BEFORE THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Power Act Section 202(c) Emergency Order: Tri-State Generation and Transmission Association, Platte River Power Authority, Salt River Project, PacifiCorp, and Xcel Energy	))))))	Order No. 202-25-14

Exhibit to
Motion to Intervene and Request for Rehearing and Stay of
Public Interest Organizations

Filed January 28, 2026

Exhibit 1-16:
Department Order No. 202-20-2

Department of Energy
Washington, DC 20585

Order No. 202-20-2

Pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretary of Energy by section 202(c) of the Federal Power Act (FPA), 16 U.S.C. § 824a(c), and section 301(b) of the Department of Energy Organization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7151(b), and delegated to the Deputy Secretary of Energy by paragraph 1.11(A) of Delegation Order No. 00-001.00G (Apr. 10, 2018), and re-delegated to the Assistant Secretary for Electricity on September 6, 2020, and for the reasons set forth below, I hereby determine that an emergency exists in California due to a shortage of electric energy, a shortage of facilities for the generation of electric energy, and other causes, and that issuance of this Order will meet the emergency and serve the public interest.

On September 6, 2020, the California Independent System Operator (CAISO), the Regional Transmission Organization whose service territory includes California and a portion of Nevada, filed a *Request for Emergency Order Pursuant to Section 202(c) of the Federal Power Act* (Application) with the United States Department of Energy (Department) "to preserve the reliability of bulk electric power system."

Since August, California has experienced several periods of extreme heat, some of which have resulted in rolling blackouts. On September 2, 2020, California Governor Gavin Newsom issued an emergency proclamation to help alleviate the stress on the state's power grid due to an "Extreme Heat Event." In declaring a statutory emergency, the proclamation cited a number of factors and observations, including the following:

- "[B]eginning on September 2, 2020, a significant heat wave struck California, bringing widespread temperatures well in excess of 100 degrees throughout the State;"
- "[T]he National Weather Service [has] issued multiple Excessive Heat Warnings within [California];"
- "[T]he Extreme Heat Event has and will continue to put significant demand and strain on California's energy grid; and"
- "[T]he Extreme Heat Event is expected to last through at least September 7, 2020."

The proclamation authorizes emergency use of stationary generators, portable generators, and "auxiliary engines by ocean-going vessels berthed in California ports," and directs the state's Air Resources Board to "exercise maximum discretion to permit the use of stationary and portable generators or auxiliary ship engines to reduce the strain on the energy infrastructure and increase energy capacity." The proclamation also

suspends "[a]ny permit, regulation or law prohibiting, restricting or penalizing the use of stationary or portable generators or auxiliary ship engines" as allowed by the proclamation order.

On September 3, the CAISO issued a statewide flex alert for September 5-7, encouraging voluntary load reduction between 3:00 p.m. and 9:00 p.m. local time each day. The alert warns that consumers should "be prepared for potential power outages, both planned and unplanned during heat waves, especially in extremely high temperatures that last multiple days," noting that "[h]ot weather can also impact generation and transmission equipment, as it runs harder and longer with less time to cool, which can cause machinery failure." The alert explains that there is little energy available to import due to high heat predicted throughout the West, and that the wildfires in the state may take out transmission lines or cause lines to be shut down for the safety of firefighters in the area.

The CAISO notes that "[e]lectric demand forecasts have continued to increase since the issuance of the California Governor's emergency proclamation and the CAISO balancing authority area has lost additional generation supply because of wildfires." Application at 3. To address the situation, the "CAISO has started to direct all generators in its balancing authority area to produce to their maximum capability during certain times of the day," and has gone so far as to allow, when reliable and safe based on currently operating conditions, "certain generators to generate more than their interconnection capacity to provide additional power to the grid." *Id.* at 3. The impetus for the Application, however, arose on September 5, 2020, when the operator of the natural gas-fired resources identified in Exhibit A of the Application informed the CAISO that it could not produce to its maximum generation capability without exceeding its federal air quality or other permit limitations. *Id.* "The CAISO is informed and believes these limitations involve both permit limitations under federal law for nitrogen oxide emissions and ammonia releases as well as a limitations regarding fuel and ammonia throughput." *Id*.

The CAISO requests "that the Secretary issue an order immediately, effective September 6, 2020, authorizing specific electric generating units located within the CAISO balancing authority area to operate at their maximum generation output levels when directed to do so by the CAISO, notwithstanding air quality or other permit limitations." *Id.* at 1. The generating units specified are units 1 - 5 at the Walnut Creek Energy Park in the City of Industry, California; units 5/6 and 7/8 at the El Segundo Energy Center in El Segundo, California; and units 1 - 4 at the Long Beach Generating Station located in Long Beach, California. *Id.* For purposes of this Order, these units are referred to as the "Specified Resources." Collectively, they represent up to as much as 100 MW. The CAISO requests "such order be entered today, September 6, 2020, and remain effective for a period of seven (7) days, without prejudice to the possible issuance of further orders as necessary to address the emergency…[to] ensure additional supply is

available during a period in which California may continue to experience extreme weather and wildfires that have forced generation out of service." *Id*. at 2.

Given the emergency nature of the expected load stress, the responsibility of the CAISO to ensure maximum reliability on its system, and the ability of the CAISO to identify and dispatch generation necessary to meet the additional load, I have determined that additional dispatch of the Specified Resources is necessary to best meet the emergency and serve the public interest for purposes of FPA section 202(c). Because the additional generation may result in a conflict with environmental standards and requirements, I am authorizing only the necessary additional generation, with reporting requirements as described below.

FPA section 202(c)(2) requires the Secretary of Energy to ensure that any 202(c) order that may result in a conflict with a requirement of any environmental law be limited to the "hours necessary to meet the emergency and serve the public interest, and, to the maximum extent practicable," be consistent with any applicable environmental law and minimize any adverse environmental impacts. The CAISO anticipates that this Order may result in exceedance of National Ambient Air Quality Standards under the Clean Air Act and notes that the Specified Resources are located in different communities within California and should not result in any disproportionate impact on a single community. *Id.* at 4. To minimize adverse environmental impacts, this Order limits operation of dispatched units to the times and within the parameters determined by the CAISO for reliability purposes.

Based on my determination of an emergency set forth above, I hereby order:

A. From September 6, 2020, to September 13, 2020, in the event that the CAISO determines that generation from the Specified Resources is necessary to meet the exceptional levels of electricity demand that the CAISO anticipates in California, I direct the CAISO to dispatch such unit or units and to order their operation only as needed to maintain the reliability of the power grid in California between the hours of 14:00 Pacific Daylight Time and 22:00 Pacific Daylight Time on days when the demand on the CAISO system exceeds expected energy and reserve requirements.

B. The CAISO shall select the combination of units that meets the reliability emergency and minimizes environmental impact. Consistent with good utility practice, the CAISO shall exhaust all reasonably and practically available resources, including demand response and identified behind-the-meter generation resources to the extent that such resources provide support to maintain grid reliability, prior to dispatching the Specified Resources.

C. By September 21, 2020, the CAISO shall report all dates between September 6, 2020, and September 13, 2020, on which the Specified Resources were

operated, the hours of operation, and the estimated air emissions (including nitrogen oxides and ammonia releases) and fuel and ammonia throughput associated with operating each unit. The CAISO shall submit a final report by October 13, 2020, with any revisions to the information reported on September 21.

D. This Order shall be effective upon its issuance, and shall expire at 23:59 Pacific Daylight Time on September 13, 2020, with the exception of the reporting requirements in paragraph C. Renewal of this Order, should it be needed, must be requested before this Order expires.

Issued in Washington, D.C. this 6th day of September, 2020.

Bruce J. Walker

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Date: 2020.09.06 17:19:49 -04'00'

Bruce Walker
Assistant Secretary for Electricity

BEFORE THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Power Act Section 202(c) Emergency Order: Tri-State Generation and Transmission Association, Platte River Power Authority, Salt River Project, PacifiCorp, and Xcel Energy	))))))	Order No. 202-25-14

Exhibit to
Motion to Intervene and Request for Rehearing and Stay of
Public Interest Organizations

Filed January 28, 2026

Exhibit 1-17:
Department Order No. 202-22-2

Department of Energy
Washington, DC 20585

Order No. 202-22-2

Pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretary of Energy by section 202(c) of the Federal Power Act (FPA), 16 U.S.C. § 824a(c), and section 301(b) of the Department of Energy Organization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7151(b), and delegated to the Deputy Secretary of Energy by paragraph 1.12(A) of Delegation Order No. S1-DEL-S2-2022 (Mar. 14, 2022), and further delegated by the Deputy Secretary by email correspondence (Sept. 2, 2022), and for the reasons set forth below, I hereby determine that an emergency exists in California due to a shortage of electric energy, a shortage of facilities for the generation of electric energy, and other causes, and that issuance of this Order will meet the emergency and serve the public interest.

Emergency Situation

On September 2, 2022, the Balancing Authority of Northern California (BANC) filed a *Request for Emergency Order Pursuant to Section 202(c) of the Federal Power Act* (Application) with the United States Department of Energy (Department or DOE) "to preserve the reliability of the bulk electric power system in California," and more specifically to allow the BANC Balancing Authority Area (BAA) to request the dispatch of generation within the BANC BAA "that may be necessary for BANC to meet demand in the face of extreme heat." BANC is a joint powers authority whose members include the Sacramento Municipal Utility District and other municipalities, irrigation districts, and public utilities districts. BANC is a registered Balancing Authority with the North American Electric Reliability Corporation and operates as a neighboring BAA to the California Independent System Operator Corporation (CAISO) BAA. On September 4, 2022, BANC filed an *Amended, Supplemented and Clarified Request for Emergency Order Pursuant to Section 202(c) of the Federal Power Act* (Amended Application) in response to questions from DOE.

California has experienced several periods of extreme heat, drought conditions, and threat of wildfires. Such conditions are expected to occur over the next several days and threaten the reliable operation of the bulk electric power system in California. The loads from the forecasted heat wave over the next week are expected to push demand for electric energy by BANC members to at or over historical peaks and higher than normally expected planning targets for this time of year. Amended Application at 2.

On August 31, 2022, California Governor Gavin Newsom issued a proclamation declaring a state of emergency regarding electricity from September 2 through September 7, 2022.[1] In declaring a statutory emergency, the proclamation cited a number of factors and observations, including the following:

- A significant heat wave will bring temperatures "in excess of 100 degrees throughout the State and is forecast to bring record temperatures 10–20 degrees

[1] GSS_9534-1E-20220831133826 (ca.gov)

above normal throughout the State, exceeding 110 degrees in some areas (the 'Extreme Heat Event');"

- The extreme heat will put a significant demand and strain on California's energy grid and is forecast to be a "West-wide event" meaning that energy demand will be high across the region and "California will have limited ability to import energy from out-of-state;"

- The CAISO issued a Heat Bulletin forecasting high electric demand during the extreme heat event that will "stress the energy grid, with peak load for electricity projected to reach its highest level of the year, exceeding 48,000 megawatts on September 5, 2022;" and

- The CAISO is forecasting supply deficiencies of "over 3,000 megawatts during evening hours from September 4, 2022, through September 6, 2022" and advised that emergency interventions would allow energy customers to make contingency plans ahead of the Labor Day holiday weekend.

The proclamation authorizes several measures aimed at mitigating the emergency and avoiding jeopardizing public health or safety, including directing the California Air Resources Board (CARB) to "implement its State-funded Climate Heat Impact Response Program (CHIRP) to mitigate emissions from any operation pursuant to this Proclamation." The proclamation also directs the California Energy Commission (CEC) to "provide information requested by [CARB] to assist with its implementation" of CHIRP.

BANC noted that it "has prepared this request in consultation with the California Energy Commission (CEC), the California Governor's Office, and the CAISO." Application at 2.

Description of Mitigation Measures

In its Application, BANC described actions it has taken in order to alleviate the generation shortfall. Electric utilities within BANC, in coordination with CEC, CAISO, and the California Governor's Office, have implemented conservation and other extraordinary efforts to procure additional supply. BANC members have been able to obtain some purchases from the Pacific Northwest (PNW) bilateral wholesale markets to help offset the additional need, but the physical interties with PNW are near physical limits. BANC members have also been making use of demand-side programs, including commercial interruptible load programs, residential peak shaving programs, and public appeals for conservation. Amended Application at 2.

Request for Order

BANC has requested an emergency order to allow the BANC BAA to dispatch the Covered Resource described below within the BANC BAA that may be necessary for

the BANC to meet demand in the face of extreme heat, subject to the terms set forth herein.

The generators for which BANC is seeking this emergency order consist of 24 diesel-fired generator units owned by NTT Global Data Centers Americas (NTT), located at 1312 Striker Ave, Sacramento, CA 95834, known as "CA 2" and more fully described in the Application Exhibit A – List of Covered Resources (NTT Generators or Covered Resource). The Covered Resource plans to participate in the CEC-administered Demand Side Grid Support program that facilitates availability of resources for emergency purposes. Application at 3; Amended Application at 3-4. Therefore, while the Covered Resource has an aggregate installed capacity of 48MW, BANC requests that this emergency order apply only to capacity necessary to supply the load at the NTT facility served by the Covered Resource, up to 26.1 MW (Covered Maximum Output). Amended Application at 3-4.

BANC has requested that the Secretary issue the requested emergency order by Sunday, September 4, 2022, or as soon as possible thereafter, authorizing the Covered Resource to operate at the Covered Maximum Output level between 2:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m., when directed to do so by BANC, notwithstanding air quality or other permit limitations.

ORDER

Given the emergency nature of the expected load stress and generation shortfall, the responsibility of BANC as the Balancing Authority to balance generation and load in its BAA to ensure maximum reliability on its system, and the ability of BANC to identify and dispatch generation necessary to meet additional load if an order is issued, I have determined that, under the conditions specified below, generation from the Covered Resource is necessary to best meet the emergency and serve the public interest for purposes of FPA section 202(c) up to the Covered Maximum Output. This determination is based on, among other things:

- The expected shortage of electric energy, shortage of facilities for the generation of electric energy, and other causes in the State of California and within the BANC BAA, including as declared in the Governor's August 31 emergency proclamation and as described in the Application and Amended Application, demonstrate the need for the Covered Resource to contribute to the reliability of the BANC BAA.

- The availability of 26.1 MW of reduced load as enabled by generation from the Covered Resource up to the Covered Maximum Output provides significant assistance by freeing up system generating resources to help alleviate the shortage of generation and meet demand in the BANC BAA.

- The Covered Resource is enrolled in CEC's Demand Side Grid Support (DSGS) program. The DSGS program establishes procedures for qualification, operation, and reporting to ensure that enrolled generation such as the Covered Resource

provides verifiable load reduction and thereby increase available system capacity during energy emergency events.

- The conditions in CEC's DSGS and those specified below restrict operation of the Covered Resource to those circumstances necessary to avoid load shed.

In line with the emergency proclamation's anticipation of near-term energy shortages, this Order is limited to a 5-day period, from September 4, 2022, through September 8, 2022. Because the additional generation may result in a conflict with environmental standards and requirements, I am authorizing only the necessary additional generation, under the conditions and with reporting requirements as described below.

FPA section 202(c)(2) requires the Secretary of Energy to ensure that any order that may result in a conflict with a requirement of any environmental law be limited to the "hours necessary to meet the emergency and serve the public interest, and, to the maximum extent practicable," be consistent with any applicable environmental law, and minimize any adverse environmental impacts. BANC anticipates that this Order may result in exceedance of National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) under the Clean Air Act and other conflicts with environmental law. This Order would permit operation of the Covered Resource and corresponding emissions of volatile organic compounds (VOCs), nitrogen oxides (NOx), sulfur dioxide (SO_2), coarse particles (PM10), and carbon monoxide (CO), in circumstances not contemplated by the units' Title V permit. Namely, under its Title V permits, the Covered Resource is permitted to operate at certain emission rates during maintenance and when electric service from the serving utility is interrupted by an unforeseeable event, but not in order to assist the utility in avoiding service interruptions for other customers. The Order would permit operation under grid emergency conditions; however, under the conditions specified below, it would not permit exceedance of the emission limits otherwise applicable to the units constituting the Covered Resource, including limits on the pounds of VOC, NOx, SO_2, PM10, and CO emitted per year.

Based on my determination of an emergency set forth above, I hereby order:

A. From September 4, 2022, to September 8, 2022, in the event that BANC determines that generation from the Covered Resource is necessary to preserve the reliability of the bulk electric power system in California, I direct BANC to dispatch such unit or units and to order their operation solely under the following conditions: the issuance and continuation of an Energy Emergency Alert Level 2[2] condition or greater between the hours of 14:00 Pacific Time and 22:00 Pacific Time after exhausting all reasonably and practically available resources.

B. Consistent with good utility practice, BANC shall exhaust all reasonably and practically available resources, including other demand response and

[2] For the purposes of this Order, "Energy Emergency Alert Level 2" has the meaning set forth in Section 3.6.3 of the California ISO System Emergency Operating Procedure, Procedure No. 4420, Version 14.0, Effective Date May 1, 2022 (CAISO Emergency Operating Procedure).

identified behind-the-meter generation resources to the extent that such resources provide support to maintain grid reliability, prior to dispatching the Covered Resource.

C. All operation of the Covered Resource must comply with applicable environmental requirements, including but not limited to monitoring, reporting, and recordkeeping requirements, to the maximum extent feasible while operating consistent with the emergency conditions. This Order does not provide relief from any obligation to pay fees or purchase offsets or allowances for emissions that occur during the emergency condition or to use other geographic or temporal flexibilities available to generators. The Covered Resource must comply with the requirements of the CARB Mandatory Reporting Regulation and California's Cap-and-Trade regulation, to the extent applicable. This Order allows operation of the Covered Resource under operating conditions not otherwise permitted by the Covered Resource's Title V permit but does not provide relief from the obligation to operate the Covered Resource within the equipment-specific or cumulative emission limit requirements specified in the Covered Resource's Title V permit.

D. BANC shall provide such additional information regarding the environmental impacts of this Order and its compliance with the conditions of this Order, in each case as requested by the Department from time to time. By October 10, 2022, BANC shall report source-specific data for all dates between September 4, 2022, and September 8, 2022, on which the Covered Resource was operated, including, for each unit, (1) the hours of operation, as well as the hours in which any permit limit was exceeded, and (2) a preliminary description of each permit term that was exceeded and the manner in which such exceedance occurred. BANC shall also submit a final report by November 14, 2022, with any revisions to the information reported on December 12, 2022. The environmental information submitted in the final report shall also include the following information:

i. Emissions data in pounds per hour for each Covered Resource unit, for each hour of the operational scenario, for CO, NOx, PM10, VOC, and SO_2;

ii. Emissions data must include emissions (lbs/hr) calculated consistent with reporting obligations pursuant to operating permits, permitted operating/emission limits, and the actual incremental emissions above the permit limits;

iii. The number and actual hours each day that each Covered Resource unit operated in excess of permit limits or conditions, e.g. "Generator #1; September 5, 2022; 4 hours; 18:00-22:00 PT";

iv. Amount, type and formulation of any fuel used by each Covered Resource;

v. All reporting provided over the last three years to the United States Environmental Protection Agency or Sacramento Metropolitan Air Quality Management District pursuant to operating permit requirements;

vi. Information provided to the CARB in response to the CARB's development and implementation of the plan to mitigate the effects of additional emissions authorized by the August 31, 2022 proclamation;

vii. Additional information requested by DOE as it performs any environmental review relating to the issuance of this Order; and

viii. Information provided by the Covered Resource describing how the requirements in paragraph C above were met by the Covered Resource while operating under the provisions of this Order.

E. BANC shall inform all affected communities where the Covered Resource operates that BANC has been issued this Order, in a manner that ensures that as many members of the community as possible are aware of the Order, and explain clearly what the Order allows BANC to do, including potential impacts to the community where the Covered Resource is located and communities adjacent to the Covered Resource. BANC shall describe the actions taken to comply with this paragraph in the reports delivered to the Department pursuant to paragraph D above.

F. This Order shall not preclude the need for the Covered Resource to comply with applicable state, local, or Federal law or regulations following the expiration of this Order.

G. BANC shall be responsible for the reasonable third-party costs of performing analysis of the environmental and environmental justice impacts of this Order, including any analysis conducted pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act.

H. This Order shall be effective upon its issuance, and shall expire at 23:59 Pacific Time on September 8, 2022, with the exceptions of paragraphs F and G and the reporting and analysis requirements in paragraphs D and E. Renewal or amendment of this Order, should it be needed, must be requested before this Order expires.

Issued in Washington, D.C. at 16:20 Eastern Time on this 4th day of September, 2022.



Kathleen Hogan
Acting Under Secretary for
Infrastructure

BEFORE THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Power Act Section 202(c) Emergency Order: Tri-State Generation and Transmission Association, Platte River Power Authority, Salt River Project, PacifiCorp, and Xcel Energy	))))))	Order No. 202-25-14

Exhibit to
Motion to Intervene and Request for Rehearing and Stay of
Public Interest Organizations

Filed January 28, 2026

Exhibit 1-18:
Department Order No. 202-21-1

Department of Energy
Washington, DC 20585

Order No. 202-21-1

Pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretary of Energy by section 202(c) of the Federal Power Act (FPA), 16 U.S.C. § 824a(c), and section 301(b) of the Department of Energy Organization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7151(b), and for the reasons set forth below, I hereby determine that an emergency exists in Texas due to a shortage of electric energy, a shortage of facilities for the generation of electric energy, and other causes, and that issuance of this Order will meet the emergency and serve the public interest.

On February 14, 2021, the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT), the Independent System Operator (ISO) whose service territory includes 90 percent of the electric customers in the state of Texas, filed a *Request for Emergency Order Under Section 202(c) of the Federal Power Act* (Application) with the United States Department of Energy (Department) "to preserve the reliability of bulk electric power system."

ERCOT is in the beginning stages of an unprecedented cold weather event brought on by a rare, southward excursion of the jet stream into the South Central United States. Temperatures for Sunday and Monday in many parts of Texas are forecasted to drop well below the lowest temperatures experienced in several decades, and abnormally low temperatures are expected to persist for several more days. This weather event is expected to result in record winter electricity demand that will exceed even ERCOT's most extreme seasonal load forecasts.

On February 12, 2021, Greg Abbott, the Governor of the State of Texas declared a state of disaster in all 254 Texas counties due to severe weather posing an "imminent threat of widespread and severe property damage, injury, and loss of life due to prolonged freezing temperatures, heavy snow, and freezing rain statewide." On the morning of February 14, ERCOT issued a system-wide conservation notice addressing the expected system emergency and describing steps that homeowners and businesses can take to reduce system demand.[1] ERCOT has also worked with state agencies to take measures that maximize generation availability in Texas. For example, on February 12, the Railroad Commission of Texas issued an Emergency Order pursuant to Texas Utilities Code affecting the gas utility systems in the state. The order specified increasing the priority of gas supplies to ERCOT generators. ERCOT's application also noted that the "Texas Commission on Environmental Quality has indicated that it will provide enforcement discretion to generators in the ERCOT region that may exceed state emissions requirements during emergency conditions."

According to ERCOT, the measures taken by ERCOT and other state agencies may not prove sufficient to avoid rotating outages of as much as 4,000 MW. Moreover,

[1] ERCOT, *Grid Operator Requests Energy Conservation for System Reliability*, www.ercot.com/news/releases/show/225151.

ERCOT has been alerted that numerous generation units will be unable to operate at full capacity without violating federal air quality or other permit limitations.

ERCOT requests that the Secretary issue an order immediately, effective February 14, 2021 through February 19, 2021, authorizing "the provision of additional energy from all generation units subject to emissions or other permit limits" in the ERCOT region. The generating units (Specified Resources) that this Order pertains to are listed on the Order 202-21-1 Resources List, as described below.

Given the emergency nature of the expected load stress, the responsibility of ERCOT to ensure maximum reliability on its system, and the ability of ERCOT to identify and dispatch generation necessary to meet the additional load, I have determined that additional dispatch of the Specified Resources is necessary to best meet the emergency and serve the public interest for purposes of FPA section 202(c). Because the additional generation may result in a conflict with environmental standards and requirements, I am authorizing only the necessary additional generation, with reporting requirements as described below.

FPA section 202(c)(2) requires the Secretary of Energy to ensure that any 202(c) order that may result in a conflict with a requirement of any environmental law be limited to the "hours necessary to meet the emergency and serve the public interest, and, to the maximum extent practicable," be consistent with any applicable environmental law and minimize any adverse environmental impacts. ERCOT anticipates that this Order may result in exceedance of emissions of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, mercury, and carbon monoxide emissions, as well as wastewater release limits. To minimize adverse environmental impacts, this Order limits operation of dispatched units to the times and within the parameters determined by ERCOT for reliability purposes.

Based on my determination of an emergency set forth above, I hereby order:

A. From February 14, to February 19, 2021, in the event that ERCOT determines that generation from the Specified Resources is necessary to meet the electricity demand that ERCOT anticipates in Texas during this event, I direct ERCOT to dispatch such unit or units and to order their operation only as needed to maintain the reliability of the power grid in the ERCOT region when the demand on the ERCOT system exceeds expected energy and reserve requirements. Specified Resources are those natural gas, coal, or distillate fuel oil generating units set forth on the Order 202-21-1 Resource List, subject to updates directed here and as described in paragraph D, which the Department shall post on www.energy.gov. ERCOT is directed to update Exhibit A to its Application with the anticipated category of environmental impact (i.e. sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, mercury, carbon monoxide emissions, wastewater release, other air pollutants) by 21:00 Central Standard Time on February 15, 2021.

B. To minimize adverse environmental impacts, this Order limits operation of dispatched units to the times and within the parameters determined by ERCOT for reliability purposes. Consistent with good utility practice, ERCOT shall exhaust all reasonably and

practically available resources, including available imports, demand response, and identified behind-the-meter generation resources selected to minimize an increase in emissions, to the extent that such resources provide support to maintain grid reliability, prior to dispatching the Specified Resources. ERCOT shall provide a daily notification to the Department reporting each generating unit that has been designated to use the allowance and operated in reliance on the allowances contained in this Order.

In furtherance of the foregoing and, in each case, subject to the exhaustion of all available imports, demand response, and identified behind-the-meter generation resources selected to minimize an increase in emissions available to support grid reliability:

(i) with respect to any Specified Resource that is an ERCOT Generation Resource or Settlement Only Generator whose operator notifies ERCOT that the unit is unable, or expected to be unable, to produce at its maximum output due to an emission or effluent limit in any federal environmental permit, ERCOT shall ensure that such Specified Resource is only allowed to exceed any such limit during a period for which ERCOT has declared an Energy Emergency Alert (EEA) Level 2 or Level 3. This incremental amount of restricted capacity would be offered at a price no lower than $1,500/MWh. Once ERCOT declares that such an EEA Level 2 or Level 3 event has ended, the unit is required to immediately return to operation within its permitted limits; and

(ii) with respect to any Specified Resource that is an ERCOT Generation Resource whose operator notifies ERCOT that the unit is offline or would need to go offline due to an emission or effluent limit in any federal environmental permit, and to which ERCOT has issued a Reliability Unit Commitment (RUC) instruction, the operator may make all of the unit's capacity available to ERCOT for dispatch during a period for which ERCOT has declared an EEA Level 2 or Level 3. This incremental amount of restricted capacity would be offered at a price no lower than $1,500/MWh. Once ERCOT declares that such an EEA Level 2 or Level 3 event has ended, the unit is required to immediately return to operating at a level below the higher of its minimum operating level or the maximum output allowable under the permitted limit.

In the event ERCOT identifies the need to exceed other relevant environmental permitting levels, ERCOT shall specifically identify such permitting levels and DOE will consider ERCOT's request in good faith.


C. All entities must comply with environmental requirements to the maximum extent necessary to operate consistent with the emergency conditions. This Order does not provide relief from an entity's obligations to purchase allowances for emissions that occur during the emergency condition or to use other geographic or temporal flexibilities available to generators.

D. In the event that ERCOT identifies additional generation units that it deems necessary to operate in excess of federal environmental permitting limits in order to maintain the reliability of the power grid in the ERCOT region when the demand on the ERCOT system exceeds expected energy and reserve requirements, including any such entity to which ERCOT intends to issue a Reliability Unit Commitment (RUC), ERCOT shall provide prompt written notice to the Department of Energy at AskOE@hq.doe.gov identifying in an updated Exhibit A to its Application such additional generation units, the fuel type of such unit, and the anticipated category of environmental impact, at 9:00 Central Standard Time or 21:00 Central Standard Time, whichever follows closest in time to the unit identification by ERCOT to the greatest extent feasible. Such additional generation unit shall be deemed a Specified Resource for the purpose of this Order for the hours prior to the required written notice to the Department, and ERCOT may dispatch such additional generation units, provided that if the Department of Energy notifies ERCOT that its does not approve of such generation unit being designated as a Specified Resource, such generation unit shall not constitute a Specified Resource upon notification from the Department. The Department shall post an updated Order 202-21-1 Resource List as soon as practicable following notification from ERCOT under this paragraph.

E. ERCOT shall provide such additional information regarding the environmental impacts of this Order and its compliance with the conditions of this Order, in each case as requested by the Department of Energy from time to time. By March 1, 2021, ERCOT shall report all dates between February 14, 2021, and February 19, 2021, on which the Specified Resources were operated, the hours of operation, and exceedance of permitting limits, including sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, mercury, carbon monoxide, and other air pollutants, as well as exceedances of wastewater release limits. ERCOT shall submit a final report by March 31, 2021, with any revisions to the information reported on March 1, 2021. In addition, ERCOT shall provide information to the Department quantifying the net revenue associated with generation in excess of environmental limits accruing to non-RUC units in connection with orders issued by the Department pursuant to Section 202(c) of the Federal Power Act.

F. This Order shall be effective upon its issuance, and shall expire at 11:59 p.m. Central Standard Time Friday, February 19, 2021, with the exception of the reporting requirements in paragraph E. Renewal of this Order, should it be needed, must be requested before this Order expires.

Issued in Washington, D.C. at 8:51 PM Eastern Standard Time on this 14th day of February, 2021.



David Huizenga
Acting Secretary of Energy


BEFORE THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Power Act Section 202(c) Emergency Order: Tri-State Generation and Transmission Association, Platte River Power Authority, Salt River Project, PacifiCorp, and Xcel Energy	))))))	Order No. 202-25-14

Exhibit to
Motion to Intervene and Request for Rehearing and Stay of
Public Interest Organizations

Filed January 28, 2026

Exhibit 1-19:
FERC Energy Primer



Energy Primer

A Handbook for Energy Market Basics

FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION
Office of Energy Policy and Innovation

Energy Primer

A Handbook for Energy Market Basics

FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION
Office of Energy Policy and Innovation
December 2023

This report is a product of the staff of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Commission or FERC). The opinions and views expressed in this paper represent the preliminary analysis of the Commission staff. This report does not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission, its Chairman, or individual Commissioners, and is not binding on the Commission.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The Energy Market Primer was originally issued in 2012 and has been updated several times since its first issuance. This update to the Energy Market Primer is the result of the combined efforts of many dedicated individuals throughout the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC or Commission). The team consisted of individuals from the Commission's Office of Energy Policy and Innovation, Office of Enforcement, Office of Energy Market Regulation, and Office of External Affairs. We specifically wanted to recognize the primary contributors to each chapter.

Chapter 1: Wholesale Natural Gas Markets – Eric Primosch

Chapter 2: Wholesale Electricity Markets – Patricia Schaub

Chapter 3: Gas-Electric Interdependency – Thomas Pinkston

Chapter 4: U.S. Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Markets – Eric Primosch

Chapter 5: Trading and Capital Markets – Astrid Rapp and Gareth Jones

Chapter 6: Market Manipulation – Thomas Olson

IN MEMORIAM



Lance Hinrichs

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Office of Energy Policy and Innovation

Lance was instrumental in the creation and publication of the Energy Market Primer. He will forever be remembered as a dedicated public servant whose knowledge of energy markets was unsurpassed.



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INTRODUCTION

Natural gas, electricity, and crude oil are forms of energy that are of particular interest to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) pursuant to its authority under the Natural Gas Act, the Federal Power Act, and the Interstate Commerce Act. This primer explores the workings of the wholesale markets for these forms of energy, as well as energy-related financial markets.

Energy markets consist of both physical and financial elements. The physical markets contain the natural resources, infrastructure, institutions and market participants involved in producing energy and delivering it to consumers. The financial markets include the buying and selling of financial instruments that derive value from the price of the physical commodity. These financial markets have their own set of market structures and institutions, market participants, and traded products which have their own drivers of supply and demand. In general, physical and financial markets can be distinguished by the products and by the intentions of the market participants involved.

Much of the wholesale natural gas and electric power industry in the United States trades competitively, while some markets and their prices are established through administrative processes based on the cost of providing service. In competitive markets, prices are largely driven by the economic concepts of supply and demand. Underlying the supply and demand for energy are physical fundamentals - the physical realities of how markets produce and deliver energy to consumers and how they form prices. These physical fundamentals will be covered in Chapter 1 (Wholesale Natural Gas Markets), Chapter 2 (Wholesale Electricity Markets), and Chapter 4 (U.S. Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Markets).

The significant shift in the U.S. fuel mix has heightened the importance over the past decade of the interdependence of the natural gas and electric systems. Given the importance of natural gas in electricity generation, integration of market operations between the natural gas and electricity industries is critical. The primer provides an overview of natural gas and electric system interdependencies in Chapter 3, Gas-Electric Interdependency.

Market participants buy and sell energy based financial contracts for a number of reasons. Physical market participants, such as producers and large consumers, usually use financial contracts to manage price risk and to protect against price volatility. That is, financial contracts can serve as a tool for managing risk akin to insurance. Other market participants use the energy markets to speculate, or to assume a market risk in hope of profiting from market fluctuations. Additionally, companies turn to the capital markets if they need to raise or invest money. This primer explores the market participants, products, market mechanisms and trading at work for natural gas and electricity in the financial markets in Chapter 5, Financial Markets and Trading.

Where there are markets, there will be those who attempt to manipulate the markets for their own benefit. These practices undermine the market's ability to operate efficiently, reduce other market participants' confidence in the markets and distort market outcomes, including prices. Some of these practices are discussed in Chapter 6, Market Manipulation.

This primer is written to be used either as a traditional text – read front to back – or as a reference guide. Consequently, some material is repeated in different sections and references are provided to other parts of the primer where a concept is addressed in greater detail.

Further information about various aspects of energy markets and FERC regulation can be found at www.ferc.gov; then navigate to the Market Oversight tab. You can find the market oversight pages here: https://www.ferc.gov/market-assessments.







Chapter 2
Wholesale Electricity Markets

WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY MARKETS

Electricity is a physical product – the flow of electrical power. It is a secondary energy source, in that it results from the conversion of other energy forms such as natural gas, coal or uranium, or the energy inherent in wind, sunshine or the flow of water in a river. Electricity is not visible or directly observable, but it can be turned on and off and measured.

Quick Facts: *Measuring Electricity*

A key measure of electricity used in industry is the rate at which it is produced, transferred, or consumed – how much energy per unit of time a generator produces, with the units of electricity called watts. Similar measures are kilowatts (kW) – 1,000 watts, and megawatts (MW) – 1,000 kilowatts. A watt, kilowatt, or megawatt is a unit of power.

The amount of electric energy generated, transmitted, or used over time is measured as the number of watt-hours (also expressed as kilowatt-hours, megawatt-hours, or gigawatt-hours).

The amount of electricity a generator can produce in an hour is its capacity, which is typically noted as megawatts. For example, a generator with a capacity of 100 MW can produce 100 MW in an hour. The amount of power consumed at any location is the demand at that point.



Electricity markets have retail and wholesale components. Retail service involves the sales of electricity to consumers and may involve retail markets; wholesale markets typically involve the sales of electricity among electric utilities and electricity traders before it is eventually sold to consumers. Because the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has jurisdiction over wholesale electric rates and not retail electric rates, this document focuses on wholesale electricity markets, although it does address retail demand and other instances where retail markets strongly influence wholesale markets.

Most wholesale electric markets rely upon competitive markets to set prices, but some prices are based on the service provider's cost of service. For wholesale markets, FERC either authorizes jurisdictional entities to sell at market-based rates or at cost-based rates.

Both market-based and cost-of-service prices are affected by physical factors or conditions that drive electric supply and demand – these factors are known as physical fundamentals. For example, weather affects both supply and demand. Fuel costs, capital costs, transmission capacity and constraints, and the operating characteristics of power plants affect the cost at which supply can be provided. The actual price for power is determined by the interaction of supply and demand. For example, extreme heat can drive up demand and require grid operators to activate less-efficient, more-expensive power plants, and consequently drive prices up.

Electric Power Industry

ELECTRICITY ON DEMAND

In the United States and other developed countries, consumers expect electricity to be available whenever they need it. Electricity use has grown as consumers integrate various devices and amenities such as lighting, refrigerators and computers into their everyday lives. Consumers also expect to pay reasonable prices for the electricity that they use.

Meeting these customer expectations requires substantial effort and activity. While technology continues to develop and advance, electric markets can only store a portion of the electricity required to serve electric loads. Thus, the vast majority of electricity must be produced instantaneously as needed. Further, unlike most other markets, electricity's historically inelastic demand does not move with prices. To provide electricity on demand, electric system operations have to be planned and conducted with that goal in mind. In the absence of significant amounts of storage and price responsive demand, operators must plan and operate power plants and the transmission grid so that demand and supply exactly match, every moment of the day, every day of the year, in every location.

ECONOMIES OF SCALE

Electric power is one of the most capital-intensive industries. Generation, transmission and distribution require significant investment in capital intensive equipment, the costs of which are fixed. Spreading these significant fixed costs over more customers helps bring down the cost that each customer pays.

Thomas Edison's first street lighting project in the 1880s grew to electrifying whole neighborhoods, towns, and cities. Providing service over larger areas allowed utilities to take advantage of economies of scale and the cost per unit of production dropped as power plants grew larger and larger. The companies building these facilities were generally self-contained and not connected to each other. They owned and operated generation, transmission, and distribution facilities and were vertically integrated.

While successful for launching the electric utility industry, this market structure had limitations. The larger generating units were difficult to replace if they experienced unexpected shutdowns. As a result, the utilities held and maintained excess capacity in reserve (reserves) to ensure reliable electric service. These reserves were able to quickly replace electricity lost due to an unexpected shutdown or an unexpected increase in electric loads.

RESERVE SHARING

The solution to high reserve costs was to share reserves with adjacent utilities. Instead of building and maintaining all of the capacity required to provide energy and sufficient reserves, utilities were able to pool their reserves and could buy power from their neighbors in times of need cutting their costs significantly as a result. To facilitate reserve sharing, utilities built interconnecting transmission lines between their transmission systems to deliver electricity in the event of a generator outage or some other system disruption. Today's bulk power grid began as a way to maintain reliable service while lowering costs. The value of reserve-sharing agreements led to the formation of power pools, the forerunners of today's regional transmission organizations.

Coordinating exchanges of energy and reserves also led to closer coordination of other utility functions, such as the process of determining which generating units to use to serve electric loads. Operators want to commit just enough capacity to ensure reliability, but no more than is needed. Over time, this coordination ultimately led to the creation of regional transmission organizations that use markets to determine the set of resources to reliably serve electric loads at least cost. These wholesale electricity markets operate over large regions of the country.

Regional coordination also was spurred by special circumstances, particularly in the West. Large federally owned dams on the Columbia and Colorado river systems generate power from the spring runoff of melting mountain snow. When the reservoirs are full and hydroelectric plants are generating plentiful amounts

of power, there is not enough local demand to use the available supply. Since hydropower was cheaper than any alternative, long distance transmission lines were built to deliver the excess power from the Northwest and Southwest to load centers in California. With these transmission interconnections in place, northwestern utilities found that they could get cheaper power from southern power generation at other times of the year. These seasonal and regional disparities in availability and price introduced a lively bilateral trading market.

In the 1960s, the electric power industry created an informal, voluntary organization of operating staff to aid in coordinating the reliable operation of the bulk electric system. Then, in 1965, the largest power blackout until that time hit the northeastern United States and southeastern Ontario, Canada, affecting 30 million people. The blackout led to the development of the National Electric Reliability Council in 1968, shortly thereafter renamed the North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC), and nine regional reliability councils.[74] Rather than serving as a power pool or other entity for sharing reserves, NERC focused on reliability. In 2006, using authority granted in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct 2005), FERC certified NERC as the electric reliability organization for the United States, and reliability standards became mandatory and enforceable.

ECONOMY ENERGY TRADE

Transmission interconnections between adjacent utilities were originally built for the primary purpose of delivering reserves in emergencies. However, this created excess transmission capacity, since these events were rare. The interconnections allowed utilities to trade power, which became profitable when the marginal cost of operating their generation was higher or lower than that of their neighbors. Transmission availability provided opportunities for utilities to save money by buying energy when it was cheaper than generating and selling energy to utilities with higher costs. This is called economy energy trading.

EVOLVING PUBLIC POLICIES

Evolving public policies, regulatory constructs and organizational structures shaped the electric power industry over its history. Five concepts that helped shape the electricity industry and markets are outlined below, and still affect the industry today.

REGULATED MONOPOLIES

In the early years of the industry, investors provided funds and took ownership shares in the power stations and electric distribution systems. These utilities became regulated – typically by state agencies – to overcome concern they were natural monopolies in the areas they served, lacking competition, and to bring stability to a capital-intensive industry. Stability came from granting exclusive service territories (or franchises), transparent financial statements, and the formulaic setting of electricity rates that were subject to regulatory oversight and approval. Over time, many of the utilities issued stock, which gave stockholders a share of the company's ownership, commonly referred to as investor-owned utilities (IOUs). The regulatory model for setting electricity rates was almost exclusively cost of service-based until about 30 years ago. Today, retail electric rate regulation is largely still based on cost-of-service, while wholesale electric rate regulation has become increasingly market-based. State regulators are responsible for approving retail rates, as well as utilities' investments in generation and distribution facilities. Some states eventually developed elaborate integrated resource planning (IRP) processes to determine what facilities should be built.[75]

NOT-FOR-PROFIT UTILITIES

Another approach to serving customers emerged in the form of nonprofit electric providers. In the early years of the industry, electrification started in towns and cities

74 In 2006, the North American Electric Reliability Council changed its name to the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (also referred to as NERC).

75 For additional background and context on the early years of the electrification of the U.S., National Museum of American History, *Powering a Generation of Change, Emergence of Electrical Utilities in America* (2002), http://americanhistory.si.edu/powering/past/h1main.htm.

where utility service was provided by municipal power agencies or city governments. The federal government also stepped in to develop and market electricity from the nation's significant hydroelectric resources. Finally, the Depression-era rural electrification program promoted customer-owned rural electric cooperatives and low-interest government loans. There are currently more than 1,700 municipal and almost 900 cooperative utilities in the United States.

POWER POOLS

Power pools are multilateral arrangements with members ceding operational control over their generating units and transmission facilities to a common operator. Members provide incremental cost data about their units and system status data to the operator. The operator then runs an energy management system that uses the unit cost data to optimize the overall unit commitment and economic dispatch.

The first of the power pools was PJM, which began in 1927 for utilities to share their generating resources. The Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) and the Southwest Power Pool (SPP) formed in 1941 to pool resources for the war effort. Later, the New York Power Pool was formed in 1966 and the New England Power Pool in 1971, in response to the 1965 Northeast blackout.

COMPETITION, PART 1: COMPETITIVE GENERATION AND OPEN ACCESS

Environmental policy and initiatives to open the airline and trucking industries to competition helped shape the energy industry in the 1970s. A provision in President Carter's energy plan led to passage of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA), which ushered in the next era.

PURPA established a program implemented by states and overseen by FERC to encourage the use of efficient cogeneration (using the heat from industrial or other processes to generate electricity) and small-scale renewable generation. FERC's role was to issue regulations for the program and certify that qualifying facilities (QFs) met statutory requirements. States administratively set the price to be paid to these generators at the cost the utilities would avoid by purchasing the power rather than generating it themselves. Such prices are referred to as avoided-cost rates.


Most states set their avoided-cost rates so low that they got little QF capacity. However, California, Texas, and Massachusetts set relatively generous avoided-cost rates, and were overwhelmed with QF capacity, much of which received prices that turned out to be higher than the actual costs avoided by the purchasing utilities. The rapid growth and size of the QF industry surprised many policymakers and entrepreneurs and got them thinking about the viability of generation independent of regulated monopolies.

Under the original regulated monopoly model, utilities owned and operated the transmission lines with no obligation to allow others to use them. This posed a significant barrier to the development of an independent power industry. FERC started conditioning approval in merger cases on the utility's voluntary provision of open transmission access. The Energy Policy Act of 1992 gave FERC the authority to grant transmission access on request. These approaches to open access resulted in a patchwork of transmission access.

By the mid-1990s, support for opening the transmission grid to all users encouraged FERC to pursue a generic solution. FERC issued Order No. 888 in 1996 and required mandatory open transmission access by all transmitting utilities and a reciprocity provision successfully extended open access to non-jurisdictional entities (municipal, cooperative and federal utilities).

Order No. 889 addressed matters needed to implement open access. The rule established the Internet-based Open Access Same-Time Information System (OASIS) for posting available transmission capacity and reserving transmission capacity. These rules required significant changes to utility control room operations and limited the ability of companies to share transmission-related information with their own power marketing operating units.

Figure 2-1: North American Regional Transmission Organizations, Independent System Operators and Bilateral Regions



Source: Hitachi Energy, Velocity Suite

COMPETITION, PART 2: INTEGRATING MARKETS AND OPERATIONS – ISOS AND RTOS

While the industry had historically traded electricity through bilateral transactions and power pool agreements, Order No. 888 promoted the concept of independent system operators (ISOs). Along with facilitating open access to transmission, an ISO would operate the transmission system independently of wholesale market participants and foster competition for electricity generation. Several groups of transmission owners formed ISOs, some from existing power pools.

In Order No. 2000, FERC encouraged utilities to join regional transmission organizations (RTOs) which, like ISOs, would operate the transmission systems and develop innovative procedures to manage transmission equitably. FERC's proceedings in Order Nos. 888 and 2000, along with the efforts of the states and the industry, led to the voluntary formation of ISOs and RTOs. Each of the ISOs and RTOs subsequently developed full-scale energy and ancillary service markets in which buyers and sellers could bid for or offer generation. Both organizations use bid-based markets to determine economic dispatch. Throughout the subsequent sections of the primer, when referring to the organized RTO and ISO markets generally and collectively, the term RTO/ISO is used.

Major parts of the country operate under more traditional market structures, notably the West (excluding California) and the Southeast. Two-thirds of the nation's electricity load is served in RTO/ISO regions.

Electricity Demand

Americans consume electricity for an ever-increasing range of uses. While consumption has grown over the years, it varies annually based on many influences, such

as weather, economic activity, and other factors. Total generation at utility-scale facilities reached 4,108,303 gigawatt hours in 2021.[76]

Vertically-integrated IOUs, federal entities, municipally owned, and electric cooperatives sell the majority of electric generation to retail consumers. Additionally, some retail consumers generate all or part of the power that they consume. The rest of the electricity ultimately consumed by customers is bought and sold through wholesale electricity markets.

DEMAND CHARACTERISTICS

The amount of electricity consumed (demand) is continuously varying and follows cycles throughout the day and year. Regionally, electric demand may peak in either the summer or the winter. Spring and fall are considered shoulder months, with lower peak demand. Seasonal peaks vary regionally, although the highest levels of power load in almost all regions of the United States occur during summer heat waves, in the late afternoon. However, a minority of regions reach their peak load when the weather is extremely cold. These are primarily areas with significant space-heating requirements and little summer air conditioning load, such as the far northern areas of the United States.

Throughout the year, and in most locations, daily demand typically peaks in the late afternoon, as commercial and domestic activities peak, and in the winter, when lighting needs grow. Electricity use also varies between weekdays and weekends. Commercial and industrial activities are lower on weekends and peoples' noncommercial activities change with their personal schedules. The load on different weekdays can also show distinct usage. For example, Mondays and Fridays, being adjacent to weekends, may have different loads than Tuesday through Thursday. This is particularly true in the summer.

Since supply must rise and fall to provide exactly the amount of electricity customers need, the cost of providing power typically rises as demand grows and falls as demand declines. This is because higher levels of demand require activation of increasingly expensive sources of power generation, and reductions as demand declines. As a result, power prices are typically highest during periods of peak demand.

DEMAND DRIVERS

The amount of electricity demanded is insensitive to prices in the short-term. Electricity is a necessity to most people and businesses. While they may be able to reduce their demand in the short-term – by turning down the thermostat or turning off lights, for example – electricity consumers find it difficult to do without electricity altogether. Further, most customers – especially smaller customers – do not get price signals to which they can respond. A vast majority of residential customers are billed monthly on a preset rate structure. Large industrial customers, on the other hand, may receive real-time price signals.

In the longer-term, options for reducing electricity use include installing insulation and implementing other energy efficiency measures. Larger consumers may also consider building their own generation facilities.

As discussed below, utilities, at the direction of government, have developed demand-response programs, which can provide reduced rates or other compensation to customers who agree to reduce load in periods of electric system stress.

Climate and Weather

Weather is one of the primary factors affecting demand. General climatic trends drive long-term consumption patterns and therefore the infrastructure needed to ensure reliable service.

Weather also can have extreme short-term effects on electricity usage. A sudden cold snap can drive heating use up quickly and a heat wave can push up air conditioning loads. Other, less obvious weather patterns affect demand

76 Derived from EIA, *Electric Power Annual, Table 3.1.A* (released November 8, 2022), www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/html/epa_03_01_a.html.

– rain and wind, for example, may result in sudden cooling, affecting heating or air conditioning usage.

Economic Activity

The overall level of economic activity affects power demand. During periods of robust activity, loads increase. Conversely, loads drop during recessions. These changes are most evident in the industrial sector, where businesses and plants may close, downsize, or eliminate factory shifts. In addition to reducing overall demand, these changes affect the pattern of demand; for example, a factory may eliminate a night shift, cutting off-peak use but continue its use of power during peak hours. In some cases, these effects can be significant. For example, the COVID-19 pandemic changed how consumers used electricity as communities and companies implemented social distancing and stay-at-home measures to combat the spread of COVID-19 in the spring of 2020. Electricity demand shifted from commercial and industrial uses to residential consumption. Overall, electricity demand in the U.S. dropped about 4% in 2020, as commercial and industrial demand dropped 6% and 8%, respectively, and residential demand rose 1%.[77]

Energy Policies and Regulations

State regulatory agencies, such as public utility commissions, oversee retail electric rates and set policies affecting retail customer service. Some states allow utilities to offer retail rate structures that enable customers to receive more accurate price signals. They include, among other things, rates that vary with the time of day and the cost of providing electricity.

Efforts to reduce overall demand by improving energy efficiency are also supported by governmental and utility programs. These include rebates for the purchase of energy efficient appliances and home improvements, as well as capacity market payments for load reductions, also known as demand response, that are made available in certain markets.

Quick Facts: *Heating and Cooling Degree Days*

In the United States, engineers developed the concept of heating and cooling degree days to measure the effects of temperature on demand. Average daily temperatures are compared to a 65°F standard - those in excess of 65° yield cooling degree days; those below 65° yield heating degree days. For example, a day with an average temperature of 66° would yield one cooling degree day.



Retail Customer Mix

Most electric utilities serve three distinct classes of customers: residential, commercial, and industrial. Each class uses electricity differently, resulting in a differing load profile, or the amount of energy each customer class uses throughout the day. If a consumer uses electricity consistently throughout the day and seasons, the load shape is flat. Another consumer may use more at some times than others. More variable demand is typically more expensive to serve, especially if the peak occurs at the same time as other customers' use peaks. Consequently, the mix of customer types affects a region's overall demand and costs.

77 EIA, *Short-Term Annual Outlook*, at 3 (January 2020).

Residential consumers form one of the top two customer segments in the United States at approximately 39 percent of electricity demand in 2021. Residential consumers use electricity for air conditioning, refrigerators, space and water heating, lighting, washers and dryers, computers, televisions, and other appliances. Prices for residential service are typically highest, reflecting both residential customers' load shape and their service from lower-voltage distribution facilities, meaning that more power lines and related assets are needed to provide service to them.

Commercial use, the next largest customer segment, represented approximately 35 percent of electricity demand in 2021.[78] This customer segment includes office buildings, hotels and motels, restaurants, street lighting, retail stores, wholesale businesses, and medical, religious, educational, and social facilities. More than half of commercial consumers' electricity use is for heating and lighting.

Industrial consumers use about 26 percent of the nation's electricity.[79] This customer segment includes manufacturing, construction, mining, agriculture and forestry operations. Industrial customers often see the lowest rates, reflecting their relatively flat load profile and their ability to take service at higher voltage levels.

Transportation demand for electricity stems primarily from trains and urban transportation systems. This is less than 1 percent of total electricity demand.[80] However, state and federal policies that advance electrification of the transportation fleet are expected to increase electric load growth in the near future.

LOAD FORECASTING

Demand is constantly changing, which challenges grid operators and suppliers who are responsible for ensuring that supply will meet demand at all times. Consequently, they expend considerable resources to forecast demand.

Load forecasting uses mathematical models to predict demand across a region, such as a utility service territory or an RTO/ISO footprint. Forecasts can be divided into three categories: short-term forecasts, which range from one hour to one week ahead; medium-term forecasts, usually a week to a year ahead; and long-term forecasts, which are longer than a year. It is possible to predict the next-day load with an accuracy of approximately one to three percent of what will actually happen. The accuracy of these forecasts is limited by the accuracy of the weather forecasts used in their preparation and the uncertainties of human behavior.

The forecasts for different time horizons are important for different operations within a utility company. Short-term load forecasting can help to estimate transmission system power flows and to make decisions that can prevent overloading of transmission systems. Timely implementation of such decisions leads to the improvement of network reliability and to reduced occurrences of equipment failures and blackouts. Forecasted weather parameters are the most important factors in short-term load forecasts, with temperature and humidity as the most commonly used load predictors.

The medium- and long-term forecasts take into account historical load and weather data, the number of customers in different customer classes, appliances used in the area and their characteristics, economic and demographic data, and other factors. For the next-year peak forecast, it is possible to provide an estimated peak load based on historical loads and weather conditions. Long-term forecasts extending 10 to 20 years into the future are used for system infrastructure planning and are meant to ensure that there are sufficient resources available to meet the needs of the expected future peak demand.

Forecasts are necessary for the variety of actions that must occur to ensure that sufficient supply is available in the immediate and long term. These include the

78 Derived from EIA, *Electric Power Annual, Table 2.5* (November 7, 2022), www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/html/epa_02_05.html.

79 *Id.*

80 *Id.*

planning of long-term infrastructure, purchasing fuel and other supplies, and ensuring adequate staffing of specific personnel. Load forecasts are also extremely important for suppliers, financial institutions, and other participants in electric energy generation, transmission, distribution, and trading. Missed forecasts, when actual demand differs significantly from the forecast, can cause wholesale prices to be significantly higher or lower than they otherwise might have been.

DEMAND RESPONSE

Electricity demand is generally insensitive to price, meaning that demand does not typically fall when prices rise. This occurs for several reasons, including that most end-use consumers of electricity are not exposed to real-time electricity prices. However, some utilities and grid operators have developed ways to stimulate a response from consumers through demand-response programs.

Demand response is the reduction in consumption of electricity by customers from their expected consumption levels, in response to either reliability needs or price signals. Customers will forego power use for short periods, shift some energy use from peak periods to other times, or use on-site generation in response to price signals or incentives for load reduction. The signals to respond to electric power system needs or high market prices may come from a utility or other load-serving entity, an RTO/ISO, or an independent provider of demand response. Both retail and wholesale entities administer these programs. Demand response has the potential to lower system-wide power costs and assist in maintaining reliability. It can also mitigate system stress and allow operators to resolve shortages, avoid operating inefficient power plants, or relieve transmission congestion. There can also be environmental benefits, such as lower levels of power plant-related emissions that result from not operating peaking units.

Measuring and verifying the amount of reduced consumption during a demand response activation requires development of consumers' baseline usage, against which their actual use is measured.

Demand-Response Programs

Programs generally fall into three categories: curtailing, shifting, or on-site generation.

Curtailing, or forgoing, involves reducing power use (load) during times of high prices or threats to reliability without making up the use later. For example, residential customers might turn off lights or raise thermostats during hot weather. Commercial facilities may turn off office equipment, lower building lighting or change thermostat settings by a few degrees.

Shifting involves moving or rescheduling high energy-use activities in response to high prices or demand response program events to off-peak periods – evenings, nights, or weekends. Industrial customers might reschedule batch production processes to evening hours or the next day. Commercial establishments may delay high-energy operations. Residential customers may wait until evening or night to use high energy consuming appliances, such as clothes dryers or dishwashers. In shifting, the lost amenity or service is made up at a subsequent time.

On-site generation is when customers respond by turning on an on-site or backup emergency generator to supply some or all of their electricity needs. Although these customers may have little or no interruption to their electrical usage, their net load and requirements from the power system are reduced. The ability to use on-site generation is most common for institutional customers, such as hospitals, large schools, or data centers.

Demand response programs can be further distinguished by whether they are controlled by the system operator (dispatchable) or the customer (non-dispatchable). Dispatchable demand response refers to programs where the system operator can direct the customer to reduce its energy use, such as direct load control of residential appliances or directed reductions to industrial customers. Dispatchable demand response programs can be used for both reliability and economic reasons. Non-dispatchable demand response lets the retail customer decide whether and when to reduce

consumption in response to the price of power. This includes time-sensitive pricing programs that are based on rates that charge higher prices during high-demand hours and lower prices at other times.

As a result of technological innovations and policy directions, new types and applications of demand response are emerging that encompass the use of smart appliances that respond in near real-time to price or other signals. These models may allow customers to respond more easily, as they require little customer monitoring or interaction.

Retail Demand Response Programs

Utilities and third-party aggregators offer a variety of demand response programs that include time-based rates and interruptible contracts. Also, some states mandate energy efficiency resource standards that include peak load reduction targets.

Time-based rates include time-of-use rates and dynamic pricing. Time-based rates depend on advanced meters at customer premises that can record usage over short increments, typically groupings of hours or individual hours. In time-of-use programs, customers are charged different prices at different times of the day, with hours on or near peak demand costing more than off-peak hours. Dynamic pricing is a category of programs where rates change frequently to better reflect system costs. The practice of adjusting prices as costs change provides an incentive for consumers to shift load to other periods or to reduce peak load. One form of dynamic pricing is termed real-time pricing. In these programs, customers are charged prices reflecting the immediate cost of power. Industrial or very large commercial customers are the most likely to choose real-time tariffs.


Another form of dynamic pricing is critical peak pricing. These programs use real-time prices at times of extreme system peak but are restricted to a limited number of hours annually. They feature higher prices than time-of-use prices during the critical peak. Consumers do not know in advance when a critical peak might be called. Critical peak programs for residential customers typically use rebates as an incentive to participate in the program, but customers take the risk of paying higher prices or reducing load during critical peak periods. These programs seek to have customers respond to price signals, as opposed to penalizing them, if they do not lower their use in the critical peak hours.

Interruptible contracts are used by utilities to control load and address potential reliability issues, such as reducing stress on the electric system during heat waves. The two primary forms of this category of demand response are direct load control and interruptible rates. Direct load control entails the utility curtailing a portion of customer load as described above. Under interruptible rates, customers agree to turn off equipment or switch their energy supply to an on-site generator.

Energy efficiency resource standards exist in 25 states, while five states and the District of Columbia. have energy efficiency goals.[81] The standards typically require utilities to achieve electric energy savings, and many include peak load reduction targets. These mandates provide incentives for utilities to reduce customers' energy consumption and include mechanisms that decouple profits from the amount of electricity sold or performance bonuses for utilities that meet or exceed reduction targets.

81 DSIRE, N.C. Clean Energy Technology Center, *Energy Efficiency Resource Standards (and Goals)* at 1 (September 2021), https://ncsolarcen-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Energy-Efficiency-Resource-Standards_Sept-2021.pdf.

Figure 2-2: Demand Response and Energy Efficiency in Electric System Planning and Operations



Source: U.S. Department of Energy[82]

Wholesale Market Demand Response Programs

On the wholesale level, market operators have some programs that dispatch the demand response resources. Other demand response programs are dispatched by the utilities or aggregators that sponsor the programs, rather than the market operator. Note that with most retail demand response programs, which can also aid wholesale markets, market operators may not be able to invoke them or even see the specific amount of response that occurs.


Demand response participation in RTO/ISOs has been encouraged in U.S. national energy policy and by various FERC orders.[83] Overall, approximately 30.8 GW of demand response participated in RTOs/ISOs in 2020.[84] These resources primarily participate in RTO/ISOs as capacity resources and receive advance reservation payments in return for their commitment to participate when called upon or activated. Additionally, demand resources may offer into the RTO/ISO day-ahead markets, specifying the hours, number of MWs and price at which they are willing to curtail.

82 U.S. Department of Energy, *Benefits of Demand Response in Electricity Markets and Recommendations for Achieving Them: A Report to the United States Congress Pursuant to Section 1252 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005*, at 15, (2006), https://www.energy.gov/oe/articles/benefits-demand-response-electricity-markets-and-recommendations-achieving-them-report.

83 EPAct 2005 included policy encouraging time-based pricing and other forms of demand response and the elimination of barriers to demand response participation in the energy, capacity, and ancillary services markets. Examples of FERC orders include Order No. 719, 128¶61,059, (July 16, 2009); Order No. 745, 134¶61,187 (March 15, 2011); and Order No. 2222, 174¶61,197, (March 18, 2021).

84 *See* FERC, *Assessment of Demand Response and Advanced Metering Staff Report*, at 3 (December 2021), https://www.ferc.gov/media/2021-assessment-demand-response-and-advanced-metering.

Figure 2-3: Electricity Supply and Delivery



Source: The NEED Project[85]

Some of the RTO/ISO demand response comes from individual entities; the rest is accumulated through third-party aggregators, or curtailment service providers, who recruit customers too small to participate on their own, such as schools, commercial chains or groups of residential customers. In aggregating small customers, curtailment service providers have increased customer participation in many wholesale reliability and emergency programs.

Demand Response and Energy Efficiency in Planning and Operations

Different demand response programs can be used at various times to support planning and operations (see Figure 2-2). Energy efficiency programs that reduce baseload or peak demand over the long-term are incorporated into system planning. Dispatchable programs that are quickly implemented and targeted for short-term peak reductions – such as direct load control – lie on the other end of the spectrum and are used in the moment of operation.


Electricity Supply and Delivery

Unlike many other products, electricity cannot be stored in any appreciable quantity relative to the total consumed across the country each day. Further, electricity is a necessity for most consumers, whose use responds little to price changes. Finally, electric equipment and appliances are tuned to very specific standards of power, measured as voltage and frequency. For example, deviations in voltage can cause devices to operate poorly or may even damage them. Consequently, the supply side of the electricity market must provide and deliver exactly the amount of power customers want at all times, at all locations. This requires constant monitoring of the grid and close coordination among industry participants.

Electricity service relies on a complex system of infrastructure that falls into two general categories: generation and delivery services of transmission and distribution. Together, the power generation and high-voltage transmission lines that deliver power to distribution facilities constitute the bulk power system. Transmission and distribution facilities are also referred to as the power grid. These are coordinated, and at times operated by, a grid coordinator.

85 National Energy Education Development Project, *Electricity*, at 56 (2017), http://www.need.org/Files/curriculum/infobook/Elec1S.pdf.

Figure 2-4: North American Electric Reliability Corporation Regions



Source: North American Electric Reliability Corporation

Nationally, the grid is geographically split into three main sections – the Western, Eastern and Texas Interconnections. These sections operate independently and have limited interconnections between them.

The nation, along with Canada and a small part of Mexico, is also divided into regional entities for reliability purposes. The regional reliability entities fall under the purview of North American Electric Reliability Corporations (NERC), which was designated by FERC as the nation's electric reliability organization, and which develops and enforces mandatory reliability standards to better ensure the reliable operation of the nation's bulk-power system (the interconnected transmission grid). The reliability standards, once approved by FERC, must be met by applicable industry participants as designated in each reliability standard. Consequently, the grid is planned and operated to meet these standards.

NERC's regions include:

- Midwest Reliability Organization (MRO)
- Northeast Power Coordinating Council (NPCC)
- Reliability First Corporation (RFC)
- SERC Reliability Corporation (SERC)
- Texas Reliability Entity (TRE)
- Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC)

FERC JURISDICTION

Under the Federal Power Act (FPA), FERC regulates the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce. The FPA requires that every public utility file with FERC all rates and charges for any transmission or sale subject to the jurisdiction of FERC. Under Sections 205 and 206 of the FPA, 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d, 824e, FERC ensures that the rates and charges made, demanded, or received by any public utility for, or in connection with, the transmission or sale of electric energy subject to the jurisdiction of FERC, and all rules and regulations affecting, or pertaining to, such rates or charges are just and reasonable and not unduly preferential or unduly discriminatory.

GENERATION

Power generators are typically categorized by the fuel that they use and subcategorized by their specific operating technology. In 2021, the United States had approximately 1,218 GW of total generating capacity.[86] The majority of power generation is produced from coal, natural gas, nuclear fuels, and renewables.

Power plants each have differing costs and operational characteristics, both of which determine when, where and how plants will be built and operated. Plant costs fall into two general categories: capital investment costs, which are amounts spent to build the plant, and operational costs, the amounts spent to maintain and run the plant. In general, there is a trade-off between these expenses: more capital-intensive plants tend to be cheaper to run – they have lower variable costs – and, conversely, the least capital intensive plants tend to be more expensive to run – they have higher variable cost. For example, nuclear plants produce vast amounts of power at low variable costs but are expensive to build. Conversely, natural gas-fired combustion turbines are far less expensive to build but can be more expensive to run. Grid operators dispatch plants – or call them into service – with the simultaneous goals of providing reliable power at the lowest cost. Because various generation technologies have differing variable costs, plants are dispatched only when they are part of the most economic combination of plants needed to supply the customers on the grid. For plants operating in RTOs/ISOs, this cost is determined by the price that generators offer. In other areas, it is determined by the marginal cost of the available generating plants.

CONVENTIONAL GENERATION

Generation is often described as conventional or renewable (described further in the Renewable Generation section below). Conventional generation typically includes natural gas-, oil-, coal- or nuclear-powered generation.

Natural Gas-Fired Generation

Natural gas power plants consist of three major technologies, each with its distinct set of market advantages and limitations. They are steam boilers, gas turbines and combined cycle generators. Natural gas fuels nearly a third of U.S. electricity generation.

Steam boiler technology is an older design that burns gas in a large boiler furnace to generate steam at both high pressure and high temperature. The steam is then run through a turbine that is attached to a generator, which spins and produces electricity. Typical plant size ranges from 300 MW to 1,000 MW. Because of their size and the limited flexibility that is inherent in the centralized boiler design, these plants require fairly long start-up times to become operational and are limited in their flexibility to produce power output beyond a certain range. Furthermore, these plants are generally not as economical or easy to site as some newer technologies – which explains why few have been built in recent years.

86 Installed nameplate capacity is assessed through December 2021 and captures Operating and Standby resources available. Note that these estimates do not imply that generation output will match the nameplate capacity of a resource type. Derived from EIA, *Preliminary Monthly Electric Generator Inventory (based on Form EIA-860M)* (February 2022), https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia860m/.

Gas turbines (GT) are small, quick-start units similar to an aircraft jet engine. These plants are also called simple cycle turbines or combustion turbines (CT). GTs are relatively inexpensive to build but are expensive to operate because they are relatively inefficient, providing low power output for the amount of gas burned, and have high maintenance costs. They are not designed to run on a continuous basis and are used to serve the highest demand during peak periods, such as hot summer afternoons. GTs also run when there are system-wide shortages, such as when a power line or generator trips offline. GTs typically have a short operational life due to the wear-and-tear caused by cycling. The typical capacity of a GT is 10-50 MW, and they are usually installed in banks of multiple units.

Combined cycle power plants (CCPPs) are a hybrid of the GT and steam boiler technologies. Specifically, this design incorporates a gas-combustion turbine unit along with an associated generator, and a heat recovery steam generator along with its own steam turbine. The result is a highly efficient power plant. They produce negligible amounts of SO2, and particulate emissions and their NOx and CO2 emissions are significantly lower than a conventional coal plant. CCPPs, on average, require 80 percent less land than a coal-fired plant, typically 100 acres for a CCPP versus 500 acres for comparable coal plant, and CCPPs also use modest amounts of water compared to other technologies.

Coal-Fired Generation

Coal plants produced approximately 22 percent of the electricity in the United States in 2021.[87] These facilities generate power by creating steam which is used to spin a very large turbine. These plants tend to be used as baseload units, meaning that they run continuously and are not especially flexible in raising or lowering their power output. They have high initial capital costs, with complex designs and operational requirements. However, coal plants have low marginal costs and can produce substantial amounts of power. Most of the coal-fired plants in the United States are located in the Southeast and Midwest.

Oil-Fired Generation

Oil plants generally produce only a small amount of the total electricity generated in the U.S. power markets. These facilities are expensive to run and also emit more pollutants than natural gas plants. They are frequently uneconomic and typically run at low-capacity factors. Like natural gas-fired generators, there are several types of units that burn oil; primarily, these are steam boilers and combustion turbines. Most dual-fuel power plants are located in the eastern half of the United States, especially on the East Coast.[88]

Generally, two types of oil are used for power generation: number 2 and number 6 (bunker) fuel oil. Number 2 is a lighter and cleaner fuel. It is more expensive, but because it produces fewer pollutants when burned, it is better for locations with stringent environmental regulations such as major metropolitan areas. Conversely, number 6 fuel oil is cheaper, but considered dirty because of its higher emissions. It is highly viscous (thick and heavy), and it comes from the bottom of the barrel in the refining process.

Nuclear Generation

Nuclear plants provided roughly 19 percent of the nation's electricity in 2021, when 93 nuclear plants operated in the United States with a total capacity of approximately 100 GW.[89] Like generating units that use coal, nuclear plants tend to be large, baseload units that run continuously. Nuclear plants have high capital and fixed costs, but low variable costs, which includes fuel cost. They typically run at full power for 18 or 24 months, which is the duration of a unit's fuel cycle, and are then taken offline for refueling and maintenance. Outages

87 EIA, *Electric Power Annual* (November 7, 2022), *Generation at Utility Scale Facilities*, *Tables 3.1A. and 3.1.B*, (accessed December 2022), www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/html/epa_01_02.html.

88 Derived from Hitachi Energy, Velocity Suite data (Accessed March 28, 2023).

89 EIA, *Form EIA-860* (November 2022), www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia860/.

typically last from 20 days to significantly longer, depending on the work needed. Of the 92 operating nuclear plants, most reside in the eastern United States. Only six are in the West, four in Texas. Illinois had the largest number of plants at 11, followed by Pennsylvania at eight, and South Carolina at seven.[90]

RENEWABLE GENERATION

Renewable resources use fuels that are naturally replaced, such as wind, solar, hydroelectric and geothermal or which use fuels that are readily replaceable, such as biomass and biogas.

Such generation (generation termed renewable generation or renewables) is an increasingly important part of total U.S. supply, accounting for 29 percent of electric energy produced in 2021.[91] As total generation from all fuels has remained relatively constant in recent years, renewable generation's share has risen, spurred by technological advancements, state policy, and federal tax credits.[92]

Wind and solar capacity have grown faster than other renewable resources in recent years. Wind capacity grew substantially, from approximately 10 GW in 2006 to 193 GW in 2021.[93] Utility-scale solar capacity grew even faster, from approximately 0.1 GW to 61 GW over the same period. [94]

Additions of renewable generation capacity are usually reported in megawatts of nameplate capacity. Actual capability varies from the nameplate for any unit type due to such factors as age, wear, maintenance and ambient conditions. But as renewable resources are often weather-dependent, their capacity factors – the ratio of average generation to the nameplate capacity for a specific period – have been lower (for example, approximately 30 percent), depending on the technology type, than for fossil-fuel generation. Grid operators pay close attention to the difference between nameplate and capacity factor values when they evaluate capacity available to cover expected load, however, capacity factors have risen with technological innovation and improved manufacturing processes.

Wind

Wind generation is among the fastest-growing renewable resource, in part due to cost declines and technology improvements, as well as receipt of federal tax credits. Increases in average hub heights and rotor diameters have increased average wind turbine capacity. Because the best wind resources are often located far from load centers, obtaining sufficient transmission presents a challenge to delivering wind output. Other market challenges for future wind development include its variable output, which is often inversely correlated to demand (seasonally and daily); system operators' limited ability to dispatch wind resources to meet load increases; difficulties related to accurately forecasting its ramping; and the need for companion generation (usually fossil-fueled) or energy storage to be available to balance wind generation when the wind is not blowing.

Solar

Solar generation transforms sunlight into electricity using one of two technologies: photovoltaic (PV) or concentrating solar power (CSP). PV modules, or panels, transform sunlight directly into power using cells made of silicon or thin-film materials. They can be installed on roofs of buildings or at ground-level PV farms. CSP plants use a two-step process to transform the sun's energy. First, mirrors direct sunlight towards a receiver that captures

90 EIA, *Form EIA-860M* (February 2023), www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia860M/.

91 Derived from EIA, *Electricity Annual* (September 2022), www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/html/epa_01_01.html.

92 Lawrence Berkeley National Lab, *U.S. State Renewables Portfolio and Clean Electricity Standards: 2023 Status Update* (June 2023), https://eta-publications.lbl.gov/sites/default/files/lbnl_rps_ces_status_report_2023_edition.pdf.

93 Installed nameplate capacity is assessed through December 2021 and captures Operating and Standby resources available. Note that these estimates do not imply that generation output will match the nameplate capacity of a resource type. Derived from EIA, *Preliminary Monthly Electric Generator Inventory (based on Form EIA-860M)* (February 2022), https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia860m/.

94 *Id.*

the heat. CSP then employs a thermal process to create steam, driving an engine or turbine to produce electricity. CSP plants, which are dispatchable, can include low-cost energy storage that extends their availability later in peak hours. PV growth has increased greatly as a result of policy incentives and cost declines. Total PV generation for 2021 was 161.5 GW, with approximately two-thirds of that generation coming from utility-scale facilities and one-third from small-scale generation.[95]

By the end of 2021, 1.5 GW of CSP was operational – a decline from 2017 when CSP capacity was 1.8 GW.[96] Total CSP capacity is significantly lower than PV owing to PV's lower costs.[97] Seven western and southwestern states have extensive CSP potential: Utah, New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada, Texas, California and Colorado.[98] Developing that potential will require overcoming challenges of cost, siting, transmission, and the need for extensive water supplies to clean mirrors.

Hydroelectric

Hydroelectric generation is powered by the kinetic energy of falling water that drives turbine generators, which convert the energy into electricity. There are two types of hydroelectric projects: conventional and pumped storage. Conventional projects, which use a dam in a waterway, can operate in a run-of-river mode, in which water outflow from the project approximates inflow, or in a peaking mode, in which the reservoir is mostly drained to generate power during peak periods when energy is more valuable. Pumped storage projects use bodies of water at two different elevations. Water is pumped into elevated storage reservoirs during off-peak periods when pumping energy is cheaper; the water is then used to generate power during peak periods as it flows back to the lower elevation reservoir. In 2021, total U.S. hydro-electric capacity (including conventional and pumped-storage capacity) reached 246 GW. Conventional hydro-electric capacity was 285.3 GW and pumped storage hydro-electric capacity was 5.1 GW.[99]

Geothermal

Geothermal generation taps into reservoirs of steam and hot water deep beneath the earth's surface to produce power. The majority of the plants are based in California and Nevada. Geothermal potential is determined by thermal conductivity, thickness of sedimentary rock, geothermal gradient, heat flow and surface temperature. Geothermal generation, which stood at 16 GW in 2021, increased from 0.6 GW in 2011, but has decreased as a portion of total renewable output, due to the growth of other renewables. California hosts about 76 percent of geothermal U.S. operating capacity.[100]

Biomass

Biomass generation includes power production from many waste byproducts, such as agricultural residues, landfill gas, municipal solid waste, and wood resources. The largest biomass category is wood waste, burned for heat and power in the lumber, pulp and paper industries. Challenges to biomass production include impacts on food supplies (for example, converting corn into ethanol), conserving natural resources, and minimizing water pollution. In 2021, net utility-scale power generation using biomass fuel sources was 54.3 GWh - composed of 36.5 GWh from wood and wood-derived fuels as well as 17.8 GWh from other biomass sources.[101]

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95 Derived from EIA, *Electric Power Annual, Tables 3.1.A. and 3.1.B* (released November 7, 2022 and accessed December 2022), www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/html/epa_01_02.html.

96 Derived from EIA, See table 4.3 in *Electric Power Annual 2021 and Electric Power Annual 2017*, www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/html/epa_04_03.html and www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/archive/pdf/03482017.pdf.

97 *See* National Renewable Energy Laboratory, *Annual Technology Baseline* (July 2018), https://atb.nrel.gov/electricity/2018/summary.html

98 EIA, *Form EIA-860*, (September 13, 2018), https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia860/.

99 Derived from EIA, *Electric Power Annual* (November 7, 2022), *Generation at Utility Scale Facilities, Tables 3.1.A and 3.1.B* (accessed December 2022), www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/html/epa_01_02.html.

100 Derived from EIA, *Form EIA-860* (accessed November 2017), https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia860/.

101 *Id.*

Biogas

Biogas energy is created through the anaerobic (without oxygen) bacterial decomposition of biodegradable waste, which is turned into a gas containing 60-70 percent methane. Biogas recovery is typically installed at farms and used to run farm operations and reduce methane emissions from natural manure decomposition.

Renewable Energy Policies

Renewable generation development is frequently tied to policies promoting their use, which include tax credits, low-cost loans, rebates and production incentives. Federal funding of research and development has played an important role in lowering the costs or reducing the time it takes for renewable technologies to become commercially viable.

Congress has provided tax incentives to spur renewable resource investments. Originally enacted in 1992, federal production tax credits (PTC) are available for wind, biomass, geothermal, and other forms of renewable generation based on a facility's production. An inflation-adjusted credit, the PTC generally has a duration of 10 years from the date the facility goes online. The PTC has been revised several times, most recently in August 2022 under the Inflation Reduction Act, which extended the PTC for projects that begin construction before 2025, including solar projects that had previously been excluded from the PTC program.[102] After 2024, the PTC becomes technology neutral and emission based, and phases out starting in 2032, or when the U.S. electricity sector emissions are 75% below 2022 levels. If projects over 1 MW meet certain labor requirements, their PTC is 2.6 c/kWh; if the projects do not meet the labor requirements, the PTC would be 0.3 c/kWh. A further 10% adder on the PTC and ITC can be obtained if a project uses U.S. steel and roughly half the of manufactured components (as measured by cost) are sourced in the United States.

Another form of tax credit for renewables, including solar and other types of projects, has been a federal investment tax credit (ITC). The ITC has generally been set at 30 percent of a project's equipment and construction costs. The Inflation Reduction Act also revised the ITC, with the same terms as for the PTC. Projects meeting labor requirements may receive a 30% ITC, otherwise the ITC drops to 6%. Projects may also receive a 10% increase in the ITC if they use U.S. components, as described for the PTC.

State renewable portfolio standards (RPS) and renewable energy standards (RES) have been significant drivers in the growth of investment in renewable generation. An RPS requires a certain percentage of energy sales measured by megawatt-hours (MWh) to come from renewable resources. Percentages usually increase incrementally from a base year to an ultimate target. Currently, 30 states plus Washington, D.C., have an RPS with financial penalties for non-achievement.[103] As utilities and independent developers build more renewable-powered generation, the markets in which they participate continue to address the integration of renewable output into their day-ahead and real-time operations, and incorporate the expected growth of renewable generation in their long-term transmission-planning processes.

Renewable energy certificates (RECs) allow state regulators to track compliance with mandatory RPS targets or verify progress in voluntary state renewable programs. They also allow compliance entities to purchase credits – subject to state-imposed limits on amount and price – if they have not generated or bought enough renewable energy to meet their annual requirements.

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102 Congress.gov, *H.R. 5376-Inflation Reduction Act of 2022*, (became law August 4, 2022) https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/5376/text.

103 Barbose, Galen. Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, *U.S. Renewables Portfolio Standards: 2021 Status Update: Early Release* (February 2021), https://eta-publications.lbl.gov/sites/default/files/rps_status_update-2021_early_release.pdf.

ELECTRIC STORAGE

Historically, utility-scale storage of electricity for later use had been limited to pumped-hydro storage facilities. Recent advances in technology have made other types of electric storage resources, including batteries and flywheels, more economically feasible. The lower costs and improved capabilities of electric storage, along with favorable state and federal policies, increased penetration of variable energy resources, and a continued focus on grid reliability have helped spur the development of electric storage resources.[104]

As of 2021, the combined capacities of utility-scale electric storage and battery storage represented less than 2 percent of total generating capacity in the United States.[105] The majority of storage capacity consists of pumped-hydro storage (21 GW in 2021), which has grown very slowly. Battery storage capacity, in contrast, has grown from 3 MW in 2016 to 4,482 MW in 2021.[106] EIA projects that total U.S. battery storage capacity could reach 30 GW by 2025.[107]

Electric storage projects are increasingly available to help balance supply and demand particularly during periods of high demand or excess supply. These resources can charge during periods of low demand or excess generation, when electricity is less expensive, and discharge when demand is high and electricity is more expensive. Batteries, flywheels, and other fast-acting electric storage technologies can also provide ancillary services which help maintain grid reliability. The vast majority of battery storage capacity in the electricity markets is used to provide ancillary services or capacity, because these applications provide the most revenue for storage owners.[108]

Some states have passed legislation to incentivize investment in storage projects. In 2013, California adopted targets for utilities to procure 1,325 MW of energy storage capacity by 2024 and subsequently increased the capacity requirement target and compressed the timeline for reaching that target.[109] As of May 2021, five states besides California also set energy storage requirements or targets: Oregon, Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey and Virginia. Additionally, some states which do not have formal energy storage requirements offer financial incentives such as grants and tax incentives, while others have begun requiring utilities to include storage in integrated resource plans.

DISTRIBUTED ENERGY RESOURCES

In Order No. 2222, the Commission defined Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) as any resource located on the distribution system, any subsystem thereof or behind a meter. These resources may include, but are not limited to, electric storage resources, distributed generation, demand response, energy efficiency, thermal storage, and electric vehicles and their supply equipment.[110] In most instances, these resources are located close to the

104 FERC has issued various orders to help remove barriers to the participation of electric storage resources in FERC-jurisdictional markets. *See, Electric Storage Participation in Markets Operated by Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent System Operators, Order No. 841, 162 FERC ¶61,127 (2018); Participation of Distributed Energy Resource Aggregations in Markets Operated by Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent System Operators, Order No. 2222*, 172 FERC ¶ 61,247 (2020).

105 Installed nameplate capacity is assessed through December 2021 and captures Operating and Standby resources available. Note that these estimates do not imply that generation output will match the nameplate capacity of a resource type. Derived from EIA, *Preliminary Monthly Electric Generator Inventory (based on Form EIA-860M)* (February 2022), https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia860m/.

106 *Id.*

107 EIA, *U.S. battery storage capacity will increase significantly by 2025* (December 8, 2022), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=54939#:~:text=As%20of%20October%202022%2C%207.8%20GW%20of%20utility-scale,add%20another%2020.8%20GW%20of%20battery%20storage%20capacity.

108 EIA, *U.S. Battery Storage Market Trends*, 13-15 (August 2021), https://www.eia.gov/analysis/studies/electricity/batterystorage/pdf/battery_storage_2021.pdf.

109 California Public Utilities Commission, *Energy Storage* (accessed December 1, 2022), www.cpuc.ca.gov/industries-and-topics/electrical-energy/energy-storage.

110 Order No. 2222, 172¶61,247, (September 17, 2020), at 4.

end user of power. While individual installations of DER tend to have capacities much smaller than that of central station power plants (for example DER installations may range from a fraction of a kW to systems producing less than 10 MW), the overall quantity of DER installations has grown tremendously, particularly in states with beneficial policies toward DERs.

One such policy is known as net metering, which is a system in which DERs are connected behind the meter to a distribution system and any surplus power is transferred onto the grid, allowing customers to offset the cost of power drawn from a distribution utility. Such surplus flow typically occurs during periods when the DER's production outstrips the customer's total demand. Under one measure of DER, as tracked by EIA, total net-metered capacity grew by approximately 277 percent between 2014 and 2020, from approximately 7.5 GW of capacity to 28.3 GW. The bulk of this capacity was solar PV, which made up 94 percent of net-metered capacity in 2020, with 62 percent of that capacity owned by residential customers.[111] In some cases, surplus power from a large DER or a set of net metered DERs may flow onto the transmission system.

TRANSMISSION

The alternating current (AC) power grid operates like an interconnected web, where, with a few exceptions, the flow of power is not specifically controlled by the operators on a line-by-line basis. Instead, power flows from sources of generation to consumers across any number of lines simultaneously, following the path of least resistance. There are also a limited number of direct current (DC) lines, which are set up as specific paths with definite beginning and end points for scheduling and moving power. These lines are controllable by operators and have other characteristics that make them attractive to grid planners and operators, such as providing greater grid stability and lower line losses. However, DC lines cost significantly more than AC lines to construct. Consequently, DC lines are typically built for certain specialized applications such as the movement of large amounts of power over long distances, for example the Pacific Intertie, which extends between the Northwest and California.

Transmission lines provide a certain amount of resistance to the flow of power as electricity travels through them. This resistance is not unlike the wind resistance that a car must overcome as it travels along a highway. The resistance in power lines creates losses: the amount of power injected into a power line diminishes as it travels through the line. The amount of these losses is contingent on many factors including the voltage of the transmission facilities.

111 EIA, *Electric Power Annual* (December 2022), (March 2022), www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/html/epa_04_10.html.

Wholesale Electricity Markets and Trading

Electric markets encompass different organizational structures and different mechanisms for buying and selling power at the wholesale level. Electric systems for delivering power to consumers in the United States are split into two structures: traditional systems and those run by RTO/ISOs. Traditional systems are typically vertically integrated, rely on management to make operational decisions, and sell electricity to retail customers based on their cost of service. In general, RTO/ISOs use their markets to make operational decisions, such as generator dispatch, and to price the resulting electricity. Load-serving entities then buy the power through the RTOs/ISOs for resale to retail customers.

Both traditional systems and RTOs/ISOs conduct certain functions, although they may perform these functions in different ways. These include:

- Ensuring the electric grid operates reliably in a defined geographic footprint
- Balancing supply and demand instantaneously and maintaining sufficient operating reserves
- Dispatching system resources as economically as possible
- Coordinating system dispatch with neighboring balancing authority areas (BAAs)
- Planning for transmission in its footprint
- Coordinating system development with neighboring systems and participating in regional planning efforts
- Providing non-discriminatory transmission access

Buying and selling electricity in the wholesale markets – trading – occurs through bilateral and RTO/ISO transactions, as discussed below. Bilateral transactions occur in both traditional systems and in RTO/ISO regions. Pricing for bilateral transactions in both RTO/ISO and traditional regions incorporates both cost-based and market-based rates.

SUPPLYING LOAD

Load serving entities (LSE) serve customer load through a combination of self-supply, bilateral market purchases and purchases from RTO/ISO markets. Self-supply means that the LSE generates power from plants it owns or operates to meet demand. With bilateral purchases, the LSE buys power from a supplier. RTO/ISO market purchases means the supplying company purchases power through the RTO's/ISO's markets.

LSEs' sources of energy vary considerably. In ISO-NE, NYISO, and CAISO, the LSEs have divested much or all their generation. In these circumstances, LSEs supply their customers' requirements through bilateral and RTO/ISO market purchases. In PJM, MISO, and SPP, LSEs may own significant amounts of generation, either directly or through affiliates, and therefore use self-supply as well as bilateral and RTO market purchases.


BILATERAL TRANSACTIONS

Bilateral transactions between two parties do not occur through an RTO/ISO and can occur through direct contact and negotiation, through a voice broker or through an electronic brokerage platform, such as the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE). The deals can range from standardized contract packages, such as those traded on ICE, to customized, complex contracts known as structured transactions. In bilateral transactions, buyers and sellers know the identity of the party with whom they are doing business.

Whether the trade is done on ICE, directly between parties or through another type of broker, the trading of standard physical and financial products, such as next-day on-peak firm or swaps, allows index providers to survey traders and publish price indexes. These indices provide price transparency.

Physical bilateral trades involving the movement of energy from one point to another require the parties to reserve transmission capacity to move the power over the transmission grid. Transmitting utilities are required to post the availability of transmission capacity and offer

Figure 2-5: Options for Energy Supply



Source: PJM Traditional Wholesale Electricity Markets

service on an OASIS website. Traders usually reserve transmission capacity on OASIS at the same time they arrange the power contract.

Transfers of power between Balancing Authority Areas (BAAs) require one of the parties to the transaction to submit a request for interchange, also known as an eTag.[112] The receiving BAA (the entity to which the power is transferred or sinks), or its agent, will process the eTag, ensure a reliability assessment has been completed, and send it to all parties named on the eTag. This ensures an orderly transfer of energy and provides transmission system operators with the information that they need to institute curtailments, as needed. Curtailments may be necessary when a change in system conditions reduces the capability of the transmission system to move power and requires some transactions to be reduced or cut.

Bilateral physical transactions that are conducted in RTO/ISOs are settled financially. Generators offer their power into the markets, and load is served through the power dispatched by the RTO/ISO. The RTO/ISO then settles bilateral transactions based on the prices in the contracts and the prices that occurred in their markets.

112 A BAA is a collection of generation, transmission, and loads within the metered boundaries of the entity (a Balancing Authority) that is responsible for balancing load, generation, and net interchange between other BAAs. Glossary of Terms Used in NERC Reliability Standards (March 2022), https://www.nerc.com/files/glossary_of_terms.pdf.

COST-BASED RATES

Cost-based rates are used to price most transmission services and some electricity when FERC determines that market-based rates are not appropriate, or when an entity does not seek market-based rate authority. Cost-based rates are set to recover costs associated with providing service and give a fair return on capital. These rates are typically listed in a published tariff.

The following are major inputs to setting cost-based electricity rates:

- Determining used-and-useful electricity plant costs. This may include the cost of generation facilities, transmission facilities, distribution plants and office and related administration facilities.
- Determining expenses for the production, transmission and distribution of electricity, including fuel and purchased power, taxes and administrative expenses.
- Establishing a fair return on capital, known as the cost of capital. This includes determining the cost of debt, common equity, preferred stock and commercial paper and other forms of short-term borrowing, such as lines of credit used to finance projects and provide cash for day-to-day operations.
- Allocating electric plant and other expenses among various customer classes and setting the rate structure and rate levels.

MARKET-BASED RATES

Under market-based rates, the terms of an electric transaction are negotiated by the sellers and buyers in bilateral markets or through RTO/ISO market operations. FERC grants market-based rate authority to electricity sellers that demonstrate that they and their affiliates lack, or have adequately mitigated, horizontal market power (typically based on whether the seller is a pivotal supplier and on the percent of generation owned by the seller relative to the total amount of generation available in a market). Sellers must also show that they lack, or have adequately mitigated, vertical market power (the ability to erect barriers to entry or influence the cost of production for competitive electricity suppliers). Wholesale sellers who have market-based rate authority and sell into day-ahead or real-time markets administered by an RTO/ISO do so subject to the specific RTO/ISO market rules approved by FERC. Thus, a seller in such markets must have an authorization from FERC and must also abide by the additional rules contained in the RTO/ISO tariff.

TRANSMISSION SERVICE

FERC requires that public utilities that own transmission lines used in interstate commerce offer transmission service on a nondiscriminatory basis to all eligible customers. The rates and terms of service are published in each utility's Open Access Transmission Tariff (OATT). Each utility's OATT specifies the transmission services available. Customers submit requests for transmission service through the OASIS. Utilities evaluate each transmission-service request using a model of the grid called a state estimator. Based on the model's estimation of the effects on the system, the request for transmission service is either approved or denied.

The two most common types of transmission service are network and point-to-point service. Network service allows a transmission customer the use of the entire transmission network to deliver generation from specified resources to specified loads. The price for service is cost-based and published in the OATT. Network service has higher priority than point-to-point service.

Point-to-point service involves paying for and reserving a fixed quantity of transmission capacity and moving power up to the reservation amount from one location, the point of receipt (POR), to another location, the point of delivery (POD). The POR and POD may be outside the transmission operator's footprint. Depending on availability, customers may purchase firm or non-firm point-to-point service for durations of one hour to multiple years.

Customers holding firm point-to-point transmission capacity may sell that capacity in a secondary market – such a sale is known as capacity reassignment. An entity holding transmission rights may want to resell

that capacity to another transmission customer in the secondary market because it is unneeded, or to make a profit. Resellers of transmission capacity are permitted to charge market-based rates for capacity reassignments, instead of the original cost-based rate at which they purchased the capacity. Most capacity reassignments are hourly, although capacity can also be reassigned on a daily, weekly, monthly, or yearly basis.[113]

If the market price of energy is greater at the POD than at the POR, the transmission has value. The transmission holder can capture this value by using the transmission – buying energy at the POR, moving it to the POD and selling it. Alternatively, the transmission holder can sell the transmission through a capacity reassignment. Thus, the price of a capacity reassignment should be consistent with, and rarely exceed, the expected price differential between the POD and the POR.

Transmission Planning

Each transmission-operating utility must participate in regional planning processes that identify transmission system additions and improvements needed to maintain reliability. Studies are conducted to test the transmission system against mandatory national reliability standards, as well as regional reliability standards. Planning studies may look 10-15 years into the future to identify transmission overloads, voltage limitations, and other reliability problems.

GRID OPERATIONS

Grid operators dispatch their systems using the least costly generation, consistent with the constraints of the transmission system and reliability requirements. The dispatch process occurs in two stages. For RTOs/ISOs, the market determines a day-ahead unit commitment, then updates the unit commitment and dispatches in real time. Grid operators in traditional utilities plan for the next day's dispatch, then update and implement that dispatch in real time.

Dispatch Planning

Grid operators decide which generating units should be committed in advance of actual operations. For RTOs/ISOs, this is done, in part, through the day-ahead markets and forecasts. For operators in traditional utilities, this is done through various planning and forecasting processes. Planning dispatch in advance of real-time operations is needed because some generating units need to obtain fuel or require several hours of lead time before they are brought online. In selecting the most economic generators to commit, operators take into account forecast load requirements and each unit's physical operating characteristics, such as how quickly output can be changed, maximum and minimum output levels and the minimum time a generator must run once it is started. Operators must also take into account each generating unit's cost factors, such as fuel and nonfuel operating costs, and the cost of environmental compliance.


Forecast conditions can also affect how the transmission grid is optimally dispatched to reliably meet load. This is the security aspect of commitment analysis. The factors that can affect grid capabilities include generation and transmission facility outages, line capacities as affected by loading levels and flow direction, and weather conditions. If the security analysis indicates that the optimal economic dispatch cannot be carried out reliably, relatively expensive generators may have to be called upon to replace less-expensive units.

System and Unit Dispatch

Grid operators must decide the actual level at which each available resource should be operated, given the actual real-time load and grid conditions, so that reliability is maintained and overall production costs are minimized. Actual conditions will vary from those forecast prior to real-time, and grid operators must adjust the dispatch accordingly. As part of real-time operations, demand, generation and interchange (imports and exports) must be continually kept in balance to maintain a system frequency of 60 hertz.

113 FERC, *Electric Quarterly Reports, Downloads, Quarterly Filings* (2021), https://eqrreportviewer.ferc.gov.

Figure 2-6: Market Supply Curve for NYISO (Illustrative)



Source: Hitachi Energy, Velocity Suite[114]

This is typically done by automatic generation control (AGC) to change the generation dispatch as needed.

In general, dispatch occurs based on the cost of generation from given resources, with the lowest-cost resources dispatched first and the higher-cost resources dispatched last. The chart above is a depiction of the market supply curve for the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO). This is also commonly called the supply stack. In it, all the generating units in the New York market are shown, sorted according to their marginal cost of production. Their cost of production is shown on the vertical axis in terms of dollars per MWh. The cheapest units to run are to the left and the most expensive to the right.

Dispatch in New York, for example, first calls upon wind generating units, followed successively by hydroelectric, nuclear and coal-, gas- and oil-fired generating units.

This assumes that the generating units have sufficient resources – enough wind for the wind-powered generators or enough river flow for the hydroelectric plants, for example – and that sufficient transmission capability exists to deliver generator output and meet reliability needs.

In addition to these considerations, transmission flows must be monitored to ensure that the grid operates within voltage and reliability limits. If transmission flows exceed accepted limits, the operator must take corrective action, which could involve curtailing schedules, changing the dispatch or shedding load. Operators may check conditions and issue adjusted dispatch instructions as often as every five minutes.

ANCILLARY SERVICES

Ancillary services maintain electric reliability and support the transmission of electricity. These services

114 Derived from Hitachi Energy, Velocity Suite, *Supply Curve Analyst, Form EIA 860, NERC Electric Supply and Demand database, FERC Form 1, FERC Form 714, ISO Load Data, Hitachi Energy Primary Research, et al* (February 2023).

are produced and consumed in real-time, or in the very near term. NERC and regional entities establish the minimum amount of each ancillary service that is required for maintaining grid reliability.[115]

Regulation matches generation with very short-term changes in load by moving the output of selected resources up and down via an automatic control signal, typically every few seconds. The changes to output are designed to maintain system frequency at 60 hertz. Failure to maintain a 60-hertz frequency can result in systemic failure of an electric grid.

Operating reserves are needed to restore load and generation balance when a supply resource trips offline. Operating reserves are provided by generating units and demand resources that can act quickly, by increasing output or reducing demand, to make up a generation deficiency. There are three types: spinning reserves, non-spinning reserves and supplemental reserves.

Spinning reserves are provided by generators that are online (synchronized to the system frequency) with some unloaded (spare) capacity and capable of increasing its electricity output within a specified period, such as 10 minutes. During normal operation, these reserves are provided by increasing output on electrically synchronized equipment or by reducing load on pumped storage hydroelectric facilities. Synchronized reserve can also be provided by demand-side resources.

Non-spinning reserves are provided by generating units that are not necessarily synchronized to the power grid but can be brought online within a specified amount of time, such as 10 minutes. Non-spinning reserve can also be provided by demand-side resources.

Supplemental reserves are provided by generating units that can be made available within a specified amount of time, such as 30 minutes and are not necessarily synchronized with the system frequency.

Blackstart generating units have the ability to go from a shutdown condition to an operating conditi on and start delivering power without any outside assistance from the electric grid. Hydroelectric facilities and diesel generators predominately have this capability. These are the first facilities to be started up in the event of a system failure or blackout to restore the rest of the grid.

Reactive power: Electricity consists of current, the flow of electrons, and voltage, the force that pushes the current through the wire. Reactive power is the portion of power that establishes and maintains electric and magnetic fields in AC equipment. It is necessary for transporting AC power over transmission lines, and for operating magnetic equipment, including rotating machinery and transformers. It is consumed by current as it flows. As the amount of electricity flowing on a line increases, so does the amount of reactive power needed to maintain voltage and move current. Power plants can produce both real and reactive power and can change the output of both. Special equipment installed on the transmission grid is also capable of injecting reactive power to maintain voltage.

WEATHER

Weather is the single most important factor affecting the level of electricity demand and, thus, is a major factor in grid operations. System operators therefore rely heavily on weather forecasts to ensure they have the right generation, in the right locations, to run the grid reliably.

Weather affects grid operations in other ways, as well. Primary among these is on the productivity of certain types of power generators: wind and hydroelectric. Wind turbines' power output changes

115 For additional information on the definitions of ancillary services, NERC, *Glossary of Terms Used in NERC Reliability Standards*, (March 2022), https://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Glossary%20of%20Terms/Glossary_of_Terms.pdf.

with wind availability and speed, which affects cost of wholesale power. Solar generation declines with cloud cover, which not only decreases available generation but can increase demand as behind-the-meter solar, such as residential and commercial installations, decrease their supply to retail users.

Hydroelectric plants rely on rain and snowfall to provide the river flow needed for their output. Geographically, this is most important in the Pacific Northwest, where seasonal hydroelectric plant output is a critical source of power. Rain and the melting of winter snowpack feed the Columbia and Snake River systems. Surplus power from these generators is typically exported to California to help meet summer peak demand, increase reliability and lower prices.

Temperature can also affect the output of other power plants and capacity of transmission lines. Thermal plants that use a turbine – coal, gas, oil, and nuclear plants – become less efficient at higher temperatures. Additionally, the capacity of transmission lines is limited by heat because the conductive material used in fabrication becomes more electrically resistant as they heat up, limiting their throughput capability.

Traditional Electricity Systems


Traditional wholesale electricity markets exist primarily in the Southeast and the West outside of California, where utilities are responsible for system operations and management, and, typically, for providing power to retail consumers. Utilities in these markets are frequently vertically integrated – they own the generation, transmission and distribution systems used to serve electricity consumers. They may also include federal systems, such as the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), the Tennessee Valley Authority and the Western Area Power Administration. Wholesale physical power trading typically occurs through bilateral transactions. In addition to the responsibilities listed in the overview to this section, a utility in a traditional region has the following responsibilities:

- Generating or obtaining the power needed to serve customers (this varies by state)
- Dispatching resources based on some cost minimizing algorithm
- Ensuring the reliability of the transmission grid

Southeast Wholesale Market Region

The Southeast electricity market is a bilateral market that includes all or parts of Florida, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Missouri, and Tennessee. It encompasses the Southeastern Electric Reliability Council (SERC) NERC region. Major hubs include Into Southern and the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). The Southeast region's hourly peak demand is greater than 203 GW.[116] While traditional bilateral trading continues in the Southeast, some utilities in the region have created a trading platform, the Southeast Energy Exchange Market (SEEM), discussed further below. Southern Company also conducts an auction for some of its available generation, also discussed further below.


Figure 2-7: Southeast Electric Region



Source: Hitachi Energy, Velocity Suite

116 The hourly peak demand observed between 2000 and 2020. Based on FERC Form 714, Annual Electric Balancing Authority Area and Planning Area Report. Derived from the Balancing Authority Areas within the SERC NERC region, using the Hitachi Energy, Velocity Suite, Balancing Authority Area Net Energy for Load & Peak Demand dataset.

Figure 2-8: Southeast Electric Region Capacity Mix



Source: EIA Form 860-M[117]

Supply Resources

The total generating capacity in the Southeast Electric Region is over 256 GW and is predominately composed of natural gas and coal-fired generators. Hydroelectric and nuclear capacity are also substantial resources in the region.

The Southeast generates most of its electricity from coal, nuclear, and natural gas-fired plants, as shown in the bar chart above.

The TVA sub-region has a majority of its capacity and output from coal and nuclear, while the Virginia-Carolina (VACAR) sub-region has the highest utilization of nuclear generation in the Southeast.

TRADING AND MARKET FEATURES

Physical sales in the Southeast are done bilaterally and long-term energy transactions are particularly prominent, compared to short-term transactions. Many long-term agreements involve full-requirements contracts or long-term power purchase agreements. For example, Southern Company's short-term transactions account for around 30 percent of its total wholesale energy sales in 2021.[118]

Short-term energy is traded among various entities, including investor-owned utilities, municipal utilities, public utility districts, independent power producers, and marketers. Some of the largest sellers of short-term power include Southern Company, North Carolina Municipal Power Agency, Cargill, and Exelon.

Industry-referenced trading points for short-term bilateral transactions in the Southeast include the following locations: Into Southern, TVA, VACAR, and Florida. Volumes for short-term transactions can be low, particularly under normal weather conditions. Overall demand for short-term transactions tends to rise during periods of system stress, for example summer heat waves or winter cold snaps.

The Southeast has relatively low volumes of short-term trades compared to the Western regions. Thus, there is limited data on that price index publishers have on which to base their price reporting. Given the bilateral nature of wholesale power transactions in the Southeast, and a relatively small market for short-term transactions, interest in financial power products in the Southeast is weak.

117 Installed nameplate capacity is assessed through December 2021 and captures Operating and Standby resources available. Note that these estimates do not imply that generation output will match the nameplate capacity of a resource type. Derived from EIA, *Preliminary Monthly Electric Generator Inventory* (based on Form EIA-860M) (released February 2022), https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia860m/.

118 FERC, *Electric Quarterly Reports, Downloads, Quarterly Filings* (2021), https://eqrreportviewer.ferc.gov.

SOUTHEAST ENERGY EXCHANGE MARKET

The Southeast Energy Exchange Market (SEEM) launched on November 9, 2022. However, on July 14, 2023, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuited remanded to FERC orders addressing the Seem. Consequently, the SEEM proposal is now pending before the Commission once again.

SOUTHERN COMPANY AUCTION

Southern Company has held daily and hourly auctions for power within its balancing area since April 2009 as a requirement of Southern Company's market-based rate tariff. This BAA encompasses the service territories of Southern Company utilities: Georgia Power, Alabama Power, Mississippi Power, and Gulf Power. The products included in the auction are day-ahead power and real-time power.

According to the auction rules, Southern Company must offer all of its available uncommitted thermal generation capacity into the auction, after regulation and contingency reserves are met. The auction is intended to mitigate the potential ability of Southern Company to exercise market power within its balancing authority area and certain adjacent balancing authority areas. In February 2017, Southern Company revised its market-based rate tariff to cap all market-based sales of less than one year outside of the auction at a cost-based tariff rate.[119]

Western Wholesale Market Regions

The power markets in the western United States are primarily bilateral markets. A key exception is most of California and portions of Nevada, which operate under CAISO. Further, several entities buy and sell electricity in a regional, short-term markets run by CAISO, called the Western Energy Imbalance Market (WEIM), and the SPP-run Western Energy Imbalance Service (WEIS). CAISO and SPP are discussed further in the RTO and ISO Markets section. The West includes the Western Power Pool (WPP), the Rocky Mountain Power Area, and the Arizona, New Mexico, Southern Nevada Power Area within the Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC), a regional entity. These areas contain over 30 balancing authority areas responsible for dispatching generation, procuring power, operating the transmission grid reliably, and maintaining adequate reserves.[120]

NORTHWEST ELECTRIC REGION


The Northwest Electric Region is composed of the Northwest Power Pool (NWPP) NERC region in the northwestern section of the Western Electric Coordinating Council (WECC) NERC region. The hourly peak demand is approximately 49 GW[121]

119 *Alabama Power Company*, 158 FERC ¶ 61,131 (2017) (February 2, 2017 Order) (order accepting market-based rate tariff revisions subject to condition).

120 Western Electricity Coordinating Council, *Western Interconnection Balancing Authorities* (accessed November 2022), https://www.wecc.org/_layouts/15/WopiFrame.aspx?sourcedoc=/Administrative/Balancing_Authorities_JAN17.pdf&action=default&DefaultItemOpen=1.

121 The hourly peak demand observed in a given month between 2000 and 2020. Based on FERC Form 714, *Annual Electric Balancing Authority Area and Planning Area Report*. Derived from the Balancing Authority Areas within the NWPP NERC subregion, using the Hitachi Energy, Velocity Suite, Balancing Authority Area Net Energy for Load & Peak Demand dataset.

Figure 2-9: Northwest Electric Region



Source: Hitachi Energy, Velocity Suite

Supply Resources


The total capacity in the Northwest Electric Region is approximately 79 GW and is primarily composed of hydroelectric, natural gas, and coal-fired generators, as shown in the bar chart below. Wind generator capacity is also a significant resource for the region.

The Northwest has a unique resource mix, as demonstrated in the bar chart below, with hydroelectric generation capacity comprising approximately 40 percent of the power supply, which is sourced from many dams that are in the Columbia River system. The largest dam, Grand Coulee, can produce up to as much power as six nuclear plants. Due to the large amount of hydroelectric generation, the Northwest typically has low-cost power during the spring and early summer. During these periods, the region exports power to neighboring regions, especially California, where power prices are typically higher.

The amount of hydroelectric power produced depends on a number of factors, some natural and some controllable. On a seasonal basis, the intensity and duration of the water flow is driven by snowpack in the mountains, the fullness of the reservoirs, and rainfall. On a short-term basis, the levels of hydroelectric power generation output are influenced by decisions to release water locally and upstream to generate power, as well as local water-use decisions that are independent of the economics of the power markets, based on recreation, irrigation, and wildlife considerations, for example. The peak hydroelectric power generation period begins in the spring, when the snow melts, and may last into early summer. When less water is available, the Northwest may rely more on its coal and natural gas generation, and occasionally import power from neighboring regions, including Canada, when loads are high.

Figure 2-10: Northwest Electric Region Capacity Mix

Source: EIA Form 860-M



Trading and Market Features

Two Canadian BAAs, Alberta Electric System Operator

The water forecast affects the forward market for electricity in the Northwest. Similarly, the daily water flow conditions influence the prices in the daily physical market. When there is an abundance of hydroelectric generation, the Northwest will export as much as possible on the transmission lines leading into California and elsewhere in the West. Sometimes in off-peak hours, more electricity is available than can move through transmission lines or be used locally, so electric prices become negative.

The largest seller of wholesale power in the region is the BPA, a federal agency that markets the output from federally owned hydroelectric facilities, as well as a non-federal nuclear plant and several other smaller non-federal power plants. BPA meets approximately one-third of the firm energy supply in its service territory and owns 75 percent of the region's high-voltage transmission.[122] BPA gives preference to municipal and other publicly owned electric systems in allocating and pricing its generation output.[123]

and British Columbia Hydro, are also substantial suppliers of energy to the United States via the Northwest Electric Region. These Canadian BAAs often import power to, and export power from, the United States, depending on market conditions. The Canadian BAAs generally import power from the United States when prices are low in order to save water in their hydroelectric reservoirs. The water is later released to generate and sell hydroelectric power during higher-priced periods[124]

The Northwest region trading points for bilateral transactions include Mid-Columbia (Mid-C), California-Oregon Border (COB), Nevada-Oregon Border (NOB), and Mona (Utah). Of these, Mid-C is the most actively traded location.

SOUTHWEST ELECTRIC REGION

The Southwest electric market encompasses Arizona, New Mexico, and Southern Nevada in the WECC NERC region. The hourly peak demand is approximately 25 GW.[125]


122 Bonneville Power Administration, *BPA Overview,* 45, https://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2016/01/f28/0911review_ikakoula.pdf.

123 Bonneville Project Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 832-832m (2000).

124 National Energy Board, *Market Snapshot: Which states trade electricity with British Columbia?* (September 2022) https://www.cer-rec.gc.ca/en/data-analysis/energy-markets/market-snapshots/; National Energy Board, *Market Snapshot: Why Canada is one of the world's largest electricity consumers* (August 2022), https://www.cer-rec.gc.ca/en/data-analysis/energy-markets/market-snapshots/

125 The hourly peak demand observed between 2000 and 2020. Based on *FERC Form 714, Annual Electric Balancing Authority Area and Planning Area Report*. Derived from the Balancing Authority Areas within the AZ/NM/SNV NERC subregion, using the Hitachi Energy, Velocity Suite, Balancing Authority Area Net Energy for Load & Peak Demand dataset.

Figure 2-11: Southwest Electric Region



Source: Hitachi Energy, Velocity Suite

Supply Resources

The total capacity in the Southwest Electric Region is over 40 GW and is predominately composed of natural gas and coal-fired generators. Hydroelectric, wind, solar, and nuclear capacity account for the majority of the remaining capacity, as shown in the bar chart below.

The majority of generation in the Southwest is produced from natural gas and coal, as demonstrated in the bar chart above. The coal generators are generally located in close proximity to coal mines, resulting in low delivered fuel costs. Some generation is jointly owned among multiple nearby utilities, including the Palo Verde nuclear plant, a plant with three units totaling approximately 4,000 MW,[126] which has owners in California and the Southwest.[127] The Southwest is also characterized by large amounts of solar capacity, as this region has the highest solar potential in the nation.[128]

Trading and Market Features


The Southwest region is summer-peaking and experiences peak loads coincident with air conditioning demand. The daily high temperature averages above 100 degrees from June through mid-September in Phoenix.

126 Derived from EIA, *Form EIA-860, 3-1-Generator_Y2021 Report*, (2021), https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia860/.

127 Plant Operating License, Palo Verde, Unit 1, Current Facility Operating License NpF-41, Tech Specs, Revised 08/18/2022, https://www.nrc.gov/info-finder/reactors/palo1.html.

128 Western Electricity Coordinating Council, *State of the Interconnection*, at 9 (September 2017), https://www.wecc.biz/epubs/StateOfTheInterconnection/.

Figure 2-12: Southwest Electric Region Capacity Mix



Source: EIA Form 860-M[129]

However, power prices tend to be the highest when there is also hot weather in Southern California, creating competition for the region's generation resources. The Southwest trading points include Palo Verde, Four Corners, and West Wing. Of these, Palo Verde is the most actively traded location.

RTO and ISO Markets

Two-thirds of the population of the United States is served by electricity markets run by regional RTOs/ISOs. A key distinction between RTO/ISO markets and vertically integrated utilities, municipal utilities and co-ops is that RTO/ISO markets deliver electricity through competitive market mechanisms coordinated by a non-profit entity over a large geographic footprint. Further, RTOs/ISOs do not own or conduct maintenance on the transmission or other resources involved in providing electric service.

Currently, seven RTO/ISOs operate in the United States, listed below in order of the size of their all-time peak load.[130] FERC regulates all RTOs/ISOs except ERCOT. In addition to operating RTOs/ISOs, SPP and CAISO also operate regional short-term or imbalance energy markets, which, while not RTOs/ISOs, provide markets for real-time energy sales and purchases. SPP operates the WEIS and CAISO runs the WEIM, which are discussed at the end of the SPP and CAISO sections below.


