Concord Road
Sudbury, MA 01776

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Tawnya Laveta [mailto:tlaveta@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:01 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Tawnya Laveta
227 C Rosario Boulevard
Santa Fe, NM 87501

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Fred Lavy [mailto:fred-cheryl@msn.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:23 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Fred Lavy
524 East Wolfe St
524 East Wolfe St
Harrisonburg, VA 22802

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Stephanie Lawner [mailto revshif@fairpoint net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 11:13 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Stephanie Lawner
297 Sunnyside Lane
Kinderhook, NY 12106

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Cecile Lawrence [mailto:artcalight13@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:08 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Cecile Lawrence
Alpine
Apalachin, NY 13732

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kathleen Lawrence [mailto:k.e.lawrence@icloud.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:08 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Kathleen Lawrence
68680 Dinah Shore Dr. 68-D
Cathedral City, CA 92234

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Rhett Lawrence [mailto:rhettlawrence@yahoo.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 1:45 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Rhett Lawrence
6445 N Commercial Ave
Portland, OR 97217

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Gene Lawson [mailto:genehlawson@comcast.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:57 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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Gene Lawson
4615 191st. t. S.W.
Lynnwood, WA 98036

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Tom Lawson [mailto:t_lawson@sympatico.ca]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:11 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Tom Lawson
172 Dorset St. East
Port Hope, ON L1A 0B1

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joan Lawson [mailto:joanvlawson@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:22 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Joan Lawson
900 University St 10MN
Seattle, WA 98101

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joseph Lawson [mailto:josephglaw@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:23 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Joseph Lawson
29 W 65th St., Apt 1G
New York, NY 10023

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joseph Lawson [mailto:josephglaw@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:01 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Joseph Lawson
29 W 65th St., Apt 1G
New York, NY 10023

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Christian Leahy [mailto:clpoema@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:38 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Christian Leahy
1944 Kiva Road
Santa Fe, NM 87505

## Consent-Based Siting

From: martha leahy [mailto martha638@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 1:07 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

martha leahy
39 lockeland rd
39 lockeland rd
winchester, MA 01890

## Consent-Based Siting

From: martha leahy [mailto martha638@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:34 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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## Consent-Based Siting

From: Rebecca Leas [mailto rrleas@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:16 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Rebecca Leas
6509 Seminole Lane
Rapid City, SD 57702

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Rose Marie Leather [mailto:fleurecerise@aol.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:19 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Rose Marie Leather
2239 E. Montecito Avenue
Phoenix, AZ 85016

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Charles Leavell [mailto:clevel0@earthlink net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:14 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Charles Leavell
2788 E. Verde Ave.
Anaheim, CA 92806

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Michael Lebell [mailto:mlebell@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:41 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Michael Lebell
980 Glen Annie Rd
goleta, CA 93117

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Candy LeBlanc [mailto:telvari9@care2.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 4:06 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Candy LeBlanc
1525 Cold Springs Rd
SPC 52
Placerville, CA 95667

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dennis Ledden [mailto:lcs5779@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 8:25 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Dennis Ledden
4545 Grinding Rock Rd
Fiddletown, CA 95629

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dennis Ledden [mailto:lcs5779@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 7:13 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Dennis Ledden
4545 Grinding Rock Rd
Fiddletown, CA 95629

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jessica Lederman [mailto:jlederman1027@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 9:26 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Jessica Lederman
236 Newark Ave
Jersey City, NJ 07302

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Marilyn Ledoux [mailto marilyn_ledoux@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 7:47 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Marilyn Ledoux
9181 Madison Ave
Apt 99
Orangevale, CA 95662

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ormond Lee [mailto:ojfoxlee@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Ormond Lee
100 Seaborn Lane R. 4
Perth, ON k7h3c6

## Consent-Based Siting

From: brenda lee [mailto:greenmomlee@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 6:50 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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brenda lee
16 quarry dr
wappingers falls, NY 12590

## Consent-Based Siting

From: alan lee [mailto:alanleealan@hotmail.co.uk]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:14 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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alan lee
1 cedar avenue
manchester, ot wa142qr

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Christy Lee-Engel [mailto:cdleee@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:54 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Christy Lee-Engel
9410 44th PL NE
Seattle, WA 98115

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Cavin Leeman [mailto:cpl@cpleeman net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:52 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Cavin Leeman
215 West 92nd Street, 13A
New York, NY 10025

## Consent-Based Siting

From: John Lefever [mailto:john.jrlson@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 11:00 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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John Lefever
PO Box 643
PO Box 643
Woodstock, NY 12572

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Susan Lefler [mailto:Susan_lefler@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 10:08 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Susan Lefler
8701 bear creek drive
austin, TX 78737

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Susan Lefler [mailto:Susan_lefler@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Susan Lefler
8701 bear creek drive
austin, TX 78737

## Consent-Based Siting

From: G Lehman [mailto:gailjlehman@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:28 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

G Lehman
19 Bradford St.
Needham, MA 02492

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Willi Lehner [mailto:bleumont@tds net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 8:22 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

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Willi Lehner
3480 County Road F
Blue Mounds, WI 53517

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Daniel Kermit Leibensperger [mailto:leibendk@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 4:33 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,
Nobody wants this in their neighborhood, so the fairest way to distribute the waste would be to put some small quantity in the backyards of all the people who made big profits creating the mess. Also do the same in regard to those who inherited big money from these folks, unless they donate all the nuke cash they inherited to cancer research, since one of the greatest causes of cancer is all the radioactive material in the air water and land from all the proliferation of deadly nuke toxins. Bet you a million to one you're too chicken to do the right thing. Like blankets with measles in the Nineteenth Century distributed by the US government, looks like the Native Americans of the Southwest are going to be saddled with the nuke trash dumps. Will you next idiotic move be to put the waste near a fault zone??
The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Daniel Kermit Leibensperger
4646 Poole Road
4646 Poole Road Sykesville MD 21784
Sykesville, MD 21784

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Susan Leibowitz [mailto:bobetsue2@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:23 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Susan Leibowitz
732 W. Schubert Ave.
Chicago, IL 60614

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Arthur Leibowitz [mailto:arthurleibowitz@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:15 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Arthur Leibowitz
322 Lake Shore Road
Putnam Valley, NY 10579

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Susan Leibowitz [mailto:bobetsue2@aol.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 4:02 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Susan Leibowitz
732 W. Schubert Ave.
Chicago, IL 60614

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Don Leichtling [mailto:d.light@cox.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:29 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

Say N to Nuclear Waste!

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Don Leichtling
3703 Ray St
San Diego, CA 92104

## Consent-Based Siting

From: LAURA LEIPZIG [mailto:laura@blueworldtravel.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:09 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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LAURA LEIPZIG
1911 SACRAMENTO ST
Berkeley, CA 94702

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Miranda Leiva [mailto:MWolfL@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:03 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Miranda Leiva
4950 Coldwater Cyn APT#23
Sherman Oaks, CA 91423

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From: Miranda Leiva [mailto:MWolfL@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 7:09 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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4950 Coldwater Cyn APT#23
Sherman Oaks, CA 91423

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kathryn Lemoine [mailto:truth58@outlook.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:22 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Kathryn Lemoine
106 Parkwest Drive
3-C
West Monroe, LA 71291

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kathryn Lemoine [mailto:truth58@outlook.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:57 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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106 Parkwest Drive
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From: Susan Lemont [mailto:vernalpoole@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:40 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Susan Lemont
90 Robbins Road
Arlington, MA 02476

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Susan Lemont [mailto:vernalpoole@yahoo.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 8:25 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Susan Lemont
90 Robbins Road
Arlington, MA 02476

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Nicholas Lenchner [mailto:airbat@pacbell net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:38 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Nicholas Lenchner
1324 cashew rd.
Santa Rosa, CA 95403

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Nicholas Lenchner [mailto:airbat@pacbell net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:02 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Nicholas Lenchner
1324 cashew rd.
Santa Rosa, CA 95403

## Consent-Based Siting

From: cecile leneman [mailto:cecilep@sonic net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:53 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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cecile leneman
2550 dana st 5-B
2550 dana st berkeley
berkeley, CA 94704

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Wayne Lensu [mailto:lensway@sbcglobal net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 11:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Wayne Lensu
53 Davis Ave
Inwood, NY 11096

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Wayne Lensu [mailto:lensway@sbcglobal net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:09 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Wayne Lensu
53 Davis Ave
Inwood, NY 11096

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Clare Lentz [mailto:clare.lentz@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 6:33 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Clare Lentz
6537 37th Ave. SW
none
Seattle, WA 99202

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Vicki Leon [mailto:vleon937@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:38 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,
I live 15 miles from Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant, which is sited on multiple earthquake faults and on the Pacific coast, making it as scary a neighbor as the disastrous Fukushima plants. Thus I have more than a casual acquaintance with Diablo and its multiple flaws and hazards, including its already over-filled pool of spent fuel rods and its lack of sufficient dry casks for storage.
The DOE's latest attempt to deal with nuke waste is a new LOW even for the nuclear industry.
The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment.
Such arrogance has no place in our society.
DOE has ZERO authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

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Vicki Leon
506 Pinon
Morro Bay, CA 93442

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jesse Lepkoff [mailto flauto@sover.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 8:38 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Jesse Lepkoff
314 upper houghton rd
Marlboro, VT 05344

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Cody LePow [mailto:cdylpw@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:05 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Cody LePow
304 n. encinal ave
ojai, CA 91214

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Patricia Leppala [mailto:paleppala@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:05 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Patricia Leppala
479 4th St
Crescent Valley, NV 89821

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Howard Lepzelter [mailto:hlepzelter@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:58 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Howard Lepzelter
1861 Matthews Avenue
Bronx, NY 10462

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Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:39 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Howard Lepzelter
1861 Matthews Avenue
Bronx, NY 10462

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Michele Leschi [mailto:miblu22@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:41 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Michele Leschi
105 Anchorage Dr.
Monrovia, CA 91016

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Tammy Lettieri [mailto:tammylettieri@aol.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 8:09 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

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Tammy Lettieri
2500 Sw 15 St
Deerfield, FL 33442

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Tammy Lettieri [mailto:tammylettieri@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

There is No Planet B. We deserve to be free from fear of yet another nuclear disaster as if Chernobyl and Fukushima weren't bad enough.
We need a Marshall plan for renewable energy projects not expansion of toxic nuclear. Energy.
The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Tammy Lettieri
2500 Sw 15 St
Deerfield, FL 33442

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Robert Leverant [mailto roblev@sonic net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:55 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Robert Leverant
471 S. High St.
Sebastopol, CA 95472

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lynn Ann Leveridge [mailto:laleveridge@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 5:16 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Lynn Ann Leveridge
13634 Erwin St.
Valley Glen, CA 91401

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sharon Levine [mailto:sdlevine@earthlink net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:16 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Sharon Levine
2384 Boalt Ave.
Simi Valley, CA 93063

From: Marci Levine [mailto:marcilevine@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:44 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Marci Levine
2120 Ridgemont Drive
2120 Ridgemont Dr.
Los Angeles, CA 90046

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joel Levine [mailto:jlevine1000@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:42 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Joel Levine
King Ranch Rd.
Ukiah, CA 95482

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lynne Levine [mailto:llevine3@juno.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 1:31 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Lynne Levine
900 University
4J
Seatt;e, WA 98101

## Consent-Based Siting

From: marilyn levine [mailto:mlevine917@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:45 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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marilyn levine
325 Sylvan Ave
Mountain View, CA 94041

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Marci Levine [mailto:marcilevine@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:44 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Marci Levine
2120 Ridgemont Drive
2120 Ridgemont Dr.
Los Angeles, CA 90046

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Marvin Lewis [mailto:Marvlewis@juno.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:48 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Marvin Lewis
3133 Fairfield Street
Philadelphia, PA 19136

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From: Wayne Lewis [mailto:waynelewistx@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:52 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Wayne Lewis
4803 76th  Street
Lubbock, TX 79424

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Erma Lewis [mailto:elewisny@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:36 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Erma Lewis
1736 63 Street
1736 63 Street
Brooklyn, NY 11204

## Consent-Based Siting

From: fred lewis [mailto rockypointbeach@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:28 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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fred lewis
1409 highlabnd dr
mt shasta, CA 96067

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Francesca Lewis [mailto:franlws@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:23 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Francesca Lewis
5395 nw 26th Lane
Ocala, FL 34482

## Consent-Based Siting

From: George Lewis [mailto:glewis@calpoly.edu]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:44 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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George Lewis
1852 6th St.
Los Osos, CA 93402

## Consent-Based Siting

From: o lewis [mailto:ovl@att net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:16 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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o lewis
ovl@att.net
los angeles, CA 90009

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Rena Lewis [mailto:relew@roadrunner.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:01 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Rena Lewis
Loma
Ojai, CA 93023

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Billie Leyendecker [mailto:billie711@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:30 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Billie Leyendecker
20 West St.
New York, NY 10004

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Nancy Leys [mailto nleys@wi rr.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 11:21 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Nancy Leys
3627 N. 63rd Street
Milwaukee, WI 53216

## Consent-Based Siting

From: John Liberty [mailto:john-liberty@att net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:21 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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John Liberty
5231 Carrington Street
Sacramento, CA 95819

## Consent-Based Siting

From: bill liddle [mailto:bill.liddle@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:30 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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bill liddle
1374 weast rd
Address 2
schenectady, NY 12306

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Robert Lieber [mailto:Hon.Lieber@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 2:19 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Robert Lieber
734 Kains Ave.
734 KAINS ave.
Albany, CA 94706

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sharon Lieberman [mailto:sjlieby@mcn.org]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:49 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Sharon Lieberman
36660 Annapolis Rd
Annapolis, CA 95412

## Consent-Based Siting

From: pat lieuallen [mailto:plieu87@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 8:59 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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pat lieuallen
3643 Cedar
Clearlake, CA 95422

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dr B Lighting [mailto:Drbarryl@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:47 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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San Onofry waste stored by tidal zone in substandard CONTAINERS. INSANE. CPUC AND NRC SEEM OUT OF CONTROL IN CALIFORNIA

Dr B Lighting
Box 949
La Jolla, CA 92038

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Barbara Likens [mailto:BarbLikens@aol.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:48 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

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Barbara Likens
23 Edgewood Rd
Yardley, PA 19067

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Andrea Likovich [mailto:alikovic@osfphila.org]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 11:09 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Andrea Likovich
609 S. Convent Rd.
Aston, PA 19014

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Allen Lilleberg [mailto:lilleah@napanet.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 11:45 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,
Nuke waste must be released off planet or we have failed as a species.
The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Allen Lilleberg
2470 West Pueblo Ave.
Napa, CA 94558

## Consent-Based Siting

From: John Limbach [mailto:vutava@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:13 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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John Limbach
Spaight St.
Madison, WI 53703

## Consent-Based Siting

From: John Limbach [mailto:vutava@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 6:36 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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John Limbach
Spaight St.
Madison, WI 53703

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lauren Linda [mailto:laulind714@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:59 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

Waste from nuclear plants poses an existential threat to all living thing.

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Lauren Linda
2376C Via Mariposa West
Laguna Woods, CA 92637

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Chris Lindberg [mailto:elylake@yahoo.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 9:59 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Chris Lindberg
29818 Yorkton Road
Murrieta, CA 92563

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Thomas & Joan Lindeman [mailto:lindemanjw@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:48 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Thomas & Joan Lindeman
224 Spencer Drive
224 Spencer Drive, Amherst MA
Amherst, MA 01002

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dana Linder [mailto:mrdanalinder@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:28 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Dana Linder
7112 Parsons Blvd
Fresh Meadows, NY 11365

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dana Linder [mailto:mrdanalinder@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 8:04 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Dana Linder
7112 Parsons Blvd
Fresh Meadows, NY 11365

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Christine E Linderman [mailto:emma@sparksinstitute.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 8:49 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

I am writing because I oppose the Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative for nuclear waste. This initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and would put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation. Thus, DOE has no real authority to pursue the siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

I urge the DOE to help our country stop making nuclear waste, and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. I support an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel which:
• Terminates or significantly reduces the production of nuclear waste.
• Provides for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
• Determines scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). The HOSS protocol would improve the safety and security of nuclear waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. Changes would include insecure transportation, and an unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored at one or more centralized additional sites. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards and increasing already high security risks.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage facilities. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. Unfortunately, Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before it was studied.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

I urge the Department of Energy to abandon its consent-based siting initiative for nuclear waste, and focus instead on the areas suggested above. Thank you for considering my comments.

Christine E Linderman
277 Riverside Dr
Florence, MA 01062

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jean Lindgren [mailto:lindgren.b8@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 11:49 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process

of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public's input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The Department of Energy has failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage. It only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

I very strongly oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

Thanks for your consideration.

Jean Lindgren
389 Guerrero Street
San Francisco, CA 94103

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Bill Lindner [mailto:mrfullsrvc@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:44 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Bill Lindner
24 Corte Oriental
Greenbrae, CA 94904

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Gary Lindorff [mailto:gllindorff@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:37 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Gary Lindorff
56 Rocks and trees Lane
Middletown Springs, VT 05757

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ann Lindsley [mailto:aqc42@bex.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:01 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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Ann Lindsley
2347 Country Squire
Toledo, OH 43615

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ann Lindsley [mailto:aqc42@bex.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 7:48 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Ann Lindsley
2347 Country Squire
Toledo, OH 43615

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Tim Linerud [mailto:racer_tim@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:07 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Tim Linerud
Middle Road
Belmont, CA 94002

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Tim Linerud [mailto:racer_tim@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Tim Linerud
Middle Road
Belmont, CA 94002

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Maureen Linneman [mailto:reenielin@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:38 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Maureen Linneman
131 Arlington St
Asheville, NC 28801

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Gail Linnerson [mailto:GLinnerkin@aol.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 11:02 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Gail Linnerson
719 9th Ave SE
719  9th Ave SE
Minneapolis, MN 55414

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Beverly Linton [mailto:thessada@comcast net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:47 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Beverly Linton
25 Udine St
Arlington, MA 02476

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Robert Linzmeier [mailto:musicman690@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:49 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Robert Linzmeier
950 E. Wilmette Rd.
Palatine, IL 60074

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lawrence Lipkind, DDS [mailto:llipkind@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:44 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Lawrence Lipkind, DDS
999 Green Street
San Francisco, CA 94133

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Timothy Lippert [mailto:tlippert43@msn.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 11:55 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Timothy Lippert
147 Spring Lake Drive
Athens, GA 30605

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Regina DeFalco Lippert [mailto:rdefalcolippert@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 7:07 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Regina DeFalco Lippert
210 Donegal Way
Martinez, CA 94553

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Timothy Lippert [mailto:tlippert43@msn.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 12:16 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Timothy Lippert
147 Spring Lake Drive
Athens, GA 30605

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kathleen Lique [mailto:kquinn310@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Why would ANYONE want nuclear waste nearby?  Eliminate nuclear power!  Other countries can do it, certainly we can.

Kathleen Lique
141 Washington St., #6
Salem, MA 01970

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kathleen Lique [mailto:kquinn310@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:09 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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What will it take for us to learn from the current disasters?

Kathleen Lique
141 Washington St., #6
Salem, MA 01970

## Consent-Based Siting

From: phil lisi [mailto:popspirate@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:22 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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phil lisi
11 hollyberry ln
marmora, NJ 08223

## Consent-Based Siting

From: John Liss [mailto:lissjohn47@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 3:36 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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John Liss
207 Brunswick
Toronto, ON m5s2m4

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Karen Litfin [mailto:Litfin@whidbey net]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 3:52 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Karen Litfin
6045 CasCara way
Clinton, WA 98236

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Laurie Litman [mailto:Llitman@pacbell net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:57 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Laurie Litman
301 27th St
301 27th St
Sacramento, CA 95816

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sister Clare Ann Litteken C.PP.S. [mailto:agathac930@att.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:34 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Sister Clare Ann Litteken C.PP.S.
930 Withnell
St. Louis, MO 63118

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sister Clare Ann Litteken C.PP.S. [mailto:agathac930@att.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:41 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

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Sister Clare Ann Litteken C.PP.S.
930 Withnell
St. Louis, MO 63118

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jim Littlefield, West Coast Director, S.E.A. [mailto:scseasurfer@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:02 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Jim Littlefield, West Coast Director, S.E.A.
410 Seaacliff Drive
Aptos, CA., CA 95003

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jim Littlefield, West Coast Director, S.E.A. [mailto:scseasurfer@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:48 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Jim Littlefield, West Coast Director, S.E.A.
410 Seaacliff Drive
Aptos, CA., CA 95003

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Elaine Livesey-Fassel [mailto:livesey-fassel@sbcglobal net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:33 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Elaine Livesey-Fassel
10387 Glenbarr Ave
Los Angeles, CA 90064

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Elaine Livingston [mailto:livingsed@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 11:33 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Elaine Livingston
1403 Glenwood Rd
Vestal, NY 13850

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Thomas Llewellyn [mailto:tomisclever@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 2:33 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Thomas Llewellyn
57 Adams St
Asheville, NC 28801

## Consent-Based Siting

From: L N [mailto:Kimonic@knac.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:27 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

L N
Harbor blvd
Costa mesa, CA 92627

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Stephen Locke [mailto:txlonewolf903@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:34 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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Stephen Locke
1003 Cr 2515
Bonham, TX 75418

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Stephen Locke [mailto:txlonewolf903@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:19 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Stephen Locke
1003 Cr 2515
Bonham, TX 75418

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kathy Loeb [mailto:Kloeb@iglou.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:15 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Kathy Loeb
350 Blueberry rd
Lexington, KY 40503

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dana Loew [mailto:inkedana@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 9:18 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Dana Loew
Wachusett
Leominster, MA, MA 01453

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Brenda Loew [mailto:brendaloew@icloud.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 12:25 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Brenda Loew
5609 2nd Ave NW., #14
Seattle, WA 98107

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Saab Lofton [mailto:saablofton@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Saab Lofton
619 Third Avenue
Seattle, WA 98104

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sharon Logan [mailto:slseposte@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:27 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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Sharon Logan
505 Waring Rd
Rochester, NY 14609

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sharon Logan [mailto:slseposte@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:16 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

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Sharon Logan
505 Waring Rd
Rochester, NY 14609

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Michael Lombardi [mailto mike.lombardi@rcn.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:59 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Michael Lombardi
19 Morning Glory Lane
Levittown PA, PA 19054

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From: Michael Lombardi [mailto mike.lombardi@rcn.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:59 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Michael Lombardi
19 Morning Glory Lane
Levittown PA, PA 19054

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Marilyn Long [mailto:mjanelong@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:30 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Marilyn Long
12710 Corrington Ave.
Grandview, MO, MO 64030

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jeanne & Vern Long [mailto:jeanne_618@msn.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 7:11 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Jeanne & Vern Long
1842 Columbia Rd
Westlake, OH 44145

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Leland Long [mailto:lplong@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:34 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Leland Long
1380 Detroit Street #130
Denver, CO 80206

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Leland Long [mailto:lplong@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:48 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Leland Long
1380 Detroit Street #130
Denver, CO 80206

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Marilyn Long [mailto:mjanelong@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:51 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Marilyn Long
12710 Corrington Ave.
Grandview, MO, MO 64030

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ned Long [mailto:kolong@charter net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:56 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Ned Long
1544 Valley View
Los 0sos, CA 93402

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Richard Longley [mailto riplongley@windstream net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:38 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Richard Longley
719 SW Chiefland Ln
Fort White, FL 32038

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Richard Longley [mailto riplongley@windstream net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:07 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Richard Longley
719 SW Chiefland Ln
Fort White, FL 32038

## Consent-Based Siting

From: jon lo [mailto:jon@longsworth.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:33 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

I AM JON LONGSWORTH AND I APPROVE THIS MESSAGE.

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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jon lo
jon@longsworth.com
aptos, CA 95001

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mary Loomba [mailto:maryloomba@mac.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:56 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Mary Loomba
24 Pleasant Ridge Road
Valhalla, NY 10595

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Brigitte Loper [mailto:brigittecloper@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:48 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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Brigitte Loper
2924 antique oaks circle
winter park, FL 32792

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Brigitte Loper [mailto:brigittecloper@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:19 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Brigitte Loper
2924 antique oaks circle
winter park, FL 32792

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Katherine Lopez [mailto:thatcrazytoaster@mail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 11:38 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Katherine Lopez
5543 Elvena Avenue
Pennsauken, NJ 08109

## Consent-Based Siting

From: June Lorenzo [mailto:junellorenzo@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 9:36 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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June Lorenzo
P.O. Box 994
Paguate, NM 87040

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ioseba Amatriain Losa [mailto:ial85@hotmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:23 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Ioseba Amatriain Losa
Felipe de Arin, 9
Andosilla, ot 31261

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Victoria Loudis [mailto:vrl243@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 11:25 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Victoria Loudis
248-15 Rushmore Ave.
Douglaston, NY 11362

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Victoria Loudis [mailto:vrl243@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:08 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

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Victoria Loudis
248-15 Rushmore Ave.
Douglaston, NY 11362

## Consent-Based Siting

From: R. Lance Loughlin [mailto:lucia-lance@att.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 7:05 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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R. Lance Loughlin
12286 Clipper Creek Road
Nevada City, CA 95959

## Consent-Based Siting

From: R. Lance Loughlin [mailto:lucia-lance@att.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 8:45 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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R. Lance Loughlin
12286 Clipper Creek Road
Nevada City, CA 95959

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Stephanie Lovell [mailto:slovell rn@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:38 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Stephanie Lovell
2432 North 75th Court
Apt. 6
Elmwood Park, IL 60707

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Vineeta Lovell [mailto:vineetalovell@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:07 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Vineeta Lovell
1543 S Osceola Way
1543 S Osceola Way Denver, CO80219
Denver, CO 80219

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Cybele nee' Judith LoVuolo-Bhushan [mailto:bhushans@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:59 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Cybele nee' Judith LoVuolo-Bhushan
3838 Mumford Place
Palo Alto, CA 94306

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sammy Low [mailto:cougarcreek7@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:18 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Sammy Low
20420 Marine Dr, Apt P2
Stanwood, WA 98292

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sammy Low [mailto:cougarcreek7@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:06 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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Stanwood, WA 98292

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jennifer Lowans [mailto:ezrawey@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:50 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Jennifer Lowans
219 Wilkson Lane
Fayetteville, PA 17222

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Patsy Lowe [mailto:patsylowe@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:01 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Patsy Lowe
9
Simi Valley, CA 93065

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Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 6:01 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
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Patsy Lowe
9
Simi Valley, CA 93065

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From: steven lowenthal [mailto:lyondale9@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 4:57 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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steven lowenthal
167 W 71 St  apt8
new york, NY 10023

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Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:57 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
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Susan Lozano
4145 Finley E Rd
Lakeport, CA 95451

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Luis Lozano [mailto:llozano@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:10 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Luis Lozano
225 Pomona #3
225 Pomona #3
Long Beach, CA 90803

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Luis Lozano [mailto:llozano@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:37 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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Luis Lozano
225 Pomona #3
225 Pomona #3
Long Beach, CA 90803

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Susan Lozano [mailto:susanwlozano@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:14 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Susan Lozano
4145 Finley E Rd
Lakeport, CA 95451

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joe Luca [mailto:joseph.luca@state.ma.us]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:03 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

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I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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Joe Luca
57 Babcock Street
#4
Brookline, MA 02446

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joe Luca [mailto:joseph.luca@state.ma.us]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only

substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Joe Luca
57 Babcock Street
#4
Brookline, MA 02446

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Judy Lukasiewicz [mailto:jsteel@cruzio.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:08 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a attempt to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. Our DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation. There are no safe storage repositories for nuclear waste due to the characteristics of radioactive waste.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future. I do not agree with this mistaken intention. Nuclear power is not sustainable, precisely due to the nature of nuclear/highly radioactive waste.

I do not consent to this process. The continued generation of nuclear waste via nuclear power production and/or nuclear weapon production, research, etc., is extremely hazardous and absolutely not worth it. As well, consolidated radioactive waste storage facilities, and mass transportation of nuclear waste is extremely dangerous and also clearly not acceptable.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP CREATING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:
•To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
•To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
•To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I strongly oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites,

both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards. --Not acceptable.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible. --Again, not acceptable.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Stop nuclear power generation in the USA. Stop all creation of nuclear waste.
Thank you.

Judy Lukasiewicz
701 Happy Valley Rd.
Santa Cruz, CA 95065

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Andy Lupenko [mailto fccsd@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:27 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Andy Lupenko
8555 Golden Avenue
Lemon Grove, CA 91945

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Andy Lupenko [mailto fccsd@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 5:36 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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Andy Lupenko
8555 Golden Avenue
Lemon Grove, CA 91945

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Steve Lustgarden [mailto:slustgarden@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:33 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Steve Lustgarden
28 Hanover Court
Santa Cruz, CA 95062

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dan Lusthaus [mailto:dlusthaus@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:23 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Dan Lusthaus
123 Sewall Ave, Apt 2J
Brookline, MA 02446

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Nancy L. Lutz [mailto:rotnkd@att.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:29 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Nancy L. Lutz
19 Apple Ln.
Park Forest, IL 60466

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Nancy L. Lutz [mailto:rotnkd@att.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:22 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Nancy L. Lutz
19 Apple Ln.
Park Forest, IL 60466

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Nancy Lyles [mailto:living4ward2it@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 1:46 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Nancy Lyles
1246 5th Avenue
Gold Hill, OR 97525

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kitty Lynch [mailto:kittylynch49.needlerock@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:50 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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Kitty Lynch
3425 Bell Springs Rd.
Garberville, CA 95542

## Consent-Based Siting

From: mike lyons [mailto:mjlyons321@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:50 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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mike lyons
172 woodbridge ave
sewaren, NJ 07077

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Deborah Lyons [mailto:basilissa1@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 8:50 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Deborah Lyons
326 W Withrow St apt 1
Oxford, OH 45056

## Consent-Based Siting

From: mike lyons [mailto:mjlyons321@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:36 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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mike lyons
172 woodbridge ave
sewaren, NJ 07077

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Denise Lytle [mailto:centauress6@live.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 11:59 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Denise Lytle
73 Poplar St.
Fords, NJ 08863

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Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 10:13 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
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Denise Lytle
11 Wisteria Dr.
Apt. 3F
Fords, NJ 08863

## Consent-Based Siting

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Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:37 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Christina M
100 Overlook Ter
#616
NY, NY 10040

## Consent-Based Siting

From: shira m [mailto:somuch2kno@aol.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 8:16 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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shira m
2268 35th street
astoria, NY 11105

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Christina M [mailto:chm516@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:26 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Christina M
100 Overlook Ter
#616
NY, NY 10040

## Consent-Based Siting

From: m s [mailto mschopac@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:01 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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m s
20 Indian Trail
Charlestown, RI 02813

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Tamara M [mailto:Tamaraalexa@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:17 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Tamara M
120
SF, CA 94110

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Barbara MacAlpine [mailto:bmacalpi@trinity.edu]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 2:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Barbara MacAlpine
P. O. Box 1906
Estes Park, CO 80517

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Barbara MacAlpine [mailto:bmacalpi@trinity.edu]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 2:52 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Barbara MacAlpine
P. O. Box 1906
Estes Park, CO 80517

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Nina Macdonald [mailto:nina@ninamacdonald.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:38 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Nina Macdonald
10 Handel Ct
Irvine, CA 92617

## Consent-Based Siting

From: leo macdonald [mailto:leomacdonald@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:15 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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leo macdonald
280 Headquarters Rd
Erwinna, PA 18920

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Robert Macdonald [mailto:goldmacd@comcast net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Robert Macdonald
401 Granelli Ave
Half moon Bay, CA 94019

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Scott MacDougall [mailto:turasoir@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:38 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Scott MacDougall
125 Mercer Street, #1
Jersey City, NJ 07302

## Consent-Based Siting

From: John MacDougall [mailto:john_macdougall@uml.edu]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:26 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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John MacDougall
175 Richdale ave. #209
Cambridge, MA 02140

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Scott MacDougall [mailto:turasoir@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:05 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Scott MacDougall
125 Mercer Street, #1
Jersey City, NJ 07302

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Donald Sage Mackay [mailto:donaldsage@sbcglobal net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:54 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Donald Sage Mackay
PO Box 823
South Pasadena, CA 91031

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Melvin Mackey [mailto:Melvin_Mackey@Hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 6:23 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Melvin Mackey
24430 Old Mill Rd SW
24430 Old Mill Road S.W.
Vashon, WA 98070

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kerry Mackin [mailto:kayok9863@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 8:08 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Kerry Mackin
76 Little Neck Rd
Ipswich, MA 01938

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Bonnie Lynn Mackinnon [mailto:bmackinnonwitherspoon@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:02 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Bonnie Lynn Mackinnon
1603 S Elm ST
Georgetown, TX 78626

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Bonnie Lynn Mackinnon [mailto:bmackinnonwitherspoon@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:00 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Bonnie Lynn Mackinnon
1603 S Elm ST
Georgetown, TX 78626

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Vic and Gail Macks [mailto:vicmacks3@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 4:40 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Vic and Gail Macks
20318 Edmunton
20318 Edmunton
St. Clair Shores, MI 48080

## Consent-Based Siting

From: George Madaraz [mailto:madaraz@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:03 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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George Madaraz
4226 Kenyon Ave
181 Pier Avenue
Los Angeles, CA 90066

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lilithe Magdalene [mailto:abodhilove@msn.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:34 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Lilithe Magdalene
PO Box 1478
Middletown, CA 95461

## Consent-Based Siting

From: susan magee [mailto:susanlmagee@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:44 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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susan magee
161  s washington st
greencastle, PA 17225

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joseph Magid [mailto:jsm33@cornell.edu]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 9:02 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Joseph Magid
411 Holly Lane
Wynnewood, PA 19096

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Pat Magrath [mailto:phatmcass@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 8:44 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Pat Magrath
1435 Ledgestone Lane
POMONA, CA 91767

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Pat Magrath [mailto:phatmcass@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 4:40 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Pat Magrath
1435 Ledgestone Lane
POMONA, CA 91767

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joel Maguire [mailto:seriugam@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:26 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Joel Maguire
PO Box 204
Prudence Island, RI 02872

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joel Maguire [mailto:seriugam@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:32 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Joel Maguire
PO Box 204
Prudence Island, RI 02872

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Cynthia Mahlau [mailto:cindygamba392@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 10:43 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Cynthia Mahlau
12705
SE River Rd
Portland, OR 97222

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Cynthia Mahlau [mailto:cindygamba392@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 10:10 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Cynthia Mahlau
12705
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Portland, OR 97222

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jody Mahnken [mailto mahnkenj@juno.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 9:28 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Jody Mahnken
4140 N. Oxbow Way
Boise, ID 83713

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jody Mahnken [mailto mahnkenj@juno.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 10:29 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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4140 N. Oxbow Way
Boise, ID 83713

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Eileen Mahood-Jose [mailto:emahoodjose@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:03 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Eileen Mahood-Jose
11 Nicholas Street
Little Ferry, NJ 07643

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From: Eileen Mahood-Jose [mailto:emahoodjose@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:23 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Eileen Mahood-Jose
11 Nicholas Street
Little Ferry, NJ 07643

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Beth Mahy [mailto:bmahy@sympatico.ca]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 9:27 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Beth Mahy
127 Norton Ave Toronto M2N 4A7
Toronto, ON M2N 4A7

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Edward Mainland [mailto:emainland@comcast.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:01 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Let's be real. DOE's consent-based siting initiative public interest. You are imposing just another scheme to move the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries ahead of the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. DOE lacks authority to conduct such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more radioactive waste into the far distant future. This is a terrible prospect.

Please record my strong objection to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

Surely it must by now have become clear to you: The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT. It is imperativean to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

You should stop the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been

no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

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Edward Mainland
1017 Bel Marin Keys Blvd.
Novato, CA 94949

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Janet Maker [mailto:jamaker2001@hotmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:21 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Janet Maker
925 Malcolm Ave
925 malcolm av
Los Angeles, CA 90024-313

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Janet Maker [mailto:jamaker2001@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:03 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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Janet Maker
925 Malcolm Ave
925 malcolm av
Los Angeles, CA 90024-313

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Simone Malboeuf [mailto:simonemalboeuf@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:53 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

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Simone Malboeuf
309 Henrietta Ave
Los Osos, CA 93402

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Cristina Malcolmson [mailto:cmalcolm@bates.edu]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:24 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

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The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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Cristina Malcolmson
70 Gleckler Road
Portland, ME 04103

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Gloria Linda Maldonado [mailto:glmaldonado68@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:41 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Gloria Linda Maldonado
131 Alameda de las Pulgas
Redwood City, CA 94062

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Alexi Malenky [mailto:info@dudewithahammer.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:19 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Alexi Malenky
1200 Curtis Street
Berkeley, CA 94706

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Susan Maletsky [mailto:saf610@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 12:55 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

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Susan Maletsky
20015 Chipmunk Rd
Sonora, CA 95370

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Karen Malley [mailto:bonic@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:12 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Karen Malley
1609 S. Gary St.
1609 S. Gary St.
Anaheim, CA 92804

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Rev. Peggy Malnati [mailto:p.malnati@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:30 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Rev. Peggy Malnati
35935 W 14 Mile Road
Farmington Hills, MI 48331

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sue Malone [mailto:organurse@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:03 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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Sue Malone
45 Adams St.
none
Westborough, MA., MA 01581

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Patrick Maloney [mailto:patrickjj@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 10:13 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Patrick Maloney
1721 W Barry Ave
Chicago, IL 60657

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Charlotte Maloney [mailto:charm71@comcast net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 7:07 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

I am very concerned that the Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest. I see it as simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment.

I agree with others that DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

This is not in the best interest of our nation: I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment.

The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:
1/ To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
2/ To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
3/ To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

I join the more than 100 organizations endorsing the improvement of the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence; I see this as a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository.

I object to the Yucca Mountain selection by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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Charlotte Maloney
4391 Shadow Wood Dr
Eugene, OR 97405

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Peter Maly [mailto:peterlmaly@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 11:54 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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Peter Maly
R.R.#2 3902 Cornwall Road
Barss Corner, NS B0R1A0

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Peter Maly [mailto:peterlmaly@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 7:44 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Peter Maly
R.R.#2 3902 Cornwall Road
Barss Corner, NS B0R1A0

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Hilary Malyon [mailto:hmalyon@mindspring.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:25 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Hilary Malyon
00 seminole ave
96 seminole ave
07436, NJ 07436

## Consent-Based Siting

From: mike manetas [mailto mikemanetas@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:06 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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mike manetas
1094 birch ave
mckinleyville, CA 95519

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Laura Manges [mailto:lauramanges@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:49 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Laura Manges
99 Neely St.
Berea, KY 40403

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Peter Maniscalco [mailto:peteronlongisland@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 11:54 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Peter Maniscalco
52 Ava Court
Manorville, NY 11949

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Peter Maniscalco [mailto:peteronlongisland@gmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 2:21 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Peter Maniscalco
52 Ava Court
Manorville, NY 11949

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Renee Mann [mailto:rmm1011@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:14 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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Renee Mann
6114 N. Hermitage
Chicago, IL 60660

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Scott Mann [mailto:Scottman313@yahoo.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 2:57 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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Scott Mann
712 Bancroft road
Walnut creek, CA 94598

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Natalie Mannering [mailto:onawah@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:51 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

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I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Natalie Mannering
100 Victoria Woods Blvd Apt 1
Eureka Springs, AR 72632

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Natalie Mannering [mailto:onawah@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:10 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Natalie Mannering
100 Victoria Woods Blvd Apt 1
Eureka Springs, AR 72632

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Tom Manning [mailto:tominsilver@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 7:34 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

All nuclear waste should be stored underneath the beds of corporate executives of the ownership interests and major investors in nuclear power plants.

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment.

We need to shut down all nuke plants and stop making nuclear waste. And As I said all current waste should be stored on site at the executives primary residences.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future. So, obviously the waste should also be stored under the beds of the top personnel of the Department of Energy.

I do not consent to the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation (move the executives and DOE personnel on site for proper bed placement with out the need to transport the nuclear waste.)
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools (in the meanwhile, we should have mandatory exercise sessions for the executives and top DOE personnel in these pools) and then move these trophies of our stupidity to robust, hardened dry-cask storage. In this way we can reduce the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protect the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage facilities. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is that we keep making the stuff.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to stop generating power from nukes. NO MORE NUCLEAR POWER! NO MORE NUCLEAR WASTE!!!

Then make it a priority to progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations.

Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program.

Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Tom Manning
406 S. Arizona St.
Silver City, NM 88061

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Michael Mannion [mailto:Mannionabc@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:38 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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Michael Mannion
3 West 87th Street
3 west 87th street
New York, NY 10024

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Michael Mannion [mailto:Mannionabc@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:36 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

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The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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Michael Mannion
3 West 87th Street
3 west 87th street
New York, NY 10024

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sarah Manno [mailto:sarahhm@frii.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 5:05 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Sarah Manno
211 Clover
Ft. Collins, CO 80521

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dr. carol Marangoni [mailto:brunzi@highlands.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:38 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Dr. carol Marangoni
P.O. Box 163
Garrison, NY 10524

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lloyd Marbet [mailto:lloyd@marbet.org]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 11:00 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Lloyd Marbet
18944 SE Bakers Ferry Rd
Boring, OR 97009

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lorretta Marcel [mailto:loret44@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:23 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Lorretta Marcel
100A Merrill St.
San Francisco, CA 94134

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lorretta Marcel [mailto:loret44@yahoo.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 12:24 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Lorretta Marcel
100A Merrill St.
San Francisco, CA 94134

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Michael Marchessault [mailto:distantthunder50@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:13 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Michael Marchessault
4543 bonny doon rd
Santa Cruz, CA 95060

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Michael Marchessault [mailto:distantthunder50@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 10:11 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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Michael Marchessault
4543 bonny doon rd
Santa Cruz, CA 95060

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jack David Marcus [mailto:jackdavidm@nyc.rr.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:29 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Jack David Marcus
215 West 92nd Street Apt. 15E
New York, NY 10025

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Martin Margolis [mailto:dolphinhealers@care2.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 3:59 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Martin Margolis
411 E.53d St., 10K
NYC, NY 10003

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mitchell Maricque [mailto mmaricque@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:10 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Mitchell Maricque
1207 25th Avenue
Menominee, MI 49858

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lily Marie [mailto:lilymarie@infostations.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:30 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Lily Marie
P.O. Box 242
Rough and Ready, CA 95975

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Suzanne Marienau [mailto:suzannemarienau@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:39 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Suzanne Marienau
780 S. 21st Ave.
Ozark, MO 65721

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Zoya Marincheva [mailto:marincheva@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:29 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Zoya Marincheva
5815 Barton Holw
San Antonio, TX 78249

## Consent-Based Siting

From: patricia marino [mailto:phmarino@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:10 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

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patricia marino
162 n main st
cranbury, NJ 08512

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Steven Markgraf [mailto:smgraf@yahoo.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 12:55 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Steven Markgraf
5205 Church St.
McFarland, WI 53558

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Patricia Marlatt [mailto:patriciamarlatt@me.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 6:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Patricia Marlatt
3863 Fredonia Dr.
Hollywood Hills, CA 90068

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Noel Marquez [mailto:marquezarts@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 5:06 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Noel Marquez
635 N. 13th St.
Lake Arthur, NM 88253

## Consent-Based Siting

From: sandra marr [mailto:sandmarr@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 2:48 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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sandra marr
275 N Belden Hill
275 N Belden Hill, Guilford
guilford, VT 05301

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dan Marsh [mailto:dan55mar@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 6:32 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Dan Marsh
320 LOCUST ST
Modesto, CA 95351

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Drew Martin [mailto:DMandCH@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:56 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Drew Martin
500 Lake Ave. #102
Lake Worth, FL 33460

## Consent-Based Siting

From: eugene martin [mailto:genesteam@msn.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:58 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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eugene martin
29 lee ave
scarsdale, NY 10583

## Consent-Based Siting

From: eugene martin [mailto:genesteam@msn.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:59 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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eugene martin
29 lee ave
scarsdale, NY 10583

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Patrice Martin [mailto:patrice@proctornet.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:05 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Patrice Martin
258 Breezy Hill Road
Wilmot, NH 03287

## Consent-Based Siting

From: William Martin [mailto:wlarmar@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:02 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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William Martin
75645
Gilmer, TX 75645

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Michael Martin [mailto:lessthansane00@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:29 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Michael Martin
980 North 8 East
Mountain Home, ID 83647

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Benjamin Martin [mailto:bendicoot@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:36 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Benjamin Martin
329 Ward St
Wallingford, CT 06492

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Alice Anne Martineau [mailto:aamartineau@sbcglobal net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 9:12 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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Alice Anne Martineau
310 Velarde
Mountain view, CA 94041

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Martha E. Martin [mailto:mauimartha@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:50 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

I am signing a letter that I did not write, but which I totally agree with. Here is the letter:

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Martha E. Martin
P.O.Box 790300
PO Box 790300, Paia, HI 96779
Paia, HI 96779

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Nicole Maschke [mailto mauricemaschke@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 10:49 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Nicole Maschke
4802 Gedeon Avenue
Cleveland, OH 44102

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Nicole Maschke [mailto mauricemaschke@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:07 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

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The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Nicole Maschke
4802 Gedeon Avenue
Cleveland, OH 44102

## Consent-Based Siting

From: jackie mason [mailto:mason.jacquie@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:21 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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I do NOT consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them. WE,THE PEOPLE...GOV'T BY, FOR, & OF THE PEOPLE!

