

Prevent OT Phys Damage: Anticipating and Preventing Catastrophic Operational Technology Physical Damage Through System Thinking Analysis



Protecting physical energy operational technology infrastructure against targeted cyberattacks that may cause physical damage to difficult-to-replace devices

Most energy delivery system (EDS) cybersecurity programs are designed to prevent unauthorized system access because, to date, most EDS attacks have targeted software-led processes that may be restored by restarting the affected components. In the case of operational technology (OT), once system access is obtained, sophisticated cyberattacks have the additional potential to cause physical damage or destruction to the devices themselves. The team is conducting research within the MIT co-generation plant to identify and anticipate physical risks to OT as a result of coordinated cyberattacks. The team will develop an analysis tool that OT operators can use to identify vulnerable EDS physical targets and failure scenarios, and create enhancements that minimize physical damage. The resulting web-based tool, with advanced graphics and an easy-to-use interface helps OT operators identify critical cybersecurity vulnerabilities, determine the specific control hierarchy, evaluate the effectiveness of control mechanisms and potential failure modes, and provide mitigation recommendations.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

- Simplifies energy delivery system analysis to identify and anticipate critical cyber-physical risks
- Eliminates or restricts hazard conditions that can lead to a dramatic loss through physical destruction of operational technology
- Implements effective, data-driven countermeasures during design and operation for operational technology

OUTCOME

This research will eliminate or restrict hazard conditions that can lead to loss of EDS operations and implements effective countermeasures during design and operation for OT operators. The team will develop an accessible system analysis tool to maximize the implementation of cyber-physical security programs.

PARTICIPANTS

ROLE



The CREDC performs multidisciplinary research and development that focuses on the cybersecurity of energy delivery systems. The central project goal is to create an ecosystem where research results lead directly to the development of applications and methodologies, which are then validated in realistic contexts.



Lead institution; validates tool at the MIT cogeneration facility



Engages stakeholders



Delivers presentations to stakeholders and leads other stakeholder engagement efforts



Received and reviewed report



Explores application within a manufacturing facility

CONTACT INFORMATION

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CYBERSECURITY FOR ENERGY DELIVERY SYSTEMS (CEDS)

CEDS projects are funded through DOE CESER, which aims to enhance the reliability and resilience of the nation's energy infrastructure by reducing the risk of energy disruptions due to cyberattacks.

Website: <https://www.energy.gov/ceser>

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