- PJM, 165 GW (summer of 2006)
- MISO, 127 GW (summer of 2011)
- ERCOT, 80 GW (summer of 2022)
- SPP, 53 GW (summer of 2022)
- CAISO, 52 GW (summer of 2022)
- NYISO, 34 GW (summer of 2013)
- ISO-NE, 28 GW (summer of 2006)

Unlike traditional electricity systems, RTOs/ISOs also operate competitive, nondiscriminatory electricity markets, which allow resource owners to offer resources and load-serving entities to submit bids for generation. These markets are the primary mechanism for dispatching resources, managing transmission congestion and pricing electricity. RTOs/ISOs work in conjunction with the resources and transmission-owning resources that participate in the RTO/ISO to maintain reliability. RTOs/ISOs also coordinate the maintenance of generation and transmission systems and oversee a transmission planning process to identify needed upgrades in both the near- and long-term.

129 Installed nameplate capacity is assessed through December 2021 and captures Operating and Standby resources available. Note that these estimates do not imply that generation output will match the nameplate capacity of a resource type. EIA, *Preliminary Monthly Electric Generator Inventory* (based on Form EIA-860M) (February 2022), https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia860m/.

130 For source information on the peak load statistics for PJM Interconnection, Midcontinent ISO, Southwest Power Pool, California ISO, New York ISO, and New England ISO, see the individual region's description later in this chapter. For ERCOT, see *ERCOT, Fact Sheet*, (October 2022), https://www.ercot.com/files/docs/2022/02/08/ERCOT_Fact_Sheet.pdf.

Figure 2-13: North American Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent System Operators



Source: Hitachi Energy, Velocity Suite

RTO/ISO FEATURES

All RTOs/ISOs function as non-profit entities that operate markets to dispatch and price electricity across a large, defined footprint. To do this, the RTOs/ISOs perform functions such as operating day-ahead and real-time markets, but also perform an array of functions not directly part of the markets, but essential to allow their efficient performance. For example, RTOs/ISOs manage the flow of payments between market participants. The next section discusses markets operated by RTOs/ISOs. The remainder of this section discusses key RTO/ISO support features or functions.

Governance

RTOs/ISOs, resource owners and operators, investor-owned, public and cooperative utilities, marketers and financial entities participate in the RTO/ISO under a governance structure and rules determined through RTO/ISO-run processes.[131] RTO/ISO governance typically involves a board of directors and stakeholder committees, which, among other things, review rule revisions. Rules underlying RTO/ISO functions are included in the RTO's/ISO's tariff and are subject to FERC's approval. Details on rule implementation can be found in RTO's/ISO's Business Practice Manuals.

Financial Policies

Financial settlement is the process through which payments due from customers, and to generators, are calculated. Such settlements are based upon day-ahead schedules, real-time metering, interchange schedules, internal energy schedules, ancillary service obligations, transmission reservations, energy prices, Financial Transmission Rights (FTR) positions, and capacity positions. Each market participant's invoice of charges and credits includes the costs of services used to serve load and the costs for operating the RTO/ISO.

131 Order No. 2000, *Regional Transmission Organizations*, 89¶61,285, (December 20, 1999).

Generally, customers receive weekly or monthly invoices stating their charges and credits. Weekly invoices must be settled within a few days of being issued, while monthly invoices must be paid within either one or two weeks, depending on the policies of each RTO/ISO. All payments are made electronically.

While RTO/ISO energy and ancillary service markets operate to price electricity at a level that compensates resources for their energy supply and meet other requirements of their tariffs, instances do occur where additional cost recovery is needed – this is commonly known as uplift. The need for uplift may arise, for example, when unplanned transmission and generation outages occur, resulting in actual operations differing from the assumptions included in the market models underlying the energy and ancillary service markets.[132]

Credit Policies

RTOs/ISOs settle the many financial charges that are paid by, or to, market participants. As RTOs/ISOs are non-profit entities with no financial interest in the markets they operate, any financial shortfall or over-collection goes to the various market participants. To protect the RTO/ISO and its market participants, each RTO/ISO has tariff provisions and other policies to ensure that market participants have the ability to pay, known as credit policies.[133] Defaults by market participants in RTOs/ISOs are rare and the costs have generally been spread across the market. Credit policies contain provisions related to credit evaluations, credit limits, forms of collateral, and the consequences of violations or defaults.

Transmission Planning

RTO/ISOs coordinate transmission planning for their footprint as required under Order 1000, a comprehensive transmission rule issued by FERC in 2011.[134] Each of the RTO/ISOs has system-wide or regional planning processes that identify transmission system additions and improvements that are needed to keep electricity flowing. Studies are conducted to test the transmission system against mandatory national reliability standards, as well as regional reliability standards. The RTO/ISO transmission planning studies may look 10-15 years into the future to identify transmission overloads, voltage limitations, and other reliability problems. RTO/ISOs then develop transmission plans in collaboration with transmission owners to resolve potential problems that could otherwise lead to overloads and blackouts. This process culminates in one recommended plan for the entire RTO/ISO footprint.

RTO/ISO MARKETS AND ASSOCIATED FUNCTIONS

RTOs/ISOs operate several markets and functions that address the physical supply of electricity and its pricing – energy and capacity markets. To physically provide the supply of electricity at all times in all places, RTOs/ISOs operate energy markets that LSEs use to procure energy and ancillary services. Some RTOs/ISOs also operate capacity markets, which, along with underlying resource adequacy rules, ensure sufficient capacity is available. RTOs/ISOs also operate financial markets associated with the energy markets – financial transmission rights and virtual transactions.


RTOs/ISOs must define rules and operate programs needed to ensure efficient market operations. The operations of the markets are discussed further below. Underlying these market operations are an extensive list of detailed rules and functions. For example, these rules detail what types of resources can participate, at limits on what prices resources can offer, and the operation of an independent market monitoring program:

132 Order No. 844, *Uplift Cost Allocation and Transparency in Markets Operated by Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent System Operators*, 163¶61,041, (April 19, 2018).

133 Order No. 741, *Credit Reforms in Organized Wholesale Electric Markets*, 133¶61,060, (October 21, 2010).

134 Order No. 1000, *Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating Public Utilities*, 135¶61,051, (July 21, 2011).

Figure 2-14: ISO-NE Wholesale Electricity Market



Source: ISO-NE

Resource Participation In addition to generation, demand response resources (DR), DER, energy efficiency and batteries may participate in RTO/ISO markets.[135]

Offer Caps Each RTO/ISO caps a resource's supply offer at $1,000. If a resource's costs exceed $1,000, they may request authority to offer at a higher price that reflects their verified costs. Offers up to $2,000 may be used by the RTO/ISO to set the locational marginal price.[136]

Market Monitoring Each RTO/ISO must have independent market monitors which oversee various aspects of the RTO's/ISO's markets and performance, such as market power mitigation, assessment and referral of market manipulation and assessing and reporting on the competitiveness of market operations.[137]

Energy Markets

All RTOs/ISOs have day-ahead and real-time markets. The day-ahead market schedules electricity production, ancillary services commitments and consumption before the operating day, whereas the real-time market reconciles any differences between the schedule in the day-ahead market and the real-time conditions. Both the day-ahead and real-time markets reflect reliability criteria and infrastructure conditions, such as transmission topology and limitations, resource outages, and resource operating limits.


Energy markets operate to match the supply options offered by resource oprators to the demand bid in by LSEs and RTO/ISO demand forecasts. The market models select the most economic supply offers available,

135 Order No. 2222, *Participation of Distributed Energy Resource Aggregations in Markets Operated by Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent System Operators*, 172¶61,247; Order No. 841, *Electric Storage Participation in Markets Operated by Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent System Operators*, 162¶61,127 (2018); Order No. 745, *Demand Response Compensation in Organized Wholesale Energy Markets*, 134¶61,187, (March 15, 2011).

136 Order No. 831, *Offer Caps in Markets Operated by Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent System Operators*, 157¶61,115, (November 17, 2016).

137 Order No. 719, *Wholesale Competition in Regions with Organized Electric Markets*, 125¶61,071.

Figure 2-15: ISO-NE Wholesale Electricity Market



Source: ISO-NE

recognizing physical resource and transmission limitation. The overall market price for electricity is determined by the highest offer accepted. However, transmission limitations may require the market to adjust the offers selected, which can change the price for different locations in the RTO/ISO – the locational marginal price (LMP). The RTO/ISO markets calculate the LMP at each location on the power grid. The LMP reflects the marginal cost of serving load at the specific location, given the set of resources that are being dispatched and the limitations of the transmission system. LMP has three elements: an energy charge, a congestion charge, and a charge for transmission system energy losses.

If there are no transmission constraints, known as transmission congestion, LMPs will not vary significantly across the RTO/ISO footprint. However, when transmission congestion occurs, LMPs will vary across the footprint because operators are not able to dispatch the least-cost generators across the entire region and some more expensive generation must be dispatched to meet demand in the constrained area.

When transmission is constrained, the highest variable cost unit that must be dispatched to meet load within transmission-constrained boundaries will set the LMP in that area. All sellers receive the LMP for their location and all buyers pay the price for their location.

The primary means used for relieving transmission congestion constraints is by changing the output of generation at different locations on the grid. The market-based LMP sends price signals that reflect congestion costs to market participants. Thus, LMPs take into account both the impact of specific generators on the constrained facility and the cost to change (redispatch) the generation output to serve load. This process is known as security-constrained economic dispatch.

This redispatch could be implemented by using non-market procedures, such as transmission loading relief (TLR). NERC established the TLR process for dealing with reliability concerns when the transmission network becomes overloaded and power flows must be reduced to protect the network. A TLR is used to ration transmission capacity when the demand for transmission is greater than the available transmission capacity (ATC). The rationing is a priority system that cuts power flows

based on size, contractual terms and scheduling.

Day-Ahead Energy Markets

The day-ahead energy market produces financially binding schedules for the production and consumption of electricity one day before its production and use (the operating day). The purpose of the day-ahead market is to give generators and load-serving entities a means for scheduling their activities with sufficient lead time to procure fuel or bring up resources with longer start times. The day-ahead bids and offers are based on a forecast of loads and are consistent with resources' business strategies.

In day-ahead markets, offers of supply and demand bids are compiled hours ahead of the beginning of the operating day. The RTO/ISO then runs a computerized market model that matches demand and supply throughout the market footprint for each hour of the day. Additionally, the model must account for changing system capabilities that occur, based on weather and equipment outages, transmission and resource capabilities, and the rules and procedures that are used to ensure system reliability.[138] The market rules dictate that generators submit supply offers and that loads submit demand bids to the RTO/ISO by a deadline that is typically in the morning of the day-ahead scheduling. Typically, 95 percent of all load is scheduled in the day-ahead market and the rest is scheduled in real-time. Generation and demand bids that are scheduled in the day-ahead market are settled at the day-ahead market prices.

Inputs into setting a day-ahead market schedule include:

- Generators' offers to sell electricity for each hour
- Load-serving entities' bids to buy electricity for each hour
- Demand-response offers by customers to curtail usage of electricity
- Virtual demand bids and supply offers
- Operational information about the transmission grid and generating resources, including planned or known transmission and generator outages, the physical characteristics of generating resources including minimum and maximum output levels and minimum run time, and the status of interconnections to external markets.

Real-Time Energy Markets

The real-time market is used to balance the differences between the day-ahead scheduled amounts of electricity cleared in the day-ahead market and the actual real-time load and supply. The real-time market is run in five-minute intervals and clears a much smaller volume of energy and ancillary services than the day-ahead market (some RTOs/ISOs also run hour-ahead and 15 minutes- ahead of the operating interval). The real-time market also provides supply resources additional opportunities for offering energy into the market. When the real-time generation and load are different from the day-ahead cleared amount, the difference is settled at the real-time price.

Real-time market prices are significantly more volatile than day-ahead market prices. This stems from demand uncertainty, transmission and generator forced outages, and other unforeseen events. Since the day-ahead market generally is not presented with these events, it produces more stable prices than in real-time. Also, because the volumes in the real-time market are much smaller, there is an increased likelihood of supply and demand imbalances, which can lead to both positive and negative price movements.

Ancillary Services

RTOs/ISOs procure ancillary services, which are described in the Electricity Supply and Delivery Section, through the day-ahead and real-time market dispatch. RTOs/ISOs primarily procure ancillary service through their market mechanisms, although they compensate blackstart and voltage service based on the cost of providing the service (cost-of-service). Changes in the

138 In evaluating which generators provide the power to meet hourly load, the market model assesses whether the power flows can travel without exceeding the physical capability of any transmission path. If the model shows such a violation of transmission capability, the combination of assigned generators will be changed in a process known as redispatch.

resources providing supply have necessitated changes in ancillary service procurement and compensation. For example, the advent of faster-ramping resources led to changes in compensation for frequency regulation.[139]

While not an ancillary service, ramping capacity is a service for which some RTOs/ISOs have developed products. The growth of renewable generation has increased the need for generation that can increase its production rapidly to offset swings in generation or load.

Shortage Pricing

RTO/ISO markets dispatch energy and ancillary services to meet demand and reserve requirements. However, the markets may find that not enough supply is available. If the RTOs/ISOs cannot procure sufficient generation to meet demand and reserve requirements in the real-time market, they trigger shortage pricing[140] to send price signals to incentivize resources to increase the supply offered. Shortage events can be caused by unexpectedly high electric loads, supply disruptions, or both.

The common method that RTO/ISOs employ to implement shortage pricing is through the use of an operating reserve demand curve. The demand curve specifies price levels for the degree of the shortages.[141] The price of the reserves, reflecting shortage as determined by the demand curves, sets the price for ancillary services and energy.

Market Power Mitigation

RTO/ISO energy and capacity markets are typically competitive, allowing the markets to set the price. However, situations may occur that result in certain resources being essential to serving demand, thus enabling those resources to increase prices in a specific area – in other words, the ability to exercise market power. Typically, this occurs when a transmission constraint limits the amount of electricity that can flow into an area, rendering generation located inside that area essential to serving that local load. RTOs/ISOs have mechanisms for determining whether such market power may occur, and if appropriate, to mitigate the price at which affected resources may offer their supply. RTO/ISO market power mitigation typically examines whether a resource has the potential to exert market power; whether they actually offer in a way that could be an exertion of market power (conduct test); and whether any potential exertion of market power actually affected the market price (impact test).

RTO/ISO Capacity Markets and Resource Adequacy

RTO/ISOs, like other electric systems, are required to maintain adequate generation and demand-resource capacity to meet load and reliability requirements. LSEs have typically satisfied their reserve obligations with owned generation or bilateral contracts with other suppliers. In general, LSEs are required to procure sufficient capacity to meet their load. Some RTOs/ISOs also have mechanisms through which LSEs can obtain capacity commitments, such as capacity auctions and capacity payments.

Most RTOs/ISOs run a capacity market that allows LSEs to satisfy their reserve obligation. The markets cover short-term capacity, such as a month, season or year. PJM and ISO-NE run capacity auctions up to three years prior to when the capacity is needed. The capacity markets are intended to provide more certainty for investment in new capacity resources while including an opportunity for all resources to recover their fixed costs over time.

Other ISOs/RTOs, such as SPP and CAISO, rely on resource adequacy programs, in which the RTO/ISO determines the capacity each LSE is required to provide

139 Order No. 755, Frequency Regulation Compensation in the Organized Wholesale Power Markets, 137¶61,064, (October 20, 2011).

140 Order No. 825, *Settlement Intervals and Shortage Pricing in Markets Operated by Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent System Operators*, 155¶61,276 (June 16, 2016).

141 RTO/ISOs apply shortage pricing in the LMP for all intervals in which the operating software indicates that there is insufficient available energy to provide system or localized demand and reserves. *Settlement Intervals and Shortage Pricing in Markets Operated by Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent System Operators*, Order No. 825, 81 Fed. Reg. 42,882 (June 30, 2016), FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,384 (2016).

at different times of the year. These programs require each LSE to show the RTO/ISO that it has procured the required capacity for different times of the year.

Special Provisions for Essential Resource Retirements
Reliability must-run (RMR) units are generating plants that would otherwise retire but that the RTO/ISO has deemed necessary to ensure reliability. They can also be units that have market power due to their location on the grid. RTO/ISOs enter into cost-based contracts with these generating units and allocate the cost of the contract to transmission customers. In return for these payments to the generator, the RTO/ISO may call on the owner of an RMR generating unit to run the unit for grid reliability. The payment must be sufficient to pay for the cost of owning and maintaining the unit, even if it does not operate. Transmission upgrades can reduce the need for RMR units by increasing generation deliverability throughout the RTOs/ISOs.

Financial Transmission Rights

Financial transmission rights (FTRs) are contracts that give market participants an offset, or hedge, against transmission congestion costs in the day-ahead market.

FTRs were originally developed in part to give native LSEs in the nascent RTOs/ISOs price certainty similar to that available to traditional vertically integrated utilities operating in non-RTO/ISO markets. This practice continues, as FTRs are allocated to load-serving entities, transmission owners, or firm transmission right holders in RTOs/ISOs, typically based on historical usage. Entities that fund the construction of specific new transmission facilities may also be eligible to receive FTRs. The details of the allocations vary by RTO/ISO.

FTRs allow customers to protect against the risk of congestion-driven price increases in the day-ahead market in the RTOs/ISOs. Specifically, FTRs grant their holders the right to day-ahead congestion revenues over specific paths and periods of time. Congestion costs occur as the demand for scheduled power over a transmission path exceeds that path's flow capabilities. This causes the price at the source to decline or the price at the sink to increase, or both, causing the congestion cost of serving Point B from Point A to increase. By buying an FTR over the path from Point A to Point B, the FTR holder is paid the difference of the congestion price components at the sink and source, thus allowing it to hedge against the congestion costs incurred in the day-ahead market.

FTRs are acquired through allocations and purchases. Purchases take place in the RTO-administered auctions or in a secondary market. Allocations stem from a related product, the auction revenue rights (ARR). ARRs provide the firm transmission capacity holders, transmission owners or LSEs with the rights to revenue from the FTR auctions. In general, ARRs are allocated based on historical load served and, in some RTO/ISOs, ARRs can be converted to FTRs. If ARRs are converted to FTRs, the holder receives revenue from congestion. If ARRs are kept as such, the holder receives revenue from the FTR auction.

The main method for procuring FTRs is through an auction, which typically includes an annual (or multiyear) auction of one-year FTRs and monthly (or semiannual) auctions of shorter-term FTRs provided by existing FTR holders or made available by the RTO/ISO. The auctions are scheduled and run by the RTO, which requires bidding parties to post credit to cover the positions taken. FTR auction revenues are used to pay the holders of ARRs and assist the funding of future congestion payments to FTR holders. There is also a secondary market for FTRs (such as PJM's eFTR), but historically only a small number of transactions have been reported.

The quantity of FTRs made available by the RTO/ISO is bounded by the physical limits of the grid, as determined by a simultaneous feasibility test across all potential flowgates. This test is performed by the RTO/ISO prior to making FTRs available at auction and takes into account existing FTR positions and system constraints. The resulting portfolio of FTRs allocated or offered at auction represents an absolute constraint on the size of the net positions that can be held by the market. Participants in FTR auctions can procure counterflow FTRs, which directly offset prevailing flow FTR capacity, thereby allowing the

value at risk on a given path to exceed the physical limits of the line. However, such bids are physically constrained, as the net position held on the path must always conform to the simultaneous feasibility test.

FTRs can also be purchased by a creditworthy entity seeking their financial attributes as a speculative investment. In this regard, FTRs are similar to financial swaps that are executed as a contract for differences between two day-ahead LMPs (swaps are explained in Chapter 5, Trading and Capital Markets). However, FTRs are substantially different from swaps in that the quantity of FTRs is linked to physical constraints in the transmission grid, while the quantity of swaps is not. Further, FTRs are procured by allocation or FTR auction, while swaps are procured through financial over-the-counter markets or exchanges.

All six FERC-jurisdictional RTOs/ISOs trade FTRs or FTR-equivalent products. However, the types and qualities of the rights traded across the organized markets vary, as do the methods used to allocate, auction, and transfer these rights. These attributes of the FTR markets are discussed below.

Flow Type: Prevailing Flow and Counterflow. A prevailing flow FTR generally has a source in a historical generation-rich location and a sink that is in a historical load-heavy location. Alternatively, the source of a prevailing flow FTR is on the unconstrained side of a transmission interface and the sink on the constrained side. Auction clearing prices for prevailing flow FTRs are positive. Conversely, a counterflow FTR often has a source in a historical load-heavy location and a sink in a historical generation-rich location. As a result, auction clearing prices for counterflow FTRs are negative; bidders are paid to take the counterflow FTR position.

Peak Type: On-peak, Off-peak, 24-hour. FTRs can be purchased for either 16-hour on-peak blocks, 8-hour off-peak blocks or around-the-clock. Only PJM offers all three peak-type products. NYISO offers only the 24-hour product. The other RTO/ISOs offer on-peak and off-peak products.

Allocated Rights: The RTO/ISOs allocate transmission rights to transmission owners or load-serving entities within their markets. In PJM, MISO, SPP, and ISO-NE, these are allocated as auction revenue rights (ARRs), which give their holders the right to receive a share of the funds raised during the FTR auctions. CAISO allocates congestion revenue rights (CRR), which provide their holders a stream of payments based on the actual congestion occurring on associated paths. NYISO allocates both auction-based and congestion-based rights through multiple instruments. PJM and MISO allow ARR holders to convert all these rights to FTRs; NYISO allows only a portion of ARR-equivalent instruments to be converted to its version of FTRs, called Transmission Congestion Credits (TCCs). ISO-NE does not allow such conversions, while CAISO's allocation is already in a form equivalent to an FTR. Converted ARRs are fully fungible in PJM, MISO, and NYISO; CAISO only allows the sale of allocated CRRs in its secondary market, and ISO-NE has no converted instruments to sell.

Auctioned Rights: All RTOs provide FTRs (or equivalent CRRs or TCCs) for sale to the public through two or more auctions held at various times of the year. The products vary by market and by auction, with some products made available only at specific auctions.

Secondary Markets: With the exception of NYISO, each of the markets that auction FTRs also operates a bulletin board or similar venue designed to enable a secondary trading platform for FTRs. However, none of these platforms has had significant volume. NYISO offered to create a bulletin board for its participants, if requested, but received no requests.

Virtual Transactions

Virtual bids and offers (collectively, virtuals) are a form of financial trading used by market participants to hedge physical positions and by speculative traders to profit from differences between day-ahead and real-time prices. The quantity of MW purchased or sold in the day-ahead market is offset by a sale or purchase of an identical quantity of MW in the real-time, so that the net effect on the market quantity traded is zero. A virtual

trader pays (or is paid) the day-ahead price while being paid (or paying) the real-time price.

Although a trader does not have to deliver power, the transaction is not strictly financial as virtual transactions can set LMPs; the price is applied to physical as well as financial transactions. Virtual transactions can also affect the resource selection in the day-ahead market.

For each hour in the day-ahead market, virtual trades are added to the demand – day-ahead scheduled load – if virtual demand is greater than virtual supply. This has the effect of raising the price in the day-ahead market and, more importantly, increasing the amount of generation resources procured by the RTO/ISO. Since these generation resources will be available to the real-time market, the fact that virtual load does not carry forward into the real-time market will decrease the real-time demand below day-ahead scheduled load, thus placing downward pressure on real-time prices. The placement of virtuals affects the dispatch of physical capacity.

The primary benefits of virtual transactions are achieved through their financial impact on the markets. Virtuals sometimes are referred to as convergence bidding, as a competitive virtual market should theoretically cause the day-ahead and real-time prices to converge in each hour. The convergence of day-ahead and real-time prices within the RTOs/ISOs is intended to mitigate market power and improve the efficiency of serving load.

Figure 2-16: New England Independent System Operator



Source: Hitachi Energy, Velocity Suite

ISO-New England (ISO-NE)

MARKET PROFILE

ISO-NE serves the six New England states: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont. As the RTO for New England, ISO-NE is responsible for operating wholesale power markets that trade electricity, capacity, transmission congestion contracts, and related products, in addition to administering auctions for the sale of capacity.[142] ISO-NE operates the region's high-voltage transmission network and performs long-term planning for the New England system. ISO-NE operates its master control center in Holyoke, Mass.

Peak Demand

New England's all-time peak demand was 28 GW in summer 2006.[143]

Imports and Exports

ISO-NE is interconnected with the NYISO, TransEnergie (Québec), and the New Brunswick System Operator and imports around 15 percent of its annual energy needs. New England receives imports from Québec and New

142 ISO-New England Inc. Internal Market Monitor, *An Overview of New England's Wholesale Electricity Markets, A Market Primer* (June 5, 2023), https://www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/2023/06/imm-markets-primer.pdf.

143 ISO New England, *Key Grid and Market Stats*, https://www.iso-ne.com/about/key-stats/.

Brunswick in most hours, and power flows in alternate directions between New England and New York, depending on market conditions.

Market Participants

The ISO-NE participants consist of end-users, IOUs, publicly owned utilities, generators, transmission owners, and financial institutions.

Membership and Governance

ISO-NE is a not-for-profit entity governed by a 10-member, independent, non-stakeholder board of directors. The sitting members of the board elect people to fill board vacancies.

NEPOOL is the principal stakeholder organization for the ISO-NE and is authorized to represent its more than 440 members in proceedings before FERC. It was organized in 1971 and its members include all the electric utilities rendering or receiving services under the ISO-NE Tariff, as well as independent power generators, marketers, load aggregators, brokers, consumer-owned utility systems, demand response providers, developers, end users, and a merchant transmission provider.

Transmission Owners

ISO-NE's largest transmission owners include:

- Central Maine Power Company
- Cross Sound Cable Company, LLC
- Emera Maine, Inc.
- Eversource Energy Service Company
- Maine Electric Power Company
- National Grid USA
- NSTAR Electric Company
- The United Illuminating Company
- VT Transco, LLC


Chronic Constraints

Overall, transmission upgrades have reduced transmission constraints in ISO-NE. Constraints in ISO-NE may occur in regions affected by intermittent resources (notably wind), or by major interconnections with New Brunswick, Hydro-Quebec, and New York.[144]

Transmission Planning

Each year, ISO-NE prepares a comprehensive 10-year regional system plan (RSP) that reports on the results of ISO system planning processes. Each plan includes forecasts of future loads (the demand for electricity measured in megawatts) and addresses how this demand may be satisfied by adding supply resources; demand resources, including demand response and energy efficiency; and new or upgraded transmission facilities. The plans also summarize the region's overall needs, as well as the needs in specific areas, and includes solutions and processes required to ensure the

Figure 2-17: ISO-NE Capacity Mix



Source: EIA Form 860-M[146]

144 ISO-New England Internal Market Monitor, *2021 Annual Markets Report* (May 26, 2022), https://www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/2022/05/2021-annual-markets-report.pdf.

145 Installed nameplate capacity is assessed through December 2021 and captures Operating and Standby resources available. Note that these estimates do not imply that generation output will match the nameplate capacity of a resource type. Derived from EIA, *Preliminary Monthly Electric Generator Inventory* (based on Form EIA-860M) (February 2022), https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia860m/.

reliable and economic performance of the New England power system.

Supply Resources

The total capacity in ISO-NE is over 38 GW and is predominately composed of natural gas-fired, oil-fired, and nuclear generators, as shown in the bar chart below. The region has a substantial proportion of oil-fired generation that is a particularly important resource to address potential power plant fuel shortages in the winter months during periods of local natural gas market stress.

Demand Response

ISO-NE administers the following demand-response programs for the New England wholesale electricity market:

- Real-Time Demand Response Resources (RTDR): These resources are required to respond within 30 minutes of the ISO's instructions.
- Real-Time Emergency Generation Resources that the ISO calls on to operate during a 5-percent voltage reduction that requires more than 10 minutes to implement. They must begin operating within 30 minutes of receiving a dispatch instruction.
- Transitional Price-Response Demand: An optional program that allows market participants with assets registered as RTDRs to offer load reductions in response to day-ahead LMP. The participant is paid the day-ahead LMP for the cleared interruptions, and real-time deviations are charged or credited at the real-time LMP.
- Price Responsive Demand (PRD): In June 2018, ISO New England launched a new PRD structure that fully integrates active demand resources into the regional wholesale electricity marketplace. With PRD, ISO-NE deploys its active demand resources as part of the energy dispatch and reserve-designation process along with generating resources. PRD incorporates demand response into the energy market, the reserves market and the capacity market.[146]

MARKET FEATURES

Energy Markets

ISO-NE operates day-ahead and real-time markets, generally consistent with the discussion in the RTO/ISO Features section of this report. In the real-time market, ISO-NE uses 5-minute intervals. Market participants can offer imports or request exports of electricity from neighboring control areas with at least one hour's notice throughout the day.

Ancillary and Other Services

Ancillary services, described in the Electricity Supply and Delivery section, are services that support the grid and reliability. ISO-NE procures and sets prices for ancillary services in the real-time and forward reserve markets.

Market Power Mitigation

In ISO-NE, market power mitigation is applied for physical withholding, economic withholding, uneconomic production, certain types of virtual transactions and other conduct, if the activity has a material effect on prices or uplift payments. The market monitor uses defined thresholds to identify physical and economic withholding and uneconomic generation. Additionally, defined thresholds determine whether bids and offers would, if not mitigated, cause a material effect on LMPs or uplift charges.

Capacity Markets

ISO-NE's capacity market is termed the Forward Capacity Market (FCM). The FCM includes annual Forward Capacity Auctions (FCA) where both generator and demand resources offer capacity three years in advance of the period for which capacity will be supplied. The three-year lead time is intended to encourage new resource entry by affording market participants additional time to plan and make decisions relative to the forward market prices. Resources whose capacity clears the FCA acquire capacity supply obligations (CSOs). ISO-NE held its first two FCAs in 2008 for the 2010-11 and 2011-12 delivery years. The first full year of

146 ISO-NE, *Price-responsive demand explained: Q&A with Henry Yoshimura, ISO Director of Demand Resource Strategy* (June 6, 2018), http://isonewswire.com/updates/2018/6/6/price-responsive-demand-explained-qa-with-henry-yoshimura-is.html.

capacity market commitments began on June 1, 2010. The FCA process includes the modeling of transmission constraints to determine if load zones will be import- or export-constrained.

The FCM includes rules known as Pay-for-Performance, which mandate performance-based financial incentives for capacity resources during times of system stress.[147] Under Pay-For-Performance, resource owners are subject to charges or incentive payments, based on performance during shortage conditions. Those resources unable to fulfill their CSOs are penalized and compensate the overperforming resources that relieve the capacity shortfall. ISO-NE additionally requires the owners of capacity resources to offer into the day-ahead and real-time energy markets.

Special Provisions for Essential Resource Retirements

When a resource owner requests to withdraw from the capacity market (termed a delist bid) or to retire the resource (termed a non-price retirement request), the ISO evaluates whether the resource is needed for reliability, such as when a resource's withdrawal could lead to a violation of a reliability requirement, such as inadequate reserve margins or a loss of electric system stability.

In New England, the resource owner has the option to retire the unit or continue to operate it while the ISO works with regional stakeholders to find alternate supply or engineering solutions that could allow the resource to retire and still maintain grid reliability. Alternative solutions might include obtaining emergency sources of generation or more expensive generation from outside the region. If no other alternative is available, the ISO may compensate the unit through certain payment provisions of the capacity market or by entering into a cost-of-service agreement with the resource owner while other options are pursued.

Financial Transmission Rights

New England FTRs are monthly and annual products that provide market participants with a means to offset or hedge against transmission congestion costs in the day-ahead energy market. An FTR is an instrument that entitles the FTR holder to a payment for costs that arise with transmission congestion over a selected path, or source-and-sink pairs of locations on the grid. The FTR also requires its holder to pay a charge for those hours when congestion occurs in the opposite direction of the selected source-and-sink pair. The RTO holds FTR auctions to allow market participants the opportunity to acquire FTRs or to sell FTRs they currently hold. In New England, ARRs represent the right to receive revenues from the FTR auctions. ISO-NE allocates ARRs to both LSEs, in relation to historical load, and to entities who make transmission upgrades that increase the capability of the transmission system.

Virtual Transactions

New England's market includes a virtual transaction feature, as generally described in the Virtual Transactions part of the RTO/ISO Features section.

Credit Requirements

ISO-NE's tariff includes credit requirements for participants that assist in mitigating the potential effects of defaults that would otherwise be borne among all market participants. ISO-NE assesses and calculates the required credit dollar amounts for the segments of the market in which an entity requests to participate. ISO-NE then establishes a credit limit for each market participant in accordance with tariff formulas that include various creditworthiness-related specifications, such as tangible net worth and total amounts due to the ISO-NE market.

147 ISO-NE's Pay-For-Performance rules became effective June 1, 2018, for Forward Capacity Auction 9. ISO-NE, Internal Market Monitor, *2017 Annual Markets Report*, at 138 (2018), https://www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/2018/05/2017-annual-markets-report.pdf.

Figure 2-18: New York Independent System Operator



Source: Hitachi Energy, Velocity Suite

New York Independent System Operator (NYISO)

MARKET PROFILE

The NYISO footprint covers the entire state of New York. Prior to restructuring of the electric industry in the 1990s, New York's private utilities and public power authorities owned and operated New York's electric system. Operation of the electric grid was coordinated by a voluntary collaboration of the utilities and power authorities known as the New York Power Pool (NYPP). The creation of the NYISO was authorized by FERC in 1998. The formal transfer of the NYPP's responsibilities to the NYISO took place on Dec. 1, 1999. NYISO operates its system from control centers in Rensselaer, NY, and Guilderland, NY.

NYISO is responsible for operating wholesale power markets that trade electricity, capacity, transmission congestion contracts, and related products, in addition to administering auctions for the sale of capacity. NYISO operates New York's high-voltage transmission network and performs long-term planning. NYISO also serves as the reliability coordinator for its footprint.

Peak Demand

NYISO's all-time peak demand was 34 GW in summer 2013.[148]

Imports and Exports

NYISO imports and exports energy through interconnections with ISO-NE, PJM, TransEnergie (Quebec) and Ontario.

Market Participants

NYISO's market participants include generators, transmission owners, financial institutions, traditional local utilities, electric co-ops, and industrials.

Membership and Governance

NYISO is governed by an independent 10-member board of directors, ISO management, and the business issues and operating committees. Each committee oversees its own set of working groups or subcommittees. These committees comprise transmission owners, generation owners and other suppliers, consumers, public power, and environmental entities. Tariff revisions on market rules and operating procedures filed with FERC are largely developed through consensus by these committees. The members of the board, as well as all employees, must not be directly associated with any market participant or stakeholder.


Transmission Owners

NYISO's largest transmission owners include:

- Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp.
- Consolidated Edison Co. of New York
- Long Island Power Authority (LIPA)

148 New York Independent System Operator, Gold Book, *2022 Load & Capacity Data Report 67* (April 2022), https://www.nyiso.com/documents/20142/2226333/2022-Gold-Book-Final-Public.pdf/cd2fb218-fd1e-8428-7f19-df3e0cf4df3e.pdf.

Figure 2-19: NYISO Capacity Mix



Source: EIA Form 860-M[150]

- New York Power Authority (NYPA)
- New York State Electric and Gas Corp. (NYSEG)
- National Grid
- Orange & Rockland Utilities
- Rochester Gas and Electric Corp.

Chronic Constraints

The chronic transmission constraints in NYISO are in the southeastern portion of the state, leading into New York City and Long Island. As a result of their dense populations, New York City and Long Island are the largest consumers of electricity. Consequently, energy flows from the west and the north towards these two large markets, frequently requiring transmission facilities to operate near their limits. This results in transmission constraints in several key areas, often resulting in higher prices in the New York City and Long Island markets.

Transmission Planning

NYISO conducts a biennial transmission planning process with stakeholders that includes both short-term and long-term projects as part of its Comprehensive System Planning Process. This work evaluates the adequacy and security of the bulk power system in New York over a ten-year study period. Reliability needs are addressed through the development of a reliability plan. Planning focuses on congestion on the bulk power system and possible projects to alleviate the congestion.

A component of NYISO's transmission planning includes evaluating proposals to meet transmission needs driven by public policy requirements identified by the New York Public Service Commission.

Supply Resources

The total capacity in NYISO is over 43 GW and is predominately composed of natural gas-fired, hydroelectric, nuclear and oil-fired generators, as shown in the bar chart below. The region's hydroelectric capacity is particularly important and includes the Niagara Falls and St. Lawrence facilities.

Demand Response

NYISO has four demand-response programs: the emergency demand-response program (EDRP), the installed capacity (ICAP) special case resources program (SCR), the Day-Ahead Demand-Response Program (DADRP) and the Demand-Side Ancillary Services Program (DSASP).

Both the emergency and special case programs can be deployed in energy shortage situations to maintain the reliability of the bulk power grid. The participants in these programs are paid by NYISO for reducing energy consumption when asked to do so and reductions are voluntary for EDRP participants.However, SCR participants are required to reduce power usage as part of their agreement and are compensated for this obligation.

149 Installed nameplate capacity is assessed through December 2021 and captures Operating and Standby resources available. Note that these estimates do not imply that generation output will match the nameplate capacity of a resource type. Derived from EIA, *Preliminary Monthly Electric Generator Inventory (based on Form EIA-860M)* (February 2022), https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia860m/.

NYISO's DADRP program allows energy users to bid their load reductions into the day-ahead market and offers that are determined to be economic are paid the market clearing price. Under day-ahead demand-response, flexible loads may effectively increase the amount of supply in the market and moderate prices.

The DSASP provides retail customers that can meet telemetry and other qualifications with the ability to bid their load curtailment capability into either the day-ahead market or real-time market to provide reserves and regulation service. Accepted offers are paid the market clearing price for the supplied reserves or regulation services.

MARKET FEATURES

Energy Markets

NYISO operates day-ahead and real-time markets, generally consistent with the discussion in the RTO/ISO Features section of this report. In the real-time market, NYISO uses 5-minute intervals. Market participants can offer imports or request exports of electricity from neighboring control areas with at least one hour's notice throughout the day. NYISO refers to LMPs as locational-based marginal prices, or LBMPs.

NYISO's real-time market also offers an hour-ahead feature. The hour-ahead market allows buyers and sellers of electricity to balance unexpected increases or decreases of electricity consumption after the day-ahead market closes. Bids and offers are submitted an hour ahead of time and prices are set based on those bids and offers, generally for use in matching generation and load requirements, but those prices are advisory only. Hour-ahead scheduling is completed at least 45 minutes prior to the beginning of the dispatch hour after NYISO reviews transmission outages, the load forecast, reserve requirements and hour-ahead generation and firm transaction bids, among other things.

Ancillary and Other Services

NYISO co-optimizes ancillary services with the energy through its markets. Operating reserves and regulation are typically provided by generators, but NYISO also allows demand-side providers to participate in these markets.

Ancillary services are those functions performed by electric generating, transmission and system-control equipment to support the transmission of electric power from generating resources to load. RTOs procure or direct the supply of ancillary services to maintain the reliability of the transmission system.

Market Power Mitigation

ISO-NE conducts automatic market power mitigation in its day-ahead and real-time markets. This automated mitigation performs conduct and impact tests and applies mitigation where it deems appropriate. The categories of conduct that may warrant mitigation by NYISO include physical withholding, economic withholding, and uneconomic production by a generator or transmission facility to obtain benefits from a transmission constraint. NYISO does not impose mitigation unless the conduct causes or contributes to a material change in prices, or substantially increases guarantee payments to participants.

Generators in New York City are subject to automated market power mitigation procedures because New York City is frequently separated by transmission congestion from other parts of New York. Additionally, generators in New York City have been deemed to have market power. These automated procedures determine whether any day-ahead or real-time energy bids, including start-up cost bids and minimum generation bids, but excluding ancillary services bids, exceed the tariff's thresholds for economic withholding. The protocols also determine whether such bids would cause material price effects or changes in guaranteed payments. If these two tests are met, mitigation is imposed automatically, and the applicable reference level is substituted for the entity's actual bid to determine the clearing price.

Capacity Markets

NYISO's capacity market requires LSEs to procure capacity through installed-capacity (ICAP) auctions, self-supply or bilateral arrangements based on their forecasted peak

load plus a margin. New York has capacity requirements for four zones: New York City, Long Island, Lower Hudson Valley, and New York-Rest of State. NYISO conducts auctions for three time periods: the capability period auction (covering six months), the monthly auction and the spot market auction. The resource requirements do not change in the monthly auctions and spot market auctions relative to the capability period auction. The shorter monthly auctions are designed to account for incremental changes in LSEs' load forecasts.

Under the NYISO capacity auction rules, entities that offer capacity into an auction that is subsequently purchased by load are required to offer that amount of capacity into the day-ahead energy market. This rule ensures that capacity sold through the capacity auctions is actually delivered into the market.

Capacity for New York City is subject to offer caps and floors. Offer caps in New York City are based on the projected clearing price for capacity in the spot market.[150] Capacity from generators within New York City must be offered in each ICAP spot market auction, unless that capacity has been exported out of New York or sold to meet ICAP requirements outside New York City.[151]

Special Provisions for Essential Resource Retirements

Generation owners within New York that seek to retire or suspend a generator must first obtain approval from state regulators. After an assessment, if the generator is found to be necessary for reliability purposes, the local transmission owner can be compelled to reach a contract with the generator that includes compensation to support continued operation of the plant until the reliability need is resolved.

Financial Transmission Rights

The NYISO refers to FTRs as Transmission Congestion Contracts (TCCs). A TCC is an instrument that entitles the holder to a payment for the costs that arise with transmission congestion over a selected path, or source-and-sink pair of locations (or nodes) on the grid. The TCC also requires its holder to pay a charge for those hours when congestion is in the opposite direction of the selected source-and-sink pair. The payment, or charges, are calculated relative to the difference in congestion prices in the day-ahead market across the specified FTR transmission path.

Virtual Transactions

NYISO's market includes a virtual transaction feature that allows a participant to buy or sell power in the day-ahead market without requiring physical generation or load. Virtual trading in NYISO takes place on a zonal level, not a nodal level.

Credit Requirements

NYISO's tariff includes credit requirements that assist in mitigating the effects of defaults that would otherwise be borne among all market participants. NYISO assesses and calculates the required credit dollar amounts for the segments of the market in which an entity requests to participate. The market participant may request an unsecured credit allowance subject to certain restrictions. NYISO must review the entity's request relative to various creditworthiness-related specifications such as investment grade or equivalency rating and payment history.

150 New York Independent System Operator, Inc., NYISO *MST - Market Administration and Control Area Services Tariff (MST) - 23MST Att H - ISO Market Power Mitigation Measures - 23.2 MST Att H Conduct Warranting Mitigation at 625* (accessed October 6, 2022), https://nyisoviewer.etariff.biz/ViewerDocLibrary/MasterTariffs/9FullTariffNYISOMST.pdf; New York Independent System Operator, Inc., *NYISO MST - Market Administration and Control Area Services Tariff (MST) - 23 MST Att H - ISO Market Power Mitigation Measures - 23.4.5 MST Att Installed Capacity Market Mitigation Measures - 23.4.5.2 MST Att H at 705* (accessed October 6, 2022), https://nyisoviewer.etariff.biz/ViewerDocLibrary/MasterTariffs/9FullTariffNYISOMST.pdf.

151 New York Independent System Operator, Inc., *NYISO MST - Market Administration and Control Area Services Tariff (MST) - 23 MST Att H - ISO Market Power Mitigation Measures - 23.4.5 MST Att Installed Capacity Market Mitigation Measures - 23.4.5.4 MST Att H* at 708 (accessed October 6, 2022), https://nyisoviewer.etariff.biz/ViewerDocLibrary/MasterTariffs/9FullTariffNYISOMST.pdf.

PJM

MARKET PROFILE

PJM centrally dispatches generation and coordinates the movement of wholesale electricity in all or part of 13 states (Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia and West Virginia) and the District of Columbia. PJM operates two fully functional dispatch centers at Valley Forge and Milford, Pennsylvania. The control rooms operate simultaneously with parallel operations. PJM operates a competitive wholesale electricity market and manages the reliability of its transmission grid. PJM provides open access to the transmission system it manages and performs long-term planning. PJM's markets include energy (day-ahead and real-time), capacity and ancillary services.

PJM was founded in 1927 as a power pool of three utilities serving customers in Pennsylvania and New Jersey. In 1956, with the addition of two Maryland utilities, it became the Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland Interconnection, or PJM. PJM became a fully functioning ISO in 1996 and, in 1997, it introduced markets with bid-based pricing and locational market pricing. PJM was designated an RTO in 2001.

Peak Demand

PJM's all-time peak demand was 165.6 GW in summer 2006.[152]


Imports and Exports

PJM has interconnections with MISO and the NYISO. PJM also has direct interconnections with TVA, Progress Energy Carolinas and the VACAR, among other systems. PJM market participants import energy from, and export energy to, external regions continuously. PJM is a primarily a net exporter of electricity, but occasionally is a net importer during periods of system stress.

Market Participants

PJM's market participants include power generators, transmission owners, electric distributors, power marketers, large consumers, and financial traders.

Figure 2-20: The PJM Interconnection



Source: Hitachi Energy, Velocity Suite

Membership and Governance

PJM has a two-tiered governance model consisting of a board of managers and the members committee. PJM is governed by a 10-member board, nine of whom PJM members elect. The board appoints the tenth, the president and CEO, to supervise day-to-day operations. The board is generally responsible for oversight of system reliability, operating efficiency and short- and long-term planning. The board ensures that no member or group of members exerts undue influence. The members committee, which advises the board, is composed of five voting sectors representing power generators, transmission owners, electric distributors, power marketers and large consumers.

Transmission Owners

PJM transmission owners eligible to vote in PJM

152 PJM Interconnection, PJM 2021 *Annual Report, Summer Performance by the Numbers*, https://services.pjm.com/annualreport2021/operations/.

stakeholder proceedings include:

- Appalachian Power Company, AEP Subsidiary[153]
- AMP Transmission, LLC
- Dayton Power & Light Company, AES Subsidiary
- Duke Energy Business Services, LLC[154]
- Duquesne Light Company
- East Kentucky Power Cooperative, Inc.
- Exelon Business Services Company, LLC[155]
- ITC Interconnection LLC
- Linden VFT LLC
- Monongahela Power d/b/a Allegheny Power, First Energy Subsidiary [156]
- Neptune Regional Transmission System, LLC[157]
- PPL Electric Utilities Corporation, d/b/a PPL Utilities[158]
- Public Service Electric and Gas Company
- Rockland Electric Company
- Virginia Electric and Power Company

Chronic Constraints

The most severe constraints occur on 230 kV transmission facilities moving power south from Pennsylvania and New Jersey to Maryland, Delaware, and Virginia. Local congestion also occurs on low-voltage lines near load centers in northern Illinois, New Jersey, eastern Pennsylvania, central and eastern Maryland, northern Virginia, the District of Columbia, and Delaware.

Transmission Planning

PJM's Regional Transmission Expansion Plan identifies transmission system additions and improvements needed to keep electricity flowing within PJM. Studies are conducted to test the transmission system against national and regional reliability standards. These studies look forward to identify future transmission overloads, voltage limitations, and other reliability standards violations. PJM then develops transmission plans to resolve violations that could otherwise lead to overloads and blackouts.

Supply Resources

The total capacity in PJM is over 219 GW and is predominately comprised of natural gas, coal, and nuclear generators, as shown in the bar chart below. Much of PJM's gas-fired capacity is located near the Marcellus and Utica shale formations. Of note, 40.6 gigawatts of coal-fired capacity are projected to retire in PJM between 2011 and 2026.[159]

Demand Response

End-use customers providing demand response have the opportunity to participate in PJM's energy, capacity, synchronized reserve, and regulation markets. PJM's demand response programs can be grouped into emergency or economic programs. The emergency program compensates end-use customers who reduce their usage during emergency conditions on the PJM system. Participation in the emergency program may be voluntary or mandatory and payments may include energy payments, capacity payments or both.

The economic program allows end-use customers to reduce electricity consumption in the energy markets and receive a payment when LMPs are high. Under this program, all hours are eligible and all participation is voluntary. Participation in the program takes three forms: submitting an offer into the day-ahead market

153 Transmission Companies represented: AEP Appalachian Transmission, AEP Energy Partners, AEP Energy, AEP Indiana Michigan Transmission, AEP Kentucky Transmission, AEP Ohio Transmission, AEP West Virginia Transmission, Appalachian Power, Indiana Michigan Power, Kentucky Power, Kingsport Power, Ohio Power, Ohio Valley Electric, PATH West Virginia Transmission, Transource Energy, Wheeling Power.

154 Transmission Companies represented: Duke Energy Kentucky, Duke Energy Ohio.

155 Transmission Companies represented: Commonwealth Edison, PECO Energy, Baltimore Gas and Electric.

156 Transmission Companies represented: American Transmission Systems, Jersey Central Power & Light, Mid-Atlantic Interstate Transmission, PATH Allegheny Transmission, Potomac Edison, Trans-Allegheny Interstate Line, West Penn Power.

157 Transmission Companies represented: Hudson Transmission Partners.

158 Transmission companies represented: Louisville Gas and Electric, Kentucky Utilities.

159 Monitoring Analytics, *2022 Quarterly State of the Market Report, January Through June*, Section 12, p. 673 (https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/PJM_State_of_the_Market/2022/2022q2-som-pjm-sec12.pdf).

Figure 2-21: PJM Capacity Mix



Source: EIA Form 860-M[161]

that clears; submitting an offer into the real-time market that is dispatched; and self-scheduling load reductions while providing notification to PJM. End-use customers participate in demand response in PJM through members called curtailment service providers who act as agents for the customers. Curtailment service providers aggregate the demand of retail customers, register that demand with PJM, submit the verification of demand reductions for payment by PJM and receive the payment from PJM.

MARKET FEATURES

Energy Markets

Energy Markets: PJM operates day-ahead and real-time markets, generally consistent with the discussion in the RTO/ISO Features section of this report. In the real-time market, PJM uses 5-minute intervals. Generators that are available but not selected in the day-ahead scheduling may alter their offers for use in the real-time market during the generation rebidding period from 4 p.m. to 6 p.m.; otherwise, their original day-ahead market offers remain in effect for the real-time market.

Ancillary and Other Services

Ancillary services, described in the Electricity Supply and Delivery section, are services that support the grid and reliability. PJM procures most ancillary services via its energy markets. Blackstart service and reactive power are compensated on a cost-of-service basis.

Market Power Mitigation

PJM caps offers for any hour in which there are three or fewer generation suppliers available for redispatch that are jointly pivotal, meaning they have the ability to increase the market price above the competitive level. This is called the Three Pivotal Supplier Test. When this occurs, generator offers are adjusted to price levels reflecting short-run marginal cost.

Capacity Markets

PJM's capacity market is called the Reliability Pricing Model (RPM). The RPM market was implemented in 2007 and is designed to ensure the future availability of capacity resources, including demand-resources and energy-efficiency resources that will be needed to keep the regional power grid operating reliably. The RPM market design is based on three-year, forward-looking annual obligations for locational capacity, under which supply offers are cleared against a downward-sloping demand curve, called the variable resource requirement (VRR) curve. The VRR curve establishes the amount of capacity that PJM requires its LSE customers to purchase, and the price for that capacity, in each capacity zone (locational deliverability area or LDA). Under RPM, when an LDA is transmission-constrained in the auction (limited in the amount of generation that can be imported into those areas), capacity prices generally rise in that area relative to the overall PJM footprint.

160 Installed nameplate capacity is assessed through December 2021 and captures Operating and Standby resources available. Note that these estimates do not imply that generation output will match the nameplate capacity of a resource type. Derived from EIA, *Preliminary Monthly Electric Generator Inventory (based on Form EIA-860M)* (released February 2022), https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia860m/.

Annual auctions are referred to as Base Residual Auctions (BRA). LSEs that are able to fully supply their own capacity needs can choose not to participate in the auctions. The largest amounts of capacity in PJM are procured through the BRA, with lesser quantities procured through self-supply and contracted (bilateral) resources.

Market power mitigation in PJM's capacity market includes rules delineating a must-offer requirement, offer caps, minimum offer prices, exceptions for competitive entry, among others. Demand resources and energy efficiency resources may be offered into RPM auctions and receive the clearing price without mitigation.

Specific RPM rules, termed Capacity Performance, provide performance incentives for power plants, demand response, and energy efficiency resources to provide electricity at peak demand regardless of extreme weather events and system emergencies. Capacity Performance rules provide performance bonus payments for resources that over-perform during system emergencies, and severe financial penalties for resources that do not perform during such events.

Existing generation that qualifies as a capacity resource must be offered into RPM auctions, except for resources owned by entities that elect the fixed resource requirement option. The fixed resource option allows LSEs to meet their supply obligation outside PJM's capacity market, using, for example, resources they own.[161] Intermittent and capacity storage resources, including hydro, and demand response and energy efficiency, are also exempt from must-offer requirements. An administratively determined demand curve defines scarcity pricing levels and, with the supply curve derived from capacity offers, determines market prices in each BRA. Participation by load-serving entities is mandatory, except for those entities that elect the fixed resource requirement option. Also, any generator that has a commitment from the capacity market must submit an offer into the day-ahead energy market.

Special Provisions for Essential Resource Retirements

A generator owner who wishes to retire a unit must request permission from PJM to deactivate the unit at least 90 days in advance of the planned date. The request includes an estimate of the amount of project investment necessary to keep the unit in operation. PJM, in turn, analyzes if the retirement would lead to a reliability issue. Additionally, PJM estimates the period of time it would take to complete transmission upgrades necessary to alleviate the reliability issue.

If PJM requests the unit to operate past the desired deactivation date, the generator owner may file with FERC for cost recovery associated with operating the unit until it may be deactivated. Alternatively, the owner may choose to receive avoided cost compensation calculated according to PJM's tariff.

Financial Transmission Rights

PJM conducts auctions for selling and buying FTRs made available for the PJM transmission system. Proceeds from the auctions are paid to Auction Revenue Right (ARR) holders, where the ARRs are allocated to firm transmission service customers. PJM conducts its auctions on a long-term, annual, and monthly basis. In PJM, market participants are able to acquire financial transmission rights in the form of options or obligations. The RTO includes a secondary market for its FTRs, which facilitates bilateral trading of existing FTRs between PJM members through an internet-based computer application.

Virtual Transactions

PJM's market includes a virtual transaction feature that allows a participant to buy or sell power in the day-ahead market without requiring physical generation or load. In addition to the types of transaction discussed above, PJM offers Up to Congestion (UTC) transactions, a spread bid. In a UTC transaction, a market participant submits an offer to simultaneously inject energy at a specified source and withdraw the same megawatt

161 PJM, *Securing Fixed Resources*, (accessed December 2, 2022), https://pjm.com/-/media/about-pjm/newsroom/fact-sheets/securing-resources-through-fixed-resource-requirement-fact-sheet.ashx.

quantity at a specified sink in the day-ahead marketand specifies the maximum difference in locational marginal prices (LMP) at the transaction's source and sink that the market participant is willing to pay. PJM accepts the bid if the day-ahead LMP differential, i.e., the difference in day-ahead LMPs at the sink and the source, does not exceed the participant's UTC transaction bid. UTC positions are liquidated in the real-time energy market.

Credit Requirements

PJM's tariff includes credit requirements that a market participant needs to meet in order to participate in the market. The credit requirements assist in mitigating the effects of defaults that would otherwise be borne among all market participants. The RTO assesses and calculates the required credit amounts for the segments of the market in which an entity requests to participate. The market participant may request an unsecured credit allowance subject to certain restrictions. The RTO must review the entity's request relative to various creditworthiness-related specifications such as tangible net worth and credit scores.


Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO)

MARKET PROFILE

MISO operates the transmission system and a centrally dispatched market in portions of 15 states in the Midwest and the South, extending from Michigan and Indiana to Montana and from the Canadian border to the southern areas of Louisiana and Mississippi. The system is operated from three control centers: Carmel, Indiana; Eagan, Minnesota; and Little Rock, Arkansas. MISO also serves as the reliability coordinator for additional systems outsideof its market area, primarily to the north and northwest of the market footprint.

MISO was not a power pool before organizing as an ISO in December 2001. It began market operations in April 2005.

Figure 2-22: Midcontinent Independent System Operator



Source: Hitachi Energy, Velocity Suite

In January 2009, MISO implemented a market redesign that added auctioned and optimized ancillary services along with energy. As part of the market update, MISO combined its 24 separate balancing areas into a single balancing area. In 2013, the RTO began operations in the MISO South region, including the utility footprints of Entergy, Cleco, and South Mississippi Electric Power Association, among others, in parts of Arkansas, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas.

Peak Demand

MISO's all-time peak demand was 127 GW in summer 2011.[162]

Imports and Exports

MISO has interconnections with the PJM and SPP RTOs. It is also directly connected to Southern Company, TVA, the electric systems of Manitoba and Ontario, and several smaller systems. MISO is a net importer of power overall, but the interchange with some areas can flow

162 MISO, Corporate Fact Sheet, at 1 (June 2022), https://www.misoenergy.org/about/media-center/corporate-fact-sheet.

in either direction, depending on the relative loads and prices in the adjoining regions. Manitoba Hydro supplies a large part of MISO's load with its excess capacity, particularly in the summer.

Market Participants

MISO includes approximately 56 transmission owners, whose assets define the MISO market area. MISO's market participants include generators, power marketers, transmission-dependent utilities and load-serving entities.[163]

Membership and Governance

An independent board of directors of ten members, including the CEO, governs MISO. Directors are elected by the MISO membership from candidates provided by the board.[164]

MISO relies upon a stakeholder process that works to find collaborative solutions to problems faced by the RTO. These entities have an interest in MISO's peration and include state regulators, consumer advocates, transmission owners, independent power producers, power marketers and brokers, municipal and cooperative utilities and large-volume customers.

Transmission Owners

MISO's largest transmission owners include:

- American Transmission Co.
- Ameren (Missouri and Illinois)
- American Transmission Systems
- Duke
- Cleco
- Entergy
- Indianapolis Power and Light
- ITC
- Michigan Public Power Agency
- NSP Companies (Xcel)
- Northern Indiana Public Service Co.
- Otter Tail Power
- MidAmerican Energy

Chronic Constraints

MISO has certain pathways that are more likely to become congested, but the likelihood and pattern of congestion in any area is subject to weather patterns, wind production, and interchange with external regions. When load is high in the eastern part of MISO and to the east in PJM, constraints occur on pathways from the Minnesota and Wisconsin areas through Chicago and across Indiana. A particular congestion point with this pattern is northern Indiana. When colder weather occurs in Minnesota and the Dakotas, there is often congestion in the northern direction, particularly in Iowa. Higher wind production can cause localized constraints in some areas and can cause congestion in pathways from southern Minnesota and western Iowa moving eastward. New Orleans and East Texas are two constrained areas in MISO South. Additionally, constraints frequently arise between MISO Midwest and MISO South.

Transmission Planning

The main vehicle MISO uses for transmission planning is the MISO Transmission Expansion Plan developed by the MISO planning department in collaboration with transmission owners and other stakeholders who form the planning advisory committee. The plan is updated annually. Once approved by the board, the plan becomes the responsibility of the transmission owners.


Supply Resources

The total capacity in MISO is over 197 GW and is predominately composed of coal and natural gas-fired generators, providing roughly 70 percent of the total capacity combined, as shown in the bar chart below. Nuclear and wind are also important resources for the region.

163 *Id.*

164 MISO, *Principals of Corporate Governance*, at 3, https://cdn.misoenergy.org/Principles%20of%20Corporate%20Governance110859.pdf.

Figure 2-23: MISO Capacity Mix



Source: EIA Form 860-M[165]

Demand Response

MISO has more than 12.2 GW of demand response resources, including behind-the-meter generation. A number of these resources are operated through local utility programs and are not under the direct control of MISO. MISO has provisions allowing demand-side resources to participate in the energy and reserve markets, but participation is a small part of demand response. Some of the demand response under MISO's direct control is only available under emergency conditions.[166]

MARKET FEATURES

Energy Markets

MISO operates day-ahead and real-time markets, generally consistent with the discussion in the RTO/ISO Features section of this report. MISO's real-time market operates for 5-minutes intervals.

Ancillary and Other Services

Ancillary services, described in the Electricity Supply and Delivery section, are services that support the grid and reliability. MISO procures ancillary services via the co-optimized energy and ancillary services market.

In addition to ancillary services, MISO has implemented a ramping product that provides capacity that can increase output rapidly to help offset shifts in generation or load, known as the Ramp Capability Product (RCP).

Market Power Mitigation

When congestion occurs, there may be limits on the number of generators that can satisfy load in some areas, so that they may be able to exercise market power. In response, MISO may impose mitigation for those generators whose offers are significantly higher than their costs and have a significant impact on one or more LMPs. When these conditions are met, MISO reduces the generator's offer to an offer that is consistent with a competitive result.

Capacity Markets

MISO maintains an annual capacity requirement on all LSEs based on the load forecast plus reserves. LSEs are required to specify to MISO what physical capacity, including demand-side resources, they have designated to meet their load forecast. This capacity can be acquired either through an annual capacity auction, bilateral purchase, or self-supply. For the capacity market, MISO is divided into 10 zones whose forecast demand must be met by internal generation, demand-side resources, or deliverable external capacity.

165 Installed nameplate capacity is assessed through December 2021 and captures Operating and Standby resources available. Note that these estimates do not imply that generation output will match the nameplate capacity of a resource type. Derived from EIA, *Preliminary Monthly Electric Generator Inventory (based on Form EIA-860M)* (released February 2022), https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia860m/.

166 Potomac Economics, *2021 State of the Market Report for the MISO Electricity Markets,* at 100 (June 2022), https://www.potomaceconomics.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/2021-MISO-SOM_Report_Body_Final.pdf.

Resources used to meet LSEs' annual capacity requirements must offer that capacity into MISO's energy markets and, when qualified, into the ancillary services markets, for each hour of each day for the entire planning year. Must-offer requirements support MISO's mitigation process by providing an objective measure with which to identify physical withholding.

Special Provisions for Essential Resource Retirements

Power plant owners that seek to retire or suspend a generator must first obtain approval from MISO. The RTO evaluates plant retirement or suspension requests against reliability needs, and System Support Resource (SSR) designations are made where reliability is threatened. Once an agreement has been reached, SSRs receive compensation associated with remaining online and available.

Financial Transmission Rights

MISO holds FTR auctions to allow market participants the opportunity to acquire FTRs, sell FTRs that they currently hold, or to convert ARRs to FTRs. ARRs provide LSEs, and entities who make transmission upgrades, with a share of the revenues generated in the FTR auctions. MISO allocates ARRs to transmission customers relative to historical usage, or upgraded capability, of the transmission system. MISO FTRs are monthly and annual products.

Virtual Transactions

MISO's market includes a virtual transaction feature that allows a participant to buy or sell power in the day-ahead market without requiring physical generation or load. Virtual transactions allow for more participation in the day-ahead, price-setting process, allow participants to manage risk, and promote price convergence between the day-ahead and real-time markets.

These transactions are a component of the day-ahead market where the bids and offers are included in the determination of the LMP along with physical resource offers and actual load bids. Market participants, whose virtual transactions clear in the day-ahead market, have their positions cleared in the real-time market at the real-time price. Virtual bids and offers are allowed in MISO at any pricing node or aggregate of pricing nodes.

Credit Requirements

MISO's tariff includes credit requirements that a market participant needs to meet in order to participate in the market. The credit requirements assist in mitigating the effects of defaults that would otherwise be borne among all market participants. The RTO assesses and calculates the required credit dollar amounts for the segments of the market in which an entity requests to participate. The market participant may request an unsecured credit allowance subject to certain restrictions. The RTO must review the entity's request relative to various creditworthiness-related specifications such as tangible net worth and credit scores.

Southwest Power Pool (SPP)


MARKET PROFILE

SPP's RTO manages transmission in fourteen states: Arkansas, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas, and Wyoming. Founded as an 11-member tight power pool in 1941, SPP achieved RTO status in 2004, ensuring reliable power supplies, adequate transmission infrastructure, and competitive wholesale electricity prices for its members. SPP operates through its control center in Little Rock, Ar.

SPP began operating its real-time Energy Imbalance Service (EIS) market in 2007. In the same year, SPP became a FERC-approved Regional Entity. The SPP Regional Entity serves as the reliability coordinator for the NERC region, overseeing compliance with reliability standards.

SPP implemented its Integrated Marketplace in March 2014 which includes a day-ahead energy market, a real-time energy market, and an operating reserve market. SPP's Integrated Marketplace also includes a market for Transmission Congestion Rights. The SPP Integrated Marketplace co-optimizes the deployment of energy and operating reserves to dispatch resources on a least-cost basis.

Figure 2-24: Southwest Power Pool



Source: Hitachi Energy, Velocity Suite

SPP expanded its footprint in 2015, incorporating the Western Area Power Administration – Upper Great Plains region, the Basin Electric Power Cooperative, and the Heartland Consumers Power District. The expansion nearly doubled SPP's service territory by square miles, adding more the 5 GW of peak demand and over 7 GW of generating capacity.[167]

SPP also operates a real-time energy imbalance market in the Western Interconnect, which is described further below.

Peak Demand

SPP's all-time peak demand of 53 GW occurred in summer 2022.[168]

Imports and Exports

SPP has interties with MISO, TVA, and other systems. Additionally, SPP has two DC interties with ERCOT and seven DC interties to the Western Interconnection through New Mexico, Colorado, Nebraska, South Dakota and Montana. At times, SPP is both a net importer and net exporter of electricity at times.

Market Participants

SPP's market participants include investor-owned utilities, generation and transmission cooperatives, independent power producers, municipal utilities, state authorities, independent transmission companies, power marketers, financial participants, and a federal power marketing administration.

Membership and Governance

SPP is governed by a board of directors representing and elected by its members. Supporting the board is the members committee, which provides non-binding input. The members' committee is composed of representatives from each sector of SPP's membership. The SPP Regional State Committee represents retail regulatory commissions from state agencies and provides input on matters of regional importance related to the development and operation of bulk electric transmission.

Transmission Owners

SPP's largest transmission owners include:

- American Electric Power
- Oklahoma Gas and Electric
- Westar Energy
- Southwestern Public Service (Xcel Energy)
- Great Plains Energy
- Kansas City Power & Light
- Omaha Public Power District
- Nebraska Public Power District
- Tri-State Generation and Transmission
- Empire District Electric
- Western Area Power Administration – Upper Great Plains
- Western Farmers Electric Cooperative

167 Southwest Power Pool, *Western, Basin, Heartland join Southwest Power Pool,* at 1 (October 2015), https://www.spp.org/about-us/newsroom/western-basin-heartland-join-southwest-power-pool/.

168 Southwest Power Pool, *Fast Facts*, https://www.spp.org/about-us/fast-facts/.

Chronic Constraints

SPP has certain pathways that are more likely to become congested, based on the physical characteristics of the transmission grid and associated transfer capability, the geographic distribution of load, and the geographic differences in fuel costs. The eastern side of the SPP footprint has a higher concentration of load and congestion can occur when wind-powered generation from the west tries to travel across limited connections to the east. The most significant congestion has typically occurred in the Oklahoma and Texas Panhandle region.[169]

Transmission Planning

SPP conducts its transmission planning according to its Integrated Transmission Planning process,which is a three-year planning process that includes 20-year, 10-year, and near-term assessments designed to identify transmission solutions that address both near-term and long-term transmission needs. The Integrated Transmission Planning process focuses on identifying cost-effective regional transmission solutions, which are identified in an annual SPP Transmission Expansion Plan report.

Supply Resources

The total capacity in SPP is approximately 94 GW and is predominately composed of natural gas and coal-fired generators, as shown in the bar chart below. Wind is an important and growing resource in the region.

Demand Response

SPP allows demand response resources to register in its market.[170] As of December 31, 2021, 102 demand resources participated in SPP's markets, representing 176 MW of nameplate capacity. While the demand response resources can participate in SPP's markets, they are rarely dispatched.

SPP allows Market Participants to register two types of demand response resources: Block Demand Response (BDR) resources and Dispatchable Demand Response (DDR) resources. BDR resources can participate in SPP's markets by providing energy and reserves in 60-minute blocks. DDR resources can participate in SPP's markets by providing energy, regulation, and reserves in 5-minute blocks.

MARKET FEATURES

Energy Markets

SPP operates day-ahead and real-time markets, generally consistent with the discussion in the RTO/ISO Features section of this report. SPP's real-time market operates in 5-minute intervals.

Figure 2-25: SPP Capacity Resources



Source: EIA Form 860-M[171]

169 See Southwest Power Pool Market Monitoring Unit, *State of the Market 2022* (May 2022), at 202, https://www.spp.org/documents/67104/2021%20annual%20state%20of%20the%20market%20report.pdf.

170 SPP Market Monitor, State of the Market 2021 (May 10, 2021), at 49, https://www.spp.org/documents/67104/2021%20annual%20state%20of%20the%20market%20report.pdf.

171 Installed nameplate capacity is assessed through December 2021 and captures Operating and Standby resources available. Note that these estimates do not imply that generation output will match the nameplate capacity of a resource type. Derived from EIA, *Preliminary Monthly Electric Generator Inventory (based on Form EIA-860M)* (released February 2022), https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia860m/.

Ancillary and Other Services

Ancillary services, described in the Electricity Supply and Delivery section, are services that support the grid and reliability. SPP procures ancillary services via the co-optimized energy and ancillary services market. Separately, SPP has a ramping product to procure capacity that can quickly increase output to offset both anticipated and unforeseen future changes in generation or load within the hour, known as the Ramp Capability Product. SPP launched this ramp product in March 2022.

Market Power Mitigation

SPP applies a set of behavioral and market outcomes tests to determine if the local market is competitive and if generator offers should be adjusted to approximate short-run marginal costs. SPP's mitigation test includes a local market power test, a conduct test, and a market impact test. Where mitigation measures are triggered by the tests, SPP generates a mitigated resource offer that the RTO then uses for dispatch, commitment, and settlement purposes.

Capacity Markets

SPP does not offer a capacity market. However, it requires each Load Responsible Entity (LRE) to have sufficient energy supply (capacity) to cover its energy obligations. SPP develops and implements policies and processes necessary to ensure resource adequacy and determines the amount of capacity each LRE must have available to meet its energy obligations. [172]

Special Provisions for Essential Resource Retirements

A generator owner who wishes to retire a unit must request that SPP study the retirement of the resource no less than one year from the expected retirement date. SPP will then conduct studies to examine the potential effects of the resource retirement including the need for transmission network upgrades, if any.

Otherwise, SPP prepares annual reliability studies as part of its system planning responsibilities. In the event that the studies reveal a potential constraint on SPP's ability to deliver power to a local area on the transmission system, SPP works with regional stakeholders to find alternate transmission, operating procedure, or generation solutions for the constraint and thus maintain grid reliability. The SPP parties then determine an appropriate sharing of the costs, and, if unable to reach agreement, SPP will submit a proposed cost-sharing arrangement to FERC for approval.

Financial Transmission Rights

SPP refers to FTRs as Transmission Congestion Rights (TCR). A TCR is an instrument that entitles the holder to receive compensation, or requires the holder to pay a charge, for costs that arise from transmission congestion over a selected path, or source-and-sink pair of locations on the grid. A TCR provides the holder with revenue, or charges, equal to the difference in congestion prices in the day-ahead market across the selected TCR transmission path. SPP TCRs include monthly and annual products, as well as a long-term instrument called Long-Term Congestion Rights.

A related product, ARRs, provide their holders with a share of the revenue generated in the TCR auctions. In general, ARRs are allocated based on firm transmission rights. As with TCRs, ARRs provide transmission owners and eligible transmission service customers an offset or hedge against transmission congestion costs in the day-ahead market.

Virtual Transactions

SPP's market includes a virtual transaction feature that allows a participant to buy or sell power in the day-ahead market without requiring physical generation or load. In SPP, virtual bids are sometimes used in the day-ahead market as a placeholder or hedge for wind generation expected in the real-time market.

Credit Requirements

SPP's tariff includes credit requirements that a market participant needs to meet in order to participate in the


172 *Southwest Power Pool Market Monitoring Unit, State of the Market 2022 (May 2022), at 202,* https://www.spp.org/documents/67104/2021%20annual%20state%20of%20the%20market%20report.pdf

market. The credit requirements assist in mitigating the effects of defaults that would otherwise be borne among all market participants. The RTO assesses and calculates the required credit amounts for the segments of the market in which an entity requests to participate. The market participant may request an unsecured credit allowance subject to certain restrictions. SPP must review the entity's request relative to various creditworthiness-related specifications such as tangible net worth and various financial measures.

Western Energy Imbalance Service (WEIS)

SPP launched its WEIS market in February 2021. The WEIS market balances generation and load regionally in real time for participants in the Western Interconnection. SPP's WEIS market centrally dispatches generation from participating resources every five minutes using the lowest-cost resource available to meet demand. As of August 2022, ten entities participate or plan to participate in the WEIS Market with three more anticipated to join in April 2023: Basic Electric Power Cooperative, BlackHills Energy (April 2023), Colorado Springs Utilities, Deseret Power Electric Cooperative, Guzman Energy, Municipal Energy Agency of Nebraska, Platte River Power Authority (April 2023), Tri-State Generation and Transmission Association, WAPA (Upper Great Plains West, Rocky Mountain, and Colorado River Storage Projects regions), and Xcel Energy (April 2023). The following map shows SPP's footprint in red and the WEIS in blue.

Figure 2-26: Western Energy Imbalance Service



Source: SPP Website

California Independent System Operator (CAISO)

MARKET PROFILE

CAISO operates an ISO serving most of California and part of Nevada. CAISO is a California nonprofit public benefit corporation started in 1998 when the state restructured its electric power industry. CAISO manages wholesale electricity markets, centrally dispatching electric generators. In managing the grid, CAISO provides open access to the transmission system and performs long-term transmission planning. It manages energy and ancillary markets in day-ahead and real-time markets and is responsible for regional reliability. CAISO also operates a real-time energy imbalance market, the Western Energy Imbalance Market (WEIM), which is discussed further below. CAISO operates its grid out of its main control center in Folsom, CA.

Peak Demand

CAISO's all-time peak demand was 52 GW in summer 2022.[173]

Imports and Exports

Up to about one-third of CAISO's energy is supplied by imports, principally from the Southwest (Arizona, Nevada, and New Mexico) and the Pacific Northwest (Oregon, Washington, and British Columbia). Imports from the Pacific Northwest generally increase in the

173 California ISO, *California ISO Peak Load History 1998 through 2022*, at 1 (n.d.), http://www.caiso.com/documents/californiaisopeakloadhistory.pdf.

late spring when hydroelectric production peaks from increases in winter snowmelt and runoff.

Market Participants

CAISO's market participants include load-serving investor-owned utilities, load-serving municipal utilities, generators, power marketers, utility customers, and financial entities.

Membership and Governance

The CAISO has a board of governors that consists of five members appointed by the governor and confirmed by the California Senate. The board provides corporate direction, reviews and approves management's annual strategic plans, and approves CAISO's operating and capital budgets.

CAISO uses an informal stakeholder process to propose solutions to problems that may ultimately require a filing at FERC. Unlike other RTOs, which have a formal committee structure, CAISO's stakeholder process generally consists of rounds of dialogue with stakeholders on major policy issues.

Transmission Owners

CAISO's largest transmission owners include:

- Pacific Gas and Electric
- Southern California Edison
- San Diego Gas and Electric
- Valley Electric Association
- Municipal utilities such as Vernon, Anaheim, and Riverside

Chronic Constraints

CAISO has several locally constrained areas, typically near population centers and where transmission lines have relatively low voltage (115 kV and below). The locally constrained areas that have local capacity requirements include the Greater Bay Area, Greater Fresno, Sierra, Humboldt, Los Angeles Basin, San Diego, and North Coast/North Bay.

Transmission Planning

CAISO conducts an annual transmission planning process with stakeholders that includes both short-term and long-term projects.

Figure 2-27: California Independent System Operator



Source: Hitachi Energy Velocity Suite


Supply Resources

The total capacity in CAISO is over 70 GW and is predominately composed of natural gas-fired and hydroelectric generators, as shown in the bar chart below. CAISO also has substantial renewable resources, including roughly half of the installed solar capacity in the U.S.

Demand Response

Demand response participation in the wholesale energy market includes programs entitled Proxy Demand Response, Reliability Demand Response Resources, and CAISO's Participating Load program. Proxy Demand Response allows for customer loads, aggregated by LSEs or third-party providers, to offer load reduction into CAISO's day-ahead, real-time, and ancillary services markets in return for compensation. Reliability Demand Response Resources allows customer loads, also aggregated by LSEs or third-party providers, to reduce load for compensation when triggered for

Figure 2-28: CAISO Capacity Mix



Source: EIA Form 860-M[175]

reliability-related events. Reliability Demand Response Resources can also offer into the day-ahead market. The Participating Load program allows the CAISO operators to directly curtail end-users' load, rather than through aggregators. This is a relatively small program that is primarily composed of the power demand from California's water pumping projects. Other demand response in California consists of programs for managing peak summer demands operated by the state's electric utilities. In general, activation of the utility demand response programs is based on criteria that are internal to the utility or when CAISO issues a Flex Alert. Flex Alerts also inform consumers of how and when to conserve electricity usage.

MARKET FEATURES

Energy Markets

CAISO operates day-ahead and real-time markets, generally consistent with the discussion in the RTO/ISO Features section of this report. CAISO operates a 15-minute market to adjust schedules from those determined in the day-ahead market, then a 5-minute market to balance supply and load in real-time. Real-time bids can be submitted up to 75 minutes before the start of the operating hour.

CAISO also procures capacity in the real-time market to provide upward and downward ramping of generation in order to accommodate changes in net load with the Flexible Ramping Product.[175] This service provides compensation to the generators selected to provide the desired flexible ramping capability.[176]

Ancillary and Other Services

Ancillary services, described in the Electricity Supply and Delivery section, are services that support the grid and reliability. CAISO procures ancillary services via its co-optimization of energy and ancillary services in its energy markets

In addition to ancillary services, CAISO has implemented a ramping product to procure capacity that can quickly increase output to offset changes in generation or load, known as the Flexible Ramping Product.

Market Power Mitigation

CAISO applies a set of behavioral and market outcome tests to determine if the local market is competitive and if generator offers should be adjusted to approximate price levels that would be seen in a competitive market – close to short-run marginal costs.

174 Installed nameplate capacity is assessed through December 2021 and captures Operating and Standby resources available. Note that these estimates do not imply that generation output will match the nameplate capacity of a resource type. Derived from EIA, *Preliminary Monthly Electric Generator Inventory (based on Form EIA-860M)* (released February 2022), https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia860m/.

175 Net load in CAISO is total market demand minus generation output from solar and wind resources.

176 CAISO describes ramping capability as a resource's ability to move from one energy output to a higher (upward ramp) or lower (downward ramp) energy output; *California Independent System Operator Corp.*, 156 FERC ¶ 61,226, at P 2 (2016).

Figure 2-29: Western Energy Imbalance Market



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Capacity Markets

CAISO does not operate a formal capacity market, but it does have a mandatory resource adequacy (RA) requirement. The program requires LSEs to procure 115 percent of their aggregate system load on a monthly basis, unless a different reserve margin is mandated by the LSE's local regulatory authority. The program provides deliverability criteria that each LSE must meet, as well as system and local capacity requirements and flexibility requirements.

The CAISO market rules also include must-offer provisions pertaining to resources procured as RA resources. These resources must make themselves available to the CAISO day-ahead and real-time markets for the capacity for which they were counted.

Special Provisions for Essential Resource Retirements

CAISO employs RMR contracts to assure that it has the ability to reliably serve load in local import-constrained areas. RMR contracts also help to mitigate any local market power that one or more units may have. Over time, CAISO has been able to significantly decrease its RMR designations in much of the system. Remaining generators with RMR contracts are located primarily near the San Francisco and Los Angeles areas.

Financial Transmission Rights

In California, FTRs are referred to as Congestion Revenue Rights (CRR). A CRR is an instrument that entitles the CRR holder to a payment for costs that arise with transmission congestion over a selected path, or source-and-sink pair of locations on the grid. The CRR also requires its holder to pay a charge for those hours when congestion occurs in the opposite direction of the selected source-and-sink pair. CRRs are monthly or quarterly products. CRRs can be bought at auction or allocated by CAISO. Allocated CRRs receive the congestion value for a specific path, similar to a converted FTR. CAISO also allocates open market CRR auction revenues to LSEs, based on their physical participation in the market, similar to an ARR in other markets.

Virtual Transactions

CAISO's market includes a virtual transactions feature, termed convergence bidding. CAISO's convergence bidding includes both virtual supply and virtual demand transactions.

Credit Requirements

CAISO's tariff includes credit requirements that a market participant needs to meet in order to participate in the market. The credit requirements assist in mitigating the effects of defaults that would otherwise be absorbed by all market participants. CAISO assesses and calculates the required credit dollar amounts for the segments of the market in which an entity requests to participate. The market participant may request an unsecured credit allowance subject to

certain restrictions – CAISO must review the entity's request relative to various creditworthiness-related specifications such as tangible net worth, net assets, and credit rating.

Western Energy Imbalance Market (WEIM)

On Nov. 1, 2014, CAISO began operation of an energy imbalance market (EIM) with PacifiCorp's two BAAs, PacifiCorp East and PacifiCorp West. The EIM is an extension of the CAISO's real-time market into other BAAs in the Western Interconnection. The market dispatches resources inside the participating entities' BAAs to meet intra-hour changes in their energy demand and supply. The EIM's imbalance energy helps the BAAs meet their energy demand in real-time. Overall, EIM energy represents about two to three percent of the energy used to meet load in the participating BAAs. With the balancing authorities in the Pacific Northwest, the EIM integrates low-cost hydroelectric power generation with the significant amount of solar and wind generation capacity in CAISO.

The EIM is a voluntary market where the participating balancing authorities can choose which resources to include in the market. The market participants have the flexibility to add and remove capacity from the EIM on an hourly basis. The transmission system operators for each participating BAA preserve the responsibility and flexibility to respond to events such as a sudden large imbalance between load and supply caused by a loss of a power plant or transmission line.

As of November 2022, the EIM consisted of the following LSEs and their respective BAAs: BPA, Puget Sound Energy, Portland General Electric, PacifiCorp West, PacifiCorp East, Idaho Power, NV Energy, Tucson Electric Power, Avista, NorthWestern Energy, Los Angeles Department of Water & Power, Public Service Company of New Mexico, Turlock Irrigation District, Salt River Project, Seattle City Light, Balancing Authority of Northern California, Idaho Power Company, Portland General Electric, Puget Sound, NV Energy, Arizona Public Service, and CAISO. Additionally, Powerex (the marketing arm of the Canadian utility, BC Hydro) joined the EIM, providing contributions of generation and load imbalance (the difference between generation supply and demand schedules).[177] Other balancing authorities have expressed interest in becoming EIM Entities.

The EIM provides a market mechanism for dispatching generation resources to meet imbalance energy needs along with a limited amount of power flows between the participating BAAs. The market dispatches generation based on the relative cost of the resources, resulting in cost savings for the participants. Before the EIM, a balancing authority such as PacifiCorp West or PacifiCorp East resolved imbalances between energy demand and supply in real-time by dispatching its resources and using ancillary services (mainly regulation). Under the EIM, by contrast, the market automates the dispatch of enough resource capacity within the BAAs, along with transmission flows between BAAs, to resolve energy imbalances.[178] The automated EIM sets LMPs at both 15-minute and 5-minute intervals.

Along with dispatch cost savings, the EIM also helps integrate renewable generation resources. Prior to the EIM, CAISO imported power from outside its service territory to balance load throughout most hours of the day. However, with the growth of solar and wind generation, particularly in California, there were periods when these resources were forced to curtail because there was too much energy offered into the market. Now, with the EIM, any excess power can be exported throughout the participating BAAs. In some hours, this results in power exports from CAISO to other BAAs.[179]

177 Powerex (BC Hydro) also makes transmission rights available to the EIM, providing its power to the EIM at the British Columbia-U.S. border

178 The EIM software calculates dispatch solutions for the EIM market area as a whole. Consequently, participating balancing authorities need not maintain high levels of reserves.

179 *See* Department of Market Monitoring – California ISO, *2017 Annual Report on Market Issues & Performance*, at 118 (June 2018), http://www.caiso.com/Documents/2017AnnualReportonMarketIssuesandPerformance.pdf.

As the independent system operator of the EIM, CAISO addresses local market power mitigation at 5-minute and 15-minute intervals across the EIM area, which includes the non-CAISO balancing authority areas. CAISO also procures a Flexible Ramp Product to provide upward and downward flexible capacity to meet energy ramp requirements. In these respects, CAISO's operator responsibilities have grown in the EIM as enhancements to the market design have been implemented.

BEFORE THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Power Act Section 202(c) Emergency Order: Tri-State Generation and Transmission Association, Platte River Power Authority, Salt River Project, PacifiCorp, and Xcel Energy	))))))	Order No. 202-25-14

Exhibit to
Motion to Intervene and Request for Rehearing and Stay of
Public Interest Organizations

Filed January 28, 2026

Exhibit 1-20:
Department Order No. 202-08-1

The Secretary of Energy
Washington, DC 20585

Order No. 202-08-1

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by section 202(c) of the Federal Power Act (FPA), 16 U.S.C. 824a(c), and section 301(b) of the Department of Energy Organization Act, 42 U.S.C. 7151(b), and for the reasons set forth below, I hereby determine that an emergency exists in Texas due to a shortage of electric energy, a shortage of facilities for the generation of electric energy, a shortage of facilities for the transmission of electric energy and other causes, and that issuance of this order will serve to alleviate the emergency and serve the public interest.

As a result of the massive devastation caused by Hurricane Ike, large portions of the areas affected by the hurricane are without electricity, posing a threat to human life and health. It is my judgment that in these circumstances, the order I am issuing today will meet the emergency and serve the public interest because it will alleviate electricity shortages and protect the life and health of the people in the affected areas.

Based on my determination set forth above, I hereby order:

Effective immediately, CenterPoint Energy is authorized and directed to temporarily connect at distribution and transmission level voltages such as 12.5kV, 13.2kV, 25kV, 69kV, 138kV, and 230kV to restore power to Entergy Gulf States, Inc. as well as electric cooperatives and municipal customers within the State of Texas. Pursuant to section 202(d) of the FPA, 16 U.S.C. 824a(d), during the continuance of this order, any person engaged in the transmission and sale of electric energy and not otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) may, pursuant to this order, make such temporary connections with any public utility subject to the jurisdiction of FERC and shall not become subject to FERC jurisdiction as a result of that temporary connection.

This order shall be effective upon its issuance and shall expire at 12:01 a.m., November 1, 2008.

Issued in Washington, D.C. at 1600 this 14th day of September, 2008.

Samuel W. Bodman
Secretary of Energy

Printed on recycled paper

BEFORE THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Power Act Section 202(c) Emergency Order: Tri-State Generation and Transmission Association, Platte River Power Authority, Salt River Project, PacifiCorp, and Xcel Energy	))))))	Order No. 202-25-14

Exhibit to
Motion to Intervene and Request for Rehearing and Stay of
Public Interest Organizations

Filed January 28, 2026

Exhibit 1-21:
Department Order No. 202-26-01

Department of Energy
Washington, DC 20585

Order No. 202-26-01

Pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretary of Energy by section 202(c) of the Federal Power Act (FPA),[1] and section 301(b) of the Department of Energy (DOE) Organization Act,[2] and for the reasons set forth below, I hereby determine that a statutory emergency exists in the Electric Reliability Council of Texas, Inc. (ERCOT) region, due to a sudden increase in demand, a shortage of electric energy, a shortage of facilities for the generation of electric energy, and other causes. I direct ERCOT (Reliability Coordinator) and its Balancing Authorities and backup generation resources defined below, to comply with this Order.[3] Issuance of this Order will meet the emergency and serve the public interest.

BACKGROUND

Throughout the United States, demand is outpacing generation supply. Generation resource inadequacy is especially problematic during prolonged winter cold snaps. According to the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), "[w]inter electricity demand is rising at the fastest rate in recent years," and the "total internal demand for the [bulk power system] is forecast to increase by 20.2 GW (2.5%) over last winter's forecast.[4] While NERC assesses that there are "adequate resources for normal winter peak-load conditions," NERC cautions that "more extreme winter conditions extending over a wide area could result in electricity supply shortfalls."[5] According to NERC, areas in the continental United States are at an elevated risk during extreme cold, which jeopardizes American lives, our economy, and national security.[6]

In its 2025–2026 Winter Reliability Assessment, NERC finds that the ERCOT assessment area is at elevated risk. According to NERC, above-normal winter peak and outage

[1] 16 U.S.C. § 824a(c).

[2] 42 U.S.C. § 7151(b).

[3] For all geographical or electrical areas of the Bulk Power System, all areas are under the oversight of one and only one Reliability Coordinator. NERC Rules of Procedure, section 501.1.4.1. All Balancing Authorities are under the responsibility of one and only one Reliability Coordinator. *Id.*, section 501.1.4.2. All Loads and generators are under the responsibility and control of one and only one Balancing Authority. *Id.*, section 501.1.4.4.

[4] *2025-2026 Winter Reliability Assessment*, NERC (NERC 2025-2026 Winter Assessment), at 8 (November 2025), https://www.nerc.com/globalassets/our-work/assessments/nerc_wra_2025.pdf. The NERC 2025-2026 Winter Assessment "identifies, assesses, and reports on areas of concern regarding the reliability of the North American [bulk power system] for the upcoming winter season." *Id*. at 4.

[5] *Id.* at 5.

[6] *Id.* at 6.

conditions could result in the need for operating mitigations and Energy Emergency Alerts (EEAs). NERC states that strong load growth is driving higher winter electricity demand forecasts and contributing to continued risk of supply shortfalls. For this winter season, NERC explains that ERCOT is expected to continue facing reserve shortage risks, particularly under extreme load conditions that accompany freezing temperatures. NERC cautions that load shedding may be needed under wide-area cold weather events.[7]

Under President Trump's leadership, this administration is determined to take swift and decisive action to protect the American people from tragedies, such as Winter Storm Uri, which resulted in "billions of dollars in damages and over 200 deaths."[8]

In Executive Order 14156, "Declaring a National Energy Emergency," President Trump determined that the "United States' insufficient energy production, transportation, refining, and generation constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to our Nation's economy, national security, and foreign policy."[9] In Executive Order 14262, "Strengthening the Reliability and Security of the United States Electric Grid," President Trump emphasized that "the United States is experiencing an unprecedented surge in electricity demand driven by rapid technological advancements, including the expansion of artificial intelligence data centers and increase in domestic manufacturing."[10] These Executive Orders underscore the dire energy challenges facing the Nation due to growing resource adequacy concerns.

The Department's July 2025 "Resource Adequacy Report: Evaluating the Reliability and Security of the United States Electric Grid," issued pursuant to the President's directive in Executive Order 14262, details the myriad challenges affecting the Nation's energy systems. "Absent decisive intervention, the Nation's power grid will be unable to meet projected demand for manufacturing, re-industrialization, and data centers driving artificial intelligence (AI)

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[7] NERC, *2025 – 2026 Winter Reliability Assessment*, at 5-6, 31 (Nov. 2025), https://www.nerc.com/globalassets/our-work/assessments/nerc_wra_2025.pdf.

[8] *The February 2021 Cold Weather Outages in Texas and the South Central United States*, FERC, NERC, and Regional Entity Staff Report, at 234 (November 2021), https://www.ferc.gov/media/february-2021-cold-weather-outages-texas-and-south-central-united-states-ferc-nerc-and. *See id.* at 189 ("Millions went without heat, lights, refrigeration, and water for days during the Event. Hundreds died from hypothermia or trying to keep warm, in their homes, in their beds.").

[9] Executive Order No. 14156, 90 Fed. Reg. 8433 (Jan. 20, 2025) (Declaring a National Energy Emergency), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/declaring-a-national-energy-emergency/.

[10] Executive Order No. 14262, 90 Fed. Reg. 15521 (Apr. 8, 2025) (Strengthening the Reliability and Security of the United States Electric Grid), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/04/strengthening-the-reliability-and-security-of-the-united-states-electric-grid/.

innovation."[11] The prolific growth of data centers for the development of AI, as well as their immense energy needs, presents a new and increasing source of load growth.

In July 2025, President Trump released America's AI Action Plan for Winning the Race.[12] It recognizes that the "U.S. electric grid is one of the largest and most complex machines on Earth . . . [that] will need to be upgraded to support data centers and other energy-intensive industries of the future."[13] That plan recommended that we stabilize the grid of today as much as possible, including leveraging extant backup power sources to bolster grid reliability during peak demand and optimize existing grid resources as much as possible, including investigating "new and novel ways for large power consumers to manage their power consumption during critical grid periods to enhance reliability and unlock additional power on the system."[14]

NERC-certified Reliability Coordinators and Balancing Authorities[15] are responsible for identifying and addressing emergency conditions on the bulk power system. As discussed below, this is squarely addressed in the mandatory and enforceable NERC Reliability Standard EOP-011-4. Today, calls for voluntary curtailment are authorized under that standard. However, this action gives Reliability Coordinators and Balancing Authorities another tool to avoid the impacts experienced as a result of Winter Storm Uri.

Currently, there are tens of gigawatts of readily available backup generation that have remained largely untapped until now. Deployment of backup generation resources (whether auxiliary, standby, directly-connected, battery storage or other, and whether synchronized or not to the bulk power system) at data centers (including but not limited to hyperscaler facilities), and at other large load industrial and commercial customer sites, can prevent avoidable blackouts, thereby saving lives and reducing costs to the American people.

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[11] Resource Adequacy Report: Evaluating the Reliability and Security of the United States Electric Grid, U.S. Department of Energy at 1(July 2025), https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2025-7/DOE%20Final%20EO%20Report%20%28FINAL%20JULY%207%29.pdf.

[12] https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Americas-AI-Action-Plan.pdf.

[13] *Id.* at 15.

[14] *Id.*

[15] The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) certifies Reliability Coordinators and Balancing Authorities in accordance with its Rules of Procedures.

APPLICATION OF EOP-011-4

Section 215 of the Federal Power Act[16] established a framework for development and implementation of mandatory and enforceable Reliability Standards that apply to Bulk Power System owners, operators, and users, such as Reliability Coordinators and Balancing Authorities. NERC certifies Reliability Coordinators and Balancing Authorities pursuant to an Organization Certification program set forth in its Rules of Procedure,[17] because of the significant roles these two functional entity category types have in ensuring bulk power system reliability. A Reliability Coordinator is defined as:

> the entity that is the highest level of authority who is responsible for the Reliable Operation of the [Bulk Electric System (BES)], has the Wide Area view of the BES, and has the operating tools, processes, and procedures, including the authority to prevent or mitigate emergency operating situations in both next-day analysis and real-time operations. The Reliability Coordinator has the purview that is broad enough to enable the calculation of Interconnection Reliability Operating Limits, which may be based on the operating parameters of transmission systems beyond any Transmission Operator's vision.[18]

A Balancing Authority is "the responsible entity that integrates resource plans ahead of time, maintains Load-interchange-generation balance within a Balancing Authority Area, and supports Interconnection frequency in real time."[19]

Because of the criticality of their respective roles, Reliability Coordinators and Balancing Authorities are subject to NERC's Organization Certification Program to ensure that they have "the tools, processes, training, and procedures to demonstrate their ability to meet the Requirements/sub-Requirements of all of the Reliability Standards applicable to the function(s) . . . ."[20]

NERC Reliability Standard EOP-011-4 addresses Emergency Operations. Requirement 2 states "[e]ach Balancing Authority shall develop, maintain, and implement one or more Reliability Coordinator-reviewed Operating Plan(s) to mitigate Capacity Emergencies and Energy Emergencies within its Balancing Authority Area." Balancing Authorities are responsible for

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[16] 16 U.S.C. § 824o.

[17] *See generally* NERC Rules of Procedure, https://www.nerc.com/globalassets/who-we-are/rules-of-procedure/nerc-rop-effective-20231128_with-appendicies.pdf; *see also id.* section 500.

[18] NERC Rules of Procedure, Appendix 5B; *see also id.* Appendix 2. Other capitalized terms in this definition also are defined in the NERC Rules of Procedure at Appendix 2.

[19] NERC Rules of Procedure, Appendix 5B; *see also id.* Appendix 2.

[20] NERC Rules of Procedure, section 501.

requesting that their respective Reliability Coordinators issue an Energy Emergency Alert in accordance with Requirement 2 and Attachment 1 to EOP-011-4. Among other things, Balancing Authorities are authorized to make "[p]ublic appeals for voluntary Load reductions" in Requirement 2.2.4. Balancing Authority Operating plans must include provisions in accordance with Requirement 2.2.9 for "Transmission Operators to implement operator-controlled manual Load shedding, undervoltage Load shedding, or underfrequency Load shedding" and provisions in accordance with Requirement 2.2.10 to determine reliability impacts of cold weather conditions.

According to Requirement 5,

> Each Reliability Coordinator that receives an Emergency notification from a Transmission Operator or Balancing Authority within its Reliability Coordinator Area shall notify, within 30 minutes from the time of receiving notification, other Balancing Authorities and Transmission Operators in its Reliability Coordinator Area, and neighboring Reliability Coordinators.

According to Requirement 6,

> Each Reliability Coordinator that has a Balancing Authority experiencing a potential or actual Energy Emergency within its Reliability Coordinator Area shall declare an Energy Emergency Alert, as detailed in Attachment 1.

Attachment 1 provides,

> **Initiation by Reliability Coordinator.** An Energy Emergency Alert (EEA) may be initiated only by a Reliability Coordinator at 1) the Reliability Coordinator's own request, or 2) upon the request of an energy deficient Balancing Authority.

***

To ensure that all Reliability Coordinators clearly understand potential and actual Energy Emergencies in the Interconnection, NERC has established three levels of EEAs. The Reliability Coordinators will use these terms when communicating Energy Emergencies to each other. An EEA is an Emergency procedure, not a daily operating practice, and is not intended as an alternative to compliance with NERC Reliability Standards.

The Reliability Coordinator may declare whatever alert level is necessary, and need not proceed through the alerts sequentially.

***

Before requesting an EEA 3, the energy deficient Balancing Authority must make use of all available resources; this includes, but is not limited to:

2.5.1 All available generation units are on line. All generation capable of being on line in the time frame of the Emergency is on line.

2.5.2 Demand-Side Management. Activate Demand-Side Management within provisions of any applicable agreements.

***

3.3.1 Energy deficient Balancing Authority obligations. The energy deficient Balancing Authority, upon notification from its Reliability Coordinator of the situation, will immediately take whatever actions are necessary to mitigate any undue risk to the Interconnection. These actions may include Load shedding.

Of particular note, NERC's 2025-2026 Winter Assessment recognizes that "[p]roactive issuance of winter advisories and other steps directed at generator availability contributed to improved reliability during cold weather events of the past two winters."[21] NERC further cautions that Reliability Coordinators and Balancing Authorities "should prepare their operating plans to manage potential supply shortfalls and take proactive steps for generator readiness, fuel availability, load curtailment, and sustained operations in extreme conditions."[22]

EMERGENCY SITUATION

Winter Storm Fern poses significant risks to electric reliability in the Reliability Coordinator's footprint. Consistent with NERC's cautionary notes and this Administration's commitment to grid stability, this order seeks to unlock and deploy backup generation resources (whether auxiliary, standby, directly-connected, battery storage or other, and whether synchronized or not to the bulk power system) at data centers (including but not limited to hyperscaler facilities), and at other large load industrial and commercial customer sites as another tool to mitigate any undue risk to the bulk power system. The employment of this backup generation is expected to reduce stress on the grid. This will permit orderly, safe, and secure operations during Winter Storm Fern.

Consistent with my letter issued on January 22, 2026, ERCOT requested today that DOE issue an order pursuant to FPA section 202(c) to allow the deployment of backup generation during emergency conditions.

ORDER

FPA section 202(c)(1) provides that whenever the Secretary of Energy determines "that an emergency exists by reason of a sudden increase in the demand for electric energy, or a shortage of electric energy or of facilities for the generation or transmission of electric energy," then the Secretary has the authority "to require by order . . . such generation, delivery, interchange, or

[21] NERC 2025-2026 Winter Assessment at 7.

[22] *Id*.

transmission of electric energy as in its judgment will best meet the emergency and serve the public interest."[23] This statutory language constitutes a specific grant of authority to the Secretary to authorize the operation of generation, delivery, and transmission resources that the Secretary has determined will best meet an emergency.

I have made the determination that an emergency exists, due to an abrupt, unexpected increase in demand for electric energy relative to prior forecasts, a shortage of electric energy, a shortage of facilities for the generation of electric energy, and other causes. As discussed above, taking into account the historical data, past projections and planning, and the projections for the upcoming winter season, together with the increasing demand for electricity that has substantially outpaced net generating capacity additions, a statutory emergency exists this winter across the continental United States. As noted above, NERC has warned that winter electricity demand is rising at the fastest rate in recent years and the total internal demand for the bulk power system is forecast to increase by 20.2 GW (2.5%) over last winter's forecast. Even prolonged cold snaps can be expected to lead to the potential loss of power to homes and businesses in the areas that may be affected by curtailments or power outages, presenting a risk to public health and safety during the upcoming winter.

To best meet the emergency and serve the public interest, backup generation resources shall be made available to run during the emergency conditions specified below.

Based on my determination of an emergency set forth above, I hereby order:

A. From January 24, 2026, the Reliability Coordinator and its Balancing Authorities are authorized to direct backup generation resources at data centers (including but not limited to hyperscaler facilities), and at other large load industrial and commercial customer sites (whether auxiliary, standby, directly-connected, battery storage or other, and whether synchronized or not to the bulk power system), to operate as a last resort before declaring an Energy Emergency Alert (EEA) 3 (i.e., before firm load interruption) or during an EEA 3.[24]

B. This Order requires the operation of the backup generation resources described in paragraph A. Following the conclusion of the EEA conditions described in paragraph A, sufficient time for orderly ramp down is permitted, consistent with industry practices.

[23] Although the text of FPA section 202(c) grants this authority to "the Commission," section 301(b) of the Department of Energy Organization Act transferred this authority to the Secretary of the Department of Energy. *See* 42 U.S.C. § 7151(b).

[24] *See* NERC Reliability Standard EOP-011-4, Attachment 1, at 3.1 ("The Reliability Coordinators and the energy deficient Balancing Authority shall continue to take all actions initiated during EEA 2.").

C. This order is not applicable to any backup generation resource serving a critical reliability or backup need, including those at defense, homeland security, first responder, air traffic control, hospital facilities, 911 call centers, water treatment or wastewater facilities, natural gas pipeline facilities, natural gas gathering facilities, or other similar facilities.

D. To minimize adverse environmental impacts, this Order limits operation of deployed units to the times and within the parameters as determined by the Reliability Coordinator and its Balancing Authorities pursuant to paragraphs A-C.

E. All operations of backup generation resources authorized under this order must otherwise comply with ancillary environmental requirements, including but not limited to monitoring, reporting, and recordkeeping requirements, to the maximum extent feasible while operating consistent with the emergency conditions. This Order does not provide relief from any obligation to pay fees or purchase offsets or allowances for emissions that occur during the emergency condition or to use other geographic or temporal flexibilities available to generators.

F. ERCOT shall provide notification to the Department (via AskCR@hq.doe.gov) within one day following the date any backup generation resources have been directed to operate pursuant to this Order. The reporting shall include a list of all backup generation resources directed to operate pursuant to this Order. ERCOT shall provide such additional information regarding the environmental and other impacts of this Order and their compliance with the conditions of this Order, as requested by the Department of Energy from time to time.

G. Each party affected by this order is directed to file with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission any tariff, tariff revisions or waivers necessary to effectuate this Order, as applicable. Rate recovery is available pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 824a(c).

H. This Order shall not preclude the need for the backup generation resources subject to this Order to comply with applicable state, local, or Federal law or regulations following the expiration of this Order.

I. Because this Order is predicated on the shortage of facilities for generation of electric energy and other causes, any backup generation resource subject to this Order shall not be considered a capacity resource.

J. This Order shall be effective upon its issuance, and shall expire at 11:59 PM EST on January 27, 2026, with the exception of applicable compliance obligations in paragraph D.

Issued in Washington, D.C. at 7:34 PM EST on this 24th day of January 2026.

Chris Wright

Chris Wright
Secretary of Energy

cc: **FERC Commissioners**
Chairman Laura V. Swett
Commissioner David Rosner
Commissioner Lindsay S. See
Commissioner Judy W. Chang
Commissioner David A. LaCerte

State Commissioners
See Attachment A

Attachment A: State Contact Information

The table below provides contact information for state commissioners within the NERC Reliability Coordinator.

State	Office	Name
TX	Public Utility Commission of Texas	Thomas Gleeson
		Kathleen Jackson
	Railroad Commission of Texas	Christi Craddick
		Wayne Christian
		Jim Wright

BEFORE THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Power Act Section 202(c) Emergency Order: Tri-State Generation and Transmission Association, Platte River Power Authority, Salt River Project, PacifiCorp, and Xcel Energy	))))))	Order No. 202-25-14

Exhibit to
Motion to Intervene and Request for Rehearing and Stay of
Public Interest Organizations

Filed January 28, 2026

Exhibit 1-22:
Department Order No. 202-26-01A

Department of Energy
Washington, DC 20585

Amended Order No. 202-26-01A

Pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretary of Energy by section 202(c) of the Federal Power Act (FPA),[1] and section 301(b) of the Department of Energy (DOE) Organization Act,[2] and for the reasons set forth below, I hereby determine that a statutory emergency exists in the Electric Reliability Council of Texas, Inc. (ERCOT) region, due to a sudden increase in demand, a shortage of electric energy, a shortage of facilities for the generation of electric energy, and other causes. I direct ERCOT (Reliability Coordinator) and its Balancing Authorities and backup generation resources defined below, to comply with this Order.[3] Issuance of this Order will meet the emergency and serve the public interest.

BACKGROUND

Throughout the United States, demand is outpacing generation supply. Generation resource inadequacy is especially problematic during prolonged winter cold snaps. According to the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), "[w]inter electricity demand is rising at the fastest rate in recent years," and the "total internal demand for the [bulk power system] is forecast to increase by 20.2 GW (2.5%) over last winter's forecast.[4] While NERC assesses that there are "adequate resources for normal winter peak-load conditions," NERC cautions that "more extreme winter conditions extending over a wide area could result in electricity supply shortfalls."[5] According to NERC, areas in the continental United States are at an elevated risk during extreme cold, which jeopardizes American lives, our economy, and national security.[6]

In its 2025–2026 Winter Reliability Assessment, NERC finds that the ERCOT assessment area is at elevated risk. According to NERC, above-normal winter peak and outage

[1] 16 U.S.C. § 824a(c).

[2] 42 U.S.C. § 7151(b).

[3] For all geographical or electrical areas of the Bulk Power System, all areas are under the oversight of one and only one Reliability Coordinator. NERC Rules of Procedure, section 501.1.4.1. All Balancing Authorities are under the responsibility of one and only one Reliability Coordinator. *Id.*, section 501.1.4.2. All Loads and generators are under the responsibility and control of one and only one Balancing Authority. *Id.*, section 501.1.4.4.

[4] *2025-2026 Winter Reliability Assessment*, NERC (NERC 2025-2026 Winter Assessment), at 8 (November 2025), https://www.nerc.com/globalassets/our-work/assessments/nerc_wra_2025.pdf. The NERC 2025-2026 Winter Assessment "identifies, assesses, and reports on areas of concern regarding the reliability of the North American [bulk power system] for the upcoming winter season." *Id*. at 4.

[5] *Id.* at 5.

[6] *Id.* at 6.

conditions could result in the need for operating mitigations and Energy Emergency Alerts (EEAs). NERC states that strong load growth is driving higher winter electricity demand forecasts and contributing to continued risk of supply shortfalls. For this winter season, NERC explains that ERCOT is expected to continue facing reserve shortage risks, particularly under extreme load conditions that accompany freezing temperatures. NERC cautions that load shedding may be needed under wide-area cold weather events.[7]

Under President Trump's leadership, this administration is determined to take swift and decisive action to protect the American people from tragedies, such as Winter Storm Uri, which resulted in "billions of dollars in damages and over 200 deaths."[8]

In Executive Order 14156, "Declaring a National Energy Emergency," President Trump determined that the "United States' insufficient energy production, transportation, refining, and generation constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to our Nation's economy, national security, and foreign policy."[9] In Executive Order 14262, "Strengthening the Reliability and Security of the United States Electric Grid," President Trump emphasized that "the United States is experiencing an unprecedented surge in electricity demand driven by rapid technological advancements, including the expansion of artificial intelligence data centers and increase in domestic manufacturing."[10] These Executive Orders underscore the dire energy challenges facing the Nation due to growing resource adequacy concerns.

The Department's July 2025 "Resource Adequacy Report: Evaluating the Reliability and Security of the United States Electric Grid," issued pursuant to the President's directive in Executive Order 14262, details the myriad challenges affecting the Nation's energy systems. "Absent decisive intervention, the Nation's power grid will be unable to meet projected demand for manufacturing, re-industrialization, and data centers driving artificial intelligence (AI)

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[7] NERC, *2025 – 2026 Winter Reliability Assessment*, at 5-6, 31 (Nov. 2025), https://www.nerc.com/globalassets/our-work/assessments/nerc_wra_2025.pdf.

[8] *The February 2021 Cold Weather Outages in Texas and the South Central United States*, FERC, NERC, and Regional Entity Staff Report, at 234 (November 2021), https://www.ferc.gov/media/february-2021-cold-weather-outages-texas-and-south-central-united-states-ferc-nerc-and. *See id.* at 189 ("Millions went without heat, lights, refrigeration, and water for days during the Event. Hundreds died from hypothermia or trying to keep warm, in their homes, in their beds.").

[9] Executive Order No. 14156, 90 Fed. Reg. 8433 (Jan. 20, 2025) (Declaring a National Energy Emergency), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/declaring-a-national-energy-emergency/.

[10] Executive Order No. 14262, 90 Fed. Reg. 15521 (Apr. 8, 2025) (Strengthening the Reliability and Security of the United States Electric Grid), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/04/strengthening-the-reliability-and-security-of-the-united-states-electric-grid/.

innovation."[11] The prolific growth of data centers for the development of AI, as well as their immense energy needs, presents a new and increasing source of load growth.

In July 2025, President Trump released America's AI Action Plan for Winning the Race.[12] It recognizes that the "U.S. electric grid is one of the largest and most complex machines on Earth . . . [that] will need to be upgraded to support data centers and other energy-intensive industries of the future."[13] That plan recommended that we stabilize the grid of today as much as possible, including leveraging extant backup power sources to bolster grid reliability during peak demand and optimize existing grid resources as much as possible, including investigating "new and novel ways for large power consumers to manage their power consumption during critical grid periods to enhance reliability and unlock additional power on the system."[14]

NERC-certified Reliability Coordinators and Balancing Authorities[15] are responsible for identifying and addressing emergency conditions on the bulk power system. As discussed below, this is squarely addressed in the mandatory and enforceable NERC Reliability Standard EOP-011-4. Today, calls for voluntary curtailment are authorized under that standard. However, this action gives Reliability Coordinators and Balancing Authorities another tool to avoid the impacts experienced as a result of Winter Storm Uri.

Currently, there are tens of gigawatts of readily available backup generation that have remained largely untapped until now. Deployment of backup generation resources (whether auxiliary, standby, directly-connected, battery storage or other, and whether synchronized or not to the bulk power system) at data centers (including but not limited to hyperscaler facilities), and at other large load industrial and commercial customer sites, can prevent avoidable blackouts, thereby saving lives and reducing costs to the American people.

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[11] Resource Adequacy Report: Evaluating the Reliability and Security of the United States Electric Grid, U.S. Department of Energy at 1(July 2025), https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2025-7/DOE%20Final%20EO%20Report%20%28FINAL%20JULY%207%29.pdf.

[12] https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Americas-AI-Action-Plan.pdf.

[13] *Id.* at 15.

[14] *Id.*

[15] The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) certifies Reliability Coordinators and Balancing Authorities in accordance with its Rules of Procedures.

APPLICATION OF EOP-011-4

Section 215 of the Federal Power Act[16] established a framework for development and implementation of mandatory and enforceable Reliability Standards that apply to Bulk Power System owners, operators, and users, such as Reliability Coordinators and Balancing Authorities. NERC certifies Reliability Coordinators and Balancing Authorities pursuant to an Organization Certification program set forth in its Rules of Procedure,[17] because of the significant roles these two functional entity category types have in ensuring bulk power system reliability. A Reliability Coordinator is defined as:

> the entity that is the highest level of authority who is responsible for the Reliable Operation of the [Bulk Electric System (BES)], has the Wide Area view of the BES, and has the operating tools, processes, and procedures, including the authority to prevent or mitigate emergency operating situations in both next-day analysis and real-time operations. The Reliability Coordinator has the purview that is broad enough to enable the calculation of Interconnection Reliability Operating Limits, which may be based on the operating parameters of transmission systems beyond any Transmission Operator's vision.[18]

A Balancing Authority is "the responsible entity that integrates resource plans ahead of time, maintains Load-interchange-generation balance within a Balancing Authority Area, and supports Interconnection frequency in real time."[19]

Because of the criticality of their respective roles, Reliability Coordinators and Balancing Authorities are subject to NERC's Organization Certification Program to ensure that they have "the tools, processes, training, and procedures to demonstrate their ability to meet the Requirements/sub-Requirements of all of the Reliability Standards applicable to the function(s) . . . ."[20]

NERC Reliability Standard EOP-011-4 addresses Emergency Operations. Requirement 2 states "[e]ach Balancing Authority shall develop, maintain, and implement one or more Reliability Coordinator-reviewed Operating Plan(s) to mitigate Capacity Emergencies and Energy Emergencies within its Balancing Authority Area." Balancing Authorities are responsible for

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[16] 16 U.S.C. § 824o.

[17] *See generally* NERC Rules of Procedure, https://www.nerc.com/globalassets/who-we-are/rules-of-procedure/nerc-rop-effective-20231128_with-appendicies.pdf; *see also id.* section 500.