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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jackie mason
1970 osceola pkwy
1970 pscepla pkwy
kissimmee, FL 34769

## Consent-Based Siting

From: jackie mason [mailto:mason.jacquie@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:41 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

jackie mason
1970 osceola pkwy
1970 pscepla pkwy
kissimmee, FL 34769

## Consent-Based Siting

From: carolyn massey [mailto:archie_101@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:11 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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carolyn massey
632 1/2 north 6th
quincy, IL 62301

## Consent-Based Siting

From: carolyn massey [mailto:archie_101@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 7:51 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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carolyn massey
632 1/2 north 6th
quincy, IL 62301

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Eileen Massey [mailto:eilmassey@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:37 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Eileen Massey
5924 Herzog St
Oakland, CA 94608

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Eileen Massey [mailto:eilmassey@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:52 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Eileen Massey
5924 Herzog St
Oakland, CA 94608

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Priscilla Massie [mailto:mihistory massie@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:13 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Priscilla Massie
2109 41st Street
Allegan, MI 49010

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Linda Massimo [mailto:lmassimo@shaw.ca]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:25 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Linda Massimo
11532 33A Avenue
Edmonton, AB T6J 3H3

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mary Masters [mailto:mmasters@stanfordalumni.org]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:56 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Thank you for your attention to these matters.
Sincerely,

Mary Masters

Mary Masters
123 Falling Tree Rd.
Orcas, WA 98280

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Rik Masterson [mailto:rikmasterson@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:45 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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Rik Masterson
5518 NE Going St
Portland, OR 97218

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Rik Masterson [mailto:rikmasterson@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:09 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Rik Masterson
5518 NE Going St
Portland, OR 97218

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Christine Mathews [mailto:mathchrstn@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:32 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Christine Mathews
1022 Willowood Ct
Fenton, MI 48430

## Consent-Based Siting

From: margaret Matson [mailto:melizmatson@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:50 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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margaret Matson
15 Anacapa
Santa Barbara, CA 93101

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Antonia Matthew [mailto:antonia matthew@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:29 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Antonia Matthew
1307 S. Grant St.
Bloomington, IN 47401

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Carole Mathews [mailto:carole mathews1@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:52 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Carole Mathews
220 Highlands Ridge Pl SE
Smyrna, GA 30082

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Janet Matthews [mailto:jisabellam@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

As a parent, early childhood educator and advocate, and person of faith I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be

transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Janet Matthews
274 N Centre Ave Apt
Rockville Centre NY, NY 11570

## Consent-Based Siting

From: nancy matthews [mailto:info@sedonaschool.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 10:37 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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nancy matthews
2945 southwest dr
sedona, AZ 86336

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Christine Mathews [mailto:mathchrstn@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:29 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Christine Mathews
1022 Willowood Ct
Fenton, MI 48430

## Consent-Based Siting

From: shirley matulich [mailto:matulich_2@msn.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 11:38 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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shirley matulich
511 s. serrano av
los angeles, CA 95928

## Consent-Based Siting

From: shirley matulich [mailto:matulich_2@msn.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:08 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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shirley matulich
511 s. serrano av
los angeles, CA 95928

## Consent-Based Siting

From: William Maurer [mailto:wmmaurer@comcast net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:20 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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William Maurer
140 Gifford St
Falmouth, MA 02540

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Doris May [mailto:dgmay15@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:22 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Doris May
137 E. 36th Street
137 e 36 street
New York, NY 10016

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dana May [mailto:obscureeng@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:26 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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Dana May
12251 Fallingleaf st., Garden Grove, Ca.
GARDEN GROVE, CA 92840

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From: Dana May [mailto:obscureeng@yahoo.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 11:26 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Dana May
12251 Fallingleaf st., Garden Grove, Ca.
GARDEN GROVE, CA 92840

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Geraldine May [mailto:huerhuero@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:24 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Geraldine May
PO Box 153
9845 Huerhuero Rd.
Santa Margarita, CA 93432

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Geraldine May [mailto:huerhuero@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 6:47 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Geraldine May
PO Box 153
9845 Huerhuero Rd.
Santa Margarita, CA 93432

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Julie May [mailto rp-j-may@ca.rr.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:13 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Julie May
2002 Hillsboro Ave.
Los Angeles, CA 90034

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Margaret Mayer [mailto:mmayer@dinecollege.edu]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:42 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Margaret Mayer
PO Box 143
PO Box 143
Tsaile, AZ 86556

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Paul Mayer [mailto:paul@viewdrive.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 5:18 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

ENVIRONMENT vs. PROFIT--LET'S CHOOSE ENVIRONMENT. PLEASE!

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I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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Paul Mayer
108 Rainbow Dr #825
Livingston, TX 77399

## Consent-Based Siting

From: George Louis Mayer [mailto:georgemayer1@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:20 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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George Louis Mayer
150 West End Ave-30P
New York, NY 10023

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Robin Mayerat [mailto ruberobin@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:58 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Robin Mayerat
2949 Cloverbank Rd.
Hamburg, NY 14075

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Robin Mayerat [mailto ruberobin@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:09 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Robin Mayerat
2949 Cloverbank Rd.
Hamburg, NY 14075

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Katherine Mayers [mailto:mayerskatherine@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 8:52 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Katherine Mayers
Apt B
Saint Petersburg, FL 33714

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Steven & Susan Mayes [mailto:bookravens@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:54 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Steven & Susan Mayes
16 Mesa Pino
16 Mesa Pino
Santa Fe, NM 87508

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Linda Mazer [mailto:lbmazer@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 10:15 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Linda Mazer
2022 Columbia Rd NW
Washington, DC 20009

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Penelope Mazza [mailto:cyber_soiree@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:02 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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Penelope Mazza
607 S 2nd St
FAIRFIELD, IA 52556

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lisa Mazzola [mailto:lmazzola@tampabay.rr.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:46 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
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Lisa Mazzola
1723 Followthru Drive
Tampa, FL 33612

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lisa Mazzola [mailto:lmazzola@tampabay.rr.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 5:09 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Lisa Mazzola
1723 Followthru Drive
Tampa, FL 33612

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Monica McAghon [mailto:Mmcaghon38@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:38 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Monica McAghon
349 Ferry St
Easton, PA 18042

## Consent-Based Siting

From: helen mcallister [mailto:hkmcallister@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:04 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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helen mcallister
16635 round hill ct
hidden valley lake, CA 95467

## Consent-Based Siting

From: helen mcallister [mailto:hkmcallister@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:18 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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helen mcallister
16635 round hill ct
hidden valley lake, CA 95467

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Edward McAninch [mailto:mcaninch1818@comcast.net]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 11:46 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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Edward McAninch
1820 NW Edgehill St.,Camas, WA
Camas, WA 98607

## Consent-Based Siting

From: John McArthur [mailto mjohnandpete@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:48 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

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John McArthur
1512 Handley Blvd.
Lakeland, FL 33803

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Janet McCalister [mailto:Natal780@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:20 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Janet McCalister
520 Valley View Drive
Paradise, CA 95969

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jan McCall [mailto:jan71mccall@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:32 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Jan McCall
278 Vine St.
West Bend, WI 53095

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jan McCall [mailto:jan71mccall@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Jan McCall
278 Vine St.
West Bend, WI 53095

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Susann McCarthy [mailto:susann@taosnet.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:52 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Susann McCarthy
200A Villa Maria
Dolores Road
Taos, NM 87571

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Bill McCarthy [mailto:unityfoundation1@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:21 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Bill McCarthy
2728 3rd Street # 103
Santa Monica, CA 92262

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jack- McClain [mailto:neitzsche2duke@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 5:24 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Jack- McClain
P.P. Box 2874
3933 Lutheran Cirlcle,Sacramento,Ca. 95826
Sacramento, CA 95812

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jaclyn McClain [mailto:jjbluejay79@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Jaclyn McClain
1178 Shenandoah Dr
Clawson, MI 48017

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Harriet McCleary [mailto:mccleary@stolaf.edu]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:37 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Harriet McCleary
2440 Stevens Ave. S. #2
Minneapolis, MN 55404

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Harriet McCleary [mailto:mccleary@stolaf.edu]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:56 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Harriet McCleary
2440 Stevens Ave. S. #2
Minneapolis, MN 55404

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jon McClellan [mailto:jonmcclellan@earthlink net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 10:50 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Jon McClellan
1109 Congress Road
Eastover, SC 29044

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Barbara McClure [mailto:barbara-mcclure1@hotmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 10:35 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Barbara McClure
86 Snail Mail
Hancock, ME 04640

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Daviann McClurg [mailto:chevy_thunder_z@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:34 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Daviann McClurg
2036 Harold Ave
Salina, KS 67401

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Daviann McClurg [mailto:chevy_thunder_z@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 7:18 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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Daviann McClurg
2036 Harold Ave
Salina, KS 67401

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Robert McCombs [mailto:bobmcc@humboldt1.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:15 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The waste should go to those that profited from it. It should be sited in the front yards of the CEOs of every utility company and manufacturer of reactors.

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Robert McCombs
PO Box 4175
164 Deer Fern Ln. Bayside (NO MAIL!)
Arcata, CA 95518

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Annie McCombs [mailto:amccombs269@netscape.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:41 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

I do not consent. Not now. Not ever. No level of nuclear waste is safe for living things. End the production of nuclear waste. Create a "moon shot" competition for discovering a way to secure the nuclear waste already in existence with the promise that no more will be created.

The event of July 16, 1945 in the early morning hours of the New Mexico desert must be put back into Pandora's box.

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

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Annie McCombs
P. O. Box 50269
P. O. Box 50269 - Kalamazoo, MI
Kalamazoo, MI 49005

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Robert McCombs [mailto:bobmcc@humboldt1.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:21 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Robert McCombs
PO Box 4175
164 Deer Fern Ln. Bayside (NO MAIL!)
Arcata, CA 95518

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Douglas McCorkle [mailto:dmccorkl@sover net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:22 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Douglas McCorkle
247 Canoe Brook Rd.
E. Dummerston, VT 05346

## Consent-Based Siting

From: T. K. McCranie [mailto:bluet3@cox net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:51 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

T. K. McCranie
De Vry Drive
Irvine, CA 92603

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dennis McCraven [mailto:dennismccraven20@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:19 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Dennis McCraven
1732  Gay Park Way
Hacienda Heights, CA 91745

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dennis McCraven [mailto:dennismccraven20@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:07 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Dennis McCraven
1732  Gay Park Way
Hacienda Heights, CA 91745

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Annie McCuen [mailto mccuen7691@comcast.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Annie McCuen
1825 Fairmount Ave S
Salem, OR 97302

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jane McCullam [mailto:cattermole@windstream net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:15 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Jane McCullam
9880 Fairmount Road
Newbury, OH 44065

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Justin McCullough [mailto:endon9@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:25 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Justin McCullough
Utah St.
San Diego, CA 92104

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Julia McDaid [mailto:juliamcdaid@hotmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 5:23 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Julia McDaid
28A Minford Gardens
London, no W14 0AN

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Pam McDonald [mailto:pmcdonald772@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:47 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment.

An agency that encourage communities to ignore the health of their citizens and accept unforeseen quantities of nuclear waste, sounds like a Federal agency that slides-by on its responsibility to protect water supplies in Flint and other communities. What are you doing? Why are we paying you?

Your job is not to protect and develop the nuclear industry. Your job is to protect the health of the American public. Encouraging us to accept nuclear waste in the indefinite future is a poor strategy for protecting the public. Please do your job.

Not in ANYONE's backyard!

Pam McDonald
55 Asher Avenue
Stonington, CT 06379

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Michael McDonald [mailto:belfastbikes@earthlink net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 5:39 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: I oppose DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative puts the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health, safety and the environment. Continued generation of nuclear waste, siting of consolidated storage facilities and mass transportation of nuclear waste is currently not an acceptable public safety and health risk, whether or not there is some measure of public consent.

A responsible integrated management plan for highly radioactive spent nuclear fuel is to terminate the production of nuclear waste, provide for secure interim storage as close as possible to the site of generation, and to determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use existing technology and dry-casks that are currently available for storage at reactor sites. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites. If the site is temporary as intended, then each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

A rational plan for nuclear waste management will limit the waste being made and continue scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be "interim" on the scale of human generations. Once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known, public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities can be a responsible approach to management of nuclear waste.

Michael McDonald
89 Cedar Street
Belfast, ME, ME 04915

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Richard McDonald [mailto:desertoceandreamer@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 10:48 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

As an addendum to the form letter above, which I totally agree with, I also want to bring this to your attention: http://action.fooddemocracynow.org/sign/label_gmos_now_2016/?t=2&akid=1914.959443.TuaL

Richard McDonald
1606 N. Florida Street
Silver City, NM 88061

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Richard McDonald [mailto:desertoceandreamer@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 7:18 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has ABSOLUTELY no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not and WILL NOT consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste!! The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Richard McDonald
1606 N. Florida Street
Silver City, NM 88061

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Rebecca McDonough [mailto:beckymcdonough@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 10:47 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Rebecca McDonough
PO Box 165
560 Cascade Way
Eastsound, WA 98245

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Holly McDuffie [mailto:seeriuscat@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:01 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Holly McDuffie
11565 Erwin Street
Los Angeles, CA 91606

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mary McElroy [mailto:memcelroysl@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:30 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

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I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Mary McElroy
7250 W. 21st Ave.
Littleton, CO 80123

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mary McElroy [mailto:memcelroysl@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 5:47 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Mary McElroy
7250 W. 21st Ave.
Littleton, CO 80123

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Aileen McEvoy [mailto:dudeob321@aol.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 7:39 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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Aileen McEvoy
191 W Pine St
Waverly, NY 14892

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Nancy McFadden [mailto:nmcfadden9@gmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 6:59 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Nancy McFadden
2813 Blair Blvd
Nashville, TN 37212

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Carol McGeehan [mailto:cpmcgeehan27@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 7:01 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Carol McGeehan
568 West 31st
Holland, MI 49423

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Carol McGeehan [mailto:cpmcgeehan27@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 8:21 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Carol McGeehan
568 West 31st
Holland, MI 49423

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ron McGill [mailto:underconsume@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:51 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Ron McGill
2666 Associated Rd #B49
Fullerton, CA 92835

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jon McGinty [mailto:fotojon42@frontier.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 8:38 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Jon McGinty
14081 Berglund Road
pecatonica, IL 61063

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sister Mary Ann McGivern [mailto:maryann.mcgivern@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:42 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Sister Mary Ann McGivern
3865 Hartford
St. Louis, MO 63116

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Pearl Mcgivney [mailto:pmcgivney@lorettocommunity.org]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:54 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Pearl Mcgivney
W 21st Ave
Lakewood, CO 80214

## Consent-Based Siting

From: William McGoldrick [mailto:billmcgo@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:34 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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William McGoldrick
2754 Rangewood Dr NE
Atlanta, GA 30345

## Consent-Based Siting

From: barbara mcgovern [mailto:publichealthmatters@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:10 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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barbara mcgovern
246 springdale road
westfield, MA 01085

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Richard McGowan [mailto:rick@unicode.org]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:37 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Richard McGowan
4436 Latimer Ave
San Jose, CA 95130

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Gail McGowan [mailto:Gail@gailmcgowan.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 8:34 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Gail McGowan
1310 Jones Street
San Francisco, CA 94109

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Corinne McGrady [mailto:corinne@hctc.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:30 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Corinne McGrady
27730 HWY 101
Lilliwaup, WA 98555

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joanne McGrath [mailto:everythingchanges41905@gmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 2:55 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Joanne McGrath
924 Chestnut Cove Rd.
Sylva, NC 28779

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Chris McGratty [mailto:chris mcgratty@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:55 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Chris McGratty
3700 Commonwealth Ave
Charlotte, NC 28205

## Consent-Based Siting

From: PATRICIA MCHUGH [mailto:pat.mchugh1999@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:26 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has NO basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has NO authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do NOT consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, NOR the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To TERMINATE the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure INTERIM storage AT, or AS CLOSE AS POSSIBLE TO, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and ISOLATION from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to REMOVE Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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PATRICIA MCHUGH
7008 AMHERST AVE.
APT. #A
SAINT LOUIS, MO 63130

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Anita McInnis [mailto:buddysmycat@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 10:18 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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Anita McInnis
9160 Sonrisa St
Spc 38
Bellflower, CA 90706

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Misty McIntyre [mailto:meowkitty15@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:06 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Misty McIntyre
2043 Lincoln Ave Apt D
Alameda, CA 94501

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Gayle McIntyre [mailto:gmcmac@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 3:20 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Gayle McIntyre
1303 3015 Parkerhill Road
Mississauga, ON L5B 4B2

## Consent-Based Siting

From: michael mckaskle [mailto:mmck@asis.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 11:36 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

michael mckaskle
box 2030
Redway, CA 95560

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Daniel McKeel [mailto:danmckeel2@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:08 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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ADD: The Weldon Spring DOE 45 acre disposal site in St. Charles county, MO was 40 miles from our home in St. Louis. Mallinckrodt-DOE vicinity properties are in the same area with nuclear waste. The US Government needs to deliver a SAFE substitute waste disposal site for Yucca Mtn, or, we must consign ourselves to storing nuclear waste in casks for the foreseeable future ("forever").

Daniel McKeel
1106 Sycamore Drive
Po.O. Box 15
Van Buren, MO 63965

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Don McKelvey [mailto:donmckelvey38@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 11:03 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Don McKelvey
20950 Priday Ave
Euclid, OH 44123

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Gerald McKelvey [mailto:jerrymckelvey@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:52 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Gerald McKelvey
1830 E Yosemite Ave
Space 196
Manteca, CA 95336

From: Monte & Elora McKenzie [mailto:mgmckenzie80@frontier.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:17 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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A huge savings in moving and storage expense!
Don't you wish GE had sold japan thorium salt power generators instead of nuc's!

Monte & Elora McKenzie
3503 Wayside Talcott rd. Talcott WV 24981
Talcott, WV 24981

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Monte & Elora McKenzie [mailto:mgmckenzie80@frontier.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 6:36 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Monte & Elora McKenzie
3503 Wayside Talcott rd. Talcott WV 24981
Talcott, WV 24981

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Marshal McKitrick [mailto:marsmck@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:15 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Marshal McKitrick
5120 ELMER WAY
SACRAMENTO, CA 95822

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Heidi McLean [mailto:mcleanheidi@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:39 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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Heidi McLean
3057 Montgomery Way
Sacramento, CA 95817

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mary McMahon [mailto:marymcmahon@greynun.org]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:00 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Mary McMahon
1750 Quarry Rd.
1750 Quarry Rd.
Yardley, PA 19067

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Susan McMillan [mailto:sssswm@aol.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 3:57 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Susan McMillan
3105 Arrowsmith Rd
Wimauma, FL 33598

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Reba Mcmillan [mailto:Celticsun@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 7:44 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Reba Mcmillan
maple
toledo, OH 43608

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Susan McMullen [mailto:slmcm57@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:09 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Susan McMullen
6756 San Miguel Ave.
Lemon Grove, CA 91945

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Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:32 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
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From: Laurence McNamara [mailto:laurencemcnamara09@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:33 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Laurence McNamara
422 N. Lakeside Drive
Lake Worth, FL 33460

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Laurence McNamara [mailto:laurencemcnamara09@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 6:20 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Laurence McNamara
422 N. Lakeside Drive
Lake Worth, FL 33460

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Katherine McNeill [mailto:kathyfuoco@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Katherine McNeill
1004 Swanston Dr.
Sacramento, CA 95818

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Alex McNish [mailto:alexmcnish@mac.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:07 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Alex McNish
835 West Victory Road
835 West Victory Road
Meridian, ID 83642

## Consent-Based Siting

From: claudia mcnulty [mailto:claudiamcnulty@me.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 8:03 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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claudia mcnulty
1614 rt 26
climax, NY 12042

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Irene and David McPhail [mailto:irenendavid@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:13 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Irene and David McPhail
242 Trinity Ave.,
Kensington, CA 94708

## Consent-Based Siting

From: James and Leslee McPherson [mailto:lesleemcp@att.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:39 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Personally, I had radiation therapy on my tonsils and adenoids in the early 1950's in the hopes of stopping frequent ear infections. It did not stop the ear infections, but it did burn out my thyroid gland. I have been taking thyroid hormone since I was 15 years old.I was lucky, in that many recipients of these treatments developed thyroid cancer. I would NEVER CONSENT to having radioactive waste stored in my community nor in communities near where people are living or growing. Storing nuclear waste near a fault line is also a bad idea.

James and Leslee McPherson
3200 Monterey St.
San Mateo, CA 94403

## Consent-Based Siting

From: James and Leslee McPherson [mailto:lesleemcp@att.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:21 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

James and Leslee McPherson
3200 Monterey St.
San Mateo, CA 94403

## Consent-Based Siting

From: James and Leslee McPherson [mailto:lesleemcp@att.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:38 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Storage near fault lines is another bad idea.

James and Leslee McPherson
3200 Monterey St.
San Mateo, CA 94403

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Linda McVarish [mailto:lindamcv@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:46 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Linda McVarish
P.O. Box 575
Laytonville, CA 95454

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Susan McWethy [mailto:smcwethy@bellsouth net]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 5:38 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Susan McWethy
2852 Delcourt Dr.
Decatur, GA 30033

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Thomas Meacham [mailto:tom meacham@wku.edu]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:11 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. It has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply an attempt to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment.

DOE has no existing authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future. I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:
• Terminate the production of nuclear waste.
• Provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
• Determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks used for storage at reactor sites (HOSS), only putting the containers on a concrete slab with a fence. The difference would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the huge amount of nuclear waste stored at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

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Thomas Meacham
1322 Leeson Drive
Bowling Green, KY 42103

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Pattie Meade [mailto:plmsurf@cox.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:46 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Pattie Meade
421 VIA MONTEGO
SAN CLEMENTE, CA 92672

## Consent-Based Siting

From: ernie medeiros [mailto:erniemedeiros@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:34 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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ernie medeiros
8468 Trenton Road
Forestville, CA 95436

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Maureen Meehan [mailto:m-meehan@sbcglobal net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:53 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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Maureen Meehan
110 S. Festival Dr., Apt. D7
El Paso, TX 79912

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Trudel Meier-Staude [mailto:trudel@projekt21plus.de]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:32 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Trudel Meier-Staude
Volkartstr. 46
Munich, Germany, ot 80636

## Consent-Based Siting

From: peter meissner [mailto:pmeissner3707@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:14 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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peter meissner
181 N. Kellog Sta Barbara 93111
Santa Barbara, CA 93111

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lois Melegari [mailto:melegarilois@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:00 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Lois Melegari
W10348 Borth Lake Road
Deerbrook, WI 54424

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ella Melik [mailto:ella.melik@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 7:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Ella Melik
11412 N King Arthur Drive
Spokane, WA 99005

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lisa Mell [mailto:lcmellhealing@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:02 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Lisa Mell
792 S. 2nd St
792 S. 2nd St
Phila, PA 19147

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lisa Mell [mailto:lcmellhealing@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:51 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Lisa Mell
792 S. 2nd St
792 S. 2nd St
Phila, PA 19147

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Daniel Melnechuk [mailto:isis@isisdesign.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:05 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Daniel Melnechuk
100 Hardy Pond Rd
Waltham, MA 02451

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kathryn Melton [mailto:zappa2004@earthlink net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:51 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Kathryn Melton
3209 Brookmeade
Deer Park, TX 77536

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Terri Melville [mailto:windwoman22@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:47 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Terri Melville
5336 Gallatin Place
Boulder, CO 80303

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jonathan Memmert [mailto:jonathanmemmert@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:39 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Jonathan Memmert
501 W 123 ST
2B
New York, NY 10027

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From: Jonathan Memmert [mailto:jonathanmemmert@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 7:12 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Jonathan Memmert
501 W 123 ST
2B
New York, NY 10027

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Richard Menapace [mailto:rmenapac@twcny rr.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:55 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Richard Menapace
23 Rosewood Ave
Cortland, NY 13045, NY 13045

## Consent-Based Siting

From: R. Miles Mendenhall [mailto:miles_mendenhall@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:23 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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R. Miles Mendenhall
20381 Bay Meadows Dr.
Sonora, CA 95370

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Akira Mercado [mailto:Akiracaridad@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:15 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Akira Mercado
237 balcony ave
Bronx, NY 10465

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Akira Mercado [mailto:Akiracaridad@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:13 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Akira Mercado
237 balcony ave
Bronx, NY 10465

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Michele Mercer [mailto:michelem555@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 6:36 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Michele Mercer
1548 E. Elegante Dr.
Casa Grande, AZ 85122

## Consent-Based Siting

From: John Merriman [mailto:jm345@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:30 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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John Merriman
4801 Butler Dr
Cortland, NY 13045

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Brian Mertan [mailto:bmertan@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:57 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Brian Mertan
5050 Klump Ave
North Hollywood, CA 91601

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Elizabeth Merz [mailto merz@prtel.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:49 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Elizabeth Merz
111 W Lincoln Ave
111 W. Lincoln Ave
Fergus Falls, MN 56537

## Consent-Based Siting

From: JORGE MESIAS [mailto:jmesiasnet@netscape net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:13 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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JORGE MESIAS
M. BULNES 641
A. D-41
IQUIQUE, MA I REGION

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Scott Messick [mailto:scott messick59@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:48 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Scott Messick
330 Arbor Trail Lane
Conroe, TX 77384

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Marlene Metcalf [mailto:mmetcalf991@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:52 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Marlene Metcalf
718 Balra Drive
El Cerrito, CA 94530

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mar Metcalf [mailto:islandgirl6662000@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:29 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Mar Metcalf
718 Balra Drive
El Cerrito, CA 94530

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Hans Meyer [mailto:hmeyer@loxodromics.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:38 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Hans Meyer
W290N3030 Hillcrest Drive
W290 N3030 Hillcrest Drive
Pewaukee, WI 53072

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Cindy Meyers [mailto:awakened2007@hotmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 12:42 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Cindy Meyers
531 Altivo Avenue
Capitola, CA 95010

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joel Meza [mailto:jdemeza@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:50 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Joel Meza
P. O. Box 210144
San Francisco, CA 94121

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Brenda Michaels [mailto:brenda@conscioustalk net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 11:06 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Brenda Michaels
15617 258th Pl. SE
Issaquah, WA 98027

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Christopher Michaels [mailto:sevenstarsp7@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:32 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Christopher Michaels
1193 Van Buren St.
Eugene, OR 97402

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Christopher Michaels [mailto:sevenstarsp7@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:21 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Christopher Michaels
1193 Van Buren St.
Eugene, OR 97402

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Nancy Michon [mailto:nmmichon@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 5:00 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Nancy Michon
8101 Amelia Rd Unit E503
Houston, TX 77092

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Timothy Mieyal [mailto:tmieyal@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:30 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Timothy Mieyal
2740 Friar Drive
Parma, OH 44134

From: Timothy Mieyal [mailto:tmieyal@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:45 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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Timothy Mieyal
2740 Friar Drive
Parma, OH 44134

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Gaia Mika [mailto:gaia.mika@colorado.edu]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:25 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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Gaia Mika
425 Valverde Commons Dr
Taos, NM 87571

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Paul Milkman [mailto:paulmilkman@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:41 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Paul Milkman
349 6th Avenue
Brooklyn, NY 11215

## Consent-Based Siting

From: George E. Milkowski [mailto:gmilkowski@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

I have been living in Chicago all of my life and I am aware that nuclear waste products from plants such as Zion and Braidwood are stored in close proximity to my home and family. I have always found this to be very disturbing and I do not wish to be the situation for anyone else. For that reason I believe that all nuclear power plants need to be phased out as quickly as possible to end the dilemma of storing radioactive materials for tens of thousands of years. Closing these plants would be a rational thing to do and that is why I find the Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative incredible as it has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites,

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Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage facilities. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

George E. Milkowski
3026 W. Chase
Chicago, IL 60645

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kathryn Miller [mailto:gardengirl_77@comcast net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:47 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Kathryn Miller
7914 Stone Hearth Rd.
7914 Stone Hearth Rd.
Severn, MD 21144

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Caroline Miller [mailto:cmiller1049@outlook.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:51 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Caroline Miller
6834 4th Ave No
St. Petersburg, FL 33710

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Charles Miller [mailto:mill8char@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:55 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Charles Miller
356 Creekside Drive
Vernon Hills, IL 60061

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Caroline Miller [mailto:cmiller1049@outlook.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:18 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Caroline Miller
6834 4th Ave No
St. Petersburg, FL 33710

## Consent-Based Siting

From: James Miller [mailto:jimvalentinojr@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:14 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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James Miller
1003 E 3rd Street
Austin, TX 78702

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Phyllis Miller [mailto:jeanmiller miller37@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:50 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Phyllis Miller
427 Marlborough St., Apartment 4
Apartment 4
Boston, MA 02115

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Phyllis Miller [mailto:jeanmiller miller37@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Phyllis Miller
427 Marlborough St., Apartment 4
Apartment 4
Boston, MA 02115

## Consent-Based Siting

From: STEVEN MILLER [mailto:smiller49@hughes.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 9:50 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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STEVEN MILLER
HC 31 BOX 230
JASPER, AR 72641

## Consent-Based Siting

From: stephanie miller [mailto:stephazilla@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:04 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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stephanie miller
555 oakdale rd
atlanta, GA 30307

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sandra Miller [mailto:semiller12@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 9:19 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Sandra Miller
17311 Willowbrook Drive
South Bend, IN 46635

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Tim Miller [mailto:tmiller@moonmountain net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 9:52 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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Tim Miller
PO Box 1894
Sonoma, CA 95476

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Victoria Miller [mailto:vemiller@earthlink.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:50 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Victoria Miller
15857 Moorpark Street
Encino, CA 91436

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jane Milliken [mailto:jmilliken90@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 5:18 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Jane Milliken
122 Cedar Cliff Road
Riverside, CT 06878

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Gerry Milliken [mailto:dolphin@communitynet.org]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 2:22 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Gerry Milliken
Winky Foundation
P.O. Box 1997
Cottonwood, AZ 86326

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Gerry Milliken [mailto:dolphin@communitynet.org]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:49 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Gerry Milliken
Winky Foundation
P.O. Box 1997
Cottonwood, AZ 86326

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Rosalind Milliken [mailto rosalind milliken@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:26 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Rosalind Milliken
80700 Avenue 38
Indio, CA 92203

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Rosalind Milliken [mailto rosalind milliken@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 7:49 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Rosalind Milliken
80700 Avenue 38
Indio, CA 92203

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Susan Mills [mailto:millsvt@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 11:51 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Susan Mills
3356 VT Rte. 66
Randolph Ctr., VT 05061

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Susan Mills [mailto:millsvt@gmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 5:33 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Susan Mills
3356 VT Rte. 66
Randolph Ctr., VT 05061

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lorree Gardener Milne [mailto:lorreeg@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 2:14 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Lorree Gardener Milne
9810 Dempsey Lane SW
Olympia, WA 98512

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Bonnie Milrod [mailto:bonniemilrod@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:32 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Bonnie Milrod
6995 Bonny Doon Rd.
Santa Cruz, CA 95060

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Karen Milstein [mailto midbarnm@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:29 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Karen Milstein
13 Blue Jay Dr
Santa Fe, NM 87506

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Karen Milstein [mailto midbarnm@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:23 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Karen Milstein
13 Blue Jay Dr
Santa Fe, NM 87506

## Consent-Based Siting

From: don Minnerly [mailto:drminnerly@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 3:43 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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don Minnerly
4508 N Williams Ave
Portland, OR 97217

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Anita Minton [mailto:anitaminton@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:10 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Anita Minton
Box 434
Guffey, CO 80820

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kathleen Mireault [mailto:kam8897@comcast net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:06 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Kathleen Mireault
32 Oakview Terrace
Jamaica Plain, MA 02130

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Peter Mitchell [mailto:joanandpeter@juno.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 11:50 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Peter Mitchell
121 Edgerton St.
Rochester, NY 14607

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Glenn Mitroff [mailto:volcoord@wort-fm.org]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:59 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Glenn Mitroff
1516 Lynchburg Trail
1516 Lynchburg Trail
Madison, WI 53718

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jay Mittenthal [mailto:mitten@illinois.edu]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 4:32 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Jay Mittenthal
605 W. Oregon St.
605 W. Oregon St.
Urbana, IL 61801

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Darren Mitton [mailto:blackwingbear@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:05 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

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Darren Mitton
280 Northern Ave
Avondale Estates, GA 30002

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Darren Mitton [mailto:blackwingbear@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 6:11 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Darren Mitton
280 Northern Ave
Avondale Estates, GA 30002

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Misako Miyagawa [mailto misakocm@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 6:34 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Misako Miyagawa
278 Alamitos Ave
Long Beach, CA 90802

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Patrick Moctezuma [mailto:pm@elemental-apps.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:55 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Patrick Moctezuma
155 E. Daffodil Rd.
155 E. Daffodil Rd.
Ruckersville, VA 22968

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Donald Moeser [mailto:donaldmoeser@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:36 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Donald Moeser
12949 Gallia Pike
Portsmouth, OH 45662

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Nick Moidja [mailto:moidja19663055@sbcglobal net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:08 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Nick Moidja
11768 South Carson Way
Gold River
Gold River, CA 95670

## Consent-Based Siting

From: cynthia molinero [mailto:turtlezavirgo@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:15 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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cynthia molinero
po box 470322
Aurora, CO 80047

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Gina Mondazze [mailto:Gdazze@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 10:57 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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Gina Mondazze
3909 Taft street
1101
Hollywood, FL 33021

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Christine M.C. Money [mailto:cobbwinkle@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 2:34 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Christine M.C. Money
5 Douglas Dr
Long Valley, NJ 07853

## Consent-Based Siting

From: James Monroe [mailto:randy@monroescienceed.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:59 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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James Monroe
5521 Michigan Blvd
Concord, CA 94521

## Consent-Based Siting

From: James Monroe [mailto:randy@monroescienceed.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:18 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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James Monroe
5521 Michigan Blvd
Concord, CA 94521

## Consent-Based Siting

From: David Monsees [mailto:dmmonsees@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:13 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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David Monsees
1347 W Parkhill Drive
Boise, ID 83702

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Danielle Montague-Judd [mailto:ddmjudd@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:59 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment--Please Oppose DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Thank you for considering these comments.

Danielle Montague-Judd
1820 Fox Run Rd.
Wanship, UT 84017

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lisa Montanus [mailto:lmontanus@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:17 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Lisa Montanus
105 Cardinal Court
Woodstock, NY 12498

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lisa Montanus [mailto:lmontanus@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 9:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Lisa Montanus
105 Cardinal Court
Woodstock, NY 12498

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Anthony Montapert [mailto:amontapert@roadrunner.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Anthony Montapert
1375  Ficus Way
1375 Ficus Way
Ventura, CA 93004

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Fjaere Mooney [mailto:happmus@roadrunner.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:29 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Fjaere Mooney
11500 Erwin St
North Hollywood, CA 91606

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Walter Moora [mailto:WalterMoora@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:59 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Walter Moora
609 N Lincoln Street
Elkhorn, WI 53121

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Janet Moore [mailto:janetmoorecarlson@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 10:58 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opng DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Janet Moore
3971 N 3rd St
Fresno, CA 93726

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Debra Moore [mailto:ilenem_1@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 2:08 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Debra Moore
10370 Evelyn Drive
Clio, MI 48420

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Debra Moore [mailto:ilenem_1@yahoo.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 12:10 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Debra Moore
10370 Evelyn Drive
Clio, MI 48420

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kristine Moore [mailto:beirutmoores@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 8:49 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Kristine Moore
4015 Soundview Dr W
Tacoma, WA 98466

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lorraine Moore [mailto:lorraine@lorraineshirkus.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 5:28 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Lorraine Moore
138 Crofton Ave.
San Antonio, TX 78210

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Nancy Moore [mailto nmoor02@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:18 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Nancy Moore
6225 Mineral Point Rd #D87
Madison, WI 53705

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Robin Moore [mailto:rbmoore22@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:51 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Robin Moore
910 Riverside Drive - 4D
New York, NY 10032

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Linda Moorman [mailto:uppityldm56@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:48 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Linda Moorman
3510 S Rhodes
Apt. 2410
Chicago, IL 60653

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sharon Moran [mailto:smoran1945@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 5:01 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Sharon Moran
1223 s arkle st
visalia, CA 93292

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Maria Morehead [mailto:spiralmother@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:39 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

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Maria Morehead
8426 5th Ave. SW
Seattle, WA 98106

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Judith E Moreland [mailto:jude_moreland@verizon net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 10:02 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Judith E Moreland
8450 Bubbling Springs Drive
Baldwinsville, NY 13027

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Phyl Morello [mailto:1432Phyl@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:02 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Phyl Morello
984 Harrison Ferry
984 Harrison Ferry
White Pine, TN 37890

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Phyl Morello [mailto:1432Phyl@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 12:41 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Phyl Morello
984 Harrison Ferry
984 Harrison Ferry
White Pine, TN 37890

## Consent-Based Siting

From: sandra morey [mailto:sandi morey@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 3:14 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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sandra morey
3461 Laguna Ave
oakland, CA 94602

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Gina mori [mailto:winamarieag@aol.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:19 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Gina mori
425 S Elm St
41b
arroyo grande, CA 93420

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Karol Morphew [mailto:kadm@whidbey.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 9:01 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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Karol Morphew
8119 Lopez Dr
Clinton, WA 98236

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Rosemarie Morris [mailto rosemariemorris@sympatico.ca]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 8:23 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Rosemarie Morris
191 Rosemary Lane
Ancaster, ON L9G 2K6

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Nancy Morris [mailto:nan_xt@w-link net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:20 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Nancy Morris
19809 18th AVE NW
Shoreline, WA 98177

## Consent-Based Siting

From: C Morrison [mailto:semperfelix76@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:25 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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C Morrison
6 Riverside Drive
Princeton, NJ 08540

## Consent-Based Siting

From: C Morrison [mailto:semperfelix76@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:34 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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C Morrison
6 Riverside Drive
Princeton, NJ 08540

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Donald Morrison [mailto:vox4pax@comcast net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:58 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Donald Morrison
4502 Brownsville Hartland Road
West Windsor, VT 05089

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Pat Morrison [mailto:patriciaadele45@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:01 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Pat Morrison
2406 W Kansas Ave
2406 W Kansas
Midland, TX 79701

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Steven Morr-Wineman [mailto:steven.wineman@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:32 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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Steven Morr-Wineman
26 McTernan St
Cambridge, MA 02139

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Claire Mortimer [mailto:clairebearcfm@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:40 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Claire Mortimer
PO Box 184
57
Brooklin, ME 04616

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Seth Mosgofian [mailto:quepasasf@comcast net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:50 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Seth Mosgofian
1309 Calle Ramon
Santa Fe, NM 87501

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jan Mosgofian [mailto:jmosgofian@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:48 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Jan Mosgofian
848 Diablo Ave  #8
Novato, CA 94947

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Rebecca Mosher [mailto:Rpeaceful@wildblue.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:36 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Rebecca Mosher
99 East Pacemont Road
99 E Pacemont Road
Columbus, OH 43202

## Consent-Based Siting

From: sharon moss [mailto:sm26099@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:43 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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sharon moss
7108 Horner C-6
st. louis, MO 63117

## Consent-Based Siting

From: anguss moss [mailto:angussone@aol.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 9:31 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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anguss moss
1031 hathaway lane
fridley, MN 55432

## Consent-Based Siting

From: anguss moss [mailto:angussone@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:33 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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anguss moss
1031 hathaway lane
fridley, MN 55432

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Glenn Moss [mailto:glennmoss2000@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:23 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Glenn Moss
629 S. Seminole Ave.
Okmulgee, OK 74447

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Adrienne Moumin [mailto:photowonder2010@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Adrienne Moumin
2807 Byron St.
2807 Byron St.
Silver Spring, MD 20902

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joe Moye [mailto:joemoye@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 8:44 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Joe Moye
4522 Moore Cir # C 3
Tallahassee, FL 32304

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ruth B Moynihan [mailto:ruthmoyn@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:46 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Ruth B Moynihan
37 Farrell Rd
Storrs, CT 06268

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ruth B Moynihan [mailto:ruthmoyn@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 8:18 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Ruth B Moynihan
37 Farrell Rd
Storrs, CT 06268

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ruth B Moynihan [mailto:ruthmoyn@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:17 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

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Ruth B Moynihan
37 Farrell Rd
Storrs, CT 06268

## Consent-Based Siting

From: John Mrakowitz [mailto:jcm42@cumc.columbia.edu]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:08 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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John Mrakowitz
151 West 86 Street
New York, NY 10024

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Stephen Mudrick [mailto:jandsmudrick@msn.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 11:14 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Stephen Mudrick
1015 Prospect St.
1015 Prospect St.
Columbia, MO 65203

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Stephen Mudrick [mailto:jandsmudrick@msn.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:52 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Stephen Mudrick
1015 Prospect St.
1015 Prospect St.
Columbia, MO 65203

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Karsten Mueller [mailto:K.mueller@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:37 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Karsten Mueller
50 Quail Crossing
Santa Cruz, CA 95060

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Guntram Mueller [mailto:guntrammueller1@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 7:27 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Guntram Mueller
35 Oxford Rd.
Newton, MA 02459

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Siraj Mufti [mailto:sirajmufti@msn.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 7:03 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Siraj Mufti
7
Tucson, AZ 85710

## Consent-Based Siting

From: John Mugge [mailto:jamugge@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:42 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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John Mugge
1285 Ellwanger Dr
Phoenixville, PA 19460

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mark Muhich [mailto markmuhich0@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:28 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Mark Muhich
2466 Emmons Rd
Jackson, MI 49201

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Deb Muhlbeier [mailto:deb reed@rocketmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 6:06 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Deb Muhlbeier
28752 Soundview Dr. S
28124 8th Ave S Des Moines, WA 98198
Des Moines, WA 98198

## Consent-Based Siting

From: bernardo alayza mujica [mailto:beralmu@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:38 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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bernardo alayza mujica
durand bernales
surquillo, IA 51111

## Consent-Based Siting

From: bernardo alayza mujica [mailto:beralmu@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 7:10 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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bernardo alayza mujica
durand bernales
surquillo, IA 51111

## Consent-Based Siting

From: James Mulcare [mailto:xsecretsx@cableone.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:50 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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James Mulcare
1110 Benjamin St
Clarkston, WA 99403

## Consent-Based Siting

From: James Mulder [mailto:jhmulder@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:57 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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James Mulder
28 Sachson Pl
Wappingers Falls, NY 12590

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Timothy Mullen [mailto:timothy.mullen3@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:52 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Timothy Mullen
1272 Richland Avenue
Stoke-on-Trent
Saint Charles, MN 55972

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Edna Mullen [mailto mullentim13@yahoo.co.uk]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:51 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Edna Mullen
1272 Richland Avenue
Saint Charles, MN 55972

## Consent-Based Siting

From: James Mullin [mailto:JVMullin66@Gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:39 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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James Mullin
757 Paddock Path
Moorestown, NJ 08057

## Consent-Based Siting

From: James Mullins [mailto:janandpatm@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:03 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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James Mullins
135 matthews avenue
athens, GA 30606

## Consent-Based Siting

From: c mulloy [mailto:carleenmulloy@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 7:19 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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c mulloy
4909 nw 67th st
6725 n oregon
kansas, MO 64151

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Randy Murbach [mailto:randymurbach@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:24 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Randy Murbach
4010 Macalpine Road
Ellicott City, MD 21042

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lauren Murdock [mailto murdock_ls@hotmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 1:59 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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Lauren Murdock
3940 Via Lucero Apt #16
Santa Barbara, CA 93110

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Brenan Murphey [mailto:RenBrenan@netscape.net]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 1:25 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Brenan Murphey
518 Rawlins
Apt. 3
Port Huron, MI 48060

## Consent-Based Siting

From: margaret murphy [mailto:murphysweetland@sbcglobal net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:39 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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margaret murphy
1902 no. 49th st.
milw., WI 53208

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ellen Murphy [mailto:ellenkavanagh@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 6:15 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Ellen Murphy
901 N. Forest St
#147
Bellingham, WA 98225

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Garrett Murphy [mailto:gsmurphy15@msn.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 6:18 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Garrett Murphy
2341 Valley Street #4
Oakland, CA 94612

## Consent-Based Siting

From: John Kelly Murphy [mailto:jkellym@msn.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:08 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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John Kelly Murphy
16546 23rd ave ne
Shoreline, WA 98155

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Liz Murphy [mailto:lizasmurphy@yahoo.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 9:12 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Liz Murphy
p.o. box 658
lafayette, TN 37083

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Margaret Murray [mailto:rosielily@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:12 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Margaret Murray
3271  S CLAY ST
ENGLEWOOD, CO 80110

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Margaret Murray [mailto:MargaretMurray46@yahoo.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 10:26 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Margaret Murray
1684 W. 1st St.
Brooklyn, NY 11223

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Margaret Murray [mailto:MargaretMurray46@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 10:08 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Margaret Murray
1684 W. 1st St.
Brooklyn, NY 11223

From: Mallory Musser [mailto:mallory_musser@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:44 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Mallory Musser
1100 12TH ST
Bremerton, WA 98337

## Consent-Based Siting

From: PAUL Myers [mailto:paul.myers600@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 11:09 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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PAUL Myers
503 Halstead LANE
Peru, VT 05152

## Consent-Based Siting

From: derald myers [mailto:kmyers520@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:23 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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derald myers
520 14th ave
santa cruz, CA 95062

## Consent-Based Siting

From: derald myers [mailto:kmyers520@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 6:49 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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derald myers
520 14th ave
santa cruz, CA 95062

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jay Myers [mailto:nov8r1@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:17 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Jay Myers
1422 N 104 Plz #224
Omaha, NE 68114

## Consent-Based Siting

From: mercy Myers [mailto:aylantisioi@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:19 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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mercy Myers
1880 grand ave
st. Paul, MN 55105

## Consent-Based Siting

From: marcella myers [mailto marcydmyers@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 1:46 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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marcella myers
145 coy drive
la selva beach, CA 95076

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sonya Myers [mailto:sonyamyersdvm@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:58 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Sonya Myers
1730 5th Ave
Vero Beach, FL 32960

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sharon Mylott [mailto:mewstermom@aol.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 8:34 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Sharon Mylott
P O Box 816
77 Coons Drive
Charlestown, NH 03603

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sharon Mylott [mailto:mewstermom@aol.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 1:34 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

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Sharon Mylott
P O Box 816
77 Coons Drive
Charlestown, NH 03603

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jon Nadle [mailto:jnadle@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:32 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

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Jon Nadle
858 Gladys Ave
Pittsburgh, PA 15216

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Margaret Nagel [mailto:formargaretn@earthlink.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:57 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

As a parent and grandparent, it concerns me very much that basic protections of American citizens could be brushed aside in favor of more aid and comfort to the moribund and destructive Nuke industry. The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Margaret Nagel
631 Hinman Ave.
Apt 1A
Evanston, IL 60202

From: Joseph Naidnur [mailto:jnaidnur@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:44 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Joseph Naidnur
3s402 Saddle Ridge Ct
Warrenville, IL 61525

From: Joseph Naidnur [mailto:jnaidnur@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:41 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Joseph Naidnur
3s402 Saddle Ridge Ct
Warrenville, IL 61525

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From: Judy Nakadegawa [mailto:jnakadegawa@yahoo.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 3:32 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Judy Nakadegawa
751 The Alameda
Berkeley, CA 94707

From: S Nam [mailto:snam5370@ymail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 6:46 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

S Nam
165 Bennett Avenue
4L
10040, NY 10040

From: Alexandra Napoleon [mailto:mixedupfiles@mac.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 11:19 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Alexandra Napoleon
902 Yardley Road
Yardley, PA 19067

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Robert Napoli [mailto:robertonly9@earthlink.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:58 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Robert Napoli
315 East 12th Street
New York City, NY 10003

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jason Nardell [mailto:Jason.Nardell@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:06 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Jason Nardell
1484 Meeker Drive
Longmont, CO 80504

From: Paul Naser [mailto:p.naser74@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:45 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Paul Naser
18825 stagg st.
Northridge, CA 91325

## Consent-Based Siting

From: keith neal [mailto:windrider4002@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:56 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) plan for mass transportation of nuclear waste is more corporate welfare, puts citizens and the taxpayer at unlimited risk. I object to this 'consent' scheme.

The DOE consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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keith neal
6735 Beach drive sw
seattle, WA 98136

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Meredith Needham [mailto:pianohag@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:40 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Meredith Needham
815 Burg Street
Granville, OH 43023

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Meredith Needham [mailto:pianohag@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:12 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Meredith Needham
815 Burg Street
Granville, OH 43023

## Consent-Based Siting

From: GRACE NEFF [mailto:Graceswallow@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 5:42 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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GRACE NEFF
800 SE 28TH
800  28th Ave. S.E.
ALBANY, OR 97322

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Charles Neidich [mailto:cneidich@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 8:18 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Charles Neidich
200 Cabrini Blvd
200 Cabrini Blvd
New York, NY 10033

From: Laura Neiman [mailto:lneiman55@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:33 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

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The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Laura Neiman
60 Seaman Ave Apt 5G
5G
New York, NY 10034

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Cheryl Nelson [mailto:cheryln489@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 3:55 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Cheryl Nelson
6325 Lyndale Ave. S Apt 112
Richfeld, MN 55428

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Chris Nelson [mailto:chris4pax@gmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 7:00 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Chris Nelson
2300 B Estes Rd.
2300 B Estes Rd. Chico, Ca.
Chico, CA 95928

## Consent-Based Siting

From: DENNIS R. NELSON, Naturalist/Energy-Environmental Researcher [mailto:dennisnelson987@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 3:00 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: HERE IS MY COMMENT OPPOSING THE USDOE'S CONSENT-BASED SITING PROCESS FOR RADIOACTIVE WASTE!!

Dear Energy Secretary Moniz=

I am one of the original, modern environmental/energy/conservation activists ever since around the very first "EARTH DAY Celebration," which was more than 46 years ago. I have a Bachelor of Science (B.S.) Degree in Biology and Environmental Studies from Dana College, Blair, Nebraska. I am a energy-environmental researcher, writer, speaker, and organizer. I am a member of the Chicago-based Nuclear Energy Information Service (NEIS), "Illinois' Nuclear Power Watchdog Group." Continuing on, the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has NO RATIONAL BASIS IN POLICY OR THE PUBLIC INTEREST, and is simply a vehicle to put the shorter-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health, public safety, and environmental quality. In short, the USDOE is "putting the nuclear cart before the horse!" The USDOE has NO AUTHORITY to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the USDOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the radwaste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

The USDOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more radioactive waste into the distant future.

I DO NOT CONSENT TO THIS PROCESS, THE CONTINUED GENERATION OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE, THE SITING OF CONSOLIDATED STORAGE FACILITIES, NOR THE MASS TRANSPORTATION OF RADIOACTICE WASTE TO THEM!!

The top goals for managing radioactive waste MUST BE TO STOP MAKING IT TO BEGIN WITH, AND TO ISOLATE THE RADWASTE THAT WE HAVE FROM THE ENVIRONMENT! The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive irradiated nuclear fuel is:

- To terminate the production of ALL radioactive waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its longer-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

Over 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of radioactive waste at reactor sites through 'Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage' (HOSS). HOSS would first move high-level radwaste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this radwaste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I OPPOSE THE CONSOLIDATION AND TRANSPORTATION OF HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE TO NEWER SITES unless (and until) a viable longer-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a "PARKING LOT DUMP!" The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of radioactive waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the radioactive waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, radwaste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto longer-term or even permanent high-level radioactive waste site, there would have been NO TECHNICAL QUALIFICATION OR SCIENTIFIC BASIS or choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be VIOLATED; and the consent-based process would be MEANINGLESS, if not FRAUDULENT.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was RIGHT, requiring the USDOE to have a longer-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian radioactive waste. The central problem afflicting radwaste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain in Nevada as the sole site to be considered for a high-level radioactive waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting radioactive waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US radwaste program! The second step is to limit the radioactive waste being made. The third step to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible radioactive waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for radioactive waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of radwaste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in radioactive waste management first is DECEPTIVE AND IRRESPONSIBLE!
The U.S. Department of Energy has "gone rogue" in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first, and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless (and until) Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current USDOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the U.S. Department of Energy FAILED in its effort to implement the NWPA. CONSOLIDATED STORAGE ONLY INCREASES THE RISKS OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE, AND DOES NOTHING TO ADVANCE CREDIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE LONGER-TERM MANAGEMENT AND ISOLATION OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS!!

DENNIS R. NELSON, Naturalist/Energy-Environmental Researcher
P.O. Box 4453
Fl. 2
Chicago, IL 60680

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dennis Nelson [mailto:dennis_nelson@att.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:51 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Dennis Nelson
10952 Decatur Road
10952 Decatur Road, San Diego
San Diego, CA 92126

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jon Nelson [mailto:jfnemail@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Jon Nelson
13306 Country Heights
Penn Valley, CA 95946

## Consent-Based Siting

From: pam nelson [mailto:pamela05n@yahoo.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 2:56 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,
Over 40 years ago, I visited the Trojan Nuclear Power plant in Oregon as a college student. I asked them about the destination of their nuclear waste and they didn't have a clear answer. I was astounded and still can't believe that Nuclear Power Plants are being still used and constructed without a place for the waste. Stop using this dangerous source of power. We live near the dangerous San Onofre waste storage and there is still no idea what to do with it. It's a ticking time-bomb.

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

pam nelson
38723 hwy 79
warner springs, CA 92086

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Paul Nelson [mailto:pnmeister@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 8:50 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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Paul Nelson
25181 Daniel Boone Pkwy
Racine, WV 25165

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Rick Nelson [mailto:bflatseventh@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 11:01 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Rick Nelson
5209 Epsom Ct
Columbus, OH 43221

# Consent-Based Siting

From: Sally Nelson [mailto:sallynels7@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:39 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Sally Nelson
2200 McGee Ave
Berkeley, CA 94703

## Consent-Based Siting

From: sandy nelson [mailto:snow.nelson@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:28 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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sandy nelson
1582 w 29th
1582 W29th
loveland, CO 81147

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sherman and Denise nelson [mailto:nelson1904@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 6:16 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Sherman and Denise nelson
4339 Edgewood Av.
Oakland, CA 94602

From: Thomas Nelson [mailto:twnelson@erols.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:58 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Thomas Nelson
105 Drexel Ave.
none
Lansdowne, PA 19050

From: Victor Nepomnyashchy [mailto:vicnep@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:20 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Victor Nepomnyashchy
9131 Burnet Ave., #7
North Hills, CA 91343

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dennis Nester [mailto:theroyprocess@cox.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 7:41 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Dennis Nester
4024 S. 183rd Lane
Goodyear, AZ 85338

From: Christa Neuber [mailto:seamusminnie@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:53 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Christa Neuber
728 N. Doheny Drive
W. Hollyuwood, CA 90069

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Elizabeth Neuse [mailto:elizabeth.neuse@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:19 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Elizabeth Neuse
8 Paramount Ave
Hamden, CT 06517

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Paula Neville [mailto:Commonprayer28@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:05 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

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Paula Neville
Pepperidge Drive
Rochester, NY 14626

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Paula Neville [mailto:Commonprayer28@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:44 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Paula Neville
Pepperidge Drive
Rochester, NY 14626

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Nancy Newell [mailto:ogec2@hotmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 9:45 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Nancy Newell
3917 N.E. Skidmore St.
3917 NE Skidmore St
Portland, OR 97211

From: Joe Newman [mailto:solarfeller@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:28 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Joe Newman
Box 833
Box 833 Bozeman
Bozeman, MT 59771

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Roberta E. Newman [mailto:robertaellengold@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:40 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Roberta E. Newman
300 Monte Vista Ave.
Mill Valley, CA 94941

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Christine Newport [mailto:angel862@peoplepc.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:50 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Christine Newport
7551 Hazelcrest
Hazelwood, MO 63042

From: keefe nghe [mailto:knghe77@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 2:15 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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keefe nghe
1213 cardigan ave.
ventura, CA 93004

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dylan Nguyen [mailto:dustinnguyen@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:25 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Dylan Nguyen
555 Willow Ave
Milpitas, CA 95035

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From: Dylan Nguyen [mailto:dustinnguyen@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 7:57 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Dylan Nguyen
555 Willow Ave
Milpitas, CA 95035

## Consent-Based Siting

From: DANORA Niccolini [mailto:dianoran@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 11:30 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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DANORA Niccolini
356 East 78th. St.
356 East 78 th. St.
New York City, NY 10075

From: Corey Nicholl [mailto:corey@eroplay.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:18 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Corey Nicholl
1200 Curtis Street
Berkeley, CA 94706

## Consent-Based Siting

From: John Nichols [mailto:nikos27@earthlink.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:05 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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No consideration of the rights or consent of those along radioactive waste transport routes is being made or requested. Although one of the greatest dangers to the most people, environments and ecosystems is the movement of tens of thousands of tons of nuclear waste on roads, rails and waterways, DOE stated at its Washington DC 'kickoff' meeting that there is complete federal preemption over transport of nuclear waste so that would not be part of the process.

Nuclear Information and Resource Service (NIRS) states, In its campaign, "Stop Mobile Chernobyl — No Fukushima Highways," "An 'interim' storage site would begin the transport of tens of thousands of casks of lethal high-level nuclear waste across the entire United States, potentially affecting 100 million Americans who live within a mile or two of likely transport routes--our nation's roads and railways.
http://www.nirs.org/radwaste/hlwtransport/mobilechernobyl.htm

There is no mechanism for consideration of the rights of future generations that inevitably would be affected.

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John Nichols
P.O. Box 96
East Orleans, MA 02643

From: Carmen Nichols [mailto:starflame_2000@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:55 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Carmen Nichols
McQueen
Chandler, AZ 85225

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Carmen Nichols [mailto:starflame_2000@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:27 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Carmen Nichols
McQueen
Chandler, AZ 85225

From: David S. Nichols [mailto:davemult@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:54 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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David S. Nichols
5107 NE Couch Street
none
Portland, OR 97213

## Consent-Based Siting

From: David S. Nichols [mailto:davemult@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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David S. Nichols
5107 NE Couch Street
none
Portland, OR 97213

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jean Nick [mailto:jmanick@yahoo.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 10:12 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Jean Nick
1911 Gallows Hill Rd
Kintnersville, PA 18930

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Stephen Nickels [mailto:snickels@shawneelink.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:36 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Stephen Nickels
2880 Trigg Tower
2880 Trigg Tower
Simpson, IL 62985

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Thomas Nieland [mailto:tln4dwild@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:12 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
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Thomas Nieland
415 Oakwood Dr
Alamo, TX 78516

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Josephine Niemann [mailto:josephinessnd@yahoo.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 5:54 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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Josephine Niemann
320 E. Ripa Ave.
320 E. Ripa Ave
St. Louis, MO 63125

## Consent-Based Siting

From: John Niendorf [mailto:JRniendorf@cs.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:13 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

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John Niendorf
508 Kelsando
Friday Harbor, WA 98250

## Consent-Based Siting

From: John Niendorf [mailto:JRniendorf@cs.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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John Niendorf
508 Kelsando
Friday Harbor, WA 98250

From: Michele Nihipali [mailto:nihipalim001@hawaii.rr.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 5:33 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Michele Nihipali
54-074 A Kam Hwy.
54-074 A Kam Hwy
Hauula, HI 96717

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Nancy Nolan [mailto:nancy@nolanconsulting.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:56 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Nancy Nolan
225 West Mariposa
Red Bluff, CA 96080

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mark Nolan [mailto:mnstretch@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:47 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Mark Nolan
6517 Zimmerman NE
6517 Zimmerman NE  Albuquerque, NM
Albuquerque, NM 87110

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Colleen Noland [mailto:4Nolandfam@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:00 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Colleen Noland
3525 singers Glen Drive
Olney, MD 20832

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sharon Nolting [mailto:s.a.nolting@earthlink.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:53 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Sharon Nolting
348 E. 9th St. #13
New York, NY 10003

From: Michael Norden [mailto:nordy@bright.net]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 8:46 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Michael Norden
22290 Co. Rd. S
Defiance, OH 43512

From: Pamela Nordhof [mailto:pamnordhof@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:56 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Pamela Nordhof
3135 60th St
Hamilton, MI 49419

## Consent-Based Siting

From: linda noren [mailto:lindasnoren@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:20 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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linda noren
8 hill drive
Petaluma, CA 94952

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jamesn Norgrove [mailto:jnorgrove@msn.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:34 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Jamesn Norgrove
Driver Ave
Winter Park, FL 32789

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Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 10:53 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
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Jamesn Norgrove
Driver Ave
Winter Park, FL 32789

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Nancy Norwood [mailto:Norwood@kcbx.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:46 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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Nancy Norwood
467 Luneta
467 Luneta Drive - San Luis Obispo, CA 93405
San Luis Obispo, CA 93405

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Toni Notar [mailto:tnotar@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:36 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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Toni Notar
2031 Serene Drive
Hollister, CA 95023

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Cristina Novelo [mailto:lestat_th@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Cristina Novelo
Rafael Garcia Auly 64
Veracruz, ot 91910

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sharon Noviss [mailto:shazen@btinternet.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 11:54 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Sharon Noviss
5 Octavia Gardens
Eastleigh, ot SO53 2PX

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Russell Novkov [mailto:rnovkov@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:25 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Russell Novkov
602 Sawyer Terrace
308
Madison, WI 53705

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Russell Novkov [mailto:rnovkov@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 9:19 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Russell Novkov
602 Sawyer Terrace
308
Madison, WI 53705

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Britney Nucci [mailto:britney.loren@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:09 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Britney Nucci
1305 Church St.
Manhattan Beach, CA 90266

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Britney Nucci [mailto:britney.loren@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:32 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Britney Nucci
1305 Church St.
Manhattan Beach, CA 90266

From: Edwina Nuccio [mailto:edwinanuc@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:17 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Edwina Nuccio
60 Algonquin Rd.
Yonkers, NY 10710

From: Edwina Nuccio [mailto:edwinanuc@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:36 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
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Edwina Nuccio
60 Algonquin Rd.
Yonkers, NY 10710

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sue Nuccio [mailto:gutterrx@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:16 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Sue Nuccio
608 Plymouth Dr.
Syracuse, NY 13206

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Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:36 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
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Sue Nuccio
608 Plymouth Dr.
Syracuse, NY 13206

From: B Nuckols [mailto:claimingthecrone@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:09 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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B Nuckols
1 Main St
Kelseyville, CA 95451

From: B Nuckols [mailto:claimingthecrone@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 8:00 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

B Nuckols
1 Main St
Kelseyville, CA 95451

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Susan Nuernberg [mailto:nuernber@uwosh.edu]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:38 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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Susan Nuernberg
147 W 22nd Ave
147 W 22nd Ave
Oshkosh, WI 95409

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Susan Nuernberg [mailto:nuernber@uwosh.edu]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:15 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Susan Nuernberg
147 W 22nd Ave
147 W 22nd Ave
Oshkosh, WI 95409

From: Raymond Nuesch [mailto:renuesch@Hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:25 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Raymond Nuesch
2000 16th Street NW
2000 16th Street NW
Free Union, VA 22940

From: Raymond Nuesch [mailto:renuesch@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:27 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Raymond Nuesch
2000 16th Street NW
2000 16th Street NW
Free Union, VA 22940

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Raymond Nuesch [mailto:renuesch@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:26 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Raymond Nuesch
4555 Catterton Road
2000 16th Street NW
Free Union, VA 22940

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Albert Nunez [mailto:solarnrgman@juno.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:07 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Albert Nunez
8 Sherman Ave
8 Sherman Ave.
Takoma Park, MD 20912

## Consent-Based Siting

From: William Nusbaum [mailto:wfnusbaum@comcast.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:50 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

William Nusbaum
2916 Gettysburg Avenue South
Saint Louis Park, MN 55426

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Natalie Nussbaum [mailto:nn12309@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:03 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Natalie Nussbaum
117 Schermerhorn Rd,
Cohoes, NY. 12047
Cohoes, NY 12047

From: JOHN OAKES [mailto:OAKES721@GMAIL.COM]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 1:27 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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JOHN OAKES
766 MONTDALE RD
SCOTT TWP, PA 18447

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Gwen Oaks [mailto:gtoaks@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:41 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Gwen Oaks
292 Terrace Street
Ashland, OR 97520

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dennis O'Brien [mailto:dobrien5@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Dennis O'Brien
104 Wagamons Blvd
Milton, DE, DE 19968

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From: Robert O'Brien [mailto:robrien2000@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:58 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Robert O'Brien
972 Allamanda DR.
Delray Beach, FL 33483

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Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:41 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Mary OByrne
99 schoolhouse road
Port jervis, NY 12771

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mary OByrne [mailto:ptahosiris7@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 5:06 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Mary OByrne
99 schoolhouse road
Port jervis, NY 12771

## Consent-Based Siting

From: B. O'Connor [mailto:bonjournm@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:22 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to ISOLATE the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

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B. O'Connor
P. O. Box 22262
P. O. Box 22262
Santa Fe,, NM 87502

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Elizabeth ODear [mailto:ekodear@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:33 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Elizabeth ODear
4301 Bissonnet St Aot 75
Bellaire, TX 77401

From: Elizabeth ODear [mailto:ekodear@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 10:28 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Elizabeth ODear
4301 Bissonnet St Aot 75
Bellaire, TX 77401

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Norma Odell [mailto:normaodell480@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:56 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Norma Odell
9 Lakeshore Terrace
Chico, CA 95928

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Carol Oftedahl [mailto:acofte@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:13 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Carol Oftedahl
W4104 County Rd K
Montello, WI 53949

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Edith Ogella [mailto:edithogella@msn.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:38 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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Edith Ogella
4868 Rhoads Avenue
4868 Rhoads Avenue, Santa Barbara, California, 93111
Santa Barbara, CA 93111

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Bonnie O'Hara [mailto:bonniebbomber@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 8:37 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Bonnie O'Hara
7007 S Birmingham Ct
Tulsa, OK 74136

From: Andreas Ohland [mailto:androsoh@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 6:14 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Andreas Ohland
6855 Abbott Ave
Miami Beach, FL 34652

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Andreas Ohland [mailto:androsoh@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:09 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Andreas Ohland
6855 Abbott Ave
Miami Beach, FL 34652

## Consent-Based Siting

From: l.Joyce Okadelk [mailto:greenhydrogen@YAHOO.COM]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:12 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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l.Joyce Okadelk
pob 59
ulster pk, NY 12487

From: Rick Olanoff [mailto:connectingwithrick@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:45 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Rick Olanoff
302 Carlton Dr
Syracuse, NY 13214

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kevin Oldham [mailto:koldham61@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:34 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Kevin Oldham
21 Ormond Pl.
Shirley, NY 11967

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jim Oleachea [mailto:jgo159@earthlink.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:58 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

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Jim Oleachea
5908 SW Miles St.
Portland, OR 97219

From: Patricia O'Leary [mailto:Psoleary@msn.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:59 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Patricia O'Leary
6010 Westchester Park
6010 Westchester Park
College Park, MD 20740

From: Kaihla Olivar [mailto:kaihla.olivar@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:19 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Kaihla Olivar
3 Repton Circle
3103
Watertown, MA 02472

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lauren Oliver [mailto:LaurenJOliver@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 4:26 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is relieving the nuclear industry of it's responsibility. It's a lot like the private incarceration industry -- offering "big bucks" to towns that are struggling economically, and hence can be convinced this will help them. It's a sham!

The DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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Lauren Oliver
176 Rusk Ave
Redway, CA 95560

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Andrew Olsen [mailto:andrewolsen76@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:07 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Andrew Olsen
4440 Finley Ave.
Los Angeles, CA 90027

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Corey E. Olsen [mailto:ceolsen@execpc.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 11:34 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety, and the environment. DOE is putting the nuclear 'cart before the horse'.

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The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste already accumulated from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:
- Terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- Provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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Corey E. Olsen
W334S724 Cushing Park Rd.
CEO Pipe Organs/Golden Ponds Farm
Delafield, WI 53018

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Corey E. Olsen [mailto:ceolsen@execpc.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 5:54 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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• Terminate the production of nuclear waste.
• Provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
• Determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and malevolent military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container moves at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the USA is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by the USA Congress through an unscientific and petty party politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the USA government nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third is to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be 'interim' on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed - and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known - can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The USA Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA.

Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Corey E. Olsen
W334S724 Cushing Park Rd.
CEO Pipe Organs/Golden Ponds Farm
Delafield, WI 53018

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Barbara Olson [mailto:barbieolson@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:50 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Barbara Olson
221 Glacier Drive
221 Glacier Drive, Madison WI 53705
Madison, WI 53705

From: Daniel Olson [mailto:dratchetset@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:13 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Daniel Olson
21-51 27 Street
Astoria, NY 11105

## Consent-Based Siting

From: joseph olson [mailto:jouskeha@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 3:45 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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joseph olson
11641 paddock lane
anchorage, AK 99516

## Consent-Based Siting

From: k olson [mailto:servimailster@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:14 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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k olson
21325 Heron Dr
21325 Heron Dr.
bodega bay, CA 94923

From: Wendy Olson [mailto:restingpointrenewal@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 5:45 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Wendy Olson
4209 Drew Ave. S.
Minneapolis, MN 55410

## Consent-Based Siting

From: bolivar ona [mailto:boliona@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:09 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

bolivar ona
85-40 105 St Richmondhill NY.
85-40 105 st richmond hill NY 11418
richmondhill, NY 11418

From: Maureen O'Neal [mailto:momoneal77@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:22 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

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Maureen O'Neal
9100 SW 80th Avenue
n/a
Portland, OR 97223

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kathy Oppenhuizen [mailto:salzberryhill@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Kathy Oppenhuizen
8135 Olive Trail
West Olive, MI 49460

## Consent-Based Siting

From: paula Orloff [mailto:paulaorloff@yahoo.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 1:06 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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paula Orloff
12476 Valley View Rd
Nevada City, CA 95959

From: John Orr [mailto:jorr@fullcoll.edu]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:57 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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John Orr
224 N. Roosevelt Ave.
224 N. Roosevelt Ave.
Fullerton, CA 92832

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Carole Osborn [mailto:longing4desertskies@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 3:59 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Carole Osborn
11 Brook Street
Winsted, CT 06098

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Leslie Osborne [mailto:yoonles7@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:53 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Leslie Osborne
1012 W 32 St
Chicago, IL 60608

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Roger Osborne [mailto:rogero@mac.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:33 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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With the ever rising incompetence and corruption we are seeing at all levels in this country I am very concerned about of nuclear programs. The risk to not only this generation, but future generations is far too great, as has been well demonstrated.

Roger Osborne
1095 Hilltop Drive
Redding, CA 96003

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Wendy Oser [mailto:woser@comcast.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:47 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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Wendy Oser
1439 Santa Fe Ave.
Berkeley, CA 94702

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Alex Oshiro [mailto:djrx.cares@hawaii rr.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:14 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Nuclear energy is the dirtiest energy with and the most dangerous for the planet. We need to abolish nuclear energy and replace it with clean renewable energies.

Alex Oshiro
1508 Pensacola St. Apt. #309
Honolulu, HI 96822

From: Maryjo Osowski [mailto:mosowski@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:41 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Maryjo Osowski
315 N. Stone Ave.
La Grange Park, IL 60526

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Allison Ostrer [mailto:aostrer@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:09 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Allison Ostrer
1107 E Denny Way, #C-3
2
Seattle, WA 98106

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Hillary Ostrow [mailto:hillaryostrow@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:33 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Hillary Ostrow
5835 Hesperia Ave
Encino, CA 91316

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Hillary Ostrow [mailto:hillaryostrow@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:10 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Hillary Ostrow
5835 Hesperia Ave
Encino, CA 91316

## Consent-Based Siting

From: john o'sullivan [mailto:johnsully57@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:53 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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john o'sullivan
55 e. 7th. st.
new york, NY 10003

From: Eric Osuna [mailto:osunaeric91@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:07 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Eric Osuna
1310 Valencia Loop
San Diego, NY 91910

From: Tracy Ouellette [mailto:tracyjouellette@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:27 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Tracy Ouellette
14078 MacTaggart Ave
Bow, WA 98232

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joe Overmyer [mailto:overmyerram@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:11 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Joe Overmyer
p o box669
fairfield, IA 52556

From: Linda Owen [mailto:lindajillyan@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:00 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Linda Owen
1642 Pinyon Court
Loveland, CO 80538

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Linda Owen [mailto:lindajillyan@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:13 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Linda Owen
1642 Pinyon Court
Loveland, CO 80538

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sharon E. Owens [mailto:seowens19143@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:16 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Sharon E. Owens
455 S. 48th St.
Philadelphia, PA 19143

## Consent-Based Siting

From: dogan ozkan [mailto:barisicindogan@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:10 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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dogan ozkan
abbasaga mahallesi yildiz vaddesi no 39/1
DOLAPDERE
Fairbanks, AK 99701

From: dogan ozkan [mailto:barisicindogan@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:12 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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dogan ozkan
abbasaga mahallesi yildiz vaddesi no 39/1
DOLAPDERE
Fairbanks, AK 99701

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Michelle P [mailto:cochefille@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:56 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Michelle P
9241 Barton Drive
Pittsburgh, PA 15237

## Consent-Based Siting

From: e p [mailto:liz1952@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:06 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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e p
box 178
talmage, CA 95481

## Consent-Based Siting

From: e p [mailto:liz1952@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:53 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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e p
box 178
talmage, CA 95481

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Laurel Pace [mailto:laurelaspen1@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:42 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Laurel Pace
81 Turtle Trail
Eureka, MT 59917

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Laurel Pace [mailto:laurelaspen1@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:43 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Laurel Pace
81 Turtle Trail
Eureka, MT 59917

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Greg Pace [mailto:gpace67@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:03 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Greg Pace
3485 Indianola Ave.
Columbus, OH 43214

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Marion Pack [mailto:marionpack1@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:28 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Marion Pack
600 N. Suttler Way
Prescott, AZ 86303

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dina Padilla [mailto:dinajpadilla@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:28 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Dina Padilla
7564 Watson Way
7564 Watson Way
CITRUS HTS, CA 95610

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dina Padilla [mailto:dinajpadilla@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:21 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Dina Padilla
7564 Watson Way
7564 Watson Way
CITRUS HTS, CA 95610

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Urmila Padmanabhan [mailto:urmila26@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:30 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Urmila Padmanabhan
42629 Queens Park Ct
Fremont, CA 94538

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Peggy Page [mailto:peggy.page@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:05 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Peggy Page
24324 MillerRd
Stanwood, WA 98292

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Carol J. Painter, Ph.D. [mailto:cpainter1@twcny.rr.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 9:05 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Carol J. Painter, Ph.D.
141 Westhaven Rd.
Ithaca, NY 14850

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Gregory Pais [mailto:paisnd@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:10 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Gregory Pais
206 Aspen Meadows Rd.
Nederland, CO 80466

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lorna Paisley [mailto:lpaisley@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:55 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Lorna Paisley
664 N. Hickory St
Joliet, IL 61025

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Thomas Pakurar [mailto:pak00@comcast net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:16 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Thomas Pakurar
13912 Bayport Landing Road
Midlothian, VA 23112

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Tami Palacky [mailto:tpalacky@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:39 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Tami Palacky
8005 Bethelen Woods Lane
SPRINGFIELD, VA 22153

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Deborah Paley [mailto:dpaley1@maine rr.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:06 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Deborah Paley
48 Tyng St.
Portland, ME 04102

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Paul Palla [mailto:paulpalla69@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 11:40 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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THERE IS ONLY ONE CHOICE FOR ENERGY GOING FORWARD: RENEWABLES!  EVERYTHING ELSE = DEATH!!

Paul Palla
30 Cottage St
Waynesboro, PA 17268

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Michelle Palladine [mailto:mpalladine@earthlink net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 3:54 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Michelle Palladine
471 E Tahquitz Canyon Way
Ste 204
Palm Springs, CA 92262

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Michelle Palladine [mailto:mpalladine@earthlink net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:06 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Michelle Palladine
471 E Tahquitz Canyon
Palm Springs, CA 92262

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Carol Palmer [mailto:carol_p@charter net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:39 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Carol Palmer
1817 Inglewood Dr.
Medford, OR 97504

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Matthew Palmer [mailto mattpalm@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Matthew Palmer
5209 E Peabody St
Long Beach, CA 90808

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Matthew Palmer [mailto mattpalm@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:53 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Matthew Palmer
5209 E Peabody St
Long Beach, CA 90808

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Harold Panciera [mailto:hpanc@att net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:50 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Harold Panciera
17 West St
Middletown, CT 06457

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jeffrey Panciera [mailto:jeffiejimmie@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:25 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Jeffrey Panciera
3636 S. Orcas St., Seattle, WA, 98118
Seattle, WA 98118

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ruth and Sam Panella [mailto:KennedyPanella@comcast net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 5:11 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Ruth and Sam Panella
2317 Woodland Lane
2317 Woodland Lane
Wilmington, DE 19810

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Carol Panfilio [mailto:madyapan@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:19 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Carol Panfilio
P O Box 2552
Vancouver, WA 98668

## Consent-Based Siting

From: David Pantalone [mailto:david.pantalone@verizon net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 2:45 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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I have read and also support all of the above pre-written comments. We need an abrupt change in previous policy towards nuclear power and need to abandon the idea that continuation of nuclear power generation is a necessary bridge to renewable resources. We must shift to renewable resources (non fossil and non nuclear) immediately together with efficiency standards and load reduction. The discomfort and disruption that such an abrupt change would cause is the price of survival. For the sake of my children and grandchildren (who cannot yet speak for themselves) , I would accept nothing less.

David Pantalone
19 Alton Place #1
Brookline, MA 02446

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Cassie Paoli [mailto:tua89517@temple.edu]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Cassie Paoli
731 Penn Avenue
Glenside, PA 19038

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jean and Francis Paone [mailto:thepaones@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:41 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Jean and Francis Paone
8323 Warren Vista Ave
Yucca Valley, CA 92284

## Consent-Based Siting

From: john papandrea [mailto:jpap100@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:52 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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john papandrea
110 west 90 street
new york, NY 10024

## Consent-Based Siting

From: john papandrea [mailto:jpap100@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 8:04 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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john papandrea
110 west 90 street
new york, NY 10024

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Cynthia Papermaster [mailto:cynthia_papermaster@yahoo.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 1:29 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Cynthia Papermaster
1907 McGee
1907 McGee Ave.
Berkeley, CA 94703

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Richard Paperno [mailto:rpaperno@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:39 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Richard Paperno
7314 Johnson Mine Rd
Somerset, CA 95684

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dolores Parra [mailto:herreralavin@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:54 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Dolores Parra
3019 Banyan Hill LN
Land O Lakes, FL 34639

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From: Marco Pardi [mailto:MPardi@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:51 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Marco Pardi
2195 Sandown Court
Lawrenceville, GA 30043

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Marco Pardi [mailto:MPardi@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:10 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Marco Pardi
2195 Sandown Court
Lawrenceville, GA 30043

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Julie Parisi [mailto:juliepkirby@earthlink.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 5:24 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Julie Parisi
36 Purdy Hollow Road
...
Woodstock, NY 12498

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Micah Parkin [mailto micahparkin@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:23 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Micah Parkin
2861 Ellison Pl.
Boulder, CO 80304

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dave Parrish [mailto:info@operationsavetheearth.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:28 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Dave Parrish
12410 W Westgate Dr
Phoenix, AZ 85375

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Adina Parsley [mailto:dickandpat3@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:36 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Adina Parsley
20420 Marine Dr, Apt P2
Stanwood, WA 98292

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Adina Parsley [mailto:dickandpat3@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 6:48 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Adina Parsley
20420 Marine Dr, Apt P2
Stanwood, WA 98292

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ronald Partridge [mailto:raturon@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:53 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Ronald Partridge
6490 Twin Circle Lane # 3
Simi Valley, CA 93063

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Richard Patenaude [mailto:patnod@mac.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:00 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Richard Patenaude
3007 Woodroe Ct.
Hayward, CA 94541

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jane Patrick [mailto:thomas2765us@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:15 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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Jane Patrick
2765 US Rt 42E, Cedarville, OH
Cedarville, OH 45314

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lewis Patrie [mailto:patrie.wncpsr@main nc.us]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 2:50 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: We Oppose DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Lewis Patrie
26 Wesley Drive, Apt H
Asheville, NC 28803

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Elizabeth Patten [mailto:tubby5759@comcast net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 6:42 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Elizabeth Patten
65 Staniels Rd
65 Staniels Rd
Chichester, NH 03258

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Alisha Patterson [mailto:rebeccap@voxcomp.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:20 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Alisha Patterson
309 E Sunset Ct.
Madison, WI 53705

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lynda Pauling [mailto:lmp5812@comcast.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:52 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Lynda Pauling
5812 Olene Ave N
5812 Olene Ave N
Oak Park Heights, MN 55082

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Thomas Paulson [mailto:tomwp577@yahoo.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 3:54 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Thomas Paulson
719 Normandie Drive
not applicable
Norman, OK 73072

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Wojciech Pawlik [mailto mr.voytek.pavlik@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:26 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Wojciech Pawlik
286
Lewisham High Street
London, ot se136jz

## Consent-Based Siting

From: P. A. Paye [mailto:timihu@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:43 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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P. A. Paye
234 S. Main St., Apt 1
Newbury, VT 05051

## Consent-Based Siting

From: P. A. Paye [mailto:timihu@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 8:51 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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P. A. Paye
234 S. Main St., Apt 1
Newbury, VT 05051

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Grace Payne [mailto:Gpay13@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 10:25 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Grace Payne
2401 Winsted La #1
Austin, TX 78703

## Consent-Based Siting

From: J Pearlman [mailto:Rozescantina@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:08 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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J Pearlman
513 Mohawk Rd.
West Hempstead, NY 11552

## Consent-Based Siting

From: tia pearson [mailto:tia.pearson@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 6:48 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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tia pearson
po box 861697
wahiawa, HI 96786

## Consent-Based Siting

From: rae pearson [mailto rpse@comcast.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:40 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

rae pearson
5527  36th NE
no
Seattle, WA 98105

## Consent-Based Siting

From: tia pearson [mailto:tia.pearson@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 5:48 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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tia pearson
po box 861697
wahiawa, HI 96786

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Eileen Pech [mailto:Pechshadow@aol.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 5:49 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Eileen Pech
3100 Clinton Avenue
Berwyn, IL 60402

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Karin Peck [mailto:atze@comcast net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:04 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Karin Peck
6401 Coyle Ave
Carmichael, CA 95608

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Patrick & Margaret PECORARO [mailto:margaretspiano@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:54 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Patrick & Margaret PECORARO
8552 East Calle Bolivsr
Not Applicable
Tucson, AZ 85715

## Consent-Based Siting

From: andrew Esa pederson [mailto:soundharma@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:59 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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andrew Esa pederson
75 park rd.
fairfax, CA 94930

## Consent-Based Siting

From: margaret Peeples [mailto:peeplesmargaret@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:01 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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margaret Peeples
838 heather lane
charlotte, NC 28209

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Leslie Peet [mailto:lapeet@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 11:58 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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Leslie Peet
4 Carlisle on Duxbury
Rolling Meadows, IL 60008

## Consent-Based Siting

From: susan peirce [mailto:speirce@prodigy.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 7:06 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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susan peirce
143 Eagle Feather Way
Lyons, CO 80540

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Christopher Pelham [mailto:cpelham@mindspring.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:49 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Christopher Pelham
150 E 7th St #C7
NEW YORK, NY 10009

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Greg Pelham [mailto:gdpelham@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:26 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Greg Pelham
661 24th St
C1036
San Leon, TX 77539

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Anne Peniazek [mailto:annecp44@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:56 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Anne Peniazek
1640 Oakwood Dr.
Narberth, PA 19072

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Anne Peniazek [mailto:annecp44@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:02 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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1640 Oakwood Dr.
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## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sarah Jane Penn [mailto:pennjanie@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 5:05 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

I do not consent to future nuclear waste production, nor do I agree to a future for the nuclear energy in this country. Nuclear waste is simply too dangerous to produce, to transport and to store for the very very long term. We need to consider our children's children's children and all the creatures we share the earth with. I do not agree that a nuclear waste producing world is safe for people or animals, and I think events have born out the logic of this position.

Sarah Jane Penn
15 Bemis Rd #3
Wellesley, MA 02481

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Susan Perez [mailto:bianing@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:32 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

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Susan Perez
497 Monterey Blvd
San Francisco, CA 94602

## Consent-Based Siting

From: andy peri [mailto:andyperi@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:41 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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andy peri
xx
Fairfax, CA 94930

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jana Perinchief [mailto:janasg@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:45 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Jana Perinchief
3330 Arbor Way
Sacramento, CA 95821

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jana Perinchief [mailto:janasg@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:08 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Jana Perinchief
3330 Arbor Way
Sacramento, CA 95821

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Louise Perini [mailto:lep56078@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:34 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Louise Perini
5201 Bradwood Street
Springfield, VA 22151

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jean Perkins [mailto:jean_perkins@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:53 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Jean Perkins
582 Parker Head Rd
Phippsburg, ME 04562

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jean Perkins [mailto:jean_perkins@yahoo.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 8:07 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Jean Perkins
582 Parker Head Rd
Phippsburg, ME 04562

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kathryn Perkins [mailto:kathy@trulycool.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 10:26 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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Kathryn Perkins
10 Albin St. #1
#1
Concord, NH 03301

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Martha D. Perlmutter [mailto mdp225@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 7:33 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Martha D. Perlmutter
119 Bellows Lane
New City, NY 10956

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Martin Perna [mailto:ocotesoul@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:21 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Martin Perna
919 S Atherton St
State College, TX 16801

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Claire Perricelli [mailto:ceperr@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:58 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Claire Perricelli
2259 16th
Eureka, CA 95501

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Theresa Perry [mailto:theresaperry@ca rr.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:46 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Theresa Perry
91040 Sunalnd Bl
Sunland, CA 91040

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Randall Perry [mailto rgp@systame net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 4:01 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Randall Perry
841 George St
Sebastian, FL 32958

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joy Perry [mailto:jperry4736@sbcglobal net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:08 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Joy Perry
7046 Fairdale Ave.
Dallas, TX 75227

## Consent-Based Siting

From: William Persky [mailto:mp.64@comcast.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:46 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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William Persky
2528 Fir St. SE
Olympia, WA 98501

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Laura J. Peskin [mailto:laurajpeskin@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:33 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Laura J. Peskin
348 Richbell Road
Mamaroneck, NY 10543

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Laura J. Peskin [mailto:laurajpeskin@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:05 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Laura J. Peskin
348 Richbell Road
Mamaroneck, NY 10543

## Consent-Based Siting

From: ilana pestcoe [mailto:epestcoe@vmh.org]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:22 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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ilana pestcoe
501 s main
viroqua, WI 54631

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Robert petermann [mailto:bwpetermann@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:21 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Robert petermann
12029 highland road
Elk River, MN 55330

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Amy Peters [mailto:stringrrl1@verizon net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 2:01 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Amy Peters
45 Harwood Drive East
Glen Cove, NY 11542

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Gene and Dori Peters [mailto:petersgene@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 11:20 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

We do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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Thank you.