[18] NERC Rules of Procedure, Appendix 5B; *see also id.* Appendix 2. Other capitalized terms in this definition also are defined in the NERC Rules of Procedure at Appendix 2.

[19] NERC Rules of Procedure, Appendix 5B; *see also id.* Appendix 2.

[20] NERC Rules of Procedure, section 501.

requesting that their respective Reliability Coordinators issue an Energy Emergency Alert in accordance with Requirement 2 and Attachment 1 to EOP-011-4. Among other things, Balancing Authorities are authorized to make "[p]ublic appeals for voluntary Load reductions" in Requirement 2.2.4. Balancing Authority Operating plans must include provisions in accordance with Requirement 2.2.9 for "Transmission Operators to implement operator-controlled manual Load shedding, undervoltage Load shedding, or underfrequency Load shedding" and provisions in accordance with Requirement 2.2.10 to determine reliability impacts of cold weather conditions.

According to Requirement 5,

> Each Reliability Coordinator that receives an Emergency notification from a Transmission Operator or Balancing Authority within its Reliability Coordinator Area shall notify, within 30 minutes from the time of receiving notification, other Balancing Authorities and Transmission Operators in its Reliability Coordinator Area, and neighboring Reliability Coordinators.

According to Requirement 6,

> Each Reliability Coordinator that has a Balancing Authority experiencing a potential or actual Energy Emergency within its Reliability Coordinator Area shall declare an Energy Emergency Alert, as detailed in Attachment 1.

Attachment 1 provides,

> **Initiation by Reliability Coordinator.** An Energy Emergency Alert (EEA) may be initiated only by a Reliability Coordinator at 1) the Reliability Coordinator's own request, or 2) upon the request of an energy deficient Balancing Authority.

***

To ensure that all Reliability Coordinators clearly understand potential and actual Energy Emergencies in the Interconnection, NERC has established three levels of EEAs. The Reliability Coordinators will use these terms when communicating Energy Emergencies to each other. An EEA is an Emergency procedure, not a daily operating practice, and is not intended as an alternative to compliance with NERC Reliability Standards.

The Reliability Coordinator may declare whatever alert level is necessary, and need not proceed through the alerts sequentially.

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Before requesting an EEA 3, the energy deficient Balancing Authority must make use of all available resources; this includes, but is not limited to:

2.5.1 All available generation units are on line. All generation capable of being on line in the time frame of the Emergency is on line.

2.5.2 Demand-Side Management. Activate Demand-Side Management within provisions of any applicable agreements.

***

3.3.1 Energy deficient Balancing Authority obligations. The energy deficient Balancing Authority, upon notification from its Reliability Coordinator of the situation, will immediately take whatever actions are necessary to mitigate any undue risk to the Interconnection. These actions may include Load shedding.

Of particular note, NERC's 2025-2026 Winter Assessment recognizes that "[p]roactive issuance of winter advisories and other steps directed at generator availability contributed to improved reliability during cold weather events of the past two winters."[21] NERC further cautions that Reliability Coordinators and Balancing Authorities "should prepare their operating plans to manage potential supply shortfalls and take proactive steps for generator readiness, fuel availability, load curtailment, and sustained operations in extreme conditions."[22]

EMERGENCY SITUATION

Winter Storm Fern poses significant risks to electric reliability in the Reliability Coordinator's footprint. Consistent with NERC's cautionary notes and this Administration's commitment to grid stability, this order seeks to unlock and deploy backup generation resources (whether auxiliary, standby, directly-connected, battery storage or other, and whether synchronized or not to the bulk power system) at data centers (including but not limited to hyperscaler facilities), and at other large load industrial and commercial customer sites as another tool to mitigate any undue risk to the bulk power system. The employment of this backup generation is expected to reduce stress on the grid. This will permit orderly, safe, and secure operations during Winter Storm Fern.

Consistent with my letter issued on January 22, 2026, ERCOT requested today that DOE issue an order pursuant to FPA section 202(c) to allow the deployment of backup generation during emergency conditions.

ORDER

FPA section 202(c)(1) provides that whenever the Secretary of Energy determines "that an emergency exists by reason of a sudden increase in the demand for electric energy, or a shortage of electric energy or of facilities for the generation or transmission of electric energy," then the Secretary has the authority "to require by order . . . such generation, delivery, interchange, or

[21] NERC 2025-2026 Winter Assessment at 7.

[22] *Id*.

transmission of electric energy as in its judgment will best meet the emergency and serve the public interest."[23] This statutory language constitutes a specific grant of authority to the Secretary to authorize the operation of generation, delivery, and transmission resources that the Secretary has determined will best meet an emergency.

I have made the determination that an emergency exists, due to an abrupt, unexpected increase in demand for electric energy relative to prior forecasts, a shortage of electric energy, a shortage of facilities for the generation of electric energy, and other causes. As discussed above, taking into account the historical data, past projections and planning, and the projections for the upcoming winter season, together with the increasing demand for electricity that has substantially outpaced net generating capacity additions, a statutory emergency exists this winter across the continental United States. As noted above, NERC has warned that winter electricity demand is rising at the fastest rate in recent years and the total internal demand for the bulk power system is forecast to increase by 20.2 GW (2.5%) over last winter's forecast. Even prolonged cold snaps can be expected to lead to the potential loss of power to homes and businesses in the areas that may be affected by curtailments or power outages, presenting a risk to public health and safety during the upcoming winter.

To best meet the emergency and serve the public interest, backup generation resources shall be made available to run during the emergency conditions specified below.

Based on my determination of an emergency set forth above, I hereby order:

A. From January 24, 2026, the Reliability Coordinator and its Balancing Authorities are authorized to direct backup generation resources at data centers (including but not limited to hyperscaler facilities), and at other large load industrial and commercial customer sites (whether auxiliary, standby, directly-connected, battery storage or other, and whether synchronized or not to the bulk power system), to operate after ERCOT deploys all available market services, except for frequency responsive services, before declaring an Energy Emergency Alert (EEA) 3 (i.e., before firm load interruption) or during an EEA 3.[24]

B. This Order requires the operation of the backup generation resources described in

[23] Although the text of FPA section 202(c) grants this authority to "the Commission," section 301(b) of the Department of Energy Organization Act transferred this authority to the Secretary of the Department of Energy. *See* 42 U.S.C. § 7151(b).

[24] *See* NERC Reliability Standard EOP-011-4, Attachment 1, at 3.1 ("The Reliability Coordinators and the energy deficient Balancing Authority shall continue to take all actions initiated during EEA 2."). *Cf.* Tex. Util. Code § 37.0561(e) ("After the independent organization deploys all available market services, except for frequency responsive services, the independent organization may direct the applicable electric utility or municipally owned utility to require the large load customer to either deploy the customer's on-site backup generating facilities or curtail load. The independent organization shall include a deployment under this section as firm load shed when calculating any price adjustments for reliability deployments.").

paragraph A. Following the conclusion of the EEA conditions described in paragraph A, sufficient time for orderly ramp down is permitted, consistent with industry practices.

C. This order is not applicable to any backup generation resource serving a critical reliability or backup need, including those at defense, homeland security, first responder, air traffic control, hospital facilities, 911 call centers, water treatment or wastewater facilities, natural gas pipeline facilities, natural gas gathering facilities, or other similar facilities.

D. To minimize adverse environmental impacts, this Order limits operation of deployed units to the times and within the parameters as determined by the Reliability Coordinator and its Balancing Authorities pursuant to paragraphs A-C.

E. All operations of backup generation resources authorized under this order must otherwise comply with ancillary environmental requirements, including but not limited to monitoring, reporting, and recordkeeping requirements, to the maximum extent feasible while operating consistent with the emergency conditions. This Order does not provide relief from any obligation to pay fees or purchase offsets or allowances for emissions that occur during the emergency condition or to use other geographic or temporal flexibilities available to generators.


F. ERCOT shall provide notification to the Department (via AskCR@hq.doe.gov) within one day following the date any backup generation resources have been directed to operate pursuant to this Order. The reporting shall include a list of all backup generation resources directed to operate pursuant to this Order. ERCOT shall provide such additional information regarding the environmental and other impacts of this Order and their compliance with the conditions of this Order, as requested by the Department of Energy from time to time.

G. This Order shall not preclude the need for the backup generation resources subject to this Order to comply with applicable state, local, or Federal law or regulations following the expiration of this Order.

H. Because this Order is predicated on the shortage of facilities for generation of electric energy and other causes, any backup generation resource subject to this Order shall not be considered a capacity resource.

I. This Order shall be effective upon its issuance, and shall expire at 11:59 PM EST on January 27, 2026, with the exception of applicable compliance obligations in paragraph D.

Issued in Washington, D.C. at 1:46 PM EST on this 25th day of January 2026.



Chris Wright
Secretary of Energy

cc: **FERC Commissioners**
Chairman Laura V. Swett
Commissioner David Rosner
Commissioner Lindsay S. See
Commissioner Judy W. Chang
Commissioner David A. LaCerte

State Commissioners
See Attachment A

Attachment A: State Contact Information

The table below provides contact information for state commissioners within the NERC Reliability Coordinator.

State	Office	Name
TX	Public Utility Commission of Texas	Thomas Gleeson
		Kathleen Jackson
		Courtney K. Hjaltman
		Morgan Johnson
	Railroad Commission of Texas	Christi Craddick
		Wayne Christian
		Jim Wright

BEFORE THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Power Act Section 202(c) Emergency Order: Tri-State Generation and Transmission Association, Platte River Power Authority, Salt River Project, PacifiCorp, and Xcel Energy	)	Order No. 202-25-14

Exhibit to
Motion to Intervene and Request for Rehearing and Stay of
Public Interest Organizations

Filed January 28, 2026

Exhibit 1-23:
Department Order No. 202-26-03

Department of Energy
Washington, DC 20585

Order No. 202-26-03

Pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretary of Energy by section 202(c) of the Federal Power Act (FPA),[1] and section 301(b) of the Department of Energy (DOE) Organization Act,[2] and for the reasons set forth below, I hereby determine that a statutory emergency exists within the ISO New England Inc. (ISO-NE) service territory due to a shortage of electric energy, a shortage of facilities for the generation of electric energy, and other causes. Issuance of this Order will meet the emergency and serve the public interest.

Emergency Situation

On January 25, 2026, ISO-NE, the Regional Transmission Organization (RTO) spanning six states,[3] filed a *Request for Emergency Order Under Section 202(c) of the Federal Power Act,* (Application) with DOE.[4] ISO-NE has indicated that "[i]n many parts of the ISO-NE Balancing Authority Area, temperatures for January 25, 26, and 27, 2026 are forecasted to drop well below average, and abnormally low temperatures are expected to persist through January 30, 2026."[5] As of the time of filing its Application, ISO-NE is anticipating a "sustained high level of demand for electricity."[6] According to ISO-NE, "[w]hile the vast majority of generating units in the ISO-NE region continue to function adequately, some units may experience difficulty due to emissions/air permitting limitations, or other operating constraints."[7] ISO-NE states that all generating resources may be needed to meet the expected demand of the cold weather event.[8]

[1] 16 U.S.C. § 824a(c).

[2] 42 U.S.C. § 7151(b).

[3] The six states are Connecticut, Rhode Island, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont.

[4] Application at 1.

[5] *Id.* at 2.

[6] *Id.*

[7] *Id.*

[8] *Id.*

Description of Mitigation Measures

In anticipation of the cold weather event, ISO-NE states that it already issued a cold weather watch.[9] ISO-NE has also indicated that it is prepared to employ measures in its Operating Procedures designed to address abnormal conditions or deficiencies to "ensure the supply of generation will continue to be sufficient to meet demand and reserve."[10]

Request for Order

ISO-NE requests that the Secretary issue an order effective immediately and through January 31, 2026, the expected period to address high load related to Winter Storm Fern, authorizing "the provision of additional energy from all [Specified Resources], as well as any other generating units subject to emissions or other permit limitations."[11] The generating units (Specified Resources) to which this Order related are listed in Exhibit A of the Application for instant Order 202-26-3, as described below.

ORDER

FPA section 202(c)(1) provides that whenever the Secretary of Energy determines "that an emergency exists by reason of a sudden increase in the demand for electric energy, or a shortage of electric energy or of facilities for the generation or transmission of electric energy," then the Secretary has the authority "to require by order . . . such generation, delivery, interchange, or transmission of electric energy as in [his] judgment will best meet the emergency and serve the public interest."[12] This statutory language constitutes a specific grant of authority to the Secretary to authorize the operation of generation, delivery, and transmission resources that the Secretary has determined will best meet an emergency.

Given the emergency caused by the expected load stress, the responsibility of ISO-NE to ensure maximum reliability on its system, and the ability of ISO-NE to identify and dispatch generation necessary to meet load requirements, I have determined that, under the conditions specified below, additional dispatch of the Specified Resources is necessary to best meet the emergency and serve the public interest for purposes of FPA section 202(c). This determination is based on the expected load stress, shortage of electric energy, shortage of facilities for the generation of electric energy, and other causes by Winter Storm Fern and its aftermath, and the potential loss of power to homes and local businesses in the areas that may be affected by curtailments or outages, presenting a risk to public health and safety.

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[9] *Id.* at 2-3.

[10] *Id*. at 2.

[11] *Id.*

[12] Although the text of FPA section 202(c) grants this authority to "the Commission," section 301(b) of the Department of Energy Organization Act transferred this authority to the Secretary of the Department of Energy. *See* 42 U.S.C. § 7151(b).

Consistent with the anticipated circumstances, this Order is limited to the period of time that Winter Storm Fern is expected to impact the ISO-NE service territory. Because the additional generation may result in a conflict with environmental standards and requirements, I am authorizing only the necessary additional generation under the conditions contained in this Order, with reporting requirements as described below.

FPA section 202(c)(2) requires the Secretary of Energy to ensure that any 202(c) order that may result in a conflict with a requirement of any environmental law be limited to the "hours necessary to meet the emergency and serve the public interest, and, to the maximum extent practicable," be consistent with any applicable environmental law and minimize any adverse environmental impacts. ISO-NE anticipates that this Order may result in exceedance of permit restrictions on emissions, effluent, or other environmental permit limitations.[13] To minimize adverse environmental impacts, this Order limits operation of dispatched units to the times and within the parameters determined by ISO-NE for reliability purposes.

Based on my determination of an emergency set forth above, I hereby order:

A. In the event that ISO-NE determines that generation from the Specified Resources is necessary to meet the electricity demand that ISO-NE anticipates in its service territory, I direct ISO-NE to dispatch such unit or units and to order their operation only as needed to maintain reliability. Specified Resources are those generating units set forth in Exhibit A to their Application for the instant order (i.e., Order 202-26-3 Resource List), subject to updates directed here and as described in paragraph D, which DOE shall post on www.energy.gov.

B. To minimize adverse environmental impacts, this Order limits operation of dispatched units to the times and within the parameters determined by ISO-NE for maintaining grid reliability and to the maximum extent practicable is consistent with any applicable environmental law. ISO-NE shall provide a daily notification to DOE (via AskCR@hq.doe.gov) reporting each generating unit that has been designated to use the allowance and operated in reliance on the allowances contained in this Order.

C. All operation of the Specified Resource must comply with applicable environmental requirements, including but not limited to monitoring, reporting, and recordkeeping requirements, to the maximum extent feasible while operating consistent with the emergency conditions. This Order does not provide relief from any obligation to pay fees or purchase offsets or allowances for emissions that occur during the emergency condition or to use other geographic or temporal flexibilities available to generators.

D. In the event that ISO-NE identifies additional generation units that it deems necessary to maintain the reliability of the power grid, ISO-NE shall provide prompt written

[13] *Id*. at 1, 4.

notice to DOE at AskCR@hq.doe.gov with the name and location of those units that ISO-NE has identified. Such additional generation unit shall be deemed a Specified Resource for the purpose of this Order for the hours prior to the required written notice to DOE updating Exhibit A of the Application, and ISO-NE may dispatch such additional generation units, provided that if the DOE notifies ISO-NE that it does not approve of such generation unit being designated as a Specified Resource, such generation unit shall not constitute a Specified Resource upon notification from DOE.

E. ISO-NE shall also provide such additional information regarding the environmental impacts of this Order and its compliance with the conditions of this Order, in each case as requested by DOE from time to time.

F. This Order shall not preclude the need for the Specified Resources to comply with applicable state, local, or Federal law or regulations following the expiration of this Order.

G. This Order shall be effective upon its issuance, and shall expire at 11:59PM EST on January 31, 2026, with the exception of the reporting requirements in paragraph D and applicable compliance obligations in paragraph E. Renewal of this Order, should it be needed, must be requested before this Order expires.

Issued in Washington, D.C. at 7:38 AM EST on this 25th day of January 2026.

Chris Wright

Chris Wright
Secretary of Energy

cc: **FERC Commissioners**
Chairman Laura V. Swett
Commissioner David Rosner
Commissioner Lindsay S. See
Commissioner Judy W. Chang
Commissioner David A. LaCerte

State Commissioners
See Attachment A

Attachment A: State Contact Information

The table below provides contact information for state commissioners within ISO-NE.

State	Office	Name
CT	Connecticut Public Utilities Regulatory Authority	Thomas Wiehl
		David Arconti
		Janice Beecher
		Holly Cheeseman
		Everett Smith
RI	Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission	Ronald T. Gerwatowski
		Abigail Anthony
		Karen Bradbury
MA	Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities	Jeremy McDiarmid
		Staci Rubin
		Elizabeth Anderson
	Massachusetts Department of Telecommunications and Cable	Karen Charles
VT	Vermont Public Utility Commission	Ed McNamara
		Riley Allen
		Margaret Cheney
	Vermont Department of Public Service	Kerrick Johnson
NH	New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission	Pradip Chattopadhyay
		Mark W. Dell'Orfano
	New Hampshire Department of Energy	Jared S. Chicoine
ME	Maine Public Utilities Commission	Philip L. Bartlett
		Carrie Gilbert
		Patrick Scully

BEFORE THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Power Act Section 202(c) Emergency Order: Tri-State Generation and Transmission Association, Platte River Power Authority, Salt River Project, PacifiCorp, and Xcel Energy	))))))	Order No. 202-25-14

Exhibit to
Motion to Intervene and Request for Rehearing and Stay of
Public Interest Organizations

Filed January 28, 2026

Exhibit 1-24:
Department Order No. 202-24-1

Department of Energy
Washington, DC 20585

Order No. 202-24-1

Pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretary of Energy by section 202(c) of the Federal Power Act (FPA), 16 U.S.C. § 824a(c), and section 301(b) of the Department of Energy Organization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7151(b), and for the reasons set forth below, I hereby determine that an emergency exists in Florida due to a shortage of electric energy, a shortage of facilities for the generation of electric energy, and other causes, and that issuance of this Order will meet the emergency and serve the public interest.

Emergency Situation

On October 9, 2024, Duke Energy Florida, LLC (Duke), an investor-owned utility, whose service territory includes electric customers in Florida, filed a *Request for Emergency Order Under Section 202(c) of the Federal Power Act* (Application) with the United States Department of Energy (Department) "to preserve the reliability of the bulk electric power system." As of 4 PM EDT on October 9, 2024, Hurricane Milton is a Category 3 storm forecast to remain a major hurricane and expand in size as it approaches the west coast of Florida. The center is likely to make landfall along the west-central coast of Florida during the night on Wednesday, October 9, 2024, or in the early morning on Thursday, October 10, 2024, and move east-northeastward across central Florida through October 10, 2024. Hurricane Milton follows the landfall of Hurricane Helene in Florida on September 26, 2024, which resulted in over 230 deaths in the southeast United States and for which recovery and restoration efforts remain ongoing. As of 5:00 PM EDT on October 9, 2024, Florida was experiencing 118,000 outages related to the approaching Hurricane Milton, with the number increasing rapidly.

On October 7, 2024, President Biden declared that an emergency exists in the State of Florida and ordered Federal assistance to supplement State, tribal, and local response efforts due to the emergency conditions resulting from Hurricane Milton beginning on October 5, 2024, and continuing.

Duke has indicated that its service territory is being impacted by Hurricane Milton. Duke expects that Hurricane Milton will cause hurricane-force-gusts across the St. Petersburg/Tampa metropolitan region at the height of the storm overnight into early Thursday, October 10, 2024. Elsewhere, strong tropical-storm to near hurricane-force-gusts are projected to impact highly populated zones along the I-4 corridor served by Duke. The combination of damaging winds,

torrential rain and subsequent flooding, storm surge at the coast, and possible tornadoes, will result in major power outages, damaging distribution and transmission infrastructure, and threaten several generation stations along the path. Application at 1.

While many generating units in the Duke service territory continue to function adequately under these stressed conditions, several of Duke's generating units are expected to be forced to shut down due to facility limits on wind speeds and storm surge, as well as staffing issues caused by mandatory evacuations. Additionally, Crystal River Units 4 and 5 remain in forced outage from storm surge impacts from Hurricane Helene. Specifically, approximately 4,000 MW of generating units are currently offline and will remain offline during Hurricane Milton. Application at 2.

Additionally, several units at Citrus Combined Cycle, the subject of this Order, may be forced offline by conditions in its Title V operating permit. With projected outages and low demand, in order to keep the Citrus Combined Cycle units online, they would potentially need to operate at low load for an extended period of time, which could result in noncompliance with its Title V permit. If these units are brought offline due to these compliance requirements, they may not be able ramp up quickly enough to meet demand as load increases following power restoration, particularly in light of the amount of generation predicted to be offline due to hurricane impacts. For example, ramp-up times from a cold start could be eight or nine hours, and could be further delayed by pre-generation start-up checks. Additionally, shutting down also increases the risk or equipment failure, as well as the risk of water intrusion due to thermal and pressure gradient changes. If equipment fails or is damaged by Hurricane Milton, units may not be able to start without additional maintenance. In that case, Duke may have to declare an Energy Emergency Alert (EEA) Level 3 and institute rotating load shed. Such impacts would hinder post-hurricane restoration and recovery activities and overall grid reliability. Although Duke would attempt to mitigate such impacts through alternative generation as well as power purchases, it is unknown what will be available following Hurricane Milton and whether the necessary transmission infrastructure will remain for this purpose. Application at 2.

The Florida Reliability Coordinating Council, Inc. (FRCC), the Reliability Coordinator for Duke's service territory and others, filed a formal endorsement on October 9, 2024, of Duke's Application, specifically the need to continue operation of the Specified Resources in Application Exhibit A at low load operation to help reduce the likelihood of any firm load shedding during the hurricane event. FRCC Letter at 1. The endorsement explains:

> It is the FRCC's firm opinion that granting this relief request will provide an immeasurable benefit to this mission and in turn, the public served by the FRCC and its member entities. Allowing this relief will not only serve the reliability of [Duke's] service territory, but also the many local electric cooperatives served by [Duke] and other interconnected electric utilities and service providers.

FRCC Letter at 2.

Description of Mitigation Measures

Duke has indicated that it will attempt to keep the Citrus Combined Cycle units operating at a load level compliant with its Title V permit whenever possible, including attempting to sell power to keep load higher. Duke anticipates needing to continue these efforts through October 13, 2024. Subject to the exceptions included in this Order, Duke has committed to continuing to take such actions, including attempting to sell power, before operating any units in a manner that will result in a conflict with a requirement of any federal, state, or local environmental statute or regulation, including requirements in permits issued pursuant to such laws or regulations.

Request for Order

Duke requests that the Secretary issue an order immediately, effective October 9, 2024, through 00:00 EDT on October 13, 2024, authorizing "continued operation of the Specified Resources" in the Duke service territory. Application at 3. The generating units (Specified Resources) that this Order pertains to are listed on the Order 202-24-1 Resources List, as described below.

ORDER

Given the emergency nature of the expected load stress, the responsibility of Duke to ensure maximum reliability on its system, and the ability of Duke to identify and dispatch generation necessary to meet load requirements, I have determined that, under the conditions specified below, additional dispatch of the Specified Resources is necessary to best meet the emergency and serve the public interest for purposes of FPA section 202(c). This determination is based on, among other things:

- The emergency nature of the expected load stress caused by the current extreme weather event and its aftermath threatens to cause loss of power to homes and local businesses in the areas that may be affected by curtailments, presenting a risk to public health and safety.
- The expected shortage of electric energy, shortage of facilities for the generation of electric energy, and other causes in the State of Florida and within the region demonstrate the need for the Specified Resources to contribute to system reliability.
- Duke's responsibility to ensure maximum reliability on its system, and, with the authority granted in this Order, its ability to identify and dispatch generation, including the Specified Resources, necessary to meet the load resulting from the extreme weather event and its aftermath.

In line with the anticipated circumstances precipitated by Hurricane Milton, this Order is limited to the period beginning with the issuance of this Order on October 9, 2024, through 00:00 EDT on October 13, 2024. Because the additional generation may result in a conflict with environmental standards and requirements, I am authorizing only the necessary additional generation on the conditions contained in this Order, with reporting requirements as described below.

FPA section 202(c)(2) requires the Secretary of Energy to ensure that any 202(c) order that may result in a conflict with a requirement of any environmental law be limited to the "hours necessary to meet the emergency and serve the public interest, and, to the maximum extent practicable," be consistent with any applicable environmental law and minimize any adverse environmental impacts. Duke anticipates that this Order may result in exceedance of emissions of Volatile Organic Compounds (VOC), specifically formaldehyde. To minimize adverse environmental impacts, this Order limits operation of dispatched units to the times and within the parameters determined by Duke for reliability purposes.

Based on my determination of an emergency set forth above, I hereby order:

A. From the time this Order is issued on October 9, 2024, to 00:00 EDT on October 13, 2024, in the event that Duke determines that generation from the Specified Resources is necessary to meet the electricity demand that Duke anticipates in Florida during and immediately following this event, I direct Duke to dispatch such unit or units and to order their operation only as needed to maintain the necessary expected generation in the Duke service territory. Specified Resources are those generating units set forth on the Order 202-24-1 Resource List, which the Department shall post on www.energy.gov. Duke is directed to provide updates, if any, to Exhibit A to its Application with the anticipated category of environmental impact(s) (i.e., formaldehyde, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, mercury, carbon monoxide emissions, wastewater release, other air pollutants) by 21:00 EDT on October 10, 2024.

B. To minimize adverse environmental impacts, this Order limits operation of dispatched units to the times and within the parameters determined by Duke for maintaining grid reliability to avoid adverse health and safety impacts to customers from shedding firm customer load. Duke shall exhaust all possible measures to run the Specified Units at a load level in compliance with permit requirements, including attempting to sell power. Duke shall provide a daily notification to the Department (via AskCR@hq.doe.gov) reporting each generating unit that has been designated to use the allowance and operated in reliance on the allowances contained in this Order.

C. All operation of the Specified Resource must comply with applicable environmental requirements, including but not limited to monitoring, reporting, and recordkeeping requirements, to the maximum extent feasible while operating consistent with the emergency conditions. This Order does not provide relief from any obligation to pay fees or purchase offsets or allowances for emissions that occur during the emergency condition or to use other geographic or temporal flexibilities available to generators.

D. Duke shall provide such additional information regarding the environmental impacts of this Order and its compliance with the conditions of this Order, in each case as requested by the Department of Energy from time to time. By October 20, 2024, Duke shall report all dates between October 9, 2024, and October 13, 2024, inclusive, on which the Specified Resources were operated, the hours of operation, and exceedance of permitting

limits, including formaldehyde, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, mercury, carbon monoxide, and other air pollutants, as well as exceedances of wastewater release limits. Duke shall submit a final report by November 20, 2024, with any revisions to the information reported on October 20, 2024. The environmental information submitted in the final report shall also include the following information:

(i) Emissions data in pounds per hour for each Specified Resource unit, for each hour of the operational scenario, for CO, NOx, PM10, formaldehyde, VOC, and SO2;

(ii) Emissions data must include emissions (lbs/hr) calculated consistent with reporting obligations pursuant to operating permits, permitted operating/emission limits, and the actual incremental emissions above the permit limits;

(iii) The number and actual hours each day that each Specified Resource unit operated in excess of permit limits or conditions, e.g. "Generator #1; October 10, 2024; 4 hours; 04:00-08:00 EDT";

(iv) Amount, type and formulation of any fuel used by each Specified Resource;

(v) All reporting provided under the Specified Resource's operating permit requirements over the last three years to the United States Environmental Protection Agency or local Air Quality Management District for the location of a Specified Resource that operates pursuant to this Order;

(vi) Additional information requested by DOE as it performs any environmental review relating to the issuance of this Order; and

(vii) Information provided by the Specified Resource describing how the requirements in paragraph C above were met by the Specified Resource while operating under the provisions of this Order.

In addition, Duke shall provide information to the Department quantifying the net revenue associated with generation in excess of environmental limits accruing to the Specified Resources in connection with any order issued by the Department pursuant to Section 202(c) of the Federal Power Act.

E. Duke shall take reasonable measures to inform affected communities where all Specified Resources operate that Duke has been issued this Order, in a manner that ensures that as many members of the community as possible are aware of the Order, and explains clearly what the Order allows Duke to do. At a minimum, Duke shall post a description of this Order on its website (with a link to this Order) and identify the name, municipality or other political subdivision, and zip code of any Specified Resource covered by this Order. In addition, in the event that a Specified Resource operates pursuant to this Order, a general description of the action authorized by this Order will be included in any press release issued by Duke with respect to the extreme weather event and will include a reference to the website posting required by the preceding sentence for further information. Duke shall describe the actions taken to comply with this paragraph in the


reports delivered to the Department pursuant to paragraph D above.

F. This Order shall not preclude the need for the Specified Resource to comply with applicable state, local, or Federal law or regulations following the expiration of this Order.

G. Duke shall be responsible for the reasonable third-party costs of performing analysis of the environmental and environmental justice impacts of this Order, including any analysis conducted pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act.

H. This Order shall be effective upon its issuance, and shall expire at 00:00 EDT on Sunday, October 13, 2024, with the exception of the reporting requirements in paragraph D. Renewal of this Order, should it be needed, must be requested before this Order expires.

Issued in Washington, D.C. at 8:00 PM Eastern Daylight Time on this 9th day of October 2024.



Jennifer Granholm
Secretary of Energy

BEFORE THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Power Act Section 202(c) Emergency Order: Tri-State Generation and Transmission Association, Platte River Power Authority, Salt River Project, PacifiCorp, and Xcel Energy	))))))	Order No. 202-25-14

Exhibit to
Motion to Intervene and Request for Rehearing and Stay of
Public Interest Organizations

Filed January 28, 2026

Exhibit 1-25:
MISO LOLE Presentation

LOLE 101: Probabilistic Analyses

LOLE 101 Training

5/8/2018

Loss of Load Expectation (LOLE) 101 Sections

- LOLE Background & History
- LOLE Study Connections to other MISO Processes
- Generating Availability Data System (GADS) Overview
- LOLE Modeling
- Strategic Energy Risk Valuation Model (SERVM)
- LOLE Results Walkthrough
- Takeaways
- Reference Materials

Loss of Load Expectation (LOLE) Definition

LOLE is the measure of how long, on average, the available generation capacity is likely to fall short of the load demand

Loss of Load Probability (LOLP) is the probability in a given hour	Sum of the Daily Peak LOLP values is an expectation (LOLE)	Sum of all LOLP values is called Loss of Load Hours (LOLH)

LOLE is used to study Generation (Resource) Adequacy

Generally considered to be the existence of sufficient resources, within a system, to satisfy consumer demand. A product of unit availability, "perfect storm". The study of low probability, high impact events.

1-day in 10-years LOLE Criteria

MISO Resource Adequacy criteria for Planning Reserve target is the industry standard LOLE objective:

<1-day in 10-years

=

NERC Standard BAL-502-RF-03


- Calculate a planning reserve margin that will result in the sum of the probabilities for loss of Load for the integrated peak hour for all days of each planning year analyzed being equal to 0.1. (This is comparable to a “one day in 10 year” criterion).

Common Terminology Misconceptions

- 1 day in 10 years LOLE ≠ 24 hours in 10 years LOLH
  - Example: 2 hours of firm load shed = 2 loss of load hours and 1 day of loss of load
  - By definition 1 day/ 10 years LOLE ≤ 24 hours / 10 years LOLH

- Cannot calculate Loss of Energy Expectation (LOEE) from LOLH without running complete analysis

LOLE Connections to Various MISO Processes




Resource Adequacy Overview

- Achieving reliability in the bulk electric systems requires that the amount of resources exceeds customer demand by an adequate margin


Margins necessary to promote Resource Adequacy need to be assessed on:

Longer-term planning basis	Near-term operational basis
Focus of MISO's RA Construct is on the longer-term planning margins used to provide sufficient resources to reliably serve load on a forward-looking basis	Resources dedicated to meet Demand have an obligation to be available to meet real-time customer demand and contingencies

Planning Reserve Margins (PRMs)



Overview of MISO Resource Adequacy Requirements




PowerGADS – Performance & Reliability System

For capacity planning and reliability study purposes,

all generating facilities declared as capacity resources in the MISO market

are required to submit GADS event and performance data

to determine the value of the facility as an unforced capacity resource



GADS Data Requirements…

- Generation Resources
- External Resources
- Demand Response Resources backed by behind the meter generation
- or Behind the Meter Generation (BTMG)



Greater than or equal to 10 MW, based on Generation Verification Test Capacity (GVTC)

- Must submit generator availability data (including, but not limited to, NERC GADS) into PowerGADS through the Market Portal



Less than 10 MW, based on (GVTC), that begin reporting generator availability data

- Must continue to report such information

GADS Data Requirements…

- Quarterly Submittal of Data
  - Stakeholders are expected to submit data on a quarterly basis
  - Quarterly GADS data must be received by the last day of the month following the operating quarter
  - Quarterly GADS data must be Level 2 Validated by the last day of the month following the operating quarter

GADS Data Requirements…

- A unit will receive 100% EFORd if it fails to submit GADS data and successfully Level 2 Validate

- Assigning 100% EFORd will impact a unit's unforced capacity calculation
  - $UCAP = GVTC * (1 - EFORd)$

Three Types of Data are to be Collected…

Event Data

- Each time a unit has a change in operating status or capability, an *event* is recorded
- From these event reports a unit's operational history can be reconstructed

Generation Performance Data

- A unit's actual generation, hours of operations, and operational characteristics

Fuel Performance Data (optional)

- A unit's actual fuel consumption and fuel quality data

PowerGADS – Event Data

Event data – to be collected:


- Event Number
- Event Type
- Start of Event
- End of Event (Can be blank if event is ongoing)
- Net Available Capacity
- Primary Cause Code
- Additional Cause Code (Optional)
- Event Contribution Code
  - describes impact or contribution that this cause or component had on the event
- Verbal Description (Optional)
- Failure Code (Optional)

PowerGADS – Performance Data


Performance data – to be collected:

- Net Maximum Capacity
- Net Dependable Capacity
- Net Actual Generation
- Typical Unit Loading Code
- Loading Verbal Description
  (If Typical Unit Loading Code is 6)
- Attempted Unit Starts
- Actual Unit Starts
- Unit Service Hours
- Reserve Shutdown Hours
- Pumping Hours
- Synchronous Condensing Hours

PowerGADS – Event Types



LOLE Model Inputs Include:



Source of LOLE Model Input Data


Generation Resources

- Generating Availability Data System (GADS)
  - Unit performance statistics used to calculate forced outage rates
  - Data is uploaded into the MISO system one month after end of each quarter
- Generation Verification Test Capacity (GVTC)
  - Units need to demonstrate maximum output level


Load

- Load training using historical load and weather data
- Monthly Peak Demand, MISO Coincident Demand and Energy Forecast are uploaded by Load Serving Entities (LSEs) into the Module-E Capacity Tracking (MECT) Tool (deadline Nov. 1st)
- MISO reviews Forecast and Finalize review by March

MISO System LOLE Model



Local Resource Zone LOLE Model



MISO uses the Strategic Energy Risk Valuation Model (SERVM) Software

Managed by Astrapé Consulting

Originated within Southern Company back in the early 1980's

Uses a sequential Monte Carlo simulation

- Steps through time chronologically and randomly drawing unit availability
- Replicating simulation with different sets of random events until statistical convergence is obtained

SERVM resource adequacy metrics consider

- Wide Variation of Load Shapes
- Growth Uncertainty
- Unit Performance

Utilizes a SQL Server database

Analytical vs. Monte Carlo approach to analysis

- Analytical methods work well for small systems and represent a system using mathematical model (A direct mathematical solution)

- Monte Carlo methods simulate the actual process and repeat simulation until convergence criteria is met

- For complex systems, a Monte Carlo “brute force” approach is more appropriate

Types of Monte Carlo Analysis

- Non-Sequential Monte Carlo Simulation
  - Each hour is independent of every other hour
  - Inability to model time-correlated issues
  - Inability to calculate frequency and duration indices
- Sequential Monte Carlo Simulation
  - Steps through time chronologically
  - Ability to model time correlated issues and calculate frequency and duration indices
  - Requires more detailed system data

Utilized SERVM Characteristics

- Multi Area Model
- Multiple Weather Years (supports up to 50 years)
- Detailed DR Representation
- Granular LOLE Calculations

Additional SERVM Characteristics

- Renewable Generation Modeling
- Transportation model to represent multiple neighbors and interconnections
- Full Economic Dispatch of Resources Allowing for Dispatch Constraints on Resources
- Alternative Dispatch During Reliability Events
- Operating Reserves Modeled Based on NERC Guidelines
- Economic Calculations
- Scarcity Pricing Algorithms
- Production Costing Ability

Utilized SERVM Modeling Components

- Weather Years
  - Multiple load shapes
- Economic Load Forecast Error (LFE)
- Unit Outage Modeling
- Energy Limited Resource Modeling
  - Demand Side Options

Additional SERVM Modeling Components

- Weather Years
  - Thermal Capacity/Hydro
- Energy Limited Resource Modeling
  - Hydro and Pump Storage
  - Renewable resources (.i.e. Wind & Solar)
- Scarcity Pricing, Neighbor Modeling, and Transmission Modeling
- Emergency Operating Procedures


Importance of Load Modeling in LOLE Analysis

- Loss of Load Expectation analysis is largely driven by two factors
  - Generation Uncertainty
  - Load Uncertainty
- Accurately capturing uncertainty is crucial to LOLE analysis
- Load Uncertainty
  - Load Shape
  - Weather Uncertainty
  - Economic Uncertainty

Load Modeling Framework

- Use historic weather years to capture load uncertainty
  - Variance in peak demand
  - Variance in load shape
- Results in more diverse and comprehensive load modeling
  - More accurate shoulder and non-peak load variance and uncertainty
- Utilize Neural-Net software to “train” data

Load Training Process




Data Sources for Load Training

- Historical real-time settlement load data
  - Source: MISO
  - 2013 to 2017
- Historical real-time LMR performance
  - Source: MISO
  - Voluntary and MISO deployments
  - 2015-2017
- Historical weather data
  - Source: NOAA
  - 1989 to 2017
- LSE load forecasts
  - Source: LSE submittals to MECT

Historical Load and Weather Formatting

- 5 years of hourly load and temperature (2013-2017)
- Weather data (2013-2017)
  - Month
  - Temperature
  - Time of Day
  - Day of Week
  - 24 hour ago Temperature
  - 48 hour ago Temperature
- Holidays are set to Sunday
  - New Year's Day
  - Memorial Day
  - Independence Day
  - Labor Day, Thanksgiving Day & Christmas Day



5-Year Load Growth Adjustment


- 5 years of load data should not include load growth due to economics
- Load normalized to consistent economics
- Adjustment calculated based off high temperature load analysis i.e. 90 degrees and above

NeuroShell Predictor Software

- Ward Systems Group Software
- Used for pattern recognition of multi-variable problems
- Makes predictions based off of established neural-net functional relationships
- Software tutorial can be found at the link below:
  - http://www.wardsystems.com/predictortutorial.asp
- Load Training Input Variables:
  - Month
  - Day of week
  - Time of day
  - Previous hour load
  - Temperature
  - 24 hour ago temperature
  - 48 hour ago temperature
- Load Training Output Variables:
  - Actual Load


	Hour	Temperature	Previous Hour Load	24 hr Ago Temp	48 hr Ago Temp	Day of Week Incl Holidays	Actual Load
1	0	84	12984.172	78.5	82	1	12052.491
2	1	83	12052.491	70	80	1	11406.383
3	2	83	11406.383	69	76	1	10984.624
4	3	82	10984.624	69	75	1	10747.635
5	4	82	10747.635	72	75	1	10849.012
6	5	81	10849.012	73	74	1	11433.276
7	6	79	11433.276	74	74	1	12365.329
8	7	79	12365.329	74	74	1	13136.045
9	8	78	13136.045	76	75	1	13864.401
10	9	79	13864.401	78	77	1	14259.09
11	10	79	14259.09	82	80	1	14576.561
12	11	78	14576.561	83.5	82	1	14729.459
13	12	79	14729.459	85	84	1	14715.28
14	13	79	14715.28	84	86	1	14659.616
15	14	79	14659.616	87.33333333	87	1	14398.177
16	15	77.75	14398.177	88.5	88	1	14239.96
17	16	73	14239.96	90.5	89	1	14212.895
18	17	73.33333333	14212.895	92	89	1	14188.923
19	18	77.66666667	14188.923	92	90	1	14075.644
20	19	78	14075.644	92	90	1	13852.38
21	20	78	13852.38	90	89	1	13712.71
22	21	80	13712.71	90	87	1	13681.636
23	22	78	13681.636	88	86	1	12928.871
24	23	78	12928.871	87	85	1	12130.917
25	0	77	12130.917	84	78.5	2	11450.251
26	1	78	11450.251	83	70	2	10956.724
27	2	79	10956.724	83	69	2	10612.272

Neural-Net Training



Best net statistics

R-squared	0.996521
Avg.error	91.26518
Correlation	0.99829
MSE	13960.78
RMSE	118.1557
% in range	0.0%
% same sign	100.0%




Neural-Net Predicting

- 30 years of historical weather
  - 1989 to 2017
- Neural-Net applied to 30 years of historical weather to predict load
- Output is 30 weather year load shapes at 5 year normalized economy
  - i.e. Predicted 2018 load with1999 weather

Extreme Temperature Verification

- Verify load training at extreme temperatures is accurate
- Less data points at temperature extremes for neural-net training



Load Forecast Adjustment

- Average of 30 predicted load shapes adjusted to match LRZ's 50/50 zonal peak load forecast for study year
- Ratio of 1st years Non-Coincident Peak Forecast to Zonal Coincident Peak Forecast applied to future years Non-Coincident Peak Forecast
- Results in 30 Planning Year weather load shapes
  - i.e. 2019-20 PY load if we have 1995 weather

Economic Load Forecast Error

- Use Projected and Actual GDP Growth Rates for Economic Uncertainty
  - Use Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projections for GDP growth (historic)
  - Compare with the actual GDP growth taken from the Bureau of Economic Analysis
  - Translate the GDP forecast error into electric utility forecast error by multiplying by a scalar
    - Rate at which electric load grows in comparison to GDP
  - Calculate the standard deviation of forecast error
  - Using the standard deviation, create a normal distribution of forecast error

Economic Load Uncertainty

- The 2018/19 PY LOLE study showed that the economic load uncertainty modeling resulted in a 0.2 percentage point increase to the MISO Planning Reserve Margin

	Load Forecast Error (LFE) Levels				
	-2.0%	-1.0%	0.0%	1.0%	2.0%
Standard Deviation in LFE	Probability to assigned to each LFE				
1.19%	10.4%	23.3%	32.6%	23.3%	10.4%

Advantages in Load Modeling with historical weather

- Multiple load shapes based on weather more accurately capture
  - Variance in load shapes
  - Variance in peak load
  - Seasonal load uncertainty
  - Frequency and duration of severe weather patterns
- Decouple weather and economic uncertainty

Unit Data

- Unit Name
- Unit Physical Local Resource Zone (LRZ)
- Installation Date
- Retirement Date
- Type (Thermal, Curtailable Load, Renewable)
- Unit Summary Type
  - Thermal (Nuclear, Fossil Steam, Combustion Turbine, Hydro, Pumped Storage Hydro)
  - Curtailable Load (Demand Response)
  - Renewable (Intermittent Resources such as Wind, Run-of-River Hydro, Biomass and Energy Efficiency)
- Thermal Units
  - Utilize the GVTC for a peak capacity and each unit's monthly Net Dependable Capacity (NDC) submitted in PowerGADS determines each unit's monthly capacity profile

Forced Outage Rates & Unit Maintenance – Thermal Units Only

- Forced Outage Rates
  - Time to Repair
  - Time to Failure
- Fixed Maintenance – Typically Nuclear Units
  - Begin Date
  - Stop Date
- Planned Outage Rates
  - Percentage of the year in which a unit will be on scheduled maintenance
  - Planned Outage Factor + Maintenance Outage Factor from PowerGADS
- Maintenance scheduled on days with maximum reserves

Curtailable Load Units (Energy Limited)

- SERVM dispatches Demand Response (DR) based on several constraints
  - Days per week
  - Hours per day
  - Hours per year
  - Dispatch price
- Use limitations to model fatigue
  - Minimum Megawatt (MW) – Zero
  - Maximum Megawatt (MW) – Monthly Profile

Demand Side Management (DSM)

- Renewable Units
- Net Hourly Load Modification
  - Maximum Megawatt (MW) – Monthly Profile
  - Positive values decrease load

Non-Firm Support

- Represents benefit of being part of Eastern Interconnect
- 1 MW of non-firm support reduces requirement by 1 MW
- Reliability targets highly sensitive to fluctuations in non-firm support
- LOLE study uses set MW amount of non-firm

Firm Imports

- External resources FRAP'ed or Offered in MECT are included in LOLE modeling
- External purchases are modeled similar to MISO units
- Modeled from external region to MISO
- Firm imports are only modeled in MISO PRM model and not zonal LRR model
- External firm imports impact LOLE based on unit characteristics

Firm Exports/Sales


- Capacity that is ineligible for MISO PRA is excluded from MISO and zonal models
- Only units that have capacity obligations outside of MISO are designated as sold in the LOLE model
- External firm exports impact LOLE based on unit characteristics

SERVM Simulation Frameworks

30 Weather Years (equal probability)	x	5 Economic Uncertainties (Normal Distribution)	=	150 Load Scenarios
150 Load Scenarios	x	300 unit outage draws	=	45,000 8760 hour simulations

** Scenarios are an example of framework and are not fixed

Capacity Adjustment Flowchart



LOLE Study Deliverables to MISO's Planning Resource Action (PRA)

- The LOLE study has four deliverables to the Planning Resource Auction
  - MISO PRM UCAP [%]
  - Local Resource Zones (LRZ) Local Reliability Requirement (LRR) per unit
  - LRZ Capacity Import Limit (CIL)
  - LRZ Capacity Export Limit (CEL)
- LOLE deliverables are applied to updated demand forecasts to calculate PRA requirements

Calculation of MISO PRM [%]

MISO Planning Reserve Margin (PRM)	2018/2019 PY	Formula Key
MISO System Peak Demand (MW)	125,805	[A]
Installed Capacity (ICAP) (MW)	149,901	[B]
Unforced Capacity (UCAP) (MW)	138,505	[C]
Firm External Support ICAP (MW)	4,938	[D]
Firm External Support UCAP (MW)	4,764	[E]
Adjustment to ICAP {1d in 10yr} (MW)	-4,550	[F]
Adjustment to UCAP {1d in 10yr} (MW)	-4,550	[G]
ICAP PRM Requirement (PRMR) (MW)	150,289	[H] = [B]+[D]+[F]
UCAP PRM Requirement (PRMR) (MW)	138,719	[I] = [C]+[E]+[G]
MISO PRM ICAP	19.5%	[J]=[H]-[A]/[A]
MISO PRM UCAP	10.3%	[K]=[I]-[A]/[A]
Post-Processing accounting for non-firm external support		
External Non-Firm Support ICAP (MW)	2,987	[L]
External Non-Firm Support UCAP (MW)	2,331	[M]
With External Support ICAP PRM Requirement (MW)	147,302	[N]=[B]+[D]+[F]-[L]
With External Support UCAP PRM Requirement (MW)	136,388	[O]=[C]+[E]+[G]-[M]
With External Support MISO PRM ICAP	17.1%	[P]=([N]-[A])/[A]
With External Support MISO PRM UCAP	8.4%	[Q]=([O]-[A])/[A]

*MISO Capacity Market procures on UCAP

Calculation of Zonal Requirements and Example PRA Requirements

Local Resource Zone (LRZ)	LRZ-1 MN/ND	LRZ-2 WI	LRZ-3 IA	LRZ-4 IL	LRZ-5 MO	LRZ-6 IN	LRZ-7 MI	LRZ-8 AR	LRZ-9 LA/TX	LRZ-10 MS	Formula Key
2018-2019 Planning Reserve Margin (PRM) Study											
Installed Capacity (ICAP) (MW)	19,055	15,863	11,145	10,638	8,665	19,458	23,225	11,594	23,514	6,756	[A]
Unforced Capacity (UCAP) (MW)	18,095	14,892	10,613	9,481	7,751	18,165	21,196	10,991	21,674	5,657	[B]
Adjustment to UCAP {1d in 10yr} (MW)	2,326	352	202	2,326	2,411	1,782	3,349	-760	1,595	1,581	[C]
Local Reliability Requirement (LRR) UCAP (MW)	20,422	15,244	10,815	11,807	10,162	19,948	24,545	10,231	23,269	7,237	[D]=[B]+[C]
Peak Demand (MW)	17,789	12,858	9,391	9,709	8,199	17,443	21,296	8,072	20,649	4,859	[E]
LRR UCAP per-unit of LRZ Peak Demand	**114.8%**	**118.6%**	**115.2%**	**121.6%**	**123.9%**	**114.4%**	**115.3%**	**126.7%**	**112.7%**	**148.9%**	[F]=[D]/[E]

Important LOLE Fundamentals Takeaways

- LOLE is the measure of how long, on average, the available generation capacity is likely to fall short of the load demand
  - LOLE is used to study Generation(Resource) Adequacy
  - Probabilistic analysis accurately captures uncertainty risk
- MISO Resource Adequacy criteria for Planning Reserve target is the industry standard LOLE objective:
  - 1-day in 10-years
  - Aligns with NERC standards
- Achieving reliability in the bulk electric systems requires that the amount of resources exceeds customer demand by an adequate margin (Planning Reserve Margin)
  - LOLE models utilize an Equivalized Transportation Model to determine Planning Reserve Margin and Local Reliability Requirements
- All Market Participants are encouraged to participate in the stakeholder process through LOLEWG

Reference Materials

- Past LOLE 101 Documents
  - LOLE 101 (Apil 11th, 2017)
- Loss of Load Expectation Reports
  - 2018 Loss of Load Expectation (LOLE) Study Report
  - Loss of Load Expectation Working Group (LOLEWG)
  - 2018 Wind Capacity Report
  - Resource Adequacy Documents
- Resource Adequacy Documents
  - BPM
    - BPM 011 - Resource Adequacy
  - MISO Tariff: Module E-1
  - NERC Standard BAL-502-RF-03

Appendix

LOLE Terms and Definitions

- **Installed Capacity:** The installed capacity that is physically located within the zone. The ICAP is the output that the generator tested for its max summer output.
- **Unforced Capacity:** The installed capacity less forced outage rates. Capacity Resources are quantified by applying forced outage rates to installed capacity values (ICAP) to calculate the Unforced Capacity value (UCAP) for the resource.
- **Adjustment to UCAP:** The UCAP capacity adjustment within the zone to drive the zone to the "1 day in 10" criteria if the zone was an island. If a zone is more reliable than "1 day in 10" capacity needs to be removed in order to drive the model to the LOLE metric.
- **LRR (UCAP):** Zonal specific reserve margin requirement [MW], capacity above zonal peak load, required to meet "1 day in 10" loss of load expectation requirement if the Local Resource Zone is an island (i.e. completely disconnected from external areas and the rest of MISO).

LOLE Terms and Definitions

- **Peak Demand**: The zone's annual peak demand including transmission losses.
- **Time of Peak Demand (ESTHE):** The date and time of the zones annual peak demand.
- **LRR UCAP per-unit of LRZ Peak Demand**: Zonal specific reserve margin [%], capacity above zonal peak load, required to meet "1 day in 10" loss of load expectation requirement if the Local Resource Zone is an island (i.e. completely disconnected from external areas and the rest of MISO).
- **Capacity Import Limit**: The amount of capacity that a zone can import from outside their zone reliably during peak load before observing a transmission constraint.
- **Capacity Export Limit**: The amount of capacity that a zone can reliably export out of their zone during peak load before observing a transmission constraint.

LOLE Terms and Definitions

- **Forecasted LRZ Load at MISO Peak**: Zone's load coincident with MISO's annual peak load.
- **Firm External Support:** Represents the external resources offered into planning year PRA and are modeled at the individual unit level.
- **External Non-Firm Support:** Represents the benefit of being part of the Eastern Interconnection, where 1 MW increase of no-firm support reduces requirement by 1MW.
- **Local Reliability Requirement**: Zonal specific reserve margin requirement [MW], capacity above zonal peak load, required to meet "1 day in 10" loss of load expectation requirement if the Local Resource Zone is an island (i.e. completely disconnected from external areas and the rest of MISO).

LOLE Terms and Definitions

- **Local Clearing Requirement**: The minimum capacity required to be physically located within a zone to meet the “1 day in 10” Loss of Load Expectation requirement. The LCR is LRR minus the CIL and non-pseudo tied exports.
- **Zone’s System Wide PRMR**: The zones share of the total MISO Planning Reserve Requirement that the zone needs to procure on a UCAP basis [MW]. The difference of the zones system wide PRMR minus the Local Clearing Requirement is the capacity that can be cleared outside of the zone (able to import at peak load) to meet the Planning Reserve Margin Requirement.
- **Planning Reserve Margin (PRM):** The reserve margin, capacity above peak load, the entire MISO footprint needs to procure to meet the “1 day in 10” Loss of Load Expectation requirement. The “1 day in 10” Loss of load requirement is the industry standard risk metric.

PRM and LRR Calculations

$$\text{PRM ICAP} = \frac{[\text{Installed capacity} + \text{ICAP Adjustment to meet 0.1 days/year LOLE} + \text{Firm Contracts}] - \text{MISO Peak Demand}}{\text{MISO Peak Demand}}$$

$$\text{PRM UCAP} = \frac{[\text{Unforced capacity} + \text{UCAP Adjustment to meet 0.1 days/year LOLE} + \text{Firm Contracts}] - \text{MISO Peak Demand}}{\text{MISO Peak Demand}}$$

$$\text{Each LRZ}'\text{s LRR} = \text{LRZ Unforced Capacity} + \text{LRZ UCAP Adjustment needed to meet 0.1 d/y LOLE}$$

$$\text{LRZ per unit LRR} = \frac{\text{LRR}}{\text{LRZ Peak Demand}}$$

BEFORE THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Power Act Section 202(c) Emergency Order: Tri-State Generation and Transmission Association, Platte River Power Authority, Salt River Project, PacifiCorp, and Xcel Energy	))))))	Order No. 202-25-14

Exhibit to
Motion to Intervene and Request for Rehearing and Stay of
Public Interest Organizations

Filed January 28, 2026

Exhibit 1-26:
NERC 2024 Reliability Report

NERC

NORTH AMERICAN ELECTRIC RELIABILITY CORPORATION



2024 State of Reliability

June 2024

[2024 SOR Infographic]

[2024 SOR Overview]

[2024 SOR Video]

Technical Assessment of 2023 Bulk Power System Performance

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Chapter 4: Grid Performance

Grid performance is evaluated through established reliability metrics and more in-depth analysis of specific aspects of the BPS:

- **Reliability Metrics**
- **Frequency Response Performance**
- **Generation Performance and Availability**
- **Transmission Performance and Unavailability**

Reliability Metrics

By calculating 2023 reliability metrics[70] and comparing the results to the previous years as well as the five-year average values, the reliability metrics discussed in this chapter can be categorized as either Improving, Stable, Monitor, or Actionable. Measuring and trending the relative state of the BPS in this manner supports NERC's obligation to assess the capability of the BPS. Table 4.1 shows the status of the reliability metrics and includes a reference to the specific metric.

Table 4.1: Reliability Indicators

Metric Name	Metric Performance Status		
M-1: Reserve Margin	**Actionable**		
M-2: Transmission-Related Events Resulting in Loss of Load (Excluding Weather)	**Improving**		
M-3: System Voltage Performance	**Retired**		
M-4: Interconnection Frequency Response	**Improving: Texas Interconnection**	**Stable: Eastern and Western Interconnections**	**Monitor: Québec Interconnection**
M-4.1: Inertia and Rate-of-Change-of-Frequency	**Improving: Texas Interconnection**	**Stable: Eastern and Western Interconnections**	**Monitor: Québec Interconnection**
M-5: Activation of Under Frequency Load Shedding	**Retired**		
M-6: Disturbance Control Standard Failures	**Metric is Under Review**		
M-7: Disturbance Control Events Greater than Most Severe Single Contingency	**Metric is Under Review**		
M-8: Interconnection Reliability Operating Limit (IROL) Exceedance	**Improving: Texas and Western Interconnections**		**Monitor: Eastern and Québec Interconnections**
M-9: Protection System Misoperations Rate	**Stable**		
M-10: Transmission Constraint Mitigation	**Retired**		
M-11: Energy Emergency Alerts	**Improving**		
M-12: Automatic AC Transmission Outages Initiated by Failed Protection System Equipment	**Improving**		
M-13: Automatic AC Transmission Outages Initiated by Human Error	**Improving**		
M-14: Automatic AC Transmission Outages Initiated by Failed AC Substation Equipment	**Improving**		

[70] Current Approved Reliability Metrics; Metrics M-3, M-5, and M-10 are retired.

Table 4.1: Reliability Indicators	
Metric Name	**Metric Performance Status**
M-15: Automatic AC Transmission Outages Initiated by Failed AC Circuit Equipment	**Improving**
M-16: Transmission Element Availability Percentage and Unavailability Percentage	**Stable**
M-17: Transmission Outage Severity	**Stable**

Frequency Response Performance

Frequency response arrests and stabilizes frequency during system disturbances. NERC closely monitors the frequency response of each of the four Interconnections and measures the margin at which under-frequency load shedding (UFLS) would be activated. UFLS provides a vital safety net for preserving Interconnection reliability. Measuring the margin allows NERC and the industry to ensure that there is adequate frequency response on the system.




Figure 4.1: Frequency Response Methodology

During the arresting period, the goal is to arrest the frequency decline for credible contingencies before the activation of UFLS. The calculation for Interconnection frequency response obligation (IFRO) under BAL-003 is based on arresting the Point C nadir before the first step of UFLS for resource contingencies at or above the resource loss protection criteria (RLPC)[71] for the Interconnection. Measuring and tracking the margin between the first-step UFLS set point and the Point C nadir is an important indicator of risk for each Interconnection. Figure 4.1 indicates the measurement periods used for analysis of the arresting period of events by looking at the frequency response between Value A and Point C as well as at the margin between Point C and the first-step UFLS set point.

During the stabilizing period, the goal is to stabilize system frequency following a disturbance primarily due to generator governor action. Figure 4.2 indicates the measurement periods used for analysis of the stabilizing period of events by looking at the frequency response between Value A and Value B.

2023 Interconnection Frequency Response

2023 performance and trends frequency response analysis indicate an adequate level of reliability.

- For the stabilizing period, the Interconnection frequency response,[72] the Eastern Interconnection, the Québec Interconnection, and the Western Interconnection showed no statistically significant changes from 2019 through 2023. The Texas Interconnection showed a statistically significant improvement for the stabilizing period from 2019 through 2023.
- For the arresting period, the inertia and rate-of-change-of-frequency (ROCOF),[73] the Eastern and Western Interconnections showed no statistically significant changes from 2019 through 2023. The Texas

[71] BAL-003-2 specifies that the RLPC be based on the two largest potential resource losses in an Interconnection or the largest resource loss due to an N-2 RAS. This value is updated annually through the BAL-003-2 data collection process.
[72] Interconnection Frequency Response, M-4
[73] Inertia and Rate-of-Change-of-Frequency, M-4.1

Interconnection showed a statistically significant improvement. The Québec Interconnection showed a statistically significant decreasing trend.

Of note in 2023, as shown in Table 4.2, the Western Interconnection had two events within the five-year period in which the measured frequency response was less than the IFRO. Both events had a starting frequency well above 60.00 Hz and had a confirmed MW loss under 500 MW. These two factors combined alleviate concerns that the Western Interconnection frequency response is insufficient. Also, of note in 2023 was the decreasing trend in the inertia and ROCOF for the Québec Interconnection. The Québec Interconnection confirmed an overrepresentation of summer events in 2023 compared to other years (2019–2022). Twenty percent of all events in the past five years occurred between May and October 2023 (months that typically have lower inertia), in part due to the wildfire events in the region. The Eastern Interconnection, Québec Interconnection, and Texas Interconnection did not have any events within the five-year period in which the measured frequency response was less than the IFRO for the respective Interconnection.

Table 4.2: 5-Year Statistical Trend

Interconnection	M-4 Interconnection Frequency Response	M4.1 Inertia and Rate-of-Change-of-Frequency	Margin-C-UFLS	Comment
Eastern	neither decreasing nor increasing	neither decreasing nor increasing	neither decreasing nor increasing	No M4 events with FR below IFRO
Texas	increasing	increasing	increasing	No M4 events with FR below IFRO
Québec	neither decreasing nor increasing	decreasing	neither decreasing nor increasing	No M4 events with FR below IFRO
Western	neither decreasing nor increasing	neither decreasing nor increasing	neither decreasing nor increasing	Two M4 events with FR below IFRO

Of note, the Western Interconnection has had the least number of valid events since frequency response evaluation started. This trend in reduction of valid frequency response events is suspected to be due to the retirement of large generating facilities in the Interconnection over the evaluation period and is a positive indicator when considering impacts to Interconnection reliability.

Frequency response for all Interconnections indicates stable and improving performance for the stabilizing period and arresting period as shown in Table 4.3 and Table 4.4.[74]

Table 4.3: 2023 Frequency Response Performance Statistics for Stabilizing Period

	2023 Operating Year Stabilizing Period Performance					
	Number of Events	Mean Frequency Response	Median	Minimum	Maximum	Number of events with FR below the IFRO
Eastern	47	2,685	2,459	1,138	5,176	0
Texas	38	1,410	1,241	682	2,788	0
Québec	65	762	693	260	1,682	0
Western	28	2,049	1,682	912	5,050	2

[74] Frequency Response Performance Statistics

Table 4.4: 2023 Frequency Response Performance Statistics for Arresting Period								
	Operating Year (OY)							
	Number of Events	Mean Frequency Response	Median	Minimum	Maximum	Mean UFLS Margin	Median UFLS Margin	Min. UFLS Margin
Eastern	47	2,151	1,969	1,059	3,550	0.454	0.453	0.441
Texas	38	727	738	283	1,604	0.611	0.606	0.579
Québec	65	124	120	48	233	1.022	1.065	0.118
Western	28	868	829	544	1,554	0.415	0.421	0.332

Figure 4.2 represents an analysis of the arresting period of frequency response events. The Y-axis shows the percent UFLS margin from 100% (60 Hz) to 0% (first UFLS set point for the Interconnection). The X-axis represents the MW loss for the event, expressed as a percentage of the RLPC for the Interconnection. The Québec Interconnection had two events at or greater than 100% of the RLPC and maintained sufficient UFLS margin. The largest events for the Eastern Interconnection and Texas Interconnection were 45% and 50%, respectively, as measured by percentage of RLPC.




Figure 4.2: Operating Year 2019–2023 Qualified Frequency Disturbances and Remaining UFLS Margin

Interconnection Reliability Operating Limit Exceedances

2023 Performance and Trends

Each RC has a different methodology for determining Interconnection reliability operating limits (IROL)[75] based on the makeup of their area and what constitutes an operating condition that is less than desirable. The following discussion of performance on an Interconnection basis is for clarity, not comparison:

[75] M-8, IROL Exceedance

- **Eastern–Québec Interconnections:** In 2023, there were eight exceedances that lasted more than 10 minutes, less than the five-year average of 19.4 exceedances as shown in Figure 4.3. The 10- to 20-minute range continued to decline from its all-time peak in 2019 with zero exceedances greater than 20 minutes.
- **Western Interconnection:** The trend has been stable with no IROL exceedances reported in 2023.
- **Texas Interconnection:** The trend has been stable with no IROL exceedances reported in 2023.




Figure 4.3: IROL Exceedance Counts[76]

Generation Performance and Availability

GADS contains information that can be used to compute reliability measures, such as WEFOR. GADS collects and stores unit operating information by pooling individual unit information, overall generating unit availability, performance, and calculated metrics.

Conventional Generation WEFOR

The horizontal lines in Figure 4.4 show the annual WEFOR compared to the monthly WEFOR columns; the solid horizontal bar shows the WEFOR for all years in the analysis period of 7.4%. While noticeably lower than the two preceding years, the annual WEFOR of 7.8% for 2023 is the third highest since NERC began digitally collecting GADS data in 2013, despite no major outlying winter weather event.

[76] M-8, IROL Exceedance




Figure 4.4: Monthly, Annual, and Five-Year WEFOR

To better illustrate 2023's high WEFOR relative to historical norms, Figure 4.5 shows the annual WEFOR by fuel type for the past 10 years. This extended analysis period is presented to illustrate how the abnormally high WEFORs in 2021 and 2022 caused by extreme cold weather conditions obfuscate long-term trends.




Figure 4.5: 10-Year Annual WEFOR by Fuel Type and 2023 Resource Mix by Net Maximum Capacity

Although coal-fired generation experienced a large decrease in WEFOR in 2023 (12.0% in 2023 versus 13.9% in 2022), it remains above pre-2021 rates. Due to year-over-year variability, coal generation is the primary driver of change in the overall WEFOR despite more energy being produced by both natural gas and nuclear power in 2023 (see Figure 4.6). Further investigation into baseload coal generation indicates that a unit's WEFOR negatively correlates most strongly to capacity factor.[77] Notably, once capacity factor falls below approximately 60%, unweighted average EFORs of units begin increasing more rapidly than those between 60% and 100%. Although forced-outage hours are a definite contributor to lower capacity factor units' increased WEFOR, the disproportionate change appears to be driven more by maintenance/planned outage hours and decreased service hours. This aligns with industry statements indicating that reduced investment in maintenance and abnormal cycling that are being adopted primarily in response to rapid changes in the resource mix are negatively impacting baseload coal unit performance.

Hydro units also experienced an unusually high annual WEFOR (6.9%) for the second time following one in 2021 (7.6%). However, these two relatively high years were both still lower than the associated years' overall WEFOR and do not indicate a trend at this point but warrant continued awareness.

[77] The correlation factor between capacity factor and WEFOR for baseload coal in 2023 was -0.41. While not mathematically indicative of a strong correlation (generally +/-0.7), it is notably stronger than any other aspect that is not a direct component of the WEFOR with the next highest being age (0.18) and planned outage hours (-0.16) given the relatively small sample size and amount of variation between coal units.




Figure 4.6: 10-Year Annual Conventional Net Actual Generation (GWh) by Fuel Type

Wind Generation Weighted Resource Forced-Outage Rate

NERC began collecting wind performance data with a phased-in approach based on plant size starting with a total installed capacity of 200 MW or greater in 2018 followed by plants with a total installed capacity of 100–199 MW in 2019 and plants with a total installed capacity of 75–99 MW in 2020 (see Figure 4.7). By the end of 2023, data from 137,737 MW of installed capacity, representing 703 wind plants across North America and 13% of nameplate generation, was reported to NERC. Data will continue to be reported separately for the reporting phase groups until sufficient history is available to analyze trends for a five-year rolling period across all wind plants comparable to the analysis for conventional generation. Specific event data collection for wind and solar began in 2024 and will allow for further analysis.




Figure 4.7: Monthly Capacity and Annual Average WRFOR Wind Plant Reporting Group

Transmission Performance and Unavailability

When evaluating transmission reliability, an important concept is that transmission line outages have different impacts on BPS reliability. Some impacts can be very severe, such as those that affect other transmission lines and load loss. Additionally, some outages are longer than others, leaving the transmission system at risk for extended periods of time. Reliability indicators for the transmission system are measured by using qualified event analysis reporting not related to weather and outages reported to TADS. The number of qualified events that include transmission outages that resulted in firm load loss not related to weather is provided in the following subsection.

Transmission-Related Events Resulting in Loss of Load

In 2023, a total of nine distinct non-weather-related transmission events resulted in a loss of firm load that met the ERO EAP reporting criteria (see Figure 4.8). The median firm load loss over the past five years was 97 MW, which is a decrease from 2018–2022's 101 MW. Although, notably, the median load loss was 113 MW in 2023, which is above the five-year median value, no discernible trend in the number of events or amount of loss is identifiable.




Figure 4.8: Transmission-Related Events Resulting in Loss of Firm Load and Median Amount of Firm Load Loss Excluding Weather-Related Events[78]

TADS Reliability Indicators

A TADS event is an unplanned transmission incident that results in the automatic outage (sustained or momentary) of one or more elements. TADS event information was analyzed for the following indicators in this section:


- **Transmission Outage Severity**
- **Automatic AC Transmission Outages**
- **Transmission Element Unavailability**

Transmission Outage Severity

The impact of a TADS event on BPS reliability is called the TOS of the event, which is defined by the number of outages in the event and by the type and voltage class of transmission elements involved in the event. TADS events are categorized by initiating cause codes (ICC). These ICCs facilitate the study of cause-effect relationships between each event's ICC and event severity.

[78] M-2, BPS Transmission Related Events Resulting in Loss of Load (Excluding Weather)

By examining the average TOS, duration, and frequency of occurrence for events with different ICCs (see Figure 4.9), it is possible to determine which ICCs contribute most to reliability performance for the considered period. The average TOS for events with a specific ICC is displayed on the Y-axis. A higher TOS for an ICC indicates that more outages or higher voltage elements were involved in an event. The average duration for events with a specific ICC is displayed on the X-axis; generally, events with a longer duration pose a greater risk to the BPS. The number of ICC occurrences is represented by the bubble size; larger bubbles indicate that an ICC occurs more often. Change in size or position of a bubble with the same number (identifying ICC) may indicate improved or declined performance. Lastly, the bubble colors indicate a statistical significance of a difference in the average TOS of this group and the events from other groups. The number of events per hour, average event duration, and average TOS for each ICC group are shown in Table 4.5.



1. Power System Condition
2. Fire
3. Combined Smaller ICC Groups
4. Misoperation
5. Failed AC Substation Equipment
6. Other
7. Unknown
8. Lightning
9. Human Error
10. Failed AC Circuit Equipment
11. Weather, Excluding Lightning
12. Foreign Interference
13. Vegetation

Figure 4.9: TOS vs. Expected TADS Event Duration

Table 4.5: TOS vs. Expected TADS Event Duration			
TADS Event	**Events per Hour**	**Average TOS**	**Average Event Duration**
Power System Condition	.012	.056	17.9
Fire	.014	.049	54.2
Combined Smaller ICC Groups	.019	.038	37.4
Misoperation	.046	.043	18.8
Failed AC Substation Equipment	.068	.034	99.4
Other	.015	.028	21.2
Unknown	.085	.027	10.0
Lightning	.067	.029	9.5
Human Error	.026	.029	12.2
Failed AC Circuit Equipment	.098	.023	47.3
Weather, Excluding Lightning	.153	.024	40.0
Foreign Interference	.061	.023	25.2
Vegetation	.045	.014	23.2

An analysis of the total TOS by year indicates that 2023 was an outlier from the statistically improving trend identified over the previous five years. Figure 4.10 shows the annual TOS, which is the third highest over the last five years; the shaded area shows the effect of the Québec wildfires on the 2023 TOS.




Figure 4.10: TOS of TADS Sustained Events of 100 kV+ AC Circuits and Transformers by Year[79]

Automatic AC Transmission Outages

The average number of outages per circuit due to failed ac substation equipment has continued to improve consistently over the last four years, showing a statistically significant decrease in 2023 compared to 2019–2022 (see Figure 4.11 The number of sustained outages due to failed ac circuit equipment per 100 miles saw a decrease in 2023 (see Figure 4.12).

[79] M-17, Transmission Outage Severity




Figure 4.11: Number of Outages per AC Circuit Due to Failed AC Substation Equipment[80]




Figure 4.12: Number of Outages per 100 Miles Due to Failed AC Circuit Equipment[81]

[80] M-14, Automatic AC Transmission Outages Initiated by Failed AC Substation Equipment
[81] M-15, Automatic AC Transmission Outages Initiated by Failed AC Circuit Equipment

Automatic AC Transformer Outages

In 2023, the number of automatic ac transformer outages per element caused by failed ac substation equipment was statistically equal to 2019–2022 (see Figure 4.13); the overall average remains stable.




Figure 4.13: Number of Outages per Transformer Due to Failed AC Substation Equipment[82]

Transmission Element Unavailability

In 2023, ac circuits over 200 kV across North America had an unavailability rate of 0.24%, meaning that there is a 0.24% chance that a specific transmission circuit is unavailable due to sustained automatic and operational outages at any given time. Transformers had an unavailability rate of 0.25% in 2023. Figure 4.14 shows that 2023 was the lowest year for ac circuit unavailability of the five-year analysis period. Figure 4.15 shows that 2023 was the second-highest year for transformer unavailability of the five-year analysis period.

[82] M-14, Automatic AC Transmission Outages Initiated by Failed AC Substation Equipment




Figure 4.14: AC Circuit Unavailability > 200 kV[83]




Figure 4.15: Transformer Unavailability[84]

[83] M-16, Element Availability Percentage (APC) & Unavailability Percentage
[84] Ibid.

BEFORE THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Power Act Section 202(c) Emergency Order: Tri-State Generation and Transmission Association, Platte River Power Authority, Salt River Project, PacifiCorp, and Xcel Energy	))))))	Order No. 202-25-14

Exhibit to
Motion to Intervene and Request for Rehearing and Stay of
Public Interest Organizations

Filed January 28, 2026

Exhibit 1-27:
NERC 2025 Summer Reliability Assessment

NERC
NORTH AMERICAN ELECTRIC RELIABILITY CORPORATION

2025 Summer Reliability Assessment

May 2025



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
Preface

Electricity is a key component of the fabric of modern society and the Electric Reliability Organization (ERO) Enterprise serves to strengthen that fabric. The vision for the ERO Enterprise, which is comprised of NERC and the six Regional Entities, is a highly reliable, resilient, and secure North American bulk power system (BPS). Our mission is to assure the effective and efficient reduction of risks to the reliability and security of the grid.

Reliability | Resilience | Security

Because nearly 400 million citizens in North America are counting on us

The North American BPS is spans six Regional Entities as shown on the map and in the corresponding table below. The multicolored area denotes overlap as some load-serving entities participate in one Regional Entity while associated Transmission Owners/Operators participate in another.



MRO	Midwest Reliability Organization
NPCC	Northeast Power Coordinating Council
RF	ReliabilityFirst
SERC	SERC Reliability Corporation
Texas RE	Texas Reliability Entity
WECC	WECC

About this Assessment

NERC's *2025 Summer Reliability Assessment* (*SRA*) identifies, assesses, and reports on areas of concern regarding the reliability of the North American BPS for the upcoming summer season. In addition, the *SRA* presents peak electricity demand and supply changes and highlights any unique regional challenges or expected conditions that might affect the reliability of the BPS. The reliability assessment process is a coordinated evaluation between the NERC Reliability Assessment Subcommittee, the Regional Entities, and NERC staff with demand and resource projections obtained from the assessment areas. This report reflects an independent assessment by NERC and the ERO Enterprise and is intended to inform industry leaders, planners, operators, and regulatory bodies so that they are better prepared to take necessary actions to ensure BPS reliability. This report also provides an opportunity for industry to discuss plans and preparations to ensure reliability for the upcoming summer period.

Key Findings

NERC's annual *SRA* covers the upcoming four-month (June–September) summer period. This assessment evaluates generation resource and transmission system adequacy as well as energy sufficiency to meet projected summer peak demands and operating reserves. This includes a deterministic evaluation of data submitted for peak demand hour and peak risk hour as well as results from recently updated probabilistic analyses. Additionally, this assessment identifies potential reliability issues of interest and regional topics of concern. While the scope of this seasonal assessment is focused on the upcoming summer, the key findings are consistent with risks and issues that NERC highlighted in the *2024 Long-Term Reliability Assessment (LTRA*), which covers a 10-year horizon, and other earlier reliability assessments and reports.[1]

Rising electricity demand forecasts, generation growth, and the increasing pace of change in the resource mix feature prominently in the summer risk profile. Since last summer, the aggregate of peak electricity demand for NERC's 23 assessment areas has risen by over 10 GW—more than double the year-to-year increase that occurred between the summers of 2023 and 2024. Over 7.4 GW of generator capacity (nameplate) has retired or become inactive for the upcoming summer, including 2.5 GW of natural-gas-fired and 2.1 GW of coal-fired generators.[2] Meanwhile, growth in solar photovoltaic (PV) and battery storage resources has accelerated with the addition of 30 GW of nameplate solar PV resources and 13 GW of new battery storage. The new solar and battery resource additions are expected to provide over 35 GW in summer on-peak capacity. New wind resources are expected to provide 5 GW on peak. Operators in many parts of the BPS face challenges in meeting higher demand this summer with a resource mix that, in general, has less flexibility and more variability.

The following findings are derived from NERC and the ERO Enterprise's independent evaluation of electricity generation and transmission capacity as well as potential operational concerns that may need to be addressed for Summer 2025.

Resource Adequacy Assessment and Energy Risk Analysis

All areas are assessed as having adequate anticipated resources for normal summer peak load conditions (see **Figure 1**). However, the following areas face risks of electricity supply shortfalls during periods of more extreme summer conditions. This determination of elevated risk is based on analysis of plausible scenarios, including 90/10 demand forecasts and historical high outage rates as well as low wind or solar PV energy conditions:

- **Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO):** MISO is expecting to have an existing certain capacity of 142,793 MW in the *2025 SRA*, which is a slight reduction from the 143,866 MW submitted for the *2024 SRA*. The retirement of 1,575 MW of natural gas and coal-fired generation since last summer, combined with a reduction in net firm capacity transfers due to some capacity outside the MISO market opting out of the MISO planning resource auction, is contributing to less dispatchable generation in MISO. With higher demand and less firm resources, MISO is at elevated risk of operating reserve shortfalls during periods of high demand or low resource output. MISO's most recent energy assessment reveals that the period of highest energy shortfall risk has shifted from July to August. This shift is driven by the decline in dispatchable generation and the increasing share that solar and wind resources have in meeting demand. The risk of supply shortfalls increases in late summer as solar output diminishes earlier in the day, leaving variable wind and a more limited amount of dispatchable resources to meet demand.
- **NPCC-New England:** The New England area expects to have sufficient resources to meet the 2025 summer peak demand forecast. As of April 1, the 50/50 peak summer demand is forecast to be 24,803 MW for the weeks beginning June 1, 2025, through September 14, 2025, with a lowest projected net margin of -1,473 MW (6.0%). The lowest projected net margin assumes a net interchange of 1,245 MW, which is capacity-backed; however, ISO New England (ISO-NE) has typically imported around 3,000 MW during summer peak load conditions. ISO-NE anticipates an increase of approximately 500 MW in forced outages from its generating fleet compared to Summer 2024. Based on NPCC's most recent energy assessment, some use of New England's operating procedures for mitigating resource shortages is anticipated during Summer 2025. Cumulative loss of load expectation (LOLE) of <0.031 days/period, loss of load hours (LOLH) of <0.120 hours/period, and expected unserved energy (EUE) of <94 MWh/period were estimated for the expected load with expected summer resources while the reduced resources and highest peak load scenario resulted in an estimated cumulative LOLE risk of 4.369 days/period, with associated LOLH of 19.554 hours/period and EUE of 19,847 MWh/period.
- **MRO-SaskPower:** For the upcoming summer months, no capacity constraints or reliability issues are expected under normal conditions. However, in the event of generator forced outages of more than 350 MW, combined with above-normal peak demand, SaskPower may need to rely on short-term imports from neighboring utilities. Other remedial actions could include quickly activating demand-response programs, adjusting maintenance schedules, and, if necessary, implementing temporary load interruptions. SaskPower's modeling projects

[1] NERC's long-term, seasonal, and special reliability assessments are published on the Reliability Assessments webpage.

[2] Other retirements include 1.2 GW nuclear capacity following the retirement of some units at the Pickering Nuclear Generator Station in Ontario, and 1.6 GW of petroleum, hydro, and other generation. Source: NERC and EIA data.

the probability of experiencing a generation forced outage exceeding 350 MW to be 21.5%. Assuming maximum available imports, the same modeling projects the number of hours with an operating reserve shortfall this summer to be about 0.65 hours with the highest likelihood occurring in June, estimated at 0.43 hours.

- **MRO-SPP:** SPP's Anticipated Reserve Margin (28.5%) is similar to last summer, and resource shortfalls are not expected for the upcoming Summer 2025 season under normal conditions. However, SPP remains at risk for energy shortfalls if above-normal peak demand periods coincide with low wind output and high generator forced outages. Other known operational challenges for the upcoming season include managing wind energy fluctuations; SPP often experiences sharp ramps of its wind generation that can cause transmission system congestion as well as scarcity conditions.
- **Texas RE-ERCOT:** An additional 7 GW of installed solar PV resource capacity and nearly 7.5 GW in new battery storage is helping ERCOT meet rising summer peak demand. ERCOT is projected to have sufficient operating reserves for the August peak load hour given normal summer system conditions. Nevertheless, continued growth in both loads and intermittent renewable resources drives a risk of emergency conditions in the evening hours when solar generation ramps down and loads remain elevated. ERCOT's probabilistic risk assessment of energy emergency alert (EEA) likelihood for the highest risk periods associated with evening hours in the peak month of August is projected to fall to 3%, down from over 15% in 2024. Lower risk is attributed to a nearly doubling of battery energy storage capacity and improved energy availability from new battery storage and operational rules. The South Texas Interconnection reliability operating limit (IROL) continues to present a system constraint, which, under specific unlikely conditions, could ultimately require ERCOT system operators to direct firm load shedding to remain within IROL limits and prevent cascading load loss. For Summer 2025, this risk is being mitigated by updating transmission line dynamic ratings and switching actions to divert power away from the most limiting transmission circuits.
- **WECC-Mexico:** The WECC-Mexico assessment area in Baja California has a peak summer demand of 3,770 MW and is served by a resource mix that is mainly natural-gas-fired generation, with some geothermal, solar, wind, and oil-fired resources (5,636 MW total installed capacity, of which 4,125 MW are gas-fired generators). WECC-Mexico's 14% Anticipated Reserve Margin exceeds the Reference Margin Level for reliability (10%) calculated by WECC. For the upcoming summer, NERC assesses that historically average generator outage rates for peak demand periods can cause a supply shortfall within the WECC-Mexico assessment area and trigger the need for non-firm resources from neighboring areas. Note, in prior SRA reports, the Baja California portion of the BPS was included as part of the WECC-CA/MX assessment area. The *2025 SRA* includes a new assessment area map for the Western Interconnection. The new assessment area boundaries provide reliability risk information in more geographic detail for the United States and Mexico.

Resource additions since last summer have helped lower the risk of energy shortfalls in several areas. Across the U.S. portion of the Western Interconnection, over 6.5 GW of installed solar capacity has been added, along with nearly 7 GW in battery storage. The resources are expected to provide close to 14 GW in on-peak capacity. In British Columbia, new hydroelectric generators were commissioned, contributing to an additional 500 MW in capacity for the summer. The resource additions have alleviated capacity and energy shortfall risks identified in these assessment areas prior to Summer 2024 and provide supplies across the Western Interconnection.




Figure 1: Summer Reliability Risk Area Summary

Seasonal Risk Assessment Summary	
High	Potential for insufficient operating reserves in normal peak conditions
Elevated	Potential for insufficient operating reserves in above-normal conditions
Normal	Sufficient operating reserves expected

Other Reliability Issues

- **Weather services are expecting above-average summer temperatures across much of North America and continued below-average precipitation in the Northwest and Midwest.** In summer-peaking areas, temperature is one of the main drivers of demand and can also contribute to forced outages for generation and other BPS equipment. Average temperatures last summer across the United States and Canada were not as hot as Summer 2023, but Summer 2024 still managed to rank in the top four hottest recorded summers with certain areas breaking records yet again. Few high-level EEAs were issued between June and September 2024, and there were no supply disruptions that resulted from inadequate resources as Balancing Authorities (BA), Transmission Operators (TOP), and Reliability Coordinators (RC) employed a variety of operational mitigations and demand-side management measures. Natural-gas-fired electricity generation broke records last year—highlighting the criticality of natural gas in meeting electric demand. This continuing trend will be key in operator preparations that help to ensure fuel availability for the coming summer. The **Review of 2024 Capacity and Energy Performance** section describes actual demand and resource levels in comparison with NERC's *2024 SRA* and summarizes 2024 resource adequacy events.

- **Load growth is driving higher peak demand forecasts and contributing to resource and transmission adequacy challenges in many areas.** Fifteen of the 23 assessment areas are expecting an increase in peak summer demand from Summer 2024. Aggregated peak demand across all assessment areas has increased by over 10 GW since 2024. This is more than double the increase in peak demand from 2023 to 2024. One of the largest increases is seen in the U.S. West (+5%), where a new peak demand record was set last summer. Extreme heat is reported as a main reliability concern this year among BAs in WECC. With precipitation expected to be lower than average in the Northwest, natural-gas-fired generation and demand-side management could be important in offsetting any lower-than-normal levels of hydroelectric generation availability. SERC Southeast is also projecting a sizable increase in peak demand of more than 2% from NERC's *2024 SRA.* Entities in the assessment area cite economic growth and increased industrial and data mining loads as the main drivers.

- **Aging generation facilities present increased challenges to maintaining generator readiness and resource adequacy.** Forced outage rates for conventional generators and wind resources have trended toward historically high levels in recent years.[3] System operators face increasing risk of resource shortfalls and operating challenges caused by forced generator outages, especially during periods of high demand or when relatively few conventional resources are dispatched to serve load. The threat to BPS reliability can be compounded in areas where aging resources are further depended upon to provide essential reliability services. In the Southwest, for example, a portion of capacity has been in operation for roughly 60 years. Electric utilities in SERC-Central have also described aging generation as a reliability challenge. Historical performance has demonstrated the need for planning assumptions that account for elevated forced outage rates for these generators. Older generators can also require extensive overhauls, such as generator rewinds, that take resources out of service for extended periods of time as discovery work can lead to additional unplanned maintenance.

- **Battery resource additions are helping reduce energy shortfall risks that can arise from resource variability and peaks in demand.** In Texas, California, and across the U.S. West, the influx of battery energy storage systems (BESS) in recent years has markedly improved the ability to manage energy risks during challenging summer periods. These areas can be exposed to energy shortfalls during hours of peak demand and into evening as solar PV output diminishes, but BESS resources that maintain their charge during the day can help meet peak demand and also overcome energy shortfalls on the system that might otherwise occur with solar down-ramps or variability. Natural-gas-fired generation also continues to play an important role in meeting peak demand and flexibly responding to fluctuations output from variable energy resources (VER).

- **Grid operators need to remain vigilant for the potential of inverter-based resources (IBR) to unexpectedly trip during grid disturbances.** While this near-term challenge persists, NERC continues to work diligently with industry to develop long-term solutions to this issue. In April, NERC published the *Aggregated Report on NERC Level 2 Recommendation to Industry: Findings from Inverter-Based Resource Model Quality Deficiencies Alert*.[4] In the report, NERC summarized the deficiencies identified in the Level 2 alert issued in June 2024. The report's findings were as follows:
  - Many grid operators indicated that they did not have the requested data readily available, supporting the previous finding that data acquisition and management was insufficient.
  - Interconnection process requirements are insufficient.
  - Two-thirds of the protection settings used by grid operators are not set to provide the maximum capability. This creates a significant artificial limitation of overall ride-through capability of BPS-connected solar photovoltaic (PV) facilities.
  - 20% of the surveyed facilities use a facility capability with a 0.95 power factor limit, which means that a significant amount of underused reactive capability exists on the BPS.
  - Dynamic model data is inconsistent.

[3] See Key Findings in NERC's 2024 *State of Reliability* report

[4] *Findings from Inverter-Based Resource Model Quality Deficiencies Alert*

As solar, wind, and battery resources remain the predominant types of resources being added to the BPS, it is imperative for industry, vendors, and manufacturers to take the recommended steps for system modeling and study practices and IBR performance.

- **Operators of natural-gas-fired generators should maintain lines of communication with natural gas system operators to support electric grid reliability.** The 2024 summer season was the fourth hottest on record,[5] and natural-gas-fired generation broke records with a peak monthly average in July of 208 TWh, up 4% from July 2023, per the latest data from the Energy Information Administration (EIA). The EIA projects that rising demand for natural gas exports this year in the wake of ramped up liquefied natural gas (LNG) production combined with lower field production levels could tighten natural gas supplies relative to last summer. Amid year-over-year increases in load projections in most assessment areas, this summer could see another record year for natural-gas-fired generation, thereby stretching supplies even further. Given that late spring and early summer are seasons when natural gas system owners and operators typically perform maintenance requiring system outages, vigilance is needed to ensure the reliability of fuel delivery to natural-gas-fired-generators.[6]
- **Supply chain issues continue to affect lead times for Bulk Electric System (BES) equipment maintenance, replacement, and construction.** While no specific reliability issues for the upcoming summer have been identified, Transmission Owners (TO) and Generator Owners (GO) face delays in parts, materials, and skilled technicians. When summer maintenance preparations or installations are delayed, effects on equipment availability can challenge system operators. Over the long term, supply chain issues and uncertainty continue to affect development. Lead times for transformers remain virtually unchanged, averaging 120 weeks in 2024. Large transformer lead times averaged 80–210 weeks.[7]
- **Wildfire risks in the areas that comprise the Western Interconnection remain ever present.** Wildfire conditions can affect transmission operations by prompting preemptive circuit outages to reduce the risk of fire ignition as well as through fire impacts to transmission infrastructure. Transmission system congestion and reduced import capacity can accompany wildfire conditions. Moreover, fires near wind generation result in curtailment for safety reasons, and solar facilities can be susceptible to range fires. Fire damage to transmission lines interconnected to remote hydro sites in the Pacific Northwest can be particularly problematic with restoration typically taking weeks to months to accomplish.

Recommendations

To reduce the risk of electricity shortfalls on the BPS this summer, NERC recommends the following:

- RCs, BAs, and TOPs in the elevated risk areas identified in the key findings should take the following actions:
  - Review seasonal operating plans and protocols for communicating and resolving potential supply shortfalls in anticipation of potentially extreme demand levels.
  - Consider the potential for higher-than-anticipated forced generator outage rates in operating plans due to plant age, operating patterns, or limited pre-seasonal maintenance availability.
  - Employ conservative generation and transmission outage coordination procedures and operate conservatively commensurate with long-range weather forecasts to ensure adequate resource availability. The review of system performance during the January 2025 cold weather event noted that early declaration of conservative operations in advance of extreme conditions helped reduce grid congestion and enhance transfer capability.[8]
  - Engage state or provincial regulators and policymakers to prepare for efficient implementation of demand-side management mechanisms called for in operating plans.
- GOs with solar PV resources should implement recommendations in the IBR performance issues alert that NERC issued in March 2023.[9]
- State regulators and industry should have protocols in place at the start of summer for managing emergent requests from generators for air-quality restriction waivers. If warranted, U.S. Department Energy (DOE) action to exercise emergency authority under the Federal Power Act (FPA) section 202(c) may be needed to ensure that sufficient generation is available during extreme weather conditions.

[5] US sweltered through its 4th-hottest summer on record – National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
[6] Short-Term Energy Outlook - U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA)
[7] Supply shortages and an inflexible market give rise to high power transformer lead times | Wood Mackenzie
[8] See notable operations practices in Appendix 2 of the *January 2025 Arctic Events System Performance Review | FERC, NERC, and its Regional Entities: A Joint Staff Report*, April 2025.
[9] See NERC Level 2 Alert: Inverter-Based Resource Performance Issues, March, 2023. Owners and operators of BPS-connected IBRs that are currently not registered with NERC should consult NERC's IBR Registration Initiative for information on the registration process.

Summer Temperature and Drought Forecasts

During the summer season, heat drives peak electricity demand as consumers use more electricity to cool their homes and businesses. Summer 2024 was the fourth hottest summer on record for the United States and Canada, and Summer 2025 is expected to bring similar intensity. Assessment area load forecasts account for many years of historical demand data, often up to 30 years, to predict summer peak demand and prepare for more extreme conditions. According to their probabilistic assessments of the coming summer season, late July and early August are the periods most frequently identified among the assessment areas as the expected period of peak demand. Peak demand hours may not coincide with the highest risk hours in the summer as the resource mix shifts during a 24-hour cycle, particularly when there are prolonged periods of above-normal temperatures. Coordinating pre-season preparations and maintenance remains critical to avoiding forced outages where possible and mitigating risks to BPS reliability.




Figure 2: United States and Canada Summer Temperature Outlook[10]

[10] Seasonal forecasts obtained from U.S. National Weather Service and Natural Resources Canada: https://www.cpc.ncep.noaa.gov/products/predictions/long_range/ and https://weather.gc.ca/saisons/prob_e.html

Risk Assessment Discussion

NERC assesses the risk of electricity supply shortfall in each assessment area for the upcoming season by considering Planning Reserve Margins, seasonal risk scenarios, probability-based risk assessments, and other available risk information. NERC provides an independent assessment of the potential for each assessment area to have sufficient operating reserves under normal conditions as well as above-normal demand and low-resource output conditions selected for the assessment. A summary of the assessment approach is provided in Table 1.

Table 1: Seasonal Risk Assessment Summary

Category	Criteria[1]
High Potential for insufficient operating reserves in normal peak conditions	• Planning Reserve Margins do not meet Reference Margin Levels • Probabilistic indices exceed benchmarks (e.g., LOLH of 2.4 hours over the season) • Analysis of the risk hour(s) indicates resources will not be sufficient to meet operating reserves under **normal peak-day demand and outage scenarios**[2]
Elevated Potential for insufficient operating reserves in above-normal conditions	• Probabilistic indices are low but not negligible (e.g., LOLH above 0.1 hours over the season) • Analysis of the risk hour(s) indicates resources will not be sufficient to meet operating reserves under **extreme peak-day demand with normal resource scenarios** (i.e., typical or expected outage and derate scenarios for conditions)[2] • Analysis of the risk hour(s) indicates resources will not be sufficient to meet operating reserves under **normal peak-day demand with reduced resources** (i.e., extreme outage and derate scenarios)[3]
Normal Sufficient operating reserves expected	• Probabilistic indices are negligible • Analysis of the risk hour(s) indicates resources will be sufficient to meet operating reserves under normal and extreme peak-day demand and outage scenarios[4]

Table Notes:
[1]The table provides general criteria. Other factors may influence a higher or lower risk assessment.
[2]**Normal resource scenarios** include planned and typical forced outages as well as outages and derates that are closely correlated to the extreme peak demand.
[3]**Reduced resource scenarios** include planned and typical forced outages and low-likelihood resource scenarios, such as extreme low-wind scenarios, low-hydro scenarios during drought years, or high thermal outages when such a scenario is warranted.
[4]Even in normal risk assessment areas, extreme demand and extreme outage scenarios that are not closely linked may indicate risk of operating reserve shortfall.

Assessment of Planning Reserve Margins and Operational Risk Analysis

Anticipated Reserve Margins, which provide the Planning Reserve Margins for normal peak conditions, as well as reserve margins for seasonal risk scenarios of more extreme conditions are provided in Table 2.

Table 2: Seasonal Risk Scenario On-Peak Reserve Margins

Assessment Area	Anticipated Reserve Margin	Anticipated Reserve Margin with Typical Outages	Anticipated Reserve Margin with Higher Demand, Outages, Derates in Extreme Conditions
MISO	24.7%	9.3%	-1.9%
MRO-Manitoba	14.6%	11.2%	3.8%
MRO-SaskPower	33.5%	28.3%	22.4%
MRO-SPP	28.5%	18.2%	3.4%
NPCC-Maritimes	42.2%	31.7%	18.6%
NPCC-New England	14.1%	3.9%	4.0%
NPCC-New York	31.6%	12.5%	5.2%
NPCC-Ontario	23.4%	23.4%	3.7%
NPCC-Québec	32.7%	28.2%	19.1%
PJM	24.7%	15.0%	5.3%
SERC-C	19.6%	12.7%	3.2%
SERC-E	29.1%	21.8%	13.0%
SERC-FP	20.2%	14.0%	11.8%
SERC-SE	41.3%	37.7%	12.5%
TRE-ERCOT	43.2%	33.0%	-5.1%
WECC-AB	42.6%	40.3%	20.5%
WECC-Basin	24.3%	15.9%	-27.2%
WECC-BC	24.3%	24.2%	-6.6%
WECC-CA	56.9%	51.0%	4.7%
WECC-Mex	14.1%	1.6%	-16.8%
WECC-NW	32.1%	29.4%	-13.0%
WECC-RM	25.7%	18.2%	-18.9%
WECC-SW	22.3%	14.0%	-13.0%

Seasonal risk scenarios for each assessment area are presented in the **Regional Assessments Dashboards** section. The on-peak reserve margin and seasonal risk scenario charts in each dashboard provide potential summer peak demand and resource condition information. The reserve margins on the right side of the dashboard pages provide a comparison to the previous year's assessment. The seasonal risk scenario charts present deterministic scenarios for further analysis of different demand and resource levels with adjustments for normal and extreme conditions. The assessment areas determined the adjustments to capacity and peak demand based on methods or assumptions that are summarized in the seasonal risk scenario charts; more information about these dashboard charts is provided in the **Data Concepts and Assumptions** section.

The seasonal risk scenario charts can be expressed in terms of reserve margins: In **Table 2**, each assessment area's Anticipated Reserve Margins are shown alongside the reserve margins for a typical generation outage scenario (where applicable) and the extreme demand and resource conditions in their seasonal risk scenario.

Highlighted in **orange** are the areas identified as having resource adequacy or energy risks for the summer in the **Key Findings** section. The typical outage reserve margin includes anticipated resources minus the capacity that is likely to be in maintenance or forced outage at peak demand. If the typical maintenance or forced outage margin is the same as the Anticipated Reserve Margin, it is because an assessment area has already factored typical outages into the anticipated resources. The extreme conditions margin includes all components of the scenario and represents the most severe operating conditions of an area's scenario. Note that any reserve margin below zero indicates that the resources fall below demand in the scenario.

In addition to the peak demand and seasonal risk hour scenario charts, the assessment areas provided a resource adequacy risk assessment that was probability-based for the summer season. Results are summarized in **Table 3**. The risk assessments account for the hour(s) of greatest risk of resource shortfall. For most areas, the hour(s) of risk coincides with the time of forecasted peak demand; however, some areas incur the greatest risk at other times based on the varying demand and resource profiles. Various risk metrics are provided and include LOLE, LOLH, EUE, and the probabilities of an EEA occurrence.

Energy Emergency Alerts

Extreme generation outages, low resource output, and peak loads similar to those experienced in wide-area heat events and the heat domes experienced in western parts of North America during the last three summers are ongoing reliability risks in certain areas for Summer 2025. When forecasted resources in an area fall below expected demand and operating reserve requirements, BAs may need to employ operating mitigations or EEAs to obtain the capacity and energy necessary for reliability. A description of each EEA level is provided below.

Energy Emergency Alert Levels

EEA Level	Description	Circumstances
EEA1	All available generation resources in use	• The BA is experiencing conditions in which all available generation resources are committed to meet firm load, firm transactions, and reserve commitments and is concerned about sustaining its required contingency reserves. • Non-firm wholesale energy sales (other than those that are recallable to meet reserve requirements) have been curtailed.
EEA2	Load management procedures in effect	• The BA is no longer able to provide its expected energy requirements and is an energy-deficient BA. • An energy-deficient BA has implemented its operating plan(s) to mitigate emergencies. • An energy-deficient BA is still able to maintain minimum contingency reserve requirements.
EEA3	Firm load interruption is imminent or in progress	• The energy-deficient BA is unable to meet minimum contingency reserve requirements.

Table 3: Probability-Based Risk Assessment		
Assessment Area	**Type of Assessment**	**Results and Insight from Assessment**
MISO	The Planning Year 2025–2026 LOLE Study Report, an annual LOLE probabilistic study[11]	The values for LOLH and EUE are taken from the assessment report noted, where the annual LOLE is set at 1 day in 10 years, or 0.1 LOLE for the summer season. For Summer 2025, LOLH is 0.252 hrs/year and EUE is 626.2 MWH/year for the Reference Margin Level. Expectations for load-loss and unserved energy are less than these amounts because MISO's resources are above the Reference Margin Level.
MRO-Manitoba	The 2024 LOLE Study	Manitoba Hydro's probability-based resource adequacy risk assessment for the summer (June–September) season is that there is a low risk of resource adequacy issues. The study indicated Annual Probabilistic Indices for the Manitoba Hydro system for 2026 of 5 MWh per year of EUE, considering a range of flow conditions, and that all of this risk would be in the higher load winter season. The increases in Manitoba load since the 2022 LOLE Study were more than offset by a reduction in long-term exports contract with the expiration of a major export sale in April 2025.
MRO-SaskPower	Probability-based capacity adequacy assessment Summer 2025	According to the study, SaskPower's expected number of hours with an operating reserve shortfall between June and September is about 0.65 hours, assuming maximum available imports. June has the highest likelihood of an EEA, estimated at 0.43 hours. For Summer 2025, the projected probability of experiencing a generation forced outage exceeding 350 MW stands at 21.5%. This number represents an approximation of the likelihood, during any given hour of the summer period, of encountering a generation forced outage surpassing the 350 MW threshold.
MRO-SPP	2024 NERC *LTRA* with Probabilistic Assessment (ProbA)	With the current SPP fleet, the ProbA base case Year 2 produced no LOLE.
NPCC	NPCC conducted an all-hour probabilistic assessment that consisted of a base case and several more severe scenarios examining low resources, reduced imports, and higher loads. The highest peak load scenario has a 7% probability of occurring.	NPCC Regional Entity assesses that there will be an adequate supply of electricity across the Regional Entity this summer. Necessary strategies and procedures are in place to deal with operational challenges and emergencies as they may develop. Preliminary results of the probabilistic analysis by assessment area are below. NPCC anticipates releasing the assessment in May.
NPCC-Maritimes		NPCC's assessment results indicate that Maritimes expects minimal LOLE, LOLH, and EUE over the May–September period, with the highest risk occurring in July and August. The assessment projected LOLE at less than 0.089 days per period, LOLH at less than 0.4 hours per period, and EUE at less than 16.5 MWh per period under the reduced resources and highest peak demand scenario.
NPCC-New England		Based on NPCC's assessment, cumulative LOLE (<0.031 days/period), LOLH (<0.120 hours/period), and EUE (<94 MWh/period) risks were estimated over the summer May to September period for the expected load with expected resources scenario. The highest peak load level conditions with reduced resources scenario resulted in an estimated cumulative LOLE risk (4.369 days/period), with associated LOLH (19.554 hours/period) and EUE (19,847 MWh/period) with the highest risk occurring in June, with some in July and August.
NPCC-New York		Negligible cumulative LOLE (<0.018 days/period), LOLH (<0.054 hours/period), and EUE (33 MWh/period) risks were estimated over the summer May–September period for the expected load with expected resources for the summer. For highest peak load level with low likelihood, reduced resource conditions resulted in an estimated cumulative LOLE risk (1.7 days/period), with associated LOLH (6.5 hours/period) and EUE (4,860 MWh/period) with the highest risk occurring in July and August.


[11] PY 2025–2026 LOLE Study Report

Table 3: Probability-Based Risk Assessment		
Assessment Area	**Type of Assessment**	**Results and Insight from Assessment**
NPCC-Ontario		NPCC's preliminary result of this assessment indicates that the low-likelihood resource case, highest peak load level conditions resulted in a negligible cumulative LOLE (0.081 days/period), with associated cumulative LOLH (0.212 hours/period) and EUE (145.4 MWh/period) with the highest risks occurring predominantly in July, with some in August. Negligible cumulative LOLE, LOLH, and EUE risks were estimated over the May–September summer period for the other scenarios modeled.
NPCC-Québec		The Québec assessment area is not expected to require use of their operating procedures designed to mitigate resource shortages during Summer 2025. Québec did not demonstrate any measurable amounts of cumulative LOLE, LOLH, or EUE risks over the May–September summer period for all the scenarios modeled since the system is winter peaking.
PJM	2023 PJM Reserve Requirement Study (RRS)	PJM is expecting a low risk of resources falling below required operating reserves during Summer 2025. PJM is forecasting around 27% installed reserves (including expected committed demand resources), which is above the target installed reserve margin of 17.7% necessary to meet the 1-day-in-10-years LOLE criterion. The Reserve Requirement Study analyzed a wide range of load scenarios (low, regular, and extreme) as well as multiple scenarios for system-wide unavailable capacity due to forced outages, maintenance outages, and ambient derations. Due to the rather low penetration of limited and variable resources in PJM relative to PJM's peak load, the hour with the most loss-of-load risk remains the hour with the highest forecasted demand.
SERC-Central SERC-East SERC-Florida Peninsula SERC-Southeast	2024 NERC *LTRA* with ProbA. For the ProbA, SERC evaluates 8,760 hourly load and 1,900 sequential Monte Carlo simulations. The results are a probability weighted average of cases, including 38 historic weather-years that are applied to load forecasts for years 2026 and 2028. The model applies a range of economic load forecast errors from -4% to 4% and other noted assumptions.	The 2024 ProbA indicates some resource adequacy risk to SERC with the results for the year 2028 showing slightly higher risk than the year 2026. For the entire SERC footprint, Summer 2026 shows a low risk in summer afternoons into evenings, and for Summer 2028, that risk is still low but extends from summer evenings later into summer nights.
Texas RE-ERCOT	ERCOT probabilistic assessment using the Probabilistic Reserve Risk Model	The simulation indicates some risk of having to declare an EEA for hours ending 20 and 21 for the peak load day in August. These two hours have the highest EEA risk (reflecting corresponding high net load conditions) with probabilities of declaring an EEA 3.05% and 1.54%, respectively. This is categorized by ERCOT as "Low risk" per its criteria of hourly EEA probability that is equal to or less than 10%. For the *2024 SRA*, ERCOT reported EEA declaration probabilities for hours ending 20 and 21 of 18.4% and 9.2%, respectively. The large decrease in EEA probabilities is due to the addition of 7,414 MW of BESS capacity.
WECC	2024 Western Assessment on Resource Adequacy employs a probabilistic energy, area-wide assessment, using Multi Area Variable Resource Integration Convolution (MAVRIC) model	

Table 3: Probability-Based Risk Assessment		
Assessment Area	**Type of Assessment**	**Results and Insight from Assessment**
WECC-AB		Probabilistic analysis performed by WECC found no LOLH or EUE for this summer. All resource margins have increased since last summer with the addition of new capacity, including almost 2,700 MW of new natural gas capacity, 1,200 MW of new wind (+27%), 200 MW of new solar (+13%), and 54 MW of new energy storage systems (+27.5%) on-line. The peak hour has moved earlier, to 3:00 p.m. from 4:00 p.m., still in late July.
WECC-Basin		Probabilistic analysis performed by WECC found no LOLH or EUE for this summer. The reserve margins are not anticipated to fall below the reference margin (14%) for the upcoming summer—existing-certain is forecast at 19% with anticipated and prospective at 24%. The area is expected to peak in early July around 3:00 p.m.
WECC-BC		Probabilistic analysis performed by WECC found no LOLH or EUE for this summer. The reserve margins are not anticipated to fall below the reference margin for the upcoming summer. All reserve margins have increased since 2024 due to increased capacity and energy availability. The peak hour for summer is forecast for early August around 4 p.m.
WECC-CA		Probabilistic analysis performed by WECC found no LOLH or EUE for this summer. The reserve margins are not anticipated to fall below the reference margin for the upcoming summer. Reserve margins have increased since last summer with the increased existing-certain and Tier 1 planned capacity more than offsetting the decrease in available demand response.
WECC-Mex		Probabilistic analysis performed by WECC found no LOLH or EUE for this summer. The peak hour is expected to occur in early August around 4:00 p.m. The reserve margins (14%) are not anticipated to fall below the reference margin (10%) for the upcoming summer. An extreme summer peak load is anticipated to be 4,067 MW. Under extreme conditions, typical forced outages are expected to be 472 MW and derates for thermal generation resources are expected to be 330 MW, requiring imports from neighboring areas. The expected operating reserve requirement on peak is 226 MW.
WECC-RM		Probabilistic analysis performed by WECC found no LOLH or EUE for this summer. The peak hour is expected to occur in late July around 4:00 p.m. Summer 2025 reserve margins (existing-certain 25%, and anticipated and prospective 26%) are not anticipated to fall below the reference margin (17%). An extreme summer peak load may be around 15 GW, and the area has 17.3 GW of existing-certain capacity plus 104 MW of planned new resources. Typical forced outages could be 1,044 MW and derates under extreme conditions of 1,561 MW for thermal and 990 MW for wind. The expected operating reserve requirement on peak is 846 MW.
WECC-NW		Probabilistic analysis performed by WECC found no LOLH or EUE for this summer. Summer 2025 peak hour is expected to occur in early July around 5:00 p.m. Reserve margins (existing-certain 29% and anticipated and prospective 32%) are not anticipated to fall below the reference margin (23%). An extreme summer peak load may be around 32,740 MW. Typical forced outages are forecast to be 777 MW with derates for thermal under extreme conditions to be 1,584 MW and 2,649 MW for wind. The expected operating reserve requirement on peak is 1,750 MW.
WECC-SW		Probabilistic analysis performed by WECC found no LOLH or EUE for this summer. The peak hour is expected to occur in early July around 5:00 p.m. The existing-certain 17% reserve margin does not fall below the reference margin (13%) for the upcoming summer. The anticipated and prospective reserve margin rises to 22%. An extreme summer peak load could approach 40 GW during the riskiest hour, while the region is anticipated to have 40.3 GW of existing-certain energy available and an additional 2 GW of Tier 1 planned resources. Typical forced outages are estimated near 3 GW, and derates for thermal under extreme conditions can shave another 3 GW from available energy. The expected operating reserve requirement is 2,119 MW.

Regional Assessments Dashboards

The following assessment area dashboards and summaries were developed based on data and narrative information collected by NERC from the six Regional Entities on an assessment area basis. Guidelines and definitions are in the **Data Concepts and Assumptions** table. On-peak reserve margin bar charts show the Anticipated Reserve Margin compared to a Reference Margin Level that is established for the areas to meet resource adequacy criteria. Prospective Reserve Margins can give an indication of additional on-peak capacity but are not used for assessing adequacy. The operational risk analysis shown in the following regional assessments dashboard pages provides a deterministic scenario for understanding how various factors that affect resources and demand can combine to impact overall resource adequacy. For each assessment area, there is a risk-period scenario graphic; the left **blue** column shows anticipated resources (from the **Demand and Resource Tables**), and the **orange** column at the right shows the two demand scenarios of the normal peak net internal demand (from the **Demand and Resource Tables**) and the extreme summer peak demand determined by the assessment area. The middle **red** or **green** bars show adjustments that are applied cumulatively to the anticipated resources. Adjustments may include reductions for typical generation outages (maintenance and forced not already accounted for in anticipated resources) and additions that represent the quantified capacity from operational tools (if any) that are available during scarcity conditions but have not been accounted for in the *SRA* reserve margins. Resources throughout the scenario are compared against expected operating reserve requirements that are based on peak load and normal weather. The cumulative effects from extreme events are also factored in through additional resource derates or low-output scenarios. In addition, results from a probability-based resource adequacy assessment are shown in the Highlights section of each dashboard. Methods varied by assessment area and provided further insights into the risk conditions forecasted for the summer period.






MISO

MISO is a not-for profit, member-based organization that administers wholesale electricity markets that provide customers with valued service; reliable, cost-effective systems and operations; dependable and transparent prices; open access to markets; and planning for long-term efficiency. MISO manages energy, reliability, and operating reserve markets that consist of 36 local BA and 394 market participants, serving approximately 42 million customers. Although parts of MISO fall in three Regional Entities, MRO is responsible for coordinating data and information submitted for NERC's reliability assessments.

Highlights

- Demand forecasts and resource data indicate that MISO is at elevated risk of operating reserve shortfalls during periods of high demand or low resource output.
- The performance of wind and solar generators during periods of high electricity demand is a key factor in determining whether system operators need to employ operating mitigations, such as maximum generation declarations and energy emergencies; MISO has over 31,000 MW of installed wind capacity and 18,245 MW of installed solar capacity; however, the historically based on-peak capacity contribution is 5,616 MW and 9,123 MW, respectively.
- Since last summer, over 1,400 MW of thermal generating capacity has been retired in MISO, and the new generation that has been added is predominantly solar (8,080 MW nameplate/4,140 MW on-peak).
- MISO's most recent energy assessment reveals that the period of highest energy shortfall risk has shifted from July to August.


On-Peak Reserve Margin




Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under normal peak-demand scenarios. Above-normal summer peak load and extreme generator outage conditions could result in the need to employ operating mitigations (e.g., load-modifying resources and energy transfers from neighboring systems) and EEAs. Emergency declarations that can only be called upon when available generation is at maximum capability are necessary to access load-modifying resources (demand response) when operating reserve shortfalls are projected.

On-Peak Fuel Mix



2025 Summer Risk Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) and (90/10) demand forecast using 30 years of historical data

Maintenance Outages: Rolling five-year summer average of maintenance and planned outages

Forced Outages: Five-year average of all outages that were not planned

Extreme Derates: Maximum historical generation outages

Operational Mitigations: A total of 2.4 GW capacity resources available during extreme operating conditions



MRO-Manitoba Hydro

Manitoba Hydro is a provincial Crown corporation and one of the largest integrated electricity and natural gas distribution utilities in Canada. Manitoba Hydro is a leader in providing renewable energy and clean-burning natural gas. Manitoba Hydro provides electricity to approximately 608,500 electric customers in Manitoba and natural gas to approximately 293,000 customers in southern Manitoba. Its service area is the province of Manitoba, which is 251,000 square miles. Manitoba Hydro is winter peaking. Manitoba Hydro is its own Planning Coordinator (PC) and BA. Manitoba Hydro is a coordinating member of MISO, which is the RC for Manitoba Hydro.