Peace!

Gene and Dori Peters
10149 W. Loma Blanca Drive
Sun City, AZ 85351

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Diane Peterson [mailto:Birch7@comcast.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:33 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Thank you, Secretary Moniz:

I am thankful for your service to our country through your work at DOE. America relies on civil servants, such as yourself, to protect our country and to make sure our government functions well for all of us. I respect your role and ask you to fairly consider my comments about the DOE consent-based siting initiative.

This consent-based siting initiative by DOE has no basis in policy or the public interest. It is biased in favor of the radioactive waste industries. DOE lacks regulatory authority on this particular siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste.

I object to this consent-based siting initiative. I object to the mass transportation of nuclear waste to siting depositories.

I desire better-thought-out solutions to America's need to manage and isolate radioactive materials.

Sincerely yours,

Diane J. Peterson

Diane Peterson
4051 Gisella Boulevard
White Bear Lake, MN 55110

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Allan Peterson [mailto:allanpeterson@opendoor.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:40 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.
We have no business using nuclear until we have a solution to the waste.
The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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Nuclear is the most dangerous way to boil water we have ever devised.

Allan Peterson
5397 Soundside Drive
Ashland, OR 97520

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Davin Peterson [mailto:davinsemail@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:52 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Davin Peterson
2846 Lowell Street
Eureka, CA 95501

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Karen Peterson [mailto:karenp735@tt net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:27 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Karen Peterson
735 York Ct.
Northbrook, IL 60062

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Nancy Peterson [mailto:nancy@baymoon.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:07 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Nancy Peterson
229 Sherman Drive
Scotts Valley, CA 95066

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Paulette Peterson [mailto:paulettemark11@msn.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 9:58 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Paulette Peterson
55 East 2 Street
Apt 3
New York, NY 10003

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Richard Peterson [mailto:cornytunes@tt net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:26 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

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Richard Peterson
735 YorkCt.
N, IL 60062

## Consent-Based Siting

From: John Petroni [mailto:johncpetroni@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:39 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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John Petroni
823 Lexington Ave
El Cerrito, CA 94530

## Consent-Based Siting

From: John Petroni [mailto:johncpetroni@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:07 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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John Petroni
823 Lexington Ave
El Cerrito, CA 94530

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Carolyn Pettis [mailto:ecokare2@yahoo.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 2:40 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Carolyn Pettis
28625 Winterdale Drive
Santa Clarita, CA 91387

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Nezka Pfeifer [mailto nezkap@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Nezka Pfeifer
303 Lakewood Manor
Scranton, PA 18505

## Consent-Based Siting

From: James Pfitzner [mailto:jimpfit@optonline.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:08 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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James Pfitzner
19 Scott Lane
Lagrangeville, NY 12540

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Terry Phelan [mailto:terandpatphelan@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

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Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

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Terry Phelan
63 McCarty Ave
Albany, NY 12202

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Elaine Phelps [mailto:efphelps@earthlink.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:10 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

There is one - and only one by definition - BEST WAY to deal with nuclear waste, and that is to STOP CREATING NUCLEAR WASTE.

The nuclear power industry must first be held accountable - financially and technologically - for the safe, long-term storage of already existing nuclear waste. It must pay for the research and development of the proper storage of these cancer-causing wastes.

We were once told by the industry that nuclear power would be so cheap to produce, that it would not have to be metered. That turned out to be totally false.

The nuclear power profit-makers have so far passed along to the taxpayers much of their costs by deliberately failing to create the essential storage for nuclear waste. They are not entitled to continue to suck at the public teat for their private profit.

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.

- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

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Elaine Phelps
17238 10th NW

Shoreline, WA 98177

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Walter Phelps [mailto:walterephelps@comcast net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:19 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Walter Phelps
120 Lorraine Court
120 Lorraine Court, Vacaville 95688
Vacaville, CA 95688

## Consent-Based Siting

From: jimmy phi [mailto:jpsf99@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:05 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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jimmy phi
po box 424992
san francisco, CA 94142

## Consent-Based Siting

From: pati philbrook [mailto:pstrouss@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:30 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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pati philbrook
1937 Prairie Circle
1937 prairie circle
Fairfield, IA 52556

## Consent-Based Siting

From: pati philbrook [mailto:pstrouss@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:15 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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pati philbrook
1937 Prairie Circle
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Fairfield, IA 52556

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Janice Phillips [mailto:janp931@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:47 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Janice Phillips
5380 Brittainywood Road
Kernersville, NC 27284

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Clifford Phillips` [mailto:cliff119@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 3:13 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Clifford Phillips`
176 Main Street
Northfield, MA 01360

## Consent-Based Siting

From: George Phillips [mailto:nctrack@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:04 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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George Phillips
124 Fidelity St, Apt 36
Carrboro, NC 27510

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Glenn Phillips [mailto:glennmphillips@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:09 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Glenn Phillips
1711 23rd  Ave S Apt217
Seattle, WA 98144

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joe Phillips [mailto:joephil282@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 9:33 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Joe Phillips
P. O. Box 282
Colfax, NC 27235

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Regina Phillips [mailto regine.phillips@sbcglobal net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 3:09 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Regina Phillips
20134 Leadwell st
winnetka, CA 91306

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ruby Phillips [mailto:rubydoobe@gmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 12:12 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Ruby Phillips
PO Box 23117
Seattle, WA 98102

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Gloria Picchetti [mailto:picchetti707@sbcglobal net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:30 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

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Gloria Picchetti
3920 N Clark
apt 312
Chicago, IL 60613

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Natalie Pien [mailto:natcpien@verizon net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:57 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Natalie Pien
20644 Gleedsville Rd
Leesburg, VA 20175

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Tara Pike [mailto:tarapike nordstrom@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:23 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Tara Pike
3856 Alice Lane
Las Vegas, NV 89103

From: Cynthia Pileggi [mailto:cynpileggi@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:50 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Cynthia Pileggi
864 CR 132
864 CR 132
Guffey, CO 80820

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sherry Pimsler [mailto:sherrypimsler@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:28 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Sherry Pimsler
21462 Bonita Terr
Monte Rio, CA 95462

## Consent-Based Siting

From: John de Clef Piñeiro, Esq. [mailto:inyuan@nyc rr.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:09 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
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John de Clef Piñeiro, Esq.
110 West 90th Street  Unit 5-J
New York, NY 10024

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Meryl Pinque [mailto:merylpinque@yahoo fr]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 4:38 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Meryl Pinque
Odlin Rd
Bangor, ME 04401

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Juliann Pinto [mailto:julianne.pinto@comcast net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:50 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Juliann Pinto
4438 Pennypack Street
Philadelphia, PA 19136

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Annette Pirrone [mailto:pirronecenter@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:28 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Annette Pirrone
1628 San Anselmo Ave.
San Anselmo, CA 94960

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Annette Pirrone [mailto:pirronecenter@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 1:47 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Annette Pirrone
1628 San Anselmo Ave.
San Anselmo, CA 94960

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Brent Pitcher [mailto:brent@crocker.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:43 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Brent Pitcher
11 Greenfield Rd
Turners Falls, MA 01376

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mariann Pittman [mailto mariann.pittman@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:53 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Mariann Pittman
471 Ridgeland Ave
Valparaiso, IN 46385

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Leon Pivinski [mailto:carry53@aol.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:24 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Leon Pivinski
1737 E Lake Park Ln
Mustang, OK 73064

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Cynthia Plockelman [mailto:CPlockelman@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:37 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Cynthia Plockelman
311 Franklin Rd.
311 Franklin Rd.
West Palm Beach, FL 33405

## Consent-Based Siting

From: James Ploger [mailto:jploger@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 10:56 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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James Ploger
1909 S Charles St
1909 S Charles St
Seattle, WA 98144

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Pat Poggi [mailto:Poggisworld@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:30 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Pat Poggi
1744 s humboldt st
Denver, CO 80210

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Pat Poggi [mailto:Poggisworld@aol.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 8:37 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Pat Poggi
1744 s humboldt st
Denver, CO 80210

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Barbara Pohl [mailto:mensan13@rcn.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:01 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation. We know those in charge of the power generation will put profits before public safety and this conflict of interest means they should have no say in the matter.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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Barbara Pohl
Melrose St
Chicago, IL 60618

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Carolyn Poinelli [mailto:gingkolady@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:25 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Carolyn Poinelli
36 Prince St #12
Boston, MA 02113

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Carolyn Poinelli [mailto:gingkolady@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:23 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Carolyn Poinelli
36 Prince St #12
Boston, MA 02113

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Greg Polchow [mailto:gpolchow@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:12 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Greg Polchow
1070 Green Street
1202
San Francisco, CA 94133

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Eric Polczynski [mailto:ericski75@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:55 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Eric Polczynski
Po Box 3483
Pagosa Springs, CO 81147

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Eric Polczynski [mailto:ericski75@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:07 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Eric Polczynski
Po Box 3483
Pagosa Springs, CO 81147

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Hollis Polk [mailto:Hollis@888-4-hollis.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:36 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Hollis Polk
POB 265
Mill Valley, CA 94942

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jeannie Pollak [mailto:jeannie22ster@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:26 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Jeannie Pollak
2672 Honeysuckle Drive
Oxnard, CA 93036

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Rebecca Pollinzi [mailto:pollinzi@tx rr.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:14 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Rebecca Pollinzi
1113 Red River
Carrollton, TX 75007

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sherry Pollock [mailto:gaiasbeloved@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:17 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Sherry Pollock
P.O. Box 30886
Anahola, HI 96703

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lance Polya [mailto:lpvt14@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:09 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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Lance Polya
46 Fields Ln.
Jericho, VT 05465

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Karen Pope [mailto:popekj@uwec.edu]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:30 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Karen Pope
4018 Tokay Blvd
Madison, WI 53711

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Donna Pope [mailto:donnapope_relo@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:02 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Donna Pope
3421 S. Carter St.  Unit F
Unit F
Tampa, FL 33629

## Consent-Based Siting

From: D.B. Pope [mailto:msdbpope@fastmail.fm]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 12:59 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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D.B. Pope
2083 Rock Spring Road
Varnville, SC 29944

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jeff Popp [mailto:jffpopp@yahoo.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 9:36 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Jeff Popp
1781 William Dr.
Romeoville, IL 60446

From: Joel Porter [mailto:joelypozole@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:20 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Joel Porter
1215 NE 63rd Ave
PORTLAND, OR 97213

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Susan Porter [mailto:susansporter@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:53 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Susan Porter
1870 Newport Ave
Pasadena, CA 91103

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Susan Porter [mailto:susansporter@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:07 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Susan Porter
1870 Newport Ave
Pasadena, CA 91103

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Susan Porter [mailto:howsue@ptd.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:11 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Susan Porter
2134 Hemlock Farms
Lords Valley, PA 18428

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kathleen Porter-DeStefano [mailto free7peace@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:36 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Kathleen Porter-DeStefano
PO Box 379
Centerport, NY 11721

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kathleen Porter-DeStefano [mailto free7peace@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 6:56 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Kathleen Porter-DeStefano
PO Box 379
Centerport, NY 11721

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From: Nancy Porter-Steele [mailto nancy.porter.steele@logosynthesis.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:33 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Nancy Porter-Steele
6095 Coburg Road #706
Halifax, N.S. B3H 4K1, CA 92020

## Consent-Based Siting

From: debra poscharscky [mailto:debforevers@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:24 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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debra poscharscky
16005 east burnside street
portland, OR 97233

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Fran Post [mailto:franpost254@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:58 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

My comments are neither more informed nor more succinct than those if the NIRS, below. Nevertheless the NIRS states my concerns incredibly well!

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Fran Post
254 Woodland Ave
Port Townsend, WA 98368

## Consent-Based Siting

From: David Potocnik [mailto:davidpoto@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 8:57 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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David Potocnik
Bldg. 1554 Box 117
2-4 GSAB
Fort Carson, CO 80913

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Graee Potorti [mailto:Gracepotorti@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 12:27 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Graee Potorti
9505 black bear dr
Reno, NV 89506

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Michael Potter [mailto mpotter@edenfoods.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:05 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Michael Potter
701 Tecumseh Rd.
101 N. Main St. #903
Clinton, MI 49236

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Rick Potthoff [mailto:poeducker@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:56 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Rick Potthoff
1814 Pine Village Dr.
Houston, TX 77080

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Rick Potthoff [mailto:poeducker@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:05 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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## Consent-Based Siting

From: Judi Poulson [mailto:judpeace@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:28 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Judi Poulson
1881 Knollwood Dr
Fairmont, MN 56031

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Judi Poulson [mailto:judpeace@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:05 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Judi Poulson
1881 Knollwood Dr
Fairmont, MN 56031

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jim Pounds [mailto:vpmdus@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:03 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Why you idiots ever let nuclear power proliferate is beyond me. Nuclear power should be eliminated as an energy source within 4 years. The tragedy is the waste. Japan's failure of leadership should not be our curse. The U.S. waste should be buried in the state with the most members working for the Department of Energy. West Virginia? Mississippi?

Jim Pounds
2540 38th Ave. NE #402
St. Anthony, MN 55421

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jim Pounds [mailto:vpmdus@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 6:46 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Jim Pounds
2540 38th Ave. NE #402
St. Anthony, MN 55421

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Christine Powell [mailto:krisztin@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Christine Powell
23701 Eli Lane
Gaithersburg, MD 20882

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Hank Prensky [mailto:Hank@TakomaHomes.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:05 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Hank Prensky
7921 Sligo Creek Parkway
7921 Sligo Creek Parkway
Takoma Park, MD 20912

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Suzanne Prescott [mailto:suz.prescott@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:14 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Suzanne Prescott
Pob 7092
87194
Albuquerque, NM 87194

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Michael Presley [mailto:mike.presley@charter net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:38 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Michael Presley
110 Lake Meadows
Rockwall, TX 75087

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ansula Press [mailto:ansula@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:36 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Ansula Press
5533 NE 30th Ave.
Portland, OR 97211

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Carolyn Pressley [mailto:carolynpressley@gmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 6:50 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The US is not yet able to manage nuclear fuel responsibly. Asking citizen's to say that the DOE is doing just fine is insane.

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Carolyn Pressley
64 A Front Street
Belfast, ME 04915

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lynne Preston [mailto:bluelynne@sbcglobal net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:02 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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Lynne Preston
638 Rhode Island St.
San Francisco, CA 94107

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Carl Pribanic [mailto:cpribanic@verizon net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Carl Pribanic
7013 Caldwell Ln
Plano, TX 75025

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Elisabeth Price [mailto:ejprice@zianet.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 11:56 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Elisabeth Price
2809 Carolina NE
Albuquerque, NM 87110

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mary Price [mailto:pricegirl3@cimtel.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 10:52 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Mary Price
2501 East Leroy Road
Cleveland, OK 74020

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Boris Price [mailto:priceboris@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:26 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

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- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

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Boris Price
516 Oak St..
San Francisco, CA 94102

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Randal Pride [mailto randalpride@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 7:29 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Randal Pride
365 Royal Pines Drive
Arden, NC 28704

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Randal Pride [mailto randalpride@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:56 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Randal Pride
365 Royal Pines Drive
Arden, NC 28704

## Consent-Based Siting

From: jovita prinz [mailto:jprincees@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 4:51 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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jovita prinz
alba 16
alba16
LAS PALMAS, AL 35007

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Johni Prinz [mailto:comfixxifmoc@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:47 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Johni Prinz
1130 Fairwood Dr SW
Ocean Shores, WA 98569

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kathy Priola [mailto:kjpriola@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:16 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Kathy Priola
528 E Alameda
SANTA FE, NM 87501

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From: Kathy Priola [mailto:kjpriola@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:57 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Kathy Priola
528 E Alameda
SANTA FE, NM 87501

## Consent-Based Siting

From: tracey pritchett [mailto:tarakaprema@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:11 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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tracey pritchett
old redwood hwy
Santa Rosa, CA 95402

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joshua Pritikin [mailto:jpritikin@pobox.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:34 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Joshua Pritikin
1000 Ridge St
Charlottesville, VA 22902

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Micaela Pronio [mailto:granatu@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 2:45 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Micaela Pronio
770 Alcatraz
770 Alcatraz
Oakland, CA 94609

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Micaela Pronio [mailto:granatu@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:24 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Micaela Pronio
770 Alcatraz
770 Alcatraz
Oakland, CA 94609

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Linda Prostko [mailto:lprostko@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 11:05 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Linda Prostko
PO Box 54
Caledonia, MI 49316

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Anne ProudFire [mailto:anne.bettysdaughter@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:36 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Anne ProudFire
658 Seward St.
Rochester, NY 14611

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Clifford Provost [mailto:provost-draper@earthlink.net]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 9:50 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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Clifford Provost
140 7th Avenue, Apt 1B
New York, NY 10011

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Nicholas Prychodko [mailto:prychdk@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:42 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Nicholas Prychodko
PO Box 2138
Bridgehampton, NY 11932

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Nicholas Prychodko [mailto:prychdk@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:38 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Bridgehampton, NY 11932

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Carol Pucakc [mailto:cpucak@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:45 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Carol Pucakc
0478 Stagecoach Lane
Carbondale, CO 81623

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Carol Pucakc [mailto:cpucak@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:56 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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0478 Stagecoach Lane
Carbondale, CO 81623

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Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:42 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Patricia Purcell
5435Clark Rd
#44
Paradise, CA 95969

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Shane Pyles [mailto:littleslip@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:04 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Shane Pyles
2301 Tremont St.
E. Lansdowne, PA 19050

From: Karen Quail [mailto:karenquail@att.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 11:31 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Karen Quail
1050 Lake Blvd
Davis, CA 95616

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joseph Quirk [mailto:jq66@earthlink.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:40 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Joseph Quirk
147 Avenue A #2R
New York, NY 10009

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joyce Raby [mailto:ttj2@verizon net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 6:50 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Joyce Raby
5624 Murdock Ave.
Sarasota, FL 34231

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Rita Raftery [mailto:gildastone9999@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:59 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Rita Raftery
99 Hobart St
Ridgefield Park, NJ 07660

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Rita Raftery [mailto:gildastone9999@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 6:25 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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Rita Raftery
99 Hobart St
Ridgefield Park, NJ 07660

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Patricia Rain [mailto rain@vanillaqueen.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:38 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them. I personally believe that nuclear power is simply too dangerous. Yes, it may be clean power but there are a lot of things that go wrong and we have see that occur with very serious consequences.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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Patricia Rain
1555 Merrill St Space 17
Santa Cruz, CA 96062

## Consent-Based Siting

From: ChanTlalok Rain [mailto:castrorain85@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:07 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

ChanTlalok Rain
1406 W. Del Mar St.
Edinburg, TX 78541

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Linda Raiteri [mailto:lraiteri@bellsouth net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 10:54 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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Linda Raiteri
3817 Allandale
Memphis, TN 38111

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Carmen Ramirez [mailto:cmvramirez@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:29 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Carmen Ramirez
2221 Shangri La Lane
Tallahassee, FL 32303

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Carmen Ramirez [mailto:cmvramirez@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:34 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Carmen Ramirez
2221 Shangri La Lane
Tallahassee, FL 32303

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Bob Ramlow [mailto:artha@wi-net.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:23 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Bob Ramlow
9784 County Rd K
Amherst, WI 54406

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Miguel Ramos [mailto mantecax@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:28 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Miguel Ramos
4663 fremont st
Bellingham, WA 98229

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Miguel Ramos [mailto mantecax@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:38 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Bellingham, WA 98229

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Colin Ramsay [mailto:cacramsay@fastmail fm]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:01 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Colin Ramsay
253 Florence Ave
Sebastopol, CA 95472

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Maxine Ramsay [mailto:MacRamz@cableone.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:58 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

For God's sake, please do not put the vote to move nuclear waste into Mississippi, 'The Most Corrupt State in the Nation', since our blow-hard, ignorant politicians will jump at the chance if they think they or their cronies will be able to make a dollar!

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Maxine Ramsay
Maxine W. Ramsay
13001 Pulpwood Road
Ocean Springs, MS, MS 39565

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Walter Ramsey [mailto:walter.ramsey@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:38 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Walter Ramsey
4165 Cherry Court
Oakley, CA 94561

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mary Randall [mailto:heartrockmr@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 7:37 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Mary Randall
PO Box 20871
Boulder, CO 80308

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sandra Rando [mailto:sandyrando@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 6:49 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Sandra Rando
2151 185th St
Fairfield, IA 52556

## Consent-Based Siting

From: David Ransom [mailto:spoons@sover.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:34 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

Look, my family did professional research on nuclear waste many decades ago. YOU promote nuclear waste and escalation, at today's level of scientific understanding, only at the peril of the entire world. "Knock it off!" - pardon me, but your resistance is urgent! I know how lawyers line the committee rooms and buck out the ones who know something!
The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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David Ransom
221 Shipman Road
221 Shipman Road
Waterville, VT 05492

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From: David Ransom [mailto:spoons@sover net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:27 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

David Ransom
221 Shipman Road
221 Shipman Road
Waterville, VT 05492

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Karen Rarick [mailto:kjrarick@ix.netcom.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:50 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

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Karen Rarick
1173 Old State Rd 46
1173 Old
NASHVILLE, IN 47448

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sandy Rasich [mailto:dancersandy@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:09 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Sandy Rasich
2300 W Alameda St
Santa Fe, NM 87507

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sandy Rasich [mailto:dancersandy@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:11 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Sandy Rasich
2300 W Alameda St
Santa Fe, NM 87507

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dave Ratcliffe [mailto:dave@ratical.org]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:26 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The DOE's consent-based siting initiative puts the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect the health of all living systems on Earth. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Dave Ratcliffe
45 Bexley Road
Roslindale, MA 02131

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ron Rattner [mailto:ronrattner@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:07 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Ron Rattner
1998 Broadway #1204
Enter your address line 2 here
San Franciso, CA 94109

## Consent-Based Siting

From: robert Raven [mailto robraven60@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 4:51 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Siting public comment

First, Stop Making More Nuclear Waste ASAP!
Close Nuclear Power and DOD Reactors! Clean Up!
Protect the People from Nuclear Accidents, Terrorism!
Ban Transportation of Nuclear Wastes on Roads, Rail, Ship!
Nuclear Wastes should be Secured On Site in solid Bunkers!
Plutonium and Uranium should be Degraded to Low Levels!
Encourage Solar and Wind Power for US Gov and Nation!

I support the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future's recommendation to implement an explicitly adaptive, staged and consent-based approach to nuclear waste disposal. And I welcome the opportunity provided by the U.S. Department of Energy to submit comments on the agency's nascent effort to design a consent-based siting process.

Achieving consent-based siting, if done right, could lay the foundation for a fair and just process for siting a nuclear waste management facility that will well position the federal government – after decades of failure – to meet its nuclear waste management commitments and begin to restore the loss of trust and confidence in its ability to find a viable and permanent solution to our waste crisis.

I support and urge the DOE to apply the following 10 Criteria for Community Consent:

1) Informed - Communities must know what they are consenting to at each stage of the process. Early and often public engagement activities should offer the public, community leaders, experts and agency representatives frequent opportunities to exchange information. Information must be accessible and offered through a variety of platforms. The full range of cost and risks associated with the project must be disclosed and verified, as well as alternatives being considered. Achieving informed consent is not an end, but an ongoing exercise that responds to new information and findings as well as new generations.

2) Inclusive - Consent should be granted by those most impacted, including states, tribes and communities. A broad range of state, tribal and local stakeholders should be included in the decision-making process, and efforts must be made to increase the number of community members who recognize themselves and their communities as stakeholders in the siting process. People and entities that would financially benefit from the siting process should be clearly disclosed.

3) Collaborative - Consent can't be achieved through a top-down process. Activities related to outreach, engagement and education must be planned in coordination with appropriate stakeholders. Any agreements or decision-making must result from mutual input and understanding, and must be responsive to the concerns of

citizens.

4) Just - Consent should not be bought. Financial compensation and other incentives must be reasonable, not used as coercion, and negotiated with full public disclosure.

5) Transparent - Consent must be pursued through an open process. Consent can be achieved and maintained through trust. Open access to information includes disclosure of funding and any conflicts of interest with the sources of information. All meetings, hearings and communications must be open to the public and on record.

6) Legitimate - A consent-based siting process must not just be the policy of the Department of Energy, but the law of the land.

7) Balanced- Consent will require sharing of power among federal executive and legislative branches, and state and local governments and communities. Negotiating and decision-making power must be shared among affected federal, state and local entities, including those in the transportation sector. States also should be granted some authority over regulation of the facility.

8) Flexible - Consent can be withdrawn. The consent-based siting process must provide ample opportunity and defined moments to correct course or completely withdrawal from the siting process.

9) Contractual - States, tribes and communities must have clear recourse if the terms of consent are breached.

10) Tailored – The consent process must be responsive to each situation. While these common elements should be applied to any consent-based process, any approach must be tailored to the specific, unique needs of the particular state, tribe and communities where a waste dump is being considered.

Thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,

robert Raven

94945

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Marilyn Ray [mailto:mlr17@cornell.edu]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:43 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Marilyn Ray
96 Besemer Road
Ithaca, NY 14850

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Edy Rayfield [mailto:edyrayfield@sbcglobal net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:48 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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Edy Rayfield
P.O.Box
P.O.Box
Davenport, CA 95017

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jeanne Raymond [mailto:Raymondj@peak.org]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 5:36 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

I say NO to nuclear power and waste.
The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be

transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Jeanne Raymond
3430 NW Elmwood Dr
3430 NW Elmwood Dr
Corvallis, OR 97330

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Timothy Raymond [mailto:raymont@cityofrochester.gov]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:44 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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Timothy Raymond
45-1/2 Marshall St
Rochester, NY 14607

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Patricia Raynor [mailto:patriraynor@gmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 2:32 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Patricia Raynor
11739 Ledura Ct. #201
Reston VA
Reston, VA 20191

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Deborah Reade [mailto:reade@nets.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:46 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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Deborah Reade
117 Duran St
Santa Fe, NM 87501

## Consent-Based Siting

From: sandy reavey [mailto:healthwealth@q.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:38 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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sandy reavey
7476 E Arkansas Av
unit 3702
Denver, CO 80231

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mark Reback [mailto mark@consumerwatchdog.org]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:51 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Mark Reback
1606 N. Avenue 55
Los Angeles, CA 90042

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mark Reback [mailto mark@consumerwatchdog.org]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:13 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Los Angeles, CA 90042

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Stephen Rebello [mailto:stephen rebello2020@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:29 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Stephen Rebello
W 9th Street
Los Angeles, CA 90019

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Michaela Redden [mailto:michaela@computerguru.org]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:21 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Michaela Redden
8 Fraesco Lane
Norwood, NJ 07648

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Rick Redfield [mailto:redfieldrh@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:35 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Rick Redfield
2032 Lake Ave
Wilmette, IL 60091

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Maryellen Redish [mailto:mredish@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:10 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Maryellen Redish
671 S.  Riverside Dr. #6
671 S. Riverside Dr. #6
Palm Springs, CA 92264

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Robert Reed [mailto:robtsreed@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:21 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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Robert Reed
16635 Alviso Ct
Lake Elsinore, CA 92530

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Michele Reed [mailto:mreed819@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:55 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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I do not consent to have nuclear waste in my community.  I have personally seen victims of Fukishima.  The toll of nuclear waste is vast and irrevokable.  It poisons all within it's purview.  After many years of creating nuclear energy throughout the world, there is still no safe way to dispose of the waste.  Storing the spent casks in the ocean destroys ocean life.  Piling them on trucks to be driven through multiple communities where they can be subject to any type of traffic accident is nothing short of a nightmare waiting to happen.  You must think of the long-term consequences before developing a plan.  The citizenry is counting on you.

I DO NOT WANT IT IN MY COMMUNITY!  I have children and hope to have grandchildren someday.  Do not destroy my community and everything in it.  We do not need nuclear energy.  We need to invest in solar and wind power, which are much safer.

Michele Reed
P.O. Box 157
P.O. Box 157
Templeton, CA 93465

From: Robert Reed [mailto:robtsreed@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:49 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Robert Reed
16635 Alviso Ct
Lake Elsinore, CA 92530

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jennifer Reed [mailto:ajreed@jeffnet.org]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:54 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

Nuclear waste is not benign. It is the result of a reckless and dangerous mainstreaming of an energy that should be eliminated, not further normalized.

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Jennifer Reed
390 Taylor St.
Ashland, OR 97520

## Consent-Based Siting

From: joy Reese [mailto:jr4peace@earthlink.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 3:18 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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joy Reese
339 w barry ave. 16c
339 west barry ave. l6c
chicago, IL 60657

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lenore Reeves [mailto:lerves@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:25 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Lenore Reeves
19934 Hickory Stick Ln
Mokena, IL 60448

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ella Reeves [mailto:eilat@wildmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:34 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Ella Reeves
1129 167 St
Vancouver, BC V2B6H7

## Consent-Based Siting

From: N Refes [mailto:maughter2@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 4:44 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

Nuclear power has no place in our growing population. It puts us all in jeopardy and there will be no escape from the horrors of radiation exposure. You can talk about "escape routes" but they will simply become huge traffic jams and people will be stuck sitting in their cars as their skin melts away.

There are many ways to provide clean renewable energy sources and we should be concentrating on implementing them.

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT

DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

N Refes
67 E 2 St
NYC, NY 10003

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Debra Rehn [mailto:BibleeoGirl@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:58 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Debra Rehn
5130 SE 30th Av. #9
#9
Portland, OR 97202

## Consent-Based Siting

From: jena reid [mailto:jena hallmark@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:14 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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jena reid
43245 corte argento
temecula, CA 92592

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Nora Reid-leZotte [mailto:nlezotte@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:51 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Nora Reid-leZotte
1814 Nichols Road
Kalamazoo, MI 49006

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Wayne Reilly [mailto:uju7@msn.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:32 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Wayne Reilly
PO Box 323
Ashland, OR 97520

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Robin Reinhart [mailto robinreinhart1@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:10 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Robin Reinhart
2626 29th st
San Diego, CA 92104

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Emil Reisman [mailto:ereisman@ca rr.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:55 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Emil Reisman
16025 Ventura Blvd., Apt. 211
Encino, CA 91436

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Tilman Reitzle [mailto:treitzle@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:08 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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Tilman Reitzle
23 Chamberlain Rd.
Scarborough, ME 04074

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ann Rennacker [mailto:annxpress@live.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:13 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Ann Rennacker
31200 Sherwood Rd
Ft Bragg, CA 95437

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dante Renzoni [mailto:silentglide@tds net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 8:55 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Dante Renzoni
W6821 Wester Ave
w6821 Wester AVe
Medford, WI 54451

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Daniel Reschke [mailto:dreschke27@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:45 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Daniel Reschke
1420 W. Glen Avenue Apt. 506
Peoria, IL 61614

## Consent-Based Siting

From: F. Carlene Reuscher [mailto:carlene-r@roadrunner.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:47 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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F. Carlene Reuscher
226 Poinsettia Ave.
Costa Mesa, CA 92626

## Consent-Based Siting

From: MR. & MRS. BRUCE REVESZ [mailto:NOGBRUTRPT@GMAIL.COM]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:46 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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MR. & MRS. BRUCE REVESZ
103 THE FAIRWAY
CEDAR GROVE, NJ 07009

## Consent-Based Siting

From: MR. & MRS. BRUCE REVESZ [mailto:NOGBRUTRPT@GMAIL.COM]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:06 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

MR. & MRS. BRUCE REVESZ
103 THE FAIRWAY
CEDAR GROVE, NJ 07009

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Oscar Revilla [mailto:e490f4ec@opayq.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 4:14 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Oscar Revilla
Juan de Herrera
San Sebastian de los Reyes, NC 28024

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Patricia Reynolds [mailto:pareynol@comcast net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:49 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Patricia Reynolds
1180 Woods Circle
Atlanta, GA 30324

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Peter Reynolds [mailto:p.j reynolds@earthlink net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:34 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Peter Reynolds
1024 Edinborough Dr
Durham, NC 27703

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kaileen Reynolds [mailto:felipuppy@sbcglobal net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 3:39 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Kaileen Reynolds
531 W. Orange Grove Rd.
Mission, TX 78574

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Adele Reynolds [mailto:adelereynolds@netscape net]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 12:01 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Adele Reynolds
900 University St., Apt CU
Seattle, WA 98101

## Consent-Based Siting

From: William Reynolds [mailto:Cisland@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:40 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public's input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program.

William Reynolds
3529 Dell  Trail
Chattanooga, TN 37411

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Thomas Reynolds [mailto:1941Train@nycap.rr.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:41 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Thomas Reynolds
66
Voorheesville, NY 12186

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Richard Rheder [mailto:rickrheder@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:07 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Richard Rheder
P.O.B. 931
WOODSTOCK, NY 12498

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Wallace Rhine [mailto fafner@bftb.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 11:30 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Wallace Rhine
22401 Fort Ross Road
Cazadero, CA, CA 95421

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sherida Ribordy [mailto:sheridar@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:56 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Sherida Ribordy
1806 Rushmore St.
Rapid City, SD 57702

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Diana Ricci [mailto:diana@realoaxaca.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:41 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Diana Ricci
1411 S. Divisadero, Visalia, Ca
Visalia, CA 93277

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Shirley Rice [mailto:scr@empacc.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:17 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Shirley Rice
3467 South Hill Road
Burdett, NY 14818

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kathryn Rice [mailto:rice.kathryn@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:23 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Kathryn Rice
24 SW 65th Street
Oklahoma City, OK 73139

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Megan Rice shcj [mailto:mrice12@gmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 1:08 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

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Megan Rice shcj
1420 W Bartlett Ave,
Nevada Desert Experience
Rye,, NY 10580

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Beverly Rice [mailto:nycbev85@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:49 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

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Beverly Rice
3 East 85 Street
NY, NY 10028

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Nancy Rice [mailto:hope247@sover net]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 11:52 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to let the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries off the hook for responsibly taking care of this very dangerous high level radioactive waste which is dangerous for many thousands of years.

The U.S. government has to protect public health and safety and the environment. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste.

I DO NOT CONSENT to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment.

The highly radioactive nuclear waste must have secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation, in hardened on-reactor-site storage (HOSS)in stainless steel casks of a thickness comparable to those used in Japan and Europe, NOT the ridiculously thin gauage of only 3/4 inch which have reportedly been known to leak. The stainless steel casks need also to be put into concrete casks which can be air-cooled for further protection.

The transporting of the highly radioactive waste across state lines on public highways or railways to new sites, thus exposing thousands of people to possible accidents, is to me unthinkably dangerous and unnecessary.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be "interim" on the scale of human

generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public's input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site.

The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

To me, your "consent-based" scheme is simply a way to absolve the nuclear industry from its responsibility to take care of the waste at the nuclear plant sites and if implemented would greatly increase the danger to the public both when the waste is transported and where these so-called "interim" storage places would be located. No one in their right mind would want this waste anywhere near their community, so "consent-based" is to me merely a fancy term for coercion.

I strongly object to "consent-based" storage of nuclear waste in interim storage places.

Our children and future generations must be protected from such irresponsible schemes. It is bad enough that they are stuck with such a Faustian bargain which they had no say about. Do not make the situation worse in this way, but instead the US government must put great effort and funding into researching how to deal with the waste where it presently is in HOSS storage as the decades go by, AND must make sure of the integrity of the storage materials and workmanship of the HOSS storage as it is used at the source of its generation. Please do imagine how this could affect your own children.

With great concern,

Nancy Rice
P. O. Box 4
Randolph Center,, VT 05061

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Pamela Richard [mailto:treeetep@peacemail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 11:42 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Pamela Richard
5422 W. Wells St.
Milwaukee, WI 53208

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Pamela Richard [mailto:treeetep@peacemail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:07 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Pamela Richard
5422 W. Wells St.
Milwaukee, WI 53208

## Consent-Based Siting

From: j. richards [mailto:jovian@grandecom.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 7:55 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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j. richards
2508 Wheless Ln
austin, TX 78723

## Consent-Based Siting

From: JAY RICHARDS [mailto:vespajayr2@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 5:56 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

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JAY RICHARDS
20801 Cross Ct
Bend, OR
Bend, OR 97701

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Paul Richey [mailto:parchey@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:52 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

I worry about nuclear threats of foolish war planners. I worry about cheap and corrupt governments who go to war for ill thought out reasons (arrogance). All these warrior nations and in spite of the NATO, SEATO and other like membered defense bodies somebody will push the button one of these days. But: I worry more about the daily contribution of nuclear materials into our neighborhood environments. In the longer run the sloppy handling of nuclear power generation will do is ill more than the hair triggered proud new nations in this world. What are we doing to deal with these conditions?

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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Paul Richey
4664 SW Fairvail Ct.
Portland, OR 97221

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sharon Richey [mailto:skrichey1@sbcglobal net]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 6:38 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Sharon Richey
4900 Vega Court West
262 Jefferson Parkway, FW 76107
Fort Worth, TX 76133

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Rosalie Richter [mailto:RozRichter@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:45 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Rosalie Richter
306 Rachel Carson Trail
Apt 4A
Ithaca, NY 14850

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Denise Rickles [mailto:deniserr@msn.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:16 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Denise Rickles
66 Overlook Terrace
new york
new York, NY 10040

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Quila Rider [mailto:act127@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 12:00 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Quila Rider
4863 Deer Valley
Lakeside, AZ 85929

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joan Rieck [mailto:joan.rieck@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:03 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Joan Rieck
4809 Todd St NE
Albuquerque, NM 87109

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joan Rieck [mailto:joan.rieck@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:15 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Joan Rieck
4809 Todd St NE
Albuquerque, NM 87109

## Consent-Based Siting

From: chris riger [mailto:criger2003@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:28 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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chris riger
72 Baker rd
shutesbury, MA 01072

## Consent-Based Siting

From: nancy riggleman [mailto:yellow93667@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:33 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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nancy riggleman
25136 tollhouse rd
Tollhouse, CA 93667

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Crystal Riggleman [mailto:sponge_122@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:34 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Crystal Riggleman
1415 Fulton Rd. Suit 205. Box418
Santa Rosa, CA 95403

## Consent-Based Siting

From: George Riggs [mailto:griggs2@optonline net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:53 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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George Riggs
269 Watch Hill Rd.
269 Watch Hill Rd.
Cortlandt Manor, NY 10567

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Garland Riggs [mailto:gtrwolvesaregood@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:48 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Garland Riggs
8603 Nightingale Dr.
Lanham, MD 20706

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joanne Rile [mailto:Joanner@rilearts.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:37 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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Joanne Rile
1474 Autumn Road
1474 Autumn Road, Ryadal, PA
Rydal, PA 19046

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sally Rings [mailto:sallyrings@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:44 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

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Sally Rings
4114 E. Mercer Lane
Phoenix, AZ 85028

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Robert Rippetoe [mailto:psroseguy@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:56 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Robert Rippetoe
71443 San Gorgonio
Rancho Mirage, CA 92270

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Douglas Risedorf [mailto:docrisedorf@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 12:29 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Douglas Risedorf
PO Box 984
Concrete, WA 98237

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Richard Rivans [mailto:richard rivans@keme.co.uk]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 9:11 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Richard Rivans
26 paget road
Colchester, ot co5 8jb

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From: Sergio Rivera [mailto meatbag21@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:15 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Sergio Rivera
3319 N Karlov Ave
Apt 3W
Chicago, IL 60641

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sergio Rivera [mailto:meatbag21@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Sergio Rivera
3319 N Karlov Ave
Apt 3W
Chicago, IL 60641

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jerry Rivers [mailto:Jerry.rivers13@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:39 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Jerry Rivers
8-Gombert Place
Roosevelt, NY 11575

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From: Christine Roane [mailto:cmroane@cool-universe.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:39 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
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Christine Roane
120 Mooreland St
Address Line 2
Springfield, MA 01104

From: Christine Roane [mailto:cmroane@cool-universe.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:48 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Christine Roane
120 Mooreland St
Address Line 2
Springfield, MA 01104

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Chris Robedee [mailto:crobedee@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 10:18 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Chris Robedee
P.O. Box 23
74 Brooklawn Dr.
Meriden, CT 06450

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Chris Robedee [mailto:crobedee@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:29 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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From: Claude Robert [mailto:ldruide@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:04 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Claude Robert
220 Chemin Saxby sud
Saint-Hyacinthe, QC J2S 3Z4

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Claude Robert [mailto:ldruide@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:01 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Claude Robert
220 Chemin Saxby sud
Saint-Hyacinthe, QC J2S 3Z4

## Consent-Based Siting

From: James Roberts [mailto:jimrobj@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:39 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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James Roberts
215 S Ellis St
Palouse, WA 99161

## Consent-Based Siting

From: jeannie roberts [mailto:jeannier@tds net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 9:24 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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jeannie roberts
1004 yale rd
madison, WI 53705

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Earl D. Roberts [mailto:edeanroberts@juno.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:34 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Earl D. Roberts
4414 Briardale St.
5
San Antonio, TX 78217

## Consent-Based Siting

From: jeannie roberts [mailto:jeannier@tds net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:43 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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jeannie roberts
1004 yale rd
madison, WI 53705

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Katherine Roberts [mailto:grrlfriday@mac.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:42 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Katherine Roberts
132 Beulah
San Francisco, CA 94117

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Nancy Roberts-Moneir [mailto:nrmfunes@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 3:56 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Nancy Roberts-Moneir
12457 Crestwood Dr.
Gulfport, MS 39503

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ed Robertson [mailto:edrobertson1@peoplepc.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:15 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Ed Robertson
255 N Forest, Apt 410
Bellingham, WA 98225

## Consent-Based Siting

From: joyce robinson [mailto:orcawolf@cablespeed.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 9:35 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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joyce robinson
8010 Covington Ave.
Glen Burnie, MD 21061

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Amy Robinson [mailto:sail4days2@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:37 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Amy Robinson
PO Box 10512
San Rafael, CA 94912

## Consent-Based Siting

From: John Robohm [mailto:john@livewirefarm.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:28 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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John Robohm
467 Butler Brook Road
PO Box 526
Jacksonville, VT 05342

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Thomas Roby IV [mailto:tomroby@sbcglobal net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:47 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Thomas Roby IV
1130 S Michigan Ave
2304
Chicago, IL 60605

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Priscilla Rocco [mailto:dementedgardensprite@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:05 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Priscilla Rocco
3309 California St.
Costa Mesa, CA 92626

## Consent-Based Siting

From: maureen roche [mailto:enhanceress1@frontier.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:18 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

maureen roche
pob 146
Petrolia, CA 95558

## Consent-Based Siting

From: maureen roche [mailto:enhanceress1@frontier.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 8:21 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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maureen roche
pob 146
Petrolia, CA 95558

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mary C. Rocks [mailto:mc_rocks@comcast net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:41 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Mary C. Rocks
216 W 2nd St
Waynesboro, PA 17268

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Brent Rocks [mailto:brent_rocks@comcast net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:04 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Brent Rocks
1518 SW Upper Hall st
Portland, OR 97201

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Brent Rocks [mailto:brent_rocks@comcast net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:06 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Brent Rocks
1518 SW Upper Hall st
Portland, OR 97201

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Therese Rockwell [mailto:terrierockwellart@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:04 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Therese Rockwell
1631 Leta Lane
Oroville, CA 95965

## Consent-Based Siting

From: lenore rodah [mailto:lrodah@hotmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 10:14 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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lenore rodah
334 grace dr.
south pasadena, CA 91030

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Odilia Gavin Rodriguez [mailto:odiliayangel@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:38 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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Odilia Gavin Rodriguez
1679 View Drive
San Leandro, CA 94577

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sylvia Rodriguez [mailto:sylvia_lion@yahoo.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 12:46 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Sylvia Rodriguez
227 E. 5th Street, #3FW
New York, NY 10003

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Rhonda Roff [mailto marshmaid@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:12 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Rhonda Roff
30290 josie billie hwy
pmb 300
Clewiston, FL 33440

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Albert Roffey [mailto:albertroffey@yahoo.ca]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:39 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Albert Roffey
41 Wilderness Drive
Scarborough, ON M1V3P4

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Marjorie Rogalski [mailto:marjorie890@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:05 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Marjorie Rogalski
Rennie
Hanover, NH 03755

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Celeste Rogers [mailto:teroger@pixi.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:25 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Celeste Rogers
91-1097 Paaoloulu Way
Kapolei, HI 96707

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dirk Rogers [mailto:1dog2dogs3dogs@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:30 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Dirk Rogers
3404 San Jacinto
Dallas, TX 75204

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dirk Rogers [mailto:1dog2dogs3dogs@gmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 12:44 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Dirk Rogers
3404 San Jacinto
Dallas, TX 75204

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jennifer Rogers [mailto:fatwopdagogirlfriend@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:39 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Jennifer Rogers
50 Sioux Path
50 Sioux Path
Sunapee, NH 03773

## Consent-Based Siting

From: MARY ROJESKI [mailto:JERO.BOOK@GTE.NET]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:40 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz, What do you want for YOUR Family????

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MARY ROJESKI
2603 3rd st
santa monica, CA 90405

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kevin Rolfes [mailto:kevin@rolfes.org]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 9:16 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Kevin Rolfes
14006 N Green Hills Loop
Austin, TX 78737

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Angelika Roll [mailto:angie@rosa-b.de]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:43 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Angelika Roll
Kyllmannstr. 2
Berlin, NY 12203

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Stanley Romaine [mailto:ssromaine@optimum.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 2:43 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Stanley Romaine
35 Arleigh Rd.
Address Line 2
Great Neck, NY 11021

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Alyse Rome [mailto:Arome7@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:30 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Alyse Rome
20126 Ballinger Way NE #239
20126 Ballimger Way NE #239
Shoreline, WA 98155

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Roberto Romo [mailto neospyder316@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 3:15 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

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I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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Roberto Romo
3227 Anza St.
San Francisco, CA 94121

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Roberto Romo [mailto neospyder316@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:49 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. The DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I am opposed to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP CREATING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- Terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- Provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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Roberto Romo
3227 Anza St.
San Francisco, CA 94121

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sharon Root [mailto:sharonroot@co.lyon.mn.us]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:34 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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Sharon Root
504 Fairgrounds Rd
Marshall, MN 56258

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Allen Root [mailto:allen.t root@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:59 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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Allen Root
PO Box 288
San Luis Obispo, CA 93406

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Greg Rosas [mailto:thesro15@yahoo.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 3:50 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Greg Rosas
4353 Edwards ln
Castro Valley, CA 94546

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kathryn Rose [mailto mizkate52@msn.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 11:23 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Kathryn Rose
2749 Lafayette St.
Denver, CO 80205

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kathryn Rose [mailto mizkate52@msn.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 10:30 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Kathryn Rose
2749 Lafayette St.
Denver, CO 80205

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Tim Rose [mailto:Trose333@yahoo.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 8:23 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Tim Rose
2151 ne 42 ct apt 123
Lighthouse point, FL 33064

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Paul Rosen [mailto:ros@rockefeller.edu]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:02 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Paul Rosen
66 W.94th St.
New York, NY 10025

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Bruce Rosen [mailto:bxqny@mac.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:16 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Bruce Rosen
600 West End Avenue apt. 1A1
600 West End Avenue apt. 1A1
New York, NY 10024

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joan Rosenbaum [mailto:padma81010@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:21 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Joan Rosenbaum
East Hill Rd, Hartwick, NY
Hartwick, NY 13348

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Larry Rosenberg [mailto:larryrosenberg@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Larry Rosenberg
PO Box 6902
Tahoe City, CA 96145

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Harriet Rosenberg [mailto:h_rosenberg@earthlink.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 4:09 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Harriet Rosenberg
5682 Kingsport Drive
5682 Kingsport Drive
Sandy Springs, GA 30342

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Bob Rosenberg [mailto:endobob@earthlink.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:38 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Bob Rosenberg
32 Toussin
Kentfield, CA 94904

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ann Rosenkranz [mailto:antigonerose2@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:54 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Ann Rosenkranz
102 Skiffs Lane
Vineyard Haven, MA 02568

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Tracey Rosenlund [mailto:traceyrosenlund@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:53 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Tracey Rosenlund
752 Evans St
#103
LARAMIE, WY 82070

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Rima Rosenthal [mailto:rimaphil@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Rima Rosenthal
632 bayside road
Ellsworth, ME 04605

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Rima Rosenthal [mailto:rimaphil@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:22 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Rima Rosenthal
632 bayside road
Ellsworth, ME 04605

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lore Rosenthal [mailto:SimplicityGroupsMD@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:45 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Lore Rosenthal
2 Gardenway, Unit R
Greenbelt, MD 20770

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Elliot Ross [mailto:kross@nep.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:42 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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Elliot Ross
Lyon St
Union Dale, PA 18470

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Adrienne Ross [mailto:ahlight@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Adrienne Ross
19 Cerro Blanco Rd
Lamy, NM 87540

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Bruce Ross [mailto:brucetwin62@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:38 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Bruce Ross
3707 Landon Park Dr.
Katy, TX 77449

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Bruce Ross [mailto:brucetwin62@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:30 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Bruce Ross
3707 Landon Park Dr.
Katy, TX 77449

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mary L. Ross [mailto:mary ross1@myfairpoint net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:29 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Mary L. Ross
P.O. Box 694
Ogunquit, ME 03907

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ellen Rosser [mailto:ellen.rosser@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:38 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Ellen Rosser
P.O. Box 275
Point Arena, CA 05468

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Daniela Rossi [mailto:danieladdt@hotmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 3:49 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Daniela Rossi
Via Roma, 15
Pomezia (Roma), ID 83210

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Daniela Rossi [mailto:danieladdt@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:58 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Daniela Rossi
Via Roma, 15
Pomezia (Roma), ID 83210

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Gregory Rossi [mailto:5a5da8dc@opayq.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:05 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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Gregory Rossi
3290 Schoolhouse Drive
Waterford, MI 48329

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Thomas Rossi [mailto:tom.rossi@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:09 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Thomas Rossi
11787 Neenach St.
Sun Valley, CA 91352

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kristy Rotermund [mailto:krotermund@earthlink.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:34 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Kristy Rotermund
13726 Mystic Mine Road
Nevada City, CA 95959

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jerome Roth [mailto:jerome_roth@cox net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:28 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Jerome Roth
1912 S. River Dr.
Tempe, AZ 85281

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Florie Rothenberg [mailto:frothenberg@comcast.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:26 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Florie Rothenberg
3125 SW Raymond St.
Seattle, WA 98125

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Wiliam Rothman [mailto:w1rothman@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:59 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Wiliam Rothman
14 Cliff Road
Belvedere, CA 94920

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Emily Rothman [mailto:DrEmily@live.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:22 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Emily Rothman
1112 San Pedro NE 270
Albuquerque, NM 87110

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Veronica Rough [mailto:vrough3@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:33 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Veronica Rough
26 Fairfield Street
26 Fairfield Street
Maynard, MA 01754

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Eileen Rourke [mailto:infoeer@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:10 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Eileen Rourke
100 Beekman street
21c
New york, NY 10038

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Daniel Rous [mailto:danrous9@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 7:01 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Daniel Rous
304 W. 121st St. #8
NY, NY 10027

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Daniel Rous [mailto:danrous9@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:06 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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304 W. 121st St. #8
NY, NY 10027

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dwight Rousu [mailto:rousu@frontier.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:04 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Dwight Rousu
13824 NE 70th Pl
13824 NE 70th Pl
Redmond, WA 98052

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Julia Rouvier [mailto:julia.rouvier@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 4:03 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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Julia Rouvier
1450 W. Kaibab #83
1450 W. Kaibab #83
Flagstaff, AZ 86001

## Consent-Based Siting

From: joanne rovno [mailto:jandsrovno@comcast net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:11 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

i can not see any community desiring nuclear waste. i am happy to see that the California Diablo canyonf is to be shut down. we put the water and the peoples lives at stake and to transport it on our crowded highways is dangeous. have we learned anything about the safety or waste? no and 2500 years is too long to care. The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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a worried great grandmom

joanne rovno
939 HARVARD ROAD
san mateo, CA 94402

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Cathy Rowan [mailto:rowan@bestweb.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:48 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Cathy Rowan
766 Brady Ave. , Apt. 635
Bronx, NY 10462

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Wojciech Rowinski [mailto:grawojro@charter net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 9:08 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Wojciech Rowinski
26 McKinley Avenue
Easthampton, MA 01027

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dr. and Ms. Allan B. Rubin [mailto:danielag333@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:01 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Dr. and Ms. Allan B. Rubin
57 Montague, Apt. 8-G-H
Brooklyn, NY 11201

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dr. and Ms. Allan B. Rubin [mailto:danielag333@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 8:39 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Dr. and Ms. Allan B. Rubin
57 Montague, Apt. 8-G-H
Brooklyn, NY 11201

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Edward Rubin [mailto:lindaandedrubin@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:07 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Edward Rubin
104 Thornton Road
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467

## Consent-Based Siting

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Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:02 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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Edward Rubin
104 Thornton Road
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Susan Rubin [mailto:suerainbowskies@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 4:00 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Susan Rubin
PO Box 420
Kilauea, HI 96754

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Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:00 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
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Susan Rubin
PO Box 420
Kilauea, HI 96754

## Consent-Based Siting

From: vince rubino [mailto:convinceable@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 11:30 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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vince rubino
555 Pierce St
Albany, CA 94706

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kenneth Ruby [mailto:kennethgem@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 2:37 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Kenneth Ruby
18 Tiffany Road #10
Salem, NH 03079

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Emily Rugel [mailto:madellne@hotmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 8:47 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Emily Rugel
5435 Sherier Pl NW
Washington, DC 20016

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To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Emily Rugel
5435 Sherier Pl NW
Washington, DC 20016

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Stephanie Rugoff [mailto:sterulo@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 9:57 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Stephanie Rugoff
600 W. 115 St.
New York, NY 10025

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Arnold Ruiz [mailto:avruiz12@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 1:12 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Arnold Ruiz
6326 W. Watkins St.
Phoenix, AZ 85043

## Consent-Based Siting

From: O. Ruiz [mailto:osiel2001@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 10:54 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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O. Ruiz
Normandy Road
Clifton, NJ 07013

## Consent-Based Siting

From: O. Ruiz [mailto:osiel2001@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:10 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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O. Ruiz
Normandy Road
Clifton, NJ 07013

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Elena Rumiantseva [mailto:coficat24@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:21 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Elena Rumiantseva
2312 16th Ave E
Seattle, WA 98103

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Brent Rusert [mailto:rusert@mcn.org]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:00 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Brent Rusert
188 S. Harold St.
188 S. Harold St.
Fort Bragg, CA 95437

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Brent Rusert [mailto:rusert@mcn.org]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:14 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Brent Rusert
188 S. Harold St.
188 S. Harold St.
Fort Bragg, CA 95437

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Steve Rusk [mailto:stvrusk@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 5:50 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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Steve Rusk
601 Blaine St.
Van Wert, OH 45891

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Michael Russell [mailto:cardcat57@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:20 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Michael Russell
630 N. 9th St.
Santa Paula, CA 93060

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lucymarie Ruth [mailto:lucymarieruth@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:43 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Lucymarie Ruth
674 Ventura St.  Apt. A
RICHMOND, CA 94805

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ben Ruwe [mailto:benruwe@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:28 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Ben Ruwe
10272 Lomita Ave.
Felton, CA 95018

## Consent-Based Siting

From: William Ryerson [mailto:bryerson@comcast net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:47 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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William Ryerson
5540 Oles Dr N
Indianapolis, IN 46228

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mark Rynearson [mailto:markrynearson@verizon net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 8:08 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Mark Rynearson
5259 Whiskey Hill Road
Wolcott, NY 14590

## Consent-Based Siting

From: J S [mailto:snoodledoo@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:52 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

J S
19011 NE 162 PL
Woodinville, WA 98072

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Pam S [mailto:pshaouy@bellsouth net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:55 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Pam S
123 Any Street
Woodstock, GA 30188

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From: Pam S [mailto:pshaouy@bellsouth net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 7:27 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Pam S
123 Any Street
Woodstock, GA 30188

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From: Rosalie Sable [mailto:rsable@live.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 5:34 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Rosalie Sable
7315 SW Beaverton Hillsdale Hwy
#107
Medford, OR 97501

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Stephen M. Sachs [mailto:ssachs@earthlink.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:14 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Stephen M. Sachs
1916 San Pedro Dr NE
Albuquerque, NM 87110

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From: Nancy Sadowsky [mailto:nancy.sadowsky@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 5:39 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
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Nancy Sadowsky
4225 sw 84 avenu
miami, FL 33155

## Consent-Based Siting

From: William Saenz [mailto:billsaenz@comcast net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 8:55 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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William Saenz
20220 Indiana
Brownstown, MI 48183

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Luisa Saffiotti [mailto:412luisaff@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 2:21 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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Luisa Saffiotti
5114 Wissioming Road
Bethesda, MD 20816

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Irene Saikevych [mailto:saikevych@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 11:04 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Irene Saikevych
2037 Old Military Rd
Talent
Central Point, OR 97502

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Irene Saikevych [mailto:saikevych@yahoo.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 12:14 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Irene Saikevych
2037 Old Military Rd
Talent
Central Point, OR 97502

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Hannele Salava [mailto:hannele.salava@gmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 5:51 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Hannele Salava
Junailijankuja 10 c 51
Helsinki, ot 00520

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dixie Salazar [mailto:dsalazar@csufresno.edu]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:17 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Dixie Salazar
704 E Brpwm
704 E Brown
Fresno, CA 93704

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Susan Saltzman [mailto:scsaltzman@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:04 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Susan Saltzman
1420 Locust Street #23M
Philadelphia, PA 19102

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Cathy Sampson-Kruse [mailto:Ulla1855@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:58 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

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Cathy Sampson-Kruse
11303 zier road
Yakima, WA 98908

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ralph Sanders [mailto:treebear@pacbell net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:40 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Ralph Sanders
22212 SE 304th St
Inglewood, CA 90304

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Rob Sanders [mailto:bsanders@westga.edu]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:32 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Rob Sanders
103 villa rosa ridge
Temple, GA 30179

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Thomas Sanders [mailto:1hornet@snet net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:28 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Thomas Sanders
PO Box 723
Higganum, CT 06441

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Erin Sandler [mailto:Ers4619@ego.thechicagoschool.edu]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 9:13 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Erin Sandler
2835 Gabriella St
Downers Grove, IL 60515

## Consent-Based Siting

From: R Sangdahl [mailto:rsangdahl@cox.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 5:07 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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*******

I want to thank whomever wrote the above letter and I agree with them. My question at this point is, why was nuclear power ever produced when there was no clear plan in place for how to store the waste?

The sane thing to do would be to stop generating nuclear waste since there is no clear plan in place for handling the waste it produces. Stop producing nuclear power period!

The waste should have always been kept on the site where it was generated so the producers could have seen exactly what a mess they were creating.

Those who are presently responsible for handling this waste are probably not concerned about those who will have to handle their waste in the future.

I am concerned for my grandchildren and all future generations to come.

Who wants to guard a nuclear waste dump for a living?

R Sangdahl
Essen Ave
Essen Ave
Parma, OH 44129

## Consent-Based Siting

From: carol sangster [mailto:joansangster@sbcglobal net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:03 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

carol sangster
po box 149
ojai, CA 93024

## Consent-Based Siting

From: carol sangster [mailto:joansangster@sbcglobal net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:54 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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carol sangster
po box 149
ojai, CA 93024

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Tony Santiago [mailto:Tonejones88@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:26 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Tony Santiago
3029 BRIGGS AV
Bronx, NY 10458

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Quannah Santiago [mailto:quannah.santiago@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 12:47 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Quannah Santiago
1208 Norwood Rd
Austin, TX 78722

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Gina Santonas [mailto:Gsantonas@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:07 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Gina Santonas
80 JEWEL STREET
80 Jewel St
BROOKLYN, NY 11222

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Marlena Santoyo [mailto marsantoyo@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:12 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Marlena Santoyo
515 Glen Echo Rd.
Philadelphia, PA 19119

## Consent-Based Siting

From: michael sarabia [mailto:shakydog808@sbcglobal net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:36 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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michael sarabia
407 west longview
stockton, CA 95207

## Consent-Based Siting

From: michael sarabia [mailto:shakydog808@sbcglobal net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:58 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

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michael sarabia
407 west longview
stockton, CA 95207

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Thomas Sarelas [mailto:valtom1@sbcglobal net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:34 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Thomas Sarelas
4442 N. Kenneth
Chicago, IL 60630

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Thomas Sarelas [mailto:valtom1@sbcglobal net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:36 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Thomas Sarelas
4442 N. Kenneth
Chicago, IL 60630

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Shawn Sargent [mailto:shawnsargent2000@yahoo.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 6:26 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Shawn Sargent
26 Rosemary Lane
26 Rosemary Lane
West Yarmouth, MA 02673

## Consent-Based Siting

From: David Saul [mailto:d-saul@comcast net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:02 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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David Saul
285 East 47th Ave
Eugene, OR 97405

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kathleen Saul [mailto:kmsaul@comcast.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 3:24 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

I live in the state of Washington and know the shenanigans that have been going on in trying to clean up the Hanford site. I know that the Department of Energy's (DOE) has spent years agreeing to contracts based on cost, not efficacy and people are suffering needlessly as a result. Based on their lousy performance to date, I do not trust the DOE to manage the waste that sits on all the other nuclear sites around the county.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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Kathleen Saul
1533 211th Ave N.E.
Sammamish, WA 98074

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Andrea Saunders [mailto:a_jamison@hotmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 11:14 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Andrea Saunders
1133 Delaware Avenue
Bethlehem, PA 18015

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Andrea Saunders [mailto:a_jamison@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:27 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

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## Consent-Based Siting

From: Maria Sause [mailto:mkrausster@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:41 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Maria Sause
15 NW Brook
Newport, OR 97365

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Maria Sause [mailto:mkrausster@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:07 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Maria Sause
15 NW Brook
Newport, OR 97365

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Patricia Savage [mailto:patriciasavage@suddenlink net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:49 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Patricia Savage
PO Box 100
Mammoth Lakes, CA 93546

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Carol Savary [mailto:carol@carolsavary.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:08 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Carol Savary
PO Box 2990
Kings Beach, CA 94131

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Rosemarie Sawdon [mailto:sawdon@msn.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:05 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Rosemarie Sawdon
100 Elderberry Lane
Rougemont, NC 27572

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From: Benjamin Sawicki [mailto:bensawicki@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:39 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Benjamin Sawicki
Adams Street
Emeryville, CA 94608

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Benjamin Sawicki [mailto:bensawicki@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:11 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Benjamin Sawicki
Adams Street
Emeryville, CA 94608

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Diana Saxon [mailto:moondaughter72@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:39 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Diana Saxon
4098 Market St NE
Apt 23
Salem, OR 97301

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jan Saxton [mailto:jansbc@earthlink net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:51 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Jan Saxton
3860A Anzar Road
Aromas, CA 95004

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Elaine G. Sc [mailto:delschwartz@juno.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:06 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Elaine G. Sc
1229 Vassar Dr., NE
1229 Vassar Dr., NE
Albuquerque, NM 87106

## Consent-Based Siting

From: john scahill [mailto:johnpatrickscahill@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:27 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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john scahill
po box 10740
2024 sarah st
pittsburgh, PA 15203

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kelley Scanlon [mailto:SunGlowAura@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:25 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Kelley Scanlon
281 Norwood Avenue
Syracuse, NY 13206

## Consent-Based Siting

From: James Scarabin [mailto:tipseytiger@msn.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:52 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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James Scarabin
2707 Kaliste Saloom Dr.
Lafayette, LA 70582

## Consent-Based Siting

From: James Scarabin [mailto:tipseytiger@msn.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:07 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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James Scarabin
2707 Kaliste Saloom Dr.
Lafayette, LA 70582

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Rachel Scarlata [mailto rachel.scarlata@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:51 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Rachel Scarlata
3855 Elk Ridge N
Divide, CO 80814

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Barb Scavezze [mailto:barb@scavezze.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:04 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Barb Scavezze
Amhurst
Olympia, WA 98501

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Timothy Schacht [mailto:drtim@speakeasy.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:30 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Timothy Schacht
1330 Whittier Road
Grosse Pointe Park, MI 48230

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Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:17 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Timothy Schacht
1330 Whittier Road
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## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kevin Schader [mailto now_what17@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:34 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Kevin Schader
1601 Sunnyvale Ave, #19
walnut creek, CA 94597

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dennis Schaef [mailto:dshifdy@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:53 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Dennis Schaef
715 Limber Rd
Meadville, PA 16335

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dennis Schaef [mailto:dshifdy@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 6:37 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Dennis Schaef
715 Limber Rd
Meadville, PA 16335

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kerwin Schaefer [mailto:klskvl@suddenlink net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:40 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Kerwin Schaefer
1407 B st
New Bern, NC 28560

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Steven Schafer [mailto:steven.schafer@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:58 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Steven Schafer
Po box 231213
Tigard, OR 97281

## Consent-Based Siting

From: H Schaktman [mailto:schaktman@comcast net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 9:14 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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H Schaktman
22 Bridge Street
Shelburne Falls, MA 01370

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Vivian Schatz [mailto:vivianschatz@earthlink net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:43 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Vivian Schatz
6907 Sherman Street
6907 Sherman Street
Philadelphia, PA 19119

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Matthew Schaut [mailto mschaut22@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:32 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Matthew Schaut
3720 27th Ave S
Minneapolis, MN 55406

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Deborah Schechter [mailto:DeborahSchechter@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:13 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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Deborah Schechter
6647 N. Richmond St.
Chicago, IL 60645

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Eric Schechter [mailto:LeftyMathProf@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:30 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Eric Schechter
807  18th Ave S apt 207
Nashville, TN 37203

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mark Schecter [mailto:urbeloved@sbcglobal net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:21 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Mark Schecter
2784 Richard Ave.
Cayucos, CA 93430

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Susan Sheinfeld [mailto:susans.3@juno.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:58 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Susan Sheinfeld
930 Leavenworth St. #7
San Francisco, CA 94109

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Susan Schellenberg [mailto:seaschell34@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:53 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Susan Schellenberg
408—66 Pacific Ave
Toronto, ON M6P 2P4

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Susan Schellenberg [mailto:seaschell34@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:27 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Toronto, ON M6P 2P4

## Consent-Based Siting

From: George Scherba [mailto:Georgellen84@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:30 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

George Scherba
131 Sunrise Lane
Novato, CA 94949

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Linda Schermer [mailto:lschermer@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:56 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Linda Schermer
500 Mountain Lilac Dr
Sedona, AZ 86336

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Linda Schermer [mailto:lschermer@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 7:21 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Linda Schermer
500 Mountain Lilac Dr
Sedona, AZ 86336

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mollie Schierman [mailto:mollie.schierman@co.anoka mn.us]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 8:55 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Mollie Schierman
4146 Zenith Avenue North
Robbinsdale, MN 55422

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kathy Schiffer [mailto:schiffer kathy@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:42 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Kathy Schiffer
5220 Dipper Way
Elk Grove, CA 95758

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joan Schildwachter [mailto:joanschildwachter@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:03 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Joan Schildwachter
11 Winterberry Court
Peekskill, NY 10566

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jeanne Schlatter [mailto:sionyx@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:45 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Jeanne Schlatter
1049 Cambridge Rd
Coshocton, OH 43812

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Darta Schlick [mailto:4daralyn@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:00 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Darta Schlick
1456 Syracuse St
1456 syracuse st
Denver, CO 80220

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Haim Schlick [mailto:Haimschlick2002@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:04 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Haim Schlick
21743 E Valley Woods Dr
Beverly Hills, MI 48025

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Haim Schlick [mailto:Haimschlick2002@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 7:58 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Haim Schlick
21743 E Valley Woods Dr
Beverly Hills, MI 48025

## Consent-Based Siting

From: E.S. SCHLOSS [mailto:ESS.007@RCN.COM]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:12 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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E.S. SCHLOSS
155 E. 93RD ST., #4A
155 E. 93RD ST., #4A
NY, NY 10128

## Consent-Based Siting

From: E.S. SCHLOSS [mailto:ESS.007@RCN.COM]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:52 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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E.S. SCHLOSS
155 E. 93RD ST., #4A
155 E. 93RD ST., #4A
NY, NY 10128

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dorion Schlund [mailto:kdschlund@aol.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 5:49 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Dorion Schlund
31 Verleye Avenue
East Northport, NY 11731

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Frank Schmeisser [mailto:progressivebum@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:51 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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Frank Schmeisser
3624 W Rusley Dr.
Bellingham, WA 98225

## Consent-Based Siting

From: adam schmidt [mailto:awestentatious@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 9:44 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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adam schmidt
3283 lillwood lane
cincinnati, OH 45251

## Consent-Based Siting

From: steven e schmidt [mailto:harstinesteve@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 12:11 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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steven e schmidt
14367 tonikan rd
shelton, WA 98584

## Consent-Based Siting

From: eileen schmitz [mailto:eileenmschmitz@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 4:27 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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eileen schmitz
1429 monterey dr.
monterey drive
santa fe, NM 87505

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sister Gladys Schmitz [mailto:gschmitz@ssndcp.org]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Sister Gladys Schmitz
170 Good Counsel Drive
Mankato, MN 56001

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Carol Schneider [mailto:nycarol8@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:43 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Carol Schneider
242 E 80th St Apt 7 A
NY, NY 10075

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Gretchen Schneider [mailto:gretchens1111@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 9:20 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Gretchen Schneider
P O Box 423
Yachats, OR 97498

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Gretchen Schneider [mailto:gretchens1111@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:10 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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Gretchen Schneider
P O Box 423
Yachats, OR 97498

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Robin Schneider [mailto:robin@texasenvironment.org]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:49 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Robin Schneider
105 W. Riverside Suite 120
Austin, TX 78704

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Katherine Schock [mailto:rswkate@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:32 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Katherine Schock
120 Blair Avenue
Rock Springs, WY 82901

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ellen Schoenwetter [mailto:elsch33@att.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Ellen Schoenwetter
784 Kelvin Rd.
El Sobrante, CA 94803

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ellen Schoenwetter [mailto:elsch33@att.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:54 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Ellen Schoenwetter
784 Kelvin Rd.
El Sobrante, CA 94803

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Betty Scholten [mailto:bscholtendc@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:09 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Betty Scholten
PO Box 645
Clatskanie, OR 97212

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Betty Scholten [mailto:bscholtendc@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 3:38 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Betty Scholten
PO Box 645
Clatskanie, OR 97212

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Betty Scholten [mailto:bscholtendc@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:37 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

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Betty Scholten
PO Box 645
Clatskanie, OR 97212

## Consent-Based Siting

From: therese schooley [mailto:teri.schooley@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:06 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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What is wrong with you people that you would consider such actions?

therese schooley
113 calvert terr
hagerstown, MD 21742

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Meryl Schrantz [mailto:merylschrantz@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:28 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Meryl Schrantz
21371 lemontree lane
Huntington Beach, CA 92646

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Clara Schroeder [mailto:crsg901@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 8:12 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Clara Schroeder
901 S. Chicago Ave.
Kankakee, IL 60901

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lawrence Schuchart [mailto:schuchart@q.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:17 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Lawrence Schuchart
6204 N. Morton
Spokane, WA 99208

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Carrie Schudda [mailto:carrie.schudda@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:15 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Carrie Schudda
510 Ash St.
Oregon, WI 53575

## Consent-Based Siting

From: BETTY SCHUESSLER [mailto:gschuessler@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 10:30 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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BETTY SCHUESSLER
2025 E. THIRD STREET
TUCSON, AZ 85719

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sara Schultz [mailto:sjws1979@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:33 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Sara Schultz
126 N Cayuga Rd
Williamsville, NY 14221

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Maria Schulz [mailto:maria.schulz54@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:17 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Maria Schulz
Intrarea Sabinei, nr.3
Timisoara, ot 300424

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Amy Schulz [mailto:aschulz@wisc.edu]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 11:09 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Amy Schulz
2304 S. Syene Rd.
Madison, WI 53711

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Maria Schulz [mailto:maria.schulz54@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 9:45 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Maria Schulz
Intrarea Sabinei, nr.3
Timisoara, ot 300424

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Michael Schwalbenberg [mailto:mikeschwal@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 10:37 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Michael Schwalbenberg
1625 Albin Way
Petaluma, CA 94954

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Elizabeth Schwartz [mailto:lizschwartz5@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:21 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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Elizabeth Schwartz
33 Road
Long Island City, NY 11106

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Suzanne Schwartz [mailto:eototos@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 6:56 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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Suzanne Schwartz
9 Eototo Road
El Prado, NM 87529

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Don Schwartz [mailto:tempdhs@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 11:56 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
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Don Schwartz
26 Skylark Drive #12-A
Larkspur, CA 94939

From: Don Schwartz [mailto:tempdhs@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:18 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Don Schwartz
26 Skylark Drive #12-A
Larkspur, CA 94939

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dan Schwartz [mailto:das18014@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:21 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Dan Schwartz
2447 Yost Rd
Bath, PA 18014

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2447 Yost Rd
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Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:46 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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33 Road
Long Island City, NY 11106

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lora Schwartzberg [mailto:watr3colr@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:11 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Lora Schwartzberg
7 Lower Salem Rd.
7 Lower Salem Rd., South Salem, NY
South Salem, NY 10590

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Henry Schwartzman [mailto:lotechdowndate@gmx.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 6:51 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Henry Schwartzman
32 E. First St.
Corning, NY 14830

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Henry Schwartzman [mailto:lotechdowndate@gmx.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:56 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Henry Schwartzman
32 E. First St.
Corning, NY 14830

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sibylle Schwarz [mailto:ssn@rupertsland.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:51 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Sibylle Schwarz
P.O.Box: 6099
Eagle River, AK 99577

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mark Scibilia-Carver [mailto:marksc112@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:49 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Mark Scibilia-Carver
5065 cold Springs Rd.
Trumansburg, NY 14886

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Allana Jeanne Scofidio [mailto:ajsknits@bestweb net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 7:15 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Allana Jeanne Scofidio
2 Brooke Club Drive #4
Ossining, NY 10562

## Consent-Based Siting

From: celia scott [mailto:twinks2@cruzio.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 8:03 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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celia scott
1520 Escalona Drive
santa cruz, CA 95060

## Consent-Based Siting

From: David Scott [mailto:dscott422@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:16 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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David Scott
423 E. Rosewood Court
optional
Ontario, CA 91764

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dorinda Scott [mailto:dorinda04@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 5:24 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Dorinda Scott
1809 Treadwell
Austin, TX 78704

## Consent-Based Siting

From: George Scott [mailto:gwscott68@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:48 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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George Scott
45 Third Ave #202
Imperial Beach, CA 91932

## Consent-Based Siting

From: J Scott [mailto:jmanoscott@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:24 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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J Scott
Nottingham
San Francisco, CA 94133

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jennifer Scott [mailto:jjscott9@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:33 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Jennifer Scott
15930 Bayside Pointe West #703
15930 Bayside Pointe West #703
Fort Myers, FL 33908

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Karen Scott [mailto:karenzscott@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:16 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Karen Scott
50 James St
Greenfield, MA 01301

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Marilyn Scott [mailto marilyn.scott2@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:13 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Marilyn Scott
4710 Dexter
#26
Goleta, CA 93117

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Melinda Scott [mailto:scotttwins@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:45 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

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Melinda Scott
2010-F Quail Ridge Road
Greenville, NC 27858

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Pamela Scott [mailto:pamrick@got.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:56 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Pamela Scott
167 Teilh Dr
Boulder Creek, CA 95006

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Raeann Scott [mailto:txgirl125@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:38 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Raeann Scott
3694 Halverstick Road
SUMAS, WA 98295

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Donny Seals [mailto:sealsknox18@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:59 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Donny Seals
3024 Beech Grove Ct Apt 2
Jeffersonville, IN 47130

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Andrew Searfin [mailto:andrewserafin@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:14 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Andrew Searfin
23 Gordon St
Guelph, ON N1H 4G9

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Julie Sears [mailto:jcsears@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:19 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Julie Sears
320 Canyon Ridge Dr
Richardson, TX 75080

## Consent-Based Siting

From: chris seaton [mailto:seatopwr@verizon.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:05 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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chris seaton
1041 via chaparral
santa barbara, CA 93105

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Douglas Sedon [mailto:sedond@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:32 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Douglas Sedon
19935 Beallsville Road
Beallsville, MD 20839

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Douglas Sedon [mailto:sedond@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:22 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Douglas Sedon
19935 Beallsville Road
Beallsville, MD 20839

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Bud See [mailto:king16x@excite.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:17 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Bud See
4118 Woodland Ct.
Grapevine, TX 76051

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joshua Seff [mailto:mv9508@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Joshua Seff
9508 George Washington Dr.
McKinney, TX 75070

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Steven Seftel [mailto:socastevie@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:02 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Steven Seftel
2500 s 600 e
SLC, UT 84106

## Consent-Based Siting

From: D Tim Seitz [mailto:Dtimseitz@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:26 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

D Tim Seitz
607-91 King St E
Kingston, ON K7L 2Z8

## Consent-Based Siting

From: June Selby [mailto:juno.stonemuse.jse@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 6:00 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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June Selby
312 Broad Street
Carrollton, GA 30117

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Greg Sells [mailto:gsells@austin rr.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:07 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Greg Sells
3300 Parker Ln.
Apt. 258
Austin, TX 78741

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Rob Seltzer [mailto rsscpa@earthlink.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:24 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Rob Seltzer
18408 Clifftop Way
Malibu, CA 90265

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Aaron Senegal [mailto:senegal@dslextreme.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:38 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Aaron Senegal
1313 Mariposa St
Richmond, CA 94804

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Aaron Senegal [mailto:senegal@dslextreme.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:14 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Aaron Senegal
1313 Mariposa St
Richmond, CA 94804

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Debbie Sequichie-Kerchee [mailto:galacticcherokee@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Debbie Sequichie-Kerchee
PO Box 701
Cache, OK 73527

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Debbie Sequichie-Kerchee [mailto:galacticcherokee@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:21 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

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Debbie Sequichie-Kerchee
PO Box 701
Cache, OK 73527

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joe Serpico [mailto:joeserp@topsoffers.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:22 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Joe Serpico
4215 E Bay Dr
Clearwater, FL 33764

## Consent-Based Siting

From: sherry serra [mailto:sherryserra@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:32 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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sherry serra
1463 e republican st
B23
seattle, WA 98112

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Heather Servais [mailto:heather.servais@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:24 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Heather Servais
Reforestation Rd
Green Bay, WI 54313

## Consent-Based Siting

From: James Servais [mailto:jimserv@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 7:58 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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James Servais
4607 Reforestation Road
4607 Reforestation Rd.
Suamico, WI 54313

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Debra Severson [mailto:deb@whispirit.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:10 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Debra Severson
123 S. Thayer
Sparta, WI 54656

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Nate Sewell [mailto:bluesmoke30@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:03 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Nate Sewell
1277 Yulupa Ave
Santa Rosa, CA 95407

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Marion Seymour [mailto:seymour marion@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 10:19 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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Marion Seymour
2300 W. Alameda D-2
Santa Fe, NM 87507

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Marguerite Sgrillo [mailto:Sgrillom@comcast net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:25 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Marguerite Sgrillo
5024 Match Ct
Richmond, CA 94806

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Susan Shaak [mailto:mgsatmsc@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:38 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Susan Shaak
3440 Stoner Ave
Reading, PA 19606

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Paul Shabazian [mailto:pshab@earthlink net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:55 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Paul Shabazian
16816 Simonds St
Granada Hills, CA 91344

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Carolyn Shafer [mailto:cshafer24@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:07 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Carolyn Shafer
1218 Hancock Rsd.
Toms River, NJ 08753

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Melissa B Shakman [mailto:melissa.shakman@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:53 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Melissa B Shakman
1360 E 56 Street
Chicago, IL 60637

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Melissa B Shakman [mailto:melissa.shakman@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:04 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Melissa B Shakman
1360 E 56 Street
Chicago, IL 60637

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Daniel Shalit [mailto:dshalit@yahoo.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 7:22 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Daniel Shalit
876 Snowbird Rd
Wrightwood, CA 92397

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Timothy Shanahan [mailto:TCSHAN@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Timothy Shanahan
10470 Falcon Avenue
Fountain Valley, CA 92708

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Matthew Shapiro [mailto:mshapiro@atg.state.il.us]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:53 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Matthew Shapiro
925 Greenleaf Avenue
Wilmette, IL 60091

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Steve Shapiro [mailto:shapirosm@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 8:11 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Steve Shapiro
3007 Westfield Ave
Baltimore, MD 21214

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Paula Sharaga [mailto:morethanpaula@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:44 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Paula Sharaga
234 Columbia St.
Cambridge, MA 02139

## Consent-Based Siting

From: William Sharfman [mailto:sharfman@umich.edu]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:33 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

William Sharfman
50 Riverside Drive
New York, NY 10024

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Neil Shargel [mailto:smithrockneil@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:06 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Neil Shargel
3940 ne 20th Ave
Portland, OR 97212

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Susan Melinda Sharpe [mailto redwing@skybest.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:14 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Susan Melinda Sharpe
2751 Old US Hwy 421
Vilas, NC 28692

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mary Shaughnessy [mailto:mollyoshocky@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:30 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Mary Shaughnessy
PO Bx 17296
Indianapolis, IN 46217

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mary Shaughnessy [mailto:mollyoshocky@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:57 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Mary Shaughnessy
PO Bx 17296
Indianapolis, IN 46217

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lynn Shauinger [mailto:starpath@pacbell.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:45 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Lynn Shauinger
941 Oak St
941 Oak St.
San Francisco, CA 94117

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From: Lynn Shauinger [mailto:starpath@pacbell.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:27 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Lynn Shauinger
941 Oak St
941 Oak St.
San Francisco, CA 94117

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Gary Shaw [mailto:crotonshaw@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:22 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

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Gary Shaw
9 Van Cortlandt Pl.
9 van cortlandt place
Croton on Hudson, NY 10520

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jeanne Shaw [mailto:dede2000@msn.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:15 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

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Jeanne Shaw
9725 E. Harvard Ave
9725 E. Harvard Ave, Denver, CO 80231
Denver, CO 80231

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Madeline Shaw [mailto:mshaw13@frontiernet net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:36 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Madeline Shaw
Ridgebury Rd
Slate Hill, NY 10973

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Matthew Sheinin [mailto mgsheinin@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 8:54 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative implies it's intent to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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Matthew Sheinin
1920 NE 150th Ave
Portland, OR 97230

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Laura Sheinkopf [mailto:lsheinkopf@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:05 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Laura Sheinkopf
59 4th Avenue
59 4th Avenue
Brooklyn, NY 11217

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Deborah Shekter [mailto:dtshekter@yahoo.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 11:54 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Deborah Shekter
11 Orion Lane
Tijeras, NM 87059

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sam Sheldon [mailto:soph1a2001@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Sam Sheldon
14140 NE Sandy
Portland, OR 97230

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dorothy Shelton [mailto:Tollivershelton@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:23 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Dorothy Shelton
4000 ANDERSON Rd 55
Nashville, TN 37217

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dorothy Shelton [mailto:Tollivershelton@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:38 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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Dorothy Shelton
4000 ANDERSON Rd 55
Nashville, TN 37217

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Anita Shenkman [mailto:ashenkman125@comcast.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:58 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Anita Shenkman
604 Valencia Dr. NE
Albuquerque, NM 87108

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Marilyn Shepherd [mailto marilynshepherd@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:35 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Marilyn Shepherd
PO Box 715
Trinidad, CA 95570

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Marilyn Shepherd [mailto marilynshepherd@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:17 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Marilyn Shepherd
PO Box 715
Trinidad, CA 95570

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Michael Sherber [mailto:sherbermike@cs.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:31 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Michael Sherber
20 Woodmont Rd.
20 Woodmont Rd.
Avon, CT 06001

## Consent-Based Siting

From: LESLIE SHERIDAN [mailto:CARPEDIEMVOICE@AOL.COM]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 3:08 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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LESLIE SHERIDAN
4246 MULLEN
473 Church St
CLEARLAKE, CA 95422

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Paul Sheridan [mailto:sheridanpa@earthlink net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 7:14 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Paul Sheridan
88 Hart Rd.
-
Northport, ME 04849

## Consent-Based Siting

From: tomsherman906@yahoo.com tomsherman906@yahoo.com [mailto:tomsherman906@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 8:18 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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## Consent-Based Siting

From: Marcia Sherman [mailto mcsherman@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:01 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Marcia Sherman
521 N. La Cumbre Road #31
none
Santa Barbara, CA 93110

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Marcia Sherman [mailto mcsherman@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 7:56 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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521 N. La Cumbre Road #31
none
Santa Barbara, CA 93110

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From: Marcia Sherman [mailto mcsherman@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:05 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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none
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From: tomsherman906@yahoo.com tomsherman906@yahoo.com [mailto:tomsherman906@yahoo.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 7:51 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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BOTTOM LINE IS YOU DON'T PUT MONEY BEFORE HEALTH.  AS FAR AS I'M CONCERNED I DON'T CARE IF WE ARE SHORT OF ENERGY AS IT USED FOR FRIVOLOUS PRODUCTS AND USED INEFFICIENTLY.

tomsherman906@yahoo.com tomsherman906@yahoo.com
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mil, WI 53217

## Consent-Based Siting

From: james sherpa [mailto:jugodon@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:13 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

james sherpa
302 giles st
ithaca, NY 14850

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sue Sherrill [mailto:sesherrill@pobox.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:46 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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Sue Sherrill
1436 Wppdland Hills Dr NE
Atlanta, GA 30324

## Consent-Based Siting

From: aron shevis [mailto:ashevis@nygoexpress.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 8:41 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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aron shevis
302 windsor pl
brooklyn, NY 11218

## Consent-Based Siting

From: aron shevis [mailto:ashevis@nygoexpress.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:09 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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aron shevis
302 windsor pl
brooklyn, NY 11218

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Susan Sheythe [mailto:shisusheythe@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 8:03 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Susan Sheythe
32483 Oakville Rd SW #44
Albany, OR 97321

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Nita Shidler [mailto:satyrane2003@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 11:01 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Nita Shidler
456 1/2  W. 39th ST.
SAN PEDRO, CA 90731

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Marcella Shields [mailto marcellahshields@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:36 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Marcella Shields
105 Laura's Way
Tafton, PA 18464

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Juli Shields [mailto:jshields1@stny rr.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 12:07 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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Juli Shields
699 Powers Road
Conklin, NY 13748

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kathy Shimata [mailto:kshimata@hawaiiantel net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:18 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Kathy Shimata
3453 Pawaina St
Honolulu, HI 96822

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Robert Shippee [mailto:rsoxbob@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:33 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Robert Shippee
13000 Trinity Ct
Richmond, VA 23233

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Rimma Shiptsova [mailto:shiptsova@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:33 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Rimma Shiptsova
900 Donner Way
206
SLC, UT 84108

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Celeste Shitama [mailto:celesteas@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 5:08 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Celeste Shitama
425 NE 9th St
425 NE 9th St
Gainesville, FL 32601

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Timothy Shivers [mailto:tshivers72@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 6:21 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Timothy Shivers
2696 Bickers Street Apt # 2102
Dallas, TX 75212

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Amit Shoham [mailto:amit@tarantic.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:08 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Amit Shoham
2106 7th Ave.
Oakland, CA 94606

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Forest Shomer [mailto:inspass@whidbey.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 4:51 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Forest Shomer
PO Box 639
Port Townsend, WA 98368

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Philip Shook [mailto:huisbaas@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 11:05 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Philip Shook
1020 E Apache Blvd
Tempe, AZ 85281

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Philip Shook [mailto:huisbaas@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:06 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Philip Shook
1020 E Apache Blvd
Tempe, AZ 85281

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joann Shook [mailto:joshook@cds1.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:34 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Joann Shook
14131 Chalk Hill Road
Healdsburg, CA 95448

## Consent-Based Siting

From: mary c shook [mailto:mcshook@sbcglobal net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 8:37 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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mary c shook
5232 2nd ave
5232 2nd ave
sacramento, CA 95817

## Consent-Based Siting

From: david shore [mailto:davidmshore@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:10 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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david shore
20 meadowbrook dr
ossining, NY 10562

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Tim Shorkey [mailto:tshorkey@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:46 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Tim Shorkey
3203 Coin St.
Coin Street
Burton, MI 48519

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Tim Shorkey [mailto:tshorkey@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:51 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Tim Shorkey
3203 Coin St.
Coin Street
Burton, MI 48519

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Michael Shorr [mailto:webinfo@michaelshorr.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:50 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Michael Shorr
624 East 20th Street. Apt 8C
New York, NY 10009

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ellen Shoun [mailto:elshoun@charter net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 9:14 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Ellen Shoun
307 N. Matteson St.
none
Bronson, MI 49028

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Rick Shreve [mailto:forestrecon@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 3:39 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Rick Shreve
501 Ninth Street
1
Arcata, CA 95521

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Rick Shreve [mailto:forestrecon@yahoo.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 2:04 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Rick Shreve
501 Ninth Street
1
Arcata, CA 95521

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Donna Shroyer [mailto:d_shroyer@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:23 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Donna Shroyer
1020 Hill Street
Meeker, CO 81641

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joseph Shulman [mailto:jhshulman1@cox net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:57 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Joseph Shulman
6249 Romo Street
San Diego, CA 92115

## Consent-Based Siting

From: ron shultz [mailto:shultz ron@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:16 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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It is your waste, let's store it in YOUR basements.

ron shultz
pobox 377
cliff, NM 88028

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sandra Silliman [mailto:pittiechick59@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Sandra Silliman
7265 Wildflower Way
Bath, NY 14810

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Carol Sills [mailto:carolbsills@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:50 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

This is a far too dangerous proposition.