Highlights

- Manitoba Hydro is not anticipating any operational challenges and/or emerging reliability issues in its assessment area for Summer 2025; the Anticipated Reserve Margin for Summer 2025 exceeds the 12% Reference Margin Level.
- While Manitoba Hydro experienced demand growth in the past year, the growth is less than the recent reduction in firm export contracts.
- Manitoba Hydro water supply conditions are below average but improved from this time last year, and above-average winter snowfall will favorably impact spring runoff.
- Manitoba Hydro expects to reliably supply its internal demand and export obligations even if extreme drought develops throughout the year.


Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under the assessed scenarios.


On-Peak Reserve Margin



On-Peak Fuel Mix



2025 Summer Risk Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: (50/50) Demand with allowance for extreme demand based on extreme summer weather scenario of 35.4 C (96 F)

Forced Outages: Typical forced outages

Extreme Derates: Summer wind capacity accreditation of 18.1% of nameplate rating based on MISO seasonal analysis

Normal hydro generation expected for this summer.

Operational Mitigations: Utilize Curtailable Rate Program to manage peak demand; utilize operating reserve if additional measures required



MRO-SaskPower

MRO-SaskPower is an assessment area in the Saskatchewan province of Canada. The province has a geographic area of 651,900 square kilometers (251,700 square miles) and a population of approximately 1.1 million. Peak demand is experienced in the winter. The Saskatchewan Power Corporation (SaskPower) is the PC and RC for the province of Saskatchewan and is the principal supplier of electricity in the province. SaskPower is a provincial Crown corporation and, under provincial legislation, is responsible for the reliability oversight of the Saskatchewan BES and its Interconnections.


Highlights

- Although Saskatchewan is mainly a winter-peaking region, summer can also bring high electricity demand due to extreme heat.
- Each year, SaskPower works with Manitoba Hydro on a joint summer operating study with input from the Western Area Power Administration and Basin Electric to develop operational guidelines to address any potential challenges.
- The expected number of hours with an operating reserve shortfall between June and September is about 0.65 hours, assuming maximum available imports. The risk of shortfall increases if major unplanned generator outages coincide with scheduled maintenance during peak demand months (June to September). For Summer 2025, the projected probability of experiencing a generation forced outage exceeding 350 MW stands at 21.5%. This number represents an approximation of the likelihood of encountering a generation forced outage surpassing the 350 MW threshold during any given hour of the summer period.
- If extreme heat coincides with significant generation outages, SaskPower will act by activating demand-response programs, arranging short-term power imports from neighboring utilities, and, if necessary, implementing temporary load interruptions to maintain grid stability.


Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under normal peak demand and outage conditions. Above-normal summer peak load and outage conditions are likely to result in the need to employ operating mitigations (e.g., demand response and transfers) and EEAs.


On-Peak Reserve Margin



On-Peak Fuel Mix



2025 Summer Risk Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) and above-normal scenario based on peak demand with lighting and all consumer loads

Forced Outages: Estimated by using SaskPower forced outage model

Extreme Derates: Estimated resources unavailable in extreme conditions

Operational Mitigations: Estimated non-firm imports and standby generators on 2–7-day notice




MRO-SPP

SPP PC's footprint covers 546,000 square miles and encompasses all or parts of Arkansas, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas, and Wyoming. The SPP long-term assessment is reported based on the PC footprint, which touches parts of the MRO Regional Entity and the WECC Regional Entity. The SPP assessment area footprint has approximately 61,000 miles of transmission lines, 756 generating plants, and 4,811 transmission-class substations, and it serves a population of more than 18 million.

Highlights

- SPP projects a low likelihood of any emerging reliability issues impacting the area for the 2025 Summer season.
- Generation availability is not expected to be impacted by fuel shortages or river conditions this summer.
- BA generation capacity deficiency risks remain depending on wind generation output levels and unanticipated generation outages in combination with high load periods.
- Using the current operational processes and procedures, SPP will continue to assess the resource needs for the 2025 Summer season and will adjust generation and energy supply portfolios as needed to ensure that real-time energy sufficiency is maintained throughout the summer.


On-Peak Reserve Margin




Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources are sufficient to meet operating reserve requirements under normal peak-demand and outage scenarios. Above-normal summer peak load, low wind conditions, and higher-than-normal forced outages could result in the need for operating mitigations (e.g., demand response and transfers from neighboring systems) and EEAs.

On-Peak Fuel Mix



2025 Summer Risk Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) and extreme demand is a 5% increase from net internal demand

Maintenance and Forced Outages: Represent five-year historical averages; calculated from SPP's generation assessment process

Extreme Derates: Additional unavailable capacity from operational data at high-demand periods

Low Wind Scenario: Derates reflecting a low-wind day in the summer




NPCC-Maritimes

The Maritimes assessment area is a winter-peaking NPCC area that contains two BAs. It is comprised of the Canadian provinces of New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island and the northern portion of Maine, which is radially connected to the New Brunswick power system. The area covers 58,000 square miles with a total population of 1.9 million.

Highlights

- As Maritimes is a winter-peaking system, no issues are expected for the upcoming summer assessment period with sufficient firm capacity to meet forecast peak demand. If an event were to occur, emergency operations and planning procedures are in place.
- Probabilistic analysis performed by NPCC for the NPCC *Summer Reliability Assessment* found negligible LOLH and EUE for the expected load and resource levels this summer. A scenario with an extreme high load shape produced minimal amounts of cumulative LOLE (<0.089 days/period), LOLH (<0.4 hours/period), or EUE (< 16.5 MWh/period) over the May–September summer period with the highest risk occurring in July and August.
- Dual-fueled units will have sufficient supplies of heavy fuel oil (HFO) on site to sustain operations in the event of natural gas supply interruptions.


On-Peak Reserve Margin




Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under normal peak-demand scenarios. Above-normal summer peak load or extreme outage conditions could necessitate operating mitigations (e.g., demand response and non-firm transfers) and EEAs.

On-Peak Fuel Mix



2025 Summer Risk Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) and (above 90/10) extreme demand forecast

Forced Outages: Based on historical operating experience

Extreme Derates: A low-likelihood scenario resulting in an additional 50% derate in the remaining capacity of both natural gas and wind resources under extreme conditions

Operational Mitigations: Imports anticipated from neighbors during emergencies, (e.g. New Brunswick Power System Operator can increase import capability from 200 MW to 550 MW under emergency operations for up to 30 minutes)



NPCC-New England


NPCC-New England is an assessment area consisting of the states of Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont that is served by ISO New England (ISO-NE) Inc. ISO-NE is a regional transmission organization that is responsible for the reliable day-to-day operation of New England's bulk power generation and transmission system, administration of the area's wholesale electricity markets, and management of the comprehensive planning of the regional BPS.

The New England BPS serves approximately 14.5 million customers over 68,000 square miles.

Highlights

- ISO-NE forecasts adequate transmission capability and manageable capacity margins to meet the expected peak demand.
- Probabilistic analysis performed by NPCC for the NPCC *Summer Reliability Assessment* identified small amounts of cumulative LOLE, LOLH, and EUE for the expected load with anticipated resources for the summer. A reduced resources and highest peak load level scenario resulted in an estimated cumulative LOLE risk of 4.369 days/period, with associated LOLH (19.554 hours/period) and EUE (19,847 MWh/period). The highest risk occurs in June, with some risk in July and August.
- The NPCC 2025 *Summer Reliability Assessment* will be approved on or about May 12, 2025, and posted on NPCC's website.


On-Peak Reserve Margin




Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources do not meet operating reserve requirements under normal peak-demand and outage scenarios. Additional non-firm transfers are likely to be needed and available from neighbors. More severe conditions (e.g., above-normal summer peak load and outage conditions) could result in an EEA.

On-Peak Fuel Mix



2025 Summer Risk Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Peak net internal demand (50/50) and (90/10) extreme demand forecast

Maintenance Outages: Based on historical weekly averages

Typical Forced Outages: Based on seasonal capacity of each resource as determined by ISO-NE

Operational Mitigations: Based on load and capacity relief assumed available from invocation of ISO-NE operating procedures



NPCC-New York

NPCC-New York is an assessment area consisting of the New York ISO (NYISO) service territory. NYISO is responsible for operating New York's BPS, administering wholesale electricity markets, and conducting system planning. NYISO is the only BA within the state of New York. The BPS in New York encompasses over 11,000 miles of transmission lines and 760 power generation units and serves 20.2 million customers. For this *SRA*, the established Reference Margin Level is 15%. Wind, grid-connected solar PV, and run-of-river totals were derated for this calculation. However, New York requires load-serving entities to procure capacity for their loads equal to their peak demand plus an Installed Reserve Margin (IRM). The IRM requirement represents a percentage of capacity above peak load forecast and is approved annually by the New York State Reliability Council. The council approved the 2025–2026 IRM at 24.4%.


Highlights

- NYISO is not anticipating any operational issues for the upcoming summer operating period. Adequate reserve margins are anticipated.
- Probabilistic analysis performed by NPCC for the NPCC *Summer Reliability Assessment* found that use of New York's established operating procedures are sufficient to maintain a balance between electricity supply and expected 50/50 demand if needed to mitigate resource shortages during Summer 2025. Negligible cumulative LOLE (<0.018 days/period), LOLH (<0.054 hours/period), and EUE (33 MWh/period) risks were estimated over the summer May to September period for the expected load with expected resources for the summer. The highest peak load level with low likelihood reduced resource conditions resulted in an estimated cumulative LOLE risk (1.7 days/period), with associated LOLH (6.5 hours/period) and EUE (4860 MWh/period) with the highest risk occurring in July and August.
- The NPCC 2025 *Summer Reliability Assessment* will be approved on or about May 12, 2025, and posted on NPCC's website.


Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under the assessed scenarios. Operating mitigations (e.g., demand response and transfers) may be needed to meet above-normal summer peak load and outage conditions.


On-Peak Reserve Margin



On-Peak Fuel Mix



2025 Summer Risk Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) and (90/10) extreme demand forecast

Maintenance Outages: Based on historical performance and the new NYISO capacity accreditation process

Forced Outages: Based on historical five-year averages

Extreme Derates: Estimated resources unavailable in extreme conditions

Operational Mitigations: A total of 3.2 GW based on operational/emergency procedures in area emergency operations manual



NPCC-Ontario

NPCC-Ontario is an assessment area in the Ontario province of Canada. The Independent Electricity System Operator (IESO) is the BA for the province of Ontario. The province of Ontario covers more than 1 million square kilometers (415,000 square miles) and has a population of m16 million. Ontario is interconnected electrically with Québec, MRO-Manitoba, states in MISO (Minnesota and Michigan), and NPCC-New York.


Highlights

- Overall, Ontario is operating within a period where generation and transmission outages are more challenging to accommodate. The IESO is prepared and expects to have adequate supply for Summer 2025.
- The IESO has been actively coordinating and planning with market participants to maintain reliability.
- This season, the grid will benefit from increased capacity secured through the capacity auction and more planned projects, including new storage, coming into service.
- The IESO is working throughout 2025 to better integrate storage solutions into the electricity markets.
- Starting with this seasonal assessment, demand is forecasted by using probabilistic weather modeling, comparable to the methodology used in the IESO 18-month *Reliability Outlook* as opposed to the previous approach of using weather scenarios."


Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under the assessed scenarios.


On-Peak Reserve Margin



On-Peak Fuel Mix



2025 Summer Risk Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50 forecast) and highest weather-adjusted daily demand based on 31 years of demand history, and extreme weather represents a 97/3 distribution of probabilistically modelled data

Extreme Derates: Derived from weather-adjusted temperature rating of thermal units and adjustments to expected hydro production for low water conditions

Operational Mitigations: The operational procedures used to mitigate extreme conditions total approximately 2,010 MW for the On-Peak Risk Scenario, consisting of imports, public appeals, and voltage reductions. Public appeals and voltage reductions were not included in the 2024 On-Peak Risk Scenario.



NPCC-Québec

The Québec assessment area (province of Québec) is a winter-peaking NPCC area that covers 595,391 square miles with a population of 8 million. Québec is one of the four Interconnections in North America; it has ties to Ontario, New York, New England, and the Maritimes consisting of either high-voltage direct current ties, radial generation, or load to and from neighboring systems.


Highlights

- The Québec area forecasted summer peak demand is 23,283 MW during the week beginning August 3, 2025, with a forecasted net margin of 5,698 MW (24.5%).
- Resource adequacy issues are not expected this summer.
- The Québec area expects to be able to assist other areas.
- Modeling was made more precise this year with the inclusion of summer demand-response programs, dispatchable demand-side management (DSM), and weekly modeling of the reserve requirements and bottled generation.


Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under the assessed scenarios.


On-Peak Reserve Margin



On-Peak Fuel Mix



2025 Summer Risk Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenario: Net internal demand (50/50) and (90/10) demand forecast

Operational mitigations: An operational procedure used to mitigate extreme conditions and not already included in margins is the depletion of some operating reserves by 750 MW.



PJM

PJM Interconnection is a regional transmission organization that coordinates the movement of wholesale electricity in all or parts of Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, and the District of Columbia. PJM serves 65 million customers and covers 369,089 square miles. PJM is a BA, PC, Transmission Planner, Resource Planner, Interchange Authority, TOP, Transmission Service Provider, and RC.


Highlights

- PJM is forecasting 27% installed reserves (including expected committed demand response), which is above the target installed reserve margin of 17.7% necessary to meet the 1-day-in-10-years LOLE criterion.
- During extreme high temperatures that can cause record demand, PJM anticipates the need for demand-response resources to help reduce load at times this summer.


Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under the assessed scenarios.


On-Peak Reserve Margin



On-Peak Fuel Mix



2025 Summer Risk Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) and (90/10) demand forecast

Forced Outages: Based on historical data and trending

Extreme Derates: Accounts for reduced thermal capacity contributions due to performance in extreme conditions

Operational Mitigations: A total of 3 GW based on operational/emergency procedures




SERC-Central

SERC-Central is an assessment area within the SERC Regional Entity. SERC-Central includes all of Tennessee and portions of Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Missouri, and Kentucky. Historically a summer-peaking area, SERC-Central is beginning to have higher peak demand forecasts in winter. SERC is one of the six companies across North America that are responsible for the work under Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)-approved delegation agreements with NERC. SERC-Central is specifically responsible for the reliability and security of the electric grid across the Southeastern and Central areas of the United States. This area covers approximately 630,000 square miles and serves a population of more than 91 million. The SERC Regional Entity includes 36 BAs, 28 planning entities, and 6 RCs.

Highlights

- SERC-Central saw a sizable increase in its reserves last summer, but coal retirements this summer will result in SERC-Central having lower reserves.
- SERC-Central's anticipated resources meet operating reserve requirements under the expected conditions and under the summer risk period scenario.
- The probabilistic analysis metrics indicate adequate energy resources for the area.
- Entities perform resource studies to ensure resource adequacy to meet the summer peak demand and maintain the reliability of the system.
- Members of SERC-Central actively participate in the SERC working groups to perform coordinated studies and develop mitigating actions for any potential or emerging reliability impacts on transmission and resource adequacy.


On-Peak Reserve Margin




Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under assessed scenarios. More severe conditions (e.g., above-normal summer peak load and outage conditions) result in the need for additional non-firm transfers available from neighbors.

On-Peak Fuel Mix



2025 Summer Risk Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) and extreme demand forecast based on extreme summer weather (equals or exceeds the (90/10) demand forecast)

Maintenance Outages: Adjusted for higher outages resulting from extreme summer temperatures and aggregated on a SERC subregional level

Forced Outages: Accounts for reduced thermal capacity contributions due to performance in extreme conditions

Operational Mitigations: 5.6 GW based on operational/emergency procedures




SERC-East

SERC-East is an assessment area within the SERC Regional Entity. SERC-East includes North Carolina and South Carolina. Historically a summer-peaking area, SERC-East is beginning to have higher peak demand forecasts in winter. SERC is one of the six companies across North America that are responsible for the work under FERC-approved delegation agreements with NERC. SERC is specifically responsible for the reliability and security of the electric grid across the Southeastern and Central areas of the United States. This area covers approximately 630,000 square miles and serves a population of more than 91 million. The SERC Regional Entity includes 36 BAs, 28 planning entities, and 6 RCs.

Highlights

- SERC-East's reserves are largely unchanged compared to the reference margin as compared to last summer's assessment.
- SERC-East's anticipated resources meet operating reserve requirements under the expected conditions and under the summer risk period scenario.
- While the last probabilistic analysis indicated that SERC-East could face potential unserved energy in summer, the 2026 and 2028 probabilistic analysis found the SERC-East unserved energy risk has shifted to winter mornings.
- Members of SERC-East actively participate in the SERC working groups to perform coordinated studies and develop mitigating actions for any potential or emerging reliability impacts on transmission and resource adequacy.


On-Peak Reserve Margin



Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under the assessed scenarios.

On-Peak Fuel Mix



2025 Summer Risk Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) and extreme demand forecast based on extreme summer weather (equals or exceeds the (90/10) demand forecast)

Maintenance Outages: Adjusted for higher outages resulting from extreme summer temperatures and aggregated on a SERC subregional level

Forced Outages: Accounts for reduced thermal capacity contributions due to performance in extreme conditions

Operational Mitigations: A total of 45 MW based on operational/emergency procedures




SERC-Florida Peninsula

SERC-Florida Peninsula is a summer-peaking assessment area within SERC. SERC is one of the six companies across North America that are responsible for the work under FERC-approved delegation agreements with NERC. SERC is specifically responsible for the reliability and security of the electric grid across the Southeastern and Central areas of the United States. This area covers approximately 630,000 square miles and serves a population of more than 91 million. The SERC Regional Entity includes 36 BAs, 28 planning entities, and 6 RCs.

Highlights

- SERC Florida-Peninsula's anticipated resources meet operating reserve requirements under the expected conditions and under the summer risk period scenario.
- The probabilistic analysis metrics indicate adequate energy resources for the subregion during the summer.
- Members of SERC-Florida Peninsula actively participate in the SERC working groups to perform coordinated studies and develop mitigating actions for any potential or emerging reliability impacts on transmission and resource adequacy.
- Entities have not identified any emerging reliability issues or operational concerns for the upcoming summer season.


On-Peak Reserve Margin




Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under the assessed scenarios.

On-Peak Fuel Mix



2025 Summer Risk Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) and extreme demand forecast based on extreme summer weather (equals or exceeds the (90/10) demand forecast)

Maintenance Outages: Adjusted for higher outages resulting from extreme summer temperatures and aggregated on a SERC subregional level

Forced Outages: Accounts for reduced thermal capacity contributions due to performance in extreme conditions




SERC-Southeast

SERC-Southeast is a summer-peaking assessment area within the SERC Regional Entity. SERC-Southeast includes all or portions of Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi. SERC is one of the six companies across North America that are responsible for the work under FERC-approved delegation agreements with NERC. SERC is specifically responsible for the reliability and security of the electric grid across the Southeastern and Central areas of the United States. This area covers approximately 630,000 square miles and serves a population of more than 91 million. The SERC Regional Entity includes 36 BAs, 28 planning entities, and 6 RCs.

Highlights

- An area within SERC-Southeast notes that natural gas pipeline constraints could impact reliability in summer, but this is not expected to pose a significant summer operational challenge.
- SERC-Southeast's anticipated resources meet operating reserve requirements under the expected conditions and under the summer risk period scenario.
- The probabilistic analysis metrics indicate adequate energy resources for the subregion.
- Members of SERC-Southeast actively participate in the SERC working groups to perform coordinated studies and develop mitigating actions for any potential or emerging reliability impacts on transmission and resource adequacy.


On-Peak Reserve Margin




Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under the assessed scenarios.

On-Peak Fuel Mix



2025 Summer Risk Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) and extreme demand forecast based on extreme summer weather (equals or exceeds the (90/10) demand forecast)

Maintenance Outages: Adjusted for higher outages resulting from extreme summer temperatures and aggregated on a SERC subregional level

Forced Outages: Accounts for reduced thermal capacity contributions due to performance in extreme conditions

Extreme Derates: Estimated resources unavailable in extreme conditions

Operational Mitigations: A total of 3 GW based on operational/emergency procedures



Texas RE-ERCOT

The Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) is the independent system operator (ISO) for the ERCOT Interconnection and is located entirely in the state of Texas; it operates as a single BA. It also performs financial settlement for the competitive wholesale bulk-power market and administers retail switching for nearly 8 million premises in competitive choice areas. ERCOT is governed by a board of directors and subject to oversight by the Public Utility Commission of Texas and the Texas Legislature. ERCOT is summer-peaking, and the forecasted summer peak load month is August. It covers approximately 200,000 square miles, connects over 52,700 miles of transmission lines, has over 1,100 generation units, and serves more than 26 million customers. Texas RE is responsible for the Regional Entity functions described in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 for ERCOT. On November 3, 2022, the Public Utility Commission of Texas issued an order directing ERCOT to assume the duties and responsibilities of the reliability monitor for the Texas grid.


Highlights

- ERCOT expects to have sufficient operating reserves for the August peak load hour given normal summer system conditions.
- ERCOT's probabilistic risk assessment indicates a low risk of having to declare EEAs during the expected August (and summer) peak load day; the EEA probability for the highest-risk hour—hour ending 9:00 p.m.—is 3.6%. The likelihood of an EEA is down significantly from the 2024 SRA due to almost a doubling of battery energy storage capacity and improved energy availability reflecting new battery storage and operational rules.
- Continued robust growth in both loads and intermittent renewable resources drives a higher risk of emergency conditions in the evening hours when solar generation ramps down and loads remain elevated.
- The South Texas IROL continues to present a risk of ERCOT directing system-wide firm load shedding to remain within IROL limits. This risk has been mitigated by updating transmission line dynamic ratings and switching actions to divert power away from the most limiting transmission circuits. The South Texas transmission limits are expected to be needed at least until the San Antonio South Reliability Project is placed in service, which is anticipated to be in Summer 2027.
- ERCOT will release its own August 2025 Monthly Outlook for Resource Adequacy on June 6.


Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements for the peak demand hour scenario. However, there is a risk of supply shortages during evening hours (when solar generation ramps down and demand remains high) if there are conventional generation forced outages or extreme low-wind conditions.


On-Peak Reserve Margin



On-Peak Fuel Mix



2025 Summer Risk Period Scenario (9:00 p.m. local time)



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at hour ending 9 p.m. local time as solar PV output is diminished and demand remains high

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) and extreme demand (95/5) based on August peak load

Forced Outages: Based on the 95th percentile of historical averages of forced outages for June through September weekdays, hours ending 3:00–8:00 p.m. local time for the last three summer seasons

Extreme Derates: Based on the 90th percentile of thermal forced outages for peak August load day

Low Wind Scenario: Based on the 10th percentile of historical averages of hourly wind for June through September, hours ending 1:00–9:00 p.m. local time

Operational Mitigations: Additional capacity from switchable generation and additional imports



WECC-Alberta

WECC-Alberta is a winter-peaking assessment area in the WECC Regional Entity that consists of the province of Alberta. It has 16,369 miles of transmission. WECC is responsible for coordinating and promoting BES reliability in the Western Interconnection. WECC's 329 members include 40 BAs, representing a wide spectrum of organizations with an interest in the BES. Serving an area of nearly 1.8 million square miles and more than 84.5 million customers, it is geographically the largest and most diverse Regional Entity.


Highlights

- Anticipated and prospective reserve margins are projected to remain above the Reference Margin Level.
- All resource margins have increased by about 50% since last summer with the addition of 23.2% new capacity, including almost 2,700 MW of new natural gas capacity, 1,200 MW of new wind (+27%), 200 MW of new solar (+13%), and 54 MW of new energy storage systems (+27.5%).
- The peak hour has moved earlier, to 3:00 p.m. from 4:00 p.m., still in late July.
- High temperatures, import limitations, and low or declining renewable output during summer evenings can result in grid alerts.
- Wildfires can threaten generating assets and transmission infrastructure requiring invocation of Alberta Electric System Operator (AESO) protocols that include instructing available assets and long lead-time assets to deliver energy up to their maximum capability, calling upon demand response, and maximizing import capability.


Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under the assessed scenarios.


On-Peak Reserve Margin



On-Peak Fuel Mix



2025 Summer Risk Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) and (90/10) demand forecast

Typical Forced Outages: Average seasonal outages

Extreme Derates: Using (90/10) point of resource performance distribution



WECC-Basin

WECC-Basin is a summer-peaking assessment area in the WECC Regional Entity that includes Utah, southern Idaho, and a portion of western Wyoming, covering Idaho Power and PacifiCorp's eastern Balancing Authority Area. The population of this area is approximately 5.4 million. It has 15,910 miles of transmission. WECC is responsible for coordinating and promoting BES reliability in the Western Interconnection. WECC's 329 members include 40 BAs, representing a wide spectrum of organizations with an interest in the BES. Serving an area of nearly 1.8 million square miles and more than 84.5 million customers, it is geographically the largest and most diverse Regional Entity. *Note: The 2025 SRA includes a new assessment area map for the U.S. Western Interconnection. The new assessment area boundaries provide more geographic detail of reliability risk information. WECC-Basin is a new assessment area in 2025 that was part of WECC-NW in the 2024 SRA.*

Highlights


- Total internal expected demand has increased 8% and demand response has increased almost 28% for a net internal demand increase of 7.2%.
- Reserve margins are not anticipated to fall below the reference margin (14%) for the upcoming summer; an early July peak is expected at around 3:00 p.m.
- During periods of contingency reserve shortage, EEAs may be declared in the region to obtain reserves from the Northwest Power Pool.
- Seasonal fluctuations in hydro supply require monitoring and forecasting to have high certainty that these resources will meet anticipated capacity; the Summer 2025 drought outlook for the United States indicates minimal drought conditions in Idaho and some drought areas in Utah this summer.
- Wildfires near wind generation can result in safety curtailments, and fire damage to transmission lines interconnected to hydro sites can present restoration challenges.

Risk Scenario Summary


Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under the assessed scenarios with imports.

On-Peak Reserve Margin


(Note: year comparison not available)



On-Peak Fuel Mix



2025 Summer Risk Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) and (90/10) demand forecast

Forced Outages: Average seasonal outages

Extreme Derates: Using (90/10) resource performance distribution at peak hour



WECC-British Columbia

WECC-British Columbia (BC) is a winter-peaking assessment area in the WECC Regional Entity that consists of the province of British Columbia. It has 11,184 miles of transmission. WECC is responsible for coordinating and promoting BES reliability in the Western Interconnection. WECC's 329 members include 40 BAs, representing a wide spectrum of organizations with an interest in the BES. Serving an area of nearly 1.8 million square miles and more than 84.5 million customers, it is geographically the largest and most diverse Regional Entity.


Highlights

- Existing capacity reserve margin has increased from 19% to 22%, and anticipated and prospective reserve margin from 19% to 24%.
- Reserve margins are not anticipated to fall below the reference margin for the upcoming summer.
- The peak hour is forecast for early August at 4:00 p.m., two hours earlier than last summer's outlook of 6:00 p.m.
- About 60% of hydro owned or contracted energy comes from the Columbia and Peace basins. Heavy precipitation in Fall 2024 mitigated the impact of below-average snowpack the previous winter, resulting in hydro storage tracking close to historical averages as of Spring 2025.
- Wildfires can affect the transmission network and generator availability and have caused energy emergencies on the electric system in the past.


Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under the assessed scenarios.


On-Peak Reserve Margin



On-Peak Fuel Mix



2025 Summer Risk Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) and (90/10) demand forecast

Forced Outages: Average seasonal outages

Extreme Derates: Using (90/10) resource performance distribution at peak hour



WECC-California

WECC-California is a summer-peaking assessment area in the Western Interconnection that includes most of California and a small section of Nevada. The assessment area has a population of over 42.5 million people. The area includes the California ISO, Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, Turlock Irrigation District, and the Balancing Area of Northern California. It has 32,712 miles of transmission. WECC is responsible for coordinating and promoting BES reliability in the Western Interconnection. WECC's 329 members include 40 BAs, representing a wide spectrum of organizations with an interest in the BES. Serving an area of nearly 1.8 million square miles and more than 84.5 million customers, it is geographically the largest and most diverse Regional Entity. *Note: The 2025 SRA includes a new assessment area map for the U.S. Western Interconnection. The new assessment area boundaries provide more geographic detail of reliability risk information. WECC-California is a new assessment area in 2025 that was part of WECC-CA/MX in the 2024 SRA*.

Highlights


- Demand response is down 8.6% since last summer, existing-certain capacity is up 5.8%, and Tier 1 planned capacity is up 41.2% for a net increase in anticipated resources of 9%; anticipated and prospective reserve margins are up by 11.4%. The peak hour is still forecasted for early September around 4:00 p.m.
- Reserve margins are not anticipated to fall below the reference margin for the upcoming summer, and probabilistic assessment of normal and extreme resource/demand scenarios reveal no EUE or LOLH.
- Wildfires can and have threatened both the California Oregon Intertie line, resulting in import capability limitations.
- Prolonged elevated demand during heat waves in combination with thermal resource derates and forced outage rates present significant risk.
- An influx of IBRs and corresponding reduction in system inertia can potentially trigger system reliability issues and require additional regulation, flexible ramp, and future imbalance reserve requirements.
- Increased solar penetrations in this region along with changing load patterns from elevated temperatures and residential demand are shifting the hours with the most challenging resource adequacy needs later into the evening rather than traditional afternoon gross peak load periods.

Risk Scenario Summary


Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under assessed scenarios, and a probabilistic assessment of normal and extreme resource/demand scenarios reveals neither EUE nor LOLH.

On-Peak Reserve Margin


(Note: year comparison not available)



On-Peak Fuel Mix



2025 Summer Risk Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) at risk hour and (90/10) demand forecast at risk hour

Forced Outages: Estimated using market forced outage model

Extreme Derates: On natural gas units based on historical data and manufacturer data for temperature performance and outages



WECC-Mexico

WECC-Mexico is a summer-peaking assessment area in the Western Interconnection that includes the northern portion of the Mexican state of Baja California, which has a population of 3.8 million people and includes CENACE. It has 1,568 miles of transmission. WECC is responsible for coordinating and promoting BES reliability in the Western Interconnection. WECC's 329 members include 40 BAs, representing a wide spectrum of organizations with an interest in the BES. Serving an area of nearly 1.8 million square miles and more than 84.5 million customers, it is geographically the largest and most diverse Regional Entity. *Note: The 2025 SRA includes a new assessment area map for the U.S. Western Interconnection. The new assessment area boundaries provide more geographic detail of reliability risk information. WECC-Mexico is a new assessment area in 2025 that was part of WECC-CA/MX in the 2024 SRA.*

Highlights


- Total and net internal expected (50/50) demand are up 6.8%, existing-certain capacity is up 29.8% or 989 MW, and Tier 1 planned capacity has fallen 100% to zero, leading to a decrease in the anticipated reserve margin from 22.9% down to 14.1%
- The peak hour is expected to occur in early August around 4:00 p.m.
- Operating reserves are a concern in this region during periods of extreme heat and elevated demand. High loading on Path 45 (See: WECC Path Rating Catalog) coupled with outages or derates to large thermal assets in this region can result in the declaration of an EAA and a request for assistance from RC West.

Risk Scenario Summary


Expected resources at normal peak demand and outage conditions require some imports to maintain operating reserves. Thus, above-normal demand, high forced outage conditions, or transmission derates in the neighboring area could place WECC-Mexico in an energy emergency.

On-Peak Reserve Margin


(Note: year comparison not available)



On-Peak Fuel Mix



2025 Summer Risk Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) and (90/10) demand forecast

Forced Outages: Average seasonal outages

Extreme Derates: Using (90/10) resource performance distribution at peak hour



WECC-Rocky Mountain

WECC-Rocky Mountain is a summer-peaking assessment area in the Western Interconnection that includes Colorado, most of Wyoming, and parts of Nebraska and South Dakota. The population of the area is approximately 6.7 million. It covers the balancing areas of the Public Service Company of Colorado and the Western Area Power Administration's Rocky Mountain Region. It has 18,797 miles of transmission. WECC is responsible for coordinating and promoting BES reliability in the Western Interconnection. WECC's 329 members include 40 BAs, representing a wide spectrum of organizations with an interest in the BES. Serving an area of nearly 1.8 million square miles and more than 84.5 million customers, it is geographically the largest and most diverse Regional Entity. *Note: The 2025 SRA includes a new assessment area map for the U.S. Western Interconnection. The new assessment area boundaries provide more geographic detail of reliability risk information. WECC-Rocky Mountain is a new assessment area in 2025 that was part of WECC-NW in the 2024 SRA*.


Highlights

- The reserve margins (existing-certain 25% and anticipated and prospective 26%) are not anticipated to fall below the reference margin (17%) for Summer 2025.
- Total and net internal demand (50/50) is up 25% or almost 2,800 MW, leading to a decline in the Anticipated Reserve Margin by almost a third.
- During the summer, there is increased load and decreased market purchase availability. Low wind availability and ramping scarcity events are a concern.
- Environmental and ecological factors have contributed to a rise in wildfire frequency and shortening of the fire return interval in the Rocky Mountain region, which, in addition to having caused generation outages, threatens rural co-ops disproportionately due to the extensive line buildout over remote regions.

Risk Scenario Summary


Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under assessed scenarios with imports.

On-Peak Reserve Margin




(Note: year comparison not available)

On-Peak Fuel Mix



2025 Summer Risk Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy occurs at the hour of peak demand

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) at risk hour and (90/10) demand forecast at risk hour

Forced Outages: Average seasonal outages

Extreme Derates: Using (90/10) scenario



WECC-Northwest

WECC-Northwest is a winter-peaking assessment area in the WECC Regional Entity. The area includes Montana, Oregon, and Washington and parts of northern California and northern Idaho. The population of the area is approximately 13.6 million. It has 32,751 miles of transmission. WECC is responsible for coordinating and promoting BES reliability in the Western Interconnection. WECC's 329 members include 40 BAs, representing a wide spectrum of organizations with an interest in the BES. Serving an area of nearly 1.8 million square miles and more than 84.5 million customers, it is geographically the largest and most diverse Regional Entity. *Note: The 2025 SRA includes a new assessment area map for the U.S. Western Interconnection. The new assessment area boundaries provide more geographic detail of reliability risk information. WECC-Northwest is a new assessment area in 2025 that was part of a larger WECC-NW footprint in the 2024 SRA.*

Highlights


- The reserve margins (existing-certain 29% and anticipated and prospective 32%) are not anticipated to fall below the reference margin (23%) for the upcoming summer. An extreme summer peak load may be around 32,740 MW.
- Typical forced outages are forecast to be 771 MW, with derates for thermal under extreme conditions to be 1,584 MW and 2,649 MW for wind. The expected operating reserve requirement on peak is 1,750 MW.
- Extreme heat corresponds with elevated loads, reduced transmission ratings, and temperature derates of thermal resources, which can strain resource adequacy and grid reliability.
- Seasonal hydro variability is a risk.

Risk Scenario Summary


Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under assessed scenarios with imports.

On-Peak Reserve Margin


(Note: year comparison not available)



On-Peak Fuel Mix



2025 Summer Risk Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy occurs at the hour of peak demand

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) at risk hour and (90/10) demand forecast at risk hour

Forced Outages: Average seasonal outages

Extreme Derates: Using (90/10) scenario



WECC-Southwest

WECC-Southwest is a summer-peaking assessment area in the Western Interconnection that includes all of Arizona and New Mexico, most of Nevada, and small parts of California and Texas. The area has a population of approximately 13.6 million. It has 23,084 miles of transmission. WECC is responsible for coordinating and promoting BES reliability in the Western Interconnection. WECC's 329 members include 40 BAs, representing a wide spectrum of organizations with an interest in the BES. Serving an area of nearly 1.8 million square miles and more than 84.5 million customers, it is geographically the largest and most diverse Regional Entity. *Note: The 2025 SRA includes a new assessment area map for the U.S. Western Interconnection. The new assessment area boundaries provide more geographic detail of reliability risk information. WECC-Southwest is a new, larger assessment area in 2025 that now includes a portion of WECC-NW in the 2024 SRA.*

Highlights


- Anticipated Reserve Margins for the summer are 22%, exceeding the Reference Margin Level for reliability calculated by WECC.
- WECC's probabilistic analysis indicates that the area is not expected to encounter LOLH or EUE under a range of demand and resource conditions.
- The peak hour is expected to occur in early July around 5:00 p.m., when solar generation output begins to diminish.
- Wide-area heat events or wildfires that affect resource and transmission availability across the western interconnection area a reliability concern for the Southwest. Firm imports may be limited at this time if neighboring areas are also experiencing peak loads, limiting energy availability to export to the Southwest.

Risk Scenario Summary


Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under assessed scenarios with imports.

On-Peak Reserve Margin


(Note: year comparison not available)



On-Peak Fuel Mix



2025 Summer Risk Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy occurs at the hour of peak demand (5:00 p.m. local)

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) at risk hour and (90/10) demand forecast

Forced Outages: Average seasonal outages

Extreme Derates: Using (90/10) scenario

Data Concepts and Assumptions

The table below explains data concepts and important assumptions used throughout this assessment.

General Assumptions
• Reliability of the interconnected BPS is comprised of both adequacy and operating reliability:
▪ Adequacy is the ability of the electric system to supply the aggregate electric power and energy requirements of the electricity consumers at all times while taking into account scheduled and reasonably expected unscheduled outages of system components.
▪ Operating reliability is the ability of the electric system to withstand sudden disturbances, such as electric short-circuits or unanticipated loss of system components.
• The reserve margin calculation is an important industry planning metric used to examine future resource adequacy.
• All data in this assessment is based on existing federal, state, and provincial laws and regulations.
• Differences in data collection periods for each assessment area should be considered when comparing demand and capacity data between year-to-year seasonal assessments.
• A positive net transfer capability would indicate a net importing assessment area; a negative value would indicate a net exporter.
Demand Assumptions
• Electricity demand projections, or load forecasts, are provided by each assessment area.
• Load forecasts include peak hourly load[12] or total internal demand for the summer and winter of each year.[13]
• Total internal demand projections are based on normal weather (50/50 distribution)[14] and are provided on a coincident[15] basis for most assessment areas.
• Net internal demand is used in all reserve margin calculations, and it is equal to total internal demand then reduced by the amount of controllable and dispatchable demand response projected to be available during the peak hour.
Resource Assumptions
Resource planning methods vary throughout the North American BPS. NERC uses the categories below to provide a consistent approach for collecting and presenting resource adequacy. Because the electrical output of VERs (e.g., wind, solar PV) depends on weather conditions, their contribution to reserve margins and other on-peak resource adequacy analysis is less than their nameplate capacity.
Anticipated Resources: • **Existing-Certain Capacity**: Included in this category are commercially operable generating units or portions of generating units that meet at least one of the following requirements when examining the period of peak demand for the summer season: unit must have a firm capability and have a power purchase agreement with firm transmission that must be in effect for the unit; unit must be classified as a designated network resource; and/or, where energy-only markets exist, unit must be a designated market resource eligible to bid into the market. • **Tier 1 Capacity Additions**: This category includes capacity that either is under construction or has received approved planning requirements. • **Net Firm Capacity Transfers (Imports minus Exports)**: This category includes transfers with firm contracts.
Prospective Resources: Includes all anticipated resources plus the following: **Existing-Other Capacity**: Included in this category are commercially operable generating units or portions of generating units that could be available to serve load for the period of peak demand for the season but do not meet the requirements of existing-certain.

[12] https://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Glossary%20of%20Terms/Glossary_of_Terms.pdf used in NERC Reliability Standards

[13] The summer season represents June–September and the winter season represents December–February.

[14] Essentially, this means that there is a 50% probability that actual demand will be higher and a 50% probability that actual demand will be lower than the value provided for a given season/year.

[15] Coincident: This is the sum of two or more peak loads that occur in the same hour. Noncoincident: This is the sum of two or more peak loads on individual systems that do not occur in the same time interval; this is meaningful only when considering loads within a limited period of time, such as a day, a week, a month, a heating or cooling season, and usually for not more than one year. SERC calculates total internal demand on a noncoincidental basis.

Reserve Margin Descriptions

Planning Reserve Margin: This is the primary metric used to measure resource adequacy; it is defined as the difference in resources (anticipated or prospective) and net internal demand then divided by net internal demand and shown as a percentage.

Reference Margin Level: The assumptions and naming convention of this metric vary by assessment area. The RML can be determined using both deterministic and probabilistic (based on a 0.1/year loss-of-load study) approaches. In both cases, this metric is used by system planners to quantify the amount of reserve capacity in the system above the forecasted peak demand that is needed to ensure sufficient supply to meet peak loads. Establishing an RML is necessary to account for long-term factors of uncertainty involved in system planning, such as unexpected generator outages and extreme weather impacts that could lead to increase demand beyond what was projected in the 50/50 load forecasted. In many assessment areas, an RML is established by a state, provincial authority, ISO/Regional Transmission Organization (RTO), or other regulatory body. In some cases, the RML is a requirement. RMLs may be different for the summer and winter seasons. If an RML is not provided by an assessment area, NERC applies 15% for predominantly thermal systems and 10% for predominantly hydro systems.

Seasonal Risk Scenario Chart Description

Each assessment area performed an operational risk analysis that was used to produce the seasonal risk scenario charts in the **Regional Assessments Dashboards**. The chart presents deterministic scenarios for further analysis of different resource and demand levels: The left **blue** column shows anticipated resources, and the two **orange** columns at the right show the two demand scenarios of the normal peak net internal demand and the extreme summer peak demand—both determined by the assessment area. The middle **red** or **green** bars show adjustments that are applied cumulatively to the anticipated resources, such as the following:

- Reductions for typical generation outages (i.e., maintenance and forced outages that are not already accounted for in anticipated resources)
- Reductions that represent additional outage or performance derating by resource type for extreme, low-probability conditions (e.g., drought condition impacts on hydroelectric generation, low-wind scenario affecting wind generation, fuel supply limitations, or extreme temperature conditions that result in reduced thermal generation output)
- Additional capacity resources that represent quantified capacity from operational procedures, if any, that are made available during scarcity conditions

Not all assessment areas have the same categories of adjustments to anticipated resources. Furthermore, each assessment area determined the adjustments to capacity based on methods or assumptions that are summarized below the chart. Methods and assumptions differ by assessment area and may not be comparable.

The chart enables evaluation of resource levels against levels of expected operating reserve requirement and the forecasted demand. Furthermore, the effects from extreme events can also be examined by comparing resource levels after applying extreme scenario derates and/or extreme summer peak demand.

Resource Adequacy

The Anticipated Reserve Margin (ARM), which is based on available resource capacity, is a metric used to evaluate resource adequacy by comparing the projected capability of anticipated resources to serve forecast peak demand.[16] Large year-to-year changes in anticipated resources or forecast peak demand (net internal demand) can greatly impact Planning Reserve Margin calculations. All assessment areas have sufficient ARMs to meet or exceed their RML for the summer 2025 as shown in **Figure 4**.




Figure 4: Summer 2025 Anticipated/Prospective Reserve Margins Compared to Reference Margin Level

[16] Generally, anticipated resources include generators and firm capacity transfers that are expected to be available to serve load during electrical peak loads for the season. Prospective resources are those that could be available but do not meet criteria to be counted as anticipated resources. Refer to the **Data Concepts and Assumptions** section for additional information on Anticipated/Prospective Reserve Margins, anticipated/prospective resources, and RMLs.

Changes from Year to Year

Figure 5 provides the relative change in the forecast ARMs from the 2024 Summer to the 2025 Summer. A significant decline can signal potential operational issues for the upcoming season. Additional details for each assessment area are provided in the Data Concepts and Assumptions and Regional Assessments Dashboards sections.




Figure 5: Summer 2024 and Summer 2025 Anticipated Reserve Margins Year-to-Year Change

Note: Yearly trends are not available for new WECC assessment areas in the United States and Baja California, Mexico.

Net Internal Demand

The changes in forecasted net internal demand for each assessment area are shown in Figure 6.[17] Assessment areas develop these forecasts based on historic load and weather information as well as other long-term projections.




Figure 6: Changes in Net Internal Demand—Summer 2024 Forecast Compared to Summer 2025 Forecast

[17] Changes in modeling and methods are contributing to year-to-year changes in forecasted net internal demand projections in NPCC Maritimes and NPCC Ontario. See assessment area dashboards.

Demand and Resource Tables

Peak demand and supply capacity data—resource adequacy data—for each assessment area are as follows in each table (in alphabetical order).

MISO			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2024 SRA**	**2025 SRA**	**2024 vs. 2025 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	124,830	125,313	0.4%
Demand Response: Available	8,750	9,004	2.9%
Net Internal Demand	116,079	116,309	0.2%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	143,866	142,793	-0.7%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	0	0	-
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	2,471	2,280	-7.7%
Anticipated Resources	146,337	145,073	-0.9%
Existing-Other Capacity	1,833	1,190	-35.1%
Prospective Resources	148,740	148,543	-0.1%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	26.1%	24.7%	-1.3
Prospective Reserve Margin	28.1%	27.7%	-0.4
Reference Margin Level	17.7%	15.7%	-2.0

MRO-Manitoba Hydro			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2024 SRA**	**2025 SRA**	**2024 vs. 2025 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	3,143	3,377	7.4%
Demand Response: Available	0	0	-
Net Internal Demand	3,143	3,377	7.4%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	5,615	5,583	-0.6%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	0	0	-
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	-1,978	-1,714	-13.3%
Anticipated Resources	3,637	3,869	6.4%
Existing-Other Capacity	37	21	-42.9%
Prospective Resources	3,674	3,890	5.9%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	15.7%	14.6%	-1.1
Prospective Reserve Margin	16.9%	15.2%	-1.7
Reference Margin Level	12.0%	12.0%	0.0

MRO-SaskPower			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2024 SRA**	**2025 SRA**	**2024 vs. 2025 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	3,590	3,620	0.8%
Demand Response: Available	50	50	0.0%
Net Internal Demand	3,540	3,570	0.8%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	4,323	4,477	3.6%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	0	0	-
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	290	290	0.0%
Anticipated Resources	4,613	4,767	3.3%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-
Prospective Resources	4,613	4,767	3.3%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	30.3%	33.5%	3.2
Prospective Reserve Margin	30.3%	33.5%	3.2
Reference Margin Level	15.0%	15.0%	0.0

MRO-SPP			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2024 SRA**	**2025 SRA**	**2024 vs. 2025 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	56,316	56,168	-0.3%
Demand Response: Available	979	1,408	43.8%
Net Internal Demand	55,337	54,760	-1.0%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	70,855	70,549	-0.4%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	0	0	-
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	-157	-201	27.5%
Anticipated Resources	70,698	70,348	-0.5%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-
Prospective Resources	70,151	69,801	-0.5%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	27.8%	28.5%	0.7
Prospective Reserve Margin	26.8%	27.5%	0.7
Reference Margin Level	19.0%	19.0%	0.0

NPCC-Maritimes			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2024 SRA**	**2025 SRA**	**2024 vs. 2025 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	3,586	3,584	-0.1%
Demand Response: Available	327	327	0.0%
Net Internal Demand	3,259	3,257	-0.1%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	4,660	4,348	-6.7%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	0	220	-
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	63	63	0.0%
Anticipated Resources	4,723	4,631	-1.9%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-
Prospective Resources	4,723	4,631	-1.9%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	44.9%	42.2%	-2.7
Prospective Reserve Margin	44.9%	42.2%	-2.7
Reference Margin Level	20.0%	20.0%	0.0

NPCC-New York			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2024 SRA**	**2025 SRA**	**2024 vs. 2025 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	31,541	31,471	-0.2%
Demand Response: Available	1,281	1,487	16.1%
Net Internal Demand	30,260	29,984	-0.9%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	37,867	37,682	-0.5%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	0	0	-
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	1,585	1,769	11.6%
Anticipated Resources	39,452	39,451	0.0%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-
Prospective Resources	39,452	39,451	0.0%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	30.4%	31.6%	1.2
Prospective Reserve Margin	30.4%	31.6%	1.2
Reference Margin Level	15.0%	15.0%	0.0

NPCC-New England			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2024 SRA**	**2025 SRA**	**2024 vs. 2025 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	25,294	25,202	-0.4%
Demand Response: Available	661	399	-39.6%
Net Internal Demand	24,633	24,803	0.7%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	27,255	27,054	-0.7%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	0	0	-
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	1,297	1,245	-4.0%
Anticipated Resources	28,552	28,299	-0.9%
Existing-Other Capacity	138	668	384.1%
Prospective Resources	28,690	28,967	1.0%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	15.9%	14.1%	-1.8
Prospective Reserve Margin	16.5%	16.8%	0.3
Reference Margin Level	12.9%	12.7%	-0.2

NPCC-Ontario			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2024 SRA**	**2025 SRA**	**2024 vs. 2025 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	22,753	21,955	-3.5%
Demand Response: Available	996	998	0.2%
Net Internal Demand	21,757	20,957	-3.7%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	26,856	24,760	-7.8%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	9	413	4568.6%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	600	689	14.8%
Anticipated Resources	27,465	25,862	-5.8%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-
Prospective Resources	27,465	25,862	-5.8%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	26.2%	23.4%	-2.8
Prospective Reserve Margin	26.2%	23.4%	-2.8
Reference Margin Level	12.8%	20.5%	7.7

NPCC-Québec			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2024 SRA**	**2025 SRA**	**2024 vs. 2025 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	22,922	23,283	1.6%
Demand Response: Available	0	1,020	-
Net Internal Demand	22,922	22,263	-2.9%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	35,731	32,132	-10.1%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	0	0	-
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	-2,689	-2,582	-4.0%
Anticipated Resources	33,042	29,550	-10.6%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-
Prospective Resources	33,042	29,550	-10.6%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	44.1%	32.7%	-11.4
Prospective Reserve Margin	44.1%	32.7%	-11.4
Reference Margin Level	11.5%	11.9%	0.4

SERC-Central			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2024 SRA**	**2025 SRA**	**2024 vs. 2025 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	42,636	42,765	0.3%
Demand Response: Available	1,941	864	-55.5%
Net Internal Demand	40,695	41,900	3.0%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	47,674	46,949	-1.5%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	332	592	78.1%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	2,578	2,554	-0.9%
Anticipated Resources	50,584	50,095	-1.0%
Existing-Other Capacity	2,075	2,475	19.2%
Prospective Resources	52,659	52,570	-0.2%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	24.3%	19.6%	-4.7
Prospective Reserve Margin	29.4%	25.5%	-3.9
Reference Margin Level	15.0%	15.0%	0.0

PJM			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2024 SRA**	**2025 SRA**	**2024 vs. 2025 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	151,247	154,144	1.9%
Demand Response: Available	7,756	7,898	1.8%
Net Internal Demand	143,491	146,246	1.9%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	183,690	186,638	1.6%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	0	0	-
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	-607	-4,200	591.9%
Anticipated Resources	183,083	182,438	-0.4%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-
Prospective Resources	182,476	178,238	-2.3%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	27.6%	24.7%	-2.8
Prospective Reserve Margin	27.2%	21.9%	-5.3
Reference Margin Level	17.7%	17.7%	0.0

SERC-East			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2024 SRA**	**2025 SRA**	**2024 vs. 2025 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	43,567	44,015	1.0%
Demand Response: Available	985	1,558	58.2%
Net Internal Demand	42,582	42,457	-0.3%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	51,304	54,665	6.5%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	122	17	-86.0%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	593	150	-74.7%
Anticipated Resources	52,019	54,832	5.4%
Existing-Other Capacity	1,131	2,628	132.3%
Prospective Resources	53,150	57,459	8.1%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	22.2%	29.1%	7.0
Prospective Reserve Margin	24.8%	35.3%	10.5
Reference Margin Level	15.0%	15.0%	0.0

SERC-Florida Peninsula			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2024 SRA**	**2025 SRA**	**2024 vs. 2025 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	53,293	52,987	-0.6%
Demand Response: Available	2,824	3,158	11.8%
Net Internal Demand	50,469	49,829	-1.3%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	63,199	59,395	-6.0%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	34	102	197.8%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	491	381	-22.4%
Anticipated Resources	63,724	59,878	-6.0%
Existing-Other Capacity	972	3,482	258.2%
Prospective Resources	64,696	63,360	-2.1%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	26.3%	20.2%	-6.1
Prospective Reserve Margin	28.2%	27.2%	-1.0
Reference Margin Level	15.0%	15.0%	0.0

Texas RE-ERCOT			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2024 SRA**	**2025 SRA**	**2024 vs. 2025 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	84,818	85,151	0.4%
Demand Response: Available	3,496	3,292	-5.8%
Net Internal Demand	81,323	81,859	0.7%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	99,541	112,321	12.8%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	2,578	4,854	88.3%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	20	20	0.0%
Anticipated Resources	102,139	117,195	14.7%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-
Prospective Resources	102,167	117,770	15.3%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	25.6%	43.2%	17.6
Prospective Reserve Margin	25.6%	43.9%	18.2
Reference Margin Level	13.75%	13.75%	0.0

SERC-Southeast			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2024 SRA**	**2025 SRA**	**2024 vs. 2025 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	46,021	47,049	2.2%
Demand Response: Available	1,599	1,338	-16.3%
Net Internal Demand	44,422	45,711	2.9%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	63,693	64,111	0.7%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	1,738	0	-100.0%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	-1,192	489	-141.0%
Anticipated Resources	64,238	64,600	0.6%
Existing-Other Capacity	785	1,077	37.1%
Prospective Resources	65,024	65,676	1.0%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	44.6%	41.3%	-3.3
Prospective Reserve Margin	46.4%	43.7%	-2.7
Reference Margin Level	15.0%	15.0%	0.0

WECC-AB			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2024 SRA**	**2025 SRA**	**2024 vs. 2025 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	12,201	12,246	0.4%
Demand Response: Available	0	0	-
Net Internal Demand	12,201	12,246	0.4%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	13,941	17,176	23.2%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	1,981	281	-85.8%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	0	0	-
Anticipated Resources	15,922	17,457	9.6%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-
Prospective Resources	15,922	17,457	9.6%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	30.5%	42.6%	12.1
Prospective Reserve Margin	30.5%	42.6%	12.1
Reference Margin Level	6.7%	9.0%	2.7

WECC-BC			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2024 SRA**	**2025 SRA**	**2024 vs. 2025 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	9,275	9,309	0.4%
Demand Response: Available	0	0	-
Net Internal Demand	9,275	9,309	0.4%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	11,022	11,313	2.6%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	0	260	-
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	0	0	-
Anticipated Resources	11,022	11,573	5.0%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-
Prospective Resources	11,022	11,573	5.0%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	18.8%	24.3%	5.5
Prospective Reserve Margin	18.8%	24.3%	5.5
Reference Margin Level	12.0%	14.9%	2.9

WECC-California			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2024 SRA**	**2025 SRA**	**2024 vs. 2025 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	54,267	54,797	1.0%
Demand Response: Available	816	746	-8.6%
Net Internal Demand	53,451	54,051	1.1%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	71,564	75,726	5.8%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	5,998	8,470	41.2%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	197	598	203.6%
Anticipated Resources	77,759	84,794	9.0%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-
Prospective Resources	77,759	84,794	9.0%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	45.5%	56.9%	11.4
Prospective Reserve Margin	45.5%	56.9%	11.4
Reference Margin Level	22.0%	19.2%	-2.8

WECC-Southwest			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2024 SRA**	**2025 SRA**	**2024 vs. 2025 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	34,629	35,321	2.0%
Demand Response: Available	422	199	-52.9%
Net Internal Demand	34,207	35,122	2.7%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	37,716	40,300	6.9%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	4,272	1,966	-54.0%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	2,957	695	-76.5%
Anticipated Resources	44,945	42,961	-4.4%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-
Prospective Resources	44,945	42,961	-4.4%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	31.4%	22.3%	-9.1
Prospective Reserve Margin	31.4%	22.3%	-9.1
Reference Margin Level	12.4%	13.3%	1.0

WECC-Northwest			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2024 SRA**	**2025 SRA**	**2024 vs. 2025 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	28,475	29,157	2.4%
Demand Response: Available	30	30	0.0%
Net Internal Demand	28,445	29,127	2.4%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	33,164	36,388	9.7%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	201	844	319.9%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	838	1,249	49.0%
Anticipated Resources	34,203	38,481	12.5%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-
Prospective Resources	34,203	38,481	12.5%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	20.2%	32.1%	11.9
Prospective Reserve Margin	20.2%	32.1%	11.9
Reference Margin Level	18.5%	23.1%	4.6

WECC-Basin			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2024 SRA**	**2025 SRA**	**2024 vs. 2025 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	13,165	14,214	8.0%
Demand Response: Available	485	620	27.8%
Net Internal Demand	12,680	13,594	7.2%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	13,534	14,923	10.3%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	2,436	704	-71.1%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	1,376	1,274	-7.4%
Anticipated Resources	17,346	16,901	-2.6%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-
Prospective Resources	17,346	16,901	-2.6%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	36.8%	24.3%	-12.5
Prospective Reserve Margin	36.8%	24.3%	-12.5
Reference Margin Level	13.3%	14.0%	0.7

WECC-Rocky Mountain			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2024 SRA**	**2025 SRA**	**2024 vs. 2025 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	11,313	14,098	24.6%
Demand Response: Available	281	284	1.1%
Net Internal Demand	11,032	13,814	25.2%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	17,345	17,262	-0.5%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	55	104	89.1%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	0	0	-
Anticipated Resources	17,400	17,366	-0.2%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-
Prospective Resources	17,400	17,366	-0.2%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	57.7%	25.7%	-32.0
Prospective Reserve Margin	57.7%	25.7%	-32.0
Reference Margin Level	18.0%	16.7%	-1.3

WECC-Mexico			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2024 SRA**	**2025 SRA**	**2024 vs. 2025 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	3,529	3,770	6.8%
Demand Response: Available	0	0	-
Net Internal Demand	3,529	3,770	6.8%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	3,314	4,303	29.8%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	874	0	-100.0%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	150	0	-100.0%
Anticipated Resources	4,338	4,303	-0.8%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-
Prospective Resources	4,338	4,303	-0.8%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	22.9%	14.1%	-8.8
Prospective Reserve Margin	22.9%	14.1%	-8.8
Reference Margin Level	7.9%	9.6%	1.6

Variable Energy Resource Contributions

Because the electrical output of VERs (e.g., wind, solar PV) depends on weather conditions, on-peak capacity contributions are less than nameplate capacity. The following table shows the capacity contribution of existing wind and solar PV resources at the peak demand hour for each assessment area. Resource contributions are also aggregated by Interconnection and across the entire BPS. For NERC's analysis of risk periods after peak demand (e.g., U.S. assessment areas in WECC), lower contributions of solar PV resources are used because output is diminished during evening periods.

BPS Variable Energy Resources by Assessment Area

	Wind			Solar PV			Hydro			Energy Storage Systems (ESS)		
Assessment Area / Interconnection	Nameplate Wind	Expected Wind	Expected Share of Nameplate (%)	Nameplate Solar PV	Expected Solar PV	Expected Share of Nameplate (%)	Nameplate Hydro	Expected Hydro	Expected Share of Nameplate (%)	Nameplate ESS	Expected ESS	Expected Share of Nameplate (%)
MISO	30,992	6,039	19%	18,246	9,123	50%	1,572	1,467	93%	3,159	3,107	98%
MRO-Manitoba Hydro	259	48	19%	-	-	0%	202	60	30%	-	-	0%
MRO-SaskPower	816	310	38%	30	9	29%	848	686	81%	-	-	0%
NPCC-Maritimes	1,230	314	26%	147	-	0%	1,313	1,313	100%	12	6	50%
NPCC-New England	1,546	142	9%	3,266	1,412	43%	575	175	31%	192	110	57%
NPCC-New York	2,586	446	17%	609	243	40%	976	478	49%	32	17	53%
NPCC-Ontario	4,943	742	15%	478	66	14%	8,862	5,320	60%	-	-	0%
NPCC-Québec	4,024	885	22%	10	-	0%	444	444	100%	-	-	0%
PJM	12,465	1,855	15%	13,731	6,244	45%	2,505	2,505	100%	310	288	93%
SERC-Central	1,324	370	28%	1,810	1,053	58%	4,991	3,418	68%	100	100	100%
SERC-East	-	-	0%	7,097	5,022	71%	3,078	3,008	98%	19	8	41%
SERC-Florida Peninsula	-	-	0%	8,295	5,749	54%	-	-	0%	631	631	100%
SERC-Southeast	-	-	0%	8,507	7,728	91%	3,258	3,308	102%	115	105	92%
SPP	35,613	5,556	16%	1,159	492	42%	114	56	49%	182	41	23%
Texas RE-ERCOT	40,102	9,396	23%	31,473	22,962	73%	572	439	77%	15,291	12,190	80%
WECC-AB	5,712	796	14%	2,174	1,480	68%	894	456	51%	250	235	94%
WECC-BC	747	149	20%	2	-	0%	16,918	10,181	60%	-	-	0%
WECC-Basin	4,859	911	19%	2,648	2,231	84%	2,637	2,022	77%	120	118	98%
WECC-CA	7,836	1,207	15%	25,059	14,756	59%	14,565	6,518	45%	11,459	11,115	97%
WECC-Mexico	300	50	17%	350	227	65%	-	-	0%	-	-	0%
WECC-NW	9,199	3,107	34%	1,349	666	49%	33,068	20,145	61%	11	10	91%
WECC-RM	5,681	1,359	24%	2,523	1,669	66%	3,251	2,446	75%	242	235	97%
WECC-SW	4,848	1,091	23%	9,288	4,293	46%	1,316	845	64%	4,187	3,982	95%
EASTERN INTERCONNECTION	91,773	15,822	17%	67,138	37,886	56%	28,294	21,794	77%	4,752	4,413	93%
QUÉBEC INTERCONNECTION	4,024	885	22%	10	-	0%	444	444	100%	-	-	0%
TEXAS INTERCONNECTION	40,102	9,396	23%	31,473	22,962	73%	572	439	77%	15,291	12,190	80%
WECC INTERCONNECTION	39,182	8,670	22%	43,393	25,322	58%	72,649	42,613	59%	16,269	15,695	96%
All INTERCONNECTIONS	**175,081**	**34,774**	**20%**	**142,014**	**86,170**	**61%**	**101,959**	**65,290**	**64%**	**36,311**	**32,298**	**89%**

Review of 2024 Capacity and Energy Performance

The summer of 2024 was the fourth hottest on record for both the contiguous United States[18] and Canada,[19] with some areas experiencing their hottest summer ever. The result was record electricity demand in the United States as well as in Canada, which was particularly pronounced in the Western Interconnection. While peak demand exceeded normal summer forecasts in most areas, only one area experienced demand that met or exceeded a 90/10 demand scenario as defined in the prior year's *SRA*. In addition, Hurricane Helene, the deadliest Atlantic hurricane to strike the US mainland since 2005, made landfall in Florida in September and led to widespread flooding and power outages from Florida to North Carolina. Helene was one of five hurricanes to impact the US last summer, joining other extreme weather incidents such as drought across the West and wildfires in the Southwest. To manage the challenging grid conditions brought about by heat domes and these other extreme weather events, grid operators across North America used various operating mitigations up to, and including, the issuance of EEAs. No disruptions to the BPS occurred due to inadequate resources. The following section describes actual demand and resource levels in comparison with NERC's *2024 SRA* and summarizes 2024 resource adequacy events.

Eastern Interconnection–Canada and Québec Interconnection

During the June heat wave that extended across the eastern half of the United States and Canada, system operators in Ontario and the Maritimes provinces followed conservative operating protocols and issued energy emergencies. A late-summer heat wave resulted in an energy emergency in Maritimes.

Eastern Interconnection–United States

MISO experienced peak electricity demand during late August. Demand was between the normal and 90/10 summer peak forecast levels. Wind and solar resource output at the time of peak demand were near expectations for summer on-peak contributions. Forced outages of thermal units, however, were lower than expected. On the day prior to MISO's peak demand, operators issued advisories to maximize generation. Similar advisories were issued earlier in the summer, coinciding with above-normal temperatures and periods of high generator forced outages.

In SPP, summer electricity demand peaked in mid-July at a level below normal 50/50 forecasts. Above-normal wind performance and sufficient generator availability contributed to sufficient electricity supplies during peak conditions. In late August, however, SPP operators issued an EEA1 due to high load forecasts, generator outages, and forecasts for low wind output. The period coincided with MISO's peak demand period, making excess supplies for import uncertain. Also in August during a period of high demand and low resource availability, operators issued public appeals for conservation when a 345 kV line outage caused a transmission emergency. During other summer periods, SPP operators responded to forecasts for high demand and low resource conditions with resource advisories intended to maximize available generators.

Like SPP, PJM also experienced peak electricity demand in mid-July and issued an EEA in August. Peak demand in July was near 90/10 forecast levels. Generator outages were below normal at the time of peak demand. In late August, PJM operators issued an EEA1 in expectation of extreme demand.

A period of unseasonably high demand in early summer brought on by high temperatures in the Northeast contributed to an EEA1 in NPCC-New England when a large thermal generator encountered a forced outage. Peak demand in New England occurred in mid-July at a near-normal summer peak demand level. At the time of peak demand, generator outages were below historical averages.

Peak demand in the NPCC-New York area occurred in early July at a level below the normal summer peak demand forecast. Generator outages were below historical levels for peak summer conditions.

[18] US sweltered through its 4th-hottest summer on record – National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
[19] Climate Trends and Variations Bulletin – Summer 2024 – Government of Canada

Systems in the U.S. Southeast saw successive heat waves beginning prior to the official start to summer and extending to early fall. Operators in the SERC region used conservative operations and resource advisories to maximize generation and transmission network availability and issued EEAs when warranted by conditions. In some instances, EEAs were issued when generator outages threatened supplies needed for high demand. Peak demand in all assessment areas within the SERC region exceeded normal summer peak demand levels and approached 90/10 demand forecasts.

Texas Interconnection–ERCOT

Peak demand in ERCOT was at or near record levels last summer, as load growth and extreme temperatures contributed to escalating summer electricity needs. Demand peaked in August well above the 90/10 demand forecast. At the time of peak demand, wind generation was below expected levels for peak demand periods, while output from solar generation was near forecasted levels. Forced generator outages were well below historical average levels for peak demand, helping to meet the extreme electricity demand. Unlike the prior summer, ERCOT did not issue any conservation appeals to customers to reduce demand during high-demand periods. New solar generation, battery resources, and some thermal generation additions since Summer 2023 boosted electricity supplies, enabling operators to meet demand records without demand-side management.

Western Interconnection

In July, the Western Interconnection set a new peak demand record of 167,988 MW. Operators in United States and Canada employed procedures throughout summer to manage challenging grid conditions from extended extreme heat and wildfires.

Western Interconnection–Canada

In the province of Alberta, the electric system operator issued an EEA3 in early July as high temperatures contributed to elevated demand that coincided with a forced generator outage. A new summer peak demand record was set in Alberta later in July at 12.2 MW (up from 11.5 GW in summer 2023). Alberta's demand peak was slightly higher than the normal demand peak scenario projected in the spring of last year.

In British Columbia, peak demand reached 9.4 GW (up from 9.2 GW the previous year), also slightly above the normal peak demand that was projected last year.

In both Alberta and British Columbia, peak demand was still below the extreme peak demand scenarios previously projected, which lowered the risk profile of those provinces over Summer 2024.

Western Interconnection–United States

Demand peaked in July in the U.S. Northwest at a level below the normal summer peak demand. During a period of high demand in July, operators at a BA in the U.S. Northwest issued an EEA1 to address forecasted conditions.

The California-Mexico assessment area, which consists of the CAISO, Northern California, and CENACE BAs, experienced system peak electricity demand in early September at a level nearing the 90/10 peak demand forecast. The extreme demand contributed to localized supply concerns and led CAISO to declare a transmission emergency and use conservative operations protocols to posture the system. Despite the extreme demand, operators were able to maintain sufficient supply without resorting to public appeals, as was required in prior summers. New battery resources were instrumental in providing energy to meet high demand during late afternoon and early evenings. Natural-gas-fired generators also performed well and were important to meeting high demand during these same periods. Dry conditions from early summer prompted operators in CA/MX to frequently employ public safety power shutoff (PSPS) procedures beginning in June. Active wildfires led transmission operators to de-energize transmission lines in Northern California and declare transmission emergencies that affected operations across CAISO.

The U.S. Southwest experienced extended heat conditions and demand levels that exceeded 90/10 peak summer forecasts, with peak occurring in early August. Higher-than-expected wind and solar output and low generator outages helped maintain sufficient supplies.

2024 Summer Demand and Generation Summary at Peak Demand							
Assessment Area	Actual Peak Demand[1] (GW)	SRA Peak Demand Scenarios[2] (GW)	Wind – Actual[1] (MW)	Wind – Expected[3] (MW)	Solar – Actual[1] (MW)	Solar – Expected[3] (MW)	Forced Outages Summary[4] (MW)
MISO	118.6	116.1 125.8	4,565	5,599	5,858	4,981	4,412
MRO-Manitoba Hydro	3.6	3.1 3.3	50	48	0	0	290
MRO-SaskPower	3.7	3.5 3.7	170	208	22	6	0
MRO-SPP	54.3	55.3 57.5	10,869	5,876	442	486	6,046
NPCC-Maritimes	3.5	3.3 3.6	428	262	21	-	777
NPCC-New England	24.3	24.6 26.5	174	122	167	1,111	1,496
NPCC-New York	29	30.3 32	130	340	0	53	1,451
NPCC-Ontario	23.9	21.8 23.7	915	720	260	66	1,174
NPCC-Québec	23	22.9 24	2,270	-	0	-	10,500*
PJM	153.1	143.5 156.9	3,366	1,703	2,709	5,694	6,402
SERC-C	42.3	40.7 43.9	312	172	813	996	959
SERC-E	44	42.6 44.7	0	-	3,009	2,405	1,878
SERC-FP	52.4	50.5 53.6	0	-	5,376	5,643	
SERC-SE	44.9	44.4 45.3	0	-	3,507	7,217	1,007
TRE-ERCOT	85.5	81.3 82.3	6,286	9,070	17,566	17,797	3,622
WECC-AB	12.2	12.2 12.7	1,091	666	1,114	786	-**
WECC-BC	9.4	9.3 9.8	257	140	0.94	0	-**

2024 Summer Demand and Generation Summary at Peak Demand							
Assessment Area	**Actual Peak Demand[1] (GW)**	**SRA Peak Demand Scenarios[2] (GW)**	**Wind – Actual[1] (MW)**	**Wind – Expected[3] (MW)**	**Solar – Actual[1] (MW)**	**Solar – Expected[3] (MW)**	**Forced Outages Summary[4] (MW)**
WECC-CA/MX	58.9	53.2 61.6	1,633	1,124	10,112	13,147	921
WECC-NW	59.7	63 69.7	4,694	2,964	6,339	2,595	3,655
WECC-SW	30.8	26.4 28.8	1,179	542	3,357	1,294	2,042
Highlighting Notes	Actual peak demand in the highlighted areas met or exceeded extreme scenario levels.		Actual wind output in highlighted areas was significantly below seasonal forecast.		Actual solar output in highlighted areas was significantly below seasonal forecast.		Actual forced outages above or below forecast by factor of two

Table Notes:
[1] Actual demand, wind, and solar values for the hour of peak demand in U.S. areas were obtained from EIA From 930 data. For areas in Canada, this data was provided to NERC by system operators and utilities.
[2] See NERC *2024 SRA* demand scenarios for each assessment area (pp. 14–33). Values represent the normal summer peak demand forecast and an extreme peak demand forecast that represents a 90/10, or once-per-decade, peak demand. Some areas use other basis for extreme peak demand.
[3] Expected values of wind and solar resources from the *2024 SRA*.
[4] Values from NERC Generator Availability Data System for the 2024 summer hour of peak demand in each assessment area. Highlighted areas had actual forced outages that were more than twice the value for typical forced outage rates used in the 2024 summer risk period scenarios in the *2024 SRA*.
*Values include both maintenance and forced outages.
**Canadian assessment areas report to the NERC Generator Availability Data System on a voluntary basis, which can contribute to the absence of some values in certain assessment areas.

BEFORE THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Power Act Section 202(c) Emergency Order: Tri-State Generation and Transmission Association, Platte River Power Authority, Salt River Project, PacifiCorp, and Xcel Energy	))))))	Order No. 202-25-14

Exhibit to
Motion to Intervene and Request for Rehearing and Stay of
Public Interest Organizations

Filed January 28, 2026

Exhibit 1-28a:
2019–24 NERC Summer Reliability Assessments

NERC
NORTH AMERICAN ELECTRIC RELIABILITY CORPORATION

Summer Reliability Assessment

June 2019




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
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Preface

The vision for the Electric Reliability Organization (ERO) Enterprise, which is comprised of the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) and the seven Regional Entities (REs), is a highly reliable and secure North American bulk power system (BPS). Our mission is to assure the effective and efficient reduction of risks to the reliability and security of the grid. The North American BPS is divided into seven REs with boundaries as shown in the map below. The multicolored area denotes overlap as some load-serving entities participate in one Region while associated Transmission Owners/Operators participate in another. Refer to the **Data Concepts and Assumptions** section for more information. A map and list of the assessment areas can be found in the **Regional Assessment Dashboards** section.

About this Report

NERC's *2019 Summer Reliability Assessment* identifies, assesses, and reports on areas of concern regarding the reliability of the North American BPS for the upcoming summer season. In addition, this assessment presents peak electricity demand and supply changes and highlights any unique regional challenges or expected conditions that might impact the BPS. The reliability assessment process is a coordinated reliability evaluation between the Reliability Assessment Subcommittee (RAS), the Regions, and NERC staff. This report reflects NERC's independent assessment and is intended to inform industry leaders, planners, operators, and regulatory bodies so they are better prepared to take necessary actions to ensure BPS reliability. The report also provides an opportunity for the industry to discuss their plans and preparations to ensure reliability for the upcoming summer period.



Key Findings

NERC's annual *Summer Reliability Assessment* covers the four-month Summer 2019 (June–September) period. This assessment provides an evaluation of whether there is adequate generation and transmission necessary to meet projected summer peak demands. The assessment monitors and identifies potential reliability issues and regional areas of concern that pertain to meeting projected customer demands. The following key findings represent NERC's independent evaluation of electric generation capacity and potential operational concerns that may need to be addressed:

- **ERCOT anticipates Energy Emergency Alerts may be needed to address resource shortfalls during periods of peak demand.** In ERCOT, the Anticipated Reserve Margin remains below the Reference Margin Level of 13.75%. ERCOT's Anticipated Reserve Margin decreased from 10.9% in Summer 2018 to 8.5% for the upcoming summer season. The reduction is caused by higher load growth, a planned generator retirement, and delays in new generation. If resource shortfalls occur, ERCOT anticipates implementing operating mitigations. These measures include importing additional power if available and energy emergency alerts that allow ERCOT to trigger emergency procedures such as voluntary load reduction.
- **Most assessment areas meet or exceed Reference Margin Levels and have sufficient electricity resources for anticipated conditions and more extreme scenarios.** In all areas, with the exception of ERCOT, the Anticipated Reserve Margin meets or surpasses the Reference Margin Level, indicating that planned resources in these areas are adequate to manage loss of load risk under normal conditions.[1] NERC also examined more extreme resource and demand conditions in each assessment area through seasonal risk scenarios. In some assessment areas, extreme summer peak loads and low-probability generator outage scenarios can result in insufficient resources to meet expected operating reserve requirements. In instances where operating reserve requirements are not met, system operators should employ operating procedures and mitigations, which may include demand response, Energy Emergency Alerts that support increased transfers, and other operational mitigations to manage resources and loads.
- **California faces ramping capability concerns.** In the California Independent System Operator (CAISO) area, there is the potential for operational risks at certain times of day as a result of shortages in resources with upward ramping capability. These shortage conditions are more prevalent during late afternoon as solar generation output decreases while system demand is still high. Transfers from neighboring areas may be needed during normal conditions when short on load-following resources capable of ramping up within the CAISO area.
- **Natural-gas-fired electric generation in Southern California will continue to need fuel from natural gas storage facilities for summer reliability.** The natural gas system operator in Southern California assesses that supplies from interstate pipelines alone may not be sufficient to meet the needs of all customers on summer peak load days, leaving electric generators at risk of curtailment. As a result, withdrawals from the Aliso Canyon natural gas storage facility would be necessary to ensure adequate fuel for generators in the Southern California area.
- **Elevated risk for wildfires in Western United States and parts of Canada poses risk to BPS reliability.** Government agencies predict above-normal wildfire risk for summer throughout parts of North America. Operation of the BPS can be impacted in areas where wildfires are active, as well as areas where there is heightened risk of wildfire ignition due to weather and ground conditions. In some areas, pre-season planning includes expanded public safety power shut-off programs in addition to maintenance and operational preparations.

[1] For more information, see the description of the "Reference Margin Level" in the **Data Concepts and Assumptions** section of this report, or refer to NERC's Long-term Reliability Assessment: https://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/NERC_LTRA_2018_12202018.pdf

Resource Adequacy

NERC uses the Anticipated Reserve Margin to evaluate resource adequacy by comparing the projected capability of anticipated resources to serve forecasted peak load.[2] Large year-to-year changes in anticipated resources or forecasted peak load can greatly impact Planning Reserve Margin calculations. As shown in **Figure 1**, other than Texas RE-ERCOT, all assessment areas have sufficient Anticipated Reserve Margins to meet or exceed their planning Reference Margin Level for the Summer 2019 period. Discussion of significant changes to Anticipated Reserve Margins in the Texas RE-ERCOT and WECC assessment areas are provided in the following sections.




Figure 1: Summer 2019 Anticipated/Prospective Reserve Margins Compared to Reference Margin Level

[2] Refer to the **Data Concepts and Assumptions** section for additional information on Anticipated Reserve Margins, Anticipated Resources, and Reference Margin Levels.

Changes from Year-to-Year

Understanding the changes from year-to-year is an essential step in assessing an area on a seasonal basis. This understanding can be used to further examine potential operational issues that emerge between reporting years. **Figure 2** provides the relative change from the Summer 2018 to the Summer 2019 period.




Figure 1: Summer 2018 to Summer 2019 Anticipated Reserve Margins Year-to-Year Change

Risk Highlights for Summer 2019

Tight Reserve Margins in Texas Lead to Operational Challenges

Texas RE-ERCOT enters the Summer 2019 season with a deficit in planning reserves, increasing the likelihood that system operators may need to employ procedures to maintain sufficient operating reserves. In 2018, ERCOT maintained sufficient generation resources through record levels of summer peak demand without resorting to Energy Emergency Alerts. This system performance, due in large part to high levels of generator availability, response to market signals, and unit performance, was notable given the Anticipated Reserve Margin of 10.9%, well-below the Reference Margin Level of 13.75%.[3] For the upcoming summer, growth in anticipated summer peak demand, delays in planned generation projects, and the announced mothballing of a 470 MW coal-fired unit (Gibbons Creek) are expected to push reserve margins still lower, to 8.5%.

Based on ERCOT's summer Seasonal Assessment of Resource Adequacy (SARA) report, released May 8, ERCOT expects that a number of operational tools may be needed this summer to help maintain sufficient operating reserves given the range of resource adequacy scenarios they evaluated.[4] For example, ERCOT system operators can release ancillary services (including load resources that can provide various types of operating reserves based on meeting certain qualification criteria), deploy contracted emergency response service resources, instruct investor-owned utilities to call on their load management and distribution voltage reduction programs, request emergency power across the dc ties, and request support from available switchable generators currently serving non-ERCOT grids.

The SARA report informs ERCOT market participants and operators by deterministically considering the impact of potential variables that may affect the sufficiency of resources for the upcoming season. Historic ranges or expectations for generation maintenance outages, forced outages, and capacity derates during extreme weather conditions are applied deterministically as resource scenarios. The effect of these resource scenarios, along with normal and extreme peak demand scenarios, are examined to determine the potential for scarcity conditions and emergency operating procedure mitigation. **Figure 3** shows a risk assessment developed by NERC using *Summer Reliability Assessment* data and additional data from Texas RE-ERCOT, and the ERCOT 2019 Preliminary SARA report. A description of resource and demand variables is found in **Table 1**.

[3] See ERCOT's 2018 Summer Performance Update: http://www.ercot.com/content/wcm/lists/144927/2018_Summer_Performance_One_Pager_FINAL.pdf
[4] For details see ERCOT's SARA Report: http://www.ercot.com/content/wcm/lists/167022/SARA-FinalSummer2019.xlsx




Figure 3: Texas RE-ERCOT Seasonal Risk Assessment

About the Seasonal Risk Assessment The operational risk analysis shown in **Figure 3** provides a deterministic scenario for understanding how various factors affecting resources and demand can combine to impact overall resource adequacy. Adjustments are applied cumulatively to summer anticipated capacity, such as the following:

- Reductions for typical generation outages (maintenance and forced, not already accounted for in summer anticipated resources)
- Additions that represent the quantified capacity from operational tools, if any, that are available during scarcity conditions but have not been accounted for in the SRA reserve margins

Resources throughout the scenario are compared against expected operating reserve requirements that are based on peak load and normal weather. The effects from low-probability, extreme events are also factored in, through additional resource derates or extreme resource scenarios, and extreme summer peak load conditions. Because the seasonal risk scenario shows the cumulative impact resulting from the occurrence of multiple low-probability events, the overall likelihood of the scenario is very low. An analysis similar to the Texas RE-ERCOT seasonal risk scenario in **Figure 3** can be found for each assessment area in the **Regional Assessment Dashboards** section of this report.

Table 1: Resource and Demand Variables in the ERCOT Seasonal Risk Assessment	
Resource Scenarios	
Typical Maintenance Outages	Typical maintenance outages refer to an estimate of generation resources that will be out for maintenance during peak load conditions. A value of 381 MW was determined based on the historical average of maintenance outages for June through September weekdays, for the last three summer seasons (2016–2018). Planned maintenance outages are generally accounted for in anticipated summer resources, however, this reduction covers additional generator outages granted by operators on a short-term basis as warranted by system conditions.
Typical Forced Outages	Typical forced outages refer to an estimate of generation resources that will experience forced outage during peak load conditions. A value of 3,845 MW is based on historical average of forced outages for June through September weekdays, for the last three summer seasons (2016–2018).
Operational Mitigations	ERCOT assesses that certain operational mitigations, in addition to operating measures accounted for in SRA data and the preliminary SARA Report, can contribute 1,160 MW of additional resources to support maintaining operating reserve requirements. This value is based on three elements: • Switchable generation resources currently serving the Southwest Power Pool (SPP) market that could become available to ERCOT in the event of an energy emergency (total of 489 MW) • Additional imports from the dc tie with the Mexican grid and from SPP beyond what was designated as long-term firm imports (total of 221 MW) • Distribution service providers implementation of distribution voltage reduction (contributing a total of 450 MW)
High Forced Outage Scenario (Low-likelihood Resource Derates)	A low-likelihood, high forced outage scenario is used to analyze the effect of extreme weather-driven generation outages. A capacity adjustment of 2,665 MW from the preliminary SARA report is based on historical forced outages assuming a 90% confidence interval.
Low-Wind Scenario (Low-likelihood)	The low-wind scenario is used to analyze the impact low-likelihood weather conditions that severely reduce output from wind generation resources. A capacity adjustment of 3,960 MW is based on a low wind output scenario included in ERCOT's preliminary summer SARA report. This capacity amount is calculated as the tenth percentile of wind output associated with the 100 highest net load hours (load minus wind output) for the 2015–2018 summer peak load seasons.
Demand Scenarios	
2019 Net Internal Demand	Net internal demand is equal to total internal demand then reduced by the amount of controllable and dispatchable demand response projected to be available during the peak hour. It is based on historical average weather (i.e., forecasts for a 50/50 distribution).
Extreme Summer Peak Load	A seasonal load adjustment (3,303 MW) is added to 2019 net internal demand based on extreme weather conditions that occurred during Summer 2011. ERCOT compared this value to a statistical extreme load forecast (i.e., a "90/10 load forecast" and found the Summer 2011 peak load to be higher and therefore a more conservative scenario.

ERCOT's tight reserve margins create a potential need to declare an energy emergency alert under many of the peak and extreme conditions studied in the SARA.[5] Once normal operating actions to maintain operating reserves are exhausted, energy emergency alerts can provide system operators with access to additional resources as discussed above that are only available during scarcity conditions. ERCOT also anticipates that higher wholesale market prices during peak demand periods will incentivize power customers to voluntarily reduce load or increase energy output from load-serving generation facilities (such as industrial cogeneration and commercial-sector distributed generation) that can inject power into the ERCOT system. Based on recent ERCOT analysis, the potential amount of this demand and generation response for the upcoming summer is significant but uncertain because the ERCOT market has not experienced summer high prices subsequent to the market design changes implemented in 2012–2014.

Seasonal Risk Assessments for Other Areas

Any area can face resource adequacy risk during peak conditions, even when Planning Reserve Margins exceed Reference Margin Levels. The reasons can be similar: generator scheduled maintenance, forced outages due to normal and more extreme weather conditions and loads, as well as low-likelihood conditions that affect generation resource performance or unit availability including constrained fuel supplies. The **Regional Assessment Dashboards** section in this report includes a seasonal risk scenario for each area that illustrates variables in resources and load, and where appropriate, the potential effects that operating actions can have to mitigate shortfalls in operating reserves.

CAISO Faces Concerns with Ramping Capability, Natural Gas Supply

For Summer 2019, the risk of resource shortfalls in CAISO is lower than last summer. However, there is increased risk of insufficient ramping capability during peak conditions. Conditions for hydroelectric generation are well above normal due to replenishment of reservoirs and mountain snow during the preceding winter, greatly reducing the potential for operating reserve shortfalls. However, the *2019 Summer Loads and Resources Assessment* highlights concerns with shortages in load-following resources capable of ramping up, particularly during late afternoon when solar generation output decreases while system demand is still high.[6] Increasing penetrations of solar resources and the retirements of dispatchable generation units has contributed to a shortage of ramping resources. When faced with such shortages, operators will need to call upon neighbors for imports to maintain system frequency. Should extreme temperatures extend over a large area to the point where neighbors lack surplus energy, load could be at risk from a shortage in ramping capability.

The impacts to electric generation resulting from operating restrictions at the Aliso Canyon natural gas storage facility remain an item of focus for electric reliability within the Western Interconnection. Withdrawals from natural gas storage facilities were at a high level during Winter 2018–2019 due to colder than average winter temperatures, resulting in below average storage levels approaching the Summer 2019 season. The Southern California Gas Company (SoCalGas) forecasts that it will be able to meet the forecasted peak day demand under a "best case" supply assumption even without supply from Aliso Canyon.[7] However, under a worst case supply assumption, supply from Aliso Canyon will be necessary to meet that forecasted peak day demand. Should operating restrictions result in natural gas supply curtailments that affect electric generation in the Southern California area, mitigation procedures that have been in place since 2016 can be used to maintain BPS reliability.

In addition to managing natural gas storage to meet summer demand, SoCalGas also uses summer months to begin increasing storage levels in preparation for peak winter months. Winter storage levels can be impacted in some scenarios that involve reduced natural gas storage receipts due to supply infrastructure servicing.

[5] A description of Energy Emergency Alerts and processes for communicating and coordination during operating emergencies is contained in NERC Reliability Standard *EOP-011-1 – Emergency Operations* available at the following link: https://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Reliability%20Standards/EOP-011-1.pdf

[6] See CAISO 2019 Summer Loads and Resources Assessment here: http://www.caiso.com/Documents/2019SummerLoadsandResourcesAssessment.pdf

[7] See Southern California Gas Company (SoCalGas) *2019 Summer Technical Assessment*, April 4, 2019, available at the link below. At the time of drafting the NERC 2019 SRA, the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) summer technical assessment for Aliso Canyon had not been released. The CPUC assessment is expected to provide the most current and comprehensive information, including potential impacts to the BPS in Southern California.
http://cpuc.ca.gov/uploadedFiles/CPUCWebsite/Content/News_Room/NewsUpdates/2019/SoCalGas%20Summer%202019%20Technical%20Assessment%20040219.pdf

Mitigation Operating Plans

Should CAISO system operating conditions go into the emergency stages, such as operating reserve shortfalls where non-spinning reserve requirement cannot be maintained or spinning reserve is depleted and operating reserve falls below minimum requirement, the following mitigation operating plan will be implemented to minimize loss of load in the CAISO Balancing Authority area:

- Use the Flex Alert program, signaling that the CAISO expects high peak load condition. This program has been proven to reduce peak load in the CAISO Balancing Authority area.
- Use the CAISO Restricted Maintenance program. This program is intended to reduce potential forced outages, therefore, minimizing forced outage rate during the high peak load condition.
- Perform manual post day-ahead unit commitment and exceptional dispatch of resources under contract to ensure the ability to serve load and meet flexible ramping capability requirements.
- Perform manual exceptional dispatch of intertie resources that have resource adequacy obligation to serve CAISO load.
- Use the CAISO Alert/Warning/Emergency (AWE) program.
- Use the demand response program including the Reliability Demand Response Resources (RDRR) under the "Warning" stage.
- Perform manual exceptional dispatch of physically available resources that are not under capacity contract.

Wildfire Risk and Potential for Impacts to the BPS


Government agencies predict above-normal wildfire risk for the summer throughout parts of North America. The National Interagency Fire Center, Natural Resources Canada, and National Meteorological Service in Mexico published a three-month seasonal potential wildfire outlook (April-June), which predicts above normal wildfire potential for California and the Pacific Northwest (Western Oregon and Washington), Western Alberta, British Columbia, and Northern Mexico.[8]

Operation of the BPS can be impacted in areas where wildfires are active, as well as areas where there is heightened risk of wildfire ignition due to weather and ground conditions. With the widely dispersed nature of the transmission system in western parts of North America, outages due to wildfires are generally not widespread. Furthermore, utilities are enhancing wildfire prevention planning in California and other areas to address increased risk. In some cases, plans could include expanding power shut-off programs in high fire-risk areas. When conditions warrant implementing these plans, power lines, including transmission-level lines, may be preemptively deenergized in high fire-risk areas to prevent wildfire ignitions. Other activities include implementing enhanced vegetation management, equipment inspections, system hardening, and added situational awareness measures.

[8] See the *North American Seasonal Fire Outlook*, issued May 10, 2019: https://www.predictiveservices.nifc.gov/outlooks/NA_Outlook.pdf

Regional Assessment Dashboards

The following assessment area dashboards and summaries were developed based on data and narrative information collected by NERC from the seven Regional Entities on an assessment area basis.



FRCC – Florida Reliability Coordinating Council
- FRCC

MRO – Midwest Reliability Organization
- MISO
- MRO-Manitoba Hydro
- MRO-SaskPower

NPCC – Northeast Power Coordinating Council
- NPCC-Maritimes
- NPCC-New England
- NPCC-New York
- NPCC-Ontario
- NPCC-Québec

RF – ReliabilityFirst
- PJM

SERC – SERC Reliability Corporation
- SERC-East
- SERC-North
- SERC-Southeast

SPP – Southwest Power Pool
- SPP

Texas RE – Texas Reliability Entity
- Texas RE-ERCOT

WECC
- WECC-CA/MX
- WECC-NWPP-AB
- WECC-NWPP-BC
- WECC-NWPP-US
- WECC-RMRG
- WECC-SRSG




FRCC


The Florida Reliability Coordinating Council's (FRCC) membership includes 32 Regional Entity Division members and 22 Member Services Division members composed of investor-owned utilities, cooperatives, municipal utilities, power marketers, and independent power producers.

FRCC is divided into 10 Balancing Authorities with 36 registered entities (including both members and non-members) performing the functions identified in the NERC Reliability Functional Model and defined in the NERC Reliability Standards. The Region contains a population of more than 16 million people and has a geographic coverage of about 50,000 square miles across Florida.

On-Peak Capacity: Generation Mix



Seasonal Risk Scenario



The table and chart above provide potential summer peak demand and resource condition information. The table on the right presents a standard seasonal assessment and comparison to the previous year's assessment. The chart above presents deterministic scenarios for further analysis of different demand and resource levels, with adjustments for normal and extreme conditions. FRCC determined the adjustments to summer capacity and peak demand based on methods or assumptions that are summarized below. See the **Seasonal Risk Scenario Chart Description** for more information about this chart.

Risk Scenario Summary

Observation:
Resources meet operating reserve requirements under studied scenarios.

Scenario Assumptions

- **Extreme Peak Load:** 90/10 forecast
- **Outages:** Historical average MW during summer season
- **Extreme Derates:** 3% capacity derate applied on all natural gas unit capacity

FRCC Resource Adequacy Data

Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margin	2018 SRA	2019 SRA	2018 vs. 2019 SRA
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	47,495	47,670	0.4%
Demand Response: Available	2,957	2,951	-0.2%
Net Internal Demand	44,538	44,719	0.4%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change**
Existing-Certain Capacity	53,010	52,163	-1.6%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	321.6	2,221	> 100%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	1,477	1,456	-1.4%
Anticipated Resources	54,809	55,840	1.9%
Existing-Other Capacity	763.9	834	9.2%
Prospective Resources	55,573	56,674	2.0%
Reserve Margins	**Percent**	**Percent**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	23.1%	24.9%	1.8
Prospective Reserve Margin	24.8%	26.7%	1.9
Reference Margin Level	15.0%	15.0%	0.0

Highlights

- FRCC has not identified any emerging reliability issues that are expected to impact reliability in the FRCC Region for the upcoming 2019 summer season.
- The BPS within the FRCC Region is expected to perform reliably for the anticipated 2019 summer season condition.
- On July 1, 2019, Regional Entity responsibilities will shift from FRCC to SERC for entities in Florida. FRCC will continue to provide member services and will remain a NERC assessment area.




MISO


The Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc. (MISO) is a not-for-profit, member-based organization administering wholesale electricity markets that provide customers with valued service; reliable, cost-effective systems and operations; dependable and transparent prices; open access to markets; and planning for long-term efficiency.

MISO manages energy, reliability, and operating reserve markets that consist of 36 local Balancing Authorities and 394 market participants, serving approximately 42 million customers. Although parts of MISO fall in three NERC Regions, MRO is responsible for coordinating data and information submitted for NERC's reliability assessments.

On-Peak Capacity: Generation Mix



Seasonal Risk Scenario



The table and chart above provide potential summer peak demand and resource condition information. The table on the right presents a standard seasonal assessment and comparison to the previous year's assessment. The chart above presents deterministic scenarios for further analysis of different demand and resource levels, with adjustments for normal and extreme conditions. MISO determined the adjustments to summer capacity and peak demand based on methods or assumptions that are summarized below. See the **Seasonal Risk Scenario Chart Description** for more information about this chart.

Risk Scenario Summary

Observation:

Resources meet operating reserve requirements under normal peak load scenario. Extreme summer peak load and outage conditions could result in the need to employ operating mitigation to manage resource shortfall.

Scenario Assumptions

- **Extreme Peak Load:** 90/10 forecast
- **Outages:** Average from highest peak hour over the past five summers
- **Extreme Derates:** Additional outages based on analysis of past five years summer peak outages

MISO Resource Adequacy Data

Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margin	2018 SRA	2019 SRA	2018 vs. 2019 SRA
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	124,704	124,744	0.0%
Demand Response: Available	5,990	6,385	6.6%
Net Internal Demand	118,714	118,359	-0.3%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change**
Existing-Certain Capacity	141,425	139,220	-1.6%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	0	0	0.0%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	-8	1,955	-
Anticipated Resources	141,417	141,175	-0.2%
Existing-Other Capacity	1,104	591	-46.5%
Prospective Resources	142,521	141,766	-0.5%
Reserve Margins	**Percent**	**Percent**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	19.1%	19.3%	0.2
Prospective Reserve Margin	20.1%	19.8%	-0.3
Reference Margin Level	17.1%	16.8%	-0.3

Highlights

- MISO does not anticipate reliability issues during the upcoming season for typical resource outages and load. MISO studied the summer system reliability under various resource outage and load scenarios. MISO held a summer readiness workshop with its members on April 23, 2019, to prepare for summer operations.
- MISO worked with entities in the SERC Region to develop an operating procedure to address potential issues that may result from high MISO north and south transfers. These transfers between MISO operating areas can cause entities in other Regions to experience loop flows that can impact system operations.
- MISO's Load Modifying Resource (LMR) FERC filing is expected to provide MISO's operators with greater access to the existing capabilities of LMRs. Enhancements include requiring LMR units to operate to their existing capability and added processes to schedule LMRs in anticipation of emergency conditions.




MRO-Manitoba Hydro


Manitoba Hydro is a provincial crown corporation that provides electricity to about 573,000 customers throughout Manitoba and natural gas service to about 279,000 customers in various communities throughout Southern Manitoba. The Province of Manitoba has a population of about 1.3 million people in an area of 250,946 square miles.

Manitoba Hydro is winter peaking. No change in the footprint area is expected during the assessment period. Manitoba Hydro is its own Planning Coordinator and Balancing Authority. Manitoba Hydro is a coordinating member of MISO. MISO is the Reliability Coordinator for Manitoba Hydro.

On-peak Capacity: Generation Mix



Seasonal Risk Scenario



The table and chart above provide potential summer peak demand and resource condition information. The table on the right presents a standard seasonal assessment and comparison to the previous year's assessment. The chart above presents deterministic scenarios for further analysis of different demand and resource levels, with adjustments for normal and extreme conditions. MRO-Manitoba determined the adjustments to summer capacity and peak demand based on methods or assumptions that are summarized below. See the **Seasonal Risk Scenario Chart Description** for more information about this chart.

Risk Scenario Summary

Observation:
Resources meet operating reserve requirements under studied scenarios.

Scenario Assumptions

- **Extreme Peak Load:** All-time highest peak load
- **Outages:** Based on historical operating experience
- **Extreme Derates:** Thermal units derated for extreme temperature where appropriate

MRO-Manitoba Hydro Resource Adequacy Data

Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margin	2018 SRA	2019 SRA	2018 vs. 2019 SRA
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	3,237	3,224	-0.4%
Demand Response: Available	0	0	0.0%
Net Internal Demand	3,237	3,224	-0.4%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change**
Existing-Certain Capacity	5,288	5,161	-2.4%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	0	0	0.0%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	-1,342	-1,408	4.9%
Anticipated Resources	3,946	3,753	-4.9%
Existing-Other Capacity	122.3	215	75.4%
Prospective Resources	4,068	3,968	-2.5%
Reserve Margins	**Percent**	**Percent**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	21.9%	16.4%	-5.5
Prospective Reserve Margin	25.7%	23.1%	-2.6
Reference Margin Level	12.0%	12.0%	0.0

Highlights


- There are no emerging reliability issues for the upcoming season in the Manitoba Hydro assessment area.
- Manitoba Hydro completed and commissioned the third HVdc line and placed it into service in July 2018. This addition significantly increased the system reliability by introducing an additional corridor for transmission of power generated by the bulk of Manitoba Hydro's generation in northern Manitoba to Southern Manitoba where the majority of the load is located.
- Reservoirs are at adequate storage levels and capable of supplying through design drought conditions.




MRO-SaskPower

Saskatchewan is a province of Canada and comprises a geographic area of 651,900 square kilometers (251,700 square miles) with approximately 1.1 million people. Peak demand is experienced in the winter. The Saskatchewan Power Corporation (SaskPower) is the Planning Coordinator and Reliability Coordinator for the province of Saskatchewan and is the principal supplier of electricity in the province. SaskPower is a provincial crown corporation and, under provincial legislation, is responsible for the reliability oversight of the Saskatchewan Bulk Electric System and its interconnections.

On-Peak Capacity: Generation Mix



Seasonal Risk Scenario



The table and chart above provide potential summer peak demand and resource condition information. The table on the right presents a standard seasonal assessment and comparison to the previous year's assessment. The chart above presents deterministic scenarios for further analysis of different demand and resource levels, with adjustments for normal and extreme conditions. MRO-SaskPower determined the adjustments to summer capacity and peak demand based on methods or assumptions that are summarized below. See the **Seasonal Risk Scenario Chart Description** for more information about this chart.

Risk Scenario Summary

Observation:

Resources meet operating reserve requirements under typical scenarios. Operating mitigations would be needed to meet reserve requirements in extreme outages and peak loads.

Scenario Assumptions

- **Extreme Peak Load:** Peak load with peak lighting and industrial demand
- **Maintenance Outages:** Estimated based on average maintenance outages in Summer 2018
- **Forced Outages:** Estimated using SaskPower model
- **Extreme Derates:** Derate on natural gas units based on historic data and manufacturer data

MRO-SaskPower Resource Adequacy Data

Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margin	2018 SRA	2019 SRA	2018 vs. 2019 SRA
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	3,426	3,553	3.7%
Demand Response: Available	85	85	0.0%
Net Internal Demand	3,341	3,468	3.8%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change**
Existing-Certain Capacity	4,013	3,907	-2.6%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	0	0	0.0%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	25	25	0.0%
Anticipated Resources	4,038	3,932	-2.6%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	0.0%
Prospective Resources	4,038	3,932	-2.6%
Reserve Margins	**Percent**	**Percent**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	20.8%	13.4%	-7.4
Prospective Reserve Margin	20.8%	13.4%	-7.4
Reference Margin Level	11.0%	11.0%	0.0

Highlights


- No reliability issues are expected for the upcoming summer season. Saskatchewan experiences peak load in winter. Reserve margin is expected to be higher than the reference reserve margin for the upcoming summer
- SaskPower conducts an annual summer season joint operating study with Manitoba Hydro, with inputs from Basin Electric Power Cooperative (North Dakota), and prepares operating guidelines for identified issues.
- In case of extreme load conditions combined with large generation forced outages, SaskPower would use available demand response programs, short term power transfers from neighboring utilities, and short term load interruptions.




NPCC-Maritimes

The Maritimes assessment area is a winter-peaking NPCC subregion that contains two Balancing Authorities. It is comprised of the Canadian provinces of New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island, and the northern portion of Maine, which is radially connected to the New Brunswick power system. The area covers 58,000 square miles with a total population of 1.9 million people.

On-Peak Capacity: Generation Mix



Seasonal Risk Scenario



NPCC-Maritimes Resource Adequacy Data

Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margin	2018 SRA	2019 SRA	2018 vs. 2019 SRA
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	3,235	3,255	0.6%
Demand Response: Available	300	289	-3.7%
Net Internal Demand	2,935	2,966	1.1%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change**
Existing-Certain Capacity	5,828	5,842	0.2%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	0	0	0.0%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	0	0	0.0%
Anticipated Resources	5,828	5,842	0.2%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	0.0%
Prospective Resources	5,828	5,842	0.2%
Reserve Margins	**Percent**	**Percent**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	98.6%	97.0%	-1.6
Prospective Reserve Margin	98.6%	97.0%	-1.6
Reference Margin Level	20.0%	20.0%	0.0

The table and chart above provide potential summer peak demand and resource condition information. The table on the right presents a standard seasonal assessment and comparison to the previous year's assessment. The chart above presents deterministic scenarios for further analysis of different demand and resource levels, with adjustments for normal and extreme conditions. NPCC-Maritimes determined the adjustments to summer capacity and peak demand based on methods or assumptions that are summarized below. See the **Seasonal Risk Scenario Chart Description** for more information about this chart.

Risk Scenario Summary

Observation:
Resources meet operating reserve requirements under studied scenarios.

Scenario Assumptions

- **Extreme Peak Load:** 90/10 forecast
- **Outages:** Based on historical operating experience
- **Extreme Derates:** An extreme, low-likelihood scenario is used whereby thermal units are derated for extreme temperature and all wind unit capacity is unavailable

Highlights


- The Maritimes area has not identified any operational issues that are expected to impact system reliability. If an event were to occur, there are emergency operations and planning procedures in place. All of the area's declared firm capacity is expected to be operational for the summer operating period.
- As part of the planning process, dual-fueled units will have sufficient supplies of heavy fuel oil (HFO) on-site to enable sustained operation in the event of natural gas supply interruptions.




NPCC-New England

ISO New England (ISO-NE) Inc. is a Regional Transmission Organization that serves Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont. It is responsible for the reliable day-to-day operation of New England's bulk power generation and transmission system, and it also administers the area's wholesale electricity markets and manages the comprehensive planning of the regional BPS. The New England regional electric power system serves approximately 14.5 million people over 68,000 square miles.

On-Peak Capacity: Generation Mix



Seasonal Risk Scenario



The table and chart above provide potential summer peak demand and resource condition information. The table on the right presents a standard seasonal assessment and comparison to the previous year's assessment. The chart above presents deterministic scenarios for further analysis of different demand and resource levels, with adjustments for normal and extreme conditions. NPCC-New England determined the adjustments to summer capacity and peak demand based on methods or assumptions that are summarized below. See the **Seasonal Risk Scenario Chart Description** for more information about this chart.

Risk Scenario Summary

Observation:

Resources meet operating reserve requirements under studied scenarios.

Scenario Assumptions

- **Extreme Peak Load:** 90/10 Forecast
- **Outages:** Near-zero MW due to summer peaking area
- **Extreme Derates:** Based on historical forced outages and any additional reductions for fuel-supply risk
- **Operating Mitigations:** Based on ISO-NE operating procedures

NPCC-New England Resource Adequacy Data

Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margin	2018 SRA	2019 SRA	2018 vs. 2019 SRA
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	25,729	25,323	-1.6%
Demand Response: Available	408	340	-16.7%
Net Internal Demand	25,321	24,983	-1.3%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change**
Existing-Certain Capacity	30,460	30,144	-1.0%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	0	1,185	-
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	1,468	1,328	-9.5%
Anticipated Resources	31,928	32,657	2.3%
Existing-Other Capacity	421	704	67.2%
Prospective Resources	32,349	33,361	3.1%
Reserve Margins	**Percent**	**Percent**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	26.1%	30.7%	4.6
Prospective Reserve Margin	27.8%	33.5%	5.7
Reference Margin Level	16.8%	18.3%	1.5

Highlights

- The New England area expects to have sufficient resources to meet the 2019 summer peak demand forecast of 25,323 MW, with a corresponding projected net margin of 7,674 MW after accounting for demand response resources. This net margin is a 1,067 MW increase from the 2018 Anticipated Reserve Margin forecast. The increase can be largely attributed to new generation becoming available prior to the 2019 summer and a decrease in forecasted net demand.
- The upcoming retirement of the 674 MW Pilgrim nuclear unit is offset by additions in excess of 1,000 MW of combined cycle and combustion gas turbine generating units.
- The 2019 summer demand forecast is 406 MW (1.6%) lower than the 2018 summer forecast and takes into account the demand reductions associated with energy efficiency and behind-the-meter photovoltaic (BTM-PV) systems.
- The 18.3% Reference Margin Level is based on New England's net installed capacity requirement for the 2019–2020 commitment period, which was approved by FERC.




NPCC-New York


The New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) is the only Balancing Authority (NYBA) within the state of New York. NYISO is a single-state ISO that was formed as the successor to the New York Power Pool—a consortium of the eight IOUs—in 1999. NYISO manages the New York State transmission grid that encompasses approximately 11,000 miles of transmission lines, more than 47,000 square miles, and serving the electric needs of 19.5 million people. New York experienced its all-time peak load of 33,956 MW in the Summer 2013.

The NERC Reference Margin Level is 15%. Wind, grid-connected solar, and run-of-river totals were derated for this calculation. However, New York requires load serving entities to procure capacity for their loads equal to their peak demand plus an Installed Reserve Margin (IRM). The IRM requirement represents a percentage of capacity above peak load forecast and is approved annually by the New York State Reliability Council (NYSRC). NYSRC approved the 2019–2020 IRM at 17%.

On-Peak Capacity: Generation Mix



Seasonal Risk Scenario



The table and chart above provide potential summer peak demand and resource condition information. The table on the right presents a standard seasonal assessment and comparison to the previous year's assessment. The chart above presents deterministic scenarios for further analysis of different demand and resource levels, with adjustments for normal and extreme conditions. NPCC-New York determined the adjustments to summer capacity and peak demand based on methods or assumptions that are summarized below. See the **Seasonal Risk Scenario Chart Description** for more information about this chart.

Risk Scenario Summary

Observation:
Resources meet operating reserve requirements under studied scenarios.

Scenario Assumptions

- **Extreme Peak Load:** 90/10 forecast
- **Extreme Derates:** Near-zero MW due to summer peaking area
- **Forced Outages:** Based on five-year average performance
- **Operational Mitigation:** Based on operational/emergency procedures in NYISO Emergency Operations Manual

NPCC-New York Resource Adequacy Data

Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margin	2018 SRA	2019 SRA	2018 vs. 2019 SRA
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	32,904	32,382	-1.6%
Demand Response: Available	1,219	1,309	7.4%
Net Internal Demand	31,685	31,073	-1.9%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change**
Existing-Certain Capacity	39,066	37,304	-4.5%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	260	27	-89.6%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	1,625	1,452	-10.7%
Anticipated Resources	40,950	38,783	-5.3%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	0.0%
Prospective Resources	40,950	38,783	-5.3%
Reserve Margins	**Percent**	**Percent**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	29.2%	24.8%	-4.4
Prospective Reserve Margin	29.2%	24.8%	-4.4
Reference Margin Level	18.2%	15.0%	-3.2

Highlights

- NYISO is not anticipating any operational issues in the New York control area for the upcoming summer operating period. Adequate capacity margins are anticipated and existing operating procedures are sufficient to handle any issues that may occur.
- High capacity factors on certain New York City peaking units could result in possible violations of their daily NOx emission limits if they were to fully respond to the NYISO dispatch signals. Significant run-time on peaking units, indicating the potential for a violation, could be the result of long duration hot weather events or loss of significant generation or transmission assets in New York City.




NPCC-Ontario


The Independent Electricity System Operator (IESO) is the Balancing Authority and Reliability Coordinator for the province of Ontario. In addition to administering the area's wholesale electricity markets, the IESO plans for Ontario's future energy needs. Ontario covers more than 415,000 square miles and has a population of more than 14 million people. Ontario is interconnected electrically with Québec, MRO-Manitoba, states in MISO (Minnesota and Michigan), and NPCC-New York.

Ontario IESO treats demand response as a resource for its own assessments, while in the NERC assessment demand response is used as a load-modifier. As a result, the total internal demand, reserve margin, and Reference Margin Level values differ in IESO's reports when compared to NERC reports.

On-Peak Capacity: Generation Mix



Seasonal Risk Scenario



NPCC-Ontario Resource Adequacy Data			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margin	**2018 SRA**	**2019 SRA**	**2018 vs. 2019 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	22,002	22,105	0.5%
Demand Response: Available	630	790	25.4%
Net Internal Demand	21,372	21,315	-0.3%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change**
Existing-Certain Capacity	25,731	26,581	3.3%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	23	924	>100%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	0	-102	-
Anticipated Resources	25,754	27,403	6.4%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	0.0%
Prospective Resources	25,754	27,403	6.4%
Reserve Margins	**Percent**	**Percent**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	20.5%	28.6%	8.1
Prospective Reserve Margin	20.5%	28.6%	8.1
Reference Margin Level	13.3%	14.9%	1.6

The table and chart above provide potential summer peak demand and resource condition information. The table on the right presents a standard seasonal assessment and comparison to the previous year's assessment. The chart above presents deterministic scenarios for further analysis of different demand and resource levels, with adjustments for normal and extreme conditions. NPCC-Ontario determined the adjustments to summer capacity and peak demand based on methods or assumptions that are summarized below. See the **Seasonal Risk Scenario Chart Description** for more information about this chart.

Risk Scenario Summary

Observation:
Resources meet operating reserve requirements under studied scenarios.

Scenario Assumptions

- **Extreme Peak Load:** Based on severe historic weather conditions
- **Extreme Derates:** Based on thermal unit derating curves, and historical hydro performance in low-water year
- **Operational Mitigation:** 2,000 MW imports assessed as available from neighbors

Highlights

- There are sufficient resources to maintain the reliability of Ontario's electricity system under normal weather conditions for Summer 2019.
- The IESO recently revised its outage approval methods and will evaluate outages using its extreme weather scenario with only firm resources and up to 2,000 MW of imports.
- Driven by the need to enhance planning transparency and help market participants make more informed decisions and investments, the IESO has renewed its approach to planning with a particular emphasis on its commitment to regular sharing of information with stakeholders. As a first step in delivering on this commitment, and helping generators and transmitters plan for and schedule outages, the IESO now extends its 18-month outage planning horizon to five years twice yearly.





NPCC-Québec

The Québec Assessment Area (Province of Québec) is a winter-peaking NPCC subregion that covers 595,391 square miles with a population of eight million.

Québec is one of the four NERC Interconnections in North America, with ties to Ontario, New York, New England, and the Maritimes, consisting of either HVDC ties, radial generation, or load to and from neighboring systems.

On-Peak Capacity: Generation Mix





NPCC- Québec Resource Adequacy Data			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margin	**2018 SRA**	**2019 SRA**	**2018 vs. 2019 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	20,534	21,005	2.3%
Demand Response: Available	0	0	0.0%
Net Internal Demand	20,534	21,005	2.3%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change**
Existing-Certain Capacity	34,014	34,303	0.8%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	0	28	-
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	-1,829	-1,663	-9.1%
Anticipated Resources	32,185	32,667	1.5%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	0.0%
Prospective Resources	32,185	32,667	1.5%
Reserve Margins	**Percent**	**Percent**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	56.7%	55.5%	-1.2
Prospective Reserve Margin	56.7%	55.5%	-1.2
Reference Margin Level	12.6%	12.8%	0.2

The table and chart above provide potential summer peak demand and resource condition information. The table on the right presents a standard seasonal assessment and comparison to the previous year's assessment. The chart above presents deterministic scenarios for further analysis of different demand and resource levels, with adjustments for normal and extreme conditions. NPCC-Québec determined the adjustments to peak demand based on methods or assumptions that are summarized below. See the **Seasonal Risk Scenario Chart Description** for more information about this chart.

Risk Scenario Summary

Observation:
Resources meet operating reserve requirements under studied scenarios.

Scenario Assumptions

- **Extreme Peak Load:** 90/10 forecast
- **Anticipated Resources:** Includes planned generator outages, deratings, bottling, historic hydroelectric reduction and 100% reduction in installed wind generation capacity

Highlights

- No issues are anticipated for the summer operating period since the system is winter peaking.
- A new 735 kV line is expected to be commissioned in May 2019 to meet NERC Reliability Standards and will provide more flexibility to operators.
- The Québec area expects to be able to provide assistance to neighboring areas if needed, up to the transfer capability available.




PJM


PJM Interconnection is a Regional Transmission Organization that coordinates the movement of wholesale electricity in all or parts of Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, and the District of Columbia.

PJM serves 65 million people and covers 369,089 square miles. PJM is a Balancing Authority, Planning Coordinator, Transmission Planner, Resource Planner, Interchange Authority, Transmission Operator, Transmission Service Provider, and Reliability Coordinator.

On-Peak Capacity: Generation Mix



Seasonal Risk Scenario



The table and chart above provide potential summer peak demand and resource condition information. The table on the right presents a standard seasonal assessment and comparison to the previous year's assessment. The chart above presents deterministic scenarios for further analysis of different demand and resource levels, with adjustments for normal and extreme conditions. PJM determined the adjustments to summer capacity and peak demand based on methods or assumptions that are summarized below. See the **Seasonal Risk Scenario Chart Description** for more information about this chart.

Risk Scenario Summary

Observation:
Resources meet operating reserve requirements under studied scenarios.

Scenario Assumptions

- **Extreme Peak Load:** 90/10 Forecast
- **Outages:** Approximate values based on review of previous summer peak periods

PJM Resource Adequacy Data

Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margin	2018 SRA	2019 SRA	2018 vs. 2019 SRA
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	152,108	151,358	-0.5%
Demand Response: Available	9,095	8,154	-10.3%
Net Internal Demand	143,013	143,204	0.1%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change**
Existing-Certain Capacity	185,440	181,013	-2.4%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	0	2,200	-
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	4,419	1,535	-65.3%
Anticipated Resources	189,859	184,748	-2.7%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	0
Prospective Resources	189,859	184,748	-2.7%
Reserve Margins	**Percent**	**Percent**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	32.8%	29.0%	-3.8
Prospective Reserve Margin	32.8%	29.0%	-3.8
Reference Margin Level	16.1%	15.9%	-0.2

Highlights

- The PJM reserve margin for this summer is 29.0% with a requirement of 15.9%. With this level of capacity, PJM has not identified any emerging reliability issues regarding resource adequacy.
- Ohio Valley Electric Cooperative (OVEC) moved from MISO into PJM in December 2018. OVEC has two large generating plants that have moved from having significant transfers into PJM to now being part of the PJM market dispatch.



SERC

SERC's assessment areas are traditionally summer-peaking and cover approximately 72,000 circuit miles and serve a population estimated at 23 million.

For NERC's assessment, the Region is divided into three assessment areas: SERC- E, SERC-C, and SERC-SE. The assessment areas include 12 Balancing Authorities: Cube Hydro Carolinas LLC, Associated Electric Cooperative, Inc. (AECI), Duke Energy Carolinas (DEC), Duke Energy Progress (DEP), Electric Energy, Inc. (EEI), LG&E and KU Services Company (as agent for Louisville Gas and Electric and Kentucky Utilities (LG&E/ KU)), PowerSouth Energy Cooperative (PowerSouth), South Carolina Electric & Gas Company (SCE&G), South Carolina Public Service Authority (SCPSA), Southern Company Services, Inc. (SOCO), Southeastern Power Administration (SPA), and Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA).

SERC Resource Adequacy Data						
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**SERC-E**	**SERC-C**	**SERC-SE**	**2018 SRA SERC Total**	**2019 SRA SERC Total**	**2018 vs. 2019 SRA**
Demand Projections	**Megawatts**	**Megawatts**	**Megawatts**	**Megawatts**	**Megawatts**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	43,704	40,781	47,311	131,994	131,796	-0.2%
Demand Response: Available	1,054	1,964	2,293	4,640	5,311	14.5%
Net Internal Demand	42,650	38,817	45,018	127,354	126,485	-0.7%
Resource Projections	**Megawatts**	**Megawatts**	**Megawatts**	**Megawatts**	**Megawatts**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	50,976	50,391	61,182	161,532	162,549	0.6%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	0	0	458	1,875	458	-75.6%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	455	301	-1,905	-3,133	-1,150	-63.3%
Anticipated Resources	51,431	50,692	59,734	160,274	161,857	1.0%
Existing-Other Capacity	852	4,060	289	2,361	5,200	120.2%
Prospective Resources	52,282	54,752	60,023	162,635	167,057	2.7%
Planning Reserve Margins	**Percent**	**Percent**	**Percent**	**Percent**	**Percent**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	20.6%	30.6%	32.7%	25.9%	28.0%	2.1
Prospective Reserve Margin	22.6%	41.1%	33.3%	27.7%	32.1%	4.4
Reference Margin Level	13.15%	13.15%	13.15%	15.00%	13.15%	-1.85

Highlights

- To date, there are no significant reliability risks expected for the 2019 summer season in the SERC Region.
- SERC continues to prepare for the integration of entities within FRCC. Both FRCC and the SERC Region are coordinating activities to ensure a successful transition of the new registered entities into the SERC Region's reliability programs and processes. For more information, visit the FRCC RE Integration webpage.[9]
- To align with SERC's subregional naming convention in its regional studies and assessments, the SERC North Assessment Area was changed to SERC Central Assessment Area in NERC Reliability Assessments.
- SERC Southeast entities have experienced loop flows from a high regional transfers between MISO North and MISO South. As a result, the impacted utilities along with MISO developed an operating procedure to address potential reliability issues that could result from high MISO regional transfers.


Charts

The charts on the next page provide potential summer peak demand and resource condition information. The table above presents a standard seasonal assessment and comparison to the previous year's assessment. The waterfall charts on the next page present deterministic scenarios for further analysis of different demand and resource levels with adjustments for normal and extreme conditions. SERC determined the adjustments to summer capacity and peak demand based on methods or assumptions that are summarized on the next page. See the **Seasonal Risk Scenario Chart Description** for more information about the charts.

[9] See http://www.serc1.org/outreach/frcc-re-integration

SERC-E

Seasonal Risk Scenario



Risk Scenario Summary


Observation:

Resources meet operating reserve requirements under studied scenarios

Scenario Assumptions


- **Extreme Peak Load:** Based on 2018 SERC Probabilistic Assessment, equal to or exceeding a 90/10 statistical level
- **Outages:** Based on historical data
- **Extreme Derates:** Based on 2018 SERC Probabilistic Assessment, equal to or exceeding a 90/10 statistic

On-Peak Capacity: Generation Mix



SERC-C

Seasonal Risk Scenario



Risk Scenario Summary


Observation:

Resources meet operating reserve requirements under studied scenarios

Scenario Assumptions


- **Extreme Peak Load:** Based on 2018 SERC Probabilistic Assessment, equal to or exceeding a 90/10 statistical level
- **Outages:** Based on historical data
- **Extreme Derates:** Based on 2018 SERC Probabilistic Assessment, equal to or exceeding a 90/10 statistic

On-Peak Capacity: Generation Mix



SERC-SE

Seasonal Risk Scenario



Risk Scenario Summary


Observation:

Resources meet operating reserve requirements under studied scenarios

Scenario Assumptions

- **Extreme Peak Load:** Based on 2018 SERC Probabilistic Assessment, equal to or exceeding a 90/10 statistical level
- **Outages:** Based on historical data
- **Extreme Derates:** Based on 2018 SERC Probabilistic Assessment, equal to or exceeding a 90/10 statistic

On-Peak Capacity: Generation Mix






SPP


Southwest Power Pool (SPP) Planning Coordinator footprint covers 546,000 square miles and encompasses all or parts of Arkansas, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas and Wyoming.

The SPP long-term assessment is reported based on the Planning Coordinator footprint, which touches parts of the Midwest Reliability Organization Regional Entity, and WECC. The SPP assessment area footprint has approximately 61,000 miles of transmission lines, 756 generating plants, and 4,811 transmission-class substations, and it serves a population of more than 18 million people.

On-Peak Capacity: Generation Mix



Seasonal Risk Scenario



The table and chart above provide potential summer peak demand and resource condition information. The table on the right presents a standard seasonal assessment and comparison to the previous year's assessment. The chart above presents deterministic scenarios for further analysis of different demand and resource levels, with adjustments for normal and extreme conditions. SPP determined the adjustments to summer capacity and peak demand based on methods or assumptions that are summarized below. See the **Seasonal Risk Scenario Chart Description** for more information about this chart.

Risk Scenario Summary

Observation: Resources meet operating reserve requirements under studied scenarios.

Scenario Assumptions

- **Extreme Peak Load:** 90/10 Forecast
- **Outages:** A derate for forced outages and performance in extreme weather based on historical data

SPP Resource Adequacy Data

Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margin	2018 SRA	2019 SRA	2018 vs. 2019 SRA
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	52,554	51,520	-2.0%*
Demand Response: Available	867	835	-3.8%
Net Internal Demand	51,687	50,685	-1.9%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change**
Existing-Certain Capacity	67,649	67,960	0.5%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	779.85	64	-91.8%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	19	-1,244	-
Anticipated Resources	68,447	66,780	-2.4%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	0.0%
Prospective Resources	68,447	66,780	-2.4%
Reserve Margins	**Percent**	**Percent**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	32.4%	31.8%	-0.6
Prospective Reserve Margin	32.4%	31.8%	-0.6
Reference Margin Level	12.0%	12.0%	0.0

* In 2018, Total Internal Demand was calculated on a non-coincident peak basis, resulting in higher demand calculations compared to coincident peak basis used for the 2019 SRA.

Highlights

- SPP does not anticipate any emerging reliability issues impacting the area for the 2019 summer season.
- SPP has experienced mid-range forecast error uncertainty in wind forecasts as the penetration of wind generation increases. This is not an issue if the error is short lived, but if the error continues throughout the day it can lead to short-term supply scarcity. Within SPP, a team is developing mitigation to ensure appropriate ramp product is available on a daily basis.




Texas RE-ERCOT

The Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) is the ISO for the ERCOT Interconnection and is located entirely in the state of Texas; it operates as a single Balancing Authority. It also performs financial settlement for the competitive wholesale bulk-power market and administers retail switching for nearly 8 million premises in competitive choice areas. ERCOT is governed by a board of directors and subject to oversight by the Public Utility Commission of Texas and the Texas Legislature.

ERCOT is a summer-peaking Region that covers approximately 200,000 square miles, connects over 46,500 miles of transmission lines, has 650 generation units, and serves more than 25 million customers. Texas RE is responsible for the regional RE functions described in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 for the ERCOT Region.

On-Peak Capacity: Generation Mix



Texas RE-ERCOT Resource Adequacy Data			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margin	**2018 SRA**	**2019 SRA**	**2018 vs. 2019 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	72,756	74,853	2.9%
Demand Response: Available	2,301	2,227	-3.2%
Net Internal Demand	70,455	72,626	3.1%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change**
Existing-Certain Capacity	76,654	77,482	1.1%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	738.95	607	-17.9%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	753	721	-4.2%
Anticipated Resources	78,146	78,810	0.9%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	0.0%
Prospective Resources	78,146	78,810	0.9%
Reserve Margins	**Percent**	**Percent**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	10.9%	8.5%	-2.4
Prospective Reserve Margin	10.9%	8.5%	-2.4
Reference Margin Level	13.75%	13.75%	0.0


Highlights

- Despite growth in anticipated resources relative to last summer, even higher expected summer peak demand, combined with delays in planned generation projects and the announced mothballing of a 470 MW coal-fired unit, are expected to result in a tighter reserve margin for the upcoming summer.
- Notable transmission improvements include a new 250 MVAr STATCOM expected to be in-service prior to summer in the Far West Texas region to support the rapid growth of oil and gas production load in the Permian Basin. Additionally, a new 345 kV line in Central Texas will be energized in the spring to support the San Antonio area.
- There are no known transmission reliability, fuel supply, or essential reliability service procurement issues projected for the upcoming season. However, delays or cancellations of planned transmission expansion projects, if they occur, may contribute to potential localized reliability concerns.

Charts

The chart on the next page provide potential summer peak demand and resource condition information. The table above presents a standard seasonal assessment and comparison to the previous year's assessment. The waterfall charts on the next page present deterministic scenarios for further analysis of different demand and resource levels with adjustments for normal and extreme conditions. ERCOT determined the adjustments to summer capacity and peak demand based on methods or assumptions that are summarized on the next page. See the **Seasonal Risk Scenario Chart Description** for more information about the chart.

Seasonal Risk Scenario



The table on page 26 and the chart above provide potential summer peak demand and resource condition information. The table presents a standard seasonal assessment and comparison to the previous year's assessment. The chart presents deterministic scenarios for further analysis of different demand and resource levels, with adjustments for normal and extreme conditions.

Risk Scenario Summary

Observation:

Operating Mitigations and Energy Emergency Alerts may be needed under peak and extreme conditions studied.

Scenario Assumptions (see Table 1 on Page 9 for detailed discussion)

- **Extreme Peak Load:** Based on 2011 historic summer peak load
- **Outages:** A derate for maintenance and forced outages based on the past three year summer periods
- **Operational Mitigations.** Additional resources (e.g., switchable generation resources, additional imports, and voltage reduction) to support maintaining operating reserves, not already counted in SRA reserve margins.



WECC

WECC is responsible for coordinating and promoting BES reliability in the Western Interconnection. WECC's 329 members, which include 38 Balancing Authorities, represent a wide spectrum of organizations with an interest in the BES. Serving an area of nearly 1.8 million square miles and more than 82 million people, it is geographically the largest and most diverse of the NERC Regional Entities. WECC's service territory extends from Canada to Mexico. It includes the provinces of Alberta and British Columbia in Canada, the northern portion of Baja California in Mexico, and all or portions of the 14 western states in between. The WECC assessment area is divided into six subregions: Rocky Mountain Reserve Group (RMRG), Southwest Reserve Sharing Group (SRSG), California/Mexico (CA/MX), the Northwest Power Pool (NWPP), and the Canadian areas of Alberta (WECC AB) and British Columbia (WECC BC). These subregional divisions are used for this study, as they are structured around reserve sharing groups that have similar annual demand patterns and similar operating practices.

WECC Resource Adequacy Data									
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**WECC AB**	**WECC BC**	**CA/MX**	**NWPP-US**	**RMRG**	**SRSG**	**2018**	**2019**	**2018 vs. 2019 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**MW**	**MW**	**MW**	**MW**	**Total MW**	**Total MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	11,111	8,432	52,929	47,619	12,636	23,415	154,256	156,142	1.2%
Demand Response: Available	0	0	957	614	225	368	3,569	2,164	-39.4%
Net Internal Demand	11,111	8,432	51,972	47,006	12,411	23,047	150,687	153,979	2.2%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**MW**	**MW**	**MW**	**MW**	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	14,560	9,746	61,806	60,056	16,627	31,413	184,981	194,208	5.0%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	43	152	1,818	1,007	257	684	1,098	3,961	>100%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.0%
Anticipated Resources	14,603	9,898	63,624	61,063	16,884	32,097	186,079	198,169	6.5%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.0%
Prospective Resources	14,603	9,898	63,624	61,063	16,884	32,097	186,079	198,169	6.5%
Planning Reserve Margins	**Percent**	**Percent**	**Percent**	**Percent**	**Percent**	**Percent**	**Percent**	**Percent**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	31.4%	17.4%	22.4%	29.9%	36.0%	39.3%	23.5%	28.7%	5.2
Prospective Reserve Margin	31.4%	17.4%	22.4%	29.9%	36.0%	39.3%	23.5%	28.7%	5.2
Reference Margin Level	10.0%	10.0%	12.0%	20.0%	17.0%	15.0%	15.4%	15.4%	0.0

Highlights


- The existing and Anticipated Reserve Margins for WECC, its subregions, and all zones within are expected to exceed their respective NERC Reference Margin Levels for the upcoming season.
- WECC and NERC are monitoring the transition of Reliability Coordinator (RC) responsibilities in the Western Interconnection as Peak RC winds down toward disestablishment at the end of 2019. NERC-certified RCs are scheduled to assume responsibilities in California (July 1) and British Columbia (September 2). All other areas will complete transition prior to December 31. Certification site visits, shadow-operating periods with Peak RC, and WECC-sponsored RC transition activities are being implemented to manage reliability risks.
- Inventories of the Aliso Canyon natural gas storage facility remain an item of focus for reliability within the Western Interconnection. This condition is being closely monitored by the CAISO, SoCal Gas, and WECC's Situational Awareness group.
- Above-average snowpack levels and the anticipated abundance of hydroelectric generation in California may be used to displace generation from natural-gas-fired units, freeing up more natural gas for Southern California if fuel availability becomes an issue.
- Localized short-term operational issues may occur due to wildfires, if seasonal wildfire predictions are accurate. Due to the widely dispersed nature of the transmission system, outages due to wildfires are generally not widespread.

Charts

The charts on the next page provide potential summer peak demand and resource condition information. The table above presents a standard seasonal assessment and comparison to the previous year's assessment. The waterfall charts on the next page present deterministic scenarios for further analysis of different demand and resource levels with adjustments for normal and extreme conditions. WECC entities determined the adjustments to summer capacity and peak demand based on methods or assumptions that are summarized on the next page. See the **Seasonal Risk Scenario Chart Description** for more information about the charts.

WECC-Alberta

Seasonal Risk Scenario



Risk Scenario Summary


Observation:

Resources meet operating reserve requirements under studied scenarios.

Scenario Assumptions


- **Extreme Peak Load:** Based on 90/10 demand forecast
- **Forced Outages:** Based on historical data
- **Extreme Derates:** Derates for thermal, wind, and solar were developed using the tenth percentile availability curves for the respective resources for the assessment area peak hour

On-Peak Capacity: Generation Mix



WECC-British Columbia

Seasonal Risk Scenario



Risk Scenario Summary


Observation:

Resources meet operating reserve requirements under studied scenarios.

Scenario Assumptions


- **Extreme Peak Load:** Based on 90/10 demand forecast
- **Forced Outages:** Based on historical data
- **Extreme Derates:** Derates for thermal, wind, and solar were developed using the tenth percentile availability curves for the respective resources for the assessment area peak hour

On-Peak Capacity: Generation Mix



WECC-California / Mexico

Seasonal Risk Scenario



Risk Scenario Summary


Observation:

Resources meet operating reserve requirements for typical outage conditions, peak load, and extreme peak loads. Extreme outages may result in insufficient resources at peak load.

Scenario Assumptions


- **Extreme Peak Load:** Based on 90/10 demand forecast
- **Forced Outages:** Based on historical data
- **Extreme Derates:** Derates for thermal, wind, and solar were developed using the tenth percentile availability curves for the respective resources for the assessment area peak hour

On-Peak Capacity: Generation Mix



WECC-Northwest Power Pool

Seasonal Risk Scenario



Risk Scenario Summary


Observation:

Resources meet operating reserve requirements for typical outage conditions, peak load, and extreme peak loads. Extreme outages may result in insufficient resources at peak load.

Scenario Assumptions


- **Extreme Peak Load:** Based on 90/10 demand forecast
- **Forced Outages:** Based on historical data
- **Extreme Derates:** Derates for thermal, wind, and solar were developed using the tenth percentile availability curves for the respective resources for the assessment area peak hour

On-Peak Capacity: Generation Mix



WECC-Rocky Mountain Reserve Sharing Group

Seasonal Risk Scenario



Risk Scenario Summary


Observation:

Resources meet operating reserve requirements for typical outage conditions, peak load, and extreme peak loads. Extreme outages may result in insufficient resources at peak load.

Scenario Assumptions


- **Extreme Peak Load:** Based on 90/10 demand forecast
- **Forced Outages:** Based on historical data
- **Extreme Derates:** Derates for thermal, wind, and solar were developed using the tenth percentile availability curves for the respective resources for the assessment area peak hour

On-Peak Capacity: Generation Mix



WECC-Southwest Reserve Sharing Group

Seasonal Risk Scenario



Risk Scenario Summary


Observation:

Resources meet operating reserve requirements for typical outage conditions, peak load, and extreme peak loads. Extreme outages may result in insufficient resources at peak load.

Scenario Assumptions

- **Extreme Peak Load:** Based on 90/10 demand forecast
- **Forced Outages:** Based on historical data
- **Extreme Derates:** Derates for thermal, wind, and solar were developed using the tenth percentile availability curves for the respective resources for the assessment area peak hour

On-Peak Capacity: Generation Mix



Data Concepts and Assumptions

The table below explains data concepts and important assumptions used throughout this assessment.

General Assumptions

- Reliability of the interconnected BPS is comprised of both adequacy and operating reliability.
  - Adequacy is the ability of the electric system to supply the aggregate electric power and energy requirements of the electricity consumers at all times while taking into account scheduled and reasonably expected unscheduled outages of system components.
  - Operating reliability is the ability of the electric system to withstand sudden disturbances such as electric short-circuits or unanticipated loss of system components.
- The reserve margin calculation is an important industry planning metric used to examine future resource adequacy.
- All data in this assessment is based on existing federal, state, and provincial laws and regulations.
- Differences in data collection periods for each assessment area should be considered when comparing demand and capacity data between year-to-year seasonal assessments.
- *2018 Long-Term Reliability Assessment* data has been used for most of this 2019 assessment period, augmented by updated load and capacity data.
- A positive net transfer capability would indicate a net importing assessment area; a negative value would indicate a net exporter.

Demand Assumptions

- Electricity demand projections, or load forecasts, are provided by each assessment area.
- Load forecasts include peak hourly load[10], or total internal demand, for the summer and winter of each year.[11]
- Total internal demand projections are based on normal weather (50/50 distribution[12]) and are provided on a coincident[13] basis for most assessment areas.
- Net internal demand is used in all reserve margin calculations, and it is equal to total internal demand then reduced by the amount of controllable and dispatchable demand response projected to be available during the peak hour.

Resource Assumptions

Resource planning methods vary throughout the North American BPS. NERC uses the following categories to provide a consistent approach for collecting and presenting resource adequacy:

Anticipated Resources:

- **Existing-Certain Capacity**: included in this category are commercially operable generating units, or portions of generating units, that meet at least one of the following requirements when examining the period of peak demand for the summer season: unit must have a firm capability and have a power purchase agreement (PPA) with firm transmission that must be in effect for the unit; unit must be classified as a designated network resource; and/or where energy-only markets exist, unit must be a designated market resource eligible to bid into the market.
- **Tier 1 Capacity Additions**: includes capacity that either is under construction or has received approved planning requirements.
- **Net Firm Capacity Transfers (Imports minus Exports)**: transfers with firm contracts.

Prospective Resources: Includes all anticipated resources, plus the following:

Existing-Other Capacity: included in this category are commercially operable generating units, or portions of generating units, that could be available to serve load for the period of peak demand for the summer or summer season but do not meet the requirements of existing-certain.

Reserve Margin Definitions

Reserve Margins: the primary metric used to measure resource adequacy; it is defined as the difference in resources (anticipated or prospective) and net internal demand then divided by net internal demand, shown as a percentage:

[10] *Glossary of Terms* Used in NERC Reliability Standards

[11] The summer season represents June–September and the winter season represents December–February.

[12] Essentially, this means that there is a 50% probability that actual demand will be higher and a 50% probability that actual demand will be lower than the value provided for a given season/year.

[13] Coincident: The sum of two or more peak loads that occur in the same hour. Noncoincident: The sum of two or more peak loads on individual systems that do not occur in the same time interval. Meaningful only when considering loads within a limited period of time, such as a day, a week, a month, a heating or cooling season, and usually for not more than one year. SERC and FRCC calculate total internal demand on a noncoincidental basis

Seasonal Risk Scenario Chart Description

Each assessment area performed an operational risk analysis that was used to produce the seasonal risk scenario charts in the **Regional Assessment Dashboards**. The chart presents deterministic scenarios for further analysis of different resource and demand levels. The left blue column shows Summer Anticipated Resources (from the Resource Adequacy Data table). The two orange columns at the right show two demand scenarios: normal peak net internal demand from the Resource Adequacy Data table and an extreme summer peak demand, both determined by the assessment area. The middle red or green bars show adjustments that are applied cumulatively to the Summer Anticipated Resources, such as the following:

- Reductions for typical generation outages (maintenance and forced, not already accounted for in Summer Anticipated Resources)
- Reductions that represent additional outage or performance derating by resource type for extreme, low-probability conditions (e.g., drought condition impacts on hydroelectric generation, low-wind scenario affecting wind generation, fuel supply limitations, or extreme temperature conditions resulting in reduced thermal generation output)
- Additional capacity resources that represent quantified capacity from operational procedures, if any, that are made available during scarcity conditions

Not all assessment areas have the same categories of adjustments to anticipated resources. Furthermore, each assessment area determined the adjustments to summer capacity based on methods or assumptions that are summarized below the chart. Methods and assumptions differ by assessment area and may not be comparable.

The chart enables evaluation of resource levels against levels of expected operating reserve requirement and the forecasted demand. Further, the effects from low-probability, extreme events can also be examined by comparing resource levels after applying extreme-scenario derates and/or extreme summer peak demand. Because such extreme scenario analysis depicts the cumulative impact resulting from the occurrence of multiple low-probability events, the overall likelihood of the scenario is very low.

NERC
NORTH AMERICAN ELECTRIC RELIABILITY CORPORATION

2020 Summer Reliability Assessment

June 2020



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Preface

Electricity is a key component of the fabric of modern society and the Electric Reliability Organization (ERO) Enterprise serves to strengthen that fabric. The vision for the ERO Enterprise, which is comprised of the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) and the six Regional Entities (REs), is a highly reliable and secure North American bulk power system (BPS). Our mission is to assure the effective and efficient reduction of risks to the reliability and security of the grid.

Reliability | Resilience | Security

Because nearly 400 million citizens in North America are counting on us

The North American BPS is divided into six RE boundaries as shown in the map and corresponding table below. The multicolored area denotes overlap as some load-serving entities participate in one Region while associated Transmission Owners/Operators participate in another.



MRO	Midwest Reliability Organization
NPCC	Northeast Power Coordinating Council
RF	ReliabilityFirst
SERC	SERC Reliability Corporation
Texas RE	Texas Reliability Entity
WECC	Western Electricity Coordinating Council

About this Report

NERC's *2020 Summer Reliability Assessment* (SRA) identifies, assesses, and reports on areas of concern regarding the reliability of the North American BPS for the upcoming summer season. In addition, the SRA presents peak electricity demand and supply changes and highlights any unique regional challenges or expected conditions that might impact the BPS. The reliability assessment process is a coordinated reliability evaluation between the Reliability Assessment Subcommittee (RAS), the Regions, and NERC staff. This report reflects NERC's independent assessment and is intended to inform industry leaders, planners, operators, and regulatory bodies so they are better prepared to take necessary actions to ensure BPS reliability. This report also provides an opportunity for the industry to discuss plans and preparations to ensure reliability for the upcoming summer period.

In April 2020, NERC published its *Special Report Pandemic Preparedness and Operational Assessment: Spring 2020* to advise electricity stakeholders about elevated risk to electric reliability as a result of the global health crisis.[1] NERC continues to assess risks to the reliability and security of the BPS from the global health crisis and reports on industry actions and preparedness in this SRA.

[1] https://www.nerc.com/pa/rrm/bpsa/Alerts%20DL/NERC_Pandemic_Preparedness_and_Op_Assessment_Spring_2020.pdf

Findings

NERC's annual SRA covers the Summer 2020 (June–September) period. This assessment provides an evaluation of resource and transmission system adequacy necessary to meet projected summer peak demands. In addition to assessing resource adequacy, the SRA monitors and identifies potential reliability issues of interest and regional topics of concern. In 2020, there is heightened uncertainty in demand projections stemming from the progression of the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic and the response of governments, society, and the electricity industry. The following key findings represent NERC's independent evaluation of electric generation and transmission capacity as well as potential operational concerns that may need to be addressed for the upcoming summer:

- **Sufficient capacity resources are expected to be in-service for the upcoming summer.** In all areas, with the exception of ERCOT, the Anticipated Reserve Margin meets or surpasses the Reference Margin Level, indicating that planned resources in these areas are adequate to manage risk of a capacity deficiency under normal conditions.[2] Assessment areas are prepared to meet potential peak demand with or without pandemic-related demand reductions. Should pandemic related restrictions continue through the summer, peak demand is expected to be lower than forecast.
  - **Texas RE-ERCOT**. Projections for increased peak demand in ERCOT indicate the potential for energy emergency alerts (EEAs) during summer peak periods. Prior to the arrival of COVID-19 and the resulting mitigations that have impacted electricity demand, ERCOT planners were expecting similarly tight operating conditions to those faced in Summer 2019. The ERCOT Anticipated Reserve Margin has risen from 8.5% in Summer 2019 to 12.9% for the upcoming summer. The increase in reserve margin is driven by the addition of over 1.9 GW of on-peak resource capacity. ERCOT's forecast of peak demand for Summer 2020 is also forecasted to grow in 2020, but higher-growth projections have been tempered in recent months by COVID-19 economic impacts. The potential for EEAs and operating mitigation at peak load remains.
- **Maintenance and preparations for summer operations impacted by pandemic.** As summer peak operating season approaches each year, generator and transmission owners and operators engage in extensive preparations, including preventive maintenance, supply stocking, and training programs. However, many normal efforts have been impinged by the global pandemic. To avoid the risk of failing to complete maintenance on-time, some owners and operators have deferred or cancelled preseason maintenance in response to pandemic-related issues. Monitoring the progress of ongoing efforts to prepare staff and equipment for summer will be important to ensuring the availability of anticipated resources to meet electricity demand. Furthermore, system operators must be prepared to address demand forecast uncertainty and potentially challenging operating conditions as a result of low demand on the system.
- **Protecting critical electric industry workforce during the COVID-19 pandemic remains a priority for reliability and resilience.** System and generation plant operators have implemented operating postures and personnel restrictions prescribed by their pandemic plans in order to protect essential personnel and support reliable operations. Many of these measures will need to be maintained for the foreseeable future. There is a continuing risk that control centers or plants could be temporarily shut down if a significant number of operators or plant employees test positive for COVID-19 despite preparedness efforts. When relaxations can be implemented, operators will likely need to stay postured to return to heightened protections in response to dynamic public health conditions.
- **Late-summer wildfire season in western United States and Canada poses risk to BPS reliability.** Government agencies warn of the potential for above-normal wildfire risk beginning as early as June in parts of the Western United States as well as Central and Western Canada.[3] Operation of the BPS can be impacted in areas where wildfires are active as well as areas where there is heightened risk of wildfire ignition due to weather and ground conditions.

[2] For more information, see the description of the "Reference Margin Level" in the **Data Concepts and Assumptions** section of this report or refer to NERC's *Long-term Reliability Assessment*: https://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/NERC_LTRA_2019.pdf

[3] See North American Seasonal Fire Assessment and Outlook, April 2020: https://www.predictiveservices.nifc.gov/outlooks/NA_Outlook.pdf

Resource Adequacy

The Anticipated Reserve Margin, which is based on available resource capacity, is a metric used to evaluate resource adequacy by comparing the projected capability of anticipated resources to serve forecasted peak demand.[4] Large year-to-year changes in anticipated resources or forecasted peak demand (net internal demand) can greatly impact Planning Reserve Margin calculations. Other than in ERCOT, all assessment areas have sufficient Anticipated Reserve Margins to meet or exceed their Reference Margin Level for Summer 2020 as shown in the **Figure 1**.

Although the pandemic introduces significant uncertainty into demand and some risk to generation resource availability, as discussed in the following section, the projections below provide indication that adequate resources are available to meet peak demand.




Figure 1: Summer 2020 Anticipated/Prospective Reserve Margins Compared to Reference Margin Level

[4] Generally, anticipated resources include generators and firm capacity transfers that are expected to be available to serve load during electrical peak loads for the season. Prospective Resources are those that could be available but do not meet criteria to be counted as Anticipated Resources. Refer to the **Data Concepts and Assumptions** section for additional information on Anticipated/Prospective Reserve Margins, Anticipated/Prospective Resources, and Reference Margin Levels.

Changes from Year-to-Year

Understanding the changes from year-to-year is an essential step in assessing an area on a seasonal basis. **Figure 2** provides the relative change from the Summer 2019 to the Summer 2020 period. The **Regional Assessment Dashboards** provide details of the demand and resource components that make up the anticipated reserve margins for each assessment area. In the following areas, anticipated reserve margin changed by more than five percentage points: none of the changes result in a resource adequacy concern for the upcoming summer.

- **NPCC Maritimes:** The retirements of one coal-fired generator and two biomass generators contributed to lower anticipated reserve margins.
- **NPCC Ontario:** Anticipated Reserve Margins decrease due to nuclear unit refurbishments and reductions in the contribution of demand response and hydro.
- **WECC BC and WECC SRSG:** Reserve margin changes are attributed to revised variable generation capacity factors and changes in peak-hour demand.
- **WECC NWPP-US:** Forecasted summer peak demand increased by 6,300 MW (13.5%) while resource levels were relatively stable, resulting in lower reserve margins.




Figure 2: Summer 2019 to Summer 2020 Anticipated Reserve Margins Year-to-Year Change

Internal Demand

The changes in forecasted Net Internal Demand for each assessment area are shown in **Figure 3**.[5] Assessment areas develop these forecasts based on historic load and weather information as well as other long-term projections.

Most assessment area demand projections in this assessment have not been decreased to account for COVID-19 mitigation measures. Although government and societal responses to halt the spread of the coronavirus (i.e., shelter-in-place orders, minimal travel, and restrictions on public gatherings) have resulted in near-term decreased electricity demand, impact projections for summer are difficult to forecast. ERCOT is an exception, where planners reduced the pre-seasonal peak demand forecast by 1,496 MW but still anticipate potentially record-setting peak demand. The demand projections used in **Figure 3** and elsewhere throughout this report are likely higher than would be expected with pandemic mitigation completely factored in.




Figure 3: Change in Net Internal Demand: 2020 Summer Forecast Compared to 2019 Summer Forecast

[5] Changes in modeling and methods may also contribute to year-to-year changes in forecasted net internal demand projections.

Pandemic Preparedness and Operational Assessment—Summer 2020

The global health crisis has elevated the electric reliability risk profile due to potential workforce disruptions, supply chain interruptions, and increased cyber security threats. In April, NERC released its *Pandemic Preparedness and Operational Assessment – Spring 2020* (special report) to advise electricity stakeholders of the reliability considerations and assess the operational preparedness of the BPS owners and operators during pandemic conditions in April and May 2020. In its special report, NERC did not identify any specific threat or degradation to the reliable operation of the BPS for the spring time frame. The ERO continues to assess risks and conditions and is pursuing all available avenues to continue coordination with federal, state, and provincial regulators as well as work with industry to identify reliability implications and lessons learned.

Increased Reliability Risk Profile by Operating Period

Spring 2020	Summer 2020	Long-Term
• No specific reliability issue identified • Potential workforce disruptions • Supply chain interruption • Increased cyber security threat and monitoring • Different system conditions including lower demands and higher voltages. • System operators under sequester • Noncritical staff are remote	• Continued potential for workforce disruptions; support service disruption • Potential equipment and fuel supply chain disruptions • Deferred generation maintenance and other factors impacting unit availability • Generation in-service dates	• Potential changes to generation and transmission in-service dates • Increased remote operation of non-critical staff • Changes to pandemic preparedness and operating plans based on lessons learned Note: a more granular assessment will be Included in NERC's 2020 Long-Term Reliability Assessment

Since the start of the widening coronavirus infection in North America in February 2020, registered entities have taken steps from pandemic plans and industry advisories to maintain the reliability and security of the BPS. In March 2020, the Electricity Subsector Coordinating Council (ESCC) issued the first version of the *ESCC Resource Guide*[6] as a resource for electric power industry leaders to guide informed localized decisions in response to the COVID-19 global health emergency; it is updated on a regular basis as new approaches, planning considerations, and issues develop. The guide highlights data points, stakeholders, and options to consider in making decisions about operational status while protecting the health and safety of employees, customers, and communities. Sharing experiences and expertise helps users of the guide to make independent, localized decisions aimed at reducing negative impacts to the continent's power supply during the COVID-19 global pandemic. In addition to immediate measures designed to protect critical operations, personnel, and functions, entities are working to minimize risk to resource and BPS equipment availability, assure fuel supplies, and prepare operating personnel for peak season.

Maintenance Preparations for Summer Impacted

Since electricity demand is lower in a typical spring season than peak summer and winter periods, Transmission and Generator Owners normally have the opportunity to schedule maintenance and address training needs. Pandemic response and mitigation plans at national, state, provincial, and local levels can impact maintenance efforts by disrupting the flow of personnel and supply chains. Some delays to transmission projects due to disrupted travel of specialized contractors has been reported. To avoid the risk of failing to complete maintenance on time, some owners and operators have deferred or cancelled preseason maintenance in response to pandemic-related issues as can be seen by the MISO area example in **Figure 4**.

[6] https://www.electricitysubsector.org/




Figure 4: Generation Capacity Planned to be Off-line in MISO through May 31, 2020 (Scheduled February 20 and April 13, 2020).

In ERCOT, planners observed a higher-than-normal volume of generator maintenance outages in late March/early April possibly due to Generator Owners accelerating maintenance schedules to get ahead of potential supply chain or personnel delays. Planners and operators continue to manage schedules of equipment outages into the summer season to ensure sufficient resource availability and transmission system readiness. Maintenance that would have been performed prior to summer but is deferred can increase the risk of forced outages.

Operators in areas where a large portion of generators have deferred maintenance could experience higher-than-expected forced outages that could lead to generation supply deficiencies during periods of peak demand. NERC is implementing codes for its Generator Availability Data System (GADS) that will support collection of data on outages with pandemic causes for use in analyzing reliability impacts in later months.[7]

Electricity supply risk can be compounded by risks to the generator and to their supply of fuel. Natural-gas-fired generators can be at risk to fuel supply infrastructure disruption from mechanical or other issues; planners and operators in areas with impacted preseason maintenance are implementing measures to mitigate such risks. For example, in ISO-NE, the Electric/Gas Operations Committee has been conducting weekly meetings to determine and assess pandemic impacts to pipelines. The ISO has also increased surveying of generator owners and operators to assess outage risks.

[7] Information about GADS: https://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/gads/Pages/GeneratingAvailabilityDataSystem-(GADS).aspx

Demand Impacts Vary and Cause Forecast Uncertainty

The pandemic is negatively impacting electricity demand in many parts of North America just as it has elsewhere around the world. Prior to summer, when government stay-at-home orders and societal response were at their highest, some areas reported as much as 15% drop off in peak demand. However, these observed demand impacts varied across North America and in some areas were negligible. Throughout the pandemic, many independent system operators and regional transmission operators have periodically reported on demand impacts.[8] In most areas, weather continues to be the predominant factor in electricity demand. Diminished peak demand resulting from pandemic does not pose any meaningful risk to reliability for the summer season.

Many areas are experiencing variations in hourly load shapes as a result of changing societal behaviors and mechanisms implemented to halt the spread of the coronavirus. In general, these areas are seeing below-normal ramp in demand in morning hours and lower evening demand as can be seen in **Figure 5**. Changes to pre-pandemic patterns can affect accuracy of day-ahead demand forecasts that are relied upon to ensure resources are available for each hour of the day. In recent years, demand and resource forecasting has become more complex—and more critical—as the generation resource mix has changed to include higher levels of variable generation, and load shape has changed with increasing solar photovoltaic (PV) resources. When operating entities began observing discrepancies between predicted and actual demand as a result of pandemic behavior, many instituted measures designed to improve the accuracy of forecasts made available to system operators. In MISO and other ISOs, support teams have increased the frequency of short-term demand forecast simulations.




Figure 5: Average Simulated and Actual Load in MISO Area for April 4–10, 2020

[8] For example, see reports from ERCOT and CAISO: http://www.caiso.com/Documents/COVID-19-Impacts-ISOLoadForecast-Presentation.pdf
http://www.ercot.com/content/wcm/lists/200201/ERCOT_COVID-19_Analysis_FINAL.pdf

Potential Demand and Resource Challenges for System Operators

Where pandemic restrictions persist through the summer, system operators could encounter difficult system characteristics, such as increased impact of DERs on load profiles, distribution reverse power flows, higher than usual operating voltages, and minimum demands at all-time lows. Operating challenges such as these need to be addressed in real-time and often by using complex tools for studying dynamic system conditions.

The effect of distributed energy resources (DERs) on system performance can become more pronounced as synchronous generation can be replaced on the system during periods of lower minimum demand; operators could face challenges in maintaining sufficient amounts of frequency-responsive reserves necessary to regulate or arrest changes in frequency. Typically, DER effects on the system are more pronounced in the spring when milder temperatures reduce air conditioning load and increase efficiency in solar PV modules. With potentially lower demand on the system as a result of the pandemic, these conditions could extend into early summer. In areas with higher DER penetration (e.g., California and North Carolina), minimum loads and reverse power flows from the distribution system can cause some challenges for system operators.

Operators in some areas may also have to contend with how a reduction in industrial and commercial loads could affect operating strategies and emergency plans. The potential lack of industrial and commercial load could alter underfrequency or undervoltage load shedding plans that rely on tripping these loads as well as demand response programs that may be relied on to support emergency operations.

Operating Reliability Considerations

- Increased uncertainty in demand projections and daily use
- Potential for increased forced outages due to deferred maintenance, staff unavailability, or limited supplies and/or fuel
- Higher than usual operating voltages
- Light load conditions
- Reverse power flow and increased penetration levels of DERs
- Potential for reduced effectiveness in underfrequency/voltage load shedding schemes as industrial and commercial load may not be online

Utility Crews and Operators Must Stay Postured for Reliability, Security, and Resilience

As the coronavirus crisis unfolds in the lead up to summer, the industry is preparing to operate with a significantly smaller workforce, an encumbered supply chain, and limited support services for an extended and unknown period of time. Vigilance to cyber security threats intensifies as risks are elevated due to a greater reliance on remote working arrangements. The business continuity and pandemic plans developed by the different operating entities are designed to protect the people working for them and to ensure critical electricity operations and infrastructure are supported properly throughout an emergency.

Protecting critical electric industry workforce during the COVID-19 pandemic remains a priority for reliability and resilience. System and Generator Operators have implemented operating postures and personnel restrictions prescribed by their pandemic plans in order to protect essential personnel and support reliable operations. Many of these measures will need to be maintained for the foreseeable future. There is a continuing risk that control centers or plants could be temporarily shut down if a significant number of operators or plant employees test positive for COVID-19 despite preparedness efforts, including employee sequestration. As of April, many entities had begun developing return to work plans; however, the majority of entities indicated that they expected to maintain protective protocols for operating personnel through summer and beyond. When relaxations can be implemented, operators will likely need to stay postured to return to heightened protections if warranted by public health conditions.

An important component of BPS resilience and recovery from hurricanes and major storms is the effective mutual assistance rendered by organizations from outside the storm-affected areas. The comprehensive plans in place to rapidly deploy support teams and equipment take on even greater complexity for the 2020 North American hurricane season (May–November) due to the need to safeguard personnel from coronavirus infection. In April, the ESCC updated its *Resource Guide* to provide lessons learned from the experience of the utilities, electric cooperatives, and investor-owned electric companies affected by a series of storms in late March and early April of this year. Lessons learned include considerations for maintaining social distancing at all times, planning for personnel protection equipment needs, and increased need for local logistical and coordination personnel to support a decentralized response.[9]

[9] See *ESCC Resource Guide*, Version 7, April 27, 2020, p. 47–48.

Cyber Security Risk and Information Sharing

Electricity and other critical infrastructure sectors face elevated cyber security risks arising from the COVID-19 pandemic in addition to ongoing risks. Opportunistic actors are attempting to find and exploit new vulnerabilities that arise as entities shift work processes and locations to maintain business continuity. The Electricity Infrastructure Sharing and Analysis Center (E-ISAC) continues to exchange information with its members and has posted communications and guidance from the ESCC and from government partners, and other advisories on its Portal; members are encouraged to check in regularly to receive updates. The E-ISAC also continues to provide information regarding emerging cyber threats; these include attacks on conferencing and remote access infrastructure, disinformation, and spear phishing campaigns attempting to harvest credentials and other information. Members are encouraged to actively share information regarding threats and other malicious activities with the E-ISAC to enable broader communication with other sector participants and government partners.

Operational Risks Highlighted for Summer 2020

Seasonal Operational Risk Assessments of Resource and Demand Scenarios

Areas can face energy shortfalls despite having Planning Reserve Margins that exceed Reference Margin Levels. Operating resources may be insufficient during periods of peak demand for reasons that could include generator scheduled maintenance, forced outages due to normal and more extreme weather conditions and loads, and low-likelihood conditions that affect generation resource performance or unit availability, including constrained fuel supplies. The **Regional Assessment Dashboards** section in this report includes a seasonal risk scenario for each area that illustrates potential variation in resource and load as well as the potential effects that operating actions can have to mitigate shortfalls in operating reserves when insufficiencies occur. **Figure 6** shows an example seasonal risk assessment for the Southwest Power Pool (SPP) area that NERC developed using SRA data. A description of resource and demand variables is found in **Table 1**.




Figure 6: SPP Assessment Area Seasonal Risk Assessment

About the Seasonal Risk Assessment

The operational risk analysis shown in **Figure 6** provides a deterministic scenario for understanding how various factors affecting resources and demand can combine to impact overall resource adequacy. Adjustments are applied cumulatively to anticipated capacity, such as reductions for typical generation outages (maintenance and forced not already accounted for in anticipated resources) and additions that represent the quantified capacity from operational tools, if any, that are available during scarcity conditions but have not been accounted for in the SRA reserve margins.

Resources throughout the scenario are compared against expected operating reserve requirements that are based on peak load and normal weather. The effects from low-probability, extreme events are also factored in through additional resource derates or extreme resource scenarios and extreme summer peak load conditions. Because the seasonal risk scenario shows the cumulative impact resulting from the occurrence of multiple low-probability events, the overall likelihood of the scenario is very low. An analysis similar to the SPP seasonal risk scenario in **Figure 6** can be found for each assessment area in the **Regional Assessment Dashboards** section of this report.

The seasonal risk assessment for the SPP assessment area shows that resources are available to meet peak summer demand, including normally hot and humid summer conditions. However, extreme heat and summer conditions, such as those associated with record-setting temperatures, could increase demand and reduce generator performance enough to cause operating emergencies. A low-output wind generation event, though rare, could lead to operating actions, including conservative operations plans and EEA declarations, to manage resources and demand. Despite anticipated resources in excess of Reference Margin Levels as shown in **Figure 1**, operators in SPP and other areas of North America can face resource constraints during extreme summer weather.

During the past two summers, system operators in SPP needed to take operating actions, including issuing one EEA in August 2019, to address resource shortfalls. In some instances, operators were responding to higher than expected planned and forced outages coupled with real time forecasting errors for load and wind. SPP has established operational mitigation teams and developed enhanced processes and procedures to support operators in maintaining real time reliability.

Table 1: Resource and Demand Variables in the SPP Seasonal Risk Assessment

Resource Scenarios	
Typical Maintenance Outages	Typical maintenance outages refer to an estimate of generation resources that will be out for maintenance during peak demand conditions. SPP calculated a value of 4,926 MW based on historical averages.
Typical Forced Outages	Typical forced outages refer to an estimate of generation resources that will experience forced outage during peak load conditions. SPP calculated a value of 4,638 MW based on historical averages.
Resource Derates for Extreme Conditions (Low-likelihood)	An estimated capacity derate due to extreme conditions is calculated and used for a low-likelihood resource scenario. The derate accounts for reduced capacity contributions due to generator performance in extreme conditions. SPP calculated a capacity derate of 2,276 MW for thermal generation due to extreme conditions.
Low-Wind Scenario (Low-likelihood)	The low-wind scenario is used to analyze the impact of low-likelihood weather conditions that severely reduce output from wind generation resources. A capacity adjustment of 5,017 MW is based on a low wind generator output historical event observed by system operators during summer peak conditions.
Operational Mitigations	SPP estimates that certain operational mitigations can contribute 1,700 MW of additional resources to support maintaining operating reserve requirements.
Demand Scenarios	
2020 Summer Net Internal Demand	Net internal demand is equal to total internal demand then reduced by the amount of controllable and dispatchable demand response projected to be available during the peak hour. It is based on historical average weather (i.e., forecasts for a 50/50 distribution).
Extreme Summer Peak Load	A seasonal load adjustment (2,313 MW) is added to 2020 Net Internal Demand to account for extreme weather conditions. The adjustment is based on a 90/10 statistical extreme load forecast.

Seasonal Risk Assessments for Other Areas

Seasonal risk scenarios for each assessment area are presented in the **Regional Assessment Dashboards** section of this report. Potential extreme generation resource outages and peak loads that can accompany extreme hot or humid weather may result in reliability risks in MISO, SPP, and ERCOT as well as the Canadian provinces of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and the Maritimes. Parts of the system within the WECC area, including California ISO, could also experience resource shortfalls in low-likelihood resource derate scenarios. Under studied conditions for these areas, grid operators would need to employ operating mitigations or EEAs to obtain resources necessary to meet extreme peak demands.

Wildfire Risk Potential and BPS Impacts


Government agencies predict normal to below-normal wildfire risk at the start of summer for the West Coast of the United States and the southwestern states. However, the latest three-month *Seasonal Fire Assessment and Outlook* published by the National Interagency Fire Center, Natural Resources Canada, and National Meteorological Service in Mexico warns that the trend toward warmer, drier weather could lead to above normal wildland fire potential in Northern California, Oregon, and Washington beginning in June.[10] Across most of western Canada, weather patterns and forecasts also suggest increased potential for wildland fires.

Operation of the BPS can be impacted in areas where wildfires are active as well as areas where there is heightened risk of wildfire ignition due to weather and ground conditions. Wildfire prevention planning in California and other areas include power shut-off programs in high fire-risk areas. When conditions warrant implementing these plans, power lines, including transmission-level lines, may be preemptively de-energized in high fire-risk areas to prevent wildfire ignitions. Other wildfire risk mitigation activities include implementing enhanced vegetation management, equipment inspections, system hardening, and added situational awareness measures.

[10] See *North American Seasonal Fire Assessment and Outlook*, May 2020: https://www.predictiveservices.nifc.gov/outlooks/NA_Outlook.pdf

Regional Assessment Dashboards

The following assessment area dashboards and summaries were developed based on data and narrative information collected by NERC from the Regional Entities on an assessment area basis.







MISO

The Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc. (MISO) is a not-for-profit, member-based organization administering wholesale electricity markets that provide customers with valued service; reliable, cost-effective systems and operations; dependable and transparent prices; open access to markets; and planning for long-term efficiency.

MISO manages energy, reliability, and operating reserve markets that consist of 36 local Balancing Authorities and 394 market participants that serves approximately 42 million customers. Although parts of MISO fall in three NERC Regions, MRO is responsible for coordinating data and information submitted for NERC's reliability assessments.



Seasonal Risk Scenario



MISO Resource Adequacy Data			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margin	**2019 SRA**	**2020 SRA**	**2019 vs. 2020 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	124,744	124,866	0.1%
Demand Response: Available	6,385	6,172	-3.3%
Net Internal Demand	118,359	118,694	0.3%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change**
Existing-Certain Capacity	139,220	140,636	1.0%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	0	0	-
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	1,955	2,795	42.9%
Anticipated Resources	141,175	143,430	1.6%
Existing-Other Capacity	591	290	-50.9%
Prospective Resources	141,766	143,720	1.4%
Reserve Margins	**Percent**	**Percent**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	19.3%	20.8%	1.5
Prospective Reserve Margin	19.8%	21.1%	1.3
Reference Margin Level	16.8%	18.0%	1.2

The table and chart above provide potential summer peak demand and resource condition information. The table on the right presents a standard seasonal assessment and comparison to the previous year's assessment. The chart above presents deterministic scenarios for further analysis of different demand and resource levels, with adjustments for normal and extreme conditions. MISO determined the adjustments to summer capacity and peak demand based on methods or assumptions that are summarized below. See the **Data Concepts and Assumptions** for more information about this table and chart.

Risk Scenario Summary

Observation:

Resources meet operating reserve requirements under normal demand and outage scenarios. Extreme summer peak demand or outages could result in a need to employ operating procedures to mitigate resource shortfall.

Scenario Assumptions

- **Extreme Peak Load:** 90/10 forecast
- **Outages:** Average from highest peak hour over the past five summers

Highlights


- Summer scenarios with high resource outages and high demand may require use of load modifying resources during peak periods as load modifying resources become an increasingly important segment of MISO's resource portfolio.
- Though MISO remains resource adequate for the 2020 summer, some areas may be resource and import constrained presenting local operating challenges.
- Near-term impacts of COVID-19 have resulted in generally lower loads and shifted morning and evening peaks to later hours. It is unclear how observed trends will change through the summer months.




MRO-Manitoba Hydro

Manitoba Hydro is a provincial crown corporation that provides electricity to about 580,000 customers throughout Manitoba and natural gas service to about 282,000 customers in various communities throughout Southern Manitoba. The Province of Manitoba has a population of about 1.3 million people in an area of 250,946 square miles.

Manitoba Hydro is winter peaking. No change in the footprint area is expected during the assessment period. Manitoba Hydro is its own Planning Coordinator and Balancing Authority. Manitoba Hydro is a coordinating member of MISO. MISO is the Reliability Coordinator for Manitoba Hydro.



Seasonal Risk Scenario



MRO-Manitoba Hydro Resource Adequacy Data			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margin	**2019 SRA**	**2020 SRA**	**2019 vs. 2020 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	3,224	3,272	1.5%
Demand Response: Available	0	0	-
Net Internal Demand	3,224	3,272	1.5%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change**
Existing-Certain Capacity	5,161	5,239	1.5%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	0	0	-
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	-1,408	-1,526	8.4%
Anticipated Resources	3,753	3,713	-1.1%
Existing-Other Capacity	215	125	-41.6%
Prospective Resources	3,968	3,838	-3.3%
Reserve Margins	**Percent**	**Percent**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	16.4%	13.5%	-2.9
Prospective Reserve Margin	23.1%	17.3%	-5.8
Reference Margin Level	12.0%	12.0%	0.0

The table and chart above provide potential summer peak demand and resource condition information. The table on the right presents a standard seasonal assessment and comparison to the previous year's assessment. The chart above presents deterministic scenarios for further analysis of different demand and resource levels with adjustments for normal and extreme conditions. MRO-Manitoba determined the adjustments to capacity and peak demand based on methods or assumptions that are summarized below. See the **Data Concepts and Assumptions** for more information about this table and chart.

Risk Scenario Summary

Resources meet operating reserve requirements under normal demand and outage scenarios.

Scenario Assumptions

- **Extreme Peak Demand:** All-time highest peak load
- **Outages:** Based on historical operating experience
- **Extreme Derates:** Thermal units derated for extreme temperature where appropriate.


Highlights

- Manitoba Hydro has implemented measures to minimize coronavirus impact risk to operations. While the COVID-19 Pandemic is expected to be present over the summer assessment period, an impact on BPS reliability is not anticipated.
- Reservoir storage levels are above average and more than adequate to withstand the design-basis drought conditions.




MRO-SaskPower

Saskatchewan is a province of Canada and comprises a geographic area of 651,900 square kilometers (251,700 square miles) with approximately 1.1 million people. Peak demand is experienced in the winter. The Saskatchewan Power Corporation (SaskPower) is the Planning Coordinator and Reliability Coordinator for the province of Saskatchewan and is the principal supplier of electricity in the province. SaskPower is a provincial crown corporation, under provincial legislation, and is responsible for the reliability oversight of the Saskatchewan Bulk Electric System (BES) and its interconnections.



Seasonal Risk Scenario



MRO-SaskPower Resource Adequacy Data			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margin	**2019 SRA**	**2020 SRA**	**2019 vs. 2020 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	3,553	3,480	-2.1%
Demand Response: Available	85	60	-29.4%
Net Internal Demand	3,468	3,420	-1.4%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change**
Existing-Certain Capacity	3,907	3,904	-0.1%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	0	0	-
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	25	125	400.0%
Anticipated Resources	3,932	4,029	2.5%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-
Prospective Resources	3,932	4,029	2.5%
Reserve Margins	**Percent**	**Percent**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	13.4%	17.8%	4.4
Prospective Reserve Margin	13.4%	17.8%	4.4
Reference Margin Level	11.0%	11.0%	0.0

The table and chart above provide potential summer peak demand and resource condition information. The table on the right presents a standard seasonal assessment and comparison to the previous year's assessment. The chart above presents deterministic scenarios for further analysis of different demand and resource levels with adjustments for normal and extreme conditions. MRO-SaskPower determined the adjustments to capacity and peak demand based on methods or assumptions that are summarized below. See the **Data Concepts and Assumptions** for more information about this table and chart.

Risk Scenario Summary

Resources meet operating reserve requirements under normal scenarios. Extreme summer peak load and outage conditions could result in the need to employ operating mitigations (i.e., demand response, transfers, and short-term load interruption.)

Scenario Assumptions

- **Extreme Peak Load:** Peak demand with lighting and all large consumer loads
- **Maintenance Outages:** Estimated based on average maintenance outages for June, July, August, and September for 2019
- **Forced Outages:** Estimated using SaskPower forced outage model
- **Extreme Derates:** Derate on natural gas units based on historic data and manufacturer data


Highlights

- Saskatchewan experiences high load in summer as a result of extreme hot weather.
- SaskPower conducts an annual summer joint operating study with Manitoba Hydro with inputs from Basin Electric (North Dakota) and prepares operating guidelines for any identified issues.
- The risk of operating reserve shortage during peak load times or EEAs could increase if large generation forced outage occurs during peak load times in the end of August to early October 2020 when 641 MW of SaskPower's natural gas generating station is off-line for overhaul maintenance.




NPCC-Maritimes

The Maritimes assessment area is a winter-peaking NPCC subregion that contains two Balancing Authorities. It is comprised of the Canadian provinces of New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island, and the northern portion of Maine that is radially connected to the New Brunswick power system. The area covers 58,000 square miles with a total population of 1.9 million.



Seasonal Risk Scenario



NPCC-Maritimes Resource Adequacy Data			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margin	**2019 SRA**	**2020 SRA**	**2019 vs. 2020 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	3,255	3,370	3.5%
Demand Response: Available	289	369	27.7%
Net Internal Demand	2,966	3,001	1.2%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change**
Existing-Certain Capacity	5,842	5,312	-9.1%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	0	0	0.0%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	0	53	0.0%
Anticipated Resources	5,842	5,365	-8.2%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	0.0%
Prospective Resources	5,842	5,365	-8.2%
Reserve Margins	**Percent**	**Percent**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	97.0%	78.8%	-18.2
Prospective Reserve Margin	97.0%	78.8%	-18.2
Reference Margin Level	20.0%	20.0%	0.0

The table and chart above provide potential summer peak demand and resource condition information. The table on the right presents a standard seasonal assessment and comparison to the previous year's assessment. The chart above presents deterministic scenarios for further analysis of different demand and resource levels with adjustments for normal and extreme conditions. NPCC-Maritimes determined the adjustments to capacity and peak demand based on methods or assumptions that are summarized below. See the **Data Concepts and Assumptions** for more information about this table and chart.

Risk Scenario Summary

Resources meet operating requirements under normal peak load scenario. Extreme summer peak load and outage conditions could result in the need to employ operating mitigation to manage resource shortfall.

Scenario Assumptions

- **Extreme Peak Load:** 90/10 forecast
- **Outages:** Based on historical operating experience
- **Extreme Derates:** An extreme, low-likelihood scenario is used whereby thermal units are derated for extreme temperature and all wind unit capacity is unavailable


Highlights

- The Maritimes area has not identified any operational issues that are expected to impact system reliability. If an event was to occur, there are emergency operations procedures in place. All of the area's declared firm capacity is expected to be operational for the summer operating period.
- As part of the planning process, dual-fueled units will have sufficient supplies of heavy fuel oil (HFO) on-site to enable sustained operation in the event of natural gas supply interruptions.
- The effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on load patterns, energy use, and peak demands will continue to be evaluated as the pandemic evolves.
- The Maritimes are evaluating contingency plans for transmission, distribution and generation planned work, planned maintenance and forced outages to proceed conservatively while mitigating short term and longer term reliability risks.




NPCC-New England

ISO New England (ISO-NE) Inc. is a regional transmission organization that serves Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont. It is responsible for the reliable day-to-day operation of New England's bulk power generation and transmission system, and it also administers the area's wholesale electricity markets and manages the comprehensive planning of the regional BPS. The New England regional electric power system serves approximately 14.5 million people over 68,000 square miles.



Seasonal Risk Scenario



NPCC-New England Resource Adequacy Data			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margin	**2019 SRA**	**2020 SRA**	**2019 vs. 2020 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	25,323	25,158	-0.7%
Demand Response: Available	340	443	30.3%
Net Internal Demand	24,983	24,715	-1.1%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change**
Existing-Certain Capacity	30,144	30,791	2.1%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	1,185	0	-100.0%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	1,328	1,510	13.7%
Anticipated Resources	32,657	32,301	-1.1%
Existing-Other Capacity	704	324	-54.0%
Prospective Resources	33,361	32,625	-2.2%
Reserve Margins	**Percent**	**Percent**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	30.7%	30.7%	0.0
Prospective Reserve Margin	33.5%	32.0%	-1.5
Reference Margin Level	18.3%	18.3%	0.0

The table and chart above provide potential summer peak demand and resource condition information. The table on the right presents a standard seasonal assessment and comparison to the previous year's assessment. The chart above presents deterministic scenarios for further analysis of different demand and resource levels with adjustments for normal and extreme conditions. NPCC-New England determined the adjustments to capacity and peak demand based on methods or assumptions that are summarized below. See the **Data Concepts and Assumptions** for more information about this table and chart.

Risk Scenario Summary

Resources meet operating reserve requirements under studied scenarios.

Scenario Assumptions

- **Extreme Peak Load:** 90/10 Forecast
- **Outages:** Based on weekly averages
- **Operating Mitigations:** Based on ISO-NE operating procedures

Highlights


- The New England Area expects to have sufficient resources to meet the 2020 summer peak demand forecast of 25,158 MW for the week beginning July 5, 2020, with a projected net margin of 3,197MW (12.7%). The 2020 summer demand forecast is 165 MW (0.7%) less than the 2019 summer forecast of 25,323 MW and takes into account the demand reductions associated with energy efficiency, load management, behind-the-meter photovoltaic (BTM-PV) systems, and distributed generation.
- With residents and businesses across New England changing their behavior in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, ISO New England is seeing a decline in system demand of approximately 3–5% compared to what would normally be expected under weather conditions in the area. These percentages may change over time.
- In addition to overall declines in consumer demand, these societal changes are also affecting demand patterns across the region. Though the pandemic is affecting energy use, weather conditions remain the primary drivers of system demand. ISO-NE will continuously monitor these ever-changing trends in load patterns and make the appropriate adjustments to calculate an accurate load forecast. The area's power system continues to remain reliable.




NPCC-New York

The New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) is the only Balancing Authority within the state of New York. NYISO is a single-state ISO that was formed as the successor to the New York Power Pool—a consortium of the eight IOUs—in 1999. NYISO manages the New York State transmission grid that encompasses approximately 11,000 miles of transmission lines, more than 47,000 square miles, and serving the electric needs of 19.5 million people. New York experienced its all-time peak load of 33,956 MW in the summer of 2013.

The NERC Reference Margin Level is 15%. Wind, grid-connected solar, and run-of-river totals were derated for this calculation. However, New York requires load serving entities to procure capacity for their loads equal to their peak demand plus an IRM. The IRM requirement represents a percentage of capacity above peak load forecast and is approved annually by the New York State Reliability Council (NYSRC). NYSRC approved the 2020–2021 IRM at 18.9%.



Seasonal Risk Scenario



NPCC-New York Resource Adequacy Data			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margin	**2019 SRA**	**2020 SRA**	**2019 vs. 2020 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	32,382	32,296	-0.3%
Demand Response: Available	1,309	1,282	-2.1%
Net Internal Demand	31,073	31,014	-0.2%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change**
Existing-Certain Capacity	37,304	38,475	3.1%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	27	101	274.8%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	1,452	1,562	7.6%
Anticipated Resources	38,783	40,138	3.5%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	0.0%
Prospective Resources	38,783	40,138	3.5%
Reserve Margins	**Percent**	**Percent**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	24.8%	29.4%	4.6
Prospective Reserve Margin	24.8%	29.4%	4.6
Reference Margin Level	15.0%	15.0%	0.0

The table and chart above provide potential seasonal peak demand and resource condition information. The table on the right presents a standard seasonal assessment and comparison to the previous year's assessment. The chart above presents deterministic scenarios for further analysis of different demand and resource levels with adjustments for normal and extreme conditions. NPCC-New York determined the adjustments to capacity and peak demand based on methods or assumptions that are summarized below. See the **Data Concepts and Assumptions** for more information about this table and chart.

Risk Scenario Summary

Resources meet operating reserve requirements under studied scenarios.

Scenario Assumptions

- **Extreme Peak Demand:** 90/10 load forecast with demand response adjustments
- **Extreme Derates:** Near-zero MW due to summer peaking area
- **Typical Outages:** Based on scheduled maintenance and GADS forced outage data
- **Operational Mitigation:** 3.1 GW based on operational/emergency procedures in NYISO *Emergency Operations Manual*

Highlights


- NYISO is not anticipating any operational issues in the New York control area for the upcoming summer. Adequate capacity margins are anticipated and existing operating procedures are sufficient to handle any issues that may occur.
- New York requires load serving entities to procure capacity for their loads equal to their peak demand plus an Installed Reserve Margin (IRM). The IRM requirement represents a percentage of capacity above peak load forecast and is determined and approved annually by the New York State Reliability Council (NYSRC). NYSRC approved a 2020–2021 IRM of 18.9%. The IRM meets the NPCC and NYSRC criterion of a loss of load expectation of no greater than 0.1 days per year. Its calculation is based on a study that accounts for the forced outage rates of thermal generators, the peak load forecast, the load forecast uncertainty, the actual hourly production data for wind and solar over the most recent five-year calendar period, long term capacity imports and exports, demand response programs derated to account for historic availability, various emergency operation procedures, and assistance from neighboring control areas. Historically since 2000, the IRM has ranged between 15.0% and 18.9%.




NPCC-Ontario

The Independent Electricity System Operator (IESO) is the Balancing Authority and Reliability Coordinator for the province of Ontario. In addition to administering the area's wholesale electricity markets, the IESO plans for Ontario's future energy needs. Ontario covers more than 415,000 square miles and has a population of more than 14 million. Ontario is interconnected electrically with Québec, MRO-Manitoba, statesin MISO (Minnesota and Michigan), and NPCC-New York.

Ontario IESO treats demand response as a resource for its own assessments while in the NERC assessment demand response is used as a load-modifier. As a result, the total internal demand, reserve margin, and Reference Margin Level values differ in IESO's reports when compared to NERC reports.



Seasonal Risk Scenario



NPCC-Ontario Resource Adequacy Data

Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margin	2019 SRA	2020 SRA	2019 vs. 2020 SRA
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	22,105	22,195	0.4%
Demand Response: Available	790	518	-34.5%
Net Internal Demand	21,315	21,677	1.7%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change**
Existing-Certain Capacity	26,581	25,719	-3.2%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	924	49	-94.7%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	-102	0	-100.0%
Anticipated Resources	27,403	25,768	-6.0%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	0.0%
Prospective Resources	27,403	25,768	-6.0%
Reserve Margins	**Percent**	**Percent**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	28.6%	18.9%	-9.7
Prospective Reserve Margin	28.6%	18.9%	-9.7
Reference Margin Level	14.9%	14.6%	-0.3

The table and chart above provide potential summer peak demand and resource condition information. The table on the right presents a standard seasonal assessment and comparison to the previous year's assessment. The chart above presents deterministic scenarios for further analysis of different demand and resource levels with adjustments for normal and extreme conditions. NPCC-Ontario determined the adjustments to capacity and peak demand based on methods or assumptions that are summarized below. See the **Data Concepts and Assumptions** for more information about this table and chart.

Risk Scenario Summary

Resources meet operating reserve requirements under studied scenarios.

Scenario Assumptions

- **Extreme Peak Load:** Determined from the most severe historical weather
- **Extreme Derates:** Based on thermal unit derating curves and historical hydro performance for a low-water year
- **Operational Mitigation:** 2,000 MW imports assessed as available from neighbors

Highlights


- The IESO expects to have sufficient generation supply for Summer 2020. Likewise, Ontario's transmission system is expected to continue to reliably supply province-wide demand throughout the summer season.
- Napanee Generating Station, a 994 MW natural-gas-fired plant, was added to Ontario's generation fleet in March 2020. The Darlington Nuclear Unit G2 (936 MW) is expected to return to service following refurbishment prior to summer.
- The year-on-year reduction in anticipated/prospective reserve margin is due to a greater number of nuclear units on refurbishment outage as well as reductions in demand response and hydroelectric contributions.
- The ongoing transmission outage of the phase angle regulator on the L33 circuit at the New York-St Lawrence interconnection continues to impact import and export capacity between Ontario and New York. The issue is being jointly managed by all involved parties.



NPCC-Québec

The Québec assessment area (Province of Québec) is a winter-peaking NPCC subregion that covers 595,391 square miles with a population of 8 million.

Québec is one of the four NERC Interconnections in North America; with ties to Ontario, New York, New England, and the Maritimes; consisting of either HVDC ties, radial generation, or load to and from neighboring systems.





NPCC- Québec Resource Adequacy Data			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margin	**2019 SRA**	**2020 SRA**	**2019 vs. 2020 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	21,005	21,635	3.0%
Demand Response: Available	0	0	0.0%
Net Internal Demand	21,005	21,635	3.0%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change**
Existing-Certain Capacity	34,303	34,771	1.4%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	28	14	-49.1%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	-1,663	-1,963	18.0%
Anticipated Resources	32,667	32,822	0.5%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	0.0%
Prospective Resources	32,667	32,822	0.5%
Reserve Margins	**Percent**	**Percent**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	55.5%	51.7%	-3.8
Prospective Reserve Margin	55.5%	51.7%	-3.8
Reference Margin Level	12.8%	9.8%	-3.0

The table and chart above provide potential seasonal peak demand and resource condition information. The table on the right presents a standard seasonal assessment and comparison to the previous year's assessment. The chart above presents deterministic scenarios for further analysis of different demand and resource levels with adjustments for normal and extreme conditions. NPCC-Québec determined the adjustments to peak demand based on methods or assumptions that are summarized below. See the **Data Concepts and Assumptions** for more information about this table and chart.

Risk Scenario Summary

Resources meet operating reserve requirements under studied scenarios.

Scenario Assumptions

- **Extreme Peak Load:** 90/10 forecast
- **Forced Outages:** Hydro resources operate in extreme conditions without increased outage rates

Highlights


- No resource adequacy or reliability issues are anticipated for the upcoming summer operating period since the Quebec system is winter peaking.
- A strategic 735 kV line was commissioned in May 2019 in order to meet NERC Reliability Standards. The line will provide more flexibility to operators for the upcoming summer period.




PJM

PJM Interconnection is a regional transmission organization that coordinates the movement of wholesale electricity in all or parts of Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, and the District of Columbia.

PJM serves 65 million people and covers 369,089 square miles. PJM is a Balancing Authority, Planning Coordinator, Transmission Planner, Resource Planner, Interchange Authority, Transmission Operator, Transmission Service Provider, and Reliability Coordinator.



Seasonal Risk Scenario



PJM Resource Adequacy Data			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margin	**2019 SRA**	**2020 SRA**	**2019 vs. 2020 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	151,358	148,092	-2.2%
Demand Response: Available	8,154	8,929	9.5%
Net Internal Demand	143,204	139,163	-2.8%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change**
Existing-Certain Capacity	181,013	182,523	0.8%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	2,200	1,800	-18.2%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	1,535	1,412	-8.0%
Anticipated Resources	184,748	185,735	7.0%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	0.0%
Prospective Resources	184,748	185,735	7.7%
Reserve Margins	**Percent**	**Percent**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	29.0%	33.5%	4.5
Prospective Reserve Margin	29.0%	33.5%	4.5
Reference Margin Level	15.9%	15.5%	-0.4

The table and chart above provide potential seasonal peak demand and resource condition information. The table on the right presents a standard seasonal assessment and comparison to the previous year's assessment. The chart above presents deterministic scenarios for further analysis of different demand and resource levels with adjustments for normal and extreme conditions. PJM determined the adjustments to capacity and peak demand based on methods or assumptions that are summarized below. See the **Data Concepts and Assumptions** for more information about this table and chart.

Risk Scenario Summary

Resources meet operating reserve requirements under studied scenarios.

Scenario Assumptions

- **Extreme Peak Load:** 90/10 forecast
- **Outages:** Approximate values based on review of previous summer peak periods

Highlights

- PJM's Anticipated Reserve Margin of 33.5% is well over the reserve margin requirement of 15.5%.
- No known operational challenges are anticipated in PJM for the upcoming summer season.
- PJM's capacity performance initiative has resulted in better generator performance than in years preceding its implementation.



SERC

On July 1, 2019, the integration of FRCC entities into SERC resulted in an additional SERC subregion (SERC FL-Peninsula) for inclusion in NERC's reliability assessments.

SERC is a summer-peaking assessment area that covers approximately 350,000 square miles and serves a population estimated at 69 million. SERC is divided into four assessment areas: SERC- E, SERC-N, SERC-SE, and SERC-FL Peninsula. The SERC assessment area includes 33 Balancing Authorities, 26 Planning Authorities, and 4 Reliability Coordinators.

SERC Resource Adequacy Data							
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**SERC-C**	**SERC-E**	**SERC-FP**	**SERC-SE**	**2019 SRA SERC Total**	**2020 SRA SERC Total**	**2019 vs. 2020 SRA**
Demand Projections	**Megawatts**	**Megawatts**	**Megawatts**	**Megawatts**	**Megawatts**	**Megawatts**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	40,799	43,702	49,286	47,311	179,466	181,098	0.9%
Demand Response: Available	1,970	947	2,906	2,145	8,262	7,968	-3.6%
Net Internal Demand	38,829	42,755	46,380	45,166	171,204	173,130	1.1%
Resource Projections	**Megawatts**	**Megawatts**	**Megawatts**	**Megawatts**	**Megawatts**	**Megawatts**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	48,368	50,825	55,093	61,495	214,712	215,780	0.5%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	0	88	333	316	2,679	736	-72.5%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	-807	266	1,146	-972	306	-367	-219.8%
Anticipated Resources	47,561	51,179	56,571	60,839	217,697	216,149	-0.7%
Existing-Other Capacity	4,427	852	529	348	6,034	6,155	2.0%
Prospective Resources	51,988	52,030	57,100	61,186	223,731	222,304	-0.6%
Planning Reserve Margins	**Percent**	**Percent**	**Percent**	**Percent**	**Percent**	**Percent**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	22.5%	19.7%	22.0%	34.7%	27.2%	24.8%	-2.4
Prospective Reserve Margin	33.9%	21.7%	23.1%	35.5%	30.7%	28.4%	-2.3
Reference Margin Level	15.0%	15.0%	15.0%	15.0%	15.0%	15.0%	0.0

Highlights

- To date in the SERC region, there are no significant reliability risks expected for the 2020 summer season.
- All subregions within SERC meet or exceed the reserve margin target of 15%.
- Entities in the SERC region continue to participate actively in the SERC Near-Term and Long-Term Working Groups. These groups identify emerging and potential reliability impacts to transmission and resource adequacy along with transfer capability.

Charts

The charts on the following pages provide potential seasonal peak demand and resource condition information. The table above presents a standard seasonal assessment and comparison to the previous year's assessment. The waterfall charts on the following pages present deterministic scenarios for further analysis of different demand and resource levels with adjustments for normal and extreme conditions. SERC determined the adjustments to capacity and peak demand based on methods or assumptions that are summarized below each chart. See the **Data Concepts and Assumptions** for more information about the table and charts.

SERC-C

Seasonal Risk Scenario




Risk Scenario Summary

Resources meet operating reserve requirements under studied scenarios.

Scenario Assumptions

- **Extreme Peak Load:** Developed by adjusting subregional peak forecasted load using the probabilistic load multiplier developed in the SERC Probabilistic Assessment
- **Outages:** Based on historical data
- **Extreme Derates:** Determined by entities and aggregated at the subregional level



SERC-E

Seasonal Risk Scenario




Risk Scenario Summary

Resources meet operating reserve requirements under studied scenarios.


Scenario Assumptions

- **Extreme Peak Load:** Developed by adjusting subregional peak forecasted load using the probabilistic load multiplier developed in the SERC Probabilistic Assessment
- **Outages:** Based on historical data
- **Extreme Derates:** Determined by entities and aggregated at the subregional level



SERC-FP

Seasonal Risk Scenario




Risk Scenario Summary

Resources meet operating reserve requirements under studied scenarios.


Scenario Assumptions

- **Extreme Peak Load:** Developed by adjusting subregional peak forecasted load using the probabilistic load multiplier developed in the SERC Probabilistic Assessment
- **Outages:** Based on historical data
- **Extreme Derates:** Determined by entities and aggregated at the subregional level



SERC-SE

Seasonal Risk Scenario




Risk Scenario Summary

Resources meet operating reserve requirements under studied scenarios.

Scenario Assumptions

- **Extreme Peak Load:** Developed by adjusting subregional peak forecasted load using the probabilistic load multiplier developed in the SERC Probabilistic Assessment
- **Outages:** Based on historical data
- **Extreme Derates:** Determined by entities and aggregated at the subregional level






SPP

Southwest Power Pool (SPP) Planning Coordinator footprint covers 546,000 square miles and encompasses all or parts of Arkansas, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas, and Wyoming.

The SPP long-term assessment is reported based on the Planning Coordinator footprint, which touches parts of the Midwest Reliability Organization Regional Entity, and the WECC Regional Entity. The SPP assessment area footprint has approximately 61,000 miles of transmission lines, 756 generating plants, and 4,811 transmission-class substations, and it serves a population of more than 18 million.





SPP Resource Adequacy Data			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margin	**2019 SRA**	**2020 SRA**	**2019 vs. 2020 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	51,520	51,943	0.8%
Demand Response: Available	835	835	0.0%
Net Internal Demand	50,686	51,108	0.8%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change**
Existing-Certain Capacity	67,960	69,100	1.7%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	64	0	-100.0%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	-1,244	-1,244	0.0%
Anticipated Resources	66,780	67,856	1.6%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	0.0%
Prospective Resources	66,780	67,856	1.6%
Reserve Margins	**Percent**	**Percent**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	31.8%	32.8%	1.0
Prospective Reserve Margin	31.8%	32.8%	1.0
Reference Margin Level	12.0%	12.0%	0.0

The table and chart above provide potential seasonal peak demand and resource condition information. The table on the right presents a standard seasonal assessment and comparison to the previous year's assessment. The chart above presents deterministic scenarios for further analysis of different demand and resource levels with adjustments for normal and extreme conditions. SPP determined the adjustments to capacity and peak demand based on methods or assumptions that are summarized below. See the **Data Concepts and Assumptions** for more information about this table and chart.

Risk Scenario Summary

Operating mitigations and EEAs may be needed under extreme demand and extreme resource derated conditions studied.

Scenario Assumptions

- **Extreme Peak Load:** 90/10 Forecast
- **Outages:** A capacity derate for maintenance outages, forced outages, and performance in extreme weather based on historical data

Highlights


- SPP does not anticipate any emerging reliability issues impacting the area for the 2020 summer season.
- In an effort to minimize declared periods of conservative operations and EEAs that may arise from uncertainty in wind forecasts, SPP created new mitigation processes to deal with high impact areas of concern. SPP has developed operational mitigation teams as well as processes and procedures to maintain real time reliability needs; some of these are new and will be relied upon for the first time in the 2020 summer season.




Texas RE-ERCOT

The Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) is the ISO for the ERCOT Interconnection and is located entirely in the state of Texas; it operatesas a single Balancing Authority. It also performs financial settlement for the competitive wholesale bulk-power market and administers retail switching for nearly 8 million premises in competitive choice areas. ERCOT is governed by a board of directors and subject to oversight by the Public Utility Commission of Texas and the Texas Legislature.

ERCOT is a summer-peaking Region that covers approximately 200,000 square miles, connects over 46,500 miles of transmission lines, has over 680 generation units, and serves more than 26 million customers. Texas RE is responsible for the regional RE functions described in the *Energy Policy Act of 2005* for the ERCOT Region.



Seasonal Risk Scenario



Texas RE-ERCOT Resource Adequacy Data			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margin	**2019 SRA**	**2020 SRA**	**2019 vs. 2020 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	74,853	75,200	0.5%
Demand Response: Available	2,227	2,251	1.1%
Net Internal Demand	72,626	72,949	0.4%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change**
Existing-Certain Capacity	77,482	79,395	2.5%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	607	2,172	257.9%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	721	817	13.3%
Anticipated Resources	78,810	82,384	4.5%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	0.0%
Prospective Resources	78,810	82,412	4.6%
Reserve Margins	**Percent**	**Percent**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	8.5%	12.9%	4.4
Prospective Reserve Margin	8.5%	13.0%	4.5
Reference Margin Level	13.75%	13.75%	0.0

The table and chart above provide potential seasonal peak demand and resource condition information. The table on the right presents a standard seasonal assessment and comparison to the previous year's assessment. The chart above presents deterministic scenarios for further analysis of different demand and resource levels with adjustments for normal and extreme conditions. ERCOT determined the adjustments to capacity and peak demand based on methods or assumptions that are summarized below.

Risk Scenario Summary

Operating mitigations and EEAs may be needed to meet extreme demand or extreme resource derated conditions.

Scenario Assumptions

- **Extreme Peak Load:** Based on 2011 historic summer peak load
- **Outages:** A derate for maintenance and forced outages based on the past three summer periods
- **Extreme Derates:** Based on 95th percentile of historical forced outages for June – September, hours ending 2:00 p.m.–8:00 p.m. for the last three summer seasons
- **Operational Mitigations:** Additional resources (e.g., switchable generation resources, additional imports, and voltage reduction) to support maintaining operating reserves, not already counted in SRA reserve margins

Highlights

- ERCOT's anticipated reserve margin, 12.9%, is higher than last summer due mainly to greater planned wind and solar capacity. Increases are attributed to completion of new projects as well as delayed projects from 2019 and improved methods for calculating wind and solar capacity contributions.
- The Planning Reserve Margin is considered tight. ERCOT expects grid operations to be similar to last summer, assuming that peak loads hit record levels as forecasted.
- ERCOT assumes the availability of 817 MW of dc tie net imports from SPP during its forecasted summer peak load hours based on recent historical experience and expected energy market conditions for the upcoming summer. Emergency conditions in both areas simultaneously would impact imports into ERCOT. ERCOT does not expect COVID-19-related delays for planned projects with expected in-service dates prior to the summer season.
- There are no known transmission reliability, fuel supply, or essential reliability service procurement issues projected for summer. Continued penetration of wind and solar resources is expected to further stress system conditions and call for additional actions to maintain system stability. Stability constraints are managed through generic transmission constraints (GTCs) in real-time operations. ERCOT assesses the impact of future planned new generation to determine the adequacy of existing GTCs and the need for developing new GTCs or system improvements.



WECC

WECC is responsible for coordinating and promoting BES reliability in the Western Interconnection. WECC's 329 members, which include 38 Balancing Authorities, represent a wide spectrum of organizations with an interest in the BES. Serving an area of nearly 1.8 million square miles and more than 82 million people, it is geographically the largest and most diverse of the NERC Regional Entities. WECC's service territory extends from Canada to Mexico. It includes the provinces of Alberta and British Columbia in Canada, the northern portion of Baja California in Mexico, and all or portions of the 14 western states of the United States in between. The WECC assessment area is divided into six subregions: Rocky Mountain Reserve Group (RMRG), Southwest Reserve Sharing Group (SRSG), California/Mexico (CA/MX), the Northwest Power Pool (NWPP), and the Canadian areas of Alberta (WECC AB), and British Columbia (WECC BC). These subregional divisions are used for this study as they are structured around reserve sharing groups that have similar annual demand patterns and similar operating practices.

WECC Resource Adequacy Data

Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	WECC AB	WECC BC	CA/MX	NWPP-US	RMRG	SRSG	2019	2020	2019 vs. 2020 SRA
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**MW**	**MW**	**MW**	**MW**	**Total MW**	**Total MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	11,500	8,278	53,236	53,964	12,568	25,145	156,142	164,691	5.5%
Demand Response: Available	0	0	910	629	240	144	2,164	1,923	-11.1%
Net Internal Demand	11,500	8,278	52,326	53,335	12,328	25,001	153,979	162,768	5.7%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**MW**	**MW**	**MW**	**MW**	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	14,356	11,471	63,186	62,770	16,068	29,440	194,208	197,292	1.6%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	0	215	92	817	53	477	3961	1,653	-58.3%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	0	0	0	749	0	0	0	749	0.0%
Anticipated Resources	14,356	11,686	63,278	64,336	16,122	29,917	198,169	199,694	0.8%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.0%
Prospective Resources	14,356	11,686	63,278	64,336	16,122	29,917	198,169	199,694	0.8%
Planning Reserve Margins	**Percent**	**Percent**	**Percent**	**Percent**	**Percent**	**Percent**	**Percent**	**Percent**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	24.8%	41.2%	20.9%	20.6%	30.8%	19.7%	28.7%	22.7%	-6.0
Prospective Reserve Margin	24.8%	41.2%	20.9%	20.6%	30.8%	19.7%	28.7%	22.7%	-6.0
Reference Margin Level	10.4%	10.4%	13.7%	15.7%	13.0%	10.0%	15.4%	15.4%	0.0


Highlights

- The existing and Anticipated Reserve Margins for WECC, its subregions, and all zones within are expected to exceed their respective NERC Reference Margin Levels for the upcoming season.
- Below-normal hydro conditions are present in California that could reduce energy available from hydro resources throughout the summer. Hydro resources and imports from neighboring areas are important for maintaining system reliability in the California ISO area, where dispatchable generation has declined and variable generation is increasing. Extreme heat extending over California and neighboring areas could pose operating risk if surplus energy for import is reduced. Risks are heightened later in the summer when energy from hydro resources will be lower and solar PV output is near zero at the peak hour.
- Inventories of the Aliso Canyon Natural Gas Storage Facility (Aliso Canyon) remain an item of focus for electric reliability within the Western Interconnection. Going into the 2020 summer, the Southern California Gas Company (SoCalGas) system has more natural gas in storage and additional transmission lines in service, making it better postured to support natural gas users including electricity generators. SoCalGas estimates that it will be able to meet the forecasted peak day demand under a "best case" supply assumption even without supply from Aliso Canyon. Under a "worst case" supply assumption, the forecasted peak day demand cannot be met without curtailment even with the use of supply from Aliso Canyon.

The charts on the next page provide potential peak demand and resource condition information. The table above presents a standard seasonal assessment and comparison to the previous year's assessment. The waterfall charts on the next page present deterministic scenarios for further analysis of different demand and resource levels with adjustments for normal and extreme conditions. WECC entities determined the adjustments to capacity and peak demand based on methods or assumptions that are summarized on the next page. See the **Data Concepts and Assumptions** for more information about the table and charts.

WECC-Alberta

Seasonal Risk Scenario




Risk Scenario Summary

Operating mitigations and EEAs may be needed under extreme demand and extreme resource derated conditions studied.

Scenario Assumptions

- **Extreme Peak Load:** Based on 90/10 demand forecast
- **Forced Outages:** Based on historical data
- **Extreme Derates:** Developed using the 10th percentile availability curves for the thermal, wind, and solar resources at the assessment area peak hour



WECC-British Columbia

Seasonal Risk Scenario




Risk Scenario Summary

Resources meet operating reserve requirements under studied scenarios.


Scenario Assumptions

- **Extreme Peak Load:** Based on 90/10 demand forecast
- **Forced Outages:** Based on historical data
- **Extreme Derates:** Developed using the 10th percentile availability curves for the thermal, wind, and solar resources at the assessment area peak hour



WECC-California / Mexico

Seasonal Risk Scenario




Risk Scenario Summary

Operating mitigations and EEAs may be needed under extreme demand and extreme resource derated conditions.


Scenario Assumptions

- **Extreme Peak Load:** Based on 90/10 demand forecast
- **Forced Outages:** Based on historical data
- **Extreme Derates:** Developed using the 10th percentile availability curves for the thermal, wind, and solar resources at the assessment area peak hour



WECC-Northwest Power Pool

Seasonal Risk Scenario




Risk Scenario Summary

Resources meet operating reserve requirements for normal peak-load and outage conditions. Operating mitigations and EEAs may be needed under extreme resource derated conditions.


Scenario Assumptions

- **Extreme Peak Load:** Based on 90/10 demand forecast
- **Forced Outages:** Based on historical data
- **Extreme Derates:** Developed using the 10th percentile availability curves for the thermal, wind, and solar resources at the assessment area peak hour



WECC-Rocky Mountain Reserve Sharing Group

Seasonal Risk Scenario




Risk Scenario Summary

Resources meet operating reserve requirements for normal peak-load and outage conditions. Operating mitigations and EEAs may be needed under extreme resource derated conditions.


Scenario Assumptions

- **Extreme Peak Load:** Based on 90/10 demand forecast
- **Forced Outages:** Based on historical data
- **Extreme Derates:** Developed using the 10th percentile availability curves for the thermal, wind, and solar resources at the assessment area peak hour



WECC-Southwest Reserve Sharing Group

Seasonal Risk Scenario




Risk Scenario Summary

Resources meet operating reserve requirements for normal peak-load and outage conditions. Operating mitigations and EEAs may be needed under extreme resource derated conditions.

Scenario Assumptions

- **Extreme Peak Load:** Based on 90/10 demand forecast
- **Forced Outages:** Based on historical data
- **Extreme Derates:** Developed using the 10th percentile availability curves for the thermal, wind, and solar resources at the assessment area peak hour



Data Concepts and Assumptions

The table below explains data concepts and important assumptions used throughout this assessment.

General Assumptions
• Reliability of the interconnected BPS is comprised of both adequacy and operating reliability: ▪ Adequacy is the ability of the electric system to supply the aggregate electric power and energy requirements of the electricity consumers at all times while taking into account scheduled and reasonably expected unscheduled outages of system components. ▪ Operating reliability is the ability of the electric system to withstand sudden disturbances such as electric short-circuits or unanticipated loss of system components.
• The reserve margin calculation is an important industry planning metric used to examine future resource adequacy.
• All data in this assessment is based on existing federal, state, and provincial laws and regulations.
• Differences in data collection periods for each assessment area should be considered when comparing demand and capacity data between year-to-year seasonal assessments.
• *2019 Long-Term Reliability Assessment* data has been used for most of this 2020 assessment period augmented by updated load and capacity data.
• A positive net transfer capability would indicate a net importing assessment area; a negative value would indicate a net exporter.
Demand Assumptions
• Electricity demand projections, or load forecasts, are provided by each assessment area.
• Load forecasts include peak hourly load[11] or total internal demand for the summer and winter of each year.[12]
• Total internal demand projections are based on normal weather (50/50 distribution[13]) and are provided on a coincident[14] basis for most assessment areas.
• Net internal demand is used in all reserve margin calculations, and it is equal to total internal demand then reduced by the amount of controllable and dispatchable demand response projected to be available during the peak hour.
Resource Assumptions
Resource planning methods vary throughout the North American BPS. NERC uses the categories below to provide a consistent approach for collecting and presenting resource adequacy. **Table 2** below shows the wind and solar generation resources in each assessment area and describes how capacity contributions values are determined.
Anticipated Resources: • **Existing-Certain Capacity**: Included in this category are commercially operable generating unit or portions of generating units that meet at least one of the following requirements when examining the period of peak demand for the summer season: unit must have a firm capability and have a power purchase agreement (PPA) with firm transmission that must be in effect for the unit; unit must be classified as a designated network resource; and/or where energy-only markets exist, unit must be a designated market resource eligible to bid into the market. • **Tier 1 Capacity Additions**: This category includes capacity that either is under construction or has received approved planning requirements. • **Net Firm Capacity Transfers (Imports minus Exports)**: This category includes transfers with firm contracts.
Prospective Resources: Includes all anticipated resources plus the following: **Existing-Other Capacity**: Included in this category are commercially operable generating units or portions of generating units that could be available to serve load for the period of peak demand for the season but do not meet the requirements of existing-certain.
Reserve Margin Descriptions
Planning Reserve Margin: This is the primary metric used to measure resource adequacy; it is defined as the difference in resources (anticipated or prospective) and net internal demand then divided by net internal demand and shown as a percentage.

[11] *Glossary of Terms* used in NERC Reliability Standards

[12] The summer season represents June–September and the winter season represents December–February.

[13] Essentially, this means that there is a 50% probability that actual demand will be higher and a 50% probability that actual demand will be lower than the value provided for a given season/year.

[14] Coincident: This is the sum of two or more peak loads that occur in the same hour. Noncoincident: This is the sum of two or more peak loads on individual systems that do not occur in the same time interval; this is meaningful only when considering loads within a limited period of time, such as a day, a week, a month, a heating or cooling season, and usually for not more than one year. SERC and FRCC calculate total internal demand on a noncoincidental basis.

Reference Margin Level: The assumptions and naming convention of this metric vary by assessment area. The Reference Margin Level can be determined using both deterministic and probabilistic (based on a 0.1/year loss of load study) approaches. In both cases, this metric is used by system planners to quantify the amount of reserve capacity in the system above the forecasted peak demand that is needed to ensure sufficient supply to meet peak loads. Establishing a Reference Margin Level is necessary to account for long-term factors of uncertainty involved in system planning, such as unexpected generator outages and extreme weather impacts that could lead to increase demand beyond what was projected in the 50/50 load forecasted. In many assessment areas, a Reference Margin Level is established by a state, provincial authority, ISO/RTO, or other regulatory body. In some cases, the Reference Margin Level is a requirement. Reference Margin Levels may be different for the summer and winter seasons. If a Reference Margin Level is not provided by an assessment area, NERC applies 15% for predominately thermal systems and 10% for predominately hydro systems.

Seasonal Risk Scenario Chart Description

Each assessment area performed an operational risk analysis that was used to produce the seasonal risk scenario charts in the **Regional Assessment Dashboards**. The chart presents deterministic scenarios for further analysis of different resource and demand levels: The left blue column shows anticipated resources (from the resource adequacy data table), and the two orange columns at the right show the two demand scenarios of the normal peak net internal demand from the resource adequacy data table and the extreme summer peak demand—both determined by the assessment area. The middle red or green bars show adjustments that are applied cumulatively to the anticipated resources, such as the following:

- Reductions for typical generation outages (i.e., maintenance and forced, not already accounted for in anticipated resources)
- Reductions that represent additional outage or performance derating by resource type for extreme, low-probability conditions (e.g., drought condition impacts on hydroelectric generation, low-wind scenario affecting wind generation, fuel supply limitations, or extreme temperature conditions that result in reduced thermal generation output)
- Additional capacity resources that represent quantified capacity from operational procedures, if any, that are made available during scarcity conditions

Not all assessment areas have the same categories of adjustments to anticipated resources. Furthermore, each assessment area determined the adjustments to capacity based on methods or assumptions that are summarized below the chart. Methods and assumptions differ by assessment area and may not be comparable.

The chart enables evaluation of resource levels against levels of expected operating reserve requirement and the forecasted demand. Further, the effects from low-probability, extreme events can also be examined by comparing resource levels after applying extreme-scenario derates and/or extreme summer peak demand. Because such extreme scenario analysis depicts the cumulative impact resulting from the occurrence of multiple low-probability events, the overall likelihood of this scenario is very low.

BPS Wind and Solar Generation Resources by Assessment Area

Assessment Area	Wind			Solar		
	Nameplate (MW)	Available Peak Demand Hour Capacity (MW)	Available/Nameplate (%)	Nameplate (MW)	Available Peak Demand Hour Capacity (MW)	Available/Nameplate (%)
MISO	21,594	4,417	20.5%	663	390	58.8%
MRO-Manitoba Hydro	259	44	17.0%	0	0	-
MRO-SaskPower	241	55.8	23.2%	29	0	0.0%
NPCC-Maritimes	1,170	283	24.2%	2	0	0.0%
NPCC-New England	1,421	178	12.5%	200	119	59.5%
NPCC-New York	1,985	301	15.2%	57	16	27.7%
NPCC-Ontario	4,846	664	13.7%	478	66	13.8%

BPS Wind and Solar Generation Resources by Assessment Area						
Assessment Area	Wind			Solar		
	Nameplate (MW)	Available Peak Demand Hour Capacity (MW)	Available/Nameplate (%)	Nameplate (MW)	Available Peak Demand Hour Capacity (MW)	Available/Nameplate (%)
NPCC-Quebec	3,904	0	0.0%	0	0	-
PJM	10,399	1,648	15.8%	4,684	2,415	51.6%
SERC-C	480	456	95.0%	10	8	80.0%
SERC-E	0	0	-	555	546	98.4%
SERC-FP	0	0	-	2,969.3	1,582.3	-
SERC-SE	0	0	-	2,266	2,259	99.7%
SPP	23,529	5,761	24.5%	272	201	73.9%
Texas RE-ERCOT	27,847	6,924	24.9%	3,735	2,838	76.0%
WECC-AB	1,445	142	9.8%	115	4.5	3.9%
WECC-BC	727.5	146	20.1%	2	0.6	30.0%
WECC-CAMX	6,773	1,097	16.2%	13,774	10,090	73.3%
WECC-NWPP-US	10,898	2,023	18.6%	5,831	883	15.1%
WECC-RMRG	3,852	774	20.1%	756	180	23.8%
WECC-SRSG	1,327	203	15.3%	1,698	458	27.0%

NERC
NORTH AMERICAN ELECTRIC RELIABILITY CORPORATION

2021 Summer Reliability Assessment

May 2021



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
Preface

The vision for the Electric Reliability Organization Enterprise, which is comprised of the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) and the six Regional Entities (RE), is a highly reliable and secure North American bulk power system (BPS). Our mission is to assure the effective and efficient reduction of risks to the reliability and security of the grid.

Reliability | Resilience | Security

Because nearly 400 million citizens in North America are counting on us

The North American BPS is made up of six RE boundaries as shown in the map below. The multicolored area denotes overlap as some load-serving entities participate in one RE while associated Transmission Owners/Operators participate in another. Refer to the **Data Concepts and Assumptions** section for more information. A map and list of the assessment areas can be found in the **Regional Assessments Dashboards** section.



MRO	Midwest Reliability Organization
NPCC	Northeast Power Coordinating Council
RF	ReliabilityFirst
SERC	SERC Reliability Corporation
Texas RE	Texas Reliability Entity
WECC	WECC

About this Report

NERC's *2021 Summer Reliability Assessment* (SRA) identifies, assesses, and reports on areas of concern regarding the reliability of the North American BPS for the upcoming summer season. In addition, the SRA presents peak electricity demand and supply changes and highlights any unique regional challenges or expected conditions that might impact the BPS. The reliability assessment process is a coordinated reliability evaluation between the Reliability Assessment Subcommittee (RAS), the RE, and NERC staff. This report reflects NERC's independent assessment and is intended to inform industry leaders, planners, operators, and regulatory bodies so that they are better prepared to take necessary actions to ensure BPS reliability. This report also provides an opportunity for the industry to discuss plans and preparations to ensure reliability for the upcoming summer period.

Findings

NERC's annual SRA covers Summer 2021 (June–September). This assessment provides an evaluation of the resource and transmission system adequacy that is necessary to meet projected summer peak demands. In addition to assessing resource adequacy, the SRA monitors and identifies potential reliability issues of interest and regional topics of concern. The following key findings represent NERC's independent evaluation of electric generation and transmission capacity as well as potential operational concerns that may need to be addressed for the upcoming summer:

- Parts of North America are at elevated risk to energy emergencies (see **Figure 1**). Above-normal heat in summer can challenge grid operators by increasing demand from temperature-dependent loads (such as air-conditioning and refrigeration) and reducing electricity supplies as a result of lower-than-capacity resource output or increased outages. Wide-area heat events (such as the August 2020 heat wave that affected much of the Western United States and Mexico) are especially challenging as fewer resources are available for electricity transfers between areas because they are required to serve native load:
  - In **Texas RE**, on-peak Planning Reserve Margins have increased to 15.3% from 12.9% last summer with the addition of 7,858 MW wind, solar, and battery resources since 2020. However, extreme weather can affect both generation and demand and cause energy shortages that lead to energy emergencies in the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT). Furthermore, with a significant portion of electricity supply coming from wind generation, operators must have sufficient flexible resources to cover periods of low-wind output.
  - Across most of **WECC**, resource and energy adequacy is a significant concern for the summer with overall capacity and demand projections for the area at similar levels to those seen in 2020 when a wide-area heat event caused energy emergencies and managed firm load loss. Though new flexible resources have been added in California, peak demand projections have also increased in many parts of the west, and overall resource capacity is lower compared to 2020. Increasing demand and lower resource capacity across WECC can mean the availability of surplus capacity for transfer into stressed areas is declining.
  - **MISO** and **NPCC-New England** have sufficient resources for periods of peak demand. However, the above-normal levels of demand in the 90/10 forecast are likely to exceed capacity resources and require additional non-firm transfers from surrounding areas.
  - All other areas have sufficient resources to manage normal summer peak demand and are at low risk of energy shortfalls from more extreme demand or generation outage conditions. Anticipated Reserve Margins meet or surpass the Reference Margin Level, indicating that planned resources in these areas are adequate to manage the risk of a capacity deficiency under normal conditions.[1] Furthermore, based on risk scenario analysis in these areas, resources and energy appear adequate.




Figure 1: Energy Emergency Risk Areas

- **WECC-California is at risk of energy emergencies during periods of normal peak summer demand and high risk when above-normal demand is widespread in the west.** Prior to summer, the planning reserve margin (which is based on existing and firm capacity) for the California-Mexico assessment area was below the 18.4% Reference Margin Level that WECC calculates is

[1] For more information, see the description of the "Reference Margin Level" in the **Data Concepts and Assumptions** section of this report or refer to NERC's *Long-term Reliability Assessment*: https://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/NERC_LTRA_2020.pdf

needed for maintaining loss-of-load risk below a 1-day-in-10-year benchmark (a 400 MW shortfall at peak demand). Probabilistic studies indicate 10,185 MWh of energy in the area is expected to go unserved this summer. Over 3 GW of additional resources are expected for this summer with most coming in the form of new solar photovoltaic (PV) generation. These generation plants can provide energy to support peak demand; however, solar PV output falls off rapidly in late afternoon while high demand often remains.

Imports to the area are needed to maintain reliability when demand peaks in the afternoon and to ramp up even further for several hours as internal resources draw down. California will have 675 MW of new battery energy storage systems on-line at the start of the summer that can continue to supply stored energy for periods when needed. Reliance on non-firm imports to cover high demand or low resource output conditions heightens the risk that operators will need to use energy emergency alerts (EEA)—and trigger the shedding of firm load in above-normal heat conditions—to maintain a stable BPS at times. Planned resource additions of 1,300 MW over the summer, including 825 MW of new battery storage, are expected to help mitigate late-summer risks.

- **Protecting the critical electrical workforce from health risks during pandemic remains a priority.** Protocols put in place for reducing risks to personnel in control centers and on the front lines, including mutual assistance in hurricane-damaged areas, should be maintained as warranted by public health conditions. Also related to the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, operators must continue to give attention to daily load shapes that can be sensitive to changing behaviors of the workforce and commercial loads. In 2021, there is remaining uncertainty in demand projections as governments adjust to changing public health guidelines and conditions and as the behavior of society adapts.
- **The Late-summer wildfire season in Western United States and Canada poses risk to BPS reliability.** Government agencies warn of the potential for above-normal wildfire risk beginning in July in parts of the Western United States as well as Central and Western Canada.[2,3] Operation of the BPS can be impacted in areas where wildfires are active as well as areas where there is heightened risk of wildfire ignition due to weather and ground conditions (see **Figure 3**).

Implications and Recommendations

The summer of 2021 is shaping up to be a challenge for electric system operators in many parts of North America, combining the resource situation described above with significant drought, fire, and high temperature risk assessments by independent agencies. In the near term, NERC recommends the following:

- Load-serving entities (LSE) and regulators work with their Balancing Authorities (BA) and Reliability Coordinators (RC) to ensure that clear lines of communication are open for coordination during periods of system stress. RC, BA, and Transmission Operators review outage schedules well in advance and coordinate across the RC area.
- BA and RC conduct drills on their alert programs to ensure that they are prepared to signal need for conservative operations, restrictive maintenance periods, etc. BA and Generator Operators verify protocols and operator training for communication and dispatch.
- LSE prepare for demand-side conservation measures and potentially condition customers to their need and efficacy.
- RC and BA maintain the highest vigilance during peak risk hours and forecasted high temperature periods.
- LSE review non-firm customer inventories and rolling black out procedures to ensure that no critical infrastructure loads (e.g., natural gas, telecommunications, etc.) would be affected.

Finally, the potential for these conditions to emerge were reflected in NERC's *2018* and *2020 Long-Term Reliability Assessments*; we recommend policy makers, system planners, LSE, and Generator Owners review these assessments and factor them into their integrated resource plans, and ISO/RTO factor them into their own generation queue management and long-range planning processes.[4]

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[2] See North American Seasonal Fire Assessment and Outlook, April 2021: https://www.predictiveservices.nifc.gov/outlooks/NA_Outlook.pdf.
[3] See Natural Resources Canada seasonal wildland fire forecasts: https://cwfis.cfs.nrcan.gc.ca/maps/forecasts
[4] NERC's Reliability Assessments web page: https://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Pages/default.aspx

Summer Temperature and Drought Forecasts

Peak electricity demand in most areas is strongly influenced by temperature. Weather officials are expecting above normal temperatures for much of North America this summer (see **Figure 2**). Assessment area load forecasts account for many years of historical demand data, often up to 30 years, to predict summer peak demand and prepare for more extreme conditions. Above average seasonal temperatures can contribute to high peak demand as well as increases in forced outages for generation and some BPS equipment. Effective preseason maintenance and preparations are particularly important to BPS reliability in severe or prolonged periods of above-normal temperatures.




Figure 2: United States and Canada Summer Temperature Outlook[5]

[5] Seasonal forecasts obtained from U.S. National Weather Service and Natural Resources Canada: https://www.cpc.ncep.noaa.gov/products/predictions/long_range/ and https://weather.gc.ca/saisons/prob_e.html

Wildfire Risk Potential and BPS Impacts

Drought conditions extend over the western half of the United States and the middle-third of Canada. Above-normal fire risk at the beginning of the summer exists in the Southwest United States and over the middle-third of North America in the spring, setting the stage for an active fire season at the beginning of the summer (see **Figure 3**). Government agencies predict an active early fire season in the Southwest United States as well as above-normal risk in the lower half of central Canada (Southern Prairies, Boreal forest, grassland and parkland areas).[6] In late summer, hotter and drier conditions are expected to cause elevated fire risk in California and the United States West Coast. BPS operation can be impacted in areas where wildfires are active as well as areas where there is heightened risk of wildfire ignition due to weather and ground conditions (see **Finding: Risk Discussion**).




Figure 3: North American Seasonal Fire Assessment for June and July 2021

[6] See North American Seasonal Fire Assessment and Outlook, April 2021: https://www.predictiveservices.nifc.gov/outlooks/NA_Outlook.pdf

Finding: Risk Discussion

Texas RE: ERCOT Interconnection

With forecasted growth in peak demand and new generation resources primarily coming in the form of variable wind and solar generation, the risk of shortages that lead to energy emergencies in ERCOT continues for the upcoming summer. On-peak Planning Reserve Margins have increased to 15.3% from 12.9% last summer with the addition of 7,858 MW wind, solar, and battery resources since 2020; This exceeds the 13.75% Reference Margin Level established in ERCOT for reliably serving demand under normal summer peak conditions. However, extreme weather can affect both resource and demand and cause energy shortages that lead to energy emergencies in ERCOT. Furthermore, with a significant portion of electricity supply coming from wind generation, operators must have sufficient flexible resources to cover periods of low-wind output (see **Figure 4** for a risk scenario involving 90/10 low wind conditions and normal 50/50 peak demand). Operational mitigations may be needed in unexpected wind generation shortfalls to avoid energy emergencies.




Figure 4: Combination of Low-Wind and Normal Generator Outages at Peak Demand in ERCOT

Weather conditions can create an elevated risk of operating emergencies in ERCOT in the event that higher demand or lower resource output diminishes the relatively low reserve margins that exist on the system. Shown in **Figure 5** are the 1-in-10 year high demand levels alongside an extreme low-resource scenario: 12.1% of expected thermal resources are unavailable as well as 76.8% reduced output of expected wind (this is 6.2% of the total installed nameplate wind capacity operating). Combinations of high peak demand and extreme low resource output are exceedingly rare; however, they are plausible and provide industry and stakeholders with insights into potential emergency conditions. The result of the described scenario is a 12.7 GW shortfall. In challenging conditions like those depicted, operators would resort to implementing rotating outages as a measure of preserving the BPS.




Figure 5: Impact of Extreme Demand and Resource Outages in ERCOT

In addition to the 1-in-10 year demand scenario above, ERCOT conducted an additional extreme demand scenario based on a wide-area heat event. In this scenario, peak demand increases by over 4,900 MW from a normal 50/50 demand forecast as all of ERCOT's eight weather zones show simultaneous high levels of demand from higher temperatures. Even with the normal resource performance and low outages typically seen in ERCOT, the electricity demand from a wide-area heat event would likely lead to operating emergencies and a potential for unserved load.[7]

Currently, much of Texas is experiencing a drought, and projections for below-normal rainfall are cause for concern for electric reliability.[8] If drought conditions continue to deteriorate, the likelihood of the actual summer peak demand exceeding the forecast and/or generation derates due to low cooling lake levels increases. Generator outages are expected to increase during severe and prolonged drought conditions due to cooling water supply and temperature issues. These issues can cause forced outages of the thermal and wind fleet.

Generator performance in ERCOT is optimized for summer conditions, supporting reliable system performance despite relatively lower reserve margins. The generation fleet in ERCOT is a diverse mix of fuel types, including natural gas, nuclear, on-shore and coastal wind, solar, and a small amount of coal-fired generation. Some design choices, such as open-air thermal plants, provide optimum summer efficiency but may contribute to operating stress at other times. The availability of reliable, flexible generation is important to balancing system needs with a high penetration of variable, weather-dependent generation from wind and solar.

[7] See ERCOT's *2021 Summer Seasonal Assessment of Resource Adequacy (SARA)*: http://www.ercot.com/content/wcm/lists/219840/SARA-FinalSummer2021.pdf
[8] https://droughtmonitor.unl.edu/CurrentMap/StateDroughtMonitor.aspx?TX

WECC: Western Interconnection

Resource and energy adequacy is a significant concern for the summer across most of the Western Interconnection with overall capacity and demand projections for the area at similar levels to those seen in 2020 when a wide-area heat event caused energy emergencies and managed firm load loss. New flexible resources have been added in California and some plans for generation retirements have been put on hold to improve resource availability for periods of peak demand as well as for times when variable generation output falls off. However, peak demand projections have also increased in many parts of the Western United States, and overall resource capacity is lower compared to 2020 (see **Table 1**). Increased demand and lower resource capacity across the Western Interconnection can mean limited availability of surplus capacity for transfer into load centers for parts of California.

August 2020 Heatwave Event in the Western Interconnection

From August 14 through August 19, 2020, the Western United States suffered an intense and prolonged heatwave that affected many areas across the Western Interconnection.[9] Because of above-average temperatures, generation and transmission capacity struggled to keep up with increased electricity demand. Throughout many supply-constrained hours over this same period, generation resource output was below preseason peak forecasts for nearly all resource types, including natural gas, wind, solar, and hydro. During the event, 10 Western Interconnection BA issued 18 separate EEA. The impacts of the August heatwave struck the entirety of the Western Interconnection and caused a peak demand record of 162,017 MW on August 18, 2020, at 4:00 p.m. Mountain time. Although demand peaked on August 18, the most severe reliability consequence of the heatwave event occurred at the beginning, when 1,087 MW of firm load was shed on August 14 and 692 MW was shed on August 15 in California. An in-depth evaluation of the August 2020 Heatwave Event on BPS operations will be included in the 2021 State of Reliability report. The State of Reliability covers significant BPS events from the prior year and is typically published mid-year.

Table 1: Western Interconnection On-Peak Resource Adequacy

WECC - AB			
	2020 SRA	2021 SRA	2020 vs. 2021 SRA
Demand Projections	Megawatts (MW)	Megawatts (MW)	Net Change (%)
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	11,500	10,886	-5.3%
Net Internal Demand	11,500	10,886	-5.3%
Resource Projections	Megawatts (MW)	Megawatts (MW)	Net Change (%)
Existing-Certain Capacity	14,356	12,205	-15.0%
Anticipated Resources	14,356	13,928	-3.0%
Reserve Margins	Percent (%)	Percent (%)	Annual Difference
Anticipated Reserve Margin	24.8%	27.9%	3.1
Reference Margin Level	10.4%	9.7%	-0.7
WECC - BC			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	2020 SRA	2021 SRA	2020 vs. 2021 SRA
Demand Projections	Megawatts (MW)	Megawatts (MW)	Net Change (%)
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	8,278	8,264	-0.2%
Net Internal Demand	8,278	8,264	-0.2%
Resource Projections	Megawatts (MW)	Megawatts (MW)	Net Change (%)
Existing-Certain Capacity	11,471	11,178	-2.6%
Anticipated Resources	11,686	11,363	-2.8%
Reserve Margins	Percent (%)	Percent (%)	Annual Difference

[9] WECC August Heat Wave Event information provided by WECC's *August Heat Wave Analysis* Presentation

Table 1: Western Interconnection On-Peak Resource Adequacy			
Anticipated Reserve Margin	41.2%	37.5%	-3.7
Reference Margin Level	10.4%	9.7%	-0.7
WECC - CA/MX			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	2020 SRA	2021 SRA	2020 vs. 2021 SRA
Demand Projections	Megawatts (MW)	Megawatts (MW)	Net Change (%)
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	53,236	55,409	4.1%
Net Internal Demand	52,326	54,487	4.1%
Resource Projections	Megawatts (MW)	Megawatts (MW)	Net Change (%)
Existing-Certain Capacity	63,186	63,396	0.3%
Anticipated Resources	63,278	67,440	6.6%
Reserve Margins	Percent (%)	Percent (%)	Annual Difference
Anticipated Reserve Margin	20.9%	23.8%	2.9
Reference Margin Level	13.7%	18.4%	4.7
WECC - NWPP-US & RMRG			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	2020 SRA	2021 SRA	2020 vs. 2021 SRA
Demand Projections	Megawatts (MW)	Megawatts (MW)	Net Change (%)
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	66,532	67,117	0.9%
Net Internal Demand	65,664	66,030	0.6%
Resource Projections	Megawatts (MW)	Megawatts (MW)	Net Change (%)
Existing-Certain Capacity	78,839	70,069	-11.1%
Anticipated Resources	80,457	77,210	-4.0%
Reserve Margins	Percent (%)	Percent (%)	Annual Difference
Anticipated Reserve Margin	*	16.9%	*
Reference Margin Level	*	14.3%	*
WECC - SRSG			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	2020 SRA	2021 SRA	2020 vs. 2021 SRA
Demand Projections	Megawatts (MW)	Megawatts (MW)	Net Change (%)
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	25,145	24,751	-1.6%
Net Internal Demand	25,001	24,419	-2.3%
Resource Projections	Megawatts (MW)	Megawatts (MW)	Net Change (%)
Existing-Certain Capacity	29,440	26,850	-8.8%
Anticipated Resources	29,917	27,904	-6.7%
Reserve Margins	Percent (%)	Percent (%)	Annual Difference
Anticipated Reserve Margin	19.7%	14.3%	-5.4
Reference Margin Level	10.0%	9.8%	-0.2

Responding to supply shortages from August 2020 and a directive from the California Public Utilities Commission, utilities in California have been procuring additional generating capacity for Summer 2021.[10] Existing on-peak capacity for the California-Mexico (CAMX) assessment area is 63.4 GW, a slight increase from 2020. However, a total of 3.4 GW of new resources are in late-stage planning for addition this summer; without these resources, the CAMX area will have an on-peak planning reserve margin of 17.6%, just short of the 18.4% Reference Margin Level target set by WECC for the area.[11] See **Figure 6** for peak hour existing certain and anticipated resource reserve margins for the Western Interconnection assessment areas.




Figure 6: On-Peak Planning Reserve Margins in the Western Interconnection Assessment Areas

Most of the resource additions in California come in the form of new solar PV generation. These generation plants can provide energy to support peak demand; however, solar PV output falls off rapidly in late afternoon while summer demand often remains (see the discussion in the **Western Interconnection Risk Scenarios** section). Battery storage systems can supply energy to smooth the system ramping needs associated with high amounts of variable generation; by summer, nearly 600 MW of large-scale battery storage projects will have come on-line in California with an additional 800 MW expected by August 1.[12] The California Independent System Operator (CAISO) has performed significant work to support the integration of these new technologies into market and operating systems so that they will enhance grid reliability.

Throughout the Western Interconnection, BAs rely on flexible resources to support balancing the increasingly weather-dependent load with the variable generation within the resource mix. Dispatchable generation from hydroelectric and thermal plants internal to the BA's area as well as imports from surplus energy in another area are called upon by operators when area shortfalls are anticipated. Under normal

[10] See California Public Utilities Commission Emergency Reliability Rulemaking R.20-11-003

[11] WECC's Reference Margin Levels are based on a probabilistic approach for Loss-of-Load Probability (LOLP) less than or equal to 0.02% (approximately a 1-day-in-10-year loss of load). For more information see the *NERC 2020 Long-Term Reliability Assessment (LTRA)* Table 10: https://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/NERC_LTRA_2020.pdf

[12] A summary of resource additions in the CAISO area is found in Table 10 of the *CAISO Summer Loads and Resources Assessment, May 2021*: http://www.caiso.com/Documents/2021-Summer-Loads-and-Resources-Assessment.pdf

conditions, there is sufficient energy and resource capacity and an adequate transmission network for transfers between areas to meet system ramping needs. However, conditions such as wide-area heat events can reduce the availability of resources for transfer as areas serve higher internal demands. Additionally, transmission networks can become stressed when events such as wildfires or wide-area heatwaves cause network congestion. The growing reliance on transfers within the Western Interconnection and falling resource capacity in many adjacent areas increases the risk that extreme events will lead to load interruption.

Western Interconnection Risk Scenarios

Probabilistic studies performed by WECC identified a continued risk of energy shortfalls. For the upcoming summer, the WECC-CAMX area has 10,180 MWh of expected unserved energy (EUE) and the Northwest Power Pool and the Rocky Mountain Reserve Sharing Group (WECC-NWPP & RMRG) has 3,442 MWh of EUE; all other WECC areas have negligible EUE. WECC examined risk across a wide probability spectrum of potential combinations of high loads and low generation levels, with and without dependency on neighboring BA areas, and how deviations from those expected means would affect reliability.[13] The risk analysis charts in the **Regional Assessments Dashboards** illustrate the potential for above-normal peak demand and resource outage scenarios, similar to those seen in 2020, to result in operating emergencies in all WECC assessment areas with the exception of the winter-peaking Canadian provinces. For example, **Figure 7** is for the WECC CAMX area. Wide-area heatwave events can heighten energy shortfall risks throughout the Western Interconnection by reducing the availability of surplus capacity for sharing or by loading the transmission network to the limits of its transfer capability.




Figure 7: CAMX On-Peak Risk Scenario

[13] See *Western Assessment of Resource Adequacy Report*: Western Assessment of Resource Adequacy Report 12-18 (Final).pdf.pdf (wecc.org)

In summer, CAMX can be exposed to greater risk of resource shortfall for the hours that immediately follow the peak demand. The reason the risk is greater in these hours is that solar resource output is rapidly diminishing with the setting sun. Shown in the scenario depicted in Figure 8, anticipated resources are lower than on peak due to the reduced solar PV outputs. During periods of peak demand and normal forced outages, imports provide the needed energy to ensure demand and operating reserve requirements are met. Demand or resource derates from extreme conditions that cannot be satisfied with imports will result in energy emergencies and the potential for load shedding. Though trends for off-peak risk are increasing in other parts of the Western Interconnection, WECC's analysis indicates that greater risk exposure after the demand peak is only exhibited in CAMX.




Figure 8: CAMX Highest Risk Hour Scenario (Hour Ending 7:00 p.m. Pacific Time)

Given that little has changed in the available electricity resources and the expected demand throughout the Western Interconnection, the summer-peaking areas remain at risk for localized shortfalls to exceed the availability of resource assistance and transmission deliverability during events like the 2020 August wide-area heat wave. Early generation and load forecasting based on long-term meteorological conditions will be important to maximize available generation and prepare load management plans for challenging weather. Enhancements to day-ahead markets and operational planning that were put in place and were effective in mitigating the impacts of the second, higher temperature heat wave that extended across the Western United States in September 2020 will need to be employed again to support BPS reliability in similar conditions.

Wildfire Impacts to the BPS in the Western Interconnections

Operation of the BPS can be impacted in areas where wildfires are active as well as areas where there is heightened risk of wildfire ignition due to weather and ground conditions. Wildfire prevention planning in California and other areas include power shut-off programs in high fire-risk areas. When conditions warrant implementing these plans, power lines (including transmission-level lines) may be preemptively de-energized in high fire-risk areas to prevent wildfire ignitions. Other wildfire risk mitigation activities include implementing enhanced vegetation management, equipment inspections, system hardening, and added

situational awareness measures. In January 2021, the Electric Reliability Organization published the *Wildfire Mitigation Reference Guide*[14] to promote preparedness within the North American electric power industry and share the experience and practices from utilities in the Western Interconnection.

On-Peak Planning Reserve Margins

The Anticipated Reserve Margin, which is based on available resource capacity, is a metric used to evaluate resource adequacy by comparing the projected capability of anticipated resources to serve forecasted peak demand.[15] Large year-to-year changes in anticipated resources or forecasted peak demand (net internal demand) can greatly impact Planning Reserve Margin calculations. All assessment areas have sufficient Anticipated Reserve Margins to meet or exceed their Reference Margin Level for Summer 2021 (see **Figure 9**). Variable energy resources, including wind, solar, and types of hydro generation, often contribute significantly less of their installed capability at the period of peak demand. Consequently, the capacity contribution of variable energy resources to an areas anticipated resources may be a fraction of the installed capacity (see **Variable Energy Resource Contributions**).




Figure 9: Summer 2021 Anticipated/Prospective Reserve Margins Compared to Reference Margin Level

[14] See the NERC Wildfire Mitigation Reference Guide, January 2021: https://nerc.com/comm/RSTC/Documents/Wildfire%20Mitigation%20Reference%20Guide_January_2021.pdf

[15] Generally, anticipated resources include generators and firm capacity transfers that are expected to be available to serve load during electrical peak loads for the season. Prospective Resources are those that could be available but do not meet criteria to be counted as Anticipated Resources. Refer to the **Data Concepts and Assumptions** section for additional information on Anticipated/Prospective Reserve Margins, Anticipated/Prospective Resources, and Reference Margin Levels.

Changes from Year-to-Year

Understanding the changes from year-to-year can give insights for the upcoming season. Figure 10 provides the relative change from the Summer 2020 to the Summer 2021 period. The assessment area tables in the Demand and Resource Tables section provide details of the demand and resource components that make up the Anticipated Reserve Margins for each assessment area. In the following areas, Anticipated Reserve Margin changed by more than five percentage points, and none of the changes result in a resource adequacy concern for the upcoming summer:

- **MRO-Manitoba Hydro:** New hydro generators begin operation in May and July.
- **NPCC-Maritimes:** A decrease in demand-side management availability accounts for the majority of Anticipated Reserve Margin loss for the Maritimes footprint.
- **NPCC-New England, Québec, and WECC-SRSG:** Resources have fallen year-on-year with generation retirements.




Figure 10: Summer 2020 to Summer 2021 Anticipated Reserve Margins Year-to-Year Change[16]

[16] WECC-NWPP and WECC-RMRG merged in 2020, so an Anticipated Reserve Margin or a Reference Margin Level was not produced for the 2020 assessment year for comparison.

Risk Assessments of Resource and Demand Scenarios

Areas can face energy shortfalls despite having Planning Reserve Margins that exceed Reference Margin Levels. Operating resources may be insufficient during periods of peak demand for reasons that could include generator scheduled maintenance, forced outages due to normal and more extreme weather conditions and loads, and low-likelihood conditions that affect generation resource performance or unit availability, including constrained fuel supplies. Grid operators employ operating mitigations or EEA (see Table 2) to obtain resources necessary to meet peak demands when operating resources are insufficient. The Regional Assessments Dashboards section in this report includes a seasonal risk scenario for each area that illustrates potential variation in resource and load as well as the potential effects that operating actions can have to mitigate shortfalls in operating reserves when insufficiencies occur.

About the Seasonal Risk Assessment

The operational risk analysis shown in the Regional Assessments Dashboards provides a deterministic scenario for understanding how various factors affecting resources and demand can combine to impact overall resource adequacy. Adjustments are applied cumulatively to anticipated capacity—such as reductions for typical generation outages (maintenance and forced not already accounted for in anticipated resources) and additions that represent the quantified capacity from operational tools, if any—that are available during scarcity conditions but have not been accounted for in the SRA reserve margins.

Resources throughout the scenario are compared against expected operating reserve requirements that are based on peak load and normal weather. The effects from low-probability events are also factored in through additional resource derates or low-output scenarios and extreme summer peak load conditions. Because the seasonal risk scenario shows the cumulative impact resulting from the occurrence of multiple low-probability events, the overall likelihood of the scenario is very low.

Table 2: Energy Emergency Alert Levels

EEA Level	Description	Circumstances
EEA 1	All available generation resources in use	• The BA is experiencing conditions where all available generation resources are committed to meet firm load, firm transactions, and reserve commitments, and is concerned about sustaining its required contingency reserves. • Non-firm wholesale energy sales (other than those that are recallable to meet reserve requirements) have been curtailed.
EEA 2	Load management procedures in effect	• The BA is no longer able to provide its expected energy requirements and is an energy deficient BA. • An energy deficient BS has implemented its operating plan(s) to mitigate emergencies. • An energy deficient BA is still able to maintain minimum contingency reserve requirements.
EEA 3	Firm Load interruption is imminent or in progress	• The energy deficient BA is unable to meet minimum contingency reserve requirements.

Transfers in a Wide-Area Event


When above-normal temperatures extend over a wide area, resources can be strained in multiple assessment areas simultaneously, increasing the risk of shortfalls. Some assessment areas expect imports from other areas to be available to meet periods of peak demand and have contracted for firm transfer commitments. A summary of area firm on-peak imports and exports is shown in **Table 3**. Firm resource transactions, such as these, are accounted for in all assessment area anticipated resources and reserve margins. Areas with net imports show a positive transfer amount, and areas with net exports show a negative transfer amount. Only areas that contained transfers for the previous or upcoming summer seasons are shown in **Table 3**; the data in this table is sourced from the data adequacy tables in the **Data Concepts and Assumptions** section. In the unlikely event that multiple assessment areas are experiencing energy emergencies as could occur in a wide-area heatwave, some transfers may be at risk of not being fulfilled. Transfer agreements may include provisions that allow the exporting entity to prioritize serving native load. Loss of transfers could exacerbate resource shortages that occur from outages and derates.

Table 3: 2020 and 2021 On-Peak Net Firm Transfers

Assessment Area	2020 Summer Transfers (MW)	2021 Summer Transfers (MW)	Year-to-Year Change
MISO	2,795	2,979	6.6%
MRO-Manitoba	-1,526	-1,596	4.6%
MRO-SaskPower	125	125	0.0%
NPCC-Maritimes	-53	-57	7.5%
NPCC-New England	1,510	1,208	-20.0%
NPCC-New York	1,562	1,816	16.3%
NPCC-Ontario	0	80	N/A
NPCC-Quebec	-1,963	-1,995	1.6%
PJM	1,412	1,460	3.4%
SERC-C	-807	172	-121.3%
SERC-E	266	562	111.3%
SERC-FP	1,146	1,007	-12.1%
SERC-SE	-972	-1,115	14.7%
SPP	-1,244	186	-115.0%
TRE-ERCOT	817	210	-74.3%
WECC-AB	0	0	N/A
WECC-BC	0	0	N/A
WECC-CAMX	0	686	N/A
WECC-NWPP-US and RMRG	749	6,139	719.6%
WECC-SRSG	0	866	N/A

Regional Assessments Dashboards

The following assessment area dashboards and summaries were developed based on data and narrative information collected by NERC from the six RE on an assessment area basis.






MISO

The Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc. (MISO) is a not-for-profit, member-based organization that administers wholesale electricity markets that provide customers with valued service; reliable, cost-effective systems and operations; dependable and transparent prices; open access to markets; and planning for long-term efficiency.

MISO manages energy, reliability, and operating reserve markets that consist of 36 local BA and 394 market participants, serving approximately 42 million customers. Although parts of MISO fall in three NERC RE, MRO is responsible for coordinating data and information submitted for NERC's reliability assessments.

On-Peak Fuel Mix




Highlights

- Summer scenarios with high resource outages and high demand may require use of load modifying resources (LMRs) and non-firm imports during peak periods. LMRs are an increasingly important segment of MISO resource portfolio. Operators designate resource constrained periods (Maximum Generation Events) to access LMRs.
- All MISO zones have met local capacity clearing requirements in the wholesale market auction and are projected to have sufficient resources for the summer.
- Covid-19 impacts on MISO load through late 2020 and the first quarter of 2021 have been much less pronounced than they were at the beginning of the pandemic. During the pandemic, MISO load has run 1–2% below normal in mild weather and 1–2% above normal in hotter weather. MISO expects load to trend close to normal through the summer; however, during a heatwave, load could trend 1–3% above normal due to increased residential demand.
- Based on probabilistic studies performed by MISO, the area has low amounts of EUE (18.6 MWh) for the summer season. Greatest risk occurs in the month of July, coinciding with the typical peak in annual demand.


Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under normal peak-demand scenarios. Above-normal summer peak load and outage conditions could result in the need to employ operating mitigations (i.e., demand response, transfers, and short-term load interruption).

On-Peak Reserve Margins



Risk-Period Scenario



Scenario Description

- **Risk Period:** Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour (late afternoon).
- **Demand Scenarios:** Net internal demand (50/50) and 90/10 demand forecast using 30 years of historical data
- **Maintenance Outages:** Rolling five-year average of maintenance and planned outages
- **Forced Outages:** Five-year average of all outages that were not planned
- **Extreme Derates:** Maximum of last five years of outages
- **Operational Mitigation:** A total of 2.4 GW capacity resources available during extreme operating conditions.




MRO-Manitoba Hydro

Manitoba Hydro is a provincial crown corporation that provides electricity to about 580,000 customers throughout Manitoba and natural gas service to about 282,000 customers in various communities throughout Southern Manitoba. The Province of Manitoba has a population of about 1.3 million in an area of 250,946 square miles.

Manitoba Hydro is winter-peaking. No change in the footprint area is expected during the assessment period. Manitoba Hydro is its own Planning Coordinator and BA. Manitoba Hydro is a coordinating member of MISO. MISO is the Reliability Coordinator for Manitoba Hydro.

On-Peak Fuel Mix




Highlights

- While the COVID-19 pandemic is expected to continue over the summer, no impact on area BPS reliability is anticipated as Manitoba Hydro has measures in place to minimize risk to operations. As of mid-March 2021, the pandemic situation in Manitoba appears stable with the implemented government measures.
- Reservoir storage levels are average and adequate to withstand the design drought.
- The first of seven Keeyask units is expected in May and the second is expected by July 1, 2021 (93 MW per unit).
- Based on the NERC 2020 Probabilistic Assessment (ProbA) and analysis of summer demand and resources, Manitoba Hydro is unlikely to experience resource shortages requiring operating procedures over the summer.


Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under the assessed scenarios.

On-Peak Reserve Margins



Risk-Period Scenario



Scenario Description

- **Risk Period:** Periods of peak demand
- **Demand Scenarios:** Net internal demand (50/50) and minimum probability of exceedance forecast load
- **Outages:** Accounts for planned maintenance and average forced outages
- **Extreme Derates:** Capacity derate for thermal resources for extreme conditions.




MRO-SaskPower

Saskatchewan is a province of Canada and comprises a geographic area of 651,900 square kilometers (251,700 square miles) with approximately 1.1 million people. Peak demand is experienced in the winter.

The Saskatchewan Power Corporation (SaskPower) is the Planning Coordinator and Reliability Coordinator for the province of Saskatchewan and is the principal supplier of electricity in the province.

SaskPower is a provincial crown corporation and, under provincial legislation, is responsible for the reliability oversight of the Saskatchewan Bulk Electric System (BES) and its interconnections.

On-Peak Fuel Mix




Highlights

- SaskPower experiences high load in summer as a result of hot weather.
- SaskPower conducts an annual summer joint operating study with Manitoba Hydro with inputs from Basin Electric (North Dakota) and prepares operating guidelines for any identified issues.
- Based on a SaskPower probability-based assessment, a low-likelihood scenario (1.8%) of capacity forced outages totaling 450 MW or greater that coincides with peak loads poses some risk of energy emergencies and unserved load. In the case of extreme hot weather conditions combined with large generation forced outages, SaskPower would use available demand response programs, short term power transfers from neighboring utilities, and short-term load interruptions. Risk is higher at the end of August to early October when larger amounts of generation maintenance is planned.


Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under normal peak-demand scenarios. Above-normal summer peak load and outage conditions could result in the need to employ operating mitigations (i.e., demand response, transfers, and short-term load interruption).

On-Peak Reserve Margins



Risk-Period Scenario




Scenario Description

- **Risk Period:** Periods of peak demand, afternoon (Risk is higher at the end of August to early October when more generation planned maintenance occurs.)
- **Demand Scenarios:** Net internal demand (50/50) and above-normal scenario based on peak demand with lighting and all consumer loads
- **Maintenance Outages:** Estimated based on averages from June-September 2020
- **Forced Outages:** Estimated using SaskPower forced outage model
- **Extreme Derates:** Estimated derate on natural gas units under extreme warm weather (>35 ˚C) based on historic performance and manufacturer data
- **Operational Mitigation:** Based on operational/emergency procedures



NPCC-Maritimes

The Maritimes assessment area is a winter-peaking NPCC area that contains two BA. It is comprised of the Canadian provinces of New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island, and the northern portion of Maine, which is radially connected to the New Brunswick power system. The area covers 58,000 square miles with a total population of 1.9 million.





Highlights

- The Maritimes Area has not identified any operational issues that are expected to impact system reliability. If an event was to occur, there are emergency operations and planning procedures in place. All declared firm capacity is expected to be operational for the summer.
- As part of the planning process, dual-fueled units will have sufficient supplies of heavy fuel oil (HFO) on-site to enable sustained operation in the event of natural gas supply interruptions.
- The effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on load patterns, energy usage, and peak demands will continue to be evaluated during the pandemic.
- The Maritimes are evaluating contingency plans for transmission, distribution and generation planned work, planned maintenance, and forced outages to proceed conservatively while mitigating short term and longer term reliability risks.
- Based on an NPCC probabilistic assessment, the Maritimes assessment area is estimated to require a limited use of their operating procedures designed to mitigate resource shortages during Summer 2021. Negligible amounts of LOLE, LOLH, and EUE were estimated over the summer period for all the scenarios modeled.

Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under the assessed scenarios.





Scenario Description

- **Risk Period:** Periods of peak demand
- **Demand Scenarios:** Net internal demand (50/50) and 90/10 demand forecast
- **Outages:** Based on historical operating experience
- **Extreme Derates:** A low-likelihood scenario resulting in no wind resources




NPCC-New England

ISO New England (ISO-NE) Inc. is a regional transmission organization that serves the six New England states of Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont. It is responsible for the reliable day-to-day operation of New England's bulk power generation and transmission system, administers the area's wholesale electricity markets, and manages the comprehensive planning of the regional BPS.

The New England BPS serves approximately 14.5 million customers over 68,000 square miles.

On-Peak Fuel Mix




Highlights

- ISO New England (ISO-NE) expects to have sufficient resources to meet the area summer peak demand forecast. Peak summer demand is forecast to be 24,810 MW occurring the week of August 8 with a projected net margin of 1,910 MW (7.6%). The summer demand forecast takes into account the demand reductions associated with energy efficiency, load management, behind-the-meter photovoltaic systems, and distributed generation.
- ISO-NE is producing a weekly analysis of the impact the response to COVID-19 is having on New England system demand, posted on its external website every Tuesday.[17] ISO-NE will adjust forecasts based on trends.
- Based on an NPCC probabilistic assessment with scenarios, the New England assessment area is expected to require limited use of their operating procedures designed to mitigate resource shortages during Summer 2021. Negligible amounts of LOLE, LOLH, and EUE were estimated over the summer period for all the scenarios modeled except the severe low-likelihood case. The two highest peak load levels for this severe case resulted in LOLE of 0.3 days, with an associated LOLH of 1.3 hours, and an associated EUE of 868 MWh. This scenario is based exclusively on the two highest load levels representing an average 10–15% increase in peak loads over the 50/50 forecast with a combined 7% probability of occurrence. Additional constraints include 10% reduction in NPCC resources and PJM reductions.


Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under normal peak-demand scenarios. Above-normal summer peak load and outage conditions could result in the need to employ operating mitigations (i.e., demand response, transfers, and short-term load interruption.)

On-Peak Reserve Margins



Risk-Period Scenario



Scenario Description

- **Risk Period:** Period of greatest risk coincides with peak demand (afternoon)
- **Demand Scenarios:** Net internal demand (50/50) and 90/10 demand forecast
- **Outages:** Based on weekly averages
- **Extreme Derates:** Represent a 90/10 case based on historical observation of force outages and additional reductions for generation at risk due to natural gas supply
- **Operational Mitigation:** Based on ISO-NE operating procedures


[17] https://www.iso-ne.com/markets-operations/system-forecast-status/estimated-impacts-of-covid-19-on-demand



NPCC-New York

The New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) is responsible for operating New York's BPS, administering wholesale electricity markets, and conducting system planning. The New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) is the only BA within the state of New York. The BPS encompasses approximately 11,000 miles of transmission lines, 760 power generation units, and serves 19.5 million customers. New York experienced its all-time peak demand of 33,956 MW in Summer 2013. The NERC Reference Margin Level is 15%. Wind, grid-connected solar, and run-of-river totals were derated for this calculation. However, New York requires load serving entities to procure capacity for their loads equal to their peak demand plus an Installed Reserve Margin (IRM). The IRM requirement represents a percentage of capacity above peak load forecast and is approved annually by the New York State Reliability Council (NYSRC). NYSRC approved the 2020–2021 IRM at 20.7%."

On-Peak Fuel Mix




Highlights

- The NYISO is not anticipating any operational issues in the New York control area for the upcoming summer operating period. Adequate capacity margins are anticipated and existing operating procedures are sufficient to handle any issues that may occur.
- High capacity factors on certain New York City peaking units could result in possible violations of their daily NOx emission limits if they were to fully respond to the NYISO dispatch signals; this could occur during long duration hot weather events or following the loss of significant generation or transmission assets. Protocols with state agencies provide for reliable operation during emergencies.
- Based on an NPCC probabilistic assessment with scenarios, the New York assessment area is expected to require limited use of their operating procedures designed to mitigate resource shortages during Summer 2021. New York's LOLE risk is correlated to simultaneous high loads occurring in PJM, Ontario, and MISO, which limits the availability of external support. Negligible amounts of LOLE, LOLH, and EUE were estimated over the summer period for all the scenarios modeled except for the low-likelihood severe case that assumes simultaneous stressed system conditions for NPCC and the modeled external systems. The two highest peak load levels for this severe case resulted in an estimated LOLE of one occurrence in July, with an associated LOLH of four hours and an EUE of 3,020 MWh risk. The highest peak load level results were based exclusively on only the two highest load levels (representing on average 10–15% increase in peak loads over the 50/50 forecast) having a combined 7% chance of occurring. Additional constraints include 10% reduction in NPCC resources and PJM reductions.


Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under assessed scenarios.

On-Peak Reserve Margins



Risk-Period Scenario



Scenario Description


- **Risk Period:** Periods of peak demand
- **Demand Scenarios:** Net internal demand (50/50) and 90/10 demand forecast with demand response adjustments
- **Forced Outages:** Based on historical 5-year averages
- **Extreme Derates:** Capacity derate for thermal resources for extreme conditions
- **Operational Mitigation:** 3.3 GW based on operational/emergency procedures in area *Emergency Operations Manual*



NPCC-Ontario

The Independent Electricity System Operator (IESO) is the BA for the province of Ontario. The province of Ontario covers more than 1 million square kilometers (415,000 square miles) and has a population of more than 14 million.

Ontario is interconnected electrically with Québec, MRO-Manitoba, states in MISO (Minnesota and Michigan), and NPCC-New York.





Highlights

- Ontario expects to have sufficient generation resources available to meet its needs throughout the summer, and its transmission system is expected to continue to reliably supply province-wide demand
- In December 2020, the IESO ran its first capacity auction, clearing 992.1 MW of capacity for the 2021 summer period. The capacity auction will be an important tool for meeting Ontario's future reliability needs.
- The ongoing transmission outage at the New York-St Lawrence interconnection continues to impact import and export capacity between Ontario and New York. The issue is being jointly managed by entities involved.
- Based on an NPCC probabilistic assessment, the Ontario assessment area is estimated to require a limited use of their operating procedures designed to mitigate resource shortages during Summer 2021. Ontario's LOLE risk is correlated to the availability of their external imports at the time of Ontario's peak load. Negligible amounts of LOLE, LOLH, and EUE were estimated over the summer period for all the scenarios modeled except the low-likelihood severe case and highest peak load levels (which resulted in an LOLE of 0.4 days with an associated LOLH of 1.2 hours and an associated EUE of 1,042 MWh risk in July). The highest peak load level results were based exclusively on only the two highest load levels of the seven modeled, having a combined 7% chance of occurring in this already low-likelihood case (with about a 10% reduction in NPCC resources and PJM reductions).

Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under normal peak-demand scenarios. Extreme summer peak load and outage conditions could result in the need to employ operating mitigations (i.e., demand response, transfers, and short-term load interruption).





Scenario Description

- **Risk Period:** Period of greatest risk coincides with peak demand (afternoon)
- **Demand Scenarios:** Net internal demand (50/50 Forecast) and highest weather-adjusted daily demand from 31 years of demand history
- **Forced Outages:** Estimated using market forced outage model
- **Extreme Derates:** Hydro derates are based on 2012 (dry-year) conditions. Thermal derates are estimated using an extreme temperature from 31 years of historical data.
- **Operational Mitigation:** Imports anticipated from neighbors during emergencies




NPCC-Québec

The Québec assessment area (Province of Québec) is a winter-peaking NPCC area that covers 595,391 square miles with a population of 8 million.

Québec is one of the four NERC Interconnections in North America; it has ties to Ontario, New York, New England, and the Maritimes; consisting of either HVDC ties, radial generation, or load to and from neighboring systems.

On-Peak Fuel Mix




Highlights

- No issues are anticipated for the summer since the Québec system is winter peaking.
- Based on an NPCC probabilistic assessment, the Québec assessment area is not expected to require use of their operating procedures designed to mitigate resource shortages during Summer 2021. The Québec area is winter peaking and has a large reserve margin for the summer period; as a result, Québec did not demonstrate any measurable amounts of LOLE, LOLH, or EUE risk over the summer period for all the scenarios modeled.


Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under assessed scenarios.

On-Peak Reserve Margins



Risk-Period Scenario



Scenario Description

- **Risk Period:** Period of peak demand (afternoons)
- **Demand Scenarios:** Net internal demand (50/50) and 90/10 demand forecast
- **Extreme Derates:** Rare scenario of 1,200 MW in unplanned outages




PJM

PJM Interconnection is a regional transmission organization that coordinates the movement of wholesale electricity in all or parts of Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, and the District of Columbia. PJM serves 65 million people and covers 369,089 square miles.

PJM is a BA, Planning Coordinator, Transmission Planner, Resource Planner, Interchange Authority, Transmission Operator, Transmission Service Provider, and Reliability Coordinator.

On-Peak Fuel Mix




Highlights

- PJM expects no resource problems over the entire 2021 summer peak season. Installed capacity is almost double the Reference Margin Level and there are currently no known deliverability restrictions.
- Probabilistic studies performed by PJM indicate that there is low risk of resource shortfall for summer. The analysis included a range of load, generation, and outage scenarios.
- PJM's Reference Margin Level decreased from 15.1% to 14.9% due to lower average expected forced outage rates in the 2020 PJM capacity model compared to prior years.


Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under assessed scenarios.

On-Peak Reserve Margins



Risk-Period Scenario



Scenario Description

- **Risk Period:** Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour (afternoon)
- **Demand Scenarios:** Net internal demand (50/50) and 90/10 demand forecast
- **Outages:** Based on historical data and trending
- **Extreme Derates:** Derate accounts for reduced thermal capacity contributions due to performance in extreme conditions
- **Operational Mitigation:** A total of 2 GW obtained through emergency requests for behind-the-meter generation dispatch




SERC-East

SERC-East is a summer-peaking assessment area within the SERC RE. SERC-East includes North Carolina and South Carolina.

SERC is one of the six companies across North America that are responsible for the work under Federal Energy Regulatory Commission approved delegation agreements with NERC. SERC is specifically responsible for the reliability and security of the electric grid across the southeastern and central areas of the United States. This area covers approximately 630,000 square miles and serves a population of more than 91 million.

The SERC RE includes 36 BA, 28 Planning Authorities, and 6 Reliability Coordinators.

On-Peak Fuel Mix




Highlights

- Entities in SERC-East have not identified any potential reliability issues for the upcoming season. The entities continue to perform resource studies to ensure resource adequacy to meet the summer peak demand and to maintain reliability to the system. Entities reported that coal inventory is in the upper allowed range to maintain reliability.
- Entities in the SERC RE continue to participate actively in the SERC Near-Term and Long-Term Working Groups. These groups identify emerging and potential reliability impacts to transmission and resource adequacy as well as with transfer capability.
- Entities in SERC-East are not anticipating operational challenges for the upcoming summer season.
- Probabilistic analysis performed for SERC-East shows almost no risk for resource shortfall for the summer. SERC-East has a small amount of EUE in August but a negligible amount at other times (EUE < 0.4 MWh).


Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under assessed scenarios.

On-Peak Reserve Margins



Risk-Period Scenario



Scenario Description

- **Risk Period:** Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour (afternoon)
- **Demand Scenarios:** Net internal demand (50/50) and 90/10 demand forecast
- **Forced Outages:** Weighted average forced outage rates on-peak are factored into the anticipated resources calculation
- **Extreme Derates:** Account for reduced thermal capacity contributions due to performance in extreme conditions




SERC-Central

SERC-Central is a summer peaking assessment area within the SERC RE. SERC-Central includes all of Tennessee and portions of Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and Kentucky.

SERC is one of the six companies across North America that are responsible for the work under Federal Energy Regulatory Commission approved delegation agreements with NERC. SERC is specifically responsible for the reliability and security of the electric grid across the southeastern and central areas of the United States. This area covers approximately 630,000 square miles and serves a population of more than 91 million.

The SERC RE includes 36 BA, 28 Planning Authorities, and 6 Reliability Coordinators.

On-Peak Fuel Mix




Highlights

- Entities in SERC-Central have not identified any potential reliability issues for the upcoming season. Entities have noted that planned outages are on schedule to be completed prior to the summer season and not anticipated to result in potential reliability issues.
- Entities in the SERC RE continue to participate actively in the SERC Near-Term and Long-Term Working Groups. These groups identify emerging and potential reliability impacts to transmission and resource adequacy along with transfer capability.
- Probabilistic analysis performed for SERC-Central shows low risk for resource shortfall for the summer. Load loss and unserved energy indices are negligible for SERC-Central.


Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under assessed scenarios.

On-Peak Reserve Margins



Risk-Period Scenario



Scenario Description

- **Risk Period:** Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour (afternoon)
- **Demand Scenarios:** Net internal demand (50/50) and 90/10 demand forecast
- **Forced Outages:** Weighted average forced outage rates on-peak are factored into the anticipated resources calculation
- **Extreme Derates:** Account for reduced thermal capacity contributions due to performance in extreme conditions




SERC-Southeast

SERC-Southeast is a summer peaking assessment area within the SERC RE. SERC-Southeast includes all or portions of Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi.

SERC is one of the six companies across North America that are responsible for the work under Federal Energy Regulatory Commission approved delegation agreements with NERC. SERC is specifically responsible for the reliability and security of the electric grid across the southeastern and central areas of the United States. This area covers approximately 630,000 square miles and serves a population of more than 91 million.

The SERC RE includes 36 BA, 28 Planning Authorities, and 6 Reliability Coordinators.

On-Peak Fuel Mix




Highlights

- Entities in SERC Southeast have not identified any emerging reliability issues for the upcoming season that will impact resource adequacy. The available system capacity for the upcoming season meets or exceeds the reserve margin target. Reliability is supported by a diverse fuel mix, firm gas contracts, and power purchases.
- Entities in the SERC area continue to participate actively in the SERC Near-Term and Long-Term Working Groups. These groups identify emerging and potential reliability impacts to transmission and resource adequacy along with transfer capability.
- Probabilistic analysis performed for SERC-Southeast shows there is low risk for resource shortfall for the summer. Load loss and unserved energy indices are negligible for SERC-Southeast throughout the summer.


Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under assessed scenarios.

On-Peak Reserve Margins



Risk-Period Scenario



Scenario Description

- **Risk Period:** Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour (afternoon)
- **Demand Scenarios:** Net internal demand (50/50) and 90/10 demand forecast
- **Forced Outages and Extreme Derates:** All outages and derates are factored into the anticipated resources calculation




SERC-Florida Peninsula

SERC-Florida Peninsula is a summer peaking assessment area within the SERC RE.

SERC is one of the six companies across North America that are responsible for the work under Federal Energy Regulatory Commission approved delegation agreements with NERC. SERC is specifically responsible for the reliability and security of the electric grid across the southeastern and central areas of the United States. This area covers approximately 630,000 square miles and serves a population of more than 91 million.

The SERC RE includes 36 BA, 28 Planning Authorities, and 6 Reliability Coordinators.

On-Peak Fuel Mix




Highlights

- Entities in SERC-Florida Peninsula have not identified any emerging reliability issues or operational concerns for the upcoming summer. Entities in the SERC Region continue to participate actively in the SERC Near-Term and Long-Term Working Groups. These groups identify emerging and potential reliability impacts to transmission and resource adequacy along with transfer capability.
- Entities within the Florida Peninsula area have reported no operational challenges for the upcoming summer season based on current expected system conditions, the BES within the Florida Peninsula is expected to perform reliably for the anticipated 2021 summer season.
- Probabilistic analysis performed for SERC-Florida Peninsula shows there is low risk for resource shortfall for the summer. Load loss and unserved energy indices for SERC-Florida Peninsula are spread across the summer months but are relatively low (LOLH < 0.03 and EUE < 18 MWH).


Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under assessed scenarios.

On-Peak Reserve Margins



Risk-Period Scenario



Scenario Description

- **Risk Period:** Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour (afternoon)
- **Demand Scenarios:** Net internal demand (50/50) and 90/10 demand forecast
- **Forced Outages:** Weighted average forced outage rates on-peak are factored into the anticipated resources calculation
- **Extreme Derates:** Account for reduced thermal capacity contributions due to performance in extreme conditions




SPP

Southwest Power Pool (SPP) Planning Coordinator footprint covers 546,000 square miles and encompasses all or parts of Arkansas, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas, and Wyoming.

The SPP long-term assessment is reported based on the Planning Coordinator footprint, which touches parts of the Midwest Reliability Organization RE, and the WECC RE. The SPP assessment area footprint has approximately 61,000 miles of transmission lines, 756 generating plants, and 4,811 transmission-class substations, and it serves a population of more than 18 million.

On-Peak Fuel Mix




Highlights

- At this time, SPP does not anticipate any emerging reliability issues impacting the area for the 2021 summer season.
- Wind generation occupies a greater share of the SPP resource mix, requiring increased attention to weather-dependent forecasts. The SPP Uncertainty Response Team uses historical data to predict and develop mitigation plans for load forecast errors up to seven days in advance. Potential errors are predicted based on the levels of expected load, wind, and traditional resource outage in forecast. Mitigation may be obtained by scheduling longer-lead resources, controlling planned outages, and communicating with owners and operators.
- Using the current operational processes and procedures, SPP will continue to assess the needs for the 2021 summer season and will adjust as needed to ensure that real time reliability is maintained throughout the summer time frame.
- Probabilistic studies performed by SPP indicate for the 2021 summer season indicate that the current Planning Reserve Margin is sufficient for the 2021 summer season.


Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under normal peak-demand scenarios. Extreme summer peak load and outage conditions could result in the need to employ operating mitigations (i.e., demand response, transfers, and short-term load interruption).

On-Peak Reserve Margins



Risk-Period Scenario



Scenario Description

- **Risk Period:** Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour (late afternoon)
- **Demand Scenarios:** Net internal demand (50/50) and 90/10 demand forecast
- **Maintenance Outages:** Based on historical summer average for the past three years
- **Forced Outages:** Based on historical summer average for the past three years
- **Extreme Thermal Derates:** Derate accounts for reduced capacity contributions due to performance in extreme conditions
- **Low-Wind Scenario:** Rare scenario with only 320 MW (of 26,800 MW installed capacity) contributing to meet demand
- **Operational Mitigation:** 1,700 MW based on operational/emergency procedures




Texas RE-ERCOT

The Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) is the ISO for the ERCOT Interconnection and is located entirely in the state of Texas; it operates as a single BA. It also performs financial settlement for the competitive wholesale bulk-power market and administers retail switching for nearly 8 million premises in competitive choice areas. ERCOT is governed by a board of directors and subject to oversight by the Public Utility Commission of Texas and the Texas Legislature.

ERCOT is a summer-peaking RE that covers approximately 200,000 square miles, connects over 46,500 miles of transmission lines, has over 710 generation units, and serves more than 25 million customers. Lubbock Power & Light joins the ERCOT grid on June 1, 2021. Texas RE is responsible for the RE functions described in the *Energy Policy Act of 2005* for the ERCOT RE.

On-Peak Fuel Mix




Highlights

- Summer probabilistic analysis performed by ERCOT indicates that the risk of unserved energy is low. Hour-ending 5:00 p.m. continues to be ERCOT's highest-risk hour for unserved energy with the likelihood of unserved energy less than 0.2%.
- Variable energy resources from wind and solar are critical to meeting peak electricity demand in ERCOT. Periods of low wind generation or higher-than expected thermal outages create a reliability risk during peak load hours. ERCOT appears to be in a weather cycle that may increase the risk of intensifying drought conditions and higher than normal summer temperatures. These weather factors could result in actual summer peak demand exceeding the forecast, which already anticipates record peak demand levels. Thermal outages may increase during severe and prolonged drought conditions due to cooling water supply and temperature issues.
- Given an Anticipated Reserve Margin of 15.3% and Reference Reserve Margin of 13.75%, ERCOT expects to have sufficient operating reserves for summer system conditions.
- Delays or cancellations of planned transmission expansion projects in the western part of the Lower Rio Grande Valley, if they occur, may contribute to potential localized reliability concerns.


Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under normal peak-demand scenarios. Above-normal summer peak load and outage conditions could result in the need to employ operating mitigations (i.e., demand response, transfers, and short-term load interruption).

On-Peak Reserve Margins



Risk-Period Scenario



Scenario Description

- **Risk Period:** Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour, late afternoon (Risk can extend for 1–2 hours after peak as solar PV output diminishes. Periods of low-wind, which usually occur 1–2 hours before peak demand, can also result in extended shortfall risk.
- **Demand Scenarios:** Net internal demand (50/50) and extreme demand based on 2011 historic summer peak demand (approximates 90/10 demand forecast)
- **Forced Outages:** Based on historical average of forced outages for June through September weekdays, hours ending 3:00–8:00 p.m., for the last three summer seasons (2018–2020)
- **Extreme Derates:** Additional derates of 2,605 MW (thermal), 6,576 MW (wind), and 2,953 MW (PV) for extreme conditions (i.e., based on the 95th percentile of historical forced outages for June–September weekdays, hours ending 3:00–8:00 p.m., for the last three years.
- **Extreme Outage Scenario:** Additional increments of thermal and hydro forced outages equating to highest hourly forced outages from 2011–2021 **(**When combined with extreme derates shown in the Risk-Period Scenario, it represents a very rare resource condition.)
- **Operational Mitigation:** Additional resources, primarily from load resources, but also switchable generation, additional imports, and voltage reduction)




WECC-AB

WECC-Alberta is an assessment area in the WECC RE that consists of the province of Alberta, Canada.

WECC is responsible for coordinating and promoting BES reliability in the Western Interconnection. WECC's 329 members, which include 38 BA, represent a wide spectrum of organizations with an interest in the BES. Serving an area of nearly 1.8 million square miles and more than 82 million people, it is geographically the largest and most diverse of the NERC RE.

WECC's service territory extends from Canada to Mexico. It includes the provinces of Alberta and British Columbia in Canada, the northern portion of Baja California in Mexico, and all or portions of the 14 Western United States in between.

On-Peak Fuel Mix




Highlights

- WECC-Alberta is a winter peaking province. Sufficient resources are anticipated to meet summer demand.
- Based on a WECC probabilistic assessment, the WECC-AB assessment area had negligible LOLH and EUE.


Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under assessed scenarios.

On-Peak Reserve Margins



Risk-Period Scenario



Scenario Description

- **Risk Period:** Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour (afternoon)
- **Demand Scenarios:** Net internal demand (50/50) and 90/10 demand forecast
- **Forced Outages:** Average seasonal outages
- **Extreme Derates:** Derate using 90/10 scenario




WECC-BC

WECC-British Columbia is an assessment area in the WECC RE that consists of the province of British Columbia, Canada.

WECC is responsible for coordinating and promoting BES reliability in the Western Interconnection. WECC's 329 members, which include 38 BA, represent a wide spectrum of organizations with an interest in the BES. Serving an area of nearly 1.8 million square miles and more than 82 million people, it is geographically the largest and most diverse of the NERC RE.

WECC's service territory extends from Canada to Mexico. It includes the provinces of Alberta and British Columbia in Canada, the northern portion of Baja California in Mexico, and all or portions of the 14 Western United States in between.

On-Peak Fuel Mix




Highlights

- WECC-British Columbia is a winter peaking province. Sufficient resources are anticipated to meet summer demand.
- Based on a WECC probabilistic assessment, the WECC-AB assessment area had negligible LOLH and EUE.


Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under assessed scenarios.

On-Peak Reserve Margins



Risk-Period Scenario



Scenario Description

- **Risk Period:** Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour (afternoon)
- **Demand Scenarios:** Net internal demand (50/50) and 90/10 demand forecast
- **Forced Outages:** Average seasonal outages
- **Extreme Derates:** Derate using 90/10 scenario




WECC-CAMX

WECC California-Mexico is an assessment area in the WECC RE that includes parts of California, Nevada, and Baja California, Mexico.

WECC is responsible for coordinating and promoting BES reliability in the Western Interconnection. WECC's 329 members, which include 38 BA, represent a wide spectrum of organizations with an interest in the BES. Serving an area of nearly 1.8 million square miles and more than 82 million people, it is geographically the largest and most diverse of the NERC RE.

WECC's service territory extends from Canada to Mexico. It includes the provinces of Alberta and British Columbia in Canada, the northern portion of Baja California in Mexico, and all or portions of the 14 Western United States in between.

On-Peak Fuel Mix




Highlights

- Anticipated resources, which include new capacity in development as well as imports, are expected to be sufficient to meet summer peak demand. However, supply shortfalls from unanticipated low variable generation output, limited imports, or thermal generation outages could lead to energy emergencies. Extreme demand, as seen in 2020, could also lead to emergencies.
- WECC-CAMX has planned resource additions of 1,300 MW over the summer, including 825 MW of new battery storage that are in development. Owners and operators must keep focus on project timelines and implementation milestones to meet anticipated resource levels and help reduce resource adequacy risks in late-summer.
- The Western Interconnection is at risk of experiencing operating challenges from wildfires. Transmission lines may be removed from service in areas with active wildfires or heightened wildfire risk. These transmission outages can impose BPS operational constraints resulting in loss of load events.
- Based on a WECC probabilistic assessment, the California portion of the assessment area has an LOLH of 0.20 hours and an EUE of 10,185 MWh. The Mexico portion has negligible LOLH and EUE.


Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources (including summer additions) meet operating reserve requirements under normal demand scenarios. Above-normal peak load would cause area resource shortages during periods of peak demand and extend into evenings as solar PV output diminishes while demand remains high. High thermal resource outages or reduced availability of imports associated with extreme or wide-area heat events are likely to result in firm load-shed.

On-Peak Reserve Margins



Risk-Period Scenario



Scenario Description

- **Risk Period:** Period of greatest risk typically within two hours following afternoon peak demand as solar PV output diminishes
- **Demand Scenarios:** Net internal demand (50/50) and 90/10 demand forecast
- **Forced Outages:** Estimated using market forced outage model
- **Extreme Derates:** Derate on natural gas units based on historic data and manufacturer data for temperature performance and outages




WECC-NWPP & RMRG

WECC Northwest Power Pool and Rocky Mountain Reserve Sharing Group is an assessment area in the WECC RE. The area includes Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming and parts of California, Nebraska, Nevada, and South Dakota.

WECC is responsible for coordinating and promoting BES reliability in the Western Interconnection. WECC's 329 members, which include 38 BA, represent a wide spectrum of organizations with an interest in the BES. Serving an area of nearly 1.8 million square miles and more than 82 million people, it is geographically the largest and most diverse of the NERC RE.

WECC's service territory extends from Canada to Mexico. It includes the provinces of Alberta and British Columbia in Canada, the northern portion of Baja California in Mexico, and all or portions of the 14 Western United States in between.

On-Peak Fuel Mix




Highlights

- The anticipated reserve margins for WECC, its subregions, and all zones within are expected to exceed their respective NERC Reference Margin Levels for the upcoming season
- WECC merged the NWPP and RMRG assessment areas in late 2020, so an Anticipated Reserve Margin or a Reference Margin Level was not produced for the 2020 assessment year for comparison. However, it is estimated that anticipated resources have declined by 4% since 2020 while demand is not significantly changed in the merged area for the upcoming summer (see **Demand and Resource Tables**).
- Localized short-term operational issues may occur due to wildfires. Due to the widely dispersed nature of the transmission system, outages due to wildfires are generally not widespread.
- Based on a WECC probabilistic assessment, the WECC-NWPP assessment area had an LOLH of 0.06 hour and a EUE of 3,442 MWh.


Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under normal peak-demand scenarios. Extreme summer peak load and outage conditions could result in the need to employ operating mitigations (i.e., demand response, transfers, and short-term load interruption).

On-Peak Reserve Margins



Risk-Period Scenario



Scenario Description

- **Risk Period:** Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour (late afternoon)
- **Demand Scenarios:** Net internal demand (50/50) and 90/10 demand forecast
- **Forced Outages:** Average seasonal outages
- **Extreme Derates:** Derate using 90/10 scenario




WECC-SRSG

WECC Southwest Reserve Sharing Group is an assessment area in the WECC RE. It includes Arizona and New Mexico and part of California and Texas.

WECC is responsible for coordinating and promoting BES reliability in the Western Interconnection. WECC's 329 members, which include 38 BA, represent a wide spectrum of organizations with an interest in the BES. Serving an area of nearly 1.8 million square miles and more than 82 million people, it is geographically the largest and most diverse of the NERC RE.

WECC's service territory extends from Canada to Mexico. It includes the provinces of Alberta and British Columbia in Canada, the northern portion of Baja California in Mexico, and all or portions of the 14 Western United States in between.

On-Peak Fuel Mix




Highlights

- The Anticipated Reserve Margins for WECC, its subregions, and all zones within are expected to exceed their respective NERC Reference Margin Levels for the upcoming season.
- For the upcoming summer season, California ISO is procuring resources to improve reliability risks.
- Localized short-term operational issues may occur due to wildfires. Due to the widely dispersed nature of the transmission system, outages due to wildfires are generally not widespread.
- Based on a WECC probabilistic assessment, the WECC-SRSG assessment area had negligible LOLH and EUE.


Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under normal peak-demand scenarios. Extreme summer peak load and outage conditions could result in the need to employ operating mitigations (i.e., demand response, transfers, and short-term load interruption).

On-Peak Reserve Margins



Risk-Period Scenario



Scenario Description

- **Risk Period:** Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour (late afternoon)
- **Demand Scenarios:** Net internal demand (50/50) and 90/10 demand forecast
- **Forced Outages:** Average seasonal outages
- **Extreme Derates:** Derate using 90/10 scenario

Data Concepts and Assumptions

The table below explains data concepts and important assumptions used throughout this assessment.

General Assumptions
• Reliability of the interconnected BPS is comprised of both adequacy and operating reliability:
▪ Adequacy is the ability of the electric system to supply the aggregate electric power and energy requirements of the electricity consumers at all times while taking into account scheduled and reasonably expected unscheduled outages of system components.
▪ Operating reliability is the ability of the electric system to withstand sudden disturbances such as electric short-circuits or unanticipated loss of system components.
• The reserve margin calculation is an important industry planning metric used to examine future resource adequacy.
• All data in this assessment is based on existing federal, state, and provincial laws and regulations.
• Differences in data collection periods for each assessment area should be considered when comparing demand and capacity data between year-to-year seasonal assessments.
• *2020 Long-Term Reliability Assessment* data has been used for most of this 2021 assessment period augmented by updated load and capacity data.
• A positive net transfer capability would indicate a net importing assessment area; a negative value would indicate a net exporter.
Demand Assumptions
• Electricity demand projections, or load forecasts, are provided by each assessment area.
• Load forecasts include peak hourly load[18] or total internal demand for the summer and winter of each year.[19]
• Total internal demand projections are based on normal weather (50/50 distribution[20]) and are provided on a coincident[21] basis for most assessment areas.
• Net internal demand is used in all reserve margin calculations, and it is equal to total internal demand then reduced by the amount of controllable and dispatchable demand response projected to be available during the peak hour.
Resource Assumptions
Resource planning methods vary throughout the North American BPS. NERC uses the categories below to provide a consistent approach for collecting and presenting resource adequacy. **Table 2** below shows the wind and solar generation resources in each assessment area and describes how capacity contributions values are determined.
Anticipated Resources:
• **Existing-Certain Capacity**: Included in this category are commercially operable generating unit or portions of generating units that meet at least one of the following requirements when examining the period of peak demand for the summer season: unit must have a firm capability and have a power purchase agreement (PPA) with firm transmission that must be in effect for the unit; unit must be classified as a designated network resource; and/or where energy-only markets exist, unit must be a designated market resource eligible to bid into the market.
• **Tier 1 Capacity Additions**: This category includes capacity that either is under construction or has received approved planning requirements.
• **Net Firm Capacity Transfers (Imports minus Exports)**: This category includes transfers with firm contracts.
Prospective Resources: Includes all anticipated resources plus the following:
Existing-Other Capacity: Included in this category are commercially operable generating units or portions of generating units that could be available to serve load for the period of peak demand for the season but do not meet the requirements of existing-certain.
Reserve Margin Descriptions

[18] *Glossary of Terms* used in NERC Reliability Standards

[19] The summer season represents June–September and the winter season represents December–February.

[20] Essentially, this means that there is a 50% probability that actual demand will be higher and a 50% probability that actual demand will be lower than the value provided for a given season/year.

[21] Coincident: This is the sum of two or more peak loads that occur in the same hour. Noncoincident: This is the sum of two or more peak loads on individual systems that do not occur in the same time interval; this is meaningful only when considering loads within a limited period of time, such as a day, a week, a month, a heating or cooling season, and usually for not more than one year. SERC and FRCC calculate total internal demand on a noncoincidental basis.

Planning Reserve Margin: This is the primary metric used to measure resource adequacy; it is defined as the difference in resources (anticipated or prospective) and net internal demand then divided by net internal demand and shown as a percentage.

Reference Margin Level: The assumptions and naming convention of this metric vary by assessment area. The Reference Margin Level can be determined using both deterministic and probabilistic (based on a 0.1/year loss of load study) approaches. In both cases, this metric is used by system planners to quantify the amount of reserve capacity in the system above the forecasted peak demand that is needed to ensure sufficient supply to meet peak loads. Establishing a Reference Margin Level is necessary to account for long-term factors of uncertainty involved in system planning, such as unexpected generator outages and extreme weather impacts that could lead to increase demand beyond what was projected in the 50/50 load forecasted. In many assessment areas, a Reference Margin Level is established by a state, provincial authority, ISO/RTO, or other regulatory body. In some cases, the Reference Margin Level is a requirement. Reference Margin Levels may be different for the summer and winter seasons. If a Reference Margin Level is not provided by an assessment area, NERC applies 15% for predominately thermal systems and 10% for predominately hydro systems.

Seasonal Risk Scenario Chart Description

Each assessment area performed an operational risk analysis that was used to produce the seasonal risk scenario charts in the **Regional Assessments Dashboards**. The chart presents deterministic scenarios for further analysis of different resource and demand levels: The left blue column shows anticipated resources (from the resource adequacy data table), and the two orange columns at the right show the two demand scenarios of the normal peak net internal demand from the resource adequacy data table and the extreme summer peak demand—both determined by the assessment area. The middle red or green bars show adjustments that are applied cumulatively to the anticipated resources, such as the following:

- Reductions for typical generation outages (i.e., maintenance and forced, not already accounted for in anticipated resources)
- Reductions that represent additional outage or performance derating by resource type for extreme, low-probability conditions (e.g., drought condition impacts on hydroelectric generation, low-wind scenario affecting wind generation, fuel supply limitations, or extreme temperature conditions that result in reduced thermal generation output)
- Additional capacity resources that represent quantified capacity from operational procedures, if any, that are made available during scarcity conditions

Not all assessment areas have the same categories of adjustments to anticipated resources. Furthermore, each assessment area determined the adjustments to capacity based on methods or assumptions that are summarized below the chart. Methods and assumptions differ by assessment area and may not be comparable.

The chart enables evaluation of resource levels against levels of expected operating reserve requirement and the forecasted demand. Further, the effects from low-probability, extreme events can also be examined by comparing resource levels after applying extreme-scenario derates and/or extreme summer peak demand. Because such extreme scenario analysis depicts the cumulative impact resulting from the occurrence of multiple low-probability events, the overall likelihood of this scenario is very low.

Demand and Resource Tables

Peak demand and supply capacity data for each assessment area are provided below.

MISO Resource Adequacy Data			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2020 SRA**	**2021 SRA**	**2020 vs. 2021 SRA**
Demand Projections	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	124,866	122,398	-2.0%
Demand Response: Available	6,172	6,038	-2.2%
Net Internal Demand	118,694	116,360	-2.0%
Resource Projections	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	140,636	138,464	-1.5%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	0	0	-
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	2,795	2,979	6.6%
Anticipated Resources	143,430	141,443	-1.4%
Existing-Other Capacity	290	633	118.1%
Prospective Resources	143,720	146,586	2.0%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	20.8%	21.6%	0.8
Prospective Reserve Margin	21.1%	26.0%	4.9
Reference Margin Level	18.0%	18.3%	0.3

MRO-Manitoba Hydro Resource Adequacy Data			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2020 SRA**	**2021 SRA**	**2020 vs. 2021 SRA**
Demand Projections	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	3,272	2,965	-9.4%
Demand Response: Available	0	0	-
Net Internal Demand	3,272	2,965	-9.4%
Resource Projections	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	5,239	5,173	-1.3%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	0	186	-
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	-1,526	-1,596	4.6%
Anticipated Resources	3,713	3,763	1.4%
Existing-Other Capacity	125	37	-70.3%
Prospective Resources	3,838	3,800	-1.0%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	13.5%	26.9%	13.4
Prospective Reserve Margin	17.3%	28.2%	10.9
Reference Margin Level	12.0%	12.0%	0.0

MRO-SaskPower Resource Adequacy Data			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2020 SRA**	**2021 SRA**	**2020 vs. 2021 SRA**
Demand Projections	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	3,480	3,400	-2.3%
Demand Response: Available	60	60	0.0%
Net Internal Demand	3,420	3,340	-2.3%
Resource Projections	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	3,904	3,863	-1.1%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	0	14	-
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	125	125	0.0%
Anticipated Resources	4,029	4,002	-0.7%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-
Prospective Resources	4,029	4,002	-0.7%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	17.8%	19.8%	2.0
Prospective Reserve Margin	17.8%	19.8%	2.0
Reference Margin Level	11.0%	11.0%	0.0

NPCC-Maritimes Resource Adequacy Data			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2020 SRA**	**2021 SRA**	**2020 vs. 2021 SRA**
Demand Projections	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	3,370	3,479	3.2%
Demand Response: Available	369	305	-17.3%
Net Internal Demand	3,001	3,174	5.8%
Resource Projections	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	5,312	5,448	2.6%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	0	0	-
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	-53	-57	7.5%
Anticipated Resources	5,259	5,391	2.5%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-
Prospective Resources	5,259	5,391	2.5%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	75.2%	69.8%	-5.4
Prospective Reserve Margin	75.2%	69.8%	-5.4
Reference Margin Level	20.0%	20.0%	0.0

NPCC-New England Resource Adequacy Data			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2020 SRA**	**2021 SRA**	**2020 vs. 2021 SRA**
Demand Projections	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	25,158	25,244	0.3%
Demand Response: Available	443	434	-2.0%
Net Internal Demand	24,715	24,810	0.4%
Resource Projections	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	30,791	29,065	-5.6%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	0	0	-
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	1,510	1,208	-20.0%
Anticipated Resources	32,301	30,273	-6.3%
Existing-Other Capacity	324	1,115	244.1%
Prospective Resources	32,625	31,388	-3.8%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	30.7%	22.0%	-8.7
Prospective Reserve Margin	32.0%	26.5%	-5.5
Reference Margin Level	18.3%	15.0%	-3.3

NPCC-Ontario Resource Adequacy Data			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2020 SRA**	**2021 SRA**	**2020 vs. 2021 SRA**
Demand Projections	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	22,195	22,500	1.4%
Demand Response: Available	518	621	20.0%
Net Internal Demand	21,677	21,879	0.9%
Resource Projections	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	25,719	26,217	1.9%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	49	22	-55.6%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	0	80	-
Anticipated Resources	25,768	26,319	2.1%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-
Prospective Resources	25,768	26,319	2.1%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	18.9%	20.3%	1.4
Prospective Reserve Margin	18.9%	20.3%	1.4
Reference Margin Level	14.6%	13.2%	-1.4

NPCC-New York Resource Adequacy Data			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2020 SRA**	**2021 SRA**	**2020 vs. 2021 SRA**
Demand Projections	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	32,296	32,333	0.1%
Demand Response: Available	1,282	1,199	-6.5%
Net Internal Demand	31,014	31,134	0.4%
Resource Projections	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	38,475	37,805	-1.7%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	101.2	0	-100.0%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	1,562	1,816	16.3%
Anticipated Resources	40,138	39,621	-1.3%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-
Prospective Resources	40,138	39,621	-1.3%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	29.4%	27.3%	-2.1
Prospective Reserve Margin	29.4%	27.3%	-2.1
Reference Margin Level	15.0%	15.0%	0.0

NPCC-Québec Resource Adequacy Data			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2020 SRA**	**2021 SRA**	**2020 vs. 2021 SRA**
Demand Projections	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	21,635	21,436	-0.9%
Demand Response: Available	0	0	-
Net Internal Demand	21,635	21,436	-0.9%
Resource Projections	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	34,771	33,380	-4.0%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	14.25	0	-100.0%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	-1,963	-1,995	1.6%
Anticipated Resources	32,822	31,385	-4.4%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-
Prospective Resources	32,822	31,385	-4.4%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	51.7%	46.4%	-5.3
Prospective Reserve Margin	51.7%	46.4%	-5.3
Reference Margin Level	9.8%	10.4%	0.6

PJM Resource Adequacy Data			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2020 SRA**	**2021 SRA**	**2020 vs. 2021 SRA**
Demand Projections	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	148,092	149,224	0.8%
Demand Response: Available	8,929	8,779	-1.7%
Net Internal Demand	139,163	140,445	0.9%
Resource Projections	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	182,523	183,572	0.6%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	1800	2,400	33.3%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	1,412	1,460	3.4%
Anticipated Resources	185,735	187,431	0.9%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-
Prospective Resources	185,735	188,891	1.7%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	33.5%	33.5%	0.0
Prospective Reserve Margin	33.5%	34.5%	1.0
Reference Margin Level	15.5%	14.7%	-0.8

SERC-E Resource Adequacy Data			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2020 SRA**	**2021 SRA**	**2020 vs. 2021 SRA**
Demand Projections	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	43,702	42,680	-2.3%
Demand Response: Available	947	970	2.4%
Net Internal Demand	42,755	41,710	-2.4%
Resource Projections	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	50,825	50,539	-0.6%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	88	0	-100.0%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	266	562	111.3%
Anticipated Resources	51,179	51,101	-0.2%
Existing-Other Capacity	851.5	766	-10.0%
Prospective Resources	52,030	51,867	-0.3%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	19.7%	22.5%	2.8
Prospective Reserve Margin	21.7%	24.4%	2.7
Reference Margin Level	15.0%	15.0%	0.0

SERC-C Resource Adequacy Data			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2020 SRA**	**2021 SRA**	**2020 vs. 2021 SRA**
Demand Projections	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	40,799	40,341	-1.1%
Demand Response: Available	1,970	1,744	-11.5%
Net Internal Demand	38,829	38,597	-0.6%
Resource Projections	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	48,368	47,987	-0.8%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	0	154	-
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	-807	172	-121.3%
Anticipated Resources	47,561	48,314	1.6%
Existing-Other Capacity	4427	4,290	-3.1%
Prospective Resources	51,988	52,604	1.2%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	22.5%	25.2%	2.7
Prospective Reserve Margin	33.9%	36.3%	2.4
Reference Margin Level	15.0%	15.0%	0.0

SERC-FP Resource Adequacy Data			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2020 SRA**	**2021 SRA**	**2020 vs. 2021 SRA**
Demand Projections	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	49,286	48,710	-1.2%
Demand Response: Available	2,906	3,030	4.3%
Net Internal Demand	46,380	45,680	-1.5%
Resource Projections	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	55,093	55,351	0.5%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	333	0	-100.0%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	1,146	1,007	-12.1%
Anticipated Resources	56,571	56,358	-0.4%
Existing-Other Capacity	529	0	-100.0%
Prospective Resources	57,100	56,358	-1.3%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	22.0%	23.4%	1.4
Prospective Reserve Margin	23.1%	23.4%	0.3
Reference Margin Level	15.0%	15.0%	0.0

SERC-SE Resource Adequacy Data			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2020 SRA**	**2021 SRA**	**2020 vs. 2021 SRA**
Demand Projections	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	47,311	46,631	-1.4%
Demand Response: Available	2,145	1,671	-22.1%
Net Internal Demand	45,166	44,960	-0.5%
Resource Projections	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	61,495	61,263	-0.4%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	316	142	-55.0%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	-972	-1,115	14.7%
Anticipated Resources	60,839	60,290	-0.9%
Existing-Other Capacity	348	783	125.3%
Prospective Resources	61,186	61,073	-0.2%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	34.7%	34.1%	-0.6
Prospective Reserve Margin	35.5%	35.8%	0.3
Reference Margin Level	15.0%	15.0%	0.0

Texas RE-ERCOT Resource Adequacy Data			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2020 SRA**	**2021 SRA**	**2020 vs. 2021 SRA**
Demand Projections	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	75,200	77,144	2.6%
Demand Response: Available	2,251	2,341	4.0%
Net Internal Demand	72,949	74,803	2.5%
Resource Projections	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	79,395	80,569	1.5%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	2172	5,489	152.7%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	817	210	-74.3%
Anticipated Resources	82,384	86,268	4.7%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-
Prospective Resources	82,412	86,296	4.7%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	12.9%	15.3%	2.4
Prospective Reserve Margin	13.0%	15.4%	2.4
Reference Margin Level	13.75%	13.75%	0.0

SPP Resource Adequacy Data			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2020 SRA**	**2021 SRA**	**2020 vs. 2021 SRA**
Demand Projections	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	51,943	52,249	0.6%
Demand Response: Available	835	606	-27.4%
Net Internal Demand	51,108	51,643	1.0%
Resource Projections	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	69,100	66,600	-3.6%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	0	300	-
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	-1,244	186	-115.0%
Anticipated Resources	67,856	67,086	-1.1%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-
Prospective Resources	67,856	66,539	-1.9%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	32.8%	29.9%	-2.9
Prospective Reserve Margin	32.8%	28.8%	-4.0
Reference Margin Level	12.0%	16.0%	4.0

WECC-AB Resource Adequacy Data			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2020 SRA**	**2021 SRA**	**2020 vs. 2021 SRA**
Demand Projections	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	11,500	10,886	-5.3%
Demand Response: Available	0	0	-
Net Internal Demand	11,500	10,886	-5.3%
Resource Projections	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	14,356	12,205	-15.0%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	0	1,723	-
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	0	0	-
Anticipated Resources	14,356	13,928	-3.0%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-
Prospective Resources	14,356	13,928	-3.0%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	24.8%	27.9%	3.1
Prospective Reserve Margin	24.8%	27.9%	3.1
Reference Margin Level	10.4%	9.7%	-0.7

WECC-BC Resource Adequacy Data			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2020 SRA**	**2021 SRA**	**2020 vs. 2021 SRA**
Demand Projections	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	8,278	8,264	-0.2%
Demand Response: Available	0	0	-
Net Internal Demand	8,278	8,264	-0.2%
Resource Projections	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	11,471	11,178	-2.6%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	215	185	-13.8%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	0	0	-
Anticipated Resources	11,686	11,363	-2.8%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-
Prospective Resources	11,686	11,363	-2.8%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	41.2%	37.5%	-3.7
Prospective Reserve Margin	41.2%	37.5%	-3.7
Reference Margin Level	10.4%	9.7%	-0.7

WECC-NWPP-US and RMRG Resource Adequacy Data			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2020 SRA**	**2021 SRA**	**2020 vs. 2021 SRA**
Demand Projections	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	66,532	67,117	0.9%
Demand Response: Available	868	1,087	25.2%
Net Internal Demand	65,664	66,030	0.6%
Resource Projections	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	78,839	70,069	-11.1%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	870	1,002	15.2%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	749	6,139	719.6%
Anticipated Resources	80,457	77,210	-4.0%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-
Prospective Resources	80,457	77,210	-4.0%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin		16.9%	
Prospective Reserve Margin		16.9%	
Reference Margin Level		14.3%	

WECC-CA/MX Resource Adequacy Data			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2020 SRA**	**2021 SRA**	**2020 vs. 2021 SRA**
Demand Projections	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	53,236	55,409	4.1%
Demand Response: Available	910	922	1.2%
Net Internal Demand	52,326	54,487	4.1%
Resource Projections	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	63,186	63,396	0.3%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	92	3,358	3555.6%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	0	686	-
Anticipated Resources	63,278	67,440	6.6%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-
Prospective Resources	63,278	67,440	6.6%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	20.9%	23.8%	2.9
Prospective Reserve Margin	20.9%	23.8%	2.9
Reference Margin Level	13.7%	18.4%	4.7

WECC-SRSG Resource Adequacy Data			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2020 SRA**	**2021 SRA**	**2020 vs. 2021 SRA**
Demand Projections	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	25,145	24,751	-1.6%
Demand Response: Available	144	332	129.9%
Net Internal Demand	25,001	24,419	-2.3%
Resource Projections	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Megawatts (MW)**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	29,440	26,850	-8.8%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	477	188	-60.6%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	0	866	-
Anticipated Resources	29,917	27,904	-6.7%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-
Prospective Resources	29,917	27,904	-6.7%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	19.7%	14.3%	-5.4
Prospective Reserve Margin	19.7%	14.3%	-5.4
Reference Margin Level	10.0%	9.8%	-0.2

Variable Energy Resource Contributions

Because electrical output of variable energy resources (e.g., wind, solar) depends on weather conditions, on-peak capacity contributions are less than nameplate capacity. The table below shows the capacity contribution of existing wind and solar resources for each assessment area.

BPS Variable Generation Resources by Assessment Area									
	Wind			Solar			Hydro		
Assessment Area / Interconnection	Nameplate Wind	Expected Wind	Expected Share of Nameplate (%)	Nameplate Solar	Expected Solar	Expected Share of Nameplate (%)	Nameplate Hydro	Expected Hydro	Expected Share of Nameplate (%)
MISO	26,829	3,872	14%	725	469	65%	2,440	2,361	97%
MRO-Manitoba Hydro	259	43	17%	-	-	-	5,461	4,903	90%
MRO-SaskPower	616	66	11%	-	-	-	864	787	91%
NPCC-Maritimes	1,188	287	24%	4	-	0%	1,318	1,186	90%
NPCC-New England	1,505	166	11%	375	112	30%	3,890	2,736	70%
NPCC-New York	2,211	502	23%	57	32	56%	6,725	4,666	69%
NPCC-Ontario	4,946	678	14%	478	66	14%	9,060	5,305	59%
NPCC-Québec	3,880		0%	10		0%	41,339	32,750	79%
PJM	8,790	1,410	16%	2,421	997	41%	3,057	3,057	100%
SERC-C	964	958	99%	521	336	65%	5,005	3,572	71%
SERC-E	-	-	-	649	641	99%	3,131	3,085	99%
SERC-FP	-	-	-	3,624	2,049	57%	-	-	-
SERC-SE	-	-	-	2,735	2,282	83%	3,242	3,288	101%
SPP	26,885	4,670	17%	275	252	92%	5,441	5,130	94%
Texas RE-ERCOT	31,829	8,565	27%	7,608	6,086	80%	556	474	85%
WECC-AB	2,219	162	7%	314	202	64%	894	378	42%

BPS Variable Generation Resources by Assessment Area									
	Wind			Solar			Hydro		
Assessment Area / Interconnection	Nameplate Wind	Expected Wind	Expected Share of Nameplate (%)	Nameplate Solar	Expected Solar	Expected Share of Nameplate (%)	Nameplate Hydro	Expected Hydro	Expected Share of Nameplate (%)
WECC-BC	717	142	20%	2	1	50%	16,334	10,088	62%
WECC-CAMX	7,686	1,089	14%	16,918	10,442	62%	11,821	5,993	51%
WECC-NWPP-US-RMRG	16,180	2,318	14%	5,234	4,028	77%	40,992	20,986	51%
WECC-NWPP-SRSG	3,141	636	20%	1,797	1,265	70%	1,303	558	43%
EASTERN INTERCONNECTION	69,446	12,378	18%	9,005	5,463	61%	49,185	39,183	80%
QUÉBEC INTERCONNECTION	3,880	-	0%	10	-	0%	41,339	32,750	79%
TEXAS INTERCONNECTION	31,829	8,565	27%	7,608	6,086	80%	556	474	85%
WECC INTERCONNECTION	29,943	4,347	15%	24,256	15,938	66%	71,344	38,003	53%
TOTAL-NERC	**135,097**	**25,290**	**19%**	**40,887**	**27,488**	**67%**	**162,425**	**110,410**	**68%**

NERC
NORTH AMERICAN ELECTRIC RELIABILITY CORPORATION

2022 Summer Reliability Assessment

May 2022



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
Preface

The vision for the Electric Reliability Organization Enterprise, which is comprised of the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) and the six Regional Entities, is a highly reliable and secure North American bulk power system (BPS). Our mission is to assure the effective and efficient reduction of risks to the reliability and security of the grid.

Reliability | Resilience | Security

Because nearly 400 million citizens in North America are counting on us

The North American BPS is made up of six Regional Entities boundaries as shown in the map below. The multicolored area denotes overlap as some load-serving entities participate in one Regional Entities while associated Transmission Owners/Operators participate in another. Refer to the **Data Concepts and Assumptions** section for more information. A map and list of the assessment areas can be found in the **Regional Assessments Dashboards** section.



MRO	Midwest Reliability Organization
NPCC	Northeast Power Coordinating Council
RF	ReliabilityFirst
SERC	SERC Reliability Corporation
Texas RE	Texas Reliability Entity
WECC	WECC

BEFORE THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Power Act Section 202(c) Emergency Order: Tri-State Generation and Transmission Association, Platte River Power Authority, Salt River Project, PacifiCorp, and Xcel Energy	))))))	Order No. 202-25-14

Exhibit to
Motion to Intervene and Request for Rehearing and Stay of
Public Interest Organizations

Filed January 28, 2026

Exhibit 1-28b:
2019–24 NERC Summer Reliability Assessments

About this Assessment

NERC's *2022 Summer Reliability Assessment* (*SRA*) identifies, assesses, and reports on areas of concern regarding the reliability of the North American BPS for the upcoming summer season. In addition, the *SRA* presents peak electricity demand and supply changes as well as highlights any unique regional challenges or expected conditions that might impact the BPS. The reliability assessment process is a coordinated reliability evaluation between the NERC Reliability Assessment Subcommittee, the Regional Entities, and NERC staff with demand and resource projections obtained from the assessment areas. This report reflects NERC and the ERO Enterprise's independent assessment and is intended to inform industry leaders, planners, operators, and regulatory bodies so that they are better prepared to take necessary actions to ensure BPS reliability. This report also provides an opportunity for the industry to discuss plans and preparations to ensure reliability for the upcoming summer period.

Key Findings

NERC's annual SRA covers the upcoming four-month (June–September) summer period. This assessment provides an evaluation of generation resource and transmission system adequacy and energy sufficiency to meet projected summer peak demands and operating reserves. This assessment identifies potential reliability issues of interest and regional topics of concern. While the scope of this seasonal assessment is focused on the upcoming summer, the key findings are consistent with risks and issues that NERC has highlighted in the *2021 Long-Term Reliability Assessment* and other earlier reliability assessments and reports.

The following findings are NERC and the ERO Enterprise's independent evaluation of electricity generation and transmission capacity and potential operational concerns that may need to be addressed for the 2022 summer:

Summer Resource Adequacy Assessment and Energy Risk Analysis

- **Midcontinent ISO (MISO) faces a capacity shortfall in its North and Central areas, resulting in high risk of energy emergencies during peak summer conditions.** Capacity shortfall projections reported in the *2021 LTRA* and as far back as the *2018 LTRA* have continued. Load serving entities in 4 of 11 zones entered the annual planning resource auction (PRA) in April 2022 without enough owned or contracted capacity to cover their requirements. Across MISO, peak demand projections have increased by 1.7% since last summer due in part to a return to normal demand patterns that have been altered in prior years by the pandemic. However, more impactful is the drop in capacity in the most recent PRA: MISO will have 3,200 MW (2.3%) less generation capacity than in the summer of 2021. System operators in MISO are more likely to need operating mitigations, such as load modifying resources or non-firm imports, to meet reserve requirements under normal peak summer conditions. More extreme temperatures, higher generation outages, or low wind conditions expose the MISO North and Central areas to higher risk of temporary operator-initiated load shedding to maintain system reliability.
- **At the start of the summer, a key transmission line connecting MISO's northern and southern areas will be out of service.** Restoration continues on a 4-mile section of 500 kV transmission line that was damaged by a tornado during severe storms on December 10, 2021. The transmission outage affects 1,000 MW of firm transfers between the Midwestern and Southern MISO system that includes parts of Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi. The transmission line is expected to be restored at the end of June 2022.
- **Anticipated resource capacity in Saskatchewan will be strained to meet peak demand projections, which have risen by over 7.5% since 2021.** SaskPower is projected to remain above their planning reserve margin threshold and have sufficient operating reserves for normal peak conditions. However, external assistance is expected to be needed in extreme conditions that cause above-normal generator outages or demand.
- **Drought conditions create heightened reliability risk for the summer.** Drought exists or threatens wide areas of North America, resulting in unique challenges to area electricity supplies and potential impacts on demand:
  - **Energy output from hydro generators throughout most of the Western United States is being affected by widespread drought and below-normal snowpack.** Dry hydrological conditions threaten the availability of hydroelectricity for transfers throughout the Western Interconnection. Some assessment areas, including WECC's California-Mexico (CA/MX) and Southwest Reserve Sharing Group (SRSG), depend on substantial electricity imports to meet demand on hot summer evenings and other times when variable energy resource (e.g., wind, solar) output is diminishing. In the event of wide-area extreme heat event, all U.S. assessment areas in the Western Interconnection are at risk of energy emergencies due to the limited supply of electricity available for transfer.
  - **Extreme drought across much of Texas can produce weather conditions that are favorable to prolonged, wide-area heat events and extreme peak electricity demand.** Resource additions to the ERCOT system in recent years—predominantly solar and some wind—have raised Anticipated Reserve Margins above Reference Margin Levels and ease concerns of capacity shortfalls for normal peak demand. However, extreme heat increases peak demand and can be accompanied by weather patterns that lead to increased forced outages or reduced energy output from resources of all types. A combination of extreme peak demand, low wind, and high outage rates from thermal generators could require system operators to use emergency procedures, up to and including temporary manual load shedding.
  - **As drought conditions continue over the Missouri River Basin, output from thermal generators that use the Missouri River for cooling in Southwest Power Pool (SPP) may be affected in summer months.** Low water levels in the river can impact generators with once-through cooling and lead to reduced output capacity. Energy output from hydro generators on the river can also be affected by drought conservation measures implemented in the reservoir system. Outages and reduced output from thermal and hydro generation could lead to energy shortfalls at peak demand. Periods of above normal wind generator output may give some relief, however, this energy is not assured. System operators could require emergency procedures to meet peak demand during periods of high generator unavailability.

- **All other areas have sufficient resources to manage normal summer peak demand and are at low risk of energy shortfalls from more extreme demand or generation outage conditions.** Anticipated Reserve Margins meet or surpass the Reference Margin Level, indicating that planned resources in these areas are adequate to manage the risk of a capacity deficiency under normal conditions. Furthermore, based on risk scenario analysis in these areas, resources and energy appear adequate.




Figure 1: Summer Reliability Risk Area Summary

Seasonal Risk Assessment Summary	
High	Potential for insufficient operating reserves in normal peak conditions
Elevated	Potential for insufficient operating reserves in above-normal conditions
Low	Sufficient operating reserves expected

Other Reliability Issues for Summer

- **Supply chain issues and commissioning challenges on new resource and transmission projects are a concern in areas where completion is needed for reliability during summer peak periods.** Assessment areas report that some generation and transmission projects are being impacted by product unavailability, shipping delays, and labor shortages. At the time of this assessment publication, WECC-CA/MX, and WECC-SRSG have sizeable amounts of generation capacity in development and included in their resource projections for summer. In Texas (ERCOT), transmission expansion projects are underway to alleviate transmission constraints and maintain system stability as the BPS is adapted to rapid growth in new generation; delays or cancellations of transmission projects can cause transmission system congestion during peak conditions and affect the ability to serve load in localized areas. Should project delays emerge, affected Generator Owners (GOs) and Transmission Owners must communicate changes to Balancing Authorities (BAs), Transmission Operators, and Reliability Coordinators, so that impacts are understood and steps are taken to reduce risks of capacity deficiencies or energy shortfalls.

- **Coal-fired GOs are having difficulty obtaining fuel and non-fuel consumables as supply chains are stressed.** No specific BPS reliability impacts are currently foreseen; however, coal stockpiles at power plants are relatively low compared to historical levels. Some owners and operators report challenges in arranging replenishment due to mine closures, rail shipping limitations, and increased coal exports. Some GOs have implemented controls to maintain sufficient stocks for peak months while BAs and Reliability Coordinators are continuing to conduct fuel surveys and monitoring the situation.

- **The electricity and other critical infrastructure sectors face cyber security threats from Russia and other potential actors amid heightened geopolitical tensions in addition to ongoing cyber risks.** Russian attackers may be planning or attempting malicious cyber activity to gain access and disrupt the electric grid in North America in retaliation for support to Ukraine. The Electricity Infrastructure Sharing and Analysis Center (E-ISAC) continues to exchange information with its members and has posted communications and guidance from government partners and other advisories on its Portal. E-ISAC members are encouraged to check in regularly to receive updates and to actively share information regarding threats and other malicious activities with the E-ISAC to enable broader communication with other sector participants and government partners.

- **Unexpected tripping of solar photovoltaic (PV) resources during grid disturbances continues to be a reliability concern.** In May and June 2021, the Texas Interconnection experienced widespread solar PV loss events like those previously observed in the California area. Similarly, four additional solar PV loss events occurred between June and August 2021 in California.

- During these events, widespread loss of solar PV resources was also coupled with the loss of synchronous generation, unintended interactions with remedial action schemes, and some tripping of distributed energy resources. As industry urgently takes steps to address systemic reliability issues through modeling, planning, and interconnection processes, system operators in areas with significant amounts of solar PV resources should be aware of the potential for resource loss events during grid disturbances.
- **An active late-summer wildfire season in the Western United States and Canada is anticipated, posing BPS reliability risks.** Government agencies warn of the potential for above-normal wildfire risk beginning in June across much of Canada, in the U.S. South Central states, and Northern California. If drought conditions persist, the fire outlook for late summer would likely extend across the Western half of North America. The interconnected transmission system can be impacted in areas where wildfires are active as well as areas where there is heightened risk of wildfire ignition due to dry weather and ground conditions. In addition, smoke from wildfires can cause diminished output from solar PV resources, and electricity supply will be affected by lower output from BPS-connected solar PV resources. Conversely, system demand may increase as part of distribution demand served by rooftop solar PV is less in smoky conditions.

ERO Actions to Reduce Risks of Unexpected Solar PV Tripping

Industry experience with unexpected tripping of BPS-connected solar PV generation units can be traced back to the 2016 Blue Cut fire in California, and similar events have occurred as recently as Summer 2021. A common thread with these events is the lack of inverter-based resource (IBR) ride-through capability causing a minor system disturbance to become a major disturbance. The latest disturbance report reinforces that improvements to NERC Reliability Standards are needed to address systemic issues with IBRs. At a high level, these include the following:

- **Performance-Based Requirements:** A number of NERC Reliability Standards require documentation that demonstrates compliance with the requirement (i.e., PRC-024-3); however, they do not specify a certain degree of performance that must be met. NERC has initiated action against this issue by developing a standards authorization request and strongly recommends that PRC-024 be retired and replaced with a comprehensive ride-through standard that focuses specifically on the generator protections and controls.
- **Performance Validation Requirement:** NERC has initiated action against this issue by developing a reliability guideline on interconnection requirements as well as issuing recommendations from recent disturbance reports. NERC strongly recommends that a performance validation standard be developed that ensures that Reliability Coordinators, Transmission Operators, or BAs are assessing the performance of interconnected facilities during grid disturbances, identifying any abnormalities, and executing corrective actions with affected facility owners to eliminate these issues. This requires entities to have strong interconnection requirements as NERC highlights in its reliability guidelines and disturbance reports.
- **Electromagnetic Transient Modeling and Model Quality Assurance:** NERC has initiated action against this issue by issuing recommendations in recent disturbance reports and strongly recommends that electromagnetic transient (EMT) modeling and studies be incorporated into NERC Reliability Standards to ensure that adequate reliability studies are conducted to ensure reliable operation of the BPS moving forward. Existing positive sequence simulation platforms have limitations in their ability to identify possible performance issues, many of which can be identified using EMT modeling and studies. As the penetration of IBRs continues to grow across North America, the need for EMT modeling and studies will only grow exponentially. Furthermore, NERC Reliability Standards need enhancements to ensure that model accuracy and model quality checks are explicitly defined.

Summer Temperature and Drought Forecasts

Peak electricity demand in most areas is directly influenced by temperature. Weather officials are expecting above normal temperatures for much of North America this summer (see **Figure 2**). In addition, drought exists or threatens wide areas of North America, resulting in unique challenges to area electricity supplies and potential impacts on demand.[1] Assessment area load forecasts account for many years of historical demand data, often up to 30 years, to predict summer peak demand and prepare for more extreme conditions. Above average seasonal temperatures can contribute to high peak demand as well as increases in forced outages for generation and some BPS equipment. Effective preseason maintenance and preparations are particularly important to BPS reliability in severe or prolonged periods of above-normal temperatures.




Figure 2: United States and Canada Summer Temperature Outlook[2]

[1] See North American Drought Monitor: https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/temp-and-precip/drought/nadm/maps

[2] Seasonal forecasts obtained from U.S. National Weather Service and Natural Resources Canada: https://www.cpc.ncep.noaa.gov/products/predictions/long_range/ and https://weather.gc.ca/saisons/prob_e.html

Wildfire Risk Potential and BPS Impacts

Above-normal fire risk at the beginning of the summer exists in much of Canada as well as in the U.S. South Central states, Northern California, and Oregon, setting the stage for an active fire season at the beginning of the summer (see **Figure 3**). In late summer, hotter and drier conditions are expected to cause elevated fire risk in California and the U.S. West Coast. BPS operation can be impacted in areas where wildfires are active as well as areas where there is heightened risk of wildfire ignition due to weather and ground conditions.




Figure 3: North American Seasonal Fire Assessment for June and July 2022[3]

Wildfire prevention planning in California and other areas includes power shut-off programs in high fire-risk areas. When conditions warrant implementing these plans, power lines (including transmission-level lines) may be preemptively de-energized in high fire-risk areas to prevent wildfire ignitions. Other wildfire risk mitigation activities include implementing enhanced vegetation management, equipment inspections, system hardening, and added situational awareness measures. In January 2021, the ERO published the *Wildfire Mitigation Reference Guide*[4] to promote preparedness within the North American electricity power industry and share the experience and practices from utilities in the Western Interconnection.

[3] *See North American Seasonal Fire Assessment and Outlook*, April 2022: https://www.predictiveservices.nifc.gov/outlooks/NA_Outlook.pdf

[4] See the NERC *Wildfire Mitigation Reference Guide*, January 2021: https://nerc.com/comm/RSTC/Documents/Wildfire%20Mitigation%20Reference%20Guide_January_2021.pdf

Risk Discussion

WECC: Western Interconnection

An elevated risk of energy emergencies persists across the U.S. Western Interconnection this summer as dry hydrological conditions threaten the availability of hydroelectric energy for transfer. Periods of high demand over a wide area will result in reduced supplies of energy for transfer, causing operators to rely primarily on alternative resources for system balancing, including natural-gas-fired generators and battery systems.

Throughout the Western Interconnection, BAs rely on flexible resources to support balancing the increasingly weather-dependent load with the variable energy generation within the resource mix. Dispatchable generation from hydroelectric and thermal plants internal to the BA's area as well as imports of surplus energy in another area are called upon by operators when area shortfalls are anticipated. Under normal conditions, there is sufficient energy and resource capacity and an adequate transmission network for transfers between areas to meet system ramping needs. However, conditions like wide-area heat events can reduce the availability of resources for transfer as areas serve higher internal demands. Additionally, transmission networks can become stressed when events like wildfires or wide-area heatwaves cause network congestion. The growing reliance on transfers within the Western Interconnection and falling resource capacity in many adjacent areas increases the risk that extreme events will lead to load interruption.

Recent Heatwave Events in the Western Interconnection

From August 14 through August 19, 2020, the Western United States suffered an intense and prolonged heatwave that affected many areas across the Western Interconnection.[5] Because of above-average temperatures, generation and transmission capacity struggled to keep up with increased electricity demand. Throughout many supply-constrained hours over this same period, generation resource output was below preseason peak forecasts for nearly all resource types, including natural gas, wind, solar, and hydroelectric. During the event, 10 Western Interconnection BAs issued 18 separate energy emergency alerts (EEA). The impacts of the August heatwave struck the entirety of the Western Interconnection and caused a peak demand record of 162,017 MW on August 18, 2020, at 4:00 p.m. Mountain time. Although demand peaked on August 18, the most severe reliability consequence of the heatwave event occurred at the beginning, when 1,087 MW of firm load was shed on August 14 and 692 MW was shed on August 15 in California. System operators at the California ISO initiated rotating electricity outages to reduce demand during early evening hours so that operating reserves would be sufficient to prevent even greater consequences for the system.

The West experienced another wide-area extreme temperature event in 2021. From late-June through mid-July, high temperatures extended over a broad area that included Northern California, Idaho, Western Nevada, Oregon, and Washington state in the United States as well as in British Columbia and (in its latter phase) Alberta, Manitoba, the Northwest Territories, Saskatchewan, and Yukon areas in Canada. Temperatures reached 121 degrees Fahrenheit in some areas, and peak demand records were set in British Columbia and Alberta. BAs in California, the U.S. Northwest, and the Canadian province of Saskatchewan issued EEAs.

In summer, WECC's CA/MX, the Northwest Power Pool (NWPP), and SRSG assessment areas can be exposed to greater risk of resource shortfalls for the hours that immediately follow afternoon peak demand. The reason the risk is greater in these hours is that solar resource output is diminishing with the setting sun while demand is still near its daily high. The scenarios for all three areas shown in **Figure 4** illustrate (six charts) how the need for imports changes from the peak demand hour to the higher risk hours that follow; see the **Data Concepts and Assumptions** for more information about these charts. Anticipated resources in the high risk hours are lower than the on peak hours due to reduced solar PV output. During periods of peak demand and normal forced outages, anticipated resources in each assessment area provide the needed energy to ensure demand and operating reserve requirements are met. Demand or resource derates from extreme conditions that cannot be remedied with imports will result in energy emergencies and the potential for load shedding. In prior summers, only CA/MX had greatest risk exposure in hours after peak demand; off-peak risk has increased in other parts of the Western Interconnection this year.

[5] WECC August Heat Wave Event information: WECC's *August Heat Wave Analysis* Presentation





Figure 4: Risk Scenarios for WECC U.S. Assessment Areas



WECC-SRSG On-Peak | WECC-SRSG Risk Hour (7:00 p.m. local)

Figure 4 (continued): Risk Scenarios for WECC U.S. Assessment Areas

WECC performed probabilistic studies and identified a continued risk of energy shortfalls for the WECC-CA/MX area. Their analysis models expected demand and resource contribution over all hours and accounts for variability with historical distributions. Assuming that the nearly 3.4 GW of new resource additions come into service in California for the summer, the Loss-of-Load Hours (LOLH) metric of projected hours with insufficient resources to meet planning reserve criteria will be one hour for the California portion. In a scenario without the new resource additions, the LOLH increases to four hours. Expected unserved energy (EUE) in California for these two scenarios is 4 MWh and 8,755 MWh, respectively. In the Mexico portion of CA/MX, LOLH of 10 and 14 hours and EUE of 100 and 200 MWh, respectively, are projected. All other WECC assessment areas have negligible load-loss and unserved energy for the summer. WECC's probabilistic study modeling includes non-firm transfers between WECC assessment areas and provides a wide-area assessment of resource adequacy. The WECC studies show that, as more areas experience the same high-demand conditions during wide-area heat events, the supply of electricity for transfer across the Interconnection is reduced and the risk of unserved energy increases.

Risk Assessments of Resource and Demand Scenarios

Seasonal risk scenarios for each assessment area are presented in the **Regional Assessments Dashboards** section. The on-peak reserve margins and seasonal risk scenario chart in each dashboard provide potential summer peak demand and resource condition information. The reserve margins on the right side of the dashboard pages provide a comparison to the previous year's assessment. The seasonal risk scenario charts present deterministic scenarios for further analysis of different demand and resource levels with adjustments for normal and extreme conditions. The assessment areas determined the adjustments to capacity and peak demand based on methods or assumptions that are summarized below the seasonal risk scenario charts; see the **Data Concepts and Assumptions** for more information about this chart.

The seasonal risk scenario charts can be expressed in terms of reserve margins. In **Table 1**, each assessment area's Anticipated Reserve Margins are shown alongside the reserve margins for a typical generation outage scenario (where applicable) and the extreme demand and resource conditions in their seasonal risk scenario. Highlighted areas are identified as having resource adequacy or energy risks for the summer in the key findings discussion. The typical outages reserve margin is comprised of anticipated resources minus the capacity that is likely to be in maintenance or forced outage at peak demand. If the typical maintenance or forced outage margin is the same as the anticipated reserve margin, it is because an assessment area has already factored typical outages into the anticipated resources. The extreme conditions

margin includes all components of the scenario and represents the most severe operating conditions of an area's scenario. Note that any reserve margin below zero indicates that the resources fall below demand in the scenario.

Extreme generation outages, low resource output, and peak loads similar to those experienced in August 2020 are reliability risks in certain areas for the upcoming summer. When forecasted resources fall below expected demand, grid operators would need to employ operating mitigations or EEAs to obtain the capacity and energy necessary to meet extreme peak demands. Table 2 describes the various EEA levels and the circumstances for each.

Table 2: Energy Emergency Alert Levels

EEA Level	Description	Circumstances
EEA 1	All available generation resources in use	The BA is experiencing conditions where all available generation resources are committed to meet firm load, firm transactions, and reserve commitments and is concerned about sustaining its required contingency reserves. Non-firm wholesale energy sales (other than those that are recallable to meet reserve requirements) have been curtailed.
EEA 2	Load management procedures in effect	The BA is no longer able to provide its expected energy requirements and is an energy deficient BA. An energy deficient BA has implemented its operating plan(s) to mitigate emergencies. An energy deficient BA is still able to maintain minimum contingency reserve requirements.
EEA 3	Firm Load interruption is imminent or in progress	The energy deficient BA is unable to meet minimum contingency reserve requirements.

Table 1: Seasonal Risk Scenario On-Peak Reserve Margins

Assessment Area	Anticipated Reserve Margin	Anticipated Reserve Margin with Typical Outages	Anticipated Reserve Margin with Higher Demand, Outages, Derates in Extreme Conditions
MISO	21.1%	3.2%	-8.3%
MRO-Manitoba	27.3%	21.5%	7.8%
MRO-SaskPower	12.2%	2.6%	-5.3%
NPCC-Maritimes	39.2%	28.7%	11.7%
NPCC-New England	20.6%	9.3%	-2.5%[6]
NPCC-New York	30.4%	22.4%	13.5%
NPCC-Ontario	18.0%	18.0%	3.0%
NPCC-Québec	40.3%	40.3%	35.0%
PJM	31.7%	23.9%	16.1%
SERC-Central	18.3%	10.7%	3.3%
SERC-East	21.4%	18.3%	11.3%
SERC-Florida Peninsula	20.7%	17.3%	15.1%
SERC-Southeast	29.8%	25.4%	17.4%
SPP	30.6%	12.3%	-4.7%
Texas RE-ERCOT	22.0%	15.9%	1.1%
WECC-NWPP-AB	19.7%	17.2%	5.3%
WECC-NWPP-BC	39.3%	39.1%	10.4%
WECC-CA/MX	31.5%	25.4%	-13.1%
WECC-NWPP-US	18.3%	16.3%	-13.8%
WECC-SRSG	16.3%	11.8%	-6.8%

[6] Energy and capacity is sufficient for a broad range of normal and above-normal scenarios in the NPCC-New England area for the summer. This negative reserve margin indicates that a scenario combining extreme high demand and extremely-low resources could, however, result in an energy emergency.

Transfers in a Wide-Area Event


When above-normal temperatures extend over a wide area, resources can be strained in multiple assessment areas simultaneously, increasing the risk of shortfalls. Some assessment areas expect imports from other areas to be available to meet periods of peak demand and have contracted for firm transfer commitments. A summary of area firm on-peak imports and exports is shown in **Table 3**. Firm resource transactions like these are accounted for in all assessment area anticipated resources and reserve margins. Areas with net imports show a positive transfer amount, and areas with net exports show a negative transfer amount. Only areas that contained transfers for the previous or upcoming summer seasons are shown in **Table 3**; the data in this table is sourced from the data adequacy tables in the **Data Concepts and Assumptions** section. In the unlikely event that multiple assessment areas are experiencing energy emergencies as could occur in a wide-area heatwave, some transfers may be at risk of not being fulfilled. Transfer agreements may include provisions that allow the exporting entity to prioritize serving native load. Loss of transfers could exacerbate resource shortages that occur from outages and derates.

Table 3: 2021 and 2022 On-Peak Net Firm Transfers

Assessment Area	2021 Summer Transfers (MW)	2022 Summer Transfers (MW)	Year-to-Year Change
MISO	2,979	1,353	-54.6%
MRO-Manitoba	-1,596	-1,816	13.8%
MRO-SaskPower	125	290	132.0%
NPCC-Maritimes	-57	64	-212.3%
NPCC-New England	1,208	1,292	7.0%
NPCC-New York	1,816	2,465	35.7%
NPCC-Ontario	80	150	87.5%
NPCC-Québec	-1,995	-2,304	15.5%
PJM	1,460	124	-91.5%
SERC-Central	172	-795	-561.6%
SERC-East	562	612	8.9%
SERC-Florida Peninsula	1,007	300	-70.2%
SERC-Southeast	-1,115	-2,524	126.4%
SPP	186	-144	-177.6%
Texas RE-ERCOT	210	20	-90.5%
WECC-AB	0	437	N/A
WECC-BC	0	0	N/A
WECC-CA/MX	686	0	-100.0%
WECC-NWPP-US	6,139	2,517	-59.0%
WECC-SRSG	866	1,002	15.7%

Regional Assessments Dashboards

The following assessment area dashboards and summaries were developed based on data and narrative information collected by NERC from the six Regional Entities on an assessment area basis. The operational risk analysis shown in the following regional assessments dashboard pages provides a deterministic scenario for understanding how various factors that affect resources and demand can combine to impact overall resource adequacy. For each assessment area, there is a risk-period scenario graphic; the left blue column shows anticipated resources (from the **Demand and Resource Tables**), and the two orange columns at the right show the two demand scenarios of the normal peak net internal demand (from the **Demand and Resource Tables**) and the extreme summer peak demand determined by the assessment area. The middle red or green bars show adjustments that are applied cumulatively to the anticipated resources. Adjustments may include reductions for typical generation outages (maintenance and forced not already accounted for in anticipated resources) and additions that represent the quantified capacity from operational tools (if any) that are available during scarcity conditions but have not been accounted for in the SRA reserve margins. Resources throughout the scenario are compared against expected operating reserve requirements that are based on peak load and normal weather. The cumulative effects from extreme events are also factored in through additional resource derates or low-output scenarios.






MISO

MISO is a not-for-profit, member-based organization that administers wholesale electricity markets that provide customers with valued service; reliable, cost-effective systems and operations; dependable and transparent prices; open access to markets; and planning for long-term efficiency.

MISO manages energy, reliability, and operating reserve markets that consist of 36 local BA and 394 market participants, serving approximately 42 million customers. Although parts of MISO fall in three Regional Entities, MRO is responsible for coordinating data and information submitted for NERC's reliability assessments.

On-Peak Fuel Mix



Highlights

- Tighter than normal operating conditions are anticipated, particularly in the MISO North/Central region, which cleared too little capacity in the 2022–2023 PRA. The PRA capacity shortfall of 1,230 MW signals a potential for operating risk during peak summer conditions.
- Continued operating measures, such as MISO maximum generation events, can be expected in order to give system operators access load modifying resources (demand response) that can only be called upon once available generation is at maximum capacity.
- MISO performs an annual loss-of-load expectation (LOLE) study to determine its installed reserve margin and other probabilistic reliability indices. Based on results of the 2021 analysis, MISO expects low amounts of EUE in the summer season. The greatest risk occurs in the month of July, coinciding with the typical peak in annual demand.


Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources do not meet operating reserve requirements under normal peak-demand and outage scenarios. Above-normal summer peak load and outage conditions could result in the need to employ operating mitigations (i.e., demand response and transfers) and EEAs. Load shedding may be needed under extreme peak demand and outage scenarios studied.

On-Peak Reserve Margins



Risk-Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) and (90/10) demand forecast using 30 years of historical data

Maintenance Outages: Rolling five-year average of maintenance and planned outages

Forced Outages: Five-year average of all outages that were not planned

Extreme Derates: Maximum of last five years of outages

Operational Mitigations: Total of 2.4 GW capacity resources available during extreme operating conditions




MRO-Manitoba Hydro

Manitoba Hydro is a provincial crown corporation that provides electricity to about 580,000 customers throughout Manitoba and natural gas service to about 282,000 customers in various communities throughout Southern Manitoba. The Province of Manitoba has a population of about 1.3 million in an area of 250,946 square miles.

Manitoba Hydro is winter-peaking. No change in the footprint area is expected during the assessment period. Manitoba Hydro is its own Planning Coordinator and Balancing Authority. Manitoba Hydro is a coordinating member of MISO. MISO is the Reliability Coordinator for Manitoba Hydro.

On-Peak Fuel Mix




Highlights

- Manitoba Hydro is not anticipating any emerging reliability issues in its assessment area for the upcoming season.
- Four Keeyask hydro units were added this past year (approximately 93 MW each). Two additional Keeyask generating units are anticipated to come on line for Summer 2022, and these are listed as Planned Tier 1 generation.
- There are no significant seasonal reliability issues identified in neighboring assessment areas that have the potential to impact Manitoba Hydro operations.
- The probability-based resource adequacy risk assessment for the summer (June–September) season is that there is a very low risk of resource adequacy issues.


Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under the assessed scenarios.

On-Peak Reserve Margins



Risk-Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) and minimum probability of exceedance forecast load

Outages: Accounts for average forced outages, including 69 MW of reduced generation capacity due to drought conditions

Extreme Derates: Brandon units 6 and 7 summer capacity temperature derates




MRO-SaskPower

Saskatchewan is a province of Canada and comprises a geographic area of 651,900 square kilometers (251,700 square miles) with approximately 1.1 million customers. Peak demand is experienced in the winter.

The Saskatchewan Power Corporation (SaskPower) is the Planning Coordinator and Reliability Coordinator for the province of Saskatchewan and is the principal supplier of electricity in the province.

SaskPower is a provincial crown corporation and, under provincial legislation, is responsible for the reliability oversight of the Saskatchewan Bulk Electric System (BES) and its interconnections.

On-Peak Fuel Mix




Highlights

- Saskatchewan experiences high load in summer as a result of extreme hot weather.
- SaskPower conducts an annual summer joint operating study with Manitoba Hydro with inputs from Basin Electric (North Dakota) and prepares operating guidelines for any identified issues.
- The risk of operating reserve shortage during peak load times or EEAs could increase if large generation forced outages combine with large planned maintenance outages during peak load times in May, June, July, August, and October.
- In case of extreme thermal conditions combined with large generation forced outages, SaskPower would use available demand response programs, short-term power transfers from neighboring utilities, and short-term load interruptions.
- SaskPower has performed a probability-based capacity adequacy study to assess risk of high forced outages that would lead to the use of emergency operating procedures. Forced outages of 300 MW or greater that coincide with peak demand may result in demand response and potential load interruptions to maintain system balance. There is an 8.2% probability of having forced outages of 300 MW or greater this summer.


Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under normal peak-demand scenarios. Above-normal summer peak load and outage conditions could result in the need to employ operating mitigations (i.e., demand response and transfers) and EEAs. Load shedding may be needed under extreme peak demand and outage scenarios.

On-Peak Reserve Margins



Risk-Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) and above-normal scenario based on peak demand with lighting and all consumer loads

Maintenance Outages: Average of planned maintenance outages for the summer months of June–September 2021

Forced Outages: Estimated by using SaskPower forced outage model

Operational Mitigations: Estimated average value based on short-term transfer capability from neighboring utilities for the upcoming 2022 summer



NPCC-Maritimes

The Maritimes assessment area is a winter-peaking NPCC area that contains two Balancing Authorities. It is comprised of the Canadian provinces of New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island, and the Northern portion of Maine, which is radially connected to the New Brunswick power system. The area covers 58,000 square miles with a total population of 1.9 million.


Highlights

- The Maritimes area has not identified any operational issues that are expected to impact system reliability. If an event was to occur, there are emergency operations and planning procedures in place. All of the area's declared firm capacity is expected to be operational for the summer operating period.
- Dual-fuel units will have sufficient supplies of heavy fuel oil on-site as part of the planning process to enable sustained operation in the event of natural gas supply interruptions.
- Based on an NPCC probabilistic assessment, the Maritimes assessment area shows a cumulative likelihood greater than 0.5 days/period of using their operating procedures and a cumulative likelihood of reducing their 30-minute reserve requirements (10 days/period) and initiating interruptible loads (5 days/period) over the 2022 summer period for the base case scenario, assuming the highest peak load levels.
- The Maritimes area is winter peaking. No significant cumulative LOLE, LOLH, and EUE risks were estimated over the summer May–September period for all scenarios simulated.


Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under normal peak-demand scenarios. Above-normal summer peak load and outage conditions could result in the need to employ operating mitigations (i.e., demand response and transfers) and EEAs. Load shedding may be needed under extreme peak demand and outage scenarios.


On-Peak Reserve Margins



On-Peak Fuel Mix



Risk-Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) and (99/1) extreme demand forecast

Outages: Based on historical operating experience

Extreme Derates: Based on historical data for ambient temperature thermal de-rates

Low Wind Scenario: A low-likelihood scenario resulting in no wind resources




NPCC-New England

ISO New England (ISO-NE) Inc. is a regional transmission organization that serves the six New England states of Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont. It is responsible for the reliable day-to-day operation of New England's bulk power generation and transmission system, administers the area's wholesale electricity markets, and manages the comprehensive planning of the regional BPS.

The New England BPS serves approximately 14.5 million customers over 68,000 square miles.

On-Peak Fuel Mix




Highlights

- The New England area expects to have sufficient capacity to meet the 2022 summer peak demand forecast. As of April 5, 2022, the peak summer (net internal) demand is forecast to be 24,817 MW for the week of July 24, 2022, with a projected net margin of 1,705 MW (6.9%). The 2022 summer (net internal) demand forecast takes into account the demand reductions associated with energy efficiency, load management, behind-the-meter PV systems, and distributed generation.
- Based on an NPCC probabilistic assessment, ISO-NE may rely on limited use of its operating procedures designed to mitigate resource and energy shortages during the summer. Negligible cumulative LOLE, LOLH, and EUE risks were estimated over the summer period for all modeled scenarios except the severe low-likelihood case. This reduced resource case with highest peak load scenario resulted in a small estimated cumulative LOLE risk of ~0.6 days/period with associated LOLH (~2.1 hours/period) and EUE (~1,603 MWh/period) risk this is divided between June and August. This scenario is based exclusively on the two highest load levels with a 7% chance of occurring and a low resource case consisting of 10% reduction in NPCC resources and PJM reductions.


Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under normal peak-demand scenarios. Above-normal summer peak load, combined with extreme outage conditions, could result in the need to employ operating mitigations (i.e., demand response and transfers) and EEAs.

On-Peak Reserve Margins



Risk-Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy occurs at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Peak net internal demand (50/50) and (90/10) extreme demand forecast

Maintenance & Forced Outages: Based on historical weekly averages

Extreme Derates: Represent a case that is beyond the (90/10) conditions based on historical observation of force outages, additional reductions for generation at risk due to operating issues at extreme hot temperatures, and other outage causes reported by generators


Operational Mitigations: Based on load and capacity relief assumed available from invocation of ISO-NE operating procedures



NPCC-New York

The New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) is responsible for operating New York's BPS, administering wholesale electricity markets, and conducting system planning. The NYISO is the only Balancing Authority within the state of New York. The BPS encompasses over 11,000 miles of transmission lines, 760 power generation units, and serves 20.2 million customers. The established Reference Margin Level is 15%. Wind, grid-connected solar, and run-of-river totals were derated for this calculation. However, New York requires load serving entities to procure capacity for their loads equal to their peak demand plus an IRM. The IRM requirement represents a percentage of capacity above peak load forecast and is approved annually by the New York State Reliability Council (NYSRC). NYSRC approved the 2022–2023 IRM at 19.6%."

On-Peak Fuel Mix




Highlights

- The NYISO is not anticipating any operational issues in the New York control area for the upcoming summer operating period. Adequate capacity margins are anticipated and existing operating procedures are sufficient to handle any issues that may occur.
- Based on an NPCC probabilistic assessment, NYISO is expected to require limited use of operating procedures designed to mitigate resource shortages during the summer. Only the highest peak load scenarios with base and reduced resource cases require operating procedures. Negligible cumulative LOLE, LOLH, and EUE risks were estimated over the summer period for all modeled scenarios.
- The analysis included simulation of a base case (normal 50/50 demand and expected resources) and a highest peak load scenario as well as including a low-likelihood reduced resource case that considers the impacts of extended maintenance in Southeastern New York, reduction in the effectiveness of demand response programs, and reduced import and transfer capabilities. This low-likelihood reduced resource scenario is based exclusively on the two highest load levels representing an average 10–15% increase in peak loads over the 50/50 forecast with a combined 7% probability of occurring. Additional constraints include an estimated 10% reduction in NPCC resources and PJM reductions.


Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under assessed scenarios.

On-Peak Reserve Margins



Risk-Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) and (90/10) extreme demand forecast

Forced Outages: Based on historical 5-year averages

Operational Mitigations: A total of 3.3 GW based on operational/emergency procedures in area *Emergency Operations Manual*




NPCC-Ontario

The Independent Electricity System Operator (IESO) is the Balancing Authority for the province of Ontario. The province of Ontario covers more than 1 million square kilometers (415,000 square miles) and has a population of more than 14 million.

Ontario is interconnected electrically with Québec, MRO-Manitoba, states in MISO (Minnesota and Michigan), and NPCC-New York.

On-Peak Fuel Mix




Highlights

- The ongoing transmission outage at the New York-St Lawrence interconnection continues to impact import and export capacity between Ontario and New York. This issue is expected to be resolved by the third quarter of 2022.
- Ontario is entering a period of tighter supply conditions brought on by rising demand and the ongoing nuclear refurbishment program; during summer months, planned generation maintenance outages will be more challenging to accommodate than they have been previously. Nonetheless, Ontario expects to have sufficient generation resources available to meet its needs throughout the summer of 2022, and its transmission system is expected to continue to reliably supply province-wide demand throughout the season.
- Based on an NPCC probabilistic assessment, IESO is expected to require limited use of operating procedures designed to mitigate resource shortages during the summer for the low-likelihood reduced resource case. This low-likelihood reduced resource scenario is based exclusively on the two highest load levels that represent an average 10–15% increase in peak loads over the 50/50 forecast with a combined 7% probability of occurring. Additional constraints include an estimated 10% reduction in NPCC resources and PJM reductions.
- Negligible cumulative LOLE, LOLH, and EUE risks are estimated over the May–September summer period for all simulated scenarios.


Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under normal peak-demand scenarios. Above-normal summer peak load and outage conditions could result in the need to employ operating mitigations (i.e., demand response and transfers) and EEAs. Load shedding may be needed under extreme peak demand and outage scenarios studied.

On-Peak Reserve Margins



Risk-Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50 Forecast) and highest weather-adjusted daily demand based on 31 years of demand history

Extreme Derates: Derived from weather-adjusted temperature rating of thermal units and adjustments to expected hydro production for low water conditions

Operational Mitigations: Imports anticipated from neighbors during emergencies




NPCC-Québec

The Québec assessment area (Province of Québec) is a winter-peaking NPCC area that covers 595,391 square miles with a population of 8 million.

Québec is one of the four Interconnections in North America; it has ties to Ontario, New York, New England, and the Maritimes; consisting of either HVDC ties, radial generation, or load to and from neighboring systems.

On-Peak Fuel Mix




Highlights

- Québec is a winter peaking system, and no particular resource adequacy problems are forecast for the upcoming summer.
- Québec expects to be able to provide assistance to other areas if needed up to the transfer capability available.
- Québec has had no major generation or transmission additions since the *2021 NERC SRA*.
- The Québec assessment area is not expected to require use of their operating procedures that are designed to mitigate resource shortages during the summer of 2022 based on an NPCC probability assessment. The Québec area is winter peaking and has a large reserve margin for the summer period. As a result, Québec does not indicate having any measurable amounts of cumulative LOLE, LOLH, or EUE risks over the May–September summer period for all the scenarios modeled.


Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under the assessed scenarios.

On-Peak Reserve Margins



Risk-Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) and (90/10) demand forecast

Net Firm Transfers: Imports anticipated from neighbors during emergencies




PJM

PJM Interconnection is a regional transmission organization that coordinates the movement of wholesale electricity in all or parts of Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, and the District of Columbia. PJM serves 65 million customers and covers 369,089 square miles.

PJM is a Balancing Authority, Planning Coordinator, Transmission Planner, Resource Planner, Interchange Authority, Transmission Operator, Transmission Service Provider, and Reliability Coordinator.

On-Peak Fuel Mix




Highlights

- PJM expects no resource problems over the entire 2022 summer peak season because installed capacity is over two times the reserve requirement.
- PJM continues to request fuel inventory and supply data of coal and oil resources (including dual-fuel units). This data request, sent every two weeks, started prior to the 2021–2022 winter season as a result of increasing reports of existing and future supply shortages of fuel and non-fuel consumables. In order to maintain situational awareness throughout the spring and into the summer of 2022, PJM is continuing efforts to monitor potential impacts of fuel and non-fuel consumables supply as well as delivery status on generation resources.
- PJM is expecting a low risk of experiencing periods of resources falling below required operating reserves during Summer 2022 based on the 2021 PJM Reserve Requirement Study. As indicated in the study, PJM is forecasting around 33% installed reserves (including expected committed Demand Resources), well above the target installed reserve margin of 14.9%.
- No other reliability issues are expected.

Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under assessed scenarios.

On-Peak Reserve Margins



Risk-Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) and (90/10) demand forecast

Forced Outages: Based on historical data and trending

Extreme Derates: Accounts for reduced thermal capacity contributions due to performance in extreme conditions

Operational Mitigations: A total of 2.3 GW based on operational/emergency procedures




SERC-East

SERC-East is a summer-peaking assessment area within the SERC Regional Entity. SERC-East includes North Carolina and South Carolina.

SERC is one of the six companies across North America that are responsible for the work under Federal Energy Regulatory Commission approved delegation agreements with NERC. SERC is specifically responsible for the reliability and security of the electric grid across the Southeastern and Central areas of the United States. This area covers approximately 630,000 square miles and serves a population of more than 91 million.

The SERC Regional Entity includes 36 Balancing Authorities, 28 Planning Authorities, and 6 Reliability Coordinators.

On-Peak Fuel Mix



Highlights

- Entities in SERC-East have not identified any potential reliability issues for the upcoming season. The entities continue to perform resource studies to ensure resource adequacy to meet the summer peak demand and to maintain system reliability. Entities reported that coal inventory is in the upper allowed range to maintain reliability.
- Entities in SERC-East continue to participate actively in the SERC Near-Term and Long-Term Working Groups. These groups identify emerging and potential reliability impacts to transmission and resource adequacy as well as with transfer capability.
- Entities in SERC-East are not anticipating operational challenges for the upcoming summer season.
- Probabilistic analysis performed for SERC-East shows almost no risk for resource shortfall for the summer. SERC-East has a small amount of EUE in August but a negligible amount at other times (EUE < 0.4 MWh).


Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under assessed scenarios.

On-Peak Reserve Margins



Risk-Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) and (90/10) demand forecast

Maintenance Outages: Adjusted for higher outages resulting from extreme summer temperatures and aggregated on a SERC subregional level

Forced Outages: Accounts for reduced thermal capacity contributions due to performance in extreme conditions

Operational Mitigations: A total of 1.6 GW based on operational/emergency procedures




SERC-Central

SERC-Central is a summer peaking assessment area within the SERC Regional Entity. SERC-Central includes all of Tennessee, portions of Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Missouri, and Kentucky.

SERC-Central is one of the six companies across North America that are responsible for the work under Federal Energy Regulatory Commission approved delegation agreements with NERC. SERC-Central is specifically responsible for the reliability and security of the electric grid across the Southeastern and Central areas of the United States. This area covers approximately 630,000 square miles and serves a population of more than 91 million.

The SERC Regional Entity includes 36 Balancing Authorities, 28 Planning Authorities, and 6 Reliability Coordinators.

On-Peak Fuel Mix



Highlights

- Entities in SERC-Central continue to work collaboratively to ensure reliability for its area within SERC and to promote reliability and adequacy.
- Entities in SERC-Central continue to participate actively in the SERC Near-Term and Long-Term Working Groups, among others, in order to identify and address emerging and potential reliability impacts to transmission and resource adequacy along with transfer capability.
- Entities in SERC-Central have not identified any potential reliability issues for the upcoming summer season.
- Entities anticipate having adequate system capacity for the upcoming season and are equipped to address unexpected, short-term issues leveraging its diverse generation portfolio and spot purchases from the power markets when necessary.
- Probabilistic analysis performed for SERC-Central indicates minimal risk for resource shortfall.


Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under assessed scenarios.

On-Peak Reserve Margins



Risk-Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) and (90/10) demand forecast

Maintenance Outages: Adjusted for higher outages resulting from extreme summer temperatures and aggregated on a SERC subregional level

Forced Outages: Accounts for reduced thermal capacity contributions due to performance in extreme conditions

Operational Mitigations: A total of 0.5 GW based on operational/emergency procedures




SERC-Southeast

SERC-Southeast is a summer peaking assessment area within the SERC Regional Entiey. SERC-Southeast includes all or portions of Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi.

SERC is one of the six companies across North America that are responsible for the work under Federal Energy Regulatory Commission approved delegation agreements with NERC. SERC is specifically responsible for the reliability and security of the electric grid across the Southeastern and Central areas of the United States. This area covers approximately 630,000 square miles and serves a population of more than 91 million.

The SERC Regional Entity includes 36 Balancing Authorities, 28 Planning Authorities, and 6 Reliability Coordinators.

On-Peak Fuel Mix




Highlights

- Entities in SERC-Southeast have not identified any emerging reliability issues for the upcoming summer that will impact resource adequacy. The available system capacity for the upcoming summer meets or exceeds the reserve margin target. Reliability is supported by a diverse fuel mix, firm natural gas contracts, and power purchases.
- Entities in SERC-Southeast continue to participate actively in the SERC Near-Term and Long-Term Working Groups. These groups identify emerging and potential reliability impacts to transmission and resource adequacy along with transfer capability.
- Probabilistic analysis performed for SERC-Southeast shows there is low risk for resource shortfall for the summer. Load loss and unserved energy indices are negligible for SERC-Southeast throughout the summer.


Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under assessed scenarios.

On-Peak Reserve Margins



Risk-Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) and (90/10) demand forecast

Maintenance Outages: Adjusted for higher outages resulting from extreme summer temperatures and aggregated on a SERC subregional level

Forced Outages: Accounts for reduced thermal capacity contributions due to performance in extreme conditions

Operational Mitigations: A total of 2.5 GW based on operational/ emergency procedures




SERC-Florida Peninsula

SERC-Florida Peninsula is a summer peaking assessment area within SERC.

SERC is one of the six companies across North America that are responsible for the work under Federal Energy Regulatory Commission approved delegation agreements with NERC. SERC is specifically responsible for the reliability and security of the electric grid across the Southeastern and Central areas of the United States. This area covers approximately 630,000 square miles and serves a population of more than 91 million.

The SERC Regional Entity includes 36 Balancing Authorities, 28 Planning Authorities, and 6 Reliability Coordinators.

On-Peak Fuel Mix



Highlights

- Entities in SERC-Florida Peninsula have not identified any emerging reliability issues or operational concerns for the upcoming summer.
- Entities in SERC-Florida Peninsula continue to participate actively in the SERC Near-Term and Long-Term Working Groups. These groups identify emerging and potential reliability impacts to transmission and resource adequacy along with transfer capability.
- Entities within the Florida Peninsula area have reported no operational challenges for the upcoming summer based on current expected system conditions. The BES within the Florida Peninsula is expected to perform reliably for the anticipated 2022 summer season.
- SERC Probabilistic analysis performed for SERC-Florida Peninsula shows there is low risk for resource shortfall for the summer. Load loss and unserved energy indices for SERC-Florida Peninsula are spread across the summer months and remain relatively low (LOLH < 0.03 and EUE < 18 MWH).


Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under assessed scenarios.

On-Peak Reserve Margins



Risk-Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) and (90/10) demand forecast

Maintenance Outages: Adjusted for higher outages resulting from extreme summer temperatures and aggregated on a SERC subregional level

Forced Outages: Accounts for reduced thermal capacity contributions due to performance in extreme conditions

Operational Mitigations: A total of 3.9 GW based on operational/ emergency procedures




SPP

Southwest Power Pool (SPP) Planning Coordinator footprint covers 546,000 square miles and encompasses all or parts of Arkansas, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas, and Wyoming.

The SPP long-term assessment is reported based on the Planning Coordinator footprint, which touches parts of the Midwest Reliability Organization Regional Entity and the WECC Regional Entity. The SPP assessment area footprint has approximately 61,000 miles of transmission lines, 756 generating plants, and 4,811 transmission-class substations, and it serves a population of more than 18 million.

On-Peak Fuel Mix



Highlights

- SPP projects a low likelihood of any emerging reliability issues impacting the area for the 2022 summer season.
- The current planning reserve margin should minimize risks of BA capacity deficiencies for summer.
- BA generation capacity deficiency risks remain depending on wind generation output levels and unanticipated generation outages in combination with high load periods.
- There are concerns that drought conditions will impact the Missouri River and other water sources used by generation resources that rely on once-through cooling processes.
- Using current operational processes and procedures, SPP will continue to assess the needs for the 2022 summer season and will adjust as needed to ensure that real time reliability is maintained throughout the summer.


Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under normal peak-demand scenarios. Above-normal summer peak load and outage conditions could result in the need to employ operating mitigations (i.e., demand response and transfers) and EEAs. Load shedding may be needed under extreme peak demand and outage scenarios studied.

On-Peak Reserve Margins



Risk-Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) and extreme demand is a 5% increase from net internal demand

Maintenance & Forced Outages: Calculated from SPP's generator assessment process

Generation Unavailability: Risk from higher outages to protect against 99.5th percentile of historical coincident generation


Operational Mitigations: A total of 2 GW of behind the meter generation and demand response to be deployed in the event of an emergency alert



Texas RE-ERCOT

The Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) is the ISO for the ERCOT Interconnection and is located entirely in the state of Texas; it operates as a single BA. It also performs financial settlement for the competitive wholesale bulk-power market and administers retail switching for nearly 8 million premises in competitive choice areas. ERCOT is governed by a board of directors and subject to oversight by the Public Utility Commission of Texas and the Texas Legislature. ERCOT is a summer-peaking Regional Entity that covers approximately 200,000 square miles, connects over 52,700 miles of transmission lines, has over 1,000 generation units, and serves more than 26 million customers. Lubbock Power & Light joined the ERCOT grid on June 1, 2021. Texas RE is responsible for the Regional Entity functions described in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 for the ERCOT Regional Entity.

On-Peak Fuel Mix




Highlights

- The amount of renewable installed capacity expected to be available during upcoming summer peak demand hours is higher by about 4,100 MW relative to the amount reported in last year's SRA.
- Most of ERCOT is experiencing severe drought conditions, setting the stage for a hotter-than-normal summer.
- Transmission expansion projects in development to add resources or address system performance are being closely monitored for delays or cancellations. Occurrences may contribute to localized reliability concerns.
- On May 9, 2021, a single-line-to-ground fault occurred at a combined-cycle power plant near Odessa, Texas. The fault impacted several solar and wind plants. In response to the NERC report on the disturbance event, ERCOT established an Inverter-based Resource Task Force to facilitate assessment of recommendations to address IBR issues identified in the report.
- An emerging challenge for transmission planning and system operations is the interest in developing new cryptocurrency mining facilities in ERCOT. ERCOT and its stakeholders have recently formed a task force to address the issues associated with these large flexible loads.
- ERCOT's Summer 2022 probabilistic assessment indicates a low risk (6% probability) of declaring a Level 1 Energy Emergency Alert (EEA1) during the expected daily peak load hour. The EEA1 risk is slightly higher from 6:00–8:00 p.m. Central time with the highest-risk hour being 7:00 p.m. This shifting of capacity scarcity risk to later hours is due to the large increase in solar capacity over the last two years. Nevertheless, the overall daily risk is lower than for the Summer 2021 model simulation. For example, the EEA1 peak load hour risk for Summer 2021 was higher at 12%.


Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under normal peak-demand scenarios. Above-normal summer peak load and outage conditions could result in the need to employ interruptible load programs and additional operating mitigations reflected in the scenario. Load shedding may be needed under extreme peak demand and outage scenarios studied.

On-Peak Reserve Margins



Risk-Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) and extreme demand represents 90th percentile of forecasted summer peaks from 2006–2020

Forced Outages: Based on the historical averages of forced outages for June through September weekdays, hours ending 3:00–8:00 p.m. local time for the last three (2019–2021) summer seasons

Extreme Derates: Based on the 95th percentile of historical averages of forced outages for June through September weekdays, hours ending 3:00–8:00 p.m. local time for the last three (2019–2021) summer seasons

Operational Mitigations: Additional capacity from switchable generation and additional imports




WECC-NWPP-AB

WECC-NWPP-AB (Alberta) is an assessment area in the WECC Regional Entity that consists of the province of Alberta, Canada.

WECC is responsible for coordinating and promoting BES reliability in the Western Interconnection. WECC's 329 members, which include 39 Balancing Authorities, represent a wide spectrum of organizations with an interest in the BES. Serving an area of nearly 1.8 million square miles and more than 82 million customers, it is geographically the largest and most diverse Regional Entity.

WECC's service territory extends from Canada to Mexico. It includes the provinces of Alberta and British Columbia in Canada, the Northern portion of Baja California in Mexico as well as all or portions of the 14 Western United States in between.

On-Peak Fuel Mix



Highlights


- There are potential natural gas supply-side tightening concerns.
- Reserve margins are tighter but still expected to be adequate.
- Based on a WECC probabilistic assessment, the WECC-NWPP-AB assessment area had negligible LOLH and EUE.

  On the peak risk hour at 6:00 p.m. local time, under a summer peak defined as a one-in-ten probability at the 90th percentile, and with either one of the combination of derates on their own or any two in combination, Alberta is expected to have sufficient resource availability to meet demand and cover reserves. However, if all derate conditions were combined concurrently, Alberta would likely need to seek external assistance for imports.


Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under normal peak-demand scenarios. Above-normal summer peak load and outage conditions could result in the need to employ operating mitigations (i.e., demand response and transfers) and EEAs. Load shedding may be needed under extreme peak demand and outage scenarios studied.

On-Peak Reserve Margins



Risk-Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) and (90/10) demand forecast

Forced Outages: Average seasonal outages

Extreme Derates: Using (90/10) scenario

Low Hydro Scenario: Reduced hydro availability resulting from drought conditions




WECC-NWPP-BC

WECC-NWPP-BC (British Columbia) is an assessment area in the WECC Regional Entity that consists of the province of British Columbia, Canada.

WECC is responsible for coordinating and promoting BES reliability in the Western Interconnection. WECC's 329 members, which include 39 Balancing Authorities, represent a wide spectrum of organizations with an interest in the BES. Serving an area of nearly 1.8 million square miles and more than 82 million customers, it is geographically the largest and most diverse Regional Entity.

WECC's service territory extends from Canada to Mexico. It includes the provinces of Alberta and British Columbia in Canada, the Northern portion of Baja California in Mexico as well as all or portions of the 14 Western United States in between.

On-Peak Fuel Mix




Highlights

- Planned resources in Tier 1 have moved into existing certain.
- Reserve margins are up across the board and adequate.
- Based on a WECC probabilistic assessment, the WECC-NWPP-BC assessment area had negligible LOLH and EUE.
- On the peak risk hour at 6:00 p.m. local time, under a summer peak defined as a 1-in-10 probability at the 90th percentile, and with any combination of derates other than hydro, BC is expected to have sufficient resource availability to meet demand and cover reserves. However, if a 1-in-10 probability at the 10th percentile of hydro conditions was to occur, BC would need to locate external assistance for imports. Summer 2022 hydro availability in BC is not expected to fall that low despite continued mega-drought conditions across much of the West.

Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under the assessed scenarios.

On-Peak Reserve Margins



Risk-Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) and (90/10) demand forecast

Forced Outages: Average seasonal outages

Extreme Derates: Using (90/10) scenario

Low Hydro Scenario: Reduced hydro availability resulting from drought conditions




WECC-CA/MX

WECC-CA/MX (California-Mexico) is an assessment area in the WECC Regional Entity that includes parts of California, Nevada, and Baja California, Mexico.

WECC is responsible for coordinating and promoting BES reliability in the Western Interconnection. WECC's 329 members, which include 39 Balancing Authorizes, represent a wide spectrum of organizations with an interest in the BES. Serving an area of nearly 1.8 million square miles and more than 82 million customers, it is geographically the largest and most diverse Regional Entity.

WECC's service territory extends from Canada to Mexico. It includes the provinces of Alberta and British Columbia in Canada, the Northern portion of Baja California in Mexico as well as all or portions of the 14 Western United States in between.

On-Peak Fuel Mix




Highlights

- California ISO is procuring resources to improve reliability risks.
- Localized short-term operational issues may occur due to wildfires, droughts, and/or supply chain issues.
- As cooling degree days continue to rise across the Western Interconnection, there is a risk that is higher than the historical average of prolonged heatwave events
- Based on a WECC probabilistic assessment, the California portion of the assessment area is projected to have an LOLH of 1.0 hours and an EUE of 4 MWh. The Mexico portion is projected to have an LOLH of 10.0 hours and an EUE of 100 MWh.
- On the peak risk hour at 8:00 p.m. local time, there is an under 1-in-10 summer peak probability at the 90th percentile, including firm transfers. The CA/MX area is not expected to have sufficient resource availability to meet demand and cover reserves under any of the scenarios on their own, including typical forced outages; CA/MX will need to locate additional external assistance for imports.


Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under normal peak-demand scenarios. Above-normal summer peak load and outage conditions could result in the need to employ operating mitigations (i.e., demand response and transfers) and EEAs. Load shedding may be needed under extreme peak demand and outage scenarios studied.

On-Peak Reserve Margins



Risk-Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at 8:00 p.m. local time as solar PV output is diminished and demand remains high

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) at risk hour and (90/10) demand forecast at risk hour

Forced Outages: Estimated using market forced outage model

Extreme Derates: On natural gas units based on historic data and manufacturer data for temperature performance and outages

Low Hydro Scenario: Reduced hydro availability resulting from drought conditions




WECC-NWPP-US

WECC-NWPP-US (Northwest Power Pool) is an assessment area in the WECC Regional Entity. The area includes Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, Utah, Washington, Wyoming and parts of California, Nebraska, Nevada, and South Dakota.

WECC is responsible for coordinating and promoting BES reliability in the Western Interconnection. WECC's 329 members, which include 39 Balancing Authorities, represent a wide spectrum of organizations with an interest in the BES. Serving an area of nearly 1.8 million square miles and more than 82 million customers, it is geographically the largest and most diverse Regional Entity.

WECC's service territory extends from Canada to Mexico. It includes the provinces of Alberta and British Columbia in Canada, the Northern portion of Baja California in Mexico as well as all or portions of the 14 Western United States in between.

On-Peak Fuel Mix




Highlights

- Potential drought conditions remain a concern.
- Reserve margins are up across the board and adequate.
- Based on a WECC probabilistic assessment, the WECC-NWPP-US assessment area had negligible LOLH and EUE.
- On the peak risk hour at 7:00 p.m., local time and under a summer peak defined as a 1-in-10 probability, including firm transfers, the WECC-NWPP-US area is not expected to have sufficient resource availability to meet demand and cover reserves under any of the scenarios on their own, including typical forced outages; WECC-NWPP-US will need to locate additional external assistance for imports.


Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under normal peak-demand scenarios. Above-normal summer peak load and outage conditions could result in the need to employ operating mitigations (i.e., demand response and transfers) and EEAs. Load shedding may be needed under extreme peak demand and outage scenarios studied.

On-Peak Reserve Margins



Risk-Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at 7:00 p.m. local time as solar PV output is diminished and demand remains high

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) at risk hour and (90/10) demand forecast at risk hour

Forced Outages: Average seasonal outages

Extreme Derates: Using (90/10) scenario

Low Hydro Scenario: Reduced hydro availability resulting from drought conditions




WECC-SRSG

WECC-SRSG (Southwest Reserve Sharing Group) is an assessment area in the WECC Regional Entity. It includes Arizona, New Mexico, and part of California and Texas.

WECC is responsible for coordinating and promoting BES reliability in the Western Interconnection. WECC's 329 members, which include 39 Balancing Authorities, represent a wide spectrum of organizations with an interest in the BES. Serving an area of nearly 1.8 million square miles and more than 82 million customers, it is geographically the largest and most diverse Regional Entity.

WECC's service territory extends from Canada to Mexico. It includes the provinces of Alberta and British Columbia in Canada as well as the Northern portion of Baja California in Mexico and all or portions of the 14 Western United States in between.

On-Peak Fuel Mix



Highlights

- Drought and supply chain issues are the main reliability concerns. Many solar developers are indicating to utilities that they will not be able to meet expected commission dates under executed and approved power purchase agreements, including at least 120 MW of PV planned for the 2022 summer.
- Reserve margins are expected to be adequate.
- Based on a WECC probabilistic assessment, the WECC-SRSG assessment area had negligible LOLH and EUE.
- On the peak risk hour is at 7:00 p.m., local time, under a summer peak defined as a 1-in-10 probability, and with either one of the derates on their own, SRSG is not expected to have sufficient resource availability to meet demand and cover reserves; SRSG will likely need to locate additional external assistance for imports.


Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under normal peak-demand scenarios. Above-normal summer peak load and outage conditions could result in the need to employ operating mitigations (i.e., demand response and transfers) and EEAs. Load shedding may be needed under extreme peak demand and outage scenarios studied.

On-Peak Reserve Margins



Risk-Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at 7:00 p.m. local time as solar PV output is diminished and demand remains high

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) at risk hour and (90/10) demand forecast at risk hour

Forced Outages: Average seasonal outages

Extreme Derates: Using (90/10) scenario

Low Hydro Scenario: Reduced hydro availability resulting from drought conditions

Data Concepts and Assumptions

The table below explains data concepts and important assumptions used throughout this assessment.

General Assumptions
• Reliability of the interconnected BPS is comprised of both adequacy and operating reliability:
▪ Adequacy is the ability of the electricity system to supply the aggregate electric power and energy requirements of the electricity consumers at all times while taking into account scheduled and reasonably expected unscheduled outages of system components.
▪ Operating reliability is the ability of the electricity system to withstand sudden disturbances such as electric short-circuits or unanticipated loss of system components.
• The reserve margin calculation is an important industry planning metric used to examine future resource adequacy.
• All data in this assessment is based on existing federal, state, and provincial laws and regulations.
• Differences in data collection periods for each assessment area should be considered when comparing demand and capacity data between year-to-year seasonal assessments.
• *2021 Long-Term Reliability Assessment* data has been used for most of this 2022 summer assessment period augmented by updated load and capacity data.
• A positive net transfer capability would indicate a net importing assessment area; a negative value would indicate a net exporter.
Demand Assumptions
• Electricity demand projections, or load forecasts, are provided by each assessment area.
• Load forecasts include peak hourly load[7] or total internal demand for the summer and winter of each year.[8]
• Total internal demand projections are based on normal weather (50/50 distribution[9]) and are provided on a coincident[10] basis for most assessment areas.
• Net internal demand is used in all reserve margin calculations, and it is equal to total internal demand then reduced by the amount of controllable and dispatchable demand response projected to be available during the peak hour.
Resource Assumptions
Resource planning methods vary throughout the North American BPS. NERC uses the categories below to provide a consistent approach for collecting and presenting resource adequacy. Because the electrical output of variable energy resources (e.g., wind, solar) depends on weather conditions, their contribution to reserve margins and other on-peak resource adequacy analysis is less than their nameplate capacity.

[7] *Glossary of Terms* used in NERC Reliability Standards

[8] The summer season represents June–September and the winter season represents December–February.

[9] Essentially, this means that there is a 50% probability that actual demand will be higher and a 50% probability that actual demand will be lower than the value provided for a given season/year.

[10] Coincident: This is the sum of two or more peak loads that occur in the same hour. Noncoincident: This is the sum of two or more peak loads on individual systems that do not occur in the same time interval; this is meaningful only when considering loads within a limited period of time, such as a day, a week, a month, a heating or cooling season, and usually for not more than one year. SERC and FRCC calculate total internal demand on a noncoincidental basis.

Anticipated Resources:

- **Existing-Certain Capacity**: Included in this category are commercially operable generating unit or portions of generating units that meet at least one of the following requirements when examining the period of peak demand for the summer season: unit must have a firm capability and have a power purchase agreement with firm transmission that must be in effect for the unit; unit must be classified as a designated network resource; and/or where energy-only markets exist, unit must be a designated market resource eligible to bid into the market.
- **Tier 1 Capacity Additions**: This category includes capacity that either is under construction or has received approved planning requirements.
- **Net Firm Capacity Transfers (Imports minus Exports)**: This category includes transfers with firm contracts.

Prospective Resources: Includes all anticipated resources plus the following:

Existing-Other Capacity: Included in this category are commercially operable generating units or portions of generating units that could be available to serve load for the period of peak demand for the season but do not meet the requirements of existing-certain.

Reserve Margin Descriptions

Planning Reserve Margin: This is the primary metric used to measure resource adequacy; it is defined as the difference in resources (anticipated or prospective) and net internal demand then divided by net internal demand and shown as a percentage.

Reference Margin Level: The assumptions and naming convention of this metric vary by assessment area. The Reference Margin Level can be determined using both deterministic and probabilistic (based on a 0.1/year loss of load study) approaches. In both cases, this metric is used by system planners to quantify the amount of reserve capacity in the system above the forecasted peak demand that is needed to ensure sufficient supply to meet peak loads. Establishing a Reference Margin Level is necessary to account for long-term factors of uncertainty involved in system planning, such as unexpected generator outages and extreme weather impacts that could lead to increase demand beyond what was projected in the 50/50 load forecasted. In many assessment areas, a Reference Margin Level is established by a state, provincial authority, ISO/RTO, or other regulatory body. In some cases, the Reference Margin Level is a requirement. Reference Margin Levels may be different for the summer and winter seasons. If a Reference Margin Level is not provided by an assessment area, NERC applies 15% for predominately thermal systems and 10% for predominately hydro systems.

Seasonal Risk Scenario Chart Description

Each assessment area performed an operational risk analysis that was used to produce the seasonal risk scenario charts in the **Regional Assessments Dashboards**. The chart presents deterministic scenarios for further analysis of different resource and demand levels: The left blue column shows anticipated resources, and the two orange columns at the right show the two demand scenarios of the normal peak net internal demand and the extreme summer peak demand—both determined by the assessment area. The middle red or green bars show adjustments that are applied cumulatively to the anticipated resources, such as the following:

- Reductions for typical generation outages (i.e., maintenance and forced, not already accounted for in anticipated resources)
- Reductions that represent additional outage or performance derating by resource type for extreme, low-probability conditions (e.g., drought condition impacts on hydroelectric generation, low-wind scenario affecting wind generation, fuel supply limitations, or extreme temperature conditions that result in reduced thermal generation output)
- Additional capacity resources that represent quantified capacity from operational procedures, if any, that are made available during scarcity conditions

Not all assessment areas have the same categories of adjustments to anticipated resources. Furthermore, each assessment area determined the adjustments to capacity based on methods or assumptions that are summarized below the chart. Methods and assumptions differ by assessment area and may not be comparable.

The chart enables evaluation of resource levels against levels of expected operating reserve requirement and the forecasted demand. Furthermore, the effects from extreme events can also be examined by comparing resource levels after applying extreme-scenario derates and/or extreme summer peak demand.

Resource Adequacy

The Anticipated Reserve Margin, which is based on available resource capacity, is a metric used to evaluate resource adequacy by comparing the projected capability of anticipated resources to serve forecast peak demand.[11] Large year-to-year changes in anticipated resources or forecast peak demand (net internal demand) can greatly impact Planning Reserve Margin calculations. All assessment areas have sufficient Anticipated Reserve Margins to meet or exceed their Reference Margin Level for the 2022 summer as shown in **Figure 9**.





Figure 9: Summer 2022 Anticipated/Prospective Reserve Margins Compared to Reference Margin Level

[11] Generally, anticipated resources include generators and firm capacity transfers that are expected to be available to serve load during electrical peak loads for the season. Prospective resources are those that could be available but do not meet criteria to be counted as anticipated resources. Refer to the **Data Concepts and Assumptions** section for additional information on Anticipated/Prospective Reserve Margins, anticipated/prospective resources, and Reference Margin Levels.

Changes from Year-to-Year

Figure 10 provides the relative change in the forecast Anticipated Reserve Margins from the 2021 summer to the 2022 summer. A significant decline can indicate potential operational issues that emerge between reporting years. MRO-SaskPower, NPCC-Maritimes, NPCC-Québec, SERC-C, and WECC-AB have noticeable reductions in anticipated resources with MRO-SaskPower close to falling below its Reference Margin Level for the 2022 summer. MRO-SaskPower will rely on demand response and transfers from neighbors during a higher load scenario to avoid load interruption. The lower Anticipated Reserve Margins for NPCC-Maritimes, NPCC-Québec, SERC-C, and WECC-AB do not present reliability concerns on peak for this upcoming summer. Additional details for each assessment area are provided in the Data Concepts and Assumptions and Regional Assessments Dashboards sections.



Note: The areas that only have one bar have the same Reference Margin Level for both years.

Figure 10: Summer 2021 and Summer 2022 Anticipated Reserve Margins Year-to-Year Change

Net Internal Demand

The changes in forecasted Net Internal Demand for each assessment area are shown in Figure 11.[12] Assessment areas develop these forecasts based on historic load and weather information as well as other long-term projections.




Figure 11: Change in Net Internal Demand: Summer 2021 Forecast Compared to Summer 2022 Forecast

[12] Changes in modeling and methods may also contribute to year-to-year changes in forecasted net internal demand projections.

Demand and Resource Tables

Peak demand and supply capacity data for each assessment area are provided below (in alphabetical order).

MISO Resource Adequacy Data			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2021 SRA**	**2022 SRA**	**2021 vs. 2022 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	122,398	124,506	1.7%
Demand Response: Available	6,038	6,287	4.1%
Net Internal Demand	116,360	118,220	1.6%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	138,464	141,844	2.4%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	0	0	-
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	2,979	1,353	-54.6%
Anticipated Resources	141,443	143,197	1.2%
Existing-Other Capacity	633	669	5.7%
Prospective Resources	146,586	149,756	2.2%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	21.6%	21.1%	-0.5
Prospective Reserve Margin	26.0%	26.7%	0.7
Reference Margin Level	18.3%	17.9%	-0.4

MRO-SaskPower Resource Adequacy Data			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2021 SRA**	**2022 SRA**	**2021 vs. 2022 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	3,400	3,656	7.5%
Demand Response: Available	60	60	0.0%
Net Internal Demand	3,340	3,596	7.7%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	3,863	3,743	-3.1%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	13.5	0	-100.0%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	125	290	132.0%
Anticipated Resources	4,002	4,033	0.8%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-
Prospective Resources	4,002	4,033	0.8%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	19.8%	12.2%	-7.6
Prospective Reserve Margin	19.8%	12.2%	-7.6
Reference Margin Level	11.0%	11.0%	0.0

MRO-Manitoba Hydro Adequacy Data			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2021 SRA**	**2022 SRA**	**2021 vs. 2022 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	2,965	3,059	3.2%
Demand Response: Available	0	0	-
Net Internal Demand	2,965	3,059	3.2%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	5,173	5,523	6.8%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	186	186	0.0%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	-1,596	-1,816	13.8%
Anticipated Resources	3,763	3,893	3.4%
Existing-Other Capacity	37	44	18.8%
Prospective Resources	3,800	3,937	3.6%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	26.9%	27.3%	0.4
Prospective Reserve Margin	28.2%	28.7%	0.5
Reference Margin Level	12.0%	12.0%	0.0

NPCC-Maritimes Resource Adequacy Data			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2021 SRA**	**2022 SRA**	**2021 vs. 2022 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	3,479	3,475	-0.1%
Demand Response: Available	305	255	-16.4%
Net Internal Demand	3,174	3,220	1.4%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	5,448	4,419	-18.9%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	0	0	-
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	-57	64	-212.3%
Anticipated Resources	5,391	4,483	-16.8%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-
Prospective Resources	5,391	4,483	-16.8%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	69.8%	39.2%	-30.6
Prospective Reserve Margin	69.8%	39.2%	-30.6
Reference Margin Level	20.0%	20.0%	0.0

NPCC-New England Resource Adequacy Data			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2021 SRA**	**2022 SRA**	**2021 vs. 2022 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	25,244	25,300	0.2%
Demand Response: Available	434	483	11.3%
Net Internal Demand	24,810	24,817	0.0%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	29,065	28,626	-1.5%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	0	0	-
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	1,208	1,292	7.0%
Anticipated Resources	30,273	29,918	-1.2%
Existing-Other Capacity	1115	911	-18.3%
Prospective Resources	31,388	30,829	-1.8%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	22.0%	20.6%	-1.4
Prospective Reserve Margin	26.5%	24.2%	-2.3
Reference Margin Level	15.0%	14.3%	-0.7

NPCC-Ontario Resource Adequacy Data			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2021 SRA**	**2022 SRA**	**2021 vs. 2022 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	22,500	22,546	0.2%
Demand Response: Available	621	666	7.2%
Net Internal Demand	21,879	21,880	0.0%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	26,217	25,648	-2.2%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	22	24	10.9%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	80	150	87.5%
Anticipated Resources	26,319	25,822	-1.9%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-
Prospective Resources	26,319	25,822	-1.9%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	20.3%	18.0%	-2.3
Prospective Reserve Margin	20.3%	18.0%	-2.3
Reference Margin Level	13.2%	13.3%	0.1

NPCC-New York Resource Adequacy Data			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2021 SRA**	**2022 SRA**	**2021 vs. 2022 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	32,333	31,765	-1.8%
Demand Response: Available	1,199	1,170	-2.4%
Net Internal Demand	31,134	30,595	-1.7%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	37,805	37,431	-1.0%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	0	0	-
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	1,816	2,465	35.7%
Anticipated Resources	39,621	39,896	0.7%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-
Prospective Resources	39,621	39,896	0.7%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	27.3%	30.4%	3.1
Prospective Reserve Margin	27.3%	30.4%	3.1
Reference Margin Level	15.0%	15.0%	0.0

NPCC-Québec Resource Adequacy Data			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2021 SRA**	**2022 SRA**	**2021 vs. 2022 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	21,436	22,271	3.9%
Demand Response: Available	0	0	-
Net Internal Demand	21,436	22,271	3.9%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	33,380	33,542	0.5%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	0	0	-
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	-1,995	-2,304	15.5%
Anticipated Resources	31,385	31,238	-0.5%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-
Prospective Resources	31,385	31,238	-0.5%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	46.4%	40.3%	-6.1
Prospective Reserve Margin	46.4%	40.3%	-6.1
Reference Margin Level	10.4%	10.3%	-0.1

PJM Resource Adequacy Data			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2021 SRA**	**2022 SRA**	**2021 vs. 2022 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	149,224	148,938	-0.2%
Demand Response: Available	8,779	8,527	-2.9%
Net Internal Demand	140,445	140,411	0.0%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	183,572	184,837	0.7%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	2400	10	-99.6%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	1,460	124	-91.5%
Anticipated Resources	187,431	184,971	-1.3%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-
Prospective Resources	188,891	185,095	-2.0%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	33.5%	31.7%	-1.8
Prospective Reserve Margin	34.5%	31.8%	-2.7
Reference Margin Level	14.7%	14.9%	0.2

SERC-East Resource Adequacy Data			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2021 SRA**	**2022 SRA**	**2021 vs. 2022 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	42,680	42,883	0.5%
Demand Response: Available	970	1,298	33.8%
Net Internal Demand	41,710	41,585	-0.3%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	50,539	49,380	-2.3%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	0	486	-
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	562	612	8.9%
Anticipated Resources	51,101	50,478	-1.2%
Existing-Other Capacity	766	1,097	43.2%
Prospective Resources	51,867	51,575	-0.6%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	22.5%	21.4%	-1.1
Prospective Reserve Margin	24.4%	24.0%	-0.4
Reference Margin Level	15.0%	15.0%	0.0

SERC-Central Resource Adequacy Data			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2021 SRA**	**2022 SRA**	**2021 vs. 2022 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	40,341	41,267	2.3%
Demand Response: Available	1,744	1,841	5.6%
Net Internal Demand	38,597	39,426	2.1%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	47,987	47,424	-1.2%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	154	0	-100.0%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	172	-795	-561.6%
Anticipated Resources	48,314	46,629	-3.5%
Existing-Other Capacity	4290	4,808	12.1%
Prospective Resources	52,604	51,437	-2.2%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	25.2%	18.3%	-6.9
Prospective Reserve Margin	36.3%	30.5%	-5.8
Reference Margin Level	15.0%	15.0%	0.0

SERC-Florida Peninsula Resource Adequacy Data			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2021 SRA**	**2022 SRA**	**2021 vs. 2022 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	48,710	52,172	7.1%
Demand Response: Available	3,030	2,932	-3.2%
Net Internal Demand	45,680	49,240	7.8%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	55,351	56,571	2.2%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	0	2,540	-
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	1,007	300	-70.2%
Anticipated Resources	56,358	59,411	5.4%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	847	-
Prospective Resources	56,358	60,258	6.9%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	23.4%	20.7%	-2.7
Prospective Reserve Margin	23.4%	22.4%	-1.0
Reference Margin Level	15.0%	15.0%	0.0

SERC-Southeast Resource Adequacy Data			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2021 SRA**	**2022 SRA**	**2021 vs. 2022 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	46,631	47,258	1.3%
Demand Response: Available	1,671	1,946	16.5%
Net Internal Demand	44,960	45,312	0.8%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	61,263	59,828	-2.3%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	142	1,514	964.9%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	-1,115	-2,524	126.4%
Anticipated Resources	60,290	58,818	-2.4%
Existing-Other Capacity	783	859	9.7%
Prospective Resources	61,073	59,677	-2.3%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	34.1%	29.8%	-4.3
Prospective Reserve Margin	35.8%	31.7%	-4.1
Reference Margin Level	15.0%	15.0%	0.0

SPP Resource Adequacy Data			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2021 SRA**	**2022 SRA**	**2021 vs. 2022 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	52,249	52,040	-0.4%
Demand Response: Available	606	658	8.6%
Net Internal Demand	51,643	51,382	-0.5%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	66,600	67,245	1.0%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	300	0	-100.0%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	186	-144	-177.6%
Anticipated Resources	67,086	67,101	0.0%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-
Prospective Resources	66,539	66,554	0.0%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	29.9%	30.6%	0.7
Prospective Reserve Margin	28.8%	29.5%	0.7
Reference Margin Level	16.0%	16.0%	0.0

Texas RE-ERCOT Resource Adequacy Data			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2021 SRA**	**2022 SRA**	**2021 vs. 2022 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	77,144	77,317	0.2%
Demand Response: Available	2,341	2,856	22.0%
Net Internal Demand	74,803	74,461	-0.5%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	80,569	89,603	11.2%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	5489	1,199	-78.2%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	210	20	-90.5%
Anticipated Resources	86,268	90,822	5.3%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-
Prospective Resources	86,296	90,850	5.3%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	15.3%	22.0%	6.7
Prospective Reserve Margin	15.4%	22.0%	6.6
Reference Margin Level	13.75%	13.75%	0.0

WECC-NWPP-AB Resource Adequacy Data			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2021 SRA**	**2022 SRA**	**2021 vs. 2022 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	10,886	11,228	3.1%
Demand Response: Available	0	0	-
Net Internal Demand	10,886	11,228	3.1%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	12,205	11,926	-2.3%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	1723	1,082	-37.2%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	0	437	-
Anticipated Resources	13,928	13,445	-3.5%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-
Prospective Resources	13,928	13,445	-3.5%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	27.9%	19.7%	-8.2
Prospective Reserve Margin	27.9%	19.7%	-8.2
Reference Margin Level	9.7%	10.1%	0.4

WECC-NWPP-BC Resource Adequacy Data			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2021 SRA**	**2022 SRA**	**2021 vs. 2022 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	8,264	8,088	-2.1%
Demand Response: Available	0	0	-
Net Internal Demand	8,264	8,088	-2.1%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	11,178	11,266	0.8%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	185	3	-98.4%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	0	0	-
Anticipated Resources	11,363	11,269	-0.8%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-
Prospective Resources	11,363	11,269	-0.8%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	37.5%	39.3%	1.8
Prospective Reserve Margin	37.5%	39.3%	1.8
Reference Margin Level	9.7%	16.3%	6.5

WECC-CA/MX Resource Adequacy Data			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2021 SRA**	**2022 SRA**	**2021 vs. 2022 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	55,409	57,269	3.4%
Demand Response: Available	922	844	-8.4%
Net Internal Demand	54,487	56,425	3.6%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	63,396	70,791	11.7%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	3358	3,381	0.7%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	686	0	-100.0%
Anticipated Resources	67,440	74,172	10.0%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-
Prospective Resources	67,440	74,172	10.0%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	23.8%	31.5%	7.7
Prospective Reserve Margin	23.8%	31.5%	7.7
Reference Margin Level	18.4%	16.9%	-1.5

WECC-SRSG Resource Adequacy Data			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2021 SRA**	**2022 SRA**	**2021 vs. 2022 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	24,751	26,720	8.0%
Demand Response: Available	332	399	20.0%
Net Internal Demand	24,419	26,321	7.8%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	26,850	28,249	5.2%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	188	1,369	628.2%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	866	1,002	15.7%
Anticipated Resources	27,904	30,620	9.7%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-
Prospective Resources	27,904	30,620	9.7%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	14.3%	16.3%	2.0
Prospective Reserve Margin	14.3%	16.3%	2.0
Reference Margin Level	9.8%	10.2%	0.4

WECC-NWPP-US Resource Adequacy Data			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2021 SRA**	**2022 SRA**	**2021 vs. 2022 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	67,117	63,214	-5.8%
Demand Response: Available	1,087	1,104	1.5%
Net Internal Demand	66,030	62,110	-5.9%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	70,069	70,154	0.1%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	1,002	798	-20.4%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	6,139	2,517	-59.0%
Anticipated Resources	77,210	73,469	-4.8%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-
Prospective Resources	77,210	73,469	-4.8%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	16.9%	18.3%	1.4
Prospective Reserve Margin	16.9%	18.3%	1.4
Reference Margin Level	14.3%	16.1%	1.8

Variable Energy Resource Contributions

Because the electrical output of variable energy resources (e.g., wind, solar) depends on weather conditions, on-peak capacity contributions are less than nameplate capacity. The table below shows the capacity contribution of existing wind and solar resources at the peak demand hour for each assessment area. Resource contributions are also aggregated by Interconnection and across the entire BPS. For NERC's analysis of risk periods after peak demand (i.e., U.S. assessment areas in WECC), lower contributions of solar resources are used because output is diminished during evening periods.

BPS Variable Energy Resources by Assessment Area									
	Wind			Solar			Hydro		
Assessment Area / Interconnection	Nameplate Wind	Expected Wind	Expected Share of Nameplate (%)	Nameplate Solar	Expected Solar	Expected Share of Nameplate (%)	Nameplate Hydro	Expected Hydro	Expected Share of Nameplate (%)
MISO	28,893	4,478	16%	2,441	1,221	50%	2,440	2,361	97%
MRO-Manitoba Hydro	259	41	16%	-	-	0%	5,917	5,255	89%
MRO-SaskPower	628	88	14%	-	-	0%	864	784	91%
NPCC-Maritimes	1,212	326	27%	2	-	0%	1,315	1,183	90%
NPCC-New England	1,421	201	14%	2,638	773	29%	4,059	2,812	69%
NPCC-New York	2,336	314	13%	76	35	46%	5,949	5,138	86%
NPCC-Ontario	4,943	751	15%	478	66	14%	8,918	4,716	53%
NPCC-Québec	3,820	-	0%	10	-	0%	41,346	32,789	79%
PJM	10,876	1,659	15%	4,852	2,878	64%	3,022	3,022	100%
SERC-Central	964	4	0%	450	287	64%	5,005	3,381	68%
SERC-East	-	-	0%	724	716	99%	3,052	3,002	98%
SERC-Florida Peninsula	-	-	0%	5,246	3,220	61%	-	-	0%
SERC-Southeast	-	-	0%	4,053	3,500	86%	3,242	3,288	101%
SPP	31,325	7,276	23%	306	245	80%	5,456	5,297	97%
Texas RE-ERCOT	35,454	9,423	27%	11,515	9,327	81%	571	475	83%
WECC-AB	3,177	232	7%	1,063	684	64%	894	378	42%
WECC-BC	717	142	20%	2	1	49%	16,378	10,115	62%
WECC-CA/MX	8,946	1,754	20%	19,457	13,634	70%	13,985	7,691	55%
WECC-NWPP-US	19,410	3,312	17%	7,479	4,735	63%	41,705	21,564	52%
WECC-NWPP-SRSG	3,245	516	16%	3,219	2,511	78%	3,532	2,765	78%
EASTERN INTERCONNECTION	82,856	14,425	17%	21,476	13,836	64%	50,846	41,776	82%
QUÉBEC INTERCONNECTION	3,820	-	0%	10	-	0%	41,346	32,789	79%
TEXAS INTERCONNECTION	35,454	9,423	27%	11,515	9,327	81%	571	475	83%
WECC INTERCONNECTION	35,495	5,956	17%	31,220	21,565	69%	76,494	42,513	56%
TOTAL:	157,626	29,804	19%	64,221	44,729	70%	169,257	117,554	69%

NERC
NORTH AMERICAN ELECTRIC RELIABILITY CORPORATION

2023 Summer Reliability Assessment

May 2023



2023 Summer Reliability Assessment Video

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Preface

Electricity is a key component of the fabric of modern society and the Electric Reliability Organization (ERO) Enterprise serves to strengthen that fabric. The vision for the ERO Enterprise, which is comprised of NERC and the six Regional Entities, is a highly reliable, resilient, and secure North American bulk power system (BPS). Our mission is to assure the effective and efficient reduction of risks to the reliability and security of the grid.

Reliability | Resilience | Security

Because nearly 400 million citizens in North America are counting on us

The North American BPS is made up of six Regional Entities as shown on the map and corresponding table below. The multicolored area denotes overlap as some load-serving entities participate in one Regional Entity while associated Transmission Owners/Operators (TO/TOP) participate in another.



MRO	Midwest Reliability Organization
NPCC	Northeast Power Coordinating Council
RF	ReliabilityFirst
SERC	SERC Reliability Corporation
Texas RE	Texas Reliability Entity
WECC	WECC

About this Assessment

NERC's *2023 Summer Reliability Assessment* (*SRA*) identifies, assesses, and reports on areas of concern regarding the reliability of the North American BPS for the upcoming summer season. In addition, the *SRA* presents peak electricity demand and supply changes and highlights any unique regional challenges or expected conditions that might affect the reliability of the BPS. The reliability assessment process is a coordinated reliability evaluation between the NERC Reliability Assessment Subcommittee, the Regional Entities, and NERC staff with demand and resource projections obtained from the assessment areas. This report reflects an independent assessment by NERC and the ERO Enterprise and is intended to inform industry leaders, planners, operators, and regulatory bodies so that they are better prepared to take necessary actions to ensure BPS reliability. This report also provides an opportunity for the industry to discuss plans and preparations to ensure reliability for the upcoming summer period.

Key Findings

NERC's annual SRA covers the upcoming four-month (June–September) summer period. This assessment provides an evaluation of generation resource and transmission system adequacy as well as energy sufficiency to meet projected summer peak demands and operating reserves. This includes a deterministic evaluation of data submitted for peak net demand hour and peak risk hour as well as results from recently updated probabilistic analyses. Additionally, this assessment identifies potential reliability issues of interest and regional topics of concern. While the scope of this seasonal assessment is focused on the upcoming summer, the key findings are consistent with risks and issues that NERC has highlighted in the *2022 Long-Term Reliability Assessment* and other earlier reliability assessments and reports.


The following findings are NERC's and the ERO Enterprise's independent evaluation of electricity generation and transmission capacity as well as potential operational concerns that may need to be addressed for the 2023 summer.

Resource Adequacy Assessment and Energy Risk Analysis

All areas are assessed as having adequate anticipated resources for normal summer peak load and conditions (see **Figure 1**). However, the following areas face risks of electricity supply shortfalls during periods of more extreme summer conditions. This determination of elevated risk is based on analysis of plausible scenarios, including 90/10 demand forecasts and historic high outage rates as well as low wind, solar photovoltaic (PV), or hydro energy conditions:

- **Midcontinent ISO (MISO):** The risk of being unable to meet reserve requirements at peak demand this summer in MISO is lower than in 2022 due to additional firm import commitments and lower peak demand forecast. MISO is expected to have sufficient resources, including firm imports, for normal summer peak demand. Wind generator performance during periods of high demand is a key factor in determining whether there is sufficient electricity supply on the system to maintain reliability. MISO can face challenges in meeting above-normal peak demand if wind generator energy output is lower than expected. Furthermore, the need for external (non-firm) supply assistance during more extreme demand levels will depend largely on wind energy output. Results of MISO's capacity auction have not been released at the time of this assessment, and these could change MISO's firm resources for the summer.
- **NPCC-New England:** Anticipated resources in New England are projected to be lower than in 2022 but are expected to remain sufficient for meeting operating reserve requirements at normal peak demand. Operating procedures for obtaining emergency resources or non-firm supplies from neighboring areas are likely to be needed during more extreme demand or low resource conditions.
- **NPCC-Ontario:** Planned nuclear outage for refurbishment have reduced the electricity supply resources serving the province. Additionally, load growth is contributing to a constrained transmission network during high-demand conditions that may not be able to deliver sufficient supply to the Windsor-Essex area in the southwest part of the province. Additional generator outages or extreme demand can lead to reserve shortages and a need to seek non-firm imports. Ontario could potentially see a significant increase in reliance on imports this summer under both normal peak (50/50) and extreme (90/10) demand scenarios.
- **SERC-Central**: Compared to the summer of 2022, forecasted peak demand has risen by over 950 MW while growth in anticipated resources has been flat. The assessment area is expected to have sufficient supply for normal peak demand while demand-side management or other operating mitigations can be expected for above-normal demand or high generator-outage conditions.
- **Southwest Power Pool (SPP):** Reserve margins have also fallen in SPP as a result of increasing peak demand and declining anticipated resources. Like MISO, the energy output of SPP's wind generators during periods of high demand is a key factor in determining whether there is sufficient electricity supply on the system. SPP can face energy challenges in meeting extreme peak demand or managing periods of thermal or hydro generator outages if wind resource energy output is below normal.
- **Texas (ERCOT):** The area is experiencing strong growth in both resources and forecasted demand. ERCOT added over 4 GW of new solar PV nameplate capacity to the ERCOT grid since 2022. Additionally, load reductions from dispatchable demand response programs have grown by over 18% to total 3,380 MW. ERCOT's peak demand forecast has also risen by 6% as a result of economic growth. Resources are adequate for peak demand of the average summer; however, dispatchable generation may not be sufficient to meet reserves during an extreme heat-wave that is accompanied by low winds.
- **U.S. Western Interconnection:** Resources across the area are sufficient to support normal peak demand. However, wide-area heat events can expose the WECC assessment areas of California/Mexico (CA/MX), Northwest (NW), and Southwest (SW) to risk of energy supply shortfall as each area relies on regional transfers to meet demand at peak and the late afternoon to evening hours when energy output from the area's vast solar PV resources are diminished. Within the Western Interconnection, entities are planning to install over 2 GW of new battery energy storage systems, which can help reduce energy risks from resource variability. Wildfire risks to the transmission network, which often accompany these wide-area heat events, can limit electricity transfers and result in localized load shedding.

All other areas have sufficient resources to manage normal summer peak demand and are at low risk of energy shortfalls from more extreme demand or generation outage conditions. Anticipated Reserve Margins meet or surpass the Reference Margin Level, indicating that planned resources in these areas are adequate to manage the risk of a capacity deficiency under normal conditions. Furthermore, based on risk scenario analysis in these areas, resources and energy appear adequate. **Figure 1** below summarizes the risk status for all assessment areas.



Seasonal Risk Assessment Summary	
High	Potential for insufficient operating reserves in normal peak conditions
Elevated	Potential for insufficient operating reserves in above-normal conditions
Low	Sufficient operating reserves expected

Figure 1: Summer Reliability Risk Area Summary

Other Reliability Issues

- **Stored supplies of natural gas and coal are at high levels, but industry is monitoring for potential generator fuel delivery risks.** The natural gas supply and infrastructure is vitally important to electric grid reliability, even as renewable generation satisfies more of our energy needs. Fuel supply and delivery infrastructure must be capable of meeting the ramp rates of natural-gas-fired generators as they balance the system when solar generation output declines. Likewise, owners and operators of some coal-fired generators in the U.S. Southeast report challenges in arranging coal replenishment due to mine closures and transport delays. Consequently, some Balancing Authorities (BA) continue to employ coal-conservation measures that began in late 2022 in order to maintain sufficient stocks for peak months.

- **New environmental rules that restrict power plant emissions will limit the operation of coal-fired generators in 23 states, including Nevada, Utah, and several states in the Gulf Coast, mid-Atlantic, and Midwest.** The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Good Neighbor Plan, finalized on March 15, 2023, ensures that affected states meet the Clean Air Act's "Good Neighbor" requirements by reducing pollution that significantly contributes to problems attaining and maintaining the EPA's health-based air quality standard[1] for ground-level ozone (i.e., smog) in downwind states.[2] Coal and natural-gas-fired generators in states affected by the Good Neighbor Plan will likely meet tighter emissions restrictions primarily by limiting hours of operation in this first year of implementation rather than through adding emissions control equipment. RCs in summer-peaking areas typically are not able to authorize extended outages to upgrade systems during this summer season in order to ensure sufficient resources for high demand. The final rule approved by the EPA includes provisions designed to give grid owners and operators flexibility to help maintain reliability, including allowance-trading mechanisms. Consequently, RCs, BAs, and GOs will need to be vigilant for emissions rule constraints that affect generator dispatchability and the potential need for emission allowance trades or waivers to meet high demand or low resource conditions. State regulators and industry should have protocols in place at the start of summer for managing emergent requests.

- **Low inventories of replacement distribution transformers could slow restoration efforts following hurricanes and severe storms.** The electric industry continues to face a shortage of distribution transformers as a result of production not keeping pace with demand. A survey by the American Public Power Association revealed that many utilities have low levels of emergency stocks that are used for responding to natural disasters and catastrophic events.[3]

[1] This standard is known as the 2015 Ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS)
[2] https://www.epa.gov/csapr/good-neighbor-plan-2015-ozone-naaqs#summary
[3] https://www.publicpower.org/periodical/article/appa-survey-members-shows-distribution-transformer-production-not-meeting-demand

Asset sharing programs used by utilities provide visibility and voluntary equipment sharing to maximize resources; however, electricity customers may experience delayed restoration of power following storms as crews must work to obtain new equipment. New efficiency standards for distribution transformers proposed by the U.S. Department of Energy could further exacerbate the transformer supply shortages.[4]

- **Supply chain issues present maintenance and summer preparedness challenges and are delaying some new resource additions.** Difficulties in obtaining sufficient labor, material, and equipment as a result of broad economic factors has affected preseason maintenance of transmission and generation facilities in North America. These supply chain issues have led some owners and operators to delay or cancel maintenance activities that are typically performed to ensure facilities are ready for summer conditions. Additionally, GOs in some areas that were preparing to interconnect new generation are facing delays that will prevent some from being available to meet expected peak summer demand. This includes areas in the U.S. Southeast and the U.S. part of the Western Interconnection (see **Regional Assessments Dashboards** for details). These supply chain issues can exacerbate concerns in elevated risk areas (**Figure 1**) and add challenges to operators across the BPS. Should project delays emerge, affected GOs and TOs must communicate changes to BAs, TOPs, and RCs so that impacts are understood and steps are taken to reduce risks of capacity deficiencies or energy shortfalls.
- **Winter precipitation is expected to improve the water supply for hydro generation in parts of the U.S. West, but low water levels on major reservoirs remain a concern for electricity generation.** Significant amounts of rainfall and high elevation snow are expected to help replenish reservoirs and maintain river flows that provide energy for most of California's hydroelectric facilities. However, reservoirs at the largest hydro facilities in the U.S. West, including Washington's Grand Coulee Dam and the Hoover Dam on the Arizona-Nevada border, remain at historic low levels, potentially limiting hydroelectric energy output. Power from these plants is used throughout the U.S. Western Interconnection.
- **Unexpected tripping of wind and solar PV resources during grid disturbances continues to be a reliability concern.** NERC has analyzed multiple large-scale disturbances on the BPS that involved widespread loss of inverter-based resources (IBR). In 2021 and 2022, the Texas Interconnection experienced widespread IBR loss events, like those previously observed in the California area. Similarly, four additional solar PV loss events occurred between June and August 2021 in California. In 2022, ERCOT required GOs to submit mitigation plans, and corrective measures are being implemented in 2023. In March 2023, NERC issued the *Inverter-Based Resource Performance Issues Alert* to GOs of Bulk Electric System (BES) solar PV generating resources.[5] As a Level 2 alert, it contains recommended actions for GOs of grid-connected solar PV resources, including steps to coordinate protection and controller settings, so that the resources will reliably operate during grid disturbances.
- **Curtailment of electricity transfers to areas in need during periods of high regional demand is a growing reliability concern.** During energy emergencies and periods of transmission system congestion, RCs and BAs may curtail area transfers for various reasons using established procedures and protocols. While the curtailments alleviate an issue in one part of the system, they can contribute to supply shortages or effect local transmission system operations in another area. Two recent extreme temperature events highlight the effect of transfer curtailments on area supply needs during energy emergencies. During the September 2022 wide-area heat dome, a BA in the WECC-SW assessment area declared an energy emergency when the neighboring assessment area, California Independent System Operator (CAISO), curtailed transfers in order to meet the high demand within their own area. During Winter Storm Elliott, firm exports were curtailed from PJM during a period of widespread energy emergencies in the U.S. Eastern Interconnection.

  For the summer of 2023, several areas identified as having capacity or energy risks are relying on imports of electricity supplies. These areas include MISO, NPCC-Ontario, SERC-Central, and the assessment areas in the U.S. Western Interconnection. A wide-area heat event that severely affects regional demand or generator availability presents an added concern in areas that are dependent on imports for managing high electricity demand.
- **In addition to the risk items identified in the Key Findings, resource outages will continue to present challenges in many areas during "near-peak" demand conditions that occur in spring and fall.** Many parts of North America experience elevated temperatures that extend beyond the summer (June–September) months into periods when BPS equipment owners and operators historically scheduled outages for maintenance. Increasingly, BAs are facing resource constrained periods during shoulder months as unseasonable temperatures coincide with generator unavailability. Careful attention to long-term weather forecasts and the potential for unusual heat patterns in the shoulder months is important to inform the need for more conservative outage coordination periods.

[4] https://www.energy.gov/articles/doe-proposes-new-efficiency-standards-distribution-transformers

[5] https://www.nerc.com/pa/rrm/bpsa/Alerts%20DL/NERC%20Alert%20R-2023-03-14-01%20Level%202%20-%20Inverter-Based%20Resource%20Performance%20Issues.pdf

Recommendations

To reduce the risk of electricity shortfalls on the BPS this summer, NERC recommends the following:

- RCs, BAs, and TOPs in the elevated risk areas identified previously in the key findings should take the following actions:
  - Review seasonal operating plans and the protocols for communicating and resolving potential supply shortfalls in anticipation of potentially extreme demand levels
  - Employ conservative generation and transmission outage coordination procedures commensurate with long-range weather forecasts to ensure adequate resource availability
  - Engage state or provincial regulators and policymakers to prepare for efficient implementation of demand side management mechanisms called for in operating plans
- GOs with solar PV resources should implement recommendations in the inverter-based resource performance issues alert that NERC issued in March 2023.
- RCs, BAs, and GOs in states affected by the new Good Neighbor Plan should be familiar with its provisions for ensuring electric reliability and have protocols in place to act to preserve generation resources when necessary to support periods of high demand. State regulators and industry should have protocols in place at the start of summer for managing emergent requests.

Discussion

Summer Temperature and Drought Forecasts

Peak electricity demand in most areas is directly influenced by temperature. Weather officials are expecting above normal temperatures for much of the United States while Canada is largely expected to see normal or below-normal average temperatures (see **Figure 2**). In addition, drought conditions continue across much of the western half of North America, resulting in unique challenges to area electricity supplies and potential impacts on demand.[6] Assessment area load forecasts account for many years of historical demand data, often up to 30 years, to predict summer peak demand and prepare for more extreme conditions. Above average seasonal temperatures can contribute to high peak demand as well as an increase in forced outages for generation and some BPS equipment. Effective preseason maintenance and preparations are particularly important to BPS reliability in severe or prolonged periods of above-normal temperatures.




Figure 2: United States and Canada Summer Temperature Outlook[7]

[6] See North American Drought Monitor: https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/temp-and-precip/drought/nadm/maps

[7] Seasonal forecasts obtained from U.S. National Weather Service and Natural Resources Canada: https://www.cpc.ncep.noaa.gov/products/predictions/long_range/ and https://weather.gc.ca/saisons/prob_e.html

Wildfire Risk Potential and BPS Impacts

Normal or below-normal fire risk is projected for much of the U.S. West at the beginning of the summer; in contrast, Florida, West Texas, and Central Canada project above-normal fire risks for the beginning of summer (see **Figure 3**). BPS operation can be impacted in areas where wildfires are active as well as areas where there is heightened risk of wildfire ignition due to weather and ground conditions. Above normal fire risk is projected for much of Canada throughout the summer.




Figure 3: North American Seasonal Fire Assessment for May through July 2023[8]

Wildfire prevention planning in California and some states in the U.S. Northwest include power shut-off programs in high fire-risk areas. When conditions warrant implementing these plans, power lines (including transmission-level lines) may be preemptively de-energized in high fire-risk areas to prevent wildfire ignitions. Other wildfire risk mitigation activities include implementing enhanced vegetation management, equipment inspections, system hardening, and added situational awareness measures. In January 2021, the ERO published the *Wildfire Mitigation Reference Guide*[9] to promote preparedness within the North American electric power industry and share the experiences and practices from utilities in the Western Interconnection.

[8] *See North American Seasonal Fire Assessment and Outlook*, May 2023. Subsequent updates at this link will include August and September: https://www.predictiveservices.nifc.gov/outlooks/NA_Outlook.pdf

[9] See the NERC *Wildfire Mitigation Reference Guide*, January 2021: https://nerc.com/comm/RSTC/Documents/Wildfire%20Mitigation%20Reference%20Guide_January_2021.pdf

Risk Assessments of Resource and Demand Scenarios

Seasonal risk scenarios for each assessment area are presented in the **Regional Assessments Dashboards** section. The on-peak reserve margin and seasonal risk scenario chart in each dashboard provide potential summer peak demand and resource condition information. The reserve margins on the right side of the dashboard pages provide a comparison to the previous year's assessment. The seasonal risk scenario charts present deterministic scenarios for further analysis of different demand and resource levels with adjustments for normal and extreme conditions. The assessment areas determined the adjustments to capacity and peak demand based on methods or assumptions that are summarized in the seasonal risk scenario charts; see the **Data Concepts and Assumptions** for more information about these dashboard charts.

The seasonal risk scenario charts can be expressed in terms of reserve margins: In **Table 1**, each assessment area's Anticipated Reserve Margins are shown alongside the reserve margins for a typical generation outage scenario (where applicable) and the extreme demand and resource conditions in their seasonal risk scenario.

Highlighted in **orange** are the areas identified as having resource adequacy or energy risks for the summer in the **Key Findings** section's discussion. The typical outages reserve margin is comprised of anticipated resources minus the capacity that is likely to be in maintenance or forced outage at peak demand. If the typical maintenance or forced outage margin is the same as the Anticipated Reserve Margin, it is because an assessment area has already factored typical outages into the anticipated resources. The extreme conditions margin includes all components of the scenario and represents the most severe operating conditions of an area's scenario. Note that any reserve margin below zero indicates that the resources fall below demand in the scenario.

In addition to the peak demand and seasonal risk hour scenario charts, the assessment areas provided a resource adequacy risk assessment that was probability-based for the summer season. Results are included in the Highlights section of each assessment area's dashboard and summarized in the **Probabilistic Assessment** section. The risk assessments account for the hour(s) of greatest risk of resource shortfall. For most areas, the hour(s) of risk coincide with the time of forecasted peak demand; however, some areas incur the greatest risk at other times based on the varying demand and resource profiles. Various risk metrics are provided and include loss of load expectation (LOLE), loss of load hours (LOLH), expected unserved energy (EUE), and the probabilities of energy emergency alert (EEA) occurrence.

Table 1: Seasonal Risk Scenario On-Peak Reserve Margins

Assessment Area	Anticipated Reserve Margin	Anticipated Reserve Margin with Typical Outages	Anticipated Reserve Margin with Higher Demand, Outages, Derates in Extreme Conditions
MISO	23.0%	4.3%	-6.9%
MRO-Manitoba	29.1%	25.6%	13.1%
MRO-SaskPower	29.1%	12.8%	-1.9%
NPCC-Maritimes	49.7%	39.3%	20.2%
NPCC-New England	17.7%	7.0%	-3.9%
NPCC-New York	30.3%	17.0%	9.9%
NPCC-Ontario	14.0%	14.0%	8.6%
NPCC-Québec	37.1%	37.1%	37.1%
PJM	31.9%	23.4%	8.4%
SERC-Central	18.0%	9.6%	6.4%
SERC-East	19.1%	16.0%	9.0%
SERC-Florida Peninsula	26.6%	19.9%	12.8%
SERC-Southeast	39.6%	36.4%	33.8%
SPP	24.6%	14.3%	-4.0%
Texas RE-ERCOT	23.0%	16.5%	-1.6%
WECC-AB	24.8%	21.9%	8.1%
WECC-BC	28.9%	28.8%	-5.4%
WECC-CA/MX	35.0%	29.0%	-11.9%
WECC-NW	28.5%	22.5%	-12.9%
WECC-SW	19.5%	15.8%	-6.8%


Extreme generation outages, low resource output, and peak loads similar to those experienced in wide area heat events and the heat domes experienced in western parts of North America during the last three summers are ongoing reliability risks in certain areas for the summer of 2023. When forecasted resources in an area fall below expected demand, BAs would need to employ operating mitigations or EEA to obtain the capacity and energy necessary to meet extreme peak demands. **Table 2** describes the various EEA levels and the circumstances for each.


Table 2: Energy Emergency Alert Levels

EEA Level	Description	Circumstances
EEA 1	All available generation resources in use	• The BA is experiencing conditions where all available generation resources are committed to meet firm load, firm transactions, and reserve commitments and is concerned about sustaining its required contingency reserves. • Non-firm wholesale energy sales (other than those that are recallable to meet reserve requirements) have been curtailed.
EEA 2	Load management procedures in effect	• The BA is no longer able to provide its expected energy requirements and is an energy deficient BA. • An energy deficient BA has implemented its operating plan(s) to mitigate emergencies. • An energy deficient BA is still able to maintain minimum contingency reserve requirements.
EEA 3	Firm Load interruption is imminent or in progress	• The energy deficient BA is unable to meet minimum contingency reserve requirements.

Regional Assessments Dashboards

The following assessment area dashboards and summaries were developed based on data and narrative information collected by NERC from the six Regional Entities on an assessment area basis. Guidelines and definitions are in the **Data Concepts and Assumptions** table. On-Peak Reserve Margin bar charts show the Anticipated Reserve Margin compared to a Reference Margin Level that is established for the areas to meet resource adequacy criteria. Prospective Reserve Margins can give an indication of additional on-peak capacity but are not used for assessing adequacy. The operational risk analysis shown in the following regional assessments dashboard pages provides a deterministic scenario for understanding how various factors that affect resources and demand can combine to impact overall resource adequacy. For each assessment area, there is a risk-period scenario graphic; the left blue column shows anticipated resources (from the **Demand and Resource Tables**), and the two orange columns at the right show the two demand scenarios of the normal peak net internal demand (from the **Demand and Resource Tables**) and the extreme summer peak demand determined by the assessment area. The middle red or green bars show adjustments that are applied cumulatively to the anticipated resources. Adjustments may include reductions for typical generation outages (maintenance and forced not already accounted for in anticipated resources) and additions that represent the quantified capacity from operational tools (if any) that are available during scarcity conditions but have not been accounted for in the SRA reserve margins. Resources throughout the scenario are compared against expected operating reserve requirements that are based on peak load and normal weather. The cumulative effects from extreme events are also factored in through additional resource derates or low-output scenarios. In addition, results from a probability-based resource adequacy assessment are shown in the Highlights section of each dashboard. Methods varied by assessment area and provided further insights into the risk conditions forecasted for the summer period.







MISO

MISO is a not-for profit, member-based organization that administers wholesale electricity markets that provide customers with valued service; reliable, cost-effective systems and operations; dependable and transparent prices; open access to markets; and planning for long-term efficiency. MISO manages energy, reliability, and operating reserve markets that consist of 36 local BA and 394 market participants, serving approximately 42 million customers. Although parts of MISO fall in three Regional Entities, MRO is responsible for coordinating data and information submitted for NERC's reliability assessments.


Highlights

- Demand forecasts and preliminary resource data indicate that MISO is at risk of operating reserve shortfalls during periods of high demand or low resource output. MISO's resources are projected to be lower than in the summer of 2022 while net internal demand has also decreased. Firm transmission imports for this summer have significantly increased; this has resulted in a higher Anticipated Reserve Margin (ARM) of 23% (on an installed capacity basis) compared to 21% last summer. MISO's capacity auction has not concluded at the time of this assessment, which could lead to some change to MISO's firm resources for the summer.
- MISO conducted its annual probabilistic LOLE analysis and determined a 2023 Reference Margin Level (RML) of 15.9% results in an LOLE of 1 day in 10 years. MISO's RML declined from 17.9% in 2022 to 15.9% in 2023 based on the newly implemented seasonal capacity construct and associated modeling improvements that include seasonal outage rates and other enhancements. Comparing the increased ARM to the lower RML indicates improved reliability from the LOLE base case at 1 day in 10 years.
- Performance of wind generators during periods of high electricity demand is a key factor in determining whether system operators need to employ operating mitigations, such as maximum-generation declarations and energy emergencies. MISO has over 30,300 MW of installed wind capacity; however, the historically-based on-peak capacity contribution is 5,488 MW.


Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under normal peak-demand scenarios. Above-normal summer peak load and outage conditions could result in the need to employ operating mitigations (i.e., load modifying resources and energy transfers from neighboring systems) and EEAs. Emergency declarations that can only be called upon when available generation is at maximum capability are necessary to access load modifying resources (demand response) when operating reserve shortfalls are projected.


On-Peak Reserve Margin



On-Peak Fuel Mix



2023 Summer Risk Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) and (90/10) demand forecast using 30 years of historical data

Maintenance Outages: Rolling five-year summer average of maintenance and planned outages

Forced Outages: Five-year average of all outages that were not planned

Extreme Derates: Maximum historical generation outages

Operational Mitigations: A total of 2.4 GW capacity resources available during extreme operating conditions



MRO-Manitoba Hydro

Manitoba Hydro is a provincial Crown Corporation and one of the largest integrated electricity and natural gas distribution utilities in Canada. Manitoba Hydro is a leader in providing renewable energy and clean-burning natural gas Manitoba Hydro provides electricity to approximately 608,500 electric customers in Manitoba and provides approximately 293,000 customers with natural gas in Southern Manitoba. The service area is the province of Manitoba which is 251,000 square miles Manitoba Hydro is winter peaking. Manitoba Hydro is its own Planning Coordinator (PC) and BA. Manitoba Hydro is a coordinating member of MISO. MISO is the RC for Manitoba Hydro.


Highlights

- Manitoba Hydro is not anticipating any operational challenges and/or emerging reliability issues in its assessment area for the summer of 2023.
- The Anticipated Reserve Margin for the summer of 2023 exceeds the 12% Reference Margin Level.
- Six of the seven units at Keeyask Generating Station (hydroelectric) have reached commercial operation status. The remaining unit (Keeyask Unit 6) is listed as a Tier 1 capacity resource as it is operating but awaiting official commercial operation status.
- The 2022 probabilistic work indicated the annual probabilistic indices for the Manitoba Hydro system for 2024 of 29 MWh per year of EUE. Given comparable supply and demand balance, the 2024 EUE is a reasonable estimate for all of 2023.

Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under the assessed scenarios.


On-Peak Reserve Margin



On-Peak Fuel Mix



2023 Summer Risk Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: (50/50) Demand with allowance for Extreme Demand based on extreme summer weather scenario of 37 C (99 F)

Forced Outages: Typical forced outages

Extreme Derates: Summer wind capacity accreditation of 18.1% of nameplate rating based on MISO seasonal analysis

Normal hydro generation expected for this summer.

Operational Mitigations: Utilize Curtailable Rate Program to manage peak demand; utilize operating reserve if additional measures required




MRO-SaskPower

MRO-SaskPower is an assessment area in the Saskatchewan province of Canada. The province has a geographic area of 651,900 square kilometers (251,700 square miles) and a population of approximately 1.1 million. Peak demand is experienced in the winter. The Saskatchewan Power Corporation (SaskPower) is the PC and RC for the province of Saskatchewan and is the principal supplier of electricity in the province. SaskPower is a provincial crown corporation and, under provincial legislation, is responsible for the reliability oversight of the Saskatchewan BES and its Interconnections.

Highlights

- Summer reserve margins in Saskatchewan are higher than in 2022 due to the addition of new wind resources, fewer scheduled generator outages, and lower forecasted peak demand.
- Saskatchewan is a winter-peaking region but also experiences high load in summer during extreme hot weather.
- SaskPower conducts an annual summer joint operating study with Manitoba Hydro and prepares operating guidelines for any identified issues. Inputs from the Western Area Power Administration are included in the study.
- Results from SaskPower's probabilistic analysis indicate that the expected number of hours with operating reserve deficiency for the 2023 summer season (June to September) is 0.21 hours. The month with the highest probability of EEA is September (0.07 hours). The risk of operating reserve shortage during peak load times or EEAs could increase if large generation forced outage combined with planned maintenance outages occurs during peak load times in June, July, August, and September months.
- In case of extreme electricity demand from high temperatures combined with large generation forced outages, SaskPower would use available demand response programs, short-term power transfers from neighboring utilities, and short-term load interruptions if necessary.
- The Reference Reserve Margin was updated to adequately assess energy risks, such as due to changing resource mix, and to align with NERC recommended RRM.


On-Peak Reserve Margin




Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under normal peak-demand scenarios. Above-normal summer peak load and outage conditions could result in the need to employ operating mitigations (i.e., demand response and transfers) and EEAs.

On-Peak Fuel Mix



2023 Summer Risk Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) and above-normal scenario based on peak demand with lighting and all consumer loads

Maintenance Outages: Average of planned maintenance outages for the last three summers less future planned outages (already considered in Anticipated Resources)

Forced Outages: Estimated by using SaskPower forced outage model

Extreme Derates: Estimated resources unavailable in extreme conditions

Low Wind Scenario: 33% reduction in nameplate capacity for temperatures between 35° C and 40° C

Operational Mitigations: Estimated non-firm imports and stand-by generators on 2–7 day notice



NPCC-Maritimes

The Maritimes assessment area is a winter-peaking NPCC area that contains two BAs. It is comprised of the Canadian provinces of New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island, and the northern portion of Maine, which is radially connected to the New Brunswick power system. The area covers 58,000 square miles with a total population of 1.9 million.


Highlights

- The Maritimes area has not identified any operational issues that are expected to impact system reliability. If an event were to occur, there are emergency operations and planning procedures in place. All of the area's declared firm capacity is expected to be operational for the summer. As part of the planning process, dual-fuel units will have sufficient supplies of heavy fuel oil on-site to enable sustained operation in the event of natural gas supply interruptions.
- Based on an NPCC Probabilistic Assessment, minimal amounts of cumulative LOLE (<0.03 days/period), LOLH (<0.11 hours/period), or EUE (<5 MWh/period) were estimated over the May–September summer period for all modeled scenarios. The Maritimes area is winter peaking. The analysis included simulation of a base case (normal 50/50 demand and expected resources) and a highest peak load scenario as well as a low-likelihood, reduced resource case. This reduced resource case considered the impacts of wind capacity being derated by half during July and August due to calm weather, natural-gas-fired units being derated by half in July and August due to supply disruptions (dual-fuel units assumed to revert to oil) as well as reduced transfer capabilities. The highest load level results were based on the two highest load levels of the seven modeled, having approximately a combined 7% chance of occurring.


Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under normal peak-demand scenarios. Above-normal summer peak load and outage conditions could result in the need to employ operating mitigations (i.e., demand response and transfers) and EEAs.


On-Peak Reserve Margin



On-Peak Fuel Mix



2023 Summer Risk Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) and (above 90/10) extreme demand forecast

Forced Outages: Based on historical operating experience

Extreme Derates: A low-likelihood scenario resulting in an additional 50% derate in the remaining capacity of both natural gas and wind resources under extreme conditions



NPCC-New England


NPCC-New England is an assessment area consisting of the states of Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont that is served by ISO New England (ISO-NE) Inc. ISO-NE is a regional transmission organization that is responsible for the reliable day-to-day operation of New England's bulk power generation and transmission system, administration of the area's wholesale electricity markets, and management of the comprehensive planning of the regional BPS.

The New England BPS serves approximately 14.5 million customers over 68,000 square miles.

Highlights

- Reserve margins in New England are projected to be lower this summer due to less existing-certain capacity and firm imports. The New England area expects to have sufficient capacity to meet the 2023 summer peak demand forecast. As of April 4, 2023, The New England area expects to have sufficient resources to meet the 2023 summer peak demand forecast of 24,664 MW, for the weeks beginning June 4 through week beginning September 10, 2023, with the lowest projected net margin of 231 MW (0.9%) during the week of June 25, 2023. The 2023 summer demand forecast takes into account the demand reductions associated with energy efficiency, load management, behind-the-meter photovoltaic (BTM-PV) systems, and distributed generation.
- Based on an NPCC Probabilistic Assessment, ISO-NE may rely on limited use of its operating procedures that are designed to mitigate resource and energy shortages during the summer. Negligible cumulative LOLE, LOLH, and EUE risks were estimated over the summer period for all modeled scenarios except the severe low-likelihood case. This reduced resource case with the highest peak load scenario resulted in a small estimated cumulative LOLE risk (0.12 days/period) with associated LOLHs (0.4 hours/period) and EUE (175 MWh/period) with the highest risk occurring in June. This scenario is based exclusively on the two highest load levels with a 7% chance of occurring and a low resource case consisting of extended summer maintenance across NPCC and reduced imports from PJM.


On-Peak Reserve Margin




Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under normal peak-demand scenarios with local operating procedures. Extreme summer peak load and outage conditions could result in the need to employ operating mitigations (i.e., demand response, transfers, appeals) and EEAs. As noted above, the risk of load shedding is low.

On-Peak Fuel Mix



2023 Summer Risk Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Peak net internal demand (50/50) and (90/10) extreme demand forecast

Maintenance & Forced Outages: Based on historical weekly averages

Extreme Derates: Represent a case that is beyond the (90/10) conditions based on historical observation of force outages, additional reductions for generation at risk due to operating issues at extreme hot temperatures, and other outage causes reported by generators

Operational Mitigations: Based on load and capacity relief assumed available from invocation of ISO-NE operating procedures




NPCC-New York

NPCC-New York is an assessment area consisting of the New York ISO (NYISO) service territory. NYISO is responsible for operating New York's BPS, administering wholesale electricity markets, and conducting system planning. The NYISO is the only BA within the state of New York. The BPS encompasses over 11,000 miles of transmission lines, 760 power generation units, and serves 20.2 million customers. For this SRA, the established Reference Margin Level is 15%. Wind, grid-connected solar PV, and run-of-river totals were derated for this calculation. However, New York requires load-serving entities to procure capacity for their loads equal to their peak demand plus an Installed Reserve Margin (IRM). The IRM requirement represents a percentage of capacity above peak load forecast and is approved annually by the New York State Reliability Council. New York State Reliability Council approved the 2022–2023 IRM at 20.0%.

Highlights

- NYISO is not anticipating any operational issues in the New York control area for the upcoming summer. Adequate capacity margins are anticipated, and existing operating procedures are sufficient to handle any issues that may occur.
- A number of combustion turbine generators will be retiring before or during this summer as a result of the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation Peaker Rule. Retirements in 2023 include 16 MW of natural-gas-fired, 53 MW of oil-fired, and 558 MW of dual-fueled generation. New generation includes 556 MW of land-based wind, 90 MW of new solar PV (coming in the third quarter), and 136 MW of new offshore wind generation (coming in the third quarter). Overall, the rule is expected to lead to the retirement of approximately 1,600 MW of capacity by 2025.
- Based on an NPCC Probabilistic Assessment, NYISO may rely on limited use of its operating procedures that are designed to mitigate resource and energy shortages during the summer. Negligible cumulative LOLE, LOLH, and EUE risks were estimated over the summer period for all modeled scenarios except the severe low-likelihood case. This reduced resource case with highest peak load scenario resulted in a small estimated cumulative LOLE risk (0.5 days/period) with associated LOLH (1.1 hours/period) and EUE (525 MWh/period) with the highest risk in June and August. This scenario is based exclusively on the two highest load levels with a 7% chance of occurring and a low resource case consisting of extended summer maintenance across NPCC and reduced imports from PJM.


On-Peak Reserve Margin




Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under the assessed scenarios.

On-Peak Fuel Mix



2023 Summer Risk Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) and (90/10) extreme demand forecast

Maintenance Outages:

Forced Outages: Based on historical 5-year averages

Extreme Derates: Estimated resources unavailable in extreme conditions

Operational Mitigations: A total of 3.3 GW based on operational/emergency procedures in area emergency operations manual



NPCC-Ontario

NPCC-Ontario is an assessment area in the Ontario province of Canada. The Independent Electricity System Operator (IESO) is the BA for the province of Ontario. The province of Ontario covers more than 1 million square kilometers (415,000 square miles) and has a population of more than 14 million. Ontario is interconnected electrically with Québec, MRO-Manitoba, states in MISO (Minnesota and Michigan), and NPCC-New York.


Highlights

- Ontario has entered a period during which generation and transmission outages will be increasingly difficult to accommodate. The IESO expects these conditions to persist for the foreseeable future. IESO is strongly encouraging market participants to plan ahead and coordinate with IESO to ensure planned outages can be appropriately scheduled.
- Under both normal and extreme weather conditions, Ontario may rely on imports and outage management for a significant number of weeks during the 2023 summer assessment period primarily as a result of coincident generator outages. Should market participants be unable to reschedule certain outages during this period, Ontario may have to rely on more than 2,000 MW of non-firm supply from other areas and/or additional operating actions to ensure reliability.
- Based on an NPCC Probabilistic Assessment, Ontario is expected to need only limited use of its operating procedures that are designed to mitigate resource and energy shortages during the summer. Negligible cumulative LOLE, LOLH, and EUE risks were estimated over the summer period for all modeled scenarios except the severe low-likelihood cases, which resulted in small LOLH (0.3 hours). These results model import availability and indicate that Ontario will be able to obtain the necessary supplies from neighbors over a range of most conditions, but there is a risk during extreme demand and low resource periods.
- The ongoing transmission outage at the New York–St. Lawrence interconnection continues to impact import and export capacity between Ontario and New York. This issue is expected to be resolved by the end of the fourth quarter of 2023.


Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under normal peak-demand scenarios. Above-normal summer peak load or extreme outage conditions could result in the need to employ operating mitigations (i.e., demand response and non-firm transfers) and EEAs. Load shedding may be needed under extreme peak demand and outage scenarios.

On-Peak Reserve Margin



On-Peak Fuel Mix



2023 Summer Risk Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50 Forecast) and highest weather-adjusted daily demand based on 31 years of demand history

Extreme Derates: Derived from weather-adjusted temperature rating of thermal units and adjustments to expected hydro production for low water conditions

Operational Mitigations: Imports anticipated from neighbors during emergencies




NPCC-Québec

The Québec assessment area (Province of Québec) is a winter-peaking NPCC area that covers 595,391 square miles with a population of 8 million. Québec is one of the four Interconnections in North America; it has ties to Ontario, New York, New England, and the Maritimes; consisting of either high voltage direct current ties, radial generation, or load to and from neighboring systems.

Highlights

- The Québec area forecasted summer peak demand (excluding April, May, and September) is 22,859 MW during the week of August 13, 2023, with a forecasted net margin of 7,202 MW (31.5%). No particular resource adequacy problems are forecasted, and the Québec area expects to be able to provide assistance to other areas up to the transfer capability available.
- In the Québec RC area, most transmission line, transformer, and generating unit maintenance is done during the summer period. Internal transmission outage plans are assessed to meet internal demand, firm sales, expected additional sales, and additional uncertainty margins. They should not impact inter-area transfer capabilities with neighboring systems. During the 2023 summer operating period, some maintenance outages are scheduled on the interconnections. Maintenance is coordinated with neighboring RC areas so as to leave maximum capability to summer-peaking areas.
- Based on an NPCC Probabilistic Assessment, Québec is expected to need only limited use of its operating procedures designed to mitigate resource and energy shortages during the summer. Negligible cumulative LOLE, LOLH, and EUE risks were estimated over the summer period for all modeled scenarios, including the severe low-likelihood cases.


On-Peak Reserve Margin




Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under the assessed scenarios.

On-Peak Fuel Mix



2023 Summer Risk Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenario: Net internal demand (50/50) and (90/10) demand forecast

Net Firm Transfers: Anticipated exports to neighbors during the risk hour



PJM

PJM Interconnection is a regional transmission organization that coordinates the movement of wholesale electricity in all or parts of Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, and the District of Columbia. PJM serves 65 million customers and covers 369,089 square miles. PJM is a BA, PC, Transmission Planner, Resource Planner, Interchange Authority, TOP, Transmission Service Provider, and RC.


Highlights

- PJM expects no resource problems over the entire 2023 summer peak season. Installed capacity is over twice the PJM reserve requirement necessary to meet the 1-day-in-10-years LOLE criterion.
- The 2022 PJM reserve requirement study used to establish the target installed reserve margin of 14.9% analyzed a wide range of load scenarios (low, regular and extreme) as well as multiple scenarios for system-wide unavailable capacity due to forced outages, maintenance outages, and ambient derations. Due to the rather low penetration of limited and variable resources in PJM relative to PJM's peak load, the hour with most loss of load risk remains the hour with highest forecasted net peak demand.
- No other reliability issues are expected.


Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under the assessed scenarios.


On-Peak Reserve Margin



On-Peak Fuel Mix



2023 Summer Risk Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) and (90/10) demand forecast

Forced Outages: Based on historical data and trending

Extreme Derates: Accounts for reduced thermal capacity contributions due to performance in extreme conditions

Operational Mitigations: A total of 2.5 GW based on operational/emergency procedures




SERC-Central

SERC-Central is an assessment area within the SERC Regional Entity. SERC-Central includes all of Tennessee and portions of Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Missouri, and Kentucky. Historically a summer-peaking area, SERC-Central is beginning to have higher peak demand forecasts in winter. SERC is one of the six companies across North America that are responsible for the work under Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) approved delegation agreements with NERC. SERC-Central is specifically responsible for the reliability and security of the electric grid across the Southeastern and Central areas of the United States. This area covers approximately 630,000 square miles and serves a population of more than 91 million. The SERC Regional Entity includes 36 BAs, 28 Planning Authorities (PA), and 6 RCs.

Highlights

- Entities in SERC-Central have not identified any potential reliability issues for the upcoming summer season. Entities anticipate having adequate system capacity for the upcoming summer season and are equipped to address unexpected short-term issues by leveraging diverse generation portfolios and spot purchases from the power markets when necessary.
- Non-economic dispatch (out of merit) of available coal-fired generators ahead of the upcoming summer season is anticipated in order to build inventory and limit consumption of fuel and consumables for plant operations and mitigate supply and transportation challenges during the summer.
- Each entity continues to work collaboratively to ensure reliability for its area within SERC and to promote reliability and adequacy across the entire SERC Regional Entity.
- Entities continue to participate actively in the SERC Near-Term and Long-Term Working Groups among others. These working groups help the entities identify and address emerging and potential reliability impacts on transmission and resource adequacy along with transfer capability.
- Probabilistic analysis indicates negligible risk for resource shortfall. The 2022 study found negligible LOLH and EUE during summer months for a similar resource mix and demand levels.


On-Peak Reserve Margin




Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under normal peak-demand scenarios. Above-normal summer peak load and outage conditions could result in the need to employ operating mitigations (i.e., demand response and transfers) and EEAs.

On-Peak Fuel Mix



2023 Summer Risk Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) and extreme demand forecast based on extreme summer weather (equals or exceeds the (90/10) demand forecast)

Maintenance Outages: Adjusted for higher outages resulting from extreme summer temperatures and aggregated on a SERC subregional level

Forced Outages: Accounts for reduced thermal capacity contributions due to performance in extreme conditions

Extreme Derates: Estimated resources unavailable in extreme conditions

Operational Mitigations: A total of 1.9 GW based on operational/emergency procedures



SERC-East

SERC-East is an assessment area within the SERC Regional Entity. SERC-East includes North Carolina and South Carolina. Historically a summer-peaking area, SERC-East is beginning to have higher peak demand forecasts in winter. SERC is one of the six companies across North America that are responsible for the work under FERC approved delegation agreements with NERC. SERC is specifically responsible for the reliability and security of the electric grid across the Southeastern and Central areas of the United States. This area covers approximately 630,000 square miles and serves a population of more than 91 million. The SERC Regional Entity includes 36 BAs, 28 PAs, and 6 RCs.


Highlights

- SERC-East is transitioning to a hybrid-peaking (both summer and winter peaking) area as solar PV reduces summer peak demand and electrification of heating drives up winter peak demand.
- Entities have not identified any emerging reliability issues or operational concerns for the upcoming summer season.
- Entities continue to perform resource studies to ensure resource adequacy to meet the summer peak demand and to maintain reliability to the system.
- Entities continue to participate actively in the SERC Near-Term and Long-Term Working Groups. These groups identify emerging and potential reliability impacts on transmission and resource adequacy along with transfer capability.
- Probabilistic analysis shows a low risk for resource shortfall during the months of July and August. The 2022 study found LOLH of 0.005 hours and EUE of 2.381 MWh during summer months for a similar resource mix and demand levels.


Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under the assessed scenarios.

On-Peak Reserve Margin




On-Peak Fuel Mix



Coal
Petroleum
Natural Gas
Biomass
Solar
Conventional Hydro
Pumped Storage
Nuclear
Battery

2023 Summer Risk Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) and extreme demand forecast based on extreme summer weather (equals or exceeds the (90/10) demand forecast)

Maintenance Outages: Adjusted for higher outages resulting from extreme summer temperatures and aggregated on a SERC subregional level

Forced Outages: Accounts for reduced thermal capacity contributions due to performance in extreme conditions

Operational Mitigations: A total of 1.5 GW based on operational/emergency procedures



SERC-Florida Peninsula

SERC-Florida Peninsula is a summer-peaking assessment area within SERC. SERC is one of the six companies across North America that are responsible for the work under FERC approved delegation agreements with NERC. SERC is specifically responsible for the reliability and security of the electric grid across the Southeastern and Central areas of the United States. This area covers approximately 630,000 square miles and serves a population of more than 91 million. The SERC Regional Entity includes 36 BAs, 28 PAs, and 6 RCs.


Highlights

- Entities have not identified any emerging reliability issues or operational concerns for the upcoming summer season.
- Entities continue to perform resource studies to ensure resource adequacy to meet the summer peak demand and to maintain system reliability.
- Entities continue to participate actively in the SERC Near-Term and Long-Term Working Groups. These groups identify emerging and potential reliability impacts on transmission and resource adequacy along with transfer capability.
- SERC probabilistic analysis indicates negligible risk for resource shortfall. The 2022 study found negligible LOLH and EUE during summer months for a similar resource mix and demand levels


Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under the assessed scenarios.


On-Peak Reserve Margin



On-Peak Fuel Mix



2023 Summer Risk Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) and extreme demand forecast based on extreme summer weather (equals or exceeds the (90/10) demand forecast)

Maintenance Outages: Adjusted for higher outages resulting from extreme summer temperatures and aggregated on a SERC subregional level

Forced Outages: Accounts for reduced thermal capacity contributions due to performance in extreme conditions

Operational Mitigations: A total of 3.8 GW based on operational/ emergency procedures



SERC-Southeast

SERC-Southeast is a summer-peaking assessment area within the SERC Regional Entity. SERC-Southeast includes all or portions of Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi. SERC is one of the six companies across North America that are responsible for the work under FERC approved delegation agreements with NERC. SERC is specifically responsible for the reliability and security of the electric grid across the southeastern and central areas of the United States. This area covers approximately 630,000 square miles and serves a population of more than 91 million. The SERC Regional Entity includes 36 BAs, 28 Planning Authorities, and 6 RCs.


Highlights

- Entities have not identified any emerging reliability issues for the upcoming summer season that will impact resource adequacy.
- The available system capacity for the upcoming summer season meets or exceeds the reserve margin target. Reliability is supported by a diverse fuel mix, firm natural gas contracts, and power purchases.
- Entities continue to participate actively in the SERC near-term and long-term working groups. These groups identify emerging and potential reliability impacts on transmission and resource adequacy along with transfer capability.
- Probabilistic analysis indicates almost no risk for resource shortfall.


Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under the assessed scenarios.


On-Peak Reserve Margin



On-Peak Fuel Mix



2023 Summer Risk Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) and extreme demand forecast based on extreme summer weather (equals or exceeds the (90/10) demand forecast)

Maintenance Outages: Adjusted for higher outages resulting from extreme summer temperatures and aggregated on a SERC subregional level

Forced Outages: Accounts for reduced thermal capacity contributions due to performance in extreme conditions

Extreme Derates: Estimated resources unavailable in extreme conditions

Operational Mitigations: A total of 3.0 GW based on operational/ emergency procedures



SPP

SPP PC footprint covers 546,000 square miles and encompasses all or parts of Arkansas, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas, and Wyoming. The SPP long-term assessment is reported based on the Planning Coordinator footprint, which touches parts of the Midwest Reliability Organization Regional Entity and the WECC Regional Entity. The SPP assessment area footprint has approximately 61,000 miles of transmission lines, 756 generating plants, and 4,811 transmission-class substations, and it serves a population of more than 18 million.


Highlights

- At this time, SPP projects a low likelihood of any emerging reliability issues impacting the area for the 2023 summer season.
- BA generation capacity deficiency risks remain depending on wind generation output levels and unanticipated generation outages in combination with high load periods.
- SPP performed a statistical analysis of risk of energy emergencies for the upcoming summer based on historical data. They found it likely that operators would use part of the 2 GW operating reserves and issue EEA1 and EEA2 level approximately one day each summer; it is likely that operators would deplete all operating reserves approximately once every five summers, resulting in an EEA3.
- Using the current operational processes and procedures, SPP will continue to assess the needs for the 2023 summer season and will adjust as needed to ensure that real-time reliability is maintained throughout the summer time frame.


Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources are sufficient to meet operating reserve requirements under normal peak-demand and outage scenarios. Above-normal summer peak load and outage conditions could result in the need to employ operating mitigations (i.e. demand response and transfers from neighboring systems) and EEAs.


On-Peak Reserve Margin



On-Peak Fuel Mix



2023 Summer Risk Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) and extreme demand is a 5% increase from net internal demand

Maintenance & Forced Outages: Represent 5-year historical averages; calculated from SPP's generation assessment process

Extreme Derates: Additional unavailable capacity from operational data at high demand periods

Low Wind Scenario: Derates reflecting a low-wind day in the summer



Texas RE-ERCOT

The Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) is the ISO for the ERCOT Interconnection and is located entirely in the state of Texas; it operates as a single BA. It also performs financial settlement for the competitive wholesale bulk-power market and administers retail switching for nearly 8 million premises in competitive choice areas. ERCOT is governed by a board of directors and subject to oversight by the Public Utility Commission of Texas and the Texas Legislature. ERCOT is summer-peaking. It covers approximately 200,000 square miles, connects over 52,700 miles of transmission lines, has over 1,100 generation units, and serves more than 26 million customers. Texas RE is responsible for the RE functions described in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 for ERCOT. On November 3, 2022, the Public Utility Commission of Texas issued an order directing ERCOT to assume the duties and responsibilities of the Reliability Monitor for the Texas power grid.


Highlights

- Given an Anticipated Reserve Margin of 23% and Reference Reserve Margin of 13.75%, ERCOT expects to have sufficient operating reserves in expected normal summer system conditions.
- Solar PV nameplate capacity expected for the 2023 summer season is 4.4 GW higher than the forecast amount reported for the 2022 SRA.
- Several generator owners in the ERCOT area indicated they could run out of NOx emission allowances by July 2023 under U.S. EPA's Good Neighbor Plan. Texas filed a motion to stay the EPA's regulatory action. A delay in implementation has alleviated these concerns. ERCOT's probabilistic risk assessment indicates a low probability of energy emergency conditions during the summer peak load period, but the risk increases into the early evening hours due reductions of solar PV generation. There is a 4% probability that ERCOT will declare an EEA1 during the expected daily peak load hour increasing up to 19% probability at the highest risk hour ending at 8:00 p.m.
- System stability and strength stemming from the growth of IBRs remains a concern. ERCOT is also experiencing large increases in renewable production curtailments due to transmission constraints, and these curtailments are increasingly occurring at solar PV sites.


Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under normal and extreme peak-demand scenarios. Extreme generator outages combined with low-wind output during extreme peak demand could result in the need to employ operating mitigations such as demand response, EEAs, and localized load shedding.


On-Peak Reserve Margin



On-Peak Fuel Mix



2023 Summer Risk Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) and extreme demand represents weather conditions 2% worse than summer peak in 2011

Forced Outages: Based on the 95th percentile of historical averages of forced outages for June through September weekdays, hours ending 3:00–8:00 p.m. local time for the last three (2019–2021) summer seasons

Low Wind Scenario: Based on the 10th percentile of historical averages of hourly wind for June through September, hours ending 1:00–9:00 p.m. local time

Extreme Derates: Based on the 95th percentile of historical averages of forced outages for June through September weekdays, hours ending 3:00–8:00 p.m. local time for the last five (2019–2021) summer seasons

Operational Mitigations: Additional capacity from switchable generation and additional imports



WECC-AB

WECC-AB (Alberta) is a winter-peaking assessment area in the WECC Regional Entity that consists of the province of Alberta, Canada. WECC is responsible for coordinating and promoting BES reliability in the Western Interconnection. WECC's 329 members include 39 BAs, representing a wide spectrum of organizations with an interest in the BES. Serving an area of nearly 1.8 million square miles and more than 82 million customers, it is geographically the largest and most diverse Regional Entity. WECC's service territory extends from Canada to Mexico. It includes the provinces of Alberta and British Columbia in Canada, the northern portion of Baja California in Mexico as well as all or portions of the 14 Western United States in between.


Highlights

- The Western Interconnection is experiencing heightened reliability risks heading into the summer of 2023 due to increased supply-side shortages along with the ongoing drought impacts in some areas, continued wildfire threats, and expanding heat wave events.
- There is 35% less coal-fired generator capacity in Alberta compared to last summer (446 MW). Resource additions include 554 MW of natural-gas-fired generation, 336 MW of new solar PV resources, and 1,350 MW of new wind generation.
- Based on a WECC Probabilistic Assessment, the WECC-AB assessment area had negligible LOLH and EUE.
- Alberta is expected to have sufficient resource availability to meet demand and cover reserves on the peak hour at 4:00 p.m. under a summer peak defined as a one-in-ten probability at the 90th percentile with any combination or accumulation of derates.


Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under the assessed scenarios


On-Peak Reserve Margin



On-Peak Fuel Mix



2023 Summer Risk Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) and (90/10) demand forecast

Typical Forced Outages: Average seasonal outages

Extreme Derates: Using (90/10) point of resource performance distribution

Low Hydro Scenario: Reduced hydro availability resulting from drought conditions



WECC-BC

WECC-British Columbia (BC) is a winter-peaking assessment area in the WECC Regional Entity that consists of the province of British Columbia, Canada. WECC is responsible for coordinating and promoting BES reliability in the Western Interconnection. WECC's 329 members include 39 BAs, representing a wide spectrum of organizations with an interest in the BES. Serving an area of nearly 1.8 million square miles and more than 82 million customers, it is geographically the largest and most diverse Regional Entity. WECC's service territory extends from Canada to Mexico. It includes the provinces of Alberta and British Columbia in Canada, the northern portion of Baja California in Mexico as well as all or portions of the 14 Western United States in between.


Highlights

- The Western Interconnection is experiencing heightened reliability risks heading into the summer of 2023 due to increased supply-side shortages along with the ongoing drought impacts in some areas, continued wildfire threats, and expanding heat wave events.
- BC shows adequate reserve margins to meet demand under extreme conditions.
- Based on a WECC Probabilistic Assessment, the WECC-BC assessment area had negligible LOLH and EUE.
- BC is expected to have sufficient resource availability to meet demand and cover reserves on the peak hour at 4:00 p.m., under a summer peak defined as a one-in-ten probability at the 90th percentile with any combination or accumulation of derates.


Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under normal peak-demand scenarios. Above-normal summer peak load and outage conditions could result in the need to employ operating mitigations (i.e., demand response and transfers) and EEAs. Load shedding may be needed under the extreme peak demand and outage scenarios studied.


On-Peak Reserve Margin



On-Peak Fuel Mix



2023 Summer Risk Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) and (90/10) demand forecast

Forced Outages: Average seasonal outages

Extreme Derates: Using (90/10) resource performance distribution at peak hour

Low Hydro Scenario: Reduced hydro availability resulting from drought conditions



WECC-CA/MX

WECC-CA/MX is a summer-peaking assessment area in the WECC Regional Entity that includes parts of California, Nevada, and Baja California, Mexico. WECC is responsible for coordinating and promoting BES reliability in the Western Interconnection. WECC's 329 members include 39 BAs, representing a wide spectrum of organizations with an interest in the BES. Serving an area of nearly 1.8 million square miles and more than 82 million customers, it is geographically the largest and most diverse Regional Entity. WECC's service territory extends from Canada to Mexico. It includes the provinces of Alberta and British Columbia in Canada, the northern portion of Baja California in Mexico as well as all or portions of the 14 Western United States in between.


Highlights

- The Western Interconnection is experiencing heightened reliability risks heading into the summer of 2023 due to increased supply-side shortages along with the ongoing drought impacts in some areas, continued wildfire threats, and expanding heat wave events.
- CA/MX shows adequate reserve margins under expected conditions on the peak hour. However, increased risk occurs during the hours after peak demand and into the evening due to the variability of energy availability. CA/MX is typically reliant on imports during these periods.
- Based on a WECC Probabilistic Assessment, WECC-CA/MX is projected to have negligible-to-low amounts of LOLH (<0.5 hours) this summer. Variation in LOLH is attributable to the amount of Tier 1 resources that connect before the later months.
- CA/MX is expected to have sufficient resource availability to meet demand and cover reserves on the peak hour at 4:00 p.m. under a summer peak defined as a one-in-ten probability at the 90th percentile with any combination or accumulation of derates.
- For the peak riskiest hour ending 8:00 pm (four hours later than the peak) under an extreme summer peak load, CA/MX would need to rely on increased imports to maintain adequate reserves. Under expected net internal demand for the same riskiest hour (not an extreme summer peak for that hour), any of the typical outages or extreme derates would also cause a need for increased reliance on imports.


Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under normal peak-demand scenarios. Above-normal summer peak load and outage conditions could result in the need to employ operating mitigations (i.e., demand response and transfers) and EEAs. Load shedding may be needed under extreme peak demand and outage scenarios studied.


On-Peak Reserve Margin



On-Peak Fuel Mix



2023 Summer Risk Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at 8:00 p.m. local time as solar PV output is diminished and demand remains high

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) at risk hour and (90/10) demand forecast at risk hour

Forced Outages: Estimated using market forced outage model

Extreme Derates: On natural gas units based on historic data and manufacturer data for temperature performance and outages

Low Hydro Scenario: Reduced hydro availability resulting from drought conditions



WECC-NW

WECC-NW is a summer-peaking assessment area in the WECC Regional Entity. The area includes Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, Utah, Washington, Wyoming and parts of California, Nebraska, Nevada, and South Dakota. WECC is responsible for coordinating and promoting BES reliability in the Western Interconnection. WECC's 329 members include 39 BAs, representing a wide spectrum of organizations with an interest in the BES. Serving an area of nearly 1.8 million square miles and more than 82 million customers, it is geographically the largest and most diverse Regional Entity. WECC's service territory extends from Canada to Mexico. It includes the provinces of Alberta and British Columbia in Canada, the northern portion of Baja California in Mexico as well as all or portions of the 14 Western United States in between.


Highlights

- The Western Interconnection is experiencing heightened reliability risks heading into the summer of 2023 due to increased supply-side shortages along with the ongoing drought impacts in some areas, continued wildfire threats, and expanding heat wave events.
- NW shows adequate reserve margins under expected conditions on the peak hour. However, NW shows increased risk a few hours later during the peak riskiest hour, due to the variability of energy availability later in the evenings. NW would be reliant on increased imports.
- Based on a WECC Probabilistic Assessment, the WECC-NW assessment area had negligible LOLH and EUE.
- WECC-NW would need to rely on imports to maintain adequate reserves on the peak riskiest hour (five hours later at 9:00 p.m.) under an extreme summer peak load and either extreme thermal or extreme hydro derates or any combination of two other extreme derate scenarios.


Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under normal peak-demand scenarios. Above-normal summer peak load and outage conditions could result in the need to employ operating mitigations (i.e., demand response and transfers) and EEAs. Load shedding may be needed under extreme peak demand and outage scenarios.


On-Peak Reserve Margin



On-Peak Fuel Mix



2023 Summer Risk Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

- **Risk Period:** Highest risk for unserved energy at 9:00 p.m. local time as solar PV output is diminished and demand remains high
- **Demand Scenarios:** Net internal demand (50/50) at risk hour and (90/10) demand forecast at risk hour
- **Forced Outages:** Average seasonal outages
- **Extreme Derates:** Using (90/10) scenario
- **Low Hydro Scenario**: Reduced hydro availability resulting from drought conditions




WECC-SW

WECC-SW is a summer-peaking assessment area in the WECC Regional Entity. It includes Arizona, New Mexico, and part of California and Texas. WECC is responsible for coordinating and promoting BES reliability in the Western Interconnection. WECC's 329 members include 39 BAs, representing a wide spectrum of organizations with an interest in the BES. Serving an area of nearly 1.8 million square miles and more than 82 million customers, it is geographically the largest and most diverse Regional Entity. WECC's service territory extends from Canada to Mexico. It includes the provinces of Alberta and British Columbia in Canada as well as the northern portion of Baja California in Mexico and all or portions of the 14 Western United States in between.

Highlights

- The Western Interconnection is experiencing heightened reliability risks heading into the summer of 2023 due to increased supply-side shortages along with the ongoing drought impacts in some areas, continued wildfire threats, and expanding heat wave events.
- WECC-SW shows adequate reserve margins to meet demand under extreme conditions.
- Based on a WECC Probabilistic Assessment, the WECC-SW assessment area had negligible LOLH and EUE.
- WECC-SW is expected to have sufficient resource availability to meet demand and cover reserves on the peak hour at 5:00 p.m. under a summer peak defined as a one-in-ten probability at the 90th percentile with any combination or accumulation of derates.


On-Peak Reserve Margin




Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under normal peak-demand scenarios. Above-normal summer peak load and outage conditions could result in the need to employ operating mitigations (i.e., demand response and transfers) and EEAs. Load shedding may be needed under extreme peak demand and outage scenarios.

On-Peak Fuel Mix



2023 Summer Risk Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy occurs at the hour of peak demand (5:00 p.m. local)

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) at risk hour and (90/10) demand forecast at risk hour

Forced Outages: Average seasonal outages

Extreme Derates: Using (90/10) scenario

Low Hydro Scenario: Reduced hydro availability resulting from drought conditions

Data Concepts and Assumptions

The table below explains data concepts and important assumptions used throughout this assessment.

General Assumptions

- Reliability of the interconnected BPS is comprised of both adequacy and operating reliability:
  - Adequacy is the ability of the electricity system to supply the aggregate electric power and energy requirements of the electricity consumers at all times while taking into account scheduled and reasonably expected unscheduled outages of system components.
  - Operating reliability is the ability of the electricity system to withstand sudden disturbances, such as electric short-circuits or unanticipated loss of system components.
- The reserve margin calculation is an important industry planning metric used to examine future resource adequacy.
- All data in this assessment is based on existing federal, state, and provincial laws and regulations.
- Differences in data collection periods for each assessment area should be considered when comparing demand and capacity data between year-to-year seasonal assessments.
- *2022 Long-Term Reliability Assessment* data has been used for most of this 2023 summer assessment period augmented by updated load and capacity data.
- A positive net transfer capability would indicate a net importing assessment area; a negative value would indicate a net exporter.

Demand Assumptions

- Electricity demand projections, or load forecasts, are provided by each assessment area.
- Load forecasts include peak hourly load[10] or total internal demand for the summer and winter of each year.[11]
- Total internal demand projections are based on normal weather (50/50 distribution[12]) and are provided on a coincident[13] basis for most assessment areas.
- Net internal demand is used in all reserve margin calculations, and it is equal to total internal demand then reduced by the amount of controllable and dispatchable demand response projected to be available during the peak hour.

Resource Assumptions

Resource planning methods vary throughout the North American BPS. NERC uses the categories below to provide a consistent approach for collecting and presenting resource adequacy. Because the electrical output of variable energy resources (e.g., wind, solar PV) depends on weather conditions, their contribution to reserve margins and other on-peak resource adequacy analysis is less than their nameplate capacity.

Anticipated Resources:

- **Existing-Certain Capacity**: Included in this category are commercially operable generating unit or portions of generating units that meet at least one of the following requirements when examining the period of peak demand for the summer season: unit must have a firm capability and have a power purchase agreement with firm transmission that must be in effect for the unit; unit must be classified as a designated network resource; and/or where energy-only markets exist, unit must be a designated market resource eligible to bid into the market.
- **Tier 1 Capacity Additions**: This category includes capacity that either is under construction or has received approved planning requirements.
- **Net Firm Capacity Transfers (Imports minus Exports)**: This category includes transfers with firm contracts.

[10] *Glossary of Terms* used in NERC Reliability Standards

[11] The summer season represents June–September and the winter season represents December–February.

[12] Essentially, this means that there is a 50% probability that actual demand will be higher and a 50% probability that actual demand will be lower than the value provided for a given season/year.

[13] Coincident: This is the sum of two or more peak loads that occur in the same hour. Noncoincident: This is the sum of two or more peak loads on individual systems that do not occur in the same time interval; this is meaningful only when considering loads within a limited period of time, such as a day, a week, a month, a heating or cooling season, and usually for not more than one year. SERC and FRCC calculate total internal demand on a noncoincidental basis.

Prospective Resources: Includes all anticipated resources plus the following:

Existing-Other Capacity: Included in this category are commercially operable generating units or portions of generating units that could be available to serve load for the period of peak demand for the season but do not meet the requirements of existing-certain.

Reserve Margin Descriptions

Planning Reserve Margin: This is the primary metric used to measure resource adequacy; it is defined as the difference in resources (anticipated or prospective) and net internal demand then divided by net internal demand and shown as a percentage.

Reference Margin Level: The assumptions and naming convention of this metric vary by assessment area. The Reference Margin Level can be determined using both deterministic and probabilistic (based on a 0.1/year loss of load study) approaches. In both cases, this metric is used by system planners to quantify the amount of reserve capacity in the system above the forecasted peak demand that is needed to ensure sufficient supply to meet peak loads. Establishing a Reference Margin Level is necessary to account for long-term factors of uncertainty involved in system planning, such as unexpected generator outages and extreme weather impacts that could lead to increase demand beyond what was projected in the 50/50 load forecasted. In many assessment areas, a Reference Margin Level is established by a state, provincial authority, ISO/RTO, or other regulatory body. In some cases, the Reference Margin Level is a requirement. Reference Margin Levels may be different for the summer and winter seasons. If a Reference Margin Level is not provided by an assessment area, NERC applies 15% for predominately thermal systems and 10% for predominately hydro systems.

Seasonal Risk Scenario Chart Description

Each assessment area performed an operational risk analysis that was used to produce the seasonal risk scenario charts in the Regional Assessments Dashboards. The chart presents deterministic scenarios for further analysis of different resource and demand levels: The left blue column shows anticipated resources, and the two orange columns at the right show the two demand scenarios of the normal peak net internal demand and the extreme summer peak demand—both determined by the assessment area. The middle red or green bars show adjustments that are applied cumulatively to the anticipated resources, such as the following:

- Reductions for typical generation outages (i.e., maintenance and forced outages that are not already accounted for in anticipated resources)
- Reductions that represent additional outage or performance derating by resource type for extreme, low-probability conditions (e.g., drought condition impacts on hydroelectric generation, low-wind scenario affecting wind generation, fuel supply limitations, or extreme temperature conditions that result in reduced thermal generation output)
- Additional capacity resources that represent quantified capacity from operational procedures, if any, that are made available during scarcity conditions

Not all assessment areas have the same categories of adjustments to anticipated resources. Furthermore, each assessment area determined the adjustments to capacity based on methods or assumptions that are summarized below the chart. Methods and assumptions differ by assessment area and may not be comparable.