I do not consent to the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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Carol Sills
2397 Old Lime Kiln Rd
2397 Old Lime Kiln Rd
Baileys Harbor, WI 54202

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Steven Silodor [mailto:Stevesimplosion@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 11:08 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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Steven Silodor
444 E 87th St
Apt. 5h
New York, NY 85251

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Susan Silver [mailto:susanjsilver@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:52 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Susan Silver
5770 Mountain Road
Apt. 4
Dover, PA 17315

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Laura Silverman [mailto:lgsilverman@optonline net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:14 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Laura Silverman
30 Rose Road
West Nyack, NY 10994

## Consent-Based Siting

-----Original Message-----
From: Constance Simeri [mailto:csimeri@sbcglobal net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 10:08 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: I will not ever consent to storing radioactive nuclear waste or transporting it. STOP MAKING IT!
Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Constance Simeri
51883 Hedge Ct.
Granger, IN 46530

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dr. Scott Simmerman [mailto:simmermn@aol.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 10:16 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Dr. Scott Simmerman
3 old oak drive
3 old oak drive
taylors, SC 29687

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jill Simon [mailto:jillie.simon@endorphinrecords.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:57 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Jill Simon
12 E. 14 St. 3E
NYC, NY 10003

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jill Simon [mailto:jillie.simon@endorphinrecords.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 3:58 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Jill Simon
12 E. 14 St. 3E
NYC, NY 10003

## Consent-Based Siting

From: nancy simon [mailto:nesimon@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:12 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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nancy simon
321 D Anacapa St.
santa barbara, CA 93101

## Consent-Based Siting

From: nancy simon [mailto:nesimon@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:26 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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nancy simon
321 D Anacapa St.
santa barbara, CA 93101

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Philip Simon [mailto:philsim75@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Philip Simon
box 9473
San Rafael, CA 94912

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Thomas Simon [mailto:suszinka@hotmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:06 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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Thomas Simon
12 E. 14 St. 3E
NYC, NY 10003

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Thomas Simon [mailto:suszinka@hotmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 3:57 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Thomas Simon
12 E. 14 St. 3E
NYC, NY 10003

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jojhn Simons [mailto:jsimons464@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 6:57 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Jojhn Simons
1574 Mackinaw RD SE
Grand Rapids, MI 49506

## Consent-Based Siting

From: g simpson [mailto:drgsimpson@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:56 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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g simpson
p.o. box 1551
p.o. box 1551 thousand oaks ca
thousand oaks, CA 91360

## Consent-Based Siting

From: bruce sims [mailto:saexodus@cox.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:54 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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bruce sims
211 n. citrus
escondido, CA 92027

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Rose Sinclair [mailto:rosesinclair@earthlink.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:38 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Rose Sinclair
77 Hope ST.
77 Hope St.
Austin, TX 78749

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Nadia Sindi [mailto:nadiasindi@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:00 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

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PS: My life in Liberal Klans Oregon!!

Arab/Muslim Americans are treated less than animals! We are called Sand N…

We are being prosecuted in a daily basis! High tech lynching, institutionally racism! Especially for Arab women!!

Oregon former late A.G. Dave Frohnmayer had my SS# blocked & prevented me from getting employed, made me homeless and jobless!

He was the one who started & initiated the fraud of taking over our homes!!

His bank robber Rep. Bob Ackerman, Doug McCool and Margaret Hallock hired Scarlet Lee/Barnhart Associates, forged my family’s signature, gave our fully paid Condo to the thief Broker  Bob Ogle. And his mom Karen Ogle ” who was working in the USA Consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia 1997-1999 & administered the power of attorney to have my sister signed it and add her son to the deed,”, without my signature!!

Bob Ackerman had never responded to the Summon from the Court, and the sheriff never served him or arrested him either!!

ThIs is what kind of criminal government we have in Oregon!!

I ran five times for public offices! Voter Fraud & Sedition by Lane County government to protect & cover up for the two criminals Frohnmayer & Ackerman!!

Oregon government is complicit with their crimes!!

https://www.facebook.com/groups/justice4nadiasindi

www.davefrohnmayer.com

Please sign petition.

https://www.change.org/petitions/a-g-eric-holder-sent-jeff-merkley-gov-john-kitzhaber-investigate-abuse-of-power-and-criminal-forgery-by-former-oregon-a-g-david-frohnmayer-and-lane-county-government#share

Nadia Sindi
P.O. Box 59
www.nadiasindi.110mb.com
Eugene, OR 97440

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Paul Singdahlsen [mailto:psingdahlsen@earthlink net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 9:22 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Paul Singdahlsen
110 Sierra Azul
Santa Fe, NM 87507

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Donald Singer [mailto:pthg3@comcast.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:38 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Donald Singer
1625 Juniper St
Longmont, CO 80501

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Carlee Singh [mailto:carlee.singh@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:36 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

If nuclear waste disposal is not something you can dump around the homes of the people who support the nuclear lobby (collude with by accepting cash donations), I strongly suggest we immediately upgrade the U.S. energy policy. Dismantle the plutocracy.

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Carlee Singh
8920 N 139th East Ave
Owasso, OK 74055

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Carlee Singh [mailto:carlee.singh@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:46 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Carlee Singh
8920 N 139th East Ave
Owasso, OK 74055

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Veena Singwi [mailto:Veenaschnitzel@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:32 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Veena Singwi
823 forest
Evanston, IL 60202

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Peter Sipp [mailto:peterfoxsipp@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 9:06 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Peter Sipp
49 Pennsylvania Ave.
Asheville, NC 28806

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joan Sitnick [mailto:joansitnick@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:27 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Joan Sitnick
16974 Escalon Dr.
Encino, CA 91436

## Consent-Based Siting

From: ginette Hess Skandrani [mailto:grianala@yahoo fr]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:06 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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ginette Hess Skandrani
passage Ménilmontant
Paris, ot 75011

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mark Skaret [mailto:ka1vfg@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:18 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Mark Skaret
153 Riverton Rd
Riverton, CT 06065

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Julie Skelton [mailto:julieskelton@msn.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:34 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Julie Skelton
40900 Bemis Rd
Belleville, MI 48111

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Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 8:25 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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## Consent-Based Siting

From: David Skinner [mailto:dskinner@scu.edu]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 2:26 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

David Skinner
2202 San Antonio Ave.
Alameda, CA 94501

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Scott Sklar [mailto:solarsklar@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:55 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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Scott Sklar
706 North Ivy Street
Arlington, VA 22201

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kate Skolnick [mailto:krs1123@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Kate Skolnick
640 Carroll St., Apt. B4
Brooklyn, NY 11238

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kate Skolnick [mailto:krs1123@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 8:14 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Kate Skolnick
640 Carroll St., Apt. B4
Brooklyn, NY 11238

From: Mary Ann Skweres [mailto:mas4reel@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:05 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Mary Ann Skweres
7659 Sand Canyon Road
7659 Sand Canyon Road
Wrightwood, CA 92397

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Fred Sladen [mailto:wintours@tds net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:36 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Fred Sladen
16 Whipple Court
New London, NH, NH 03257

From: Anne Slaughter Perrote [mailto:asperrote3@juno.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:45 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Anne Slaughter Perrote
617 W. Olin Ave
617 W. Olin Ave, Madison, WI
Madison, WI 53715

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Richard Slingerland [mailto:richardslingerland@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 6:34 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

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Richard Slingerland
18 Pine
Pulaski, NY 13142

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Griselda Sloan [mailto:txgma@ertin.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:08 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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I worked helping to build a nuclear plant and also worked in an active unit there. Let each plant devise safe storage and monitor them very closely.

I confronted one engineer who had written a fairly long paper without one single verb in its entire length. He was livid.
He thought it was a masterpiece.

I am not sure I would trust the DOE anymore than I would trust such engineers.

Griselda Sloan
118 Ledgerwood Lane
Rockwood, TN 37854

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mews Small [mailto:mews.small@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:24 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Mews Small
29100 121st street East
29100 121st street east
Littlerock, CA 93543

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sally Small [mailto:sallyasmall@att.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:41 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Sally Small
802 N Layman Av
Indianapolis, IN 46219

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Tom Smallman [mailto:tomsmall@optusnet.com.au]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:34 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment.

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I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to stop making it and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an 'integrated management plan' for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, as per the NWPA.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear

waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks.

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Tom Smallman
80 Hunter St
Melbourne, ot 3055

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kathleen Smaluk-Nix [mailto:ksmaluknix@bellsouth.net]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 3:01 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Kathleen Smaluk-Nix
4151 Southern Pkwy
Louisville, KY 40214

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Angela Smith [mailto:enlitened@earthlink net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:18 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Angela Smith
13641 26th Pl S
SeaTac, WA 98166

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Anne Smith [mailto:bsmithfmly@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:52 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Anne Smith
1755 Kolob Dr
Fairfield, CA 94534

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Baker Smith [mailto:bakerjsmith@comcast net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:05 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Baker Smith
11416 10th Ave S
Burien, WA 98168

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Barbara Smith [mailto:barbaradsmith@ameritech.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:12 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Barbara Smith
28770 Somerset Place
Lathrup Village  48076
Lathrup Village, MI 48076

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Barry Smith [mailto:barry@flatbushfoodcoop.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 10:12 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Barry Smith
796 East 19th Street
Brooklyn, NY 11230

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Benita Smith [mailto:benitaledersmith@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:49 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Benita Smith
2315 Oak St.
Berkeley, CA 94708

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Betsy Smith [mailto:bsmith@eastgate.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 8:22 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

Why was the Department of Energy (DOE) established? It was to protect the energy-based needs of citizens. Unfortunately, the DOE's consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Betsy Smith
105 Eastgate Road
Brewster, MA 02631

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Cameron Smith [mailto:dsap@artapult.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 10:57 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Cameron Smith
1315 Rover
Murphysboro, IL 62966

## Consent-Based Siting

From: DEBORAH SMITH [mailto:deborah993@cox net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:44 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

TAKE NOTE...
The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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DEBORAH SMITH
3044 N.W. 30TH
3044 N.W. 30TH
OKLAHOMA CITY, OK 73112

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Glenn Smith [mailto:glenntrumpet@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 7:29 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Glenn Smith
15505 Excelsior Ditch Camp Rd.
Nevada City, CA 95959

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Hal smith [mailto:hals205b@aol.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 9:38 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Hal smith
205B Garrett Road
windsor, NY 13865

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Janet E Smith [mailto:jes83144@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:16 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Janet E Smith
11211 55 Avenue
11211 55 Avenue
Edmonton, AB T6H 0W9

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joan Smith [mailto:joanesq93@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:40 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Joan Smith
765F Portola St
San Francisco, CA 94129

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joy Smith [mailto:joy.ash333@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 8:57 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Joy Smith
46 Hidden Acres Drive #12
46 hidden acres dr
Asheville, NC 28806

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Judith Smith [mailto:axisdance@comcast net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:38 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Judith Smith
2712 Grande Vista Ave
Oakland, CA 94601

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Keelan Smith [mailto:concreteblonde27@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:11 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Keelan Smith
8818 Powderhorn Ln
Indianapolis, IN 46256-1

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kellie Smith [mailto:kelf.nh@live.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:20 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Kellie Smith
13 Brandy Lane
Deering, NH 03244

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kevin Smith [mailto:tubalove@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:53 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Kevin Smith
56 K St, Apt 1
Turners Falls, MA 01376

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mike Smith [mailto:mike55smith@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 3:09 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Mike Smith
1531 1st Ave
Seattle, WA 98101

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ronald Smith [mailto ronnine@comcast.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 11:32 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Ronald Smith
536 Selborne Road
Riverside, IL 60546

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sheila Smith [mailto:gardensheila@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:03 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The earth is a closed system.
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- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be

transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Sheila Smith
17530 Pond Derosa Ln
Salinas, CA 93907

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sonya Smith [mailto:sonyasuel@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 6:03 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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Sonya Smith
142 princess loop
Cadillac, MI 28166

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Stacey Smith [mailto fishswimfreely@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:42 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Stacey Smith
5439 Solvay Rd
Tully, NY 10708

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Susan Smith [mailto:susansmith@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:55 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Susan Smith
15149 sunny hill lane
Grass valley, CA 95949

## Consent-Based Siting

From: William Wharton Smith III [mailto:william3@finewoodcarving.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:37 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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I am further concerned that in the event of so-called 'long term storage' of these nuclear wastes, we may be inadvertently setting the stage for a nuclear arms race far in the future. These wastes contain plutonium, which if separated from the remainder of the wastes could be used to fabricate a nuclear weapon. With a half-life of 24,400 years, the plutonium will far outlive any human culture or society that has yet existed. Concentrating these wastes in one location, however deeply buried or guarded, could pose an irresistible temptation to some future Hitler bent on dominating the world. I therefore urge DOE to stop the current production of nuclear wastes by shutting all nuclear power reactors immediately while the intractable problem of storing the existing wastes is studied.

William Wharton Smith III
244 Hull Cove Farm Road
PO Box 281
Jamestown, RI 02835

## Consent-Based Siting

From: pete smyke [mailto:politburro@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

If you all are so hot to keep the nuclear industry going with this "consent based" plan, then start by consenting to take the waste at DOE headquarters in Washington, DC. Show people by example that you all practice what you preach. If you're not willing to take the waste there, then stop your bullshit about foisting it off on regular folks.

Isn't Fukushima a big enough example of how wrong nuclear power is? Then factor in how fortunate it would be for ISIS to go after one of your nuke dumps (lone wolf anyone?). There can never be such a thing as "safe" nuclear waste storage, and that gets more true every day.

How about accepting what you all already know - that you are coddling the masters of death on this planet, and that any attempt to keep this killer industry going is simply doing the work of the devil on planet earth. If you won't store the waste near your families and children, then don't expect the rest of the country to fall into your nuclear death trap.

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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pete smyke
n 1st st
alpine, TX 79830

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Seth Snapp [mailto:sethsnapp@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:09 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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Seth Snapp
2214 H. Street
2214 H. Street
Bellingham, WA 98225

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Tina Snyder [mailto:tonopahtina@frontiernet net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:23 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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Tina Snyder
3260 Golden Mountain Lane
Tonopah, NV 89049

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Christina Snyder [mailto:CASnyder@ic.org]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 8:06 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Christina Snyder
11994 Pleasant Lake Rd
Manchester, MI 48158

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kezia Snyder [mailto:Kspirit11@aol.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 7:40 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Kezia Snyder
218 West 16 St.
NY, NY 10011

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Tina Snyder [mailto:tonopahtina@frontiernet net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 5:51 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Tina Snyder
3260 Golden Mountain Lane
Tonopah, NV 89049

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Michael Sodos [mailto:msodos@peacemail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:23 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Michael Sodos
7095 Catalpa Rd.
Frederick, MD 21703

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Judy W. Soffler [mailto:judywsoffler@optonline.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:08 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Judy W. Soffler
8
New City, NY 10956

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Samuel Soffler [mailto:Sam@dynaire.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 8:32 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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Samuel Soffler
8 Termakay Drive
New City, NY 10956

## Consent-Based Siting

From: katherine sogolow [mailto:soaglow@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:24 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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katherine sogolow
5760 Bee Ridge Road Ext
Sarasota, FL 34241

## Consent-Based Siting

From: katherine sogolow [mailto:soaglow@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 9:56 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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katherine sogolow
5760 Bee Ridge Road Ext
Sarasota, FL 34241

## Consent-Based Siting

From: katherine sogolow [mailto:soaglow@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:06 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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katherine sogolow
5760 Bee Ridge Road Ext
Sarasota, FL 34241

## Consent-Based Siting

From: L. Sokei [mailto:lsokei6@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:07 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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L. Sokei
1061 Clark Way
Palo Alto, CA 94304

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Michele Sokoloff [mailto:Msplantscapes@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:38 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Michele Sokoloff
Rodman St
Philadelphia, PA 19147

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Laila Solaris [mailto:lailasolaris@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 3:06 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Laila Solaris
683 29th ave
San Francisco, CA 94121

## Consent-Based Siting

From: ShannYn Sollitt [mailto:networks@networkearth.org]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 3:06 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

Now that it has been shown that the renewable energy technologies are more than adequate to provide our future energy needs, the first step for the Department of Energy is to put the kibosh on any idea that nuclear power is a viable means to produce energy. It is dangerously idiotically absurd for DOE to continue to pursue planning for any future nuclear power plants. We have already witnessed too many nuclear catastrophes and their devastating aftermaths. All nuclear power plants must be shut down and decommissioned starting first with the oldest leaking ones. Across our country, there are far too many of these aging leaking nuclear power plants posing an imminent threat of nuclear catastrophe. The only way to effectively decommission the nuclear power plants is to store the waste on site in above ground retrievable, monitored HOSS facilities and each site must become the repository for the waste that was produced there. The construction and monitoring of these waste storage facilities will provide a new sector of job opportunities as well as be the most cost effective solution for both the short and long term for the taxpayer.

The lies consistently perpetrated by DOE must end immediately. American citizens need to understand the absolute seriousness of the nature of radioactive contamination and acknowledge that DOE has backed our country into a corner with no viable solutions for the waste issue of the nuclear power industrial complex. Because radioactivity is detectible only through the use of sophisticated technology not available to the average citizen, you have fooled the citizenry way too long. In the areas around the leaking nuclear power plants, the radioactivity in the atmosphere is dangerously high - along with the childhood cancer rates. The correlations are clear. For DOE to continue with the lie based culture is an act of genocide.

No long term storage has been found within the US because this is the wrong solution. DOE has spent too many decades in denial of this enduring and obvious truth and it now must be immediately addressed head-on, honestly and logically. Resources must be directed to engaging our Nation's universities and the training our top minds to discover the means to reduce the half-lives of radioactive isotopes. I believe the needed solutions are discoverable, but the DOE must deem it of utmost importance to truthfully bring this issue before the President and Congress and ask for the creation of a Manhattan type project that engages with the many universities across US and the world who have already been invested in undertaking this research. The University of California has not demonstrated the capabilities of effectively proffering solutions to the cleanup of even their own horribly nuclear contaminated sites.

DOE's consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE’s Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an “integrated management plan” for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

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radioactive materials.

ShannYn Sollitt
220 A Irvine
Santa Fe, NM 87501

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Curt Sommer [mailto:curt.sommer7@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:14 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Curt Sommer
18490 Lower Midhill Dr
West Linn, OR 97068

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Curt Sommer [mailto:curt.sommer7@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:24 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Curt Sommer
18490 Lower Midhill Dr
West Linn, OR 97068

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Marshall Sorkin [mailto:ms22eco@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:32 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Marshall Sorkin
2920 W. Sherwin Ave.
Chicago, IL 60645

## Consent-Based Siting

From: P.P. Soucek [mailto:politicek@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:22 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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P.P. Soucek
14421 1/2 Weddington Street
Sherman Oaks, CA 91401

## Consent-Based Siting

From: P.P. Soucek [mailto:politicek@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:20 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

P.P. Soucek
14421 1/2 Weddington Street
Sherman Oaks, CA 91401

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ellen Southard [mailto:esouthard@shastacollege.edu]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:30 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Ellen Southard
11555 Old Oregon Trail
Redding, CA 96049

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Bruce Southwick [mailto:bsouthwick@mac.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:14 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Bruce Southwick
1570 Blossom Hill Rd
San Jose, CA 95118

## Consent-Based Siting

From: peggy ann Southwick [mailto:psouthwick@mac.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:28 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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peggy ann Southwick
1570 Blossom Hill Rd
San Jose, CA 95118

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Winthrop Southworth [mailto:southworthw@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:00 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future. For the healthy future of us all, we must not continue to produce any nuclear waste. The future rests on energy efficiency and renewable resources.

The siting of consolidated storage facilities must be the most secure -- using hard casks near the site of generation.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific

research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is so very deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Thank you for your concern for a healthier nation and planet.

Winthrop Southworth
CPO 6105-Warren Wilson College
PO Box 9000
Asheville, NC 28815

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Shelley Sovola [mailto:lotltc@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:07 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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Shelley Sovola
P.O. Box 6969
Brookings, OR 97415

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Shelley Sovola [mailto:lotltc@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:16 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Shelley Sovola
P.O. Box 6969
Brookings, OR 97415

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Gregg Sparkman [mailto:greggrsparkman@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:49 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Gregg Sparkman
160 Lincoln Ave
Palo Alto, CA 94301

## Consent-Based Siting

From: alice speakman [mailto:amspeakman@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:29 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

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alice speakman
8932 biscayne
huntington bch, CA 92646

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Martha Spencer [mailto:spencer_martha@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:54 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Martha Spencer
988 Henry Mountain Road
Brevard, NC 28712

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sheila Spencer [mailto:sheraspencer@earthlink net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:32 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Sheila Spencer
2212 SW 4th St
Gresham, OR 97080

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dane Spencer [mailto:dane@ds-la.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:49 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Dane Spencer
1640 Wisconsin Lane
Sarasota, FL 34239

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Martha Spencer [mailto:spencer_martha@hotmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 1:25 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Martha Spencer
988 Henry Mountain Road
Brevard, NC 28712

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Julie Spickler [mailto:pjspickler@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:01 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

Nuclear waste is the Achilles' heel of energy production: until the problem of nuclear waste is truly solved, nuclear power is too dangerous to be used, except in very special circumstances.

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Julie Spickler
1259 El Camino Real
Menlo Park, CA 94025

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Julie Spickler [mailto:pjspickler@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 7:52 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Julie Spickler
1259 El Camino Real
Menlo Park, CA 94025

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Julie Squire [mailto:jksdls2@att.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:38 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Julie Squire
6605 Claremont Ave
Raytown, MO 64133

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Fred Squires [mailto:fredxpress@hotmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 3:09 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Fred Squires
2701 Hartley Rd
Lakeport, CA 95453

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Fred Squires [mailto:fredxpress@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:58 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Fred Squires
2701 Hartley Rd
Lakeport, CA 95453

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Suneet Srivastava [mailto:suneetforcharity@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 12:59 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Suneet Srivastava
100 Logan Avenue
Toronto, ON M4M2M8

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Amy St Lawrence [mailto:amy.st.lawrence@phoenix.edu]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:49 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Amy St Lawrence
6920 E 4th St
Scottsdale, AZ 85044

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Peter and Darlene St. Martin [mailto:stmartin79@comcast net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:22 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Peter and Darlene St. Martin
506 N Laventure Road
NA
Mount Vernon, WA 98273

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Peter and Darlene St. Martin [mailto:stmartin79@comcast net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 7:44 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Peter and Darlene St. Martin
506 N Laventure Road
NA
Mount Vernon, WA 98273

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ray Staar [mailto:rstaar@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:55 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Ray Staar
1441 Clay Street #5
San Francisco, CA 94109

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Delores Stachura [mailto:1322wash@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:52 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Delores Stachura
405 N 12th St
Herrin, IL 62948

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Delores Stachura [mailto:1322wash@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:15 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Delores Stachura
405 N 12th St
Herrin, IL 62948

## Consent-Based Siting

From: George Stadnik [mailto:gstadnik@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:25 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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George Stadnik
24-66 44 Street
Queens
Astoria, NY 11103

## Consent-Based Siting

From: George Stadnik [mailto:gstadnik@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:07 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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George Stadnik
24-66 44 Street
Queens
Astoria, NY 11103

## Consent-Based Siting

From: David Staiger [mailto:davestaiger@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 10:23 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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David Staiger
203 ScribnerSt.
Delton, MI 49046

## Consent-Based Siting

From: James Stamos [mailto:jstamos@alum mit.edu]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:33 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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James Stamos
13361 Argonne Drive
Saratoga, CA 95070

## Consent-Based Siting

From: barbara stamp [mailto:bestamp7@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:18 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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barbara stamp
6901 W 84th St
bloomington, MN 55438

## Consent-Based Siting

From: barbara stamp [mailto:bestamp7@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:01 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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barbara stamp
6901 W 84th St
bloomington, MN 55438

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Steven Standard [mailto:swstandard@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:07 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Steven Standard
13640 Bellflower Blvd.
Bellflower, CA 90023

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From: Phyllis Standish [mailto:pestandish@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 2:09 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Phyllis Standish
651 Marion Place Apt C
Glendora, CA 91740

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From: Phyllis Standish [mailto:pestandish@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 6:59 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Phyllis Standish
651 Marion Place Apt C
Glendora, CA 91740

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lala Stanley [mailto:lstanleysf@comcast net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Lala Stanley
567 Corbett Ave
Apt 3
San Francisco, CA 94114

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Erica Stanojevic [mailto:Ericast@gmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 6:05 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Erica Stanojevic
611 centennial
Santa Cruz, CA 95060

## Consent-Based Siting

From: garry star [mailto:gstar42@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:35 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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garry star
3084 Chancery Pl
Thousand Oaks, CA 91362

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Doug Stark [mailto:dostark@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 6:07 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Doug Stark
2698
Holladay, UT 84117

## Consent-Based Siting

From: lorrie starr [mailto:lorriebelle@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 6:01 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

Thank you for your time and attention to this very risky topic of Nuclear Waste Disposal. This entire process, from the building and safety of now aged plants to the disposal of their life threatening waste could have been prevented. We are now dealing with Pandora's box , the risks of transport are too numerous to discuss. Please consider the health and safety of people and the environment above money and convenience. As a Native American woman I have seen our lands mined and the water forever poisoned. We cannot risk the potential catastrophic outcomes. I beg you to stand strong and do the right thing.

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Thank you for your time and attention,

Dr. Lorrie Starr

lorrie starr
917 W. Ash
2125 e. sheridan st.
columbia, MO 65203

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jason Steadmon [mailto:jasonsteadmon@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:51 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Jason Steadmon
677 Avenue M
Boulder City, NV, NV 89005

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jason Steadmon [mailto:jasonsteadmon@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:29 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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Jason Steadmon
677 Avenue M
Boulder City, NV, NV 89005

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Robert Stebbins [mailto:stebbinr@peak.org]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:29 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Robert Stebbins
1525 SW Brooklane Dr
1525 SW Brooklane Drive
Corvallis, OR 97333

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Burton Steck [mailto:brtn@comcast.net]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 4:15 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Burton Steck
3522 N Leavitt St.
===
Chicago, IL 60618

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joanne Steele [mailto:joannesteele5@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:03 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Joanne Steele
1 Union Center Road
Saint Remy, NY 12401

## Consent-Based Siting

From: debbie steele [mailto:dmebsteele@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:16 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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debbie steele
766 forest lane
kissimmee, FL 34746

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From: Joanne Steele [mailto:joannesteele5@gmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 9:18 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Joanne Steele
1 Union Center Road
Saint Remy, NY 12401

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jon Steenhoven [mailto:jonsteenhoven@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:28 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Jon Steenhoven
1118 Valerie Way
Santa Rosa, CA 95407

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jon Steenhoven [mailto:jonsteenhoven@yahoo.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 12:05 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Jon Steenhoven
1118 Valerie Way
Santa Rosa, CA 95407

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Cletus stein [mailto:cletus@arn net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:45 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Cletus stein
5113 SW `16th
5113 sw16th
amarillo, TX 79106

## Consent-Based Siting

From: E Stein [mailto:egal677@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 9:14 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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E Stein
3 Keesey
Stewartstown, PA 17363

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Alan Stein [mailto:asteinpt@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 9:18 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Alan Stein
73-35 Utopia Pkwy.
Fresh Meadows, NY 11366

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Gerald Stein [mailto:jerrydoc@ufl.edu]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 5:09 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Gerald Stein
1813 NW 35th Way
Gainesville, FL 32605

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Richard Steinberg [mailto rsteinberg108@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:56 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Richard Steinberg
14 Whitehill Place
Cold Spring, NY 10516

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mark Steiner [mailto:mark.steiner@twc.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:52 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Mark Steiner
318 Primrose Dr
Louisville, KY 40207

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lorenz Steininger [mailto:schreibdemstein@posteo.de]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 11:14 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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Lorenz Steininger
Waldstr.
stafford, VA 22554

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Roderic Stephens [mailto:savecal@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:29 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Roderic Stephens
1787 Lakeside Dr.
Redding, CA 96001

## Consent-Based Siting

From: M Stephens [mailto:mstephens@ccp.edu]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 6:40 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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M Stephens
825 North 29th Street 5AA
Philadelphia, PA 19130

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mary Stephenson [mailto:ms102@comcast net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 6:24 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Mary Stephenson
217 Pelagic Lane
217 Pelagic Lane
Solomons, MD 20688

## Consent-Based Siting

From: John Steponaitis [mailto:steponaj@takas.lt]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 2:14 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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John Steponaitis
910 Geary 20
San Francisco, CA 94109

## Consent-Based Siting

From: John Steponaitis [mailto:steponaj@takas.lt]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:04 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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John Steponaitis
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San Francisco, CA 94109

## Consent-Based Siting

From: myra sternheim [mailto:myrastern5@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:00 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

myra sternheim
5602 Manor Drive
Peekskill, NY 10566

## Consent-Based Siting

From: David Stetler [mailto:davidhstetler@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:59 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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David Stetler
203 Dorn Ave
Apt. C
Everett, WA 98034

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Raymond A and Barbara C. Stevens [mailto:stvns@greenbelt.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 11:11 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Raymond A  and Barbara C. Stevens
46 a Ridge Road
Greenbelt, MD 20770

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Arin Stevens [mailto:astevens@sonic net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 5:15 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Arin Stevens
1646 Jennings Ave
Santa Rosa, CA 95401

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Daphne T Stevens [mailto:daphnetstevens4@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:18 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Help, Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

I read about you and believe you are one of the good guys who really is focused on the health of the planet. The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Daphne T Stevens
15
Fiskdale, MA 01518

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Raymond A and Barbara C. Stevens [mailto:stvns@greenbelt.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 11:36 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Raymond A  and Barbara C. Stevens
46 a Ridge Road
Greenbelt, MD 20770

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From: John Stewart [mailto foodtopia@humboldt net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:45 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

John Stewart
P.O. Box 185
Redway, CA 95560

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Laura Stewart [mailto:yogini850@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:15 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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Laura Stewart
157 Maestas Road
Ranchos de Taos, NM 87571

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Laura Stewart [mailto:yogini850@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 7:32 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Laura Stewart
157 Maestas Road
Ranchos de Taos, NM 87571

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Michael Stieber [mailto:mrstieber@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:53 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Michael Stieber
861 Inca Pkwy
Boulder, CO 80303

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sarah Stiles [mailto:fire@SarahStiles.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 11:28 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Sarah Stiles
POB 410003
San Francisco, CA 95405

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sarah Stiles [mailto:fire@SarahStiles.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:19 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Sarah Stiles
POB 410003
San Francisco, CA 95405

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Vickie Stimac [mailto:vickiestimac@earthlink net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 8:26 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Vickie Stimac
515 Walnut St
Windsor, CO 80550

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Karen Stingle [mailto:kstingle@efn.org]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 6:23 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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Karen Stingle
358 W 4th
NA
Eugene, OR 97401

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Wendy Stock [mailto:wendystock@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:52 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Wendy Stock
1306 Bay View Pl
Berkeley, CA 94708

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Bonnie Stoehn [mailto:bonnies@cruzio.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 2:41 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Bonnie Stoehn
221 Bay Street
221 Bay street
Santa Cruz, CA 95060

## Consent-Based Siting

From: MARY STOFFREGEN [mailto:marystoffregen@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 5:00 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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MARY STOFFREGEN
HC 42 Box 515
HC 42 Box 515
Busby, MT 59016

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Debra Stoleroff [mailto:debra@vtlink net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:59 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Debra Stoleroff
158 New Hamburger Rd.
Plainfield, VT 05667

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Connie Stomper [mailto:cms320@mac.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:39 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Connie Stomper
1611 Olive St.
1438 25th st.
Santa Barbara, CA 93101

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Connie Stomper [mailto:cms320@mac.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:28 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Connie Stomper
1611 Olive St.
1438 25th st.
Santa Barbara, CA 93101

## Consent-Based Siting

From: James Stone [mailto:choice@choiceimaging.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:38 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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James Stone
155 S 4th St
Santa Rosa Beach, FL 32459

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From: James Stone [mailto:choice@choiceimaging.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 6:37 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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James Stone
155 S 4th St
Santa Rosa Beach, FL 32459

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Karen Stone [mailto:karsto41@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 7:54 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Karen Stone
25031 Silverleaf Ln.
Laguna Hills, CA 92653

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lisa Stone [mailto:lestone@aya.yale.edu]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 10:53 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Lisa Stone
8902 Birdwood Ct
Houston, TX 77096

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lisa Stone [mailto:lestone@aya.yale.edu]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:32 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Lisa Stone
8902 Birdwood Ct
Houston, TX 77096

## Consent-Based Siting

From: William Stone [mailto:stonewil2@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:09 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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William Stone
112 Rock Spring Court
Carrboro, NC 27510

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dorothy Stoner [mailto:dorothystoner@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 11:39 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

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Dorothy Stoner
1130 Longford
Bartlett, IL 60103

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dorothy Stoner [mailto:dorothystoner@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:43 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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Dorothy Stoner
1130 Longford
Bartlett, IL 60103

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Richard Stookey [mailto:ricncali@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:56 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Richard Stookey
6047 Woodminster Cir
Apt 19
Orangevale, CA 95662

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jeff Stookey [mailto:jstookey108@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:17 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Jeff Stookey
3656 NE Wasco St
Portland, OR 97232

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Cecilia Story [mailto:cstory09@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:30 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Cecilia Story
220 cross pl
eugene, OR 97402

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mary stowe
574 Willard Road
quechee, VT 05301

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Darina Stoyanova [mailto:darinajoy@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:23 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Darina Stoyanova
PO Box 1381
PO Box 1381
Ojai, CA 93024

## Consent-Based Siting

From: George Stradtman [mailto:gstradtman@juno.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:56 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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George Stradtman
700 Elkins Avenue, #B3
700 Elkins Avenue
Elkins Park, PA 19027

## Consent-Based Siting

From: George Stradtman [mailto:gstradtman@juno.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:57 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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George Stradtman
700 Elkins Avenue, #B3
700 Elkins Avenue
Elkins Park, PA 19027

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Anthony Straka [mailto:atstraka@juno.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 9:45 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

Our country does not need to continue producing electricity through nuclear energy. For reasons of nuclear waste alone, nuclear energy production should be eliminated as soon as possible. Further, any form of energy production that must be subsidized by taxpayers and insured by the federal government has no business existing in our country.

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Anthony Straka
26 Honey Lane
Wappingers Falls, NY 12590

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Marisa Strange [mailto:strange523@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:10 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Marisa Strange
3124 E. 1st Street
Long Beach, CA 90803

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From: Marisa Strange [mailto:strange523@yahoo.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 6:12 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Marisa Strange
3124 E. 1st Street
Long Beach, CA 90803

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From: Lyn Strangstad [mailto:strangstad@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:54 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Lyn Strangstad
327 Doty St.
327 Doty St.
Mineral Point, WI 53565

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Susan Strasser [mailto:sustras@starpower.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 9:22 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Susan Strasser
7309 Willow Ave.
Takoma Park, MD 20912

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Susan Strasser [mailto:sustras@starpower.net]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 10:01 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Susan Strasser
7309 Willow Ave.
Takoma Park, MD 20912

## Consent-Based Siting

From: jewels stratton [mailto:djjewelsann@yahoo.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 5:14 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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jewels stratton
2233 powell st
San Francisco, CA 94133

## Consent-Based Siting

From: John Strauss [mailto:john.strauss@yale.edu]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 11:54 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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John Strauss
50 Burton St
New Haven, CT 06515

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Keith Streeter [mailto:Robotrononwheels@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:50 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Keith Streeter
box 761
Bernardston, MA 01337

## Consent-Based Siting

From: James Strick [mailto:jstrick@fandm.edu]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 9:02 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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James Strick
9905 Tenbrook Dr
Silver Spring, MD 20901

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Theresa Strolberg [mailto:mothertheresa@filertel.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:09 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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Theresa Strolberg
221 Fruitland Ave.
Buhl, ID 83316

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mary Ellen Strote [mailto mestrote@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:57 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Mary Ellen Strote
475 Stunt Road
475 Stunt Road
Calabasas, CA 91302

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Patrick Stroud [mailto:plstroud@msn.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:05 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Patrick Stroud
1145 Pinehurst Circle
Norwalk, IA 50211

## Consent-Based Siting

From: arno struzina [mailto:astruz@bigpond.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:16 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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arno struzina
seymour st
seymour
majors creek, ot 2622

## Consent-Based Siting

From: J Stufflebeam [mailto:jstufflebeam@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:35 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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J Stufflebeam
19178 S.Echo Dell Lane
Oregon City, OR 97045

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From: J Stufflebeam [mailto:jstufflebeam@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:24 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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J Stufflebeam
19178 S.Echo Dell Lane
Oregon City, OR 97045

## Consent-Based Siting

From: P Stump [mailto:Psspiral@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 2:47 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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P Stump
2216 bodle hill rd
Owego, NY 13827

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lee Sturdivant [mailto naturals@rockisland.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 6:05 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

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Lee Sturdivant
745 Larsen St.
Friday Harbor, WA 98250

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Moraima Suarez [mailto moraima48@earthlink.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:43 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Thank you for considering my views.

Moraima Suarez
215 21st Street. apt 1F
Brooklyn, NY 11232

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Steven Sugarman [mailto:wrathchild62@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:41 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Steven Sugarman
PO Box 923
Malibu, CA 90265

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Steven Sugarman [mailto:wrathchild62@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:40 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Steven Sugarman
PO Box 923
Malibu, CA 90265

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Nancy W Sullivan [mailto:badgmur@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:27 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

A number of years ago there was a strong initiative to locate a nuclear fuel rod reprocessing facility in SE Ohio. I did a lot of research around this idea and was really concerned about some of the findings.

Part of my issue revolved around transportation; at that time, part of the deal was that this plant would reprocess all of the spent fuel rods from every nuclear plant in France. They would travel one of three ways: barge, rail or highway.

Barge accidents happen not infrequently. The Ohio River runs in to the Mississippi and down to the Gulf. Any spill caused by a barge accident could have disastrous consequences for all the towns drawing water from the Ohio, not to mention the aquatic life in the river.

We have seen catastrophic rail accidents in the last several years with crude oil coming from Canada's oil shale and also North Dakota. People have been incinerated and neighborhoods badly damaged. Imagine nuclear waste getting scattered in a rail accident. Whole areas would become another Chernobyl in terms of permanent evacuation.

I completed my research before the level of hostile acts of sabotage and destruction we have seen recently. I reviewed the protection trucks carrying spent rods would have with the idea of possible terrorist acts. The studies said they would withstand a shotgun blast.

Terrorists have gone beyond shotguns to grenade launchers and high powered rifles, etc. Someone standing on a bridge in the middle of a city or, if trucks were routed on beltways around major cities, on an overpass on a major highway and blast a truck carrying nuclear material, again more or less permanently contaminating wide swaths of urban or suburban areas.

The DOE cannot post guards on every overpass and bridge before a train or truck carrying nuclear waste passed under it. Nor can you prevent the kind of everyday accidents caused by ice, driver error, a blow-out, etc., which result in the dumping of potentially hazardous cargo.

The Department of Energy’s (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE’s Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Nancy W Sullivan
534 Enright Ave
Cincinnati, OH 45205

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Gail Sullivan [mailto:gaildiva1@aol.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 11:51 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Gail Sullivan
105 Arden Street
New York, NY 10040

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Gail Sullivan [mailto:gaildiva1@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:14 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Gail Sullivan
105 Arden Street
New York, NY 10040

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lydia Sullivan [mailto:lydiasullivan42@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:21 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Lydia Sullivan
5901 Montrose Road, S101
Rockville, MD 20852

## Consent-Based Siting

From: PATRICK SULLIVAN [mailto:PJSULLIVAN@WINDSTREAM.NET]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:30 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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PATRICK SULLIVAN
457 COUNTY ROUTE 33
PENNELLVILLE, NY 13132

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Barbara Sullivn [mailto:barbara808@flash net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:18 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Barbara Sullivn
2229 N. Brighton Pl.
Arlington Heights, IL 60004

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Barbara Sullivn [mailto:barbara808@flash.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Barbara Sullivn
2229 N. Brighton Pl.
Arlington Heights, IL 60004

## Consent-Based Siting

From: dorothy sulock [mailto:dsulock@unca.edu]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:15 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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dorothy sulock
18 beaverdam knoll
asheville, NC 28804

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Maureen Sutton [mailto:maureen@sanjevani net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:15 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Maureen Sutton
9901 Datura Trail NE
Albuqueruqe, NM 87122

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sophia Sutton [mailto:manyhahama@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 8:49 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

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Sophia Sutton
632 N. Belvidere Ave
Independence, MO 64056

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kazuye Suyematsu [mailto:kazuye@lmi.net]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 3:40 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

Our species, the Homo Sapiens, has been around for some 40,000 years. Here we are creating lethal waste that will be around some million or more years, thinking future generations will honor our instructions to leave it undisturbed...for their safety. We cannot even remember, let alone interpret, messages left us 40,000 years ago. What stupid fool will believe we can leave readable messages a million years into the future??? Not to create such substances as radio active lethal waste for future generations to deal with would be not only the humane but also the moral thing to do. It should be made a law in any society engaged in nuclear fission activities.