The chart enables evaluation of resource levels against levels of expected operating reserve requirement and the forecasted demand. Furthermore, the effects from extreme events can also be examined by comparing resource levels after applying extreme-scenario derates and/or extreme summer peak demand.

Resource Adequacy

The Anticipated Reserve Margin, which is based on available resource capacity, is a metric used to evaluate resource adequacy by comparing the projected capability of anticipated resources to serve forecast peak demand.[14] Large year-to-year changes in anticipated resources or forecast peak demand (net internal demand) can greatly impact Planning Reserve Margin calculations. All assessment areas have sufficient Anticipated Reserve Margins to meet or exceed their Reference Margin Level for the 2023 summer as shown in **Figure 4**.





Figure 4: Summer 2023 Anticipated/Prospective Reserve Margins Compared to Reference Margin Level

[14] Generally, anticipated resources include generators and firm capacity transfers that are expected to be available to serve load during electrical peak loads for the season. Prospective resources are those that could be available but do not meet criteria to be counted as anticipated resources. Refer to the **Data Concepts and Assumptions** section for additional information on Anticipated/Prospective Reserve Margins, anticipated/prospective resources, and Reference Margin Levels.

Changes from Year-to-Year

Figure 5 provides the relative change in the forecast Anticipated Reserve Margins from the 2022 summer to the 2023 summer. A significant decline can indicate potential operational issues that emerge between reporting years. NPCC-Ontario, SPP and WECC-BC have noticeable reductions in anticipated resources with NPCC-Ontario close to falling below its Reference Margin Level for the 2023 summer. NPCC-Ontario is experiencing ongoing nuclear refurbishments and recent retirements will make it difficult to accommodate unplanned generator or transmission outages. NPCC-Ontario will rely on demand response and transfers from neighbors during a higher load scenario to avoid load interruption. The lower Anticipated Reserve Margins for NPCC-Maritimes, NPCC-Québec, SERC-C, and WECC-AB do not present reliability concerns on peak for this upcoming summer. Additional details for each assessment area are provided in the **Data Concepts and Assumptions** and **Regional Assessments Dashboards** sections.



Note: The areas that only have one bar have the same Reference Margin Level for both years.

Figure 5: Summer 2022 and Summer 2023 Anticipated Reserve Margins Year-to-Year Change

Net Internal Demand

The changes in forecasted Net Internal Demand for each assessment area are shown in Figure 6.[15] Assessment areas develop these forecasts based on historic load and weather information as well as other long-term projections.




Figure 6: Change in Net Internal Demand—Summer 2022 Forecast Compared to Summer 2023 Forecast

[15] Changes in modeling and methods may also contribute to year-to-year changes in forecasted net internal demand projections.

Demand and Resource Tables

Peak demand and supply capacity data—resource adequacy data—for each assessment area are as follows in each table (in alphabetical order).

MISO			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2022 SRA**	**2023 SRA**	**2022 vs. 2023 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	124,506	123,728	-0.6%
Demand Response: Available	6,287	6,903	9.8%
Net Internal Demand	118,220	116,825	-1.2%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	141,844	140,650	-0.8%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	0	0	-
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	1,353	3,018	123.1%
Anticipated Resources	143,197	143,668	0.3%
Existing-Other Capacity	669	668	-0.1%
Prospective Resources	149,756	151,579	1.2%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	21.1%	23.0%	1.8
Prospective Reserve Margin	26.7%	29.7%	3.1
Reference Margin Level	17.9%	15.9%	-2.0

MRO-Manitoba Hydro			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2022 SRA**	**2023 SRA**	**2022 vs. 2023 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	3,059	3,060	0.0%
Demand Response: Available	0	0	-
Net Internal Demand	3,059	3,060	0.0%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	5,523	5,731	3.8%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	186	91	-50.9%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	-1,816	-1,872	3.1%
Anticipated Resources	3,893	3,950	1.5%
Existing-Other Capacity	44	34	-23.4%
Prospective Resources	3,937	3,984	1.2%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	27.3%	29.1%	1.8
Prospective Reserve Margin	28.7%	30.2%	1.5
Reference Margin Level	12.0%	12.0%	0.0

MRO-SaskPower			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2022 SRA**	**2023 SRA**	**2022 vs. 2023 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	3,656	3,539	-3.2%
Demand Response: Available	60	50	-16.7%
Net Internal Demand	3,596	3,489	-3.0%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	3,743	4,213	12.6%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	0	0	-
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	290	290	0.0%
Anticipated Resources	4,033	4,503	11.7%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-
Prospective Resources	4,033	4,503	11.7%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	12.2%	29.1%	16.9
Prospective Reserve Margin	12.2%	29.1%	16.9
Reference Margin Level	11.0%	15.0%	4.0

NPCC-Maritimes			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2022 SRA**	**2023 SRA**	**2022 vs. 2023 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	3,475	3,612	3.9%
Demand Response: Available	255	328	28.6%
Net Internal Demand	3,220	3,284	2.0%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	4,419	4,834	9.4%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	0	0	-
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	64	81	26.6%
Anticipated Resources	4,483	4,915	9.6%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-
Prospective Resources	4,483	4,915	9.6%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	39.2%	49.7%	10.4
Prospective Reserve Margin	39.2%	49.7%	10.4
Reference Margin Level	20.0%	20.0%	0.0

NPCC-New England			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2022 SRA**	**2023 SRA**	**2022 vs. 2023 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	25,300	25,111	-0.7%
Demand Response: Available	483	447	-7.5%
Net Internal Demand	24,817	24,664	-0.6%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	28,626	27,997	-2.2%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	0	0	-
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	1,292	1,030	-20.3%
Anticipated Resources	29,918	29,027	-3.0%
Existing-Other Capacity	911	872	-4.3%
Prospective Resources	30,829	29,899	-3.0%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	20.6%	17.7%	-2.9
Prospective Reserve Margin	24.2%	21.2%	-3.0
Reference Margin Level	14.3%	12.0%	-2.3

NPCC-Ontario			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2022 SRA**	**2023 SRA**	**2022 vs. 2023 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	22,546	22,439	-0.5%
Demand Response: Available	666	687	3.1%
Net Internal Demand	21,880	21,752	-0.6%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	25,648	24,575	-4.2%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	24	9	-61.5%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	150	223	48.5%
Anticipated Resources	25,822	24,807	-3.9%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-
Prospective Resources	25,822	24,807	-3.9%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	18.0%	14.0%	-4.0
Prospective Reserve Margin	18.0%	14.0%	-4.0
Reference Margin Level	13.3%	13.2%	0.0

NPCC-New York			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2022 SRA**	**2023 SRA**	**2022 vs. 2023 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	31,765	32,049	0.9%
Demand Response: Available	1,170	1,226	4.8%
Net Internal Demand	30,595	30,823	0.7%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	37,431	37,216	-0.6%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	0	0	-
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	2,465	2,932	18.9%
Anticipated Resources	39,896	40,148	0.6%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-
Prospective Resources	39,896	40,148	0.6%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	30.4%	30.3%	-0.1
Prospective Reserve Margin	30.4%	30.3%	-0.1
Reference Margin Level	15.0%	15.0%	0.0

NPCC-Québec			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2022 SRA**	**2023 SRA**	**2022 vs. 2023 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	22,271	22,859	2.6%
Demand Response: Available	0	0	-
Net Internal Demand	22,271	22,859	2.6%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	33,542	33,690	0.4%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	0	0	-
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	-2,304	-2,353	2.1%
Anticipated Resources	31,238	31,337	0.3%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-
Prospective Resources	31,238	31,337	0.3%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	40.3%	37.1%	-3.2
Prospective Reserve Margin	40.3%	37.1%	-3.2
Reference Margin Level	10.3%	11.0%	0.7

PJM			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2022 SRA**	**2023 SRA**	**2022 vs. 2023 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	148,938	149,059	0.1%
Demand Response: Available	8,527	7,288	-14.5%
Net Internal Demand	140,411	141,771	1.0%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	184,837	186,540	0.9%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	10	0	-100.0%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	124	463	273.4%
Anticipated Resources	184,971	187,003	1.1%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-
Prospective Resources	185,095	187,466	1.3%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	31.7%	31.9%	0.2
Prospective Reserve Margin	31.8%	32.2%	0.4
Reference Margin Level	14.9%	14.9%	0.0

SERC-East			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2022 SRA**	**2023 SRA**	**2022 vs. 2023 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	42,883	43,889	2.3%
Demand Response: Available	1,298	1,008	-22.3%
Net Internal Demand	41,585	42,881	3.1%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	49,380	50,452	2.2%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	486	0	-100.0%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	612	624	2.0%
Anticipated Resources	50,478	51,076	1.2%
Existing-Other Capacity	1,097	1,182	7.8%
Prospective Resources	51,575	52,258	1.3%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	21.4%	19.1%	-2.3
Prospective Reserve Margin	24.0%	21.9%	-2.2
Reference Margin Level	15.0%	15.0%	0.0

SERC-Central			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2022 SRA**	**2023 SRA**	**2022 vs. 2023 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	41,267	42,223	2.3%
Demand Response: Available	1,841	1,910	3.7%
Net Internal Demand	39,426	40,313	2.2%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	47,424	46,964	-1.0%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	0	93	-
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	-795	1,068	-
Anticipated Resources	46,629	47,556	2.0%
Existing-Other Capacity	4,808	2,313	-51.9%
Prospective Resources	51,437	49,868	-3.0%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	18.3%	18.0%	-0.3
Prospective Reserve Margin	30.5%	23.7%	-6.8
Reference Margin Level	15.0%	15.0%	0.0

SERC-Florida Peninsula			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2022 SRA**	**2023 SRA**	**2022 vs. 2023 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	52,172	52,195	0.0%
Demand Response: Available	2,932	2,898	-1.2%
Net Internal Demand	49,240	49,297	0.1%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	56,571	60,074	6.2%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	2,540	1,742	-31.4%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	300	589	96.3%
Anticipated Resources	59,411	62,405	5.0%
Existing-Other Capacity	847	776	-8.4%
Prospective Resources	60,258	63,181	4.9%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	20.7%	26.6%	5.9
Prospective Reserve Margin	22.4%	28.2%	5.8
Reference Margin Level	15.0%	15.0%	0.0

SERC-Southeast			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2022 SRA**	**2023 SRA**	**2022 vs. 2023 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	47,258	46,127	-2.4%
Demand Response: Available	1,946	2,010	3.3%
Net Internal Demand	45,312	44,117	-2.6%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	59,828	59,559	-0.4%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	1,514	2,865	89.3%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	-2,524	-815	-67.7%
Anticipated Resources	58,818	61,609	4.7%
Existing-Other Capacity	859	908	5.7%
Prospective Resources	59,677	62,517	4.8%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	29.8%	39.6%	9.8
Prospective Reserve Margin	31.7%	41.7%	10.0
Reference Margin Level	15.0%	15.0%	0.0

SPP			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2022 SRA**	**2023 SRA**	**2022 vs. 2023 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	52,040	53,468	2.7%
Demand Response: Available	658	842	27.9%
Net Internal Demand	51,382	52,626	2.4%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	67,245	65,821	-2.1%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	0	0	-
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	-144	-238	65.0%
Anticipated Resources	67,101	65,583	-2.3%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-
Prospective Resources	66,554	65,036	-2.3%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	30.6%	24.6%	-6.0
Prospective Reserve Margin	29.5%	23.6%	-5.9
Reference Margin Level	16.0%	19.0%	3.0

Texas RE-ERCOT			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2022 SRA**	**2023 SRA**	**2022 vs. 2023 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	77,317	82,307	6.5%
Demand Response: Available	2,856	3,380	18.3%
Net Internal Demand	74,461	78,927	6.0%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	89,603	94,580	5.6%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	1,199	2,445	103.9%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	20	20	0.0%
Anticipated Resources	90,822	97,045	6.9%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-
Prospective Resources	90,850	97,073	6.9%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	22.0%	23.0%	1.0
Prospective Reserve Margin	22.0%	23.0%	1.0
Reference Margin Level	13.75%	13.75%	0.0

WECC-AB			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2022 SRA**	**2023 SRA**	**2022 vs. 2023 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	11,228	11,206	-0.2%
Demand Response: Available	0	0	-
Net Internal Demand	11,228	11,206	-0.2%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	11,926	13,759	15.4%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	1,082	227	-79.0%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	437	0	-100.0%
Anticipated Resources	13,445	13,986	4.0%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-
Prospective Resources	13,445	13,986	4.0%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	19.7%	24.8%	5.1
Prospective Reserve Margin	19.7%	24.8%	5.1
Reference Margin Level	10.1%	9.9%	-0.2

WECC-BC			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2022 SRA**	**2023 SRA**	**2022 vs. 2023 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	8,088	8,636	6.8%
Demand Response: Available	0	0	-
Net Internal Demand	8,088	8,636	6.8%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	11,266	11,135	-1.2%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	3	0	-100.0%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	0	0	-
Anticipated Resources	11,269	11,135	-1.2%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-
Prospective Resources	11,269	11,135	-1.2%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	39.3%	28.9%	-10.4
Prospective Reserve Margin	39.3%	28.9%	-10.4
Reference Margin Level	16.3%	14.4%	-1.9

WECC-CA / MX			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2022 SRA**	**2023 SRA**	**2022 vs. 2023 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	57,269	56,356	-1.6%
Demand Response: Available	844	862	2.2%
Net Internal Demand	56,425	55,494	-1.7%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	70,791	69,408	-2.0%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	3,381	5,522	63.3%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	0	0	-
Anticipated Resources	74,172	74,930	1.0%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-
Prospective Resources	74,172	74,930	1.0%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	31.5%	35.0%	3.6
Prospective Reserve Margin	31.5%	35.0%	3.6
Reference Margin Level	16.9%	16.8%	-0.1

WECC-SW			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2022 SRA**	**2023 SRA**	**2022 vs. 2023 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	26,720	25,992	-2.7%
Demand Response: Available	399	380	-4.7%
Net Internal Demand	26,321	25,612	-2.7%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	28,249	26,206	-7.2%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	1,369	1,655	20.9%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	1,002	2,747	174.2%
Anticipated Resources	30,620	30,608	0.0%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-
Prospective Resources	30,620	30,608	0.0%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	16.3%	19.5%	3.2
Prospective Reserve Margin	16.3%	19.5%	3.2
Reference Margin Level	10.2%	10.8%	0.6

WECC-NW			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2022 SRA**	**2023 SRA**	**2022 vs. 2023 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	63,214	66,366	5.0%
Demand Response: Available	1,104	1,038	-6.0%
Net Internal Demand	62,110	65,328	5.2%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	70,154	76,587	9.2%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	798	2,350	194.5%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	2,517	5,004	98.8%
Anticipated Resources	73,469	83,941	14.3%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-
Prospective Resources	73,469	83,941	14.3%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	18.3%	28.5%	10.2
Prospective Reserve Margin	18.3%	28.5%	10.2
Reference Margin Level	16.1%	16.3%	0.2

Variable Energy Resource Contributions

Because the electrical output of variable energy resources (e.g., wind, solar PV) depends on weather conditions, on-peak capacity contributions are less than nameplate capacity. The following table shows the capacity contribution of existing wind and solar PV resources at the peak demand hour for each assessment area. Resource contributions are also aggregated by Interconnection and across the entire BPS. For NERC's analysis of risk periods after peak demand (i.e., U.S. assessment areas in WECC), lower contributions of solar PV resources are used because output is diminished during evening periods.

BPS Variable Energy Resources by Assessment Area									
	Wind			Solar			Hydro		
Assessment Area / Interconnection	Nameplate Wind	Expected Wind	Expected Share of Nameplate (%)	Nameplate Solar PV	Expected Solar PV	Expected Share of Nameplate (%)	Nameplate Hydro	Expected Hydro	Expected Share of Nameplate (%)
MISO	30,373	5,488	18%	7,499	3,750	50%	4,884	4,688	96%
MRO-Manitoba Hydro	259	47	18%	-	-	0%	6,220	5,548	89%
MRO-SaskPower	615	203	33%	30	-	0%	851	797	94%
NPCC-Maritimes	1,212	255	21%	4	-	0%	1,315	1,183	90%
NPCC-New England	1,448	186	13%	2,914	1,163	40%	3,565	2,472	69%
NPCC-New York	2,879	331	12%	179	84	47%	6,731	5,067	75%
NPCC-Ontario	4,943	771	16%	478	126	26%	8,985	5,185	58%
NPCC-Québec	3,880	-	0%	10	-	0%	40,307	32,974	82%
PJM	10,923	1,688	15%	5,169	2,984	58%	3,027	3,027	100%
SERC-Central	1,206	564	47%	885	511	58%	4,967	3,315	67%
SERC-East	-	-	0%	1,475	1,473	99%	3,064	3,013	98%
SERC-Florida Peninsula	-	-	0%	7,724	4,534	59%	-	-	0%
SERC-Southeast	-	-	0%	5,305	4,647	88%	3,242	3,288	101%
SPP	32,028	4,500	14%	440	378	86%	5,465	4,996	91%
Texas RE-ERCOT	30,938	10,293	33%	15,958	12,509	78%	563	477	85%
WECC-AB	3,619	309	9%	1,165	763	65%	894	416	47%
WECC-BC	747	137	18%	2	1	50%	16,519	10,124	61%
WECC-CA/MX	9,362	1,111	12%	21,975	14,489	66%	13,957	4,606	33%
WECC-SW	2,994	593	20%	3,493	1,411	40%	1,202	844	70%
WECC-NW	20,296	3,968	20%	9,270	5,062	55%	41,860	22,752	54%
EASTERN INTERCONNECTION	85,886	14,032	16%	32,102	19,649	61%	52,316	42,578	81%
QUÉBEC INTERCONNECTION	3,880	-	0%	10	-	0%	40,307	32,974	82%
TEXAS INTERCONNECTION	30,938	10,293	33%	15,958	12,509	78%	563	477	85%
WECC INTERCONNECTION	37,018	6,118	17%	35,905	21,726	61%	74,432	38,742	52%
INTERCONNECTION TOTAL:	**157,722**	**30,443**	**19%**	**83,975**	**53,885**	**64%**	**167,618**	**114,771**	**68%**

Probabilistic Assessment

Regional Entities and assessment areas provided a resource adequacy risk assessment that was probability-based for the summer season. Results are included in the Highlights section of each assessment area's dashboard and summarized in the table below. The risk assessments account for the hour(s) of greatest risk of resource shortfall. For most areas, the hour(s) of risk coincide with the time of forecasted peak demand; however, some areas incur the greatest risk at other times based on the varying demand and resource profiles. Various risk metrics are provided and include LOLE, LOLH, EUE, and the probabilities of EEA occurrence.

Probability-Based Risk Assessment		
Assessment Area	**Type of Assessment**	**Results and Insight From Assessment**
MISO	Annual probabilistic LOLE study	MISO's RML decreased from 17.9% in 2022 to 15.9% for Summer 2023. The change results from implementing seasonal forced outages and probabilistic distributions of non-firm imports. Operating mitigations are needed in extreme peak summer conditions.
MRO-Manitoba	Verification of NERC 2022 Probabilistic Assessment (2022 ProbA)	The 2022 ProbA results indicate 29 MWh per year of EUE for 2024. Given comparable supply and demand balance, the 2024 EUE is a reasonable estimate for all of 2023. EUE for summer is less than the annual EUE.
MRO-SaskPower	Probability-based capacity adequacy assessment	Results indicate that the expected number of hours with operating reserve deficiency for the 2023 summer season (June to September) is 0.21 hours. September is the month with highest risk.
NPCC	NPCC conducted an all-hour Probabilistic Assessment that consisted of a base case and several more severe scenarios examining low resources, reduced imports, and higher loads. The highest peak load scenario has a 7% probability of occurring.	The assessment forecasts that the NPCC Regional Entity will have an adequate supply of electricity this summer. Necessary strategies and procedures are in place to deal with operational challenges and emergencies as they may develop. Results of the probabilistic analysis by assessment area are below.
NPCC-Maritimes		NPCC's assessment results indicate that Maritimes is likely to use a combination of imports and operating procedures to mitigate resource shortages this summer. Cumulative LOLE (<0.03 days/summer), LOLH (<0.11 hours/summer), or EUE (<5 MWh/summer) were estimated over the May–September summer for all modeled scenarios.
NPCC-New England		NPCC's assessment results indicate that ISO-NE may rely on limited use of its operating procedures to mitigate resource and energy shortages during the summer. The reduced resource case with the highest peak load scenario resulted in a small estimated cumulative LOLE risk (0.12 days/period) with associated LOLHs (0.4 hours/period) and EUE (175 MWh/period) with the highest risk occurring in June. This scenario is based exclusively on the two highest load levels with a 7% chance of occurring and a low resource case consisting of extended summer maintenance across NPCC and reduced imports from PJM.
NPCC-New York		NPCC's assessment results indicate that NYISO may rely on limited use of its operating procedures to mitigate resource and energy shortages during the summer. The reduced resource case with the highest peak load scenario resulted in a small estimated cumulative LOLE risk (0.5 days/summer) with associated LOLH (1.1 hours/summer) and EUE (525 MWh/summer). The highest risk is in June and August.
NPCC-Ontario		NPCC's assessment results indicate that Ontario is likely to use a combination of imports and operating procedures to mitigate resource shortages this summer. Negligible cumulative LOLE, LOLH, and EUE risks were estimated over the summer period for all modeled scenarios, including the severe low-likelihood cases. These results indicate that Ontario will be able to obtain necessary supplies from neighbors over a range of conditions.

Probability-Based Risk Assessment		
Assessment Area	**Type of Assessment**	**Results and Insight From Assessment**
NPCC-Québec		Québec is expected to need only limited use of its operating procedures designed to mitigate resource and energy shortages during the summer. Negligible cumulative LOLE, LOLH, and EUE risks were estimated over the summer period for all modeled scenarios, including the severe low-likelihood cases.
PJM	Based on 2022 PJM Reserve Requirement Study (RRS)	PJM is expecting a low risk of resources falling below required operating reserves. PJM forecasts a 29% installed reserve margin, well above the target of 14.9%. Due to the low penetration of variable energy resources in PJM relative to PJM's peak load, the hour with most loss of load risk remains the hour with highest forecasted demand.
SERC	Verification of NERC 2022 ProbA Results	The 2022 Base Case results indicated adequate resources for the SERC Region as a whole with an observed LOLE of 0.03 days/year for the year 2024. Trends from 2022 to 2023 indicate little change in study results, so SERC does not anticipate resource adequacy risk for the upcoming summer season.
SERC-Central		Probabilistic analysis indicates no risk for resource shortfall.
SERC-East		Probabilistic analysis shows low risk for July and August with EUE of 2.38 MWh and LOLH 0.005 hours.
SERC-Florida Peninsula		SERC Probabilistic analysis indicates no risk of resource shortfall.
SERC-Southeast		Probabilistic analysis indicates almost no risk of resource shortfall.
SPP	Statistical analysis of the Summer 2022 real time data; Operational process and procedures	Potential risk of using operating reserves and EEA1 or EEA2 is 1 day per summer. Risk of EEA3 is 0.2 days per summer. Risks is associated with low wind generation output levels or unanticipated generation outages in combination with high load periods.
Texas RE-ERCOT	ERCOT's Summer 2023 Probabilistic Assessment	There is a 4% probability that ERCOT will declare an EEA1 during the expected daily peak load hour; Increasing up to 19% probability at the highest risk hour and ending at 8:00 p.m.
WECC	The 2022 Western Assessment of Resource Adequacy provides the most recent probability-based resource adequacy risk assessment for Summer 2023 across WECC's areas.	The Western Interconnection is experiencing heightened reliability risks heading into Summer 2023 due to increased supply-side shortages and fuel constraints along with the ongoing drought impacts in some areas, continued wildfire threats, and expanding heat wave events. The installation of new resources for the summer and the availability of the imports, especially during wide-area heat events, affects resource adequacy for the U.S. assessment areas. The reliability and resource adequacy of the Western Interconnection depends on the ability to move power throughout the footprint.
WECC-AB		Alberta is expected to have sufficient resource availability to meet demand and cover reserves on the peak hour at 4:00 p.m. under a summer peak defined at the 90th percentile with any combination or accumulation of derates.
WECC-BC		BC is expected to have sufficient resource availability to meet demand and cover reserves on the peak hour at 4:00 p.m. under a summer peak defined at the 90th percentile with any combination or accumulation of derates.
WECC-CA/MX		WECC-CA/MX is projected to have negligible-to-low amounts of LOLH (<0.5 hours) this summer with variation attributable to the amount of Tier 1 resources that connect before the later months. Resources are sufficient to meet demand and cover reserves on the peak hour at 3:00

Probability-Based Risk Assessment		
Assessment Area	**Type of Assessment**	**Results and Insight From Assessment**
		p.m. under a summer peak defined at the 90th percentile with any combination or accumulation of derates. However, there is increased risk of insufficient reserves at later hours (up to 8:00 p.m.) due to the variability of energy resource output. Imports to the area are required to cover these risk periods; however, regional resource availability and transmission constraints can affect external assistance during wide area heat events.
WECC-NW		WECC-NW assessment area is projected to have negligible LOLH and EUE this summer with planned resource additions and normal transfer availability. However, some LOLH (<0.1) and EUE (<400 MWh) is anticipated during above-normal demand periods if new resource are delayed or external transfers are disrupted. WECC-NW would rely on imports to maintain adequate reserves on the during the risk hours from 4:00–9:00 p.m. under extreme summer peak load and low-resource conditions (e.g., extreme thermal or extreme hydro derates or combinations of other low energy output scenarios.)
WECC-SW		WECC-SW assessment area is projected to have negligible LOLH and EUE this summer with planned resource additions and normal transfer availability. However, some LOLH (<0.1) and EUE (<150 MWh) is anticipated during above-normal demand periods if new resource are delayed or external transfers are disrupted.

Errata

May 2023

- The Risk Scenario Summaries for SERC-Central and SERC-East were corrected (page 23 and page 24)

NERC
NORTH AMERICAN ELECTRIC RELIABILITY CORPORATION

2024 Summer Reliability Assessment

May 2024



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Preface

Electricity is a key component of the fabric of modern society and the Electric Reliability Organization (ERO) Enterprise serves to strengthen that fabric. The vision for the ERO Enterprise, which is comprised of NERC and the six Regional Entities, is a highly reliable, resilient, and secure North American bulk power system (BPS). Our mission is to assure the effective and efficient reduction of risks to the reliability and security of the grid.

Reliability | Resilience | Security

Because nearly 400 million citizens in North America are counting on us

The North American BPS is made up of six Regional Entities as shown on the map and in the corresponding table below. The multicolored area denotes overlap as some load-serving entities participate in one Regional Entity while associated Transmission Owners/Operators participate in another.



MRO	Midwest Reliability Organization
NPCC	Northeast Power Coordinating Council
RF	ReliabilityFirst
SERC	SERC Reliability Corporation
Texas RE	Texas Reliability Entity
WECC	WECC

About this Assessment

NERC's *2024 Summer Reliability Assessment* (*SRA*) identifies, assesses, and reports on areas of concern regarding the reliability of the North American BPS for the upcoming summer season. In addition, the *SRA* presents peak electricity demand and supply changes and highlights any unique regional challenges or expected conditions that might affect the reliability of the BPS. The reliability assessment process is a coordinated reliability evaluation between the NERC Reliability Assessment Subcommittee, the Regional Entities, and NERC staff with demand and resource projections obtained from the assessment areas. This report reflects an independent assessment by NERC and the ERO Enterprise and is intended to inform industry leaders, planners, operators, and regulatory bodies so that they are better prepared to take necessary actions to ensure BPS reliability. This report also provides an opportunity for industry to discuss plans and preparations to ensure reliability for the upcoming summer period.

Key Findings

NERC's annual *SRA* covers the upcoming four-month (June–September) summer period. This assessment evaluates generation resource and transmission system adequacy as well as energy sufficiency to meet projected summer peak demands and operating reserves. This includes a deterministic evaluation of data submitted for peak demand hour and peak risk hour as well as results from recently updated probabilistic analyses. Additionally, this assessment identifies potential reliability issues of interest and regional topics of concern. While the scope of this seasonal assessment is focused on the upcoming summer, the key findings are consistent with risks and issues that NERC highlighted in the *2023 Long-Term Reliability Assessment (LTRA*), covering a 10-year horizon, and other earlier reliability assessments and reports.[1]

The following findings are derived from NERC and the ERO Enterprise's independent evaluation of electricity generation and transmission capacity as well as potential operational concerns that may need to be addressed for the 2024 summer.

Resource Adequacy Assessment and Energy Risk Analysis

All areas are assessed as having adequate anticipated resources for normal summer peak load conditions (see **Figure 1**). However, the following areas face risks of electricity supply shortfalls during periods of more extreme summer conditions. This determination of elevated risk is based on analysis of plausible scenarios, including 90/10 demand forecasts and historical high outage rates as well as low wind or solar photovoltaic (PV) energy conditions:

- **Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO):** New solar and natural-gas-fired generation and additional demand response (DR) resources are offset by generator retirements, lower firm imports, and increased reserve requirements. MISO is expected to have sufficient resources, including firm imports, for normal summer peak demand. However, it can be challenging for MISO to meet above-normal peak demand if wind and solar resource output is lower than expected. Wind generator performance during periods of high demand is a key factor in determining whether there is sufficient electricity supply on the system or if external (non-firm) supply assistance is required to maintain reliability.
- **MRO-SaskPower:** Despite being primarily a winter-peaking area, Saskatchewan can face high electricity demand during hot summer weather conditions. Since 2023, both electricity demand and supply resources have increased, resulting in a 1.2% increase in reserve margin for the summer. Unanticipated generator outages that coincide with peak demand can result in insufficient reserves, a condition that operators will seek to alleviate through short-term transfers from neighbors and demand-side management.
- **NPCC-New England:** With the retirement of two natural-gas-fired generators at Mystic Generating Station in May 2024 (1,400 MW combined summer capacity), ISO New England will have less capacity this summer. This makes it more likely that ISO New England will need to resort to operating procedures for obtaining resources or non-firm supplies from neighboring areas during periods of above-normal peak demand or low-resource conditions. Summer heat waves that extend over the entire area can limit the availability of excess supplies and increase the risk of energy emergencies in New England.
- **Texas RE-ERCOT:** As a result of continued vigorous growth in both loads and solar and wind resources, there is a risk of emergency conditions in the summer evening hours when solar generation begins to ramp down. Contributing to the elevated risk is a potential need, under certain grid conditions, to limit power transfers from South Texas into the San Antonio region. These grid conditions can occur when demand is high and wind and solar output is low in specific areas, straining the transmission system and necessitating South Texas generation curtailments and potential firm load shedding to avoid cascading outages.
- **WECC-BC:** The peak demand forecast in the province of British Columbia has increased by over 600 MW since 2023 (7.4%), contributing to a drop in Anticipated Reserve Margin by over 10 percentage points. Much of the province is experiencing significant drought, and long-term precipitation deficits can challenge electricity production at some hydropower generators. Above-normal demand and low-resource conditions can result in the need for imports from neighboring areas. However, external assistance can be at risk during wide-area heat events.
- **WECC-CA/MX:** New solar and battery resources are contributing to higher on-peak reserve margins (46.7%, up over 11 percentage points since 2023) for the upcoming summer. Winter precipitation and snowpack have alleviated drought conditions across California, making more output from the area's hydropower resources available to balance variability in wind and solar output. Probabilistic assessments performed by WECC show that the risks of load loss are similar to Summer 2023, ranging from negligible to 0.8 loss of load hours (LOLH) depending on how much of the area's new solar and battery resources (totaling nearly 6 GW of nameplate capacity) are completed over the summer. The loss-of-load risk in this analysis occurs primarily under above-normal demand and low-resource conditions (e.g., low solar output, below-normal imports due to wide-area heat conditions or transmission limitations). Furthermore, risk is concentrated in the Baja (Mexico) portion of the WECC-CA/MX

[1] NERC's long-term, seasonal, and special reliability assessments are published on the Reliability Assessments web page.

assessment area. The assessment area has adequate resources for normal summer conditions.

- **WECC-SW:** Both forecasted peak demand and resources have risen since last summer, yielding a modest increase in the anticipated on-peak reserve margin (22.0%, up 2.5 percentage points since 2023.) The area has sufficient resources for normal summer demand. However, extreme demand or low resource output scenarios will likely require additional non-firm imports from neighboring areas, which may be unavailable during wide-area heat events. The ongoing severe drought in the Southwest increases the risk that extreme conditions could impact the BPS this summer.




Figure 1: Summer Reliability Risk Area Summary

Seasonal Risk Assessment Summary	
High	Potential for insufficient operating reserves in normal peak conditions
Elevated	Potential for insufficient operating reserves in above-normal conditions
Normal	Sufficient operating reserves expected

New resources including 25 GW of nameplate solar capacity have been added to the BPS since last summer. Resource additions in assessment areas that were identified as at risk in the *2023 SRA* have largely outpaced rising demand forecasts and resulted in higher on-peak reserve margins. Four elevated-risk assessment areas from the *2023 SRA* are considered normal risk for the upcoming summer: NPCC-Ontario, SERC-Central, SPP, and WECC-NW. New firm transfer agreements, growth in DR, and postponed generator retirements are also contributing to an overall improved resource outlook for the upcoming summer. Details of each area are contained in the assessment area pages.

The findings in the *SRA* are consistent with conclusions reported in NERC's *2023 LTRA*. In assessing potential future electricity supply shortfalls over the 10-year horizon, NERC found that resource additions and delayed generator retirements have improved the outlook for 2024 in comparison to results reported in prior *LTRA*s. However, the *2023 LTRA* also found that a growing number of areas in North America face adequacy risks as early as 2025. NERC will publish the next *LTRA* in December 2024 based on demand forecasts, resource and transmission projections, and other information collected this year. NERC will also publish the 2024–2025 *Winter Reliability Assessment* in November to identify, assess, and report on BPS reliability issues for the next winter season.

Other Reliability Issues

- **Weather services are expecting above-average summer temperatures across much of North America, potentially creating challenging summer grid conditions.** Peak electricity demand in most areas is directly influenced by temperature. Above-average seasonal temperatures can contribute to high peak demand as well as an increase in forced outages for generation and some BPS equipment. Last summer brought record temperatures, extended heat waves, and wildfires to large parts of North America. Although few high-level energy emergency alerts were issued and no electricity supply disruptions occurred as a result of inadequate resources, operators at BAs, TOPs, and RCs faced significant challenges and drew upon procedures and protocols to obtain all available resources, manage system demand, and ensure that energy is delivered over the transmission network to meet the system demand. Additionally, load-serving entities and state and local officials in many parts of North America used mechanisms and public appeals to lower customer demand during periods of strained supplies. Operators should review lessons and experience from the prior summer and incorporate insights into their seasonal operations planning. The **Review of 2023 Capacity and Energy Performance** section describes actual demand and resource levels in comparison with NERC's *2023 SRA* and summarizes 2023 resource adequacy events.
- **Rising demand is challenging resource and transmission adequacy in several areas.** Most areas are forecasting increases in peak demand compared to last summer. The extent that demand forecasts have increased and the drivers affecting growth vary by area. In ERCOT,

SPP, and British Columbia, the increases are among the highest and build on similar growth from the prior year. New data centers and cryptocurrency mining facilities are contributing to higher demand forecasts in ERCOT this summer, and some of these loads participate in demand-side management programs that can offset their impacts (see **Evolving Demand-Side Management Programs**). While resource additions in Texas, primarily solar PV, are outpacing demand increases, energy risks are growing during the hours when solar output is diminished. Further, transmission development is straining to connect new resources and deliver electricity supplies to growing load areas.

- **Occurrences involving the unexpected tripping of inverter-based resources (IBR) during grid disturbances continue to spread, underscoring the need for operator vigilance in the near term and urgent industry action on long-term solutions.** The tripping of BPS-connected solar PV generating units during grid faults has caused sudden loss of generation resources (over wide areas in some cases). Industry experience with unexpected tripping of BPS-connected solar PV generation units can be traced back to the 2016 Blue Cut fire in California. Similar events have occurred as recently as Summer 2023.[2] New event reports published by NERC analyzing the Southwest Utah disturbance (April 2023) and the California Battery Energy Storage disturbances (April and May 2022) illustrate that the reliability concern extends to more geographic areas and more than just solar PV resources. IBRs include most solar and wind generation as well as new battery energy storage systems (BESS) or hybrid generation and account for over 70% of the new generation in development for connecting to the BPS. IBRs respond to disturbances and dynamic conditions based on programmed logic and inverter controls. A common thread with these tripping events is the lack of IBR ride-through capability that causes a minor system disturbance to become a major disturbance. In March 2023, NERC issued the *Inverter-Based Resource Performance Issues Alert* to Generator Owners (GO) of Bulk Electric System (BES) solar PV generating resources.[3] As a Level 2 alert, it contains recommended actions for GOs of grid-connected solar PV resources, including steps to coordinate protection and controller settings, so that the resources will remain reliable during grid disturbances. NERC's comprehensive Inverter-Based Resources Strategy and FERC Order No. 901 describe additional steps for the ERO and industry to ensure that IBRs operate reliably and that the system is planned with due consideration for their characteristics.[4,5]

- **Stored supplies of natural gas are at high levels, but continued vigilance is needed to ensure the reliability of fuel delivery to natural-gas-fired-generators.**[6] The natural gas supply and infrastructure is vitally important to electric grid reliability, particularly as variable energy resources satisfy more of our energy needs. Fuel supply and delivery infrastructure must be capable of meeting the ramp rates of natural-gas-fired generators as they balance the system when wind and solar generation output declines. No specific reliability issues have been identified for the upcoming summer, but Reliability Coordinators (RC) and Balancing Authorities (BA) should be cognizant of natural gas supply infrastructure outage and maintenance plans that could affect generators in their areas.

- **Expanded demand-side management programs are an added resource for operators that should be carefully considered in operating plans and monitored during peak demand periods.** Formal DR programs involving commercial and industrial customers that have agreements with their load-serving entities to curtail load during high-demand periods have grown in many assessment areas. Additionally, some entities have launched programs with retail customers that also provide operator-controlled demand-side management capabilities. Operators will need to give special attention to new or expanded demand-side management programs in their planning if they are unfamiliar with protocols or uncertain about the amount of load relief that will be realized. These new mechanisms and protocols for controlling demand can support operating reliability and energy adequacy needs when they are effectively implemented and monitored.

- **Supply chain issues are delaying some new resource and transmission projects, raising concerns that some may not be completed prior to peak summer conditions.** Lead times for transformers, circuit breakers, transmission cables, switchgears, and insulators have increased significantly since 2020. Additionally, PV panels are more difficult to procure. These longer lead times can affect new project construction, existing asset upgrades, pre-seasonal maintenance, and the interconnection of new resources and customers. Long-term mitigation strategies include lengthening ongoing construction timelines and ordering surplus inventory in advance. In the near term, supply chain issues can exacerbate concerns in elevated risk areas and add operating challenges for the summer across the BPS. Should project delays emerge, affected GOs and Transmission Owners (TO) must communicate changes to BAs, Transmission Operators (TOP), and RCs so that impacts are understood and steps are taken to reduce risks of capacity deficiencies or energy shortfalls.

- **Wildfire risk areas cover a smaller portion of North America at the start of summer, lowering the likelihood that the BPS will be affected by fire conditions.** At the start of summer, Canadian wildfire information system officials assess that there is potential for above-average fire activity over a large region that extends from British Columbia to northwest Manitoba

[2] See the ERO's extensive IBR event reporting here: NERC Major Event Reports
[3] NERC Alert: Inverter Based Resource Performance Issues
[4] NERC IBR Activities
[5] FERC Order No. 901 - Final Rule Reliability Standards to Address Inverter-Based Resources
[6] Short-Term Energy Outlook - U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA)

and includes Alberta and Saskatchewan. In the United States, Climate Prediction Center and Predictive Services outlooks for early summer indicate that above-normal significant fire potential is limited to portions of the U.S. Southwest and West Texas.[7] Nonetheless, wildfire risk in North America typically increases in later summer months as hotter and drier weather increases fire potential. BPS operation can be impacted in areas where wildfires are active as well as areas where there is heightened risk of wildfire ignition due to weather and ground conditions.

Recommendations

To reduce the risk of electricity shortfalls on the BPS this summer, NERC recommends the following:

- RCs, BAs, and TOPs in the elevated risk areas identified in the key findings should take the following actions:
  - Review seasonal operating plans and the protocols for communicating and resolving potential supply shortfalls in anticipation of potentially extreme demand levels
  - Employ conservative generation and transmission outage coordination procedures commensurate with long-range weather forecasts to ensure adequate resource availability
  - Engage state or provincial regulators and policymakers to prepare for efficient implementation of demand-side management mechanisms called for in operating plans
- GOs with solar PV resources should implement recommendations in the IBR performance issues alert that NERC issued in March 2023.[8]
- State regulators and industry should have protocols in place at the start of summer for managing emergent requests from generators for air-quality restriction waivers. If warranted, U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) action to exercise emergency authority under the Federal Power Act (FPA) section 202(c) may be needed to ensure that sufficient generation is available during extreme weather conditions.

[7] NIFC North American Outlook

[8] Industry Recommendation: Inverter-Based Resource Performance Issues

Discussion

Summer Temperature and Drought Forecasts

Peak electricity demand in most areas is directly influenced by temperature. Weather officials are expecting above-normal temperatures for much of the United States and Canada (see **Figure 2**). In addition, drought conditions continue across much of Canada and the U.S. Southwest, resulting in unique challenges to area electricity supplies and potential impacts on demand.[9] Assessment area load forecasts account for many years of historical demand data, often up to 30 years, to predict summer peak demand and prepare for more extreme conditions. Above-average seasonal temperatures can contribute to high peak demand as well as an increase in forced outages for generation and some BPS equipment. Effective preseason maintenance and preparations are particularly important to BPS reliability in severe or prolonged periods of above-normal temperatures.




Figure 2: United States and Canada Summer Temperature Outlook[10]

[9] See North American Drought Monitor: https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/temp-and-precip/drought/nadm/maps

[10] Seasonal forecasts obtained from U.S. National Weather Service and Natural Resources Canada: https://www.cpc.ncep.noaa.gov/products/predictions/long_range/ and https://weather.gc.ca/saisons/prob_e.html

Risk Assessment Discussion

NERC assesses the risk of electricity supply shortfall in each assessment area for the upcoming season by considering Planning Reserve Margins, seasonal risk scenarios, probability-based risk assessments, and other available risk information. NERC provides an independent assessment of the potential for each assessment area to have sufficient operating reserves under normal conditions as well as above-normal demand and low-resource output conditions selected for the assessment. A summary of the assessment approach is provided in Table 1.

Table 1: Seasonal Risk Assessment Summary

Category	Criteria[1]
High Potential for insufficient operating reserves in normal peak conditions	• Planning Reserve Margins do not meet Reference Margin Levels; or • Probabilistic indices exceed benchmarks (e.g., LOLH of 2.4 hours over the season); or • Analysis of the risk hour(s) indicates resources will not be sufficient to meet operating reserves under **normal peak-day demand and outage scenarios**[2]
Elevated Potential for insufficient operating reserves in above-normal conditions	• Probabilistic indices are low but not negligible (e.g., LOLH above 0.1 hours over the season); or • Analysis of the risk hour(s) indicates resources will not be sufficient to meet operating reserves under **extreme peak-day demand with normal resource scenarios** (i.e., typical or expected outage and derate scenarios for conditions);[2] or • Analysis of the risk hour(s) indicates resources will not be sufficient to meet operating reserves under **normal peak-day demand with reduced resources** (i.e., extreme outage and derate scenarios)[3]
Normal Sufficient operating reserves expected	• Probabilistic indices are negligible • Analysis of the risk hour(s) indicates resources will be sufficient to meet operating reserves under normal and extreme peak-day demand and outage scenarios[4]

Table Notes:
[1]The table provides general criteria. Other factors may influence a higher or lower risk assessment.
[2]**Normal resource scenarios** include planned and typical forced outages as well as outages and derates that are closely correlated to the extreme peak demand.
[3]**Reduced resource scenarios** include planned and typical forced outages and low-likelihood resource scenarios, such as extreme low-wind scenarios, low-hydro scenarios during drought years, or high thermal outages when such a scenario is warranted.
[4]Even in normal risk assessment areas, extreme demand and extreme outage scenarios that are not closely linked may indicate risk of operating reserve shortfall.

Assessment of Planning Reserve Margins and Operational Risk Analysis

Anticipated Reserve Margins, which provide the Planning Reserve Margins for normal peak conditions, as well as reserve margins for seasonal risk scenarios of more extreme conditions are provided in Table 2.

Table 2: Seasonal Risk Scenario On-Peak Reserve Margins

Assessment Area	Anticipated Reserve Margin	Anticipated Reserve Margin with Typical Outages	Anticipated Reserve Margin with Higher Demand, Outages, Derates in Extreme Conditions
MISO	26.1%	8.7%	-6.3%
MRO-Manitoba	15.7%	11.7%	5.1%
MRO-SaskPower	30.3%	26.5%	10.3%
MRO-SPP	27.8%	17.6%	-2.5%
NPCC-Maritimes	44.9%	34.5%	6.0%
NPCC-New England	15.9%	6.3%	3.3%
NPCC-New York	30.4%	11.4%	4.0%
NPCC-Ontario	26.2%	26.2%	19.8%
NPCC-Québec	44.1%	23.8%	18.2%
PJM	27.6%	17.9%	9.0%
SERC-C	24.3%	14.9%	14.7%
SERC-E	22.2%	16.3%	10.8%
SERC-FP	26.3%	19.3%	12.3%
SERC-SE	44.6%	41.1%	34.9%
TRE-ERCOT	25.6%	19.2%	11.5%
WECC-AB	30.5%	28.1%	8.6%
WECC-BC	18.8%	18.7%	-5.6%
WECC-CA/MX	46.7%	40.8%	5.4%
WECC-NW	35.5%	29.7%	1.1%
WECC-SW	22.0%	12.9%	-10.8%

Seasonal risk scenarios for each assessment area are presented in the **Regional Assessments Dashboards** section. The on-peak reserve margin and seasonal risk scenario charts in each dashboard provide potential summer peak demand and resource condition information. The reserve margins on the right side of the dashboard pages provide a comparison to the previous year's assessment. The seasonal risk scenario charts present deterministic scenarios for further analysis of different demand and resource levels with adjustments for normal and extreme conditions. The assessment areas determined the adjustments to capacity and peak demand based on methods or assumptions that are summarized in the seasonal risk scenario charts; more information about these dashboard charts is provided in the **Data Concepts and Assumptions** section.

The seasonal risk scenario charts can be expressed in terms of reserve margins: In **Table 2**, each assessment area's Anticipated Reserve Margins are shown alongside the reserve margins for a typical generation outage scenario (where applicable) and the extreme demand and resource conditions in their seasonal risk scenario.

Highlighted in **orange** are the areas identified as having resource adequacy or energy risks for the summer in the **Key Findings** section's discussion. The typical outage reserve margin includes anticipated resources minus the capacity that is likely to be in maintenance or forced outage at peak demand. If the typical maintenance or forced outage margin is the same as the Anticipated Reserve Margin, it is because an assessment area has already factored typical outages into the anticipated resources. The extreme conditions margin includes all components of the scenario and represents the most severe operating conditions of an area's scenario. Note that any reserve margin below zero indicates that the resources fall below demand in the scenario.

In addition to the peak demand and seasonal risk hour scenario charts, the assessment areas provided a resource adequacy risk assessment that was probability-based for the summer season. Results are summarized in **Table 3**. The risk assessments account for the hour(s) of greatest risk of resource shortfall. For most areas, the hour(s) of risk coincide with the time of forecasted peak demand; however, some areas incur the greatest risk at other times based on the varying demand and resource profiles. Various risk metrics are provided and include loss of load expectation (LOLE), LOLHs, expected unserved energy (EUE), and the probabilities of energy emergency alert (EEA) occurrence.

Energy Emergency Alerts

Extreme generation outages, low resource output, and peak loads similar to those experienced in wide-area heat events and the heat domes experienced in western parts of North America during the last three summers are ongoing reliability risks in certain areas for Summer 2024. When forecasted resources in an area fall below expected demand and operating reserve requirements, BAs may need to employ operating mitigations or EEAs to obtain the capacity and energy necessary for reliability. A description of each EEA level is provided below.

Energy Emergency Alert Levels

EEA Level	Description	Circumstances
EEA 1	All available generation resources in use	• The BA is experiencing conditions in which all available generation resources are committed to meet firm load, firm transactions, and reserve commitments and is concerned about sustaining its required contingency reserves. • Non-firm wholesale energy sales (other than those that are recallable to meet reserve requirements) have been curtailed.
EEA 2	Load management procedures in effect	• The BA is no longer able to provide its expected energy requirements and is an energy-deficient BA. • An energy-deficient BA has implemented its operating plan(s) to mitigate emergencies. • An energy-deficient BA is still able to maintain minimum contingency reserve requirements.
EEA 3	Firm load interruption is imminent or in progress	• The energy-deficient BA is unable to meet minimum contingency reserve requirements.

Table 3: Probability-Based Risk Assessment		
Assessment Area	**Type of Assessment**	**Results and Insight from Assessment**
MISO	NERC 2022 Probabilistic Assessment (2022 ProbA)	The 2022 ProbA results found 187 MWh EUE for Summer 2024 and <1 hour of LOLH. However, MISO has more resources and higher reserves for the summer than were considered in the 2022 ProbA, which should result in lower risk.
MRO-Manitoba	Verification of NERC 2022 Probabilistic Assessment (2022 ProbA)	The 2022 ProbA results indicate 29 MWh per year of EUE for 2024.
MRO-SaskPower	Probability-based capacity adequacy assessment	Results indicate that the expected number of hours with operating reserve deficiency for the 2024 summer season (June–September) is 0.68 hours. June is the month with highest risk.
MRO-SPP	Statistical analysis of the Summer 2022 real-time data and operating procedures	Potential risk of using operating reserves and EEA 1 or EEA 2 is 1 day per summer. Risk of EEA3 is 0.2 days per summer. Risk is associated with low wind generation output levels or unanticipated generation outages in combination with high-load periods.
NPCC	NPCC conducted an all-hour probabilistic assessment that consisted of a base case and several more severe scenarios examining low resources, reduced imports, and higher loads. The highest peak load scenario has a 7% probability of occurring.	NPCC Regional Entity assesses that there will be an adequate supply of electricity across the Regional Entity this summer. Necessary strategies and procedures are in place to deal with operational challenges and emergencies as they may develop. Preliminary results of the probabilistic analysis by assessment area are below. [NPCC anticipates releasing the assessment in early May].
NPCC-Maritimes		NPCC's assessment results indicate that Maritimes is unlikely to experience resource shortages that would require additional imports or operating procedures this summer. Negligible cumulative LOLE, LOLH, and EUE risks were estimated over the summer period for all modeled scenarios, including the severe low-likelihood cases.
NPCC-New England		NPCC's assessment results indicate that ISO-New England (ISO-NE) could experience resource shortages during high-demand and low-resource conditions and require limited use of operating procedures for mitigation. In NPCC's probabilistic assessment, the reduced resource case with the highest peak load scenario resulted in New England having a small estimated cumulative LOLE risk (0.66 days/summer) with associated LOLHs (2.7 hours/summer) and EUE (1,476 MWh/summer) with the highest risk occurring in June. This scenario is based exclusively on the two highest load levels with a 7% chance of occurring and a low-resource case consisting of extended summer maintenance across NPCC and reduced imports from PJM. Negligible cumulative LOLE (<0.022 days/summer), LOLH (<0.08hours/summer), and EUE (<17 MWh/summer) risks were estimated over the summer May–September period for the other scenarios modeled.
NPCC-New York		NPCC's assessment results indicate that New York ISO (NYISO) could experience resource shortages during high-demand conditions and require limited use of operating procedures for mitigation. In NPCC's probabilistic assessment, the highest peak load scenarios resulted in New York having a small estimated cumulative LOLE risk (1.6 days/summer) with associated LOLHs (5.9 hours/summer) and EUE (5,460 MWh/summer) with the highest risk occurring in July and August. Scenarios are based exclusively on the two highest load levels with a 7% chance of occurring. Negligible cumulative LOLE (<0.023 days/summer), LOLH (<0.07 hours/summer), and EUE (39 MWh/summer) were estimated over the summer period for the other scenarios modeled. Furthermore, the New York State Reliability Council conducts an annual study to determine the installed reserve margin (IRM) necessary to meet the 1 day in 10 years Loss of LOLE criterion. NYISO has procured capacity for the upcoming summer to meet the IRM requirement.

Table 3: Probability-Based Risk Assessment		
Assessment Area	**Type of Assessment**	**Results and Insight from Assessment**
NPCC-Ontario		NPCC's assessment results indicate that Ontario is unlikely to experience resource shortages that would require additional imports or operating procedures this summer. In NPCC's probabilistic assessment, the reduced resource case with the highest peak load scenario resulted in Ontario having a negligible cumulative LOLE risk (0.03 days/summer) with associated LOLHs (0.07 hours/summer) and EUE (33 MWh/summer) with the highest risk occurring in August. This scenario is based exclusively on the two highest load levels with a 7% chance of occurring and a low-resource case consisting of additional summer maintenance and low hydroelectric output. Negligible cumulative LOLE, LOLH, and EUE risks were estimated over the summer for the other scenarios modeled.
NPCC-Québec		NPCC's assessment results indicate that Québec is unlikely to experience resource shortages that would require additional imports or operating procedures this summer. Negligible cumulative LOLE, LOLH, and EUE risks were estimated over the summer period for all modeled scenarios, including the severe low-likelihood cases.
PJM	Based on 2023 PJM Reserve Requirement Study (RRS)	PJM is expecting a low risk of resources falling below required operating reserves. PJM forecasts a 29% IRM, well above the target of 17.7%. The RRS analyzed a wide range of load scenarios (low, regular, and extreme) as well as multiple scenarios for system-wide unavailable capacity due to forced outages, maintenance outages, and ambient derations. Due to the low penetration of variable energy resources in PJM relative to PJM's peak load, the hour with most loss of load risk remains the hour with highest forecasted demand.
SERC	Verification of NERC 2022 ProbA Results	The 2022 base case results indicated adequate resources for the SERC Regional Entity as a whole with an observed LOLE of 0.01 days/summer for 2024.
SERC-Central		Probabilistic analysis indicates no risk for resource shortfall.
SERC-East		Probabilistic analysis shows low risk for July and August with EUE of 2.38 MWh and LOLH 0.005 hours.
SERC-Florida Peninsula		SERC probabilistic analysis indicates no risk of resource shortfall.
SERC-Southeast		Probabilistic analysis indicates almost no risk of resource shortfall.
Texas RE-ERCOT	ERCOT probabilistic assessment using the Probabilistic Reserve Risk Model	The simulation indicates an elevated risk of having to declare an EEA during evenings on peak load days in August—the forecasted summer peak load month. The probability of declaring an EEA is 18.4% during the highest risk hour. The probability of firm load shedding is 14.6% during the highest risk hour. The model accounts for the risk of triggering the curtailment of coastal region wind generation due to transmission system constraints.
WECC	WECC performed a probabilistic assessment for Summer 2024 based on demand and resource forecasts provided by load-serving entities.	Resource adequacy remains a critical risk in the Western Interconnection and continues to challenge industry planners, operators, regulators, and partners. Resource adequacy risks over the medium and long terms have increased significantly compared to last year's assessment. Three risks merit particular attention: increasing variability, rate of demand growth and uncertainty of future load patterns, and the pace of new resource growth necessary to meet future energy demand.[11]
WECC-AB		Alberta is expected to have sufficient resource availability to meet demand and cover reserves on the peak hour at 5:00 p.m. under a summer peak defined at the 90th percentile with any combination or accumulation of derates.

[11] See 2023 Western Assessment of Resource Adequacy.pdf (wecc.org)

Table 3: Probability-Based Risk Assessment		
Assessment Area	**Type of Assessment**	**Results and Insight from Assessment**
WECC-BC		British Columbia is expected to have sufficient resource availability to meet reserves at the peak demand hour (5:00–6:00 p.m.) under most conditions. However, above-normal demand that coincides with low hydro output could result in a reserve shortage. This evaluation considers a 1-in-10 probability (90th percentile) level for peak demand and a combination of resource derates including low hydro output.
WECC-CA/MX		WECC-CA/MX is projected to have negligible-to-low amounts of LOLH (<1 hours) this summer, primarily forecast in the Baja (Mexico) part of CA/MX. Resources are sufficient to meet demand and cover reserves on the peak demand hour at 5:00 p.m. under a summer peak demand defined at the 90th percentile with any combination or accumulation of resource derates. There is increased risk of insufficient reserves at later hours (up to 7:00 p.m.) due to the variability of energy resource output. Imports to the area are required to cover these risk periods.
WECC-NW		The Northwest is expected to have sufficient resource availability to meet reserves at the peak demand hour at 5:00 p.m. under a summer peak defined at the 90th percentile with any combination or accumulation of derates.
WECC-SW		Results of WECC's probabilistic analysis indicate that the WECC-SW assessment area is projected to have negligible LOLH and EUE this summer under assessed scenarios. NERC's assessment of elevated risk is influenced by the deterministic risk scenario on page 36. The scenario shows that the assessment area would have insufficient resources to meet operating reserve requirements at a 90/10 demand level with typical generation outages and a scenario involving low-resource output and normal peak demand.

Evolving Demand-Side Management Programs

Demand-side management programs are expanding in many assessment areas, providing operators with additional resources to reduce electricity demand during periods when electricity supplies may not be sufficient. **Figure 3** shows the assessment areas with a DR exceeding 1.5% of the total internal demand. Formal DR programs involving commercial and industrial customers that have agreements with their load-serving entities to curtail load during high demand periods have grown in many assessment areas (see **Demand and Resource Tables**). Additionally, some entities have launched programs with retail customers that provide similar operator-controlled demand-side management capabilities. Programs in use by the independent system operators in Texas and the province of Ontario, discussed below, provide examples of the types of DR programs in use this summer and the contributions to meeting operating reliability and resource adequacy needs.




Figure 3: Demand Response in Assessment Areas Exceeding 1.5% Total Internal Demand


In ERCOT, nearly 3,500 MW of DR resources are expected for this summer, the equivalent of 4% of normal peak demand. Resources come from various programs, including several that are administered by ERCOT as well as those administered by other entities.

- ERCOT's controllable load resources (CLR) consist of large loads (e.g., data centers) and battery charging systems that can be dispatched by ERCOT to provide frequency regulation and short-notice resources for managing wind and solar ramps; 600 MW of CLRs are registered.
- Non-controllable load resources (NCLR) consist of "blocky" loads with both a 10-minute ramp capability for manual deployments and automatic deployment through underfrequency relay. NCLRs participate in ERCOT's Responsive Reserve Service market. ERCOT expects just over 1,100 MW of participation for the highest reserve risk hours for the upcoming summer.
- Some DR resources participate in ERCOT's Emergency Response Service (ERS), along with distributed generation. ERCOT's ERS consists of 10- and 30-minute-ramping DR and distributed generation that can first be deployed when physical responsive capability (PRC) drops to 3,000 MW to provide a contingency reserve. During the 2023 program year, ERS was deployed twice, once on August 17, and again on September 6 when ERCOT's PRC dropped below 3,000 MW. ERCOT expects approximately 1,000 MW to participate in ERS for the highest reserve risk hours for the upcoming summer.
- Transmission and distribution service provider (TDSP) load management programs provide price incentives for voluntary load reductions from commercial, industrial, and, most recently, residential loads during EEA Level 2 events. These programs have historically only been available for the months of June through September from 1:00–7:00 p.m. on weekdays (except holidays) and deployed via ERCOT instruction pursuant to agreements between ERCOT and the TDSPs. ERCOT forecasts that these programs can provide 330 MW in demand relief this summer. In addition, ERCOT Nodal Protocols allow ERCOT to instruct TDSPs to reduce customer load by using existing, in-service distribution voltage reduction measures to avoid an EEA. Conservation voltage reduction (CVR) can lower demand by nearly 575 MW.
- ERCOT accounts for load-reduction programs administered by retail entities in its load forecast. The 4-Coincident Peak (4CP) Load Reduction program incentivizes customers to reduce load during four anticipated 15-minute peak-load intervals, one each across the summer months of June, July, August, and September. The amount of load reduction for the four 4CP days in 2023 averaged 4,674 MW. Additionally, retail entities offer a variety of price-response programs that are factored into ERCOT's load forecast.

In the province of Ontario, the Independent Electricity System Operator (IESO) has expanded DR programs for summer. Overall, this summer, the effective capacity of Ontario's DR programs is 996 MW, the equivalent of 4% of normal peak demand. This includes 805 MW of DR from the capacity auction. The Peak Perks program, launched in June 2023, will contribute 92 MW of effective capacity this summer through enrolled residential customers with smart thermostats that may be controlled at peak times. The IESO also launched the Interruptible Rate Pilot in July 2023. The pilot is designed to provide large-load customers with an interruptible rate in exchange for agreeing to interrupt demand during up to 15 event periods, each up to four hours long. The pilot will run for a three-year period and has two participants that will provide 76 MW of interruptible demand.

Regional Assessments Dashboards

The following assessment area dashboards and summaries were developed based on data and narrative information collected by NERC from the six Regional Entities on an assessment area basis. Guidelines and definitions are in the **Data Concepts and Assumptions** table. On-peak reserve margin bar charts show the Anticipated Reserve Margin compared to a Reference Margin Level that is established for the areas to meet resource adequacy criteria. Prospective Reserve Margins can give an indication of additional on-peak capacity but are not used for assessing adequacy. The operational risk analysis shown in the following regional assessments dashboard pages provides a deterministic scenario for understanding how various factors that affect resources and demand can combine to impact overall resource adequacy. For each assessment area, there is a risk-period scenario graphic; the left **blue** column shows anticipated resources (from the **Demand and Resource Tables**), and the **orange** column at the right shows the two demand scenarios of the normal peak net internal demand (from the **Demand and Resource Tables**) and the extreme summer peak demand determined by the assessment area. The middle **red** or **green** bars show adjustments that are applied cumulatively to the anticipated resources. Adjustments may include reductions for typical generation outages (maintenance and forced not already accounted for in anticipated resources) and additions that represent the quantified capacity from operational tools (if any) that are available during scarcity conditions but have not been accounted for in the *SRA* reserve margins. Resources throughout the scenario are compared against expected operating reserve requirements that are based on peak load and normal weather. The cumulative effects from extreme events are also factored in through additional resource derates or low-output scenarios. In addition, results from a probability-based resource adequacy assessment are shown in the Highlights section of each dashboard. Methods varied by assessment area and provided further insights into the risk conditions forecasted for the summer period.



MISO *(Midcontinent Independent System Operator)*
PJM

MRO – Midwest Reliability Organization
- MRO-Manitoba Hydro
- MRO-SaskPower
- MRO-SPP

NPCC – Northeast Power Coordinating Council
- NPCC-Maritimes
- NPCC-New England
- NPCC-New York
- NPCC-Ontario
- NPCC-Québec

SERC – SERC Reliability Corporation
- SERC-Central
- SERC-East
- SERC-Southeast
- SERC-Florida Peninsula

Texas RE – Texas Reliability Entity
- Texas RE-ERCOT *(Electric Reliability Council of Texas)*

WECC
- WECC-AB *(Alberta)*
- WECC-BC *(British Colombia)*
- WECC-CA/MX *(California/Mexico)*
- WECC-NW *(Northwest)*
- WECC-SW *(Southwest)*



MISO

MISO is a not-for profit, member-based organization that administers wholesale electricity markets that provide customers with valued service; reliable, cost-effective systems and operations; dependable and transparent prices; open access to markets; and planning for long-term efficiency. MISO manages energy, reliability, and operating reserve markets that consist of 36 local BA and 394 market participants, serving approximately 42 million customers. Although parts of MISO fall in three Regional Entities, MRO is responsible for coordinating data and information submitted for NERC's reliability assessments.


Highlights

- Demand forecasts and resource data indicate that MISO is at elevated risk of operating reserve shortfalls during periods of high demand or low resource output. MISO's resources are projected to be higher than in Summer 2023 while net internal demand decreased slightly. With increased resource availability for this summer, Anticipated Reserve Margin (ARM) of 31.6% (on an installed capacity basis) is higher than last summer's ARM of 23%.
- MISO conducted its annual probabilistic LOLE analysis and determined that a 2024 Reference Margin Level (RML) of 17.7% results in an LOLE of 1 day in 10 years. MISO's RML increased from 15.9% in 2023 to 17.7% in 2024 based on the summer seasonal capacity construct. A methodology change in the Planning Resource Auction (PRA) requesting GOs' seasonally corrected Generator Verification Test Capacity (GVTC), updated seasonal forced outage rates, and updated annualized planned maintenance outage rates as well as information on new units, retirements, suspensions, and changes in the resource mix contributed to the increase in reserve margin for the 2024 summer. Comparing the increased ARM to the lower RML indicates improved reliability from the LOLE base case at 1 day in 10 years.
- Performance of wind generators during periods of high electricity demand is a key factor in determining whether system operators need to employ operating mitigations, such as maximum-generation declarations and energy emergencies. MISO has over 31,000 MW of installed wind capacity; however, the historically based on-peak capacity contribution is 5,616 MW.


Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under normal peak-demand scenarios. Above-normal summer peak load and extreme generator outage conditions could result in the need to employ operating mitigations (e.g., load-modifying resources and energy transfers from neighboring systems) and EEAs. Emergency declarations that can only be called upon when available generation is at maximum capability are necessary to access load-modifying resources (DR) when operating reserve shortfalls are projected.


On-Peak Reserve Margin



On-Peak Fuel Mix



2024 Summer Risk Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) and (90/10) demand forecast using 30 years of historical data

Maintenance Outages: Rolling five-year summer average of maintenance and planned outages

Forced Outages: Five-year average of all outages that were not planned

Extreme Derates: Maximum historical generation outages

Operational Mitigations: A total of 2.4 GW capacity resources available during extreme operating conditions



MRO-Manitoba Hydro

Manitoba Hydro is a provincial Crown corporation and one of the largest integrated electricity and natural gas distribution utilities in Canada. Manitoba Hydro is a leader in providing renewable energy and clean-burning natural gas. Manitoba Hydro provides electricity to approximately 608,500 electric customers in Manitoba and natural gas to approximately 293,000 customers in southern Manitoba. Its service area is the province of Manitoba, which is 251,000 square miles. Manitoba Hydro is winter peaking. Manitoba Hydro is its own Planning Coordinator (PC) and BA. Manitoba Hydro is a coordinating member of MISO, which is the RC for Manitoba Hydro.


Highlights

- Manitoba Hydro is not anticipating any operational challenges and/or emerging reliability issues for Summer 2024.
- ARM has fallen since Summer 2023 due to higher peak demand forecast, more generator planned maintenance outages, and an increase in net firm capacity transfers. Nonetheless, ARM exceeds the 12% RML.
- Manitoba Hydro is experiencing below-average water supply conditions. However, above-average late-winter snowfall will favorably impact spring runoff. The Manitoba Hydro system is designed and operated such that reliable operations can be maintained under extreme drought. Manitoba Hydro expects to reliably supply its internal demand and export obligations even if drought continues through 2024/25.
- All units at Keeyask Generating Station have commercial operation status.


Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under the assessed scenarios.


On-Peak Reserve Margin



On-Peak Fuel Mix



2024 Summer Risk Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: (50/50) Demand with allowance for extreme demand based on extreme summer weather scenario of 35.4 C (96 F)

Forced Outages: Typical forced outages

Extreme Derates: Summer wind capacity accreditation of 18.1% of nameplate rating based on MISO seasonal analysis

Normal hydro generation expected for this summer.

Operational Mitigations: Utilize Curtailable Rate Program to manage peak demand; utilize operating reserve if additional measures required



MRO-SaskPower

MRO-SaskPower is an assessment area in the Saskatchewan province of Canada. The province has a geographic area of 651,900 square kilometers (251,700 square miles) and a population of approximately 1.1 million. Peak demand is experienced in the winter. The Saskatchewan Power Corporation (SaskPower) is the PC and RC for the province of Saskatchewan and is the principal supplier of electricity in the province. SaskPower is a provincial Crown corporation and, under provincial legislation, is responsible for the reliability oversight of the Saskatchewan BES and its Interconnections.


Highlights

- Despite being primarily a winter-peaking area, Saskatchewan also faces significant electricity demand in the summer during extremely hot weather conditions.
- SaskPower collaborates annually with Manitoba Hydro for a summer joint operating study, incorporating inputs from the Western Area Power Administration (WAPA) and Basin Electric to develop operational guidelines addressing any identified issues.
- The probability of experiencing a shortage in operating reserves during peak load periods, or EEAs, may increase if significant generation forced outages happen at the same time as planned maintenance outages during the high-demand months of June through September.
- If extreme thermal conditions align with significant generation outages, SaskPower will deploy available DR programs, engage in short-term power transfers from neighboring utilities, and implement temporary load interruptions as necessary to mitigate the situation.


Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under the assessed scenarios. Above-normal summer peak load and outage conditions similar to those observed in Summer 2023 are likely to result in the need to employ operating mitigations (e.g., DR and transfers) and EEAs.


On-Peak Reserve Margin



On-Peak Fuel Mix



2024 Summer Risk Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) and above-normal scenario based on peak demand with lighting and all consumer loads

Forced Outages: Estimated by using SaskPower forced outage model

Extreme Derates: Estimated resources unavailable in extreme conditions

Operational Mitigations: Estimated non-firm imports and standby generators on 2–7-day notice



MRO-SPP

SPP PC's footprint covers 546,000 square miles and encompasses all or parts of Arkansas, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas, and Wyoming. The SPP long-term assessment is reported based on the PC footprint, which touches parts of the MRO Regional Entity and the WECC Regional Entity. The SPP assessment area footprint has approximately 61,000 miles of transmission lines, 756 generating plants, and 4,811 transmission-class substations, and it serves a population of more than 18 million.


Highlights

- ARMs are higher in SPP compared to Summer 2023. Increased capacity for the summer is coming from wind resource additions, higher expected wind contribution at peak demand, and commitments from switchable generators (i.e., resources capable of supplying SPP or a neighboring BA) to qualify as resources in SPP.
- SPP projects a low likelihood of any emerging reliability issues impacting the area for the 2024 summer season.
- BA generation capacity deficiency risks remain depending on wind generation output levels and unanticipated generation outages in combination with high-load periods.
- Using the current operational processes and procedures, SPP will continue to assess the needs for the 2024 summer season and will adjust as needed to ensure that real-time reliability is maintained throughout the summer time frame.


Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources are sufficient to meet operating reserve requirements under normal peak-demand and outage scenarios. Above-normal summer peak load and outage conditions could necessitate operating mitigations (e.g., DR and transfers from neighboring systems) and EEAs.


On-Peak Reserve Margin



On-Peak Fuel Mix



2024 Summer Risk Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) and extreme demand is a 5% increase from net internal demand

Maintenance and Forced Outages: Represent five-year historical averages; calculated from SPP's generation assessment process

Extreme Derates: Additional unavailable capacity from operational data at high-demand periods

Low Wind Scenario: Derates reflecting a low-wind day in the summer




NPCC-Maritimes

The Maritimes assessment area is a winter-peaking NPCC area that contains two BAs. It is comprised of the Canadian provinces of New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island and the northern portion of Maine, which is radially connected to the New Brunswick power system. The area covers 58,000 square miles with a total population of 1.9 million.

Highlights

- The Maritimes area has not identified any operational issues that are expected to impact system reliability. If an event were to occur, emergency operations and planning procedures are in place.
- All of the area's declared firm capacity is expected to be operational for the summer operating period.
- As part of the planning process, dual-fueled units will have sufficient supplies of heavy fuel oil (HFO) on site to enable sustained operation in the event of natural gas supply interruptions.


On-Peak Reserve Margin




Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under normal peak-demand scenarios. Above-normal summer peak load or extreme outage conditions could necessitate operating mitigations (e.g., DR and non-firm transfers) and EEAs.

On-Peak Fuel Mix



2024 Summer Risk Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) and (above 90/10) extreme demand forecast

Forced Outages: Based on historical operating experience

Extreme Derates: A low-likelihood scenario resulting in an additional 50% derate in the remaining capacity of both natural gas and wind resources under extreme conditions

Operational Mitigations: Imports anticipated from neighbors during emergencies



NPCC-New England


NPCC-New England is an assessment area consisting of the states of Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont that is served by ISO New England (ISO-NE) Inc. ISO-NE is a regional transmission organization that is responsible for the reliable day-to-day operation of New England's bulk power generation and transmission system, administration of the area's wholesale electricity markets, and management of the comprehensive planning of the regional BPS.

The New England BPS serves approximately 14.5 million customers over 68,000 square miles.

Highlights

- The New England area expects to have sufficient resources to meet the 2024 summer peak demand forecast.
- 330 MW of resources are currently on emergency outage but are scheduled to be available during the summer operating period.
- The 50/50 peak summer demand is forecast to be 24,633 MW for the weeks beginning June 2, 2024, through September 15, 2024, with a lowest projected net margin of -401 MW (-1.6%). This margin assumes a net interchange of 1,297 MW, which is capacity backed. However, ISO-NE typically imports around 3,000 MW during summer peak load conditions. For this *SRA*, the established Reference Margin Level is 12.9%. Wind, grid-connected solar PV, and run-of-river totals were derated for this calculation.
- The 2024 summer demand forecast factors in demand reductions associated with energy efficiency, load management, behind-the-meter photovoltaic (BTM-PV) systems, and distributed generation.


On-Peak Reserve Margin




Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources do not meet operating reserve requirements under normal peak-demand and outage scenarios. Operating mitigations (e.g., DR and transfers) are likely to be needed to meet peak demand. More severe conditions (e.g., above-normal summer peak load and outage conditions) could result in an EEA.

On-Peak Fuel Mix



2024 Summer Risk Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Peak net internal demand (50/50) and (90/10) extreme demand forecast

Maintenance Outages: Based on historical weekly averages

Typical Forced Outages: Based on seasonal capacity of each resource as determined by ISO-NE

Operational Mitigations: Based on load and capacity relief assumed available from invocation of ISO-NE operating procedures




NPCC-New York

NPCC-New York is an assessment area consisting of the NYISO service territory. NYISO is responsible for operating New York's BPS, administering wholesale electricity markets, and conducting system planning. NYISO is the only BA within the state of New York. The BPS in New York encompasses over 11,000 miles of transmission lines and 760 power generation units and serves 20.2 million customers. For this *SRA*, the established RML is 15%. Wind, grid-connected solar PV, and run-of-river totals were derated for this calculation. However, New York requires load-serving entities to procure capacity for their loads equal to their peak demand plus an IRM. The IRM requirement represents a percentage of capacity above peak load forecast and is approved annually by the New York State Reliability Council. The council approved the 2024–2025 IRM at 22.0%.

Highlights

- NYISO is not anticipating any operational issues in the New York Control Area for the upcoming summer.
- No unanticipated operating conditions occurred during the summer 2023 season.
- Adequate capacity margins are anticipated, and existing operating procedures are sufficient to handle any issues that may occur.


On-Peak Reserve Margin




Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under the assessed scenarios. Operating mitigations (e.g., DR and transfers) may be needed to meet above-normal summer peak load and outage conditions.

On-Peak Fuel Mix



2024 Summer Risk Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) and (90/10) extreme demand forecast

Maintenance Outages: Based on historical performance and the new NYISO capacity accreditation process

Forced Outages: Based on historical five-year averages

Extreme Derates: Estimated resources unavailable in extreme conditions

Operational Mitigations: A total of 3.3 GW based on operational/emergency procedures in area emergency operations manual




NPCC-Ontario

NPCC-Ontario is an assessment area in the Ontario province of Canada. The IESO is the BA for the province of Ontario. The province of Ontario covers more than 1 million square kilometers (415,000 square miles) and has a population of more than 15 million. Ontario is interconnected electrically with Québec, MRO-Manitoba, states in MISO (Minnesota and Michigan), and NPCC-New York.

Highlights

- Overall, Ontario is operating within a period in which generation and transmission outages are more challenging to accommodate. The IESO has been actively coordinating and planning with market participants to maintain reliability.
- The Ontario grid is better positioned for Summer 2024 than it was for Summer 2023.
- This season, the grid will benefit from fewer coincident planned generator outages, progress being made on nuclear refurbishments, increased capacity secured through the capacity auction, and new demand-side management programs, including the Interruptible Rate Pilot and Peak Perks.
- The system will be adequate in Summer 2024 under normal weather conditions. It is also expected to be adequate during extreme weather conditions with the availability of up to 2,000 MW of imports from neighboring jurisdictions or other operating actions to ensure reliability.


On-Peak Reserve Margin




Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under the assessed scenarios.

On-Peak Fuel Mix



2024 Summer Risk Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50 forecast) and highest weather-adjusted daily demand based on 31 years of demand history

Extreme Derates: Derived from weather-adjusted temperature rating of thermal units and adjustments to expected hydro production for low water conditions

Operational Mitigations: Imports anticipated from neighbors during emergencies




NPCC-Québec

The Québec assessment area (province of Québec) is a winter-peaking NPCC area that covers 595,391 square miles with a population of 8 million. Québec is one of the four Interconnections in North America; it has ties to Ontario, New York, New England, and the Maritimes consisting of either high-voltage direct current ties, radial generation, or load to and from neighboring systems.

Highlights

- The Québec area forecasted summer peak demand (excluding April, May, and September) is 22,922 MW during the week beginning August 11, 2024, with a forecasted net margin of 7,423 MW (32.4%).
- Resource adequacy issues are not expected this summer.
- The Québec area expects to be able to assist other areas, if needed, up to the transfer capability available.


On-Peak Reserve Margin




Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under the assessed scenarios.

On-Peak Fuel Mix



2024 Summer Risk Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenario: Net internal demand (50/50) and (90/10) demand forecast

Net Firm Transfers: Anticipated exports to neighbors during the risk hour




PJM

PJM Interconnection is a regional transmission organization that coordinates the movement of wholesale electricity in all or parts of Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, and the District of Columbia. PJM serves 65 million customers and covers 369,089 square miles. PJM is a BA, PC, Transmission Planner, Resource Planner, Interchange Authority, TOP, Transmission Service Provider, and RC.

Highlights

- PJM expects no resource problems over the 2024 summer peak season. PJM is forecasting around 29% installed reserves (including expected committed DR), which is well above the target IRM of 17.7%. The increase of 1.8 percentage points of the reserve requirement is driven by adjusted load forecast parameters.
- Rising demand, generator retirements, and slower-than-anticipated resource additions contribute to lower reserve margins compared to last summer.
- The greatest load-loss risk remains the hour with highest forecasted demand due to the low penetration of variable energy resources relative to PJM's peak load.


On-Peak Reserve Margin




Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under the assessed scenarios.

On-Peak Fuel Mix



2024 Summer Risk Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) and (90/10) demand forecast

Forced Outages: Based on historical data and trending

Extreme Derates: Accounts for reduced thermal capacity contributions due to performance in extreme conditions

Operational Mitigations: A total of 3 GW based on operational/emergency procedures



SERC-Central

SERC-Central is an assessment area within the SERC Regional Entity. SERC-Central includes all of Tennessee and portions of Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Missouri, and Kentucky. Historically a summer-peaking area, SERC-Central is beginning to have higher peak demand forecasts in winter. SERC is one of the six companies across North America that are responsible for the work under Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)-approved delegation agreements with NERC. SERC-Central is specifically responsible for the reliability and security of the electric grid across the Southeastern and Central areas of the United States. This area covers approximately 630,000 square miles and serves a population of more than 91 million. The SERC Regional Entity includes 36 BAs, 28 planning entities, and 6 RCs.


Highlights

- SERC-Central will have higher reserves compared to last summer due to increased firm imports and additions of gas and solar generation.
- Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under the assessed scenarios.
- The probabilistic analysis metrics indicate adequate energy resources for the subregion.
- Entities perform resource studies to ensure resource adequacy to meet the summer peak demand and maintain the reliability of the system. They actively participate in the SERC Near-Term, Long-Term, and Resource Adequacy Working Groups, which identify emerging and potential reliability impacts on transmission and resource adequacy along with transfer capability.
- There is a moderate risk of transmission impacts due to severe weather. The advanced age and material condition of older coal- and gas-fired generators could result in potential reliability challenges. Entities are mitigating these risks through summer readiness processes, pursuing short-term market opportunities, and leveraging demand-side management programs as necessary.


Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under the assessed scenarios.


On-Peak Reserve Margin



On-Peak Fuel Mix



2024 Summer Risk Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) and extreme demand forecast based on extreme summer weather (equals or exceeds the (90/10) demand forecast)

Maintenance Outages: Adjusted for higher outages resulting from extreme summer temperatures and aggregated on a SERC subregional level

Forced Outages: Accounts for reduced thermal capacity contributions due to performance in extreme conditions

Extreme Derates: Estimated resources unavailable in extreme conditions

Operational Mitigations: A total of 1.9 GW based on operational/emergency procedures




SERC-East

SERC-East is an assessment area within the SERC Regional Entity. SERC-East includes North Carolina and South Carolina. Historically a summer-peaking area, SERC-East is beginning to have higher peak demand forecasts in winter. SERC is one of the six companies across North America that are responsible for the work under FERC-approved delegation agreements with NERC. SERC is specifically responsible for the reliability and security of the electric grid across the Southeastern and Central areas of the United States. This area covers approximately 630,000 square miles and serves a population of more than 91 million. The SERC Regional Entity includes 36 BAs, 28 planning entities, and 6 RCs.

Highlights

- Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under the assessed scenarios.
- The probabilistic analysis metrics show some risk for energy resource adequacy during the summer months of July and August in the afternoon hours.
- Entities perform resource studies to ensure resource adequacy to meet the summer peak demand and maintain the reliability of the system. They actively participate in the SERC Near-Term, Long-Term, and Resource Adequacy Working Groups, which identify emerging and potential reliability impacts on transmission and resource adequacy along with transfer capability.
- Entities have not identified any emerging reliability issues or operational concerns for the upcoming summer season.


On-Peak Reserve Margin




Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under the assessed scenarios.

On-Peak Fuel Mix



2024 Summer Risk Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) and extreme demand forecast based on extreme summer weather (equals or exceeds the (90/10) demand forecast)

Maintenance Outages: Adjusted for higher outages resulting from extreme summer temperatures and aggregated on a SERC subregional level

Forced Outages: Accounts for reduced thermal capacity contributions due to performance in extreme conditions

Operational Mitigations: A total of 1.5 GW based on operational/emergency procedures



SERC-Florida Peninsula

SERC-Florida Peninsula is a summer-peaking assessment area within SERC. SERC is one of the six companies across North America that are responsible for the work under FERC-approved delegation agreements with NERC. SERC is specifically responsible for the reliability and security of the electric grid across the Southeastern and Central areas of the United States. This area covers approximately 630,000 square miles and serves a population of more than 91 million. The SERC Regional Entity includes 36 BAs, 28 planning entities, and 6 RCs.


Highlights

- Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under the assessed scenarios.
- The probabilistic analysis metrics indicate adequate energy resources for the subregion.
- Entities perform resource studies to ensure resource adequacy to meet the summer peak demand and maintain the reliability of the system. They actively participate in the SERC Near-Term, Long-Term, and Resource Adequacy Working Groups, which identify emerging and potential reliability impacts on transmission and resource adequacy along with transfer capability.
- Entities have not identified any emerging reliability issues or operational concerns for the upcoming summer season.


Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under the assessed scenarios.


On-Peak Reserve Margin



On-Peak Fuel Mix



2024 Summer Risk Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) and extreme demand forecast based on extreme summer weather (equals or exceeds the (90/10) demand forecast)

Maintenance Outages: Adjusted for higher outages resulting from extreme summer temperatures and aggregated on a SERC subregional level

Forced Outages: Accounts for reduced thermal capacity contributions due to performance in extreme conditions

Operational Mitigations: A total of 3.8 GW based on operational/emergency procedures



SERC-Southeast

SERC-Southeast is a summer-peaking assessment area within the SERC Regional Entity. SERC-Southeast includes all or portions of Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi. SERC is one of the six companies across North America that are responsible for the work under FERC-approved delegation agreements with NERC. SERC is specifically responsible for the reliability and security of the electric grid across the Southeastern and Central areas of the United States. This area covers approximately 630,000 square miles and serves a population of more than 91 million. The SERC Regional Entity includes 36 BAs, 28 planning entities, and 6 RCs.


Highlights

- Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under the assessed scenarios.
- A new 1,100 MW nuclear unit and additional solar generation will give SERC-Southeast higher reserves compared to last summer.
- The probabilistic analysis metrics indicate adequate energy resources for the subregion.
- With the increased penetration of variable energy resources (VER), the curtailment of VER during light-load conditions to support operations may become more prevalent. This, in combination with the retirement of resources, increases the operational challenges in managing the ramps in some areas of SERC-Southeast.
- Entities perform resource studies to ensure resource adequacy to meet the summer peak demand and maintain the reliability of the system. They actively participate in the SERC Near-Term, Long-Term, and Resource Adequacy Working Groups, which identify emerging and potential reliability impacts on transmission and resource adequacy along with transfer capability.


Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under the assessed scenarios.


On-Peak Reserve Margin



On-Peak Fuel Mix



2024 Summer Risk Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) and extreme demand forecast based on extreme summer weather (equals or exceeds the (90/10) demand forecast)

Maintenance Outages: Adjusted for higher outages resulting from extreme summer temperatures and aggregated on a SERC subregional level

Forced Outages: Accounts for reduced thermal capacity contributions due to performance in extreme conditions

Extreme Derates: Estimated resources unavailable in extreme conditions

Operational Mitigations: A total of 3 GW based on operational/emergency procedures




Texas RE-ERCOT

The Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) is the independent system operator (ISO) for the ERCOT Interconnection and is located entirely in the state of Texas; it operates as a single BA. It also performs financial settlement for the competitive wholesale bulk-power market and administers retail switching for nearly 8 million premises in competitive choice areas. ERCOT is governed by a board of directors and subject to oversight by the Public Utility Commission of Texas and the Texas Legislature. ERCOT is summer-peaking, and the forecasted summer peak load month is August. It covers approximately 200,000 square miles, connects over 52,700 miles of transmission lines, has over 1,100 generation units, and serves more than 26 million customers. Texas RE is responsible for the Regional Entity functions described in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 for ERCOT. On November 3, 2022, the Public Utility Commission of Texas issued an order directing ERCOT to assume the duties and responsibilities of the reliability monitor for the Texas grid.

Highlights

- Given an ARM of 25.6% and Reference Reserve Margin of 13.75%, ERCOT expects to have sufficient operating reserves for the August peak load hour given expected normal summer system conditions.
- Solar and battery energy storage installed capacity has grown by about 4,500 and 1,600 MW, respectively, since last August.
- Continued robust growth in both loads and intermittent renewable resources has elevated the risk of emergency conditions in the evening hours when solar generation begins to ramp down.
- ERCOT's probabilistic risk assessment indicates an elevated risk of having to declare EEAs during hours ending 8:00–9:00 p.m. Central on the August peak load day. ERCOT judges an hour to have elevated risk (as opposed to low risk) when the probability of an EEA is greater than 10%. The EEA probability for these two hours is about 16% and 18%, respectively.
- Contributing to the elevated risk is a potential need, under certain grid conditions, to limit power transfers from South Texas into the San Antonio region. Conditions could cause overloads on the lines that make up the South Texas export and import interfaces, necessitating South Texas generation curtailments and potential firm load shedding to avoid cascading outages. The risk is greatest when ERCOT has extremely high net loads in the early evening hours. This issue will be addressed with mitigation measures including the construction of the San Antonio South Reliability Project, which is anticipated to be completed by Summer 2027.


On-Peak Reserve Margin




Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements for the peak demand hour scenario. However, there is risk of supply shortages as solar generation ramps down during the early evening hours when system load is high and transmission constraints limit transfers.

On-Peak Fuel Mix



2024 Summer Risk Period Scenario (9:00 p.m. local time)



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at hour ending 9 p.m. local time as solar PV output is diminished and demand remains high

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) and extreme demand (95/5) based on August peak load

Forced Outages: Based on the 95th percentile of historical averages of forced outages for June through September weekdays, hours ending 3:00–8:00 p.m. local time for the last three summer seasons

Extreme Derates: Based on the 90th percentile of thermal forced outages for peak August load day

Low Wind Scenario: Based on the 10th percentile of historical averages of hourly wind for June through September, hours ending 1:00–9:00 p.m. local time

Operational Mitigations: Additional capacity from switchable generation and additional imports




WECC-AB

WECC-AB (Alberta) is a winter-peaking assessment area in the WECC Regional Entity that consists of the province of Alberta. WECC is responsible for coordinating and promoting BES reliability in the Western Interconnection. WECC's 329 members include 39 BAs, representing a wide spectrum of organizations with an interest in the BES. Serving an area of nearly 1.8 million square miles and more than 82 million customers, it is geographically the largest and most diverse Regional Entity. WECC's service territory extends from Canada to Mexico. It includes the provinces of Alberta and British Columbia in Canada and the northern portion of Baja California in Mexico as well as all or portions of the 14 western U.S. states in between.

Highlights

- Thermal and renewable capacity are being added to the area to address rapid load growth, but supply chain issues causing project delays or cancellations may be an issue.
- Thermal tier 1 resources for this upcoming summer include a new 900 MW natural gas combined-cycle facility and the conversion of two existing coal units to two 1x1 natural gas combustion turbine sites with 932 MW (112 incremental MW) of capacity after the steam turbine tie in. The two coal sites undergoing conversion to natural gas are the only remaining coal facilities operating in the area.
- Issues maintaining rate of change of frequency (ROCOF) during islanded or near-islanded situations with high IBR output and low demand is also a concern.
- Alberta is expected to have sufficient resource availability to meet reserves at the peak demand hour (4:00–5:00 p.m.). This evaluation considers a 1-in-10 probability (90th percentile) level for peak demand and a combination of resource derates.
- Alberta shows no LOLH or EUE for the upcoming summer season.


On-Peak Reserve Margin




Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under the assessed scenarios.

On-Peak Fuel Mix



2024 Summer Risk Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) and (90/10) demand forecast

Typical Forced Outages: Average seasonal outages

Extreme Derates: Using (90/10) point of resource performance distribution



WECC-BC

WECC-British Columbia (BC) is a winter-peaking assessment area in the WECC Regional Entity that consists of the province of British Columbia. WECC is responsible for coordinating and promoting BES reliability in the Western Interconnection. WECC's 329 members include 39 BAs, representing a wide spectrum of organizations with an interest in the BES. Serving an area of nearly 1.8 million square miles and more than 82 million customers, it is geographically the largest and most diverse Regional Entity. WECC's service territory extends from Canada to Mexico. It includes the provinces of Alberta and British Columbia in Canada and the northern portion of Baja California in Mexico as well as all or portions of the 14 western U.S. states in between.


Highlights

- British Columbia faces operational challenges on multiple fronts, including drought, wildfires, and rapid electrification in the residential, commercial, industrial, and transportation sectors.
- British Columbia is expected to have sufficient resource availability to meet reserves at the peak demand hour (5:00–6:00 p.m.) under most conditions. However, above-normal demand that coincides with low hydro output could result in a reserve shortage. This evaluation considers a 1-in-10 probability (90th percentile) level for peak demand and a combination of resource derates including low hydro output.
- WECC's probabilistic analysis shows no LOLH or EUE for British Columbia during the upcoming summer season.


Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under normal peak-demand scenarios. Above-normal summer peak load and outage conditions could result in the need to employ operating mitigations (e.g., DR and transfers) and EEAs.


On-Peak Reserve Margin



On-Peak Fuel Mix



2024 Summer Risk Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) and (90/10) demand forecast

Forced Outages: Average seasonal outages

Extreme Derates: Using (90/10) resource performance distribution at peak hour



WECC-CA/MX

WECC-CA/MX is a summer-peaking assessment area in the WECC Regional Entity that includes parts of California, Nevada, and Baja California, Mexico. WECC is responsible for coordinating and promoting BES reliability in the Western Interconnection. WECC's 329 members include 39 BAs, representing a wide spectrum of organizations with an interest in the BES. Serving an area of nearly 1.8 million square miles and more than 82 million customers, it is geographically the largest and most diverse Regional Entity. WECC's service territory extends from Canada to Mexico. It includes the provinces of Alberta and British Columbia in Canada and the northern portion of Baja California in Mexico as well as all or portions of the 14 western U.S. states in between.


Highlights

- Drought conditions, which were a concern prior to 2023, have been alleviated for the upcoming summer.
- CA/MX is expected to have sufficient resource availability to meet reserves at the peak demand hour (4:00–5:00 p.m.). The riskiest hour for CA/MX is the hour ending 6:00–7:00 p.m. when solar output is low, causing the area to rely on imports to meet demand.
- In WECC's probabilistic analysis, CA/MX is projected to have LOLH ranging from negligible to 0.8 hours with the greatest risk of EUE and LOLH being in the Baja (Mexico) part of CA/MX. Variation in LOLH in the analysis is attributable to the amount of Tier 1 resource additions that connect before the later months. Supply chain issues resulting in the delay or cancellation of Tier 1 projects are a potential risk this summer for CA/MX.
- WECC's analysis considers a 1-in-10 probability (90th percentile) level for peak demand and a combination of resource derates.


Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under normal peak-demand scenarios. Above-normal summer peak load and outage conditions could necessitate operating mitigations (e.g., DR and transfers) and EEAs.


On-Peak Reserve Margin



On-Peak Fuel Mix



2024 Summer Risk Period Scenario (7 p.m. local time)



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at hour ending 7:00 p.m. local time as solar PV output is diminished and demand remains high

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) at risk hour and (90/10) demand forecast at risk hour

Forced Outages: Estimated using market forced outage model

Extreme Derates: On natural gas units based on historical data and manufacturer data for temperature performance and outages




WECC-NW

WECC-NW is a summer-peaking assessment area in the WECC Regional Entity. The area includes Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming and parts of California, Nebraska, Nevada, and South Dakota. WECC is responsible for coordinating and promoting BES reliability in the Western Interconnection. WECC's 329 members include 39 BAs, representing a wide spectrum of organizations with an interest in the BES. Serving an area of nearly 1.8 million square miles and more than 82 million customers, it is geographically the largest and most diverse Regional Entity. WECC's service territory extends from Canada to Mexico. It includes the provinces of Alberta and British Columbia in Canada and the northern portion of Baja California in Mexico as well as all or portions of the 14 western U.S. states in between.

Highlights

- Operational challenges for the Northwest include supply chain issues potentially resulting in project delays or cancellations and unprecedented flow patterns associated with the expansion of IBRs.
- The Northwest is expected to have sufficient resource availability to meet reserves at the peak demand hour (4:00–5:00 p.m.). This evaluation considers a 1-in-10 probability (90th percentile) level for peak demand and a combination of resource derates.
- The Northwest shows no LOLH or EUE for the upcoming summer season.


On-Peak Reserve Margin




Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under normal peak-demand scenarios. Above-normal summer peak load and outage conditions could result in the need to employ operating mitigations (e.g., DR and transfers) and EEAs.

On-Peak Fuel Mix



2024 Summer Risk Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy occurs at the hour of peak demand

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) at risk hour and (90/10) demand forecast at risk hour

Forced Outages: Average seasonal outages

Extreme Derates: Using (90/10) scenario



WECC-SW

WECC-SW is a summer-peaking assessment area in the WECC Regional Entity. It includes Arizona, New Mexico, and parts of California and Texas. WECC is responsible for coordinating and promoting BES reliability in the Western Interconnection. WECC's 329 members include 39 BAs, representing a wide spectrum of organizations with an interest in the BES. Serving an area of nearly 1.8 million square miles and more than 82 million customers, it is geographically the largest and most diverse Regional Entity. WECC's service territory extends from Canada to Mexico. It includes the provinces of Alberta and British Columbia in Canada as well as the northern portion of Baja California in Mexico and all or portions of the 14 western U.S. states in between.


Highlights

- Operational challenges for the Southwest include drought, wildfires, derates of gas facilities due to extreme heat, and supply chain issues potentially affecting thermal resource return to service dates and CODs.
- The Southwest is expected to have sufficient resource availability to meet reserves at the peak demand hour (4:00–5:00 p.m.) under most conditions. However, above-normal demand that coincides with high generator forced outages or other low-resource conditions could result in a reserve shortage. This evaluation considers a 1-in-10 probability (90th percentile) level for peak demand and a combination of resource derates.
- The Southwest shows no LOLH or EUE for the upcoming summer season in WECC's probabilistic analysis.


Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under normal peak-demand scenarios. Above-normal summer peak load and outage conditions could result in the need to employ operating mitigations (e.g., DR and transfers) and EEAs.


On-Peak Reserve Margin



On-Peak Fuel Mix



2024 Summer Risk Period Scenario



Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy occurs at the hour of peak demand (5:00 p.m. local)

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) at risk hour and (90/10) demand forecast

Forced Outages: Average seasonal outages

Extreme Derates: Using (90/10) scenario

Data Concepts and Assumptions

The table below explains data concepts and important assumptions used throughout this assessment.

General Assumptions

- Reliability of the interconnected BPS is comprised of both adequacy and operating reliability:
  - Adequacy is the ability of the electric system to supply the aggregate electric power and energy requirements of the electricity consumers at all times while taking into account scheduled and reasonably expected unscheduled outages of system components.
  - Operating reliability is the ability of the electric system to withstand sudden disturbances, such as electric short-circuits or unanticipated loss of system components.
- The reserve margin calculation is an important industry planning metric used to examine future resource adequacy.
- All data in this assessment is based on existing federal, state, and provincial laws and regulations.
- Differences in data collection periods for each assessment area should be considered when comparing demand and capacity data between year-to-year seasonal assessments.
- *2023 Long-Term Reliability Assessment* data has been used for most of this 2024 summer assessment period augmented by updated load and capacity data.
- A positive net transfer capability would indicate a net importing assessment area; a negative value would indicate a net exporter.

Demand Assumptions

- Electricity demand projections, or load forecasts, are provided by each assessment area.
- Load forecasts include peak hourly load[12] or total internal demand for the summer and winter of each year.[13]
- Total internal demand projections are based on normal weather (50/50 distribution)[14] and are provided on a coincident[15] basis for most assessment areas.
- Net internal demand is used in all reserve margin calculations, and it is equal to total internal demand then reduced by the amount of controllable and dispatchable DR projected to be available during the peak hour.

Resource Assumptions

Resource planning methods vary throughout the North American BPS. NERC uses the categories below to provide a consistent approach for collecting and presenting resource adequacy. Because the electrical output of variable energy resources (e.g., wind, solar PV) depends on weather conditions, their contribution to reserve margins and other on-peak resource adequacy analysis is less than their nameplate capacity.

Anticipated Resources:

- **Existing-Certain Capacity**: Included in this category are commercially operable generating units or portions of generating units that meet at least one of the following requirements when examining the period of peak demand for the summer season: unit must have a firm capability and have a power purchase agreement with firm transmission that must be in effect for the unit; unit must be classified as a designated network resource; and/or, where energy-only markets exist, unit must be a designated market resource eligible to bid into the market.
- **Tier 1 Capacity Additions**: This category includes capacity that either is under construction or has received approved planning requirements.
- **Net Firm Capacity Transfers (Imports minus Exports)**: This category includes transfers with firm contracts.

[12] *Glossary of Terms* used in NERC Reliability Standards
[13] The summer season represents June–September and the winter season represents December–February.
[14] Essentially, this means that there is a 50% probability that actual demand will be higher and a 50% probability that actual demand will be lower than the value provided for a given season/year.
[15] Coincident: This is the sum of two or more peak loads that occur in the same hour. Noncoincident: This is the sum of two or more peak loads on individual systems that do not occur in the same time interval; this is meaningful only when considering loads within a limited period of time, such as a day, a week, a month, a heating or cooling season, and usually for not more than one year. SERC calculates total internal demand on a noncoincidental basis.

Prospective Resources: Includes all anticipated resources plus the following:

Existing-Other Capacity: Included in this category are commercially operable generating units or portions of generating units that could be available to serve load for the period of peak demand for the season but do not meet the requirements of existing-certain.

Reserve Margin Descriptions

Planning Reserve Margin: This is the primary metric used to measure resource adequacy; it is defined as the difference in resources (anticipated or prospective) and net internal demand then divided by net internal demand and shown as a percentage.

Reference Margin Level: The assumptions and naming convention of this metric vary by assessment area. The RML can be determined using both deterministic and probabilistic (based on a 0.1/year loss of load study) approaches. In both cases, this metric is used by system planners to quantify the amount of reserve capacity in the system above the forecasted peak demand that is needed to ensure sufficient supply to meet peak loads. Establishing an RML is necessary to account for long-term factors of uncertainty involved in system planning, such as unexpected generator outages and extreme weather impacts that could lead to increase demand beyond what was projected in the 50/50 load forecasted. In many assessment areas, an RML is established by a state, provincial authority, ISO/Regional Transmission Organization (RTO), or other regulatory body. In some cases, the RML is a requirement. RMLs may be different for the summer and winter seasons. If an RML is not provided by an assessment area, NERC applies 15% for predominately thermal systems and 10% for predominately hydro systems.

Seasonal Risk Scenario Chart Description

Each assessment area performed an operational risk analysis that was used to produce the seasonal risk scenario charts in the Regional Assessments Dashboards. The chart presents deterministic scenarios for further analysis of different resource and demand levels: The left **blue** column shows anticipated resources, and the two **orange** columns at the right show the two demand scenarios of the normal peak net internal demand and the extreme summer peak demand—both determined by the assessment area. The middle **red** or **green** bars show adjustments that are applied cumulatively to the anticipated resources, such as the following:

- Reductions for typical generation outages (i.e., maintenance and forced outages that are not already accounted for in anticipated resources)
- Reductions that represent additional outage or performance derating by resource type for extreme, low-probability conditions (e.g., drought condition impacts on hydroelectric generation, low-wind scenario affecting wind generation, fuel supply limitations, or extreme temperature conditions that result in reduced thermal generation output)
- Additional capacity resources that represent quantified capacity from operational procedures, if any, that are made available during scarcity conditions

Not all assessment areas have the same categories of adjustments to anticipated resources. Furthermore, each assessment area determined the adjustments to capacity based on methods or assumptions that are summarized below the chart. Methods and assumptions differ by assessment area and may not be comparable.

The chart enables evaluation of resource levels against levels of expected operating reserve requirement and the forecasted demand. Furthermore, the effects from extreme events can also be examined by comparing resource levels after applying extreme scenario derates and/or extreme summer peak demand.

Resource Adequacy

The ARM, which is based on available resource capacity, is a metric used to evaluate resource adequacy by comparing the projected capability of anticipated resources to serve forecast peak demand.[16] Large year-to-year changes in anticipated resources or forecast peak demand (net internal demand) can greatly impact Planning Reserve Margin calculations. All assessment areas have sufficient ARMs to meet or exceed their RML for the 2024 summer as shown in **Figure 4**.





Figure 4: Summer 2024 Anticipated/Prospective Reserve Margins Compared to Reference Margin Level

[16] Generally, anticipated resources include generators and firm capacity transfers that are expected to be available to serve load during electrical peak loads for the season. Prospective resources are those that could be available but do not meet criteria to be counted as anticipated resources. Refer to the **Data Concepts and Assumptions** section for additional information on Anticipated/Prospective Reserve Margins, anticipated/prospective resources, and RMLs.

Changes from Year-to-Year

Figure 5 provides the relative change in the forecast ARMs from the 2023 summer to the 2024 summer. A significant decline can signal potential operational issues for the upcoming season. Both MRO-Manitoba Hydro and WECC-BC have noticeable reductions in their ARM levels for the 2024 summer. MRO-Manitoba Hydro does not anticipate elevated risk for the upcoming summer, but WECC-BC is experiencing increasing forecasted demand and drought conditions, increasing risk heading into the 2024 summer. Additional details for each assessment area are provided in the **Data Concepts and Assumptions** and **Regional Assessments Dashboards** sections.



Note: The areas that only have one bar have the same Reference Margin Level for both years.

Figure 5: Summer 2023 and Summer 2024 Anticipated Reserve Margins Year-to-Year Change

Net Internal Demand

The changes in forecasted net internal demand for each assessment area are shown in Figure 6.[17] Assessment areas develop these forecasts based on historic load and weather information as well as other long-term projections.




Figure 6: Changes in Net Internal Demand—Summer 2023 Forecast Compared to Summer 2024 Forecast

[17] Changes in modeling and methods may also contribute to year-to-year changes in forecasted net internal demand projections.

BEFORE THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Power Act Section 202(c) Emergency Order: Tri-State Generation and Transmission Association, Platte River Power Authority, Salt River Project, PacifiCorp, and Xcel Energy	))))))	Order No. 202-25-14

Exhibit to
Motion to Intervene and Request for Rehearing and Stay of
Public Interest Organizations

Filed January 28, 2026

Exhibit 1-28c:
2019–24 NERC Summer Reliability Assessments

Demand and Resource Tables

Peak demand and supply capacity data—resource adequacy data—for each assessment area are as follows in each table (in alphabetical order).

MISO			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2023 SRA**	**2024 SRA**	**2023 vs. 2024 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	123,728	124,830	0.9%
Demand Response: Available	6,903	8,750	26.8%
Net Internal Demand	116,825	116,079	-0.6%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	140,650	143,866	2.3%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	0	0	-
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	3,018	2,471	-18.1%
Anticipated Resources	143,668	146,337	1.9%
Existing-Other Capacity	668	1,833	174.4%
Prospective Resources	151,579	148,740	-1.9%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	23.0%	26.1%	3.1
Prospective Reserve Margin	29.7%	28.1%	-1.6
Reference Margin Level	15.9%	17.7%	1.8

MRO-SaskPower			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2023 SRA**	**2024 SRA**	**2023 vs. 2024 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	3,539	3,590	1.4%
Demand Response: Available	50	50	0.0%
Net Internal Demand	3,489	3,540	1.5%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	4,213	4,323	2.6%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	0	0	-
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	290	290	0.0%
Anticipated Resources	4,503	4,613	2.4%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-
Prospective Resources	4,503	4,613	2.4%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	29.1%	30.3%	1.2
Prospective Reserve Margin	29.1%	30.3%	1.2
Reference Margin Level	15.0%	15.0%	0.0

MRO-Manitoba Hydro			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2023 SRA**	**2024 SRA**	**2023 vs. 2024 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	3,060	3,143	2.7%
Demand Response: Available	0	0	-
Net Internal Demand	3,060	3,143	2.7%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	5,731	5,615	-2.0%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	91	0	-100.0%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	-1,872	-1,978	5.7%
Anticipated Resources	3,950	3,637	-7.9%
Existing-Other Capacity	34	37	9.7%
Prospective Resources	3,984	3,674	-7.8%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	29.1%	15.7%	-13.4
Prospective Reserve Margin	30.2%	16.9%	-13.3
Reference Margin Level	12.0%	12.0%	0.0

MRO-SPP			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2023 SRA**	**2024 SRA**	**2023 vs. 2024 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	53,468	56,316	5.3%
Demand Response: Available	842	979	16.3%
Net Internal Demand	52,626	55,337	5.2%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	65,821	70,855	7.6%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	0	0	-
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	-238	-157	-33.9%
Anticipated Resources	65,583	70,698	7.8%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-
Prospective Resources	65,036	70,151	7.9%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	24.6%	27.8%	3.2
Prospective Reserve Margin	23.6%	26.8%	3.2
Reference Margin Level	19.0%	19.0%	0.0

NPCC-Maritimes			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2023 SRA**	**2024 SRA**	**2023 vs. 2024 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	3,612	3,586	-0.7%
Demand Response: Available	328	327	-0.3%
Net Internal Demand	3,284	3,259	-0.8%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	4,834	4,660	-3.6%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	0	0	-
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	81	63	-22.2%
Anticipated Resources	4,915	4,723	-3.9%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-
Prospective Resources	4,915	4,723	-3.9%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	49.7%	44.9%	-4.8
Prospective Reserve Margin	49.7%	44.9%	-4.8
Reference Margin Level	20.0%	20.0%	0.0

NPCC-New York			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2023 SRA**	**2024 SRA**	**2023 vs. 2024 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	32,049	31,541	-1.6%
Demand Response: Available	1,226	1,281	4.5%
Net Internal Demand	30,823	30,260	-1.8%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	37,216	37,867	1.7%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	0	0	-
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	2,932	1,585	-45.9%
Anticipated Resources	40,148	39,452	-1.7%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-
Prospective Resources	40,148	39,452	-1.7%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	30.3%	30.4%	0.1
Prospective Reserve Margin	30.3%	30.4%	0.1
Reference Margin Level	15.0%	15.0%	0.0

NPCC-New England			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2023 SRA**	**2024 SRA**	**2023 vs. 2024 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	25,111	25,294	0.7%
Demand Response: Available	447	661	47.9%
Net Internal Demand	24,664	24,633	-0.1%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	27,997	27,255	-2.7%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	0	0	-
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	1,030	1,297	25.9%
Anticipated Resources	29,027	28,552	-1.6%
Existing-Other Capacity	872	138	-84.2%
Prospective Resources	29,899	28,690	-4.0%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	17.7%	15.9%	-1.8
Prospective Reserve Margin	21.2%	16.5%	-4.7
Reference Margin Level	12.0%	12.9%	0.9

NPCC-Ontario			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2023 SRA**	**2024 SRA**	**2023 vs. 2024 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	22,439	22,753	1.4%
Demand Response: Available	687	996	45.0%
Net Internal Demand	21,752	21,757	0.0%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	24,575	26,856	9.3%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	9	9	-1.6%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	223	600	169.1%
Anticipated Resources	24,807	27,465	10.7%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-
Prospective Resources	24,807	27,465	10.7%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	14.0%	26.2%	12.2
Prospective Reserve Margin	14.0%	26.2%	12.2
Reference Margin Level	13.2%	12.8%	-0.5

NPCC-Québec			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2023 SRA**	**2024 SRA**	**2023 vs. 2024 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	22,859	22,922	0.3%
Demand Response: Available	0	0	-
Net Internal Demand	22,859	22,922	0.3%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	33,690	35,731	6.1%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	0	0	-
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	-2,353	-2,689	14.3%
Anticipated Resources	31,337	33,042	5.4%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-
Prospective Resources	31,337	33,042	5.4%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	37.1%	44.1%	7.0
Prospective Reserve Margin	37.1%	44.1%	7.0
Reference Margin Level	11.0%	11.5%	0.5

SERC-Central			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2023 SRA**	**2024 SRA**	**2023 vs. 2024 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	42,223	42,636	1.0%
Demand Response: Available	1,910	1,941	1.6%
Net Internal Demand	40,313	40,695	0.9%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	46,964	48,677	3.6%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	93	332	257.3%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	1,068	2,592	142.7%
Anticipated Resources	47,556	51,601	8.5%
Existing-Other Capacity	2,313	2,074	-10.3%
Prospective Resources	49,868	51,083	2.4%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	18.0%	26.8%	8.8
Prospective Reserve Margin	23.7%	25.5%	1.8
Reference Margin Level	15.0%	15.0%	0.0

PJM			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2023 SRA**	**2024 SRA**	**2023 vs. 2024 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	149,059	151,247	1.5%
Demand Response: Available	7,288	7,756	6.4%
Net Internal Demand	141,771	143,491	1.2%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	186,540	183,690	-1.5%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	0	0	-
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	463	-607	-231.1%
Anticipated Resources	187,003	183,083	-2.1%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-
Prospective Resources	187,466	182,476	-2.7%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	31.9%	27.6%	-4.3
Prospective Reserve Margin	32.2%	27.2%	-5.0
Reference Margin Level	14.9%	17.7%	2.8

SERC-East			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2023 SRA**	**2024 SRA**	**2023 vs. 2024 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	43,889	43,567	-0.7%
Demand Response: Available	1,008	985	-2.3%
Net Internal Demand	42,881	42,582	-0.7%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	50,452	51,304	1.7%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	0	122	-
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	624	593	-5.0%
Anticipated Resources	51,076	52,019	1.8%
Existing-Other Capacity	1,182	1,131	-4.3%
Prospective Resources	52,258	52,557	0.6%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	19.1%	22.2%	3.1
Prospective Reserve Margin	21.9%	23.4%	1.5
Reference Margin Level	15.0%	15.0%	0.0

SERC-Florida Peninsula			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2023 SRA**	**2024 SRA**	**2023 vs. 2024 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	52,195	53,293	2.1%
Demand Response: Available	2,898	2,824	-2.6%
Net Internal Demand	49,297	50,469	2.4%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	60,074	60,962	1.5%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	1,742	34	-98.0%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	589	200	-66.0%
Anticipated Resources	62,405	61,196	-1.9%
Existing-Other Capacity	776	985	27.0%
Prospective Resources	63,181	61,981	-1.9%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	26.6%	21.3%	-5.3
Prospective Reserve Margin	28.2%	22.8%	-5.4
Reference Margin Level	15.0%	15.0%	0.0

Texas RE-ERCOT			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2023 SRA**	**2024 SRA**	**2023 vs. 2024 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	82,307	84,818	3.1%
Demand Response: Available	3,380	3,496	3.4%
Net Internal Demand	78,927	81,323	3.0%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	94,580	99,541	5.2%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	2,445	2,578	5.4%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	20	20	0.0%
Anticipated Resources	97,045	102,139	5.2%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-
Prospective Resources	97,073	102,167	5.2%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	23.0%	25.6%	2.6
Prospective Reserve Margin	23.0%	25.6%	2.6
Reference Margin Level	13.75%	13.75%	0.0

SERC-Southeast			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2023 SRA**	**2024 SRA**	**2023 vs. 2024 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	46,127	46,021	-0.2%
Demand Response: Available	2,010	1,599	-20.4%
Net Internal Demand	44,117	44,422	0.7%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	59,559	63,918	7.3%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	2,865	1,738	-39.4%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	-815	-1,192	46.3%
Anticipated Resources	61,609	64,463	4.6%
Existing-Other Capacity	908	785	-13.5%
Prospective Resources	62,517	66,441	6.3%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	39.6%	45.1%	5.5
Prospective Reserve Margin