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Kazuye Suyematsu
1483 San Pablo Ave.
1483 San Pablo Ave., Berkeley, CA 94702
Berkeley, CA 94702

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Bo Svensson [mailto:bophoto@sonic.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:49 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Create a legacy to something your children and grandchildren can really be proud of you for !! Help them inherit a world that's worth living in !! Show them our generation's concern for the rest of the world doesn't end at the tip of our own noses !!!

Bo Svensson
63 Westgate Circle
Santa Rosa, CA 95401

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Bo Svensson [mailto:bophoto@sonic net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Bo Svensson
63 Westgate Circle
Santa Rosa, CA 95401

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Terese Svoboda [mailto:svoboda@el net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:36 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Terese Svoboda
56 Ludlow St.
#2
NYC, NY 10002

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mary Swain [mailto:maryswain@lorettocommunity.org]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:10 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Mary Swain
515 Nerinx Road
Nerinx, KY 40049

From: Sharon Swan [mailto:skayswan@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:44 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Sharon Swan
1317 Tourmaline Ave.
Mentone, CA 92359

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Gabrielle Swanberg [mailto:g_swanberg@hotmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 7:30 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Gabrielle Swanberg
1649 Lancaster Dr
1649 Lancaster Dr
p, CA 94954

## Consent-Based Siting

From: mark swanson [mailto:bandmaster@comcast net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:12 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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mark swanson
1555 gleaner hall ct
ann arbor, MI 48105

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Victoria Swanson [mailto:vswans@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 8:44 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Victoria Swanson
847 Concha Loma Drive
Carpinteria, CA 93013

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Victoria Swanson [mailto:vswans@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 9:17 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Victoria Swanson
847 Concha Loma Drive
Carpinteria, CA 93013

## Consent-Based Siting

From: william sweetling [mailto:ppcarpenter@eastlink.ca]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:20 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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william sweetling
22 Robie St.
halifax, NS b1y2x6

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Christian Sweningsen [mailto:csweningsen@berk.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:14 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Christian Sweningsen
18 Riverview St
18 Riverview St
Stuyvesant, NY 12173

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Chelsea Swick [mailto:Pinkcatmints@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:54 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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Chelsea Swick
440 Solaris Lane
Bayside, CA 95524

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Rev Crow Swimsaway PhD [mailto:crow@church-of-earth-healing.org]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:12 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Rev Crow Swimsaway PhD
6560 SR 356
New Marshfield, OH 45766

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Thomas Swoffer [mailto:swofftr@q.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:28 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Thomas Swoffer
341 st
Ravensdale, WA 98051

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jim Sylva [mailto:jasylva@northrim net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:02 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Jim Sylva
P.O. Box 115
Hansen, ID 83334

## Consent-Based Siting

From: CS Symington [mailto:sonbyrd@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:23 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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CS Symington
2602 Riverhills Rd
2602 riverhills
Austin, TX 78733

## Consent-Based Siting

-----Original Message-----
From: barbara and steve szemenyei [mailto:sszemenyei@cox.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 6:55 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Lied to again by energy corporations!! "Clean energy" what a dark lie that was when there was no plan to dump waste. What crime could be worse than lying about destroying the earth for profit! ENOUGH ALREADY!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

barbara and steve szemenyei
32 alta pine
sjc, CA 92675

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Paul Szymanowski [mailto:pszymanowski@earthlink net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:57 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Paul Szymanowski
P.O. Box 74
P.O. Box 74
Curtice, OH 43412

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Janet Tache [mailto:tache@together.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:23 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

After Fukushima, after Hanford, after Chernobyl NO ONE WANTS NUCLEAR ENERGY---NO ONE THAT WE KNOW. AND CERTAINLY NO ONE WANTS NUCLEAR WASTE!

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

MY FAMILY AND I DO NOT CONSENT TO THIS!! WE ARE TOTALLY OPPOSED TO THE CONTINUED GENERATION OF NUCLEAR WASTE----AND OF NUCLEAR ENERGY. We are opposed vehemently to the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, and the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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Janet Tache
PO Box 1210
Penn Valley, CA 95946

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Deborah Taggert [mailto:dtaggert@triad rr.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 11:35 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Deborah Taggert
5675 Gumtree RD
Winston Salem, NC 27107

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Nancy Taiani [mailto nancytaiani@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:54 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Nancy Taiani
50 Gordonhurst Ave.
Glen Ridge, NJ 07028

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Julie Takatsch [mailto:56jules@optonline net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:19 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Julie Takatsch
67 Schoolhouse Rd
Port Jervis, NY 12771

## Consent-Based Siting

From: j talbot [mailto:talbot@talbotworld.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:33 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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j talbot
305 w milton
austin, TX 78704

## Consent-Based Siting

From: j talbot [mailto:talbot@talbotworld.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:55 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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j talbot
305 w milton
austin, TX 78704

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Deenie Tallant [mailto:Deenie_Tallant@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:28 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Deenie Tallant
710 Duvall Blvd
Highland Village, TX 75077

## Consent-Based Siting

From: RUBEN Tamamian [mailto:rubentamamian@sbcglobal net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:27 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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RUBEN Tamamian
2651 koa ave
Morro bay, CA 93442

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Rosemary Tann [mailto:rocatgo@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:34 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Rosemary Tann
916 N. Park Road
1617 Adams Street, Hollywood, FL
Hollywood, FL 33312

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From: Rosemary Tann [mailto:rocatgo@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:20 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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1617 Adams Street, Hollywood, FL
Hollywood, FL 33312

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From: Yvette Tapp [mailto:yvette@mountainairfilms.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:20 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
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Yvette Tapp
1255 Ave Morelia #204
Santa Fe, NM 87506

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Yvette Tapp
1255 Ave Morelia #204
Santa Fe, NM 87506

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Janet Tarn [mailto:janettarn09@mac.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:42 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future. I happen to live across the valley from Los Alamos National Laboratory and the thought of what is going on there AS WE SPEAK is of major concern to residents of Santa Fe and surrounding communities, including the Pueblo of Santa Clara, as well as the thousands of visitors who visit the area.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

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Janet Tarn
PO Box 8187
Santa Fe, NM 87506

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Bruce Van Tassell [mailto:bkvt@telus.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:03 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

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Bruce Van Tassell
924 Observatory st.
924 Observatory st.
Nelson, BC V1L4Z5

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Nancy Tate [mailto:lepoco@fast net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:22 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Nancy Tate
313 West 4th St.
825 Church Rd.
Bethlehem, PA 18077

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Beth Tatum [mailto:tatumer@auburn.edu]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:52 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Beth Tatum
569 Hudson Ter
Auburn, AL 36830

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Beth Tatum [mailto:tatumer@auburn.edu]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:11 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Beth Tatum
569 Hudson Ter
Auburn, AL 36830

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dave Tavalin [mailto:tavalind@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:05 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Dave Tavalin
302 E. 126th Strert
New York, NY 10035

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jeremy Taylor [mailto:dreamrev@comcast net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:47 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Jeremy Taylor
736 San Pedro Street
Fairfield, CA 94533

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Allan S Taylor [mailto:altaylor@sasktel net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:59 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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Allan S Taylor
413 - 17th Ave., East,
Regina,, SK S4N 0Y4

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Elizabeth Taylor [mailto:emtseattle@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 12:25 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Elizabeth Taylor
721 N 138th St
Seattle, WA 98133

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Imogen Taylor [mailto:imogen.taylor@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:03 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Imogen Taylor
515 N Holland
Portland, OR 97217

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jeremy Taylor [mailto:dreamrev@comcast net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:55 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Jeremy Taylor
736 San Pedro Street
Fairfield, CA 94533

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Laura Pitt Taylor [mailto:pitttaylor@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:22 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Laura Pitt Taylor
25 Jay Street
Brooklyn, NY 87105

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Margaret Taylor [mailto:maggie.taylor@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:20 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Margaret Taylor
500 W 122nd St #1H
New York, NY 10027

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Rolf Taylor [mailto rolf.taylor@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 8:53 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Rolf Taylor
4136 watkins trail
Annandale, VA 22003

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Terry Tedesco-Kerrick [mailto:ttedesco49@cox net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:29 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Terry Tedesco-Kerrick
3042 E Squaw Peak Circle
n/a
Phoenix, AZ 85016

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From: Terry Tedesco-Kerrick [mailto:ttedesco49@cox net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:54 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Terry Tedesco-Kerrick
3042 E Squaw Peak Circle
n/a
Phoenix, AZ 85016

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Taylor Teegarden [mailto:twrite@earthlink.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:19 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

While the now-decommissioned nuclear facility at Hanford, WA, continues to leak its radioactive products downstream through prime salmon beds that sustain the native Americans who live there; and while unmarked tractor/trailers sit untended along highways leading out of New Mexico's vaunted-but-now closed WIPP facility, our nuclear poisons sit poised to become a problem in a neighborhood near you.

Remediation? Just how stupid do you think Americans are? First of all, the Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest. Surprise, surprise. The DOE wants to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment.

Nice try, you guys. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Taylor Teegarden
513 Midway Court
Martinez, CA 94501

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Scott Teel [mailto:scottkl@twcny.rr.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:12 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Scott Teel
710 N. Cayuga St.
Apt. 3
Ithaca, NY 14850

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Michele Temple [mailto:mt1142@juno.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:58 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Michele Temple
42-26 69th street
Woodside, NY 11377

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From: Michele Temple [mailto:mt1142@juno.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:18 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Michele Temple
42-26 69th street
Woodside, NY 11377

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Marcia Tendick [mailto:mtendick@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:28 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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Marcia Tendick
1889 Plateau Circle
Moab, UT 84532

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lynne Teplin [mailto:lynnet@lagcc.cuny.edu]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:33 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Lynne Teplin
846 Palmer Road #1A
Bronxville, NY 10708

From: Lynne Teplin [mailto:lynnet@lagcc.cuny.edu]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:43 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Lynne Teplin
846 Palmer Road #1A
Bronxville, NY 10708

## Consent-Based Siting

From: TERAO Terumi [mailto:teraoter@mint.ocn.ne.jp]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 8:39 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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TERAO Terumi
Ooze 1-1-1-1116
Yashio, ot 00000

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Yara Tethys [mailto:yara.tethys@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 7:25 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Yara Tethys
1010 NW Fisk St
Pullman, WA 99163

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Donna Thelander [mailto:dthelander@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:25 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Donna Thelander
1521 NE Holman Street
Portland, OR 97211

## Consent-Based Siting

From: James Thomas [mailto:jmichaelthomas2005@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:52 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

James Thomas
5900 Hathaway Lane
Chapel Hill, NC 27514

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jan Thomas [mailto:Jan@artapult.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 9:46 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Jan Thomas
433 N 7th St
Murphysboro, IL 62966

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Bob Thomas [mailto:rockthomas@hughes net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:08 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Bob Thomas
2001 Weaver Rd
Myrtle Creek, OR 97457

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Clara Thomas [mailto:ohcs_cgt@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 10:15 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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With policy such as this it is clear neither the protection of the environment nor the health of the population is a consideration of the DOE.

Clara Thomas
2050 Austell Road
Apt. T-9
Marietta, GA 36109

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Debbie Thomas [mailto:08shiloh@live.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:54 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Debbie Thomas
P.O. Box 2377
Fernley, NV 89408

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jan Thomas [mailto:Jan@artapult.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 10:22 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Jan Thomas
433 N 7th St
Murphysboro, IL 62966

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mollie Thomas [mailto:grouseridgetower@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:20 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Mollie Thomas
1506 Bethel St. NE
Olympia, WA 98532

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Scott Thomas [mailto:scottdas68@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:09 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

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Scott Thomas
n/a
n/a
Santa Fe, NM 87505

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Trevor Thomas [mailto:tegthomas@cox.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:36 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Trevor Thomas
90 Rossini Rd
Westerly, RI 02891

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Susan Thompson [mailto:suzzeliza@aol.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 3:54 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Susan Thompson
23516 Shannondell Dr
Audubon, PA 19403
Audubon, PA 19403

## Consent-Based Siting

From: LORRAINE THOMPSON [mailto:LAURA451@LIVE.COM]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 10:22 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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LORRAINE THOMPSON
126 COTTAGE ST.
126 COTTAGE ST.
MIDDLETOWN, NY 10940

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Susan Thompson [mailto:susan@wattworks.net]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 9:51 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Susan Thompson
10501 Sycamore Rd
Middletown, CA 95461

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Gerald Tichy [mailto:tgetish@aol.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 9:15 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Gerald Tichy
6 Edwards Dr
Oxford, CT 06478

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Marion Tidwell [mailto:marilat@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:11 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Marion Tidwell
3330 W 78th Place
Merrillville, IN 46410

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Marion Tidwell [mailto:marilat@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:46 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Merrillville, IN 46410

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Grace Tiessen [mailto:gracetiessen@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:06 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Grace Tiessen
714 Prospect Blvd
714 Prospect Boulevard
Pasadena, CA 91103

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Grace Tiessen [mailto:gracetiessen@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:31 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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## Consent-Based Siting

From: Tina Tine' [mailto:tina.m.tine@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:28 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Tina Tine'
414 n. forest park blvd. #725
Knoxville, TN 37919

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Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 9:46 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Tina Tine'
414 n. forest park blvd. #725
Knoxville, TN 37919

## Consent-Based Siting

From: pamela tinto [mailto:pamtinto@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:34 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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pamela tinto
73 high  Street
Amherst, MA 01002

## Consent-Based Siting

From: David Tivol [mailto:dtivol@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:38 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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David Tivol
140 Locksunart Way #1
Sunnyvale, CA 94087

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Alice Tobias [mailto:alicetobias@msn.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:09 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Alice Tobias
3616 42nd Str
Seattle, WA 98105

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Alice Tobias [mailto:alicetobias@msn.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:45 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Alice Tobias
3616 NE 42nd St
Seattle, WA 98105

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Beatrice Tocher [mailto:beatricetocher@sbcglobal net]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 1:43 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Beatrice Tocher
591 Appleberry Dr
San Rafael, CA, CA 94903

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jude Todd [mailto:todd@ucsc.edu]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:43 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Jude Todd
2655 Brommer St. #18
Santa Cruz, CA 95062

## Consent-Based Siting

From: sacha Todd [mailto:green_scarecrow@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 6:41 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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sacha Todd
1840 N Leverett Ave Apt 7
Fayetteville, AR 72703

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jude Todd [mailto:todd@ucsc.edu]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:09 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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Jude Todd
2655 Brommer St. #18
Santa Cruz, CA 95062

## Consent-Based Siting

From: A. Todd [mailto:todd87701@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:27 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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A. Todd
PO Box 41783
Eugene, OR 97404

## Consent-Based Siting

From: sacha Todd [mailto:green_scarecrow@yahoo.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 12:41 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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sacha Todd
1840 N Leverett Ave Apt 7
Fayetteville, AR 72703

## Consent-Based Siting

From: George Tolleson [mailto:gtoll2@charter net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:32 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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George Tolleson
48 W. Raleigh Rd.
Asheville, NC 28803

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Pela Tomasello [mailto:p_tomasello@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:32 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Pela Tomasello
621 Windham St
Santa Cruz, CA 95062

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Barbara Tombleson [mailto:bjt@coho net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 7:14 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Barbara Tombleson
7526 SW Capitol Hill Rd.
7526 SW Capitol Hill Rd.
Portland, OR 97219

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Travis Tomjack [mailto:ttomjack@austin rr.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:20 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Travis Tomjack
11160 Jollyville Rd # 726
Austin, TX 78759

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Gary Tonkin [mailto:gwtonkin@charter net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:48 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Oppose DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

My take is the Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Gary Tonkin
239 W Winona St
Duluth, MN 55803

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mithi Toor [mailto:musicrestore1@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:03 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Mithi Toor
1030 Tiverton Ave
Los Angeles, CA 90024

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mithi Toor [mailto:musicrestore1@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:51 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Mithi Toor
1030 Tiverton Ave
Los Angeles, CA 90024

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sharon Torrisi [mailto:satvet@aol.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:25 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Sharon Torrisi
2126 Ardmore Ave
Hermosa Beach, CA 90254

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sharon Torrisi [mailto:satvet@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:39 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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2126 Ardmore Ave
Hermosa Beach, CA 90254

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lana Touchstone [mailto:lanatouchstone@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:24 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Lana Touchstone
252 Grapewood St
Vallejo, CA 94591

## Consent-Based Siting

From: rebecca townsend [mailto:mygardenstudio@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:29 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. That's not fair. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. That's the most logical and healthy option. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

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rebecca townsend
531 Lawrence Dr.
San Luis Obispo, CA 93401

## Consent-Based Siting

From: rebecca townsend [mailto:mygardenstudio@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:58 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. Please help keep us safe! DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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rebecca townsend
531 Lawrence Dr.
San Luis Obispo, CA 93401

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lenore Traband [mailto:ltraband@igc.org]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 7:27 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Lenore Traband
229 Holroyd Place
229 Holroyd Place, Woodbury, NJ
Woodbury, NJ 08096

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Debora Tramposh [mailto:dtramposh@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 11:09 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Debora Tramposh
1525 SE 139th
Portland, OR 97233

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Debora Tramposh [mailto:dtramposh@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:14 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Debora Tramposh
1525 SE 139th
Portland, OR 97233

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Patricia Tran [mailto:patriciamtran@aol.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 3:19 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Patricia Tran
2514 Loyanne
2514 loyanne
Spring, TX 77373

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Danielle Tran [mailto:danishome@live.ca]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:34 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Danielle Tran
191 Edenwold Dr NW
Calgary, AB T3A3S4

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Norman Traum [mailto:dougiemacd67@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:44 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Norman Traum
2818 Jay Rd
Boulder, CO 80027

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Roy Treadway [mailto roycttreadway@comcast.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:46 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Roy Treadway
1951 Circle Lane SE
Lacey, WA 98503

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Carolyn Treadway [mailto:carolyn@planetcare.us]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:01 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Carolyn Treadway
1951 Circle Lane SE
Lacey, WA 98503

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lynne Treat [mailto:ltreat142@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:40 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Lynne Treat
674 NE Franklin Avenue
Chehalis, WA 98532

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Steve Treegoob [mailto:steve-try@hotmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 7:38 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

Nuclear waste: The Gift* (please forgive the pun in German) that gives forever. *poison

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Steve Treegoob
2020 Northrup #910
#
Portland, OR 97209

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Richard Tregidgo [mailto:norslope@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:19 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Richard Tregidgo
1146 Sunnyside Dr.
Holtwood, PA 17532

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dennis Trembly [mailto:trembly@usc.edu]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 10:18 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Dennis Trembly
880 West 1st St. #301
Los Angeles, CA 90012

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Leonard Tremmel [mailto:slapshoe@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:09 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Leonard Tremmel
800 Lyon #2
San Francisco, CA 94115

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Gina Trent [mailto:ginaftrent@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:59 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Gina Trent
270 5th St.
1J
Brooklyn, NY 11215

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Betty Trentlyon [mailto:bettysvat@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:44 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Betty Trentlyon
409 West 21st Street
New York, NY 10011

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Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:44 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
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Betty Trentlyon
409 West 21st Street
New York, NY 10011

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Diana Trichilo [mailto:dtrichilo@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:10 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Diana Trichilo
450 Pitt Avenue
#3
Sebastopol, CA 95473

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ursula Trimble [mailto:urstrimble@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:39 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Ursula Trimble
1265 SW Seabrook LN
Waldport, OR 97394

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ursula Trimble [mailto:urstrimble@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 5:45 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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Ursula Trimble
1265 SW Seabrook LN
Waldport, OR 97394

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Emily Trinkaus [mailto:etrinkaus@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 11:42 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Emily Trinkaus
6947 SW 33rd Place
Portland, OR 97213

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Emily Trinkaus [mailto:etrinkaus@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:37 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Emily Trinkaus
6947 SW 33rd Place
Portland, OR 97213

## Consent-Based Siting

From: David Trione [mailto:renewabledavid@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 5:54 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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David Trione
431 33rd Pl
Philomath, OR 97370

## Consent-Based Siting

From: David Trione [mailto:renewabledavid@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 3:14 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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David Trione
431 33rd Pl
Philomath, OR 97370

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Tom Tripp [mailto:tripptom@comcast net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:54 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Tom Tripp
3839 Bonneymoore Drive
Fort Collins, CO 80524

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Phyllis Troia [mailto:pjtroia@verizon net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 6:08 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Phyllis Troia
627 Long Pond Rd
Plymouth, MA 02360

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Carmine Tronolone [mailto:redrap@nyc.rr.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 11:33 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

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Carmine Tronolone
327 W 30 St
New York, NY 10001

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Carolyn Trovao [mailto:carolyntrovao@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 8:52 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Carolyn Trovao
4547 W Harvard Ave
Fresno, CA 93722

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Carolyn Trovao [mailto:carolyntrovao@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 9:50 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Carolyn Trovao
4547 W Harvard Ave
Fresno, CA 93722

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mary True [mailto:streamgirlll@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:03 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Mary True
PO BOX 1020
Pepe'ekeo, HI 96783

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mary True [mailto:streamgirlll@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 6:12 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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PO BOX 1020
Pepe'ekeo, HI 96783

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From: Hal Trufan [mailto:htrufan@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:43 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Hal Trufan
6808 Old Forge Dr
Charlotte, NC 28226

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Robert Trujillo [mailto:trujillo@localnet.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:01 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Robert Trujillo
148 Palmdale Dr
Amherst, NY 14221

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joel Trupin [mailto:ktrupin@msn.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:20 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

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Joel Trupin
3704 Woodmont Blvd.
Marshfield, VT 05658

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joel Trupin [mailto:ktrupin@msn.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:27 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Joel Trupin
3704 Woodmont Blvd.
Marshfield, VT 05658

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jackie Tryggeseth [mailto:jtrygges@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:13 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Jackie Tryggeseth
8773 Blynn Rd.
6869 Taylor Rd
Mazomanie, WI 53560

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Laurie Tsitsivas [mailto:craig@unisol.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 9:42 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Laurie Tsitsivas
33586 Via Lagos
Dana Point, CA 92629

## Consent-Based Siting

From: frederick tuck [mailto:tuck_saxman@earthlink.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:30 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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frederick tuck
po box 748
stanardsville, VA 22973

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Anne Tuddenham [mailto:hatuddenham@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:17 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Anne Tuddenham
1220 King Drive
El Cerrito, CA 94530

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Diane Turco [mailto:tturco@comcast.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Diane Turco
PO Box 303
157 Long Road
South Harwich, MA 02661

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lawrence Turk, RN [mailto:butch@wildrockies.org]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 4:28 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Lawrence Turk, RN
POB 203
none
Hendersonville, NC 28793

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ian Turner [mailto:ian.turner019@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:57 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Ian Turner
955 43rd Ave., #112
Sacramento, CA 95831

## Consent-Based Siting

From: David Turner [mailto:psalter103@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:21 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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David Turner
45 Rocco Street, Apt. C6
Belleville, NJ 07109

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Carolyn Turner [mailto:cat123@bellsouth net]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 6:11 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Carolyn Turner
2207 Fellowship Court
Tucker, GA 30084

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Glenyth Turner [mailto:glenyth@att net]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 3:36 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Glenyth Turner
5736 Camber Drive
San Diego, CA 92117

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Rogers Turrentine [mailto:rturrentine@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 10:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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Rogers Turrentine
311 S Horne St
Oceanside, CA 92054

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Katharine Tussing [mailto:kathytussing@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 9:05 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Katharine Tussing
148 Crestwood Ave
Apt.11
Buffalo, NY 14216

## Consent-Based Siting

From: carl tyndall [mailto:ctyn2000@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:56 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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carl tyndall
5 fordham hill oval
brooklyn, NY 10468

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Vic and Barby Ulmer [mailto:odw@magiclink.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:02 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future. This is very short sighted both for public health and for the environment. Nuclear power is more expensive than truly positive alternatives of wind and solar with a need to use tremendous amounts of water which is very scarce in many parts of the country.
We need to stop producing nuclear weapons also which we have signed treaties to reduce rather than make more.
NO! NO! NO! to nuclear in any form. The waste we now have should stay as close to where it was produced but as far from people as possible.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Vic and Barby Ulmer
13004 Paseo Presada
13004 Paseo Presada
Saratoga, CA 95070

From: Francine Ungaro [mailto:fbungaro@cox.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:34 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Francine Ungaro
639 Andrews Street
Southington, CT 06489

From: Pamela Unger [mailto:prairieroots@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 11:34 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Pamela Unger
5559 North Meadows Blvd
Columbus, OH 43229

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Pamela Unger [mailto:prairieroots@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:38 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Pamela Unger
5559 North Meadows Blvd
Columbus, OH 43229

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dennis Upton [mailto:denkafer1@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:00 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Dennis Upton
925 Oregon Avenue
Palo Alto, CA 94306

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Gayna Uransky [mailto:gayna707@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 2:07 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

I think it is very CLEAR THAT THE PUBLIC DOES NOT WANT TO LIVE NEXT TO A NUCLEAR DUMP SITE !!!!!

I DO NOT WANT TO LIVE NEXT TO A NUCLEAR DUMPSITE ! I DON'T WANT MY KIDS LIVING NEXT TO A NUCLEAR DUMPSITE !!!! I DON'T EVEN WANT YOUR KIDS LIVING NEXT TO A NUCLEAR DUMPSITE !!!!!!!!!!!!

MY GUESS IS THAT NO ONE WANTS TO LIVE NEXT TO A NUCLEA R DUMPSITE !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Gayna Uransky
1653 Kimtu Rd
Garberville, CA 95542

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Benjamin Urmston [mailto:urmston@xavier.edu]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:39 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Benjamin Urmston
3844 Victory Parkway
3844 Victory Parkway
Cincinnati, OH 45207

From: Charles Utt [mailto:charlesrutt72@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 1:50 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Charles Utt
1645 Austin Drive
Dixon, CA 95620

# Consent-Based Siting

From: Kenny Vaher [mailto:Muggrat@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:06 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Kenny Vaher
219 West 24th Street
219 West 24th Street
NYC, NY 10011

From: Janice Vakili [mailto:vakilimom@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:55 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Janice Vakili
12715 ne 7th ave
vancouver, WA 98685

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ann Valdez [mailto:valdezann3@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:49 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Ann Valdez
3178 Bayview Avenue
Brooklyn, NY 11224

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joana Valek [mailto:jolanavanek@yahoo.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 2:14 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Joana Valek
100 West Colorado
POB 1555
Telluride, CO 81435

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Claudia Van Gerven [mailto:claudia.vangerven@colorado.edu]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:14 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Claudia Van Gerven
727 Ithaca Dr.
Boulder, CO 80305

From: Natalie Van Leekwijck [mailto:hoepagirl@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:05 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Natalie Van Leekwijck
Riddle Press 4555 SW Main Ave
Beaverton, OR 97005

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Natalie Van Leekwijck [mailto:hoepagirl@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 7:19 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Natalie Van Leekwijck
Riddle Press 4555 SW Main Ave
Beaverton, OR 97005

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jane Leatherman Van Praag [mailto:jlvanpraag@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 9:20 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Jane Leatherman Van Praag
P. O. Box 354
P. O. Box 354
Bartlett, TX 76511

From: Carol Van Strum [mailto:cvs@peak.org]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 6:28 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Carol Van Strum
7493 E. Five Rivers
Tidewater, OR 97390

From: Jordan Van Voast [mailto:jordanvvvv@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:53 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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Jordan Van Voast
2109 31st Ave. S.
Seattle, WA 98144

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Betty J. Van Wicklen [mailto:g10121@care2.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:08 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Betty J. Van Wicklen
41 Lake Shore Dr.  #2B
Watervliet, NY 12189

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Leathea Vanadore [mailto:lev212@rcn.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:42 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Leathea Vanadore
330 West 28th St.
330 West 28th St,, New York, N.Y. 10001
new York, NY 10001

## Consent-Based Siting

From: phil vanasse [mailto:pava58@comcast.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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phil vanasse
16 colonial court
High Bridge, NJ 08829

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Susan Vanderborg [mailto:sjvander@mailbox.sc.edu]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:45 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Susan Vanderborg
3810 Verner Street
Columbia, SC 29204

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Diane Vandiver [mailto:dianev72@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:44 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Diane Vandiver
530 Princeton Dr
Bolingbrook, IL 60440

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Diane Vandiver [mailto:dianev72@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:24 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Diane Vandiver
530 Princeton Dr
Bolingbrook, IL 60440

From: Nancy Vann [mailto:nancy_vann@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:01 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

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The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Nancy Vann
510 W 110th St
New York, NY 10025

## Consent-Based Siting

From: tony vanoni [mailto:tonygvanoni@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:58 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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tony vanoni
1095 Buena Vista Way
Carlsbad, CA 92008

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dorothy Varellas [mailto:djvarellas@comcast.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:59 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Dorothy Varellas
35 Carr st
35 Carr st
San Francisco, CA 94124

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Gabriel Varkonyi [mailto:varkga@yahoo.ca]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:30 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Gabriel Varkonyi
2019 Lansdowne Ave.
Saskatoon, SK S7J 1G4

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sherry Vatter [mailto:sgv@chem.ucla.edu]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:33 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Sherry Vatter
3362 Keystone Avenue, Apt. 2
Los Angeles, CA 90034

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sherry Vatter [mailto:sgv@chem.ucla.edu]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:19 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Sherry Vatter
3362 Keystone Avenue, Apt. 2
Los Angeles, CA 90034

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kevin Vaught [mailto:klvaught@bellsouth.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:43 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Kevin Vaught
505 Oak Forest Circle
Antioch, TN 37013

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kevin Vaught [mailto:klvaught@bellsouth.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:10 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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Kevin Vaught
505 Oak Forest Circle
Antioch, TN 37013

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Satya Vayu [mailto:satyavayu@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 6:29 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Satya Vayu
4418 SE Harrison
Portland, OR 97215

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ordell Vee [mailto:otvee@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 10:13 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Ordell Vee
427 2nd st. n.e.
Madelia, MN 56062

From: Gerry Veeder [mailto:gkv0001@verizon.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:42 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Gerry Veeder
1721 Wisteria St.
1721 Wisteria St.
Denton, TX 76205

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Bill Ventre [mailto:nottwo@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:57 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Bill Ventre
1315 W. Jefferson St.
Boise, ID 83702

From: john ventre [mailto:jv3free@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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john ventre
700 shumont rd
bl. mt., NC 28711

## Consent-Based Siting

From: anne veraldi [mailto:anneveraldi@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:17 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

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2
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From: anne veraldi [mailto:anneveraldi@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 6:45 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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## Consent-Based Siting

From: Theresa Vernon [mailto:acuvern@tvernonlac.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:48 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Theresa Vernon
2241 Grahn Drive
Santa Rosa, CA 95404

From: Evelyn Verrill [mailto:im2valla@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 9:48 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Evelyn Verrill
1155 w fawn lane
Prescott, AZ 86305

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Adam Versenyi [mailto:glideradam@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 8:35 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Adam Versenyi
205 Oleander Road
Carrboro, NC 27510

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From: Jean Verthein [mailto:jverthein@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 7:46 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Jean Verthein
620 Fort Washington Ave
NY, NY 10040

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Paul Vesper [mailto:Pontiffp@comcast.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:44 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Paul Vesper
1601 Berkeley Way
Berkeley, CA 94703

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Paul Vesper [mailto:Pontiffp@comcast.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:51 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Paul Vesper
1601 Berkeley Way
Berkeley, CA 94703

From: Judith Vidaver [mailto:indigoa@mcn.org]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:17 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Judith Vidaver
32000 Camp 2 Ten Mile Rd
Fort Bragg, CA 95437

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Tanja Vierthaler [mailto:tanja.vierthaler@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:06 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Tanja Vierthaler
24 Georgiana Street
London, ot NW1 0EA

From: Kathleen View [mailto:kaview_822@gmx.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:18 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Kathleen View
115 Dewitt Ave 10R
Elmira, NY 14901

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lauren Vigna [mailto:LaurenV1@Yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 11:21 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Lauren Vigna
92 Somerston Road
Yorktown Heights, NY 10710

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lori Visioli [mailto:loriag215@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:56 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Lori Visioli
1091 Roseberry Court
Morganville, NJ 07751

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lori Visioli [mailto:loriag215@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:31 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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Lori Visioli
1091 Roseberry Court
Morganville, NJ 07751

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Stephen Vodantis [mailto:svodantis@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:10 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

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Stephen Vodantis
901 Tenth St
Santa Monica, CA 90403

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Stephen Vodantis [mailto:svodantis@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:32 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Stephen Vodantis
901 Tenth St
Santa Monica, CA 90403

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From: Nathan Vogel [mailto:doctorspook@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:45 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Nathan Vogel
49 alpine terrace
San Francisco, CA 94177

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Nathan Vogel [mailto:doctorspook@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:53 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Nathan Vogel
49 alpine terrace
San Francisco, CA 94177

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From: Gary Vogt [mailto:garyvogt@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:01 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Gary Vogt
9631 Stylecrest Ct
St. Louis, MO 63126

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Axel Vogt [mailto:vogt@ub.uni-freiburg.de]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 2:04 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Axel Vogt
Reinhold-Schneider-Str. 15
Freiburg, ot 79117

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Susan Vogt [mailto:susanvogt1@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:08 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Susan Vogt
523 E. Southern Ave.
Covington, KY 41015

From: deborah j volk [mailto:wjvinns@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:56 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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deborah j volk
1548 pullan ave
cincinnati, OH 45223

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Pieter Vollaard [mailto:pvollaard@hetnet.nl]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:51 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Pieter Vollaard
Clementstreet 7
Nisse, ot 4443AL

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Pieter Vollaard [mailto:pvollaard@hetnet.nl]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 4:21 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Pieter Vollaard
Clementstreet 7
Nisse, ot 4443AL

## Consent-Based Siting

From: joe and mary volpe [mailto:jmvolpe@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:55 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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joe and mary volpe
P.O. Box 2083
ventura, CA 93002

## Consent-Based Siting

From: joe and mary volpe [mailto:jmvolpe@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:21 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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joe and mary volpe
P.O. Box 2083
ventura, CA 93002

From: Citizen Voter [mailto:moxie@mcn.org]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 4:32 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Citizen Voter
PO 113
Westport, CA 95488

From: Citizen Voter [mailto:moxie@mcn.org]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:18 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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Citizen Voter
PO 113
Westport, CA 95488

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Theodore Voth III [mailto:tedvoth3@uwalumni.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 10:42 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Theodore Voth III
1908 E. Main St. Apt. 1
Madison, WI 53704

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Alan Vovolka [mailto:alan.v@cox.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:11 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Alan Vovolka
3719 Hamilton St
Omaha, NE 68131

From: Adam Vrbanic [mailto:nostalgiaparks@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:05 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Adam Vrbanic
1710 Avenue H
Brooklyn, NY 11230

## Consent-Based Siting

From: nancy wade [mailto:nancywade2002@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:54 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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nancy wade
po box 872
po box 872
willits, CA 95490

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jim Wagner [mailto:JimWagner@safe-mail.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 7:20 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Jim Wagner
4897 E Walnut St
Westerville, OH 43081

From: pauline wagner [mailto:ctwagner@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:19 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

pauline wagner
102 alder st.
102 alder st.
mechanicsburg, PA 17055

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mana-Jean Wagnon [mailto:jwagnon@pacifier.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 2:48 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Mana-Jean Wagnon
2834 Johnson Ave
Alameda, CA 94501

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Marie Wakefield [mailto:wakefieldm_2000@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:48 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Marie Wakefield
3054 Highway 20
Newport, OR 97365

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Bret Walburg [mailto:bretwalburg@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:12 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Bret Walburg
918 Broderick St. Apt PH
918 Broderick St.
San Francisco, CA 94115

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Birgit Walch [mailto:birgitwalch@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:09 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Birgit Walch
Stone Church Rd E
Hamilton, ON L8W 0B1

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Richard Waldo [mailto:richardwaldo83@comcast net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:55 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Richard Waldo
4916 S. 525 W.
Riverdale, UT 84405

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Stephanie Walker [mailto:swalker@craterdiver.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:57 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Stephanie Walker
638 Los Ninos Way
Los Altos, CA
Los Altos, CA 94022

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Beverly Walker [mailto:peacockwalk@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 7:18 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

Stop the poisoning of our environment. Since science has proved the consequences of this toxic industry, we taxpayers and citizens should not suffer for their pollution, nor should they profit by ruining our air/water/soil, etc.

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Beverly Walker
1602 Teepee
Kingsland, TX 78639

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Bonnell Walker [mailto:etatum1@ec rr.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:45 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Bonnell Walker
108 Francis Street
Elizabethtown, NC 28337

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Donald Walker [mailto:donwalkerjr@comcast.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 11:06 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public's input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program.

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. This is another scheme where an industry reaps all the profits and then dumps the clean-up costs on the American taxpayer.

Unbelievably,DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years.

I do not consent to the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

Donald Walker
102 Delabarre Ave.
Conway, MA 01341

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joan Walker [mailto:jbmwalker13fr@gmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 8:39 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Joan Walker
1800 SW 15th Street
Bell, FL 32619

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joan Walker [mailto:jbmwalker13fr@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

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The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Joan Walker
1800 SW 15th Street
Bell, FL 32619

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Patti Walker [mailto:eternalshawnee.pw@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:13 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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Patti Walker
RR#2 Box 42A
Karbers Ridge, IL 62955

## Consent-Based Siting

From: adam wall [mailto:adamjwall@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:58 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

adam wall
311 Wagon Wheel Road
Montague, NJ 07827

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Christine Wall [mailto:wavemakerc@gmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 10:33 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Christine Wall
Sawyer
Seattle, WA 98020

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Bruce Wallace [mailto:clela4@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:33 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Bruce Wallace
1335 Warmlands Ave
Vista, CA 92084

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Donald Wallace [mailto:donwwallace@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 9:03 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

Firstly; I suspect that you don't even know that the U.S. Patent office granted a patent to a small California company who solved the last remaining scientific problem keeping fusion power from practical application... containment of the reaction. DOE solved the ignition issue in 1979 at ANL. See: fusionpowercorporation.com for the answer... RFADHIF!!!

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Donald Wallace
1710 Cold Canyon Rd
1710 Cold Canyon Road
Calabasas, CA 91302

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Bruce Wallace [mailto:clela4@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:40 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Bruce Wallace
1335 Warmlands Ave
Vista, CA 92084

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ray Wallace [mailto:howstl@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:45 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Ray Wallace
612 Nirk Ave
St Louis, MO 63122

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Deborah Wall [mailto:Deborahwall76@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:38 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Deborah Wall
23 Hughey St.
Nashua, NH 03064

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Susan Walp [mailto:susanwalp@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:48 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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Susan Walp
1234 El Mirador
Pasadena, CA 91103

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Susan Walp [mailto:susanwalp@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:15 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Susan Walp
1234 El Mirador
Pasadena, CA 91103

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Steve Walsh [mailto:tie.dye.steve54@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:40 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Bottom line all nuke business is a bad idea for our planet! No if ands or buts!...

Steve Walsh
220 NE Liberty Ave  Apt #1
Gresham, OR 97030

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joe Walsh [mailto:Walshjr46@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 10:17 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Joe Walsh
2525 S. Shore dr
2525 South Shore Dr.
Milwaukee, WI 53207

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Tom Walsh [mailto:tomwalsh10@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:39 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Tom Walsh
N4693 440th St.
Menomonie, WI 54751

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From: Tom Walsh [mailto:tomwalsh10@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 9:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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## Consent-Based Siting

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Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:39 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Marilyn Waltasti
20117 N. Geyser Drive
Maricopa, AZ 85138

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Marilyn Waltasti [mailto:mwaltasti@msn.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:50 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Marilyn Waltasti
20117 N. Geyser Drive
Maricopa, AZ 85138

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Deb Walter [mailto:debwalter56@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:06 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Deb Walter
4100 Easy St.
Moab, UT 84532

## Consent-Based Siting

From: kenneth walters [mailto:kennywaltersphoto@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 7:59 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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kenneth walters
629 22nd av. south
birmingham, AL 35205

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Daniell C. Walters [mailto:dan@chavous.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:25 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Daniell C. Walters
1006 E. Strawberry Lane
Boise, ID 83712

From: michael walters [mailto:michael.electricdreamer@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:42 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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michael walters
bentzonsvej 37
copenhagen, ot 2000

## Consent-Based Siting

From: John Walton [mailto:jwtqn@sonic net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:32 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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John Walton
35501 s hwy , unit 175
Galaa, CA 95445

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Nancy Wang [mailto:nancy@ethnohtec.org]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:46 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Nancy Wang
San Francisco
San Francisco, CA 94110

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sandra Wagner [mailto:sandywag@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:38 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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Sandra Wagner
1114 Bavarian Lane
Bryan, OH 43506

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lewis Ward [mailto:lew_ward@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:33 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Lewis Ward
246 Smith Rd.
Newfield, NY 14867

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Aurelie Ward [mailto:health@wardgroup net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 9:47 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Aurelie Ward
1409 Forest Park Drvie
Statesville, NC 28677

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Aurelie Ward [mailto:health@wardgroup net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:19 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Aurelie Ward
1409 Forest Park Drvie
Statesville, NC 28677

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Victoria Ward [mailto:vward1216@earthlink.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:11 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Victoria Ward
3002 Paseo Tranquillo
Santa Barbara, CA 93105

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Janette Warren [mailto:janette.warren@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:57 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Janette Warren
3350 crestview dr s
Salem, OR 97302

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ronald Warren [mailto ronw@imageiv.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:47 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Ronald Warren
3041 E Chevy Chase Dr
Glendale, CA 91206

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ronald Warren [mailto ronw@imageiv.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:09 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

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- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Ronald Warren
3041 E Chevy Chase Dr
Glendale, CA 91206

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Susan Warren [mailto:swarren28806@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:42 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I vehemently oppose the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, and the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Susan Warren
656 sand hill road
Asheville, NC 28806

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Roxanne Warren [mailto:rwarchitectsv42@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:52 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

Two of the most technically advanced countries in the world -- France and Germany -- are phasing out their nuclear plants. There must be a reason. Why are we even considering subsidizing ours? Have we forgotten Fukushima so soon?

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do NOT consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Roxanne Warren
523 West 112th Street #72
New York, NY 10025

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ellen Wasfi [mailto:EWasfi@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:04 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Ellen Wasfi
286 Pine Valley Road
Dover, DE 19904

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Charles Washburn [mailto:cjwashburn@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:25 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Charles Washburn
9 Congress Street
Worcester, MA 01609

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Chris Washington [mailto:cwashington@wlrk.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:08 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Chris Washington
345 West 58th Street, #11U
New York, NY 10019

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Chris Washington [mailto:cwashington@wlrk.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 6:08 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Chris Washington
345 West 58th Street, #11U
New York, NY 10019

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jacqueline Wasilewski [mailto:jwashi@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:56 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Jacqueline Wasilewski
P.O. Box 211
Highland, MD 20777

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joseph Wasserman [mailto:joewass64@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 2:34 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Joseph Wasserman
87 Shadow Lane
87 Shadow Lane
West Hartford, CT 06110

## Consent-Based Siting

From: L. Watchempino [mailto:5000wave@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:34 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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L. Watchempino
P.O. Box 407
Pueblo of Acoma, NM 87034

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mr. Anje' Waters [mailto:anjewa@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:30 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Mr. Anje' Waters
14945 Christmas Tree Ln.
980 Gold Flat Rd
Grass Valley, CA 95945

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mr. Anje' Waters [mailto:anjewa@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:04 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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14945 Christmas Tree Ln.
980 Gold Flat Rd
Grass Valley, CA 95945

## Consent-Based Siting

From: James H Waters [mailto:jgamtnvt@comcast net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:00 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

James H Waters
2302  46th Avenue NE
Olympia, WA 98506

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jennifer Waters [mailto:lyricessence@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:48 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Jennifer Waters
PO Box 23747
Tempe, AZ 85285

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Karen Watkins [mailto:katusha@main nc.us]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:25 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Karen Watkins
201 Sang Branch Road
201 sang Branch Rd
Burnsville, NC 28714

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Danny Watson [mailto:dwtsn4@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:11 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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I agree with Helen Caldecott:  radiation is incompatible with life and radioactive materials need to be left alone in the earth.

Danny Watson
Box C6
Cimarron
Cimarron, CO 81220

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Don Wattenbarger [mailto:dw333@reninet.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:05 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Don Wattenbarger
101
Eureka, CA 95503

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Randall Wayne [mailto:rushwayne@q.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:20 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

I am a business owner with a PhD in Biochemistry living in Oregon. I agree with the Nuclear Research and Information Service (NIRS) that the Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Randall Wayne
2720 Onyx St.
Eugene, OR 97403

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Robert Weaver [mailto:weaver.bert@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:00 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Robert Weaver
3066 Terramar Drive
Chamblee, GA 30341

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Esther Weaver [mailto:edw200@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:20 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Esther Weaver
47 Hawleys Corners Road
Highland, NY 12528

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Esther Weaver [mailto:edw200@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:36 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Esther Weaver
47 Hawleys Corners Road
Highland, NY 12528

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Randall Webb [mailto:lawrkw@comcast net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:37 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Randall Webb
2328 NW Glisan St. #10
na
Portland, OR 97210

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Susan Wechsler [mailto:susanwechsler@comcast.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:02 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Susan Wechsler
1820 NE Vine Ave
Corvallis, OR 97330

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Judith Wecker [mailto:wecs46@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:05 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Judith Wecker
3223 Ruger Ave.
Janesville, WI 53546

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Barbara Wefing, RN [mailto:bewefing@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 5:59 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,
I am writing to oppose the transport of nuclear material on our highways and through communities in the USA. An accident would be catastrophic and would expose innocent people to genetic mutations and reproductive dangers.

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Barbara Wefing, RN
320 South Street
Apt 10F
Morristown, NJ 07960

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Henry Weinberg [mailto:whweinberg@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:34 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Henry Weinberg
835 Puente Drive
Santa Barbara, CA 93110

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Henry Weinberg [mailto:whweinberg@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:59 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

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Henry Weinberg
835 Puente Drive
Santa Barbara, CA 93110

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Judi Weiner [mailto:samasinsam@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:34 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Judi Weiner
17C Doherty Circle
Swampscott, MA 01907

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joseph Weinstein [mailto:jweins123@hotmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:40 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment in opposition to DOE's proposed consent-based siting of nuclear waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) proposal for 'consent-based' interim siting of nuclear waste, in consolidated non-generation sites, serves in essence just to put short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect the public's tax funds, health, safety, and environment. In effect the proposal would commit DOE to a dangerous policy of supporting the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I oppose and do not consent to unending generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

A rational "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel must above all END the further waste production; and for existing waste must (a) provide for secure interim storage as close as possible to the site of generation and (b) determine and use
scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just methods for long-term isolation of the waste from the biosphere.

Scores of concerned organizations have endorsed improving interim storage and security of nuclear waste via Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would provide interim storage of maximum feasible safety and security by moving (sufficiently cooled) waste out of fuel pools to on-site robust, hardened dry-cask storage. This approach both reduces risk of catastrophic fuel pool fires and best protects us from needless extra dangers of moving and transporting the waste - actions which increase likelihood of or vulnerability to natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new interim sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, but their use would add the hazards and insecurity of transportation. If a consolidated storage site truly is temporary, then each container will have to move at least twice - i.e. both to the site and from it - compounding transportation hazards. Indeed, with use of an interim consolidated 'consent-based' storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) correctly required DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency takes title to and transports civilian nuclear waste.

A rational policy for USA nuclear waste has long been foiled by the unscientific fiat pre-selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site for a nuclear waste repository - before the site's suitability was carefully studied! As its first step a rational waste policy must end such fiat pre-selection of Yucca Mountain or of any other site.

A needed second step is to curtail the waste being generated, and a third step is to energize scientific research to

identify feasible technologies and locations for long-term (million-year) isolation of the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment so that storage at reactor sites can actually be “interim”.

Only after scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are identified can meaningful public consent be given to the siting of nuclear waste facilities.

The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Joseph Weinstein
4000 Linden Ave.
Long Beach, CA 90807

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Stuart Weinstock [mailto:sjweinstock@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:13 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Stuart Weinstock
180 West End Ave
West Orange, NJ 07052

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jef Weisel [mailto:wowwees@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:44 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Jef Weisel
44 high st
keene, NH 03431

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jef Weisel [mailto:wowwees@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:19 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Jef Weisel
44 high st
keene, NH 03431

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lynne Weiske [mailto:movieblonde@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:32 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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Lynne Weiske
wilshire bl
los angeles, CA 90048

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lynne Weiske [mailto:movieblonde@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:33 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Lynne Weiske
wilshire bl
los angeles, CA 90048

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Eleanor Weisman [mailto:eleanor.weisman@allegheny.edu]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:28 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Eleanor Weisman
990 First St.
990 First St.
Meadville, PA 16335

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kenny Weiss [mailto:kennyw@thresholdent.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:39 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Kenny Weiss
206 B Oakland Ave
Capitola, CA. 95010
Capitola, CA 95010

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Daniel Weiss [mailto:dweiss@moomail net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:51 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Daniel Weiss
161 Austin Drive - Apt. 106
Burlington, VT 05401

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Elinor Weiss [mailto:Ellie46@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:46 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Elinor Weiss
6177 Ranch View Drive
East Amherst, NY 14051

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Brian Weissbuch [mailto:kw@kwbotanicals.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:53 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Brian Weissbuch
165 Tunstead Ave
San Anselmo, CA 94960

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ted Weissgerber [mailto:burger2227@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:18 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

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Ted Weissgerber
18 B Scott Drive
Pittsburgh, PA 15236

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Roberta Weissglass [mailto rwactivist@cox net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:17 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment.

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Roberta Weissglass
P.O. Box 31015
Santa Barbara, CA 93130

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Stephen Weitz [mailto:weitzs@earthlink.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:56 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Stephen Weitz
2757 Best Ave.
Oakland, CA 94619

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dennis Welch [mailto:blakeprof@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 11:06 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Dennis Welch
701 Eldridge Loop
Cary, NC 27519

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dennis Welch [mailto:blakeprof@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Dennis Welch
701 Eldridge Loop
Cary, NC 27519

## Consent-Based Siting

From: MaryJane Welch [mailto:jane.johnnyjumpup@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:23 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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MaryJane Welch
145 Rankin St.
Apt. D
Rockland, ME 04841

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ken Welke [mailto:lieugy@yahoo.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 12:42 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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Ken Welke
821 glen miller dr.
821 glen miller dr.
Windsor, CA 95492

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jeannette Welling [mailto:bongodrum@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:24 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

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Jeannette Welling
2450 Pleasant Way
Thousand Oaks, CA 91362

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jeannette Welling [mailto:bongodrum@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 8:16 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Jeannette Welling
2450 Pleasant Way
Thousand Oaks, CA 91362

## Consent-Based Siting

From: R Wells [mailto:tigerwells@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:45 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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R Wells
442 S. Alexandria Ave #1
Los Angeles, CA 90020

## Consent-Based Siting

From: R Wells [mailto:tigerwells@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 5:52 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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R Wells
442 S. Alexandria Ave #1
Los Angeles, CA 90020

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mike Weltman [mailto mikewealthman@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Mike Weltman
13320 SW Allen Blvd apt 208
BEAVERTON, OR 97005

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Deborah Ann Welton [mailto:twomoons1010@care2.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 11:51 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Deborah Ann Welton
202 Marshall St.
Brookneal, VA 24528

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Shahla Werner [mailto:shahlawerner@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 10:15 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,
I'm writing to voice my serious concerns about the Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act correctly requires the DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of nuclear waste into the future. As a mother of two, I find this concerning and unacceptable. Consent-based siting must only be predicated on the idea that dangerous, radioactive waste and the nuclear energy that produces it must be phased out in favor of renewables and efficiency, so that we can focus on safely storing a known quantity of hazardous material for perpetuity. Mass transportation of nuclear waste poses grave risks, and should not be done on an ongoing basis.

The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

The best option for storing nuclear waste already generated is to keep it at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site, there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is irresponsible.

Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of

nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Shahla Werner
126 Buckingham Ln
Madison, WI 53714

## Consent-Based Siting

From: F. Robert Wesley [mailto:frw2@cornell.edu]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 9:40 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

F. Robert Wesley
212 Hill Road
Ithaca, NY 14850

## Consent-Based Siting

From: F. Robert Wesley [mailto:frw2@cornell.edu]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:05 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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F. Robert Wesley
212 Hill Road
Ithaca, NY 14850

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Eric Wessman [mailto:eric@ericwessman.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:10 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

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Eric Wessman
723 Pelhamdale Ave.
Pelham, NY 10803

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Eric Wessman [mailto:eric@ericwessman.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:53 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Eric Wessman
723 Pelhamdale Ave.
Pelham, NY 10803

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Eric West [mailto:eagleyachts@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:59 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

With respect to storing nuclear waste, there is only one option for DOE, to store the waste on site at the nuclear plants themselves. If DOE wishes to continue supporting the most dangerous fuel on the planet, then the utilities have to take on the liability for their waste, not us.

With regard to storing nuclear waste in the Carolinas, Georgia and Florida, there is no safe way to store it, ever. The Floridan Aquifer stretches from the Appalachian Mountains through Florida and the Bahamas, and dye tests have shown that some of it even reaches islands in the Caribbean. One leak could destroy the safety of drinking water for millions of people, and wipe out the economies of over one-third of the US.

That's what your support of the nuclear energy utilities actually means. And, that's really, really stupid.

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.

- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Eric West
3943 s. Peninsula Dr.
Port Orange, FL 32127

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Geraldine West [mailto:jriwest@aol.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 4:22 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Geraldine West
Electric Ave
Seal Beach, CA 90740

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Geraldine West [mailto:jriwest@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:24 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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Geraldine West
Electric Ave
Seal Beach, CA 90740

## Consent-Based Siting

From: dave westerlund [mailto:turbotechwest@kalama.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:09 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

Due to prevailing winds (west to east), for the sake of the U.S., nuclear waste should be stored on our East Coast. I would recommend in Maryland, just west of Washington D.C.

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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dave westerlund
140 Monticello Dr.
Longview (& Cathlamet), WA 98632

## Consent-Based Siting

From: John Wetherhold [mailto:zixu@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 6:54 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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John Wetherhold
13 W. 13th St #4BS
13 w. 13th st.
New York, NY 10011

## Consent-Based Siting

From: John Wetherhold [mailto:zixu@yahoo.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 10:04 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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John Wetherhold
13 W. 13th St #4BS
13 w. 13th st.
New York, NY 10011

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Bill Wharton [mailto:char-bill@embarqmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:44 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Bill Wharton
4479 Northshore Dr.
4479 Northshore Dr.
Port Charlotte, FL 33980

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mark Wheeler [mailto:mark@rootsrealty.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:30 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Mark Wheeler
628 SE 58th
Portland, OR 97215

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mark Wheeler [mailto:mark@rootsrealty.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:44 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Mark Wheeler
628 SE 58th
Portland, OR 97215

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Carolyn Wheeler [mailto:cjrwheeler@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:22 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Carolyn Wheeler
40452 ditmus ct
fremont, CA 94538

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Barry J White [mailto:bwtamia@bellsouth.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:40 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz.

NO COMMUNITY AND NOT ONE SPECK OF EARTH
IN THE USA SHOULD RECEIVE ONE OUNCE OF NUCLEAR WASTE. Don't produce the waste in the first place and let the existing waste stay where it is. There are safer ways to produce energy. Use them.

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Barry J White
10001 SW 129 Terrace
Miami, FL 33176

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Bruce White [mailto:bwhite4re@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 9:08 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Bruce White
1591 Martin Ave.
1591 Martin Ave., San Jose,CA
San Jose, CA 95067

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Bruce White [mailto:bwhite4re@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:11 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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1591 Martin Ave.
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San Jose, CA 95067

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From: Bruce White [mailto:bwhite4re@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 12:50 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Bruce White
1591 Martin Ave.
1591 Martin Ave., San Jose,CA
San Jose, CA 95067

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Frances White, SHCJ [mailto:francew@juno.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 1:37 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

I do not give you my consent to transport nuclear waste through my community or to my community. I do not agree with continuing the use of nuclear power because there is no safe disposal.

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Frances White, SHCJ
1833 E Orange Grove Blvd
PASADENA, CA 91104

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lucille White [mailto:lwhite@sni.org]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:52 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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Lucille White
1101 S. Sulphur Springs Rd.
Irving, NY 14081

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mary White [mailto:whitmf@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:41 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Mary White
1606 Morton Ave.
Ann Arbor, MI 48104

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mary Whitehead [mailto:thewhiteheads@tyler net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:07 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Mary Whitehead
207 Atlanta Ave
Tyler, TX 75703

## Consent-Based Siting

From: M Andrew Whitemaqn [mailto:andy@whiteman.us]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:01 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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The public is endangered by nuclear waste being left on the beach at the shut down San Onofre Power Plant! This waste should be removed ASAP!!!!

M Andrew Whitemaqn
509 Sunrise Ave
Alamogordo, NM 88310

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Anne Whitfield [mailto:annew@madison main nc.us]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 7:29 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Anne Whitfield
4301 Regis Ave
4301 regis
Durham, NC 27705

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Carolyn Whiting [mailto:crwhit99@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 11:08 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Carolyn Whiting
17 Chestnut Rd
Reading, MA 01867

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Pamela Whiting-Broeder [mailto:vegesoul@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:39 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Pamela Whiting-Broeder
230 Lolita Street
Encinitas, CA 92024

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Pamela Whiting-Broeder [mailto:vegesoul@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:12 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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Pamela Whiting-Broeder
230 Lolita Street
Encinitas, CA 92024

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Diane Whitmire [mailto:dragondw@sonic.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:33 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

This is yet one more "stick it to The People
plans" of the DOE's. Chernobyl was 30 yrs ago and IT IS STILL HOT!!!! because there is no "shelf life" for radioactive waste...a fact you are well aware of. So, what to do with all the Hot Waste? Give it to The People. You want to put it in household products like pots and pans and pet dishes as well as Zippers! ? And now you want to dump the contaminated, poisonous, and DANGEROUS junk in our communities including in what passes for livable spaces our Gov't forced the First Nations People onto and called "reservations?" You are INSANE to think We, the People, are going to simply say OK and quietly accept this HOT Radioactive Waste in our communities or in any so-called Product.

You and the AEC should have thought this all the way through before deciding that Nuclear Breeder and Reactor plants was a good idea. Nuclear anything makes Radioactive Waste and before anything was made, the FIRST problem to have contended with was what WERE you going to do with the Contaminated and Radioactive Waste! There is NO SAFE LEVEL of Radiation. There is NO CURE for Radiation POISONING! 500-1,000 yrs of "shelf life" is a GUESSTIMATE! Everyone involved needed to start with the end product and work backward from there, but that would be too logical so that now, you've got a big problem: What to do with all the HOT WASTE!

Tell ya' what! If this is such a good thing and such a good idea, PUT THE HOT STUFF IN YOUR COMMUNITY! Put your actions and ideas where YOU live. If you cannot conceive of having your streets paved with this or burying it under schools and/or playgrounds which your children and grandchildren attend and/or play in....if YOU would say: NO WAY!....then you have your answer without asking anyone else - a fact you have already considered and rejected.

There should be no Nuclear ANYTHING for the simple reason that it creates its own waste product which is HOT and FILTHY DIRTY with RADIOACTIVE POISON for 500 yrs and Upwards.

RADIOACTIVE WASTE IS A POISON, A CONTAMINANT THAT WILL HORRIBLY AND PAINFULLY KILL ANY LIVING THING ANYWHERE NEAR IT. Don't even think of putting HOT waste in our areas - or in ANY areas. You have too much of a bad thing? Tough! You should have considered every angle of that before you allowed Nuclear Reactors to be built.

You might consider working with NASA and find a way to send this junk to the deepest, darkest, and furthest Black Hole where NOTHING can get out once in. That'll work - but don't even think of bringing it here.

The Department of Energy’s (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need

to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Diane Whitmire
1585 Terrace Way
Santa Rosa, CA 95404

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Katherine Whitson [mailto:katherine.whitson@gmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 11:10 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Katherine Whitson
621 N. 40th Street
Omaha, NE 68131

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Erika Whitton [mailto:efortuny73@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Erika Whitton
2235 Watermarke Place
Irvine CA 92612
Irvine, CA 92612

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dan Wicht [mailto:wicht_dan@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 3:40 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Dan Wicht
941 Overton Drive Northeast
Fridley, MN 55432

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dan Wicht [mailto:wicht_dan@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:45 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Dan Wicht
941 Overton Drive Northeast
Fridley, MN 55432

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sarah Wiebenson [mailto:petillante@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 3:20 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Sarah Wiebenson
1634 SE Hawthorne Blvd, Apt 212
Portland, OR 97214

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sarah Wiebenson [mailto:petillante@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 11:34 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Sarah Wiebenson
1634 SE Hawthorne Blvd, Apt 212
Portland, OR 97214

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Robin Wieder [mailto:gadboo2@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:48 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Robin Wieder
61 Judith Court
East Rockaway, NY 11518

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dave Wiig [mailto:wiig@optonline.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:39 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Dave Wiig
141 Benton Rd
Morris, CT 06763

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lynn Wilbur [mailto:kalei.lw@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:24 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Lynn Wilbur
617 Katlian Street
Sitka, AK 99835

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lynn Wilbur [mailto:kalei.lw@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:10 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Lynn Wilbur
617 Katlian Street
Sitka, AK 99835

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Margaret Wilbur [mailto mwlbr@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Margaret Wilbur
45 West Road, #1E
Orleans, MA 02645

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Margaret Wilbur [mailto mwlbr@yahoo.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 6:33 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

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Margaret Wilbur
45 West Road, #1E
Orleans, MA 02645

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Max Wilder [mailto:mswilder@ucsc.edu]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:52 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Max Wilder
101 Flower St.
Santa Cruz, CA 95060

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Florence Wilder [mailto fwilder@gwi net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 7:16 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Florence Wilder
P O Box 436
Hancock, ME 04640

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Patricia Wiley [mailto:Pattywiley@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:06 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Patricia Wiley
2063 Merrill Rd.
Kent, OH 44240

## Consent-Based Siting

From: James Wilhelmi [mailto:morocco1957422@netscape.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:01 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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James Wilhelmi
5552 E. Erin Ave.
5552 E. Erin Ave.
Fresno, CA 93727

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dorothy Wilkinson [mailto:deegee43@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:48 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Dorothy Wilkinson
5118 De Longpre Avenue, #314
Hollywood, CA 90027

From: Daniel Wilkinson [mailto:dandub@gte.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:49 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Daniel Wilkinson
3122 Clark Avenue
Long Beach, CA 90808

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Daniel Wilkinson [mailto:dandub@gte.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:09 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Daniel Wilkinson
3122 Clark Avenue
Long Beach, CA 90808

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Edna Willadsen [mailto:willadsen716@msn.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:10 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Edna Willadsen
1719 E Lambert Lane  Port Angeles, WA
Port Angeles, WA 98362

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jesse Williams [mailto:arqwing@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 3:01 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Jesse Williams
1525 marlowe ave
cincinnati, OH 45224

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Christopher Williams [mailto:dominousqi@gmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 12:15 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Christopher Williams
4051 E. Cornell Ave. Denver, Co
Denver, CO 80237

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Cheryl Williams [mailto:cannw2006@att.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Cheryl Williams
688 Lincoln Station
Oswego, IL 60543

## Consent-Based Siting

From: David Williams [mailto:devwilliams@juno.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:57 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

David Williams
148 Murdock Ave
148 MUrdock Ave , Asheville ,NC
Asheville, ND 28801

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Elizabeth Williams [mailto:wethbilliams@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 8:15 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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Elizabeth Williams
4469 Sedgwick St., N.W.
Washington, DC 20016

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Felicia Williams [mailto:badger5@operamail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 8:33 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Felicia Williams
4201 Mass. Ave. NW,
Apt. 175
Washington, DC, DC 20016

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Felicia Williams [mailto:badger5@operamail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:05 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Felicia Williams
4201 Mass. Ave. NW,
Apt. 175
Washington, DC, DC 20016

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Glen Williams [mailto:glen r.williams@gmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 1:10 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Glen Williams
17641 Grizzly Den Rd
Weed, CA 96094

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jesse Williams [mailto:arqwing@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:14 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Jesse Williams
1525 marlowe ave
cincinnati, OH 45224

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Margery Williams [mailto margerywilliams1948@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 11:02 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Margery Williams
152 Apple Avenue
Grass Valley, CA 95945

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Margery Williams [mailto margerywilliams1948@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 4:26 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

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## Consent-Based Siting

From: Penelope Williams [mailto:saiwillpen@att.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:04 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Penelope Williams
1283 Rockledge Dr.
Rockledge, FL 32955

## Consent-Based Siting

From: S. E. Williams [mailto:Shashannah@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:21 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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S. E. Williams
12707 Murphy Rd., #70
Stafford, TX 77477

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Terrie Williams [mailto:pit_bull_lovr@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:27 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Terrie Williams
850 Laura Lane
None
Vidor, TX 77662

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Terrie Williams [mailto:yarddawg_1@att net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:13 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Terrie Williams
850 Laura Lane
None
Vidor, TX 77662

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From: Terrie Williams [mailto:yarddawg_1@att net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:28 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Terrie Williams
850 Laura Lane
None
Vidor, TX 77662

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Nancy Willing [mailto nancyvwilling@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 6:44 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Nancy Willing
5 Francis Circle
newark, DE 19711

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Howard Wilshire [mailto:howardgw@comcast.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:45 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest. The DOE has no credible policy for safely storing the huge wastes already on hand, whether at/near the sites of its creation or in consolidated storage facilities.

Therefore, I do not consent to the process proposed, nor the creation of more wastes.

Howard Wilshire
3727 Burnside Rd.
Sebastapol, CA 95472

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Debra Wilson [mailto:wilsondebraj@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 11:17 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I DO NOT consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Debra Wilson
108 Crocker Street
Ashland, OR 97520

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Doris (Jody) Wilson [mailto:jodyhere24doris@comcast net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:03 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
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I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Doris (Jody) Wilson
12711 NE 129th Court, G-104, Kirkland, WA 98034-3265
Kirkland, WA 98034

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dorothy Wilson [mailto:tuniew1@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 7:05 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

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Dorothy Wilson
4500 N. Northwoods Ln.
Bloomington, IN 47404

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Elaine Wilson [mailto:elaine1111@earthlink net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:33 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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Elaine Wilson
2357 Del Amo
Torrance, CA 90501

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Helen Wilson [mailto:hwilson6790@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:38 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Helen Wilson
12 Penacook St
Penacook, NH 03303

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jane Wilson [mailto:wwbyjw@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Jane Wilson
16500 S Copley Ct
Oregon City, OR 97045

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Karen Wilson [mailto:jokawi@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 10:30 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Karen Wilson
P.O. Box 347
Egg Harbor, WI 54209

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Leland Wilson [mailto:lelandwil@hotmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 11:57 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Leland Wilson
2709 Hillcrest Drive
LaVerne, CA 91750

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Marguerite Wilson [mailto:marguerite@cybermesa.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:42 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Marguerite Wilson
9 Fido Lane
Santa Fe, NM 87508

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Patricia Wilson [mailto:trish22630@comcast net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Patricia Wilson
642 Mccoys Ford Rd
Front Royal, VA 22630

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Patricia Wilson [mailto:pwilsontchr@comcast net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:04 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Patricia Wilson
PO Box 7516
Spreckels, CA, CA 93962

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Teresa Wilson [mailto:rtconaway@comcast net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:06 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Teresa Wilson
544 Bradford Ct
claremont, CA 15143

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Thomas Wilson [mailto:balTHOMore@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 9:50 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment OPPOSING DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Thomas Wilson
1161 Quantril Way
Street Address 2
Baltimore City, MD 21205

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lori Wilson-Hopkins [mailto:lwilhop@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:01 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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Lori Wilson-Hopkins
12070 Peregrine Way
Auburn, CA 95603

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Thomas Windberg [mailto:tjwindberg@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 9:31 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Thomas Windberg
2416 Pace Bend Rd S
Spicewood, TX 78745

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ken Windrum [mailto:kwindrum@earthlink.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:33 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Ken Windrum
511 S. Serrano Ave., #405
Los Angeles, CA 90004

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Maggie Wineburgh-Freed [mailto:mwfreed@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:08 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Maggie Wineburgh-Freed
4652 Oak Grove Cir
Los Angeles, CA 90041

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Douglas Wingeier [mailto:dcwing@main nc.us]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 8:44 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Douglas Wingeier
266 Merrimon Ave
Asheville, NC 28801

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Douglas Wingeier [mailto:dcwing@main nc.us]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 10:48 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Douglas Wingeier
266 Merrimon Ave
Asheville, NC 28801

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Linda Winkler [mailto:lindajwink@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:50 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Linda Winkler
138 Alden Pl
Staten Island, NY 10301

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Rebecca Winkler [mailto:acalculatedwhisk@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 5:09 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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I also do not consent to future nuclear waste production. I do not agree that the production, transport and storage of nuclear waste is safe for a planet of living creatures.

Rebecca Winkler
311 Marlboro Ave
Chattanooga, TN 37411

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Leslie Winston [mailto:winstonl@humnet.ucla.edu]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:06 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Leslie Winston
5012 5th Street NW
5012 5th St. Nw
Washington, DC 21044

## Consent-Based Siting

From: David Wisbey [mailto:yourvillagemaps@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:06 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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David Wisbey
10050 E Harvard Ave Apt A205
Apt 212
Denver, CO 80231

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Steve Wise [mailto:elsavio43@yahoo.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 1:30 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Steve Wise
140 Bixby Terrace SE
Atlanta, GA 30317

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Ronald Withrow [mailto:ronw1@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:32 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Think "Fukushima" and the failed sites here. The DOE and the industry have been less than forthcoming, where problems and failures with existing reactors is concerned. Why is there a media blackout on "progress" at Fukushima or any other member of nuclear club?

Ronald Withrow
1273 Wilbur Ct. NE
Palm Bay
Palm Bay, FL 32905

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lee Witkowski [mailto:ljwitt@comcast net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:39 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Lee Witkowski
1359 State St.
Illinois
Lemont, IL 60439

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Andrew & Kathleen Wittenborn [mailto:wittenbn@westnet.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:57 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

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Andrew & Kathleen Wittenborn
152 Mountain Rd.
Pleasantville, NY 10570

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Andrew & Kathleen Wittenborn [mailto:wittenbn@westnet.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:28 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Andrew & Kathleen Wittenborn
152 Mountain Rd.
Pleasantville, NY 10570

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Alan Wojtalik [mailto:alan_wojtalik@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:37 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Alan Wojtalik
3723 Green Oak Court
Baltimore, MD 21234

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Daniel Wolk [mailto:dwolkfp@gmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 8:44 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Daniel Wolk
!05 Grayling Ave
Narberth, PA 19072

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Michael Wollman [mailto mwollman@calpoly.edu]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 3:23 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Michael Wollman
217 Westmont Avenue
217 WESTMONT AVENUE
San Luis Obispo, CA 93405

## Consent-Based Siting

From: manuela wolter [mailto:mwolter61@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:46 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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manuela wolter
villareal 2
Tamarindo
san-jose, IA 50309

## Consent-Based Siting

From: manuela wolter [mailto:mwolter61@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:12 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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manuela wolter
villareal 2
Tamarindo
san-jose, IA 50309

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Timothy Wong [mailto:twong@asu.edu]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:19 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Timothy Wong
6823 W. Ivanhoe Street
Chandler, AZ 85226

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Timothy Wong [mailto:twong@asu.edu]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 7:50 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Timothy Wong
6823 W. Ivanhoe Street
Chandler, AZ 85226

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Alberta Wood [mailto:awood@mun.ca]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 2:17 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Alberta Wood
66 Meredith Dr.
P.O. Box 225
Ilderton, ON N0M 2A0

## Consent-Based Siting

From: John and Polly Wood [mailto:machjuan@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:32 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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John and Polly Wood
POB
Street 2
Hood River, OR 97031

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Linda Wood [mailto:lindawood4@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:15 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Linda Wood
1326 Acton Street
Berkeley, CA 94706

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Rick Wood [mailto rw69@cornell.edu]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:50 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Rick Wood
PO Box 803
Burdett, NY 14818

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Sandra Woodall [mailto:lswoodall@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:44 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Sandra Woodall
118 W. Hermine Blvd.
San Antonio, TX 78212

## Consent-Based Siting

From: BENNIE WOODARD [mailto:bwoodard44@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:39 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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BENNIE WOODARD
208 E LAKE HOWARD DR UNIT #401
WINTER HAVEN, FL 33881

## Consent-Based Siting

From: BENNIE WOODARD [mailto:bwoodard44@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:08 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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BENNIE WOODARD
208 E LAKE HOWARD DR UNIT #401
WINTER HAVEN, FL 33881

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Merryl Woodard [mailto merwooda@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:53 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Merryl Woodard
13401 Dumas Rd
Mill Creek, WA 98012

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Charlene Woodcock [mailto:charlene@woodynet.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

I very strongly object to the idea that we taxpayers should continue to fund the disaster of nuclear energy, which was developed without any solution to the necessary secure storage of radioactive nuclear waste for many generations. We need you to protect the interests and health of the American people.

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Charlene Woodcock
2355 Virginia Street
Berkeley, CA 94709

## Consent-Based Siting

From: cynthia woods [mailto:sinywoo@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:46 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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cynthia woods
1258 marina dr
marina drive
slidell, LA 70458

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Matt Woolery [mailto:mattwoolery@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:44 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

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Matt Woolery
8529 Villa La Jolla Dr Unit D
Unit D
La Jolla, CA 92037

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Chris Worcester [mailto:chris@solarwindworks.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:38 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

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Chris Worcester
16713 Greenlee Road
16713 Greenlee Road 96161
Truckee, CA 96160

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Chris Worcester [mailto:chris@solarwindworks.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 6:18 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Chris Worcester
16713 Greenlee Road
16713 Greenlee Road 96161
Truckee, CA 96160

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Michael Worsham [mailto:marylandmichael@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:09 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Michael Worsham
1916 Cosner Road
1916 Cosner Road
Forest Hill, MD 21050

## Consent-Based Siting

From: John Wozniak [mailto:daddywoz@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 11:29 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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John Wozniak
P.O. Box 1750
Mendocino, CA 95460

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lara Wright, MD [mailto:lara.wright@sonic.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:47 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Lara Wright, MD
1165 Santa Fe Ave.
Albany, CA 94706

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Katherine Wright [mailto:kmhgw@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:17 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Katherine Wright
4 TITIAN
Aliso Viejo, CA 92656

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Katherine Wright [mailto:kmhgw@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:37 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

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Katherine Wright
4 TITIAN
Aliso Viejo, CA 92656

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Lara Wright, MD [mailto:lara.wright@sonic.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:21 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse.

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Lara Wright, MD
1165 Santa Fe Ave.
Albany, CA 94706

From: Becky Wurzel [mailto:wurz0701@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:19 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Becky Wurzel
2021 Green Bay St.
La Crosse, WI 54601

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Brenda Wyrick [mailto:Crwyrick19@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:34 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Brenda Wyrick
7870 Tatum Dr
Frisco, TX 75034

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Brenda Wyrick [mailto:Crwyrick19@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:48 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Brenda Wyrick
7870 Tatum Dr
Frisco, TX 75034

From: paula xiberras [mailto:paulajx2001@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 9:12 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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paula xiberras
hill
hobart, LA 70011

## Consent-Based Siting

From: paula xiberras [mailto:paulajx2001@hotmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 8:41 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

paula xiberras
hill
hobart, LA 70011

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Doug Yamamoto [mailto:718glazier@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 10:14 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
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Doug Yamamoto
916 Peralta Ave
Albany, CA 94706

## Consent-Based Siting

From: James Yarbrough [mailto:jyarbro2003@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:43 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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James Yarbrough
574 Garfield Ave.
South Pasadena, CA 91030

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Parma Yarkin [mailto:pjyarkin@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:32 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Parma Yarkin
n\a
Dearborn, MI 48124

From: Joan Yater [mailto:jeyater@os2bbs.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:12 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Joan Yater
2407 Childs Lane
Alexandria, VA 22308

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jane Yater [mailto:jayater@texas.net]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:38 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Jane Yater
2654 Barton Hills Drive
Austin, TX 78704

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joan Yater [mailto:jeyater@os2bbs.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 7:04 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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## Consent-Based Siting

From: Jane Yater [mailto:jayater@texas.net]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 12:50 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Jane Yater
2654 Barton Hills Drive
Austin, TX 78704

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Julian Yerena Jr [mailto:julianjr559@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 8:34 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Julian Yerena Jr
13571 E Third St
Parlier, CA 93648

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kim Young [mailto:kimsings3@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:47 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment OPPOSING DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has ABSOLUTELY NO basis in policy or certainly the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. THIS IS COMPLETELY AND TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE!!! In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart WAY before the horse. DOE has NO (AS IN NONE) authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation. Nuclear waste is a huge and gruesome mess that no one truly knows what to do with! There is NO safe way to deal with it either!!

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future. WHY??? LET'S DO THE WORLD A FAVOR AND STOP PRODUCING NUCLEAR WASTE NOW!!!!!!!!!!

I do NOT consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, NOR the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them. AGAIN, IT'S TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to completely isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act!!!!!!!!!!!!!

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP!!!!! WHAT??? This IS INSANITY!!!!!The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are unacceptable security risks. If the site is temporary as

intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards even further!!! This just isn't wise AT ALL!!!

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent. This truly is not a good plan at all!!!

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation BEFORE the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste. Not good!!

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is very, very deceptive and totally irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has NO statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must STOP scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does NOTHING to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials. Please go back to the drawing board and try again.

Kim Young
2929 SELENA DR. G-104
Nashville, TN 37211

From: Margaret Young [mailto:myoung94564@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:09 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Margaret Young
800 John Street
Apt #220 A
Pinole, CA 94564

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Kristofer Young [mailto:kychiro@pacbell.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:56 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

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Kristofer Young
407 Del Norte Road
-
Ojai, CA 93023

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Landon Young [mailto:zopiloteyoung@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:05 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Landon Young
HC 61 Box 17
Miami, NM 87729

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Margaret Young [mailto:myoung94564@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 3:35 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Margaret Young
800 John Street
Apt #220 A
Pinole, CA 94564

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Dave Yue [mailto:dyue01@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:15 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
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Dave Yue
P. O. Box 450663
Westlake, OH 44145

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Rich Yurman [mailto:ryurman@newsguy.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 5:27 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Rich Yurman
Ross Street
2516  24th Ave
Oakland, CA 94618

From: Guy Zahller [mailto:gop.r.war.criminals@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:36 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Guy Zahller
146 creek drive, c
aptos, CA 95003

## Consent-Based Siting

From: John Zahos [mailto:subzerohc@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 3:50 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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John Zahos
8228 Keating Ave.
skokie, IL 60076

From: Janet Zampieri [mailto:jlz@psconsult.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:21 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Janet Zampieri
3125 W Mockingbird Ln
Tucson, AZ 85713

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Janet Zampieri [mailto:jlz@psconsult.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:16 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Janet Zampieri
3125 W Mockingbird Ln
Tucson, AZ 85713

From: Marya Zanders [mailto:caravanz2@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:02 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.

I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Marya Zanders
407 E Walnut
Centerville, IA 52544

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Marya Zanders [mailto:caravanz2@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 12:24 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Marya Zanders
407 E Walnut
Centerville, IA 52544

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Cortney Zaret [mailto:cortneyzaret@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:32 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Cortney Zaret
3647 N. Wilton
Chicago, IL 60657

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Cortney Zaret [mailto:cortneyzaret@hotmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 12:01 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Cortney Zaret
3647 N. Wilton
Chicago, IL 60657

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Greta Zarro [mailto:glaz@me.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 8:12 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Greta Zarro
12 Salem Lane
South Salem, NY 10590

From: C Zawadzki [mailto:czawadzki@nycap.rr.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 3:14 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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C Zawadzki
227 juniper dr
Schenectady, NY 12306

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Diane Zeitlin [mailto:dianecz@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:07 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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Diane Zeitlin
327 Jackson Street #13
Hoboken, NJ 07030

## Consent-Based Siting

From: vivian zelaya [mailto:zelaya9@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 11:47 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

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vivian zelaya
2021b Lincoln St.
berkeley, CA 94709

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Bernie Zelazny [mailto:bdz@apcwizard.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 3:33 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Bernie Zelazny
PO Box 523
Alpine, TX 79830

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Tim Zemba [mailto:tazbike23@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 6:24 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Tim Zemba
112 N Harper Avenue
Los Angeles, CA 90048

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Elizabeth Zenker [mailto:eazenker@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 1:38 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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Elizabeth Zenker
1375 Sunset Ave
Arcata, CO 95521

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Elizabeth Zenker [mailto:eazenker@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2016 4:33 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Elizabeth Zenker
1375 Sunset Ave
Arcata, CO 95521

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Laura Ziegler [mailto:zieweed@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 7:04 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Laura Ziegler
PO Box 164
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Plainfield, VT 05667

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Katherine Zieman [mailto:Kziemannd@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 2:22 PM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

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Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

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The first step to getting nuclear waste policy on track is to remove Yucca Mountain from the US nuclear waste program. The second step is to limit the waste being made and third to make energetic progress on scientific research to identify feasible technologies and locations for isolating the radioactive materials in nuclear waste from the environment for a million years, so that storage at reactor sites will actually be “interim” on the scale of human generations. Only once scientifically viable and environmentally responsible nuclear waste storage methods are developed—and the options and risks for nuclear waste storage are known--can public consent to the siting of nuclear waste facilities be possible, much less play a meaningful role in the process. To pursue consent before there can be public confidence in nuclear waste management first is deceptive and irresponsible.

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Katherine Zieman
2016 SE Henkle Rd
Corbett, OR 97019

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Joseph Zilligen [mailto:joe@zilligen.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:37 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

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Joseph Zilligen
2033 Nottingham Lane
Wheaton, IL 60189

From: Elizabeth Zimmer-Lloyd [mailto:2BethLloyd@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 2:05 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Elizabeth Zimmer-Lloyd
1631 Wells St.
Port Huron, MI 48060

From: Melvin Zimmerman [mailto:sylvmelv@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:20 AM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Melvin Zimmerman
355 Morro Bay Boulevard
Morro Bay, CA 93442

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Mark Zimoski [mailto:mzimos@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, July 29, 2016 11:05 AM
To: Consent Based Siting
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

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Mark Zimoski
13610
13610 Emelita St.
Valley Glen, CA 91401

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Andrea Zinn [mailto:andreazinn050@aol.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 1:53 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Andrea Zinn
629 East 24th Street
Brooklyn, NY 11210

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Richard Zoah-Henderson [mailto:rmzh@suddenlink.net]
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2016 3:47 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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The Department of Energy has gone rogue in pursuing consent-based siting for consolidated storage first and suggesting that the public’s input has any value when the agency has no statutory authority to pursue such a program. Unless and until Yucca Mountain is removed from consideration under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be no progress on a legal site. The current DOE administration must stop scapegoating the NWPA for prohibiting consolidated storage independent of an operating repository, instead of offering candor in admitting that the Department of Energy failed in its effort to implement NWPA. Consolidated storage only increases the risks of nuclear waste, and does nothing to advance credible solutions to the long-term management and isolation of radioactive materials.

Richard Zoah-Henderson
3904 Cedar #B
Eureka, CA 95503

From: tim zorach [mailto:tzorach@gmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2016 1:43 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

DOE has clearly stated it intends to support the continued production of more nuclear waste into the distant future.

I do not consent to this process, the continued generation of nuclear waste, the siting of consolidated storage facilities, nor the mass transportation of nuclear waste to them.

The top goal for managing nuclear waste must be to STOP MAKING IT and to isolate the waste we have from the environment. The only rational basis for an "integrated management plan" for highly radioactive spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel is to:

- To terminate the production of nuclear waste.
- To provide for secure interim storage at, or as close as possible to, the site of generation.
- To determine scientifically viable, environmentally responsible, and socially just and equitable methods for its long-term management and isolation from the biosphere.

More than 100 organizations have endorsed improving the storage and security of nuclear waste at reactor sites through Hardened On-Reactor-Site Storage (HOSS). HOSS would first move waste (when sufficiently cooled) out of fuel pools to robust, hardened dry-cask storage, reducing the hazard of catastrophic fuel pool fires and better protecting the waste from natural disasters, industrial accidents, and military or terrorist attacks. HOSS would improve the safety and security of this waste for interim storage at, or as near as possible to, the reactor sites where it is generated.
I oppose the consolidation and transportation of waste to new sites unless and until a viable long-term management facility is in operation, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The consolidated storage facilities under consideration would use precisely the same technology and dry-casks currently available for storage at reactor sites, with containers on a concrete slab with a fence, a PARKING LOT DUMP. The only substantive changes would be the added hazards and insecurity of transportation, and the unprecedented amount of nuclear waste to be stored in this configuration at one or more centralized additional sites, both of which are security risks. If the site is temporary as intended, then, by definition, each container will move at least twice, compounding transportation hazards.

Depending on how long the waste remains in an interim consolidated storage system, waste may need to be transported multiple times, as community consent periods expire and require siting of new consolidated storage

facilties. Conversely, if the site devolves to a de facto long-term or even permanent waste site there would have been no technical qualification or scientific basis for choosing the site; the willingness of a community to support the siting of a temporary storage facility would be violated; and the consent-based process would be meaningless, if not fraudulent.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was right, requiring DOE to have a long-term management facility licensed and in operation before the agency can take title to and transport civilian nuclear waste. The central problem afflicting nuclear waste policy in the United States is the selection of Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain was chosen by Congress through an unscientific and politicized process of elimination, excluding all other sites before Yucca Mountain was studied to determine whether the site could isolate the radioactivity in this waste.

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tim zorach
34 stonebridge lane
corralitos, CA 95076

## Consent-Based Siting

From: marguery lee zucker [mailto:lee@thelocomotive.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:50 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

Dear Secretary Moniz,

The Department of Energy's (DOE) consent-based siting initiative has no basis in policy or the public interest, and is simply a vehicle to put the short-term interests of the nuclear power and radioactive waste industries before the need to protect public health and safety and the environment. In short, DOE is putting the nuclear cart before the horse. DOE has no authority to pursue such a siting process for consolidated storage of commercial nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and the DOE's Standard Contract with nuclear power generators explicitly state that the federal government may take title to and possession of the waste from commercial nuclear power generation when a repository is in operation.

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marguery lee zucker
1966 Orchard St.
Eugene, OR 97403

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Alex Zukas [mailto:alexzukas@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:37 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Alex Zukas
5615 Spartan Drive
San Diego, CA 92115

## Consent-Based Siting

From: Rod Zwirner [mailto:zrod@comcast.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 4:39 PM
To: Consent Based Siting <consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov>
Subject: Comment Opposing DOE's Consent-Based Siting Process for Nuclear Waste

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Rod Zwirner
5 Myrtle Ave
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Antrim, NH 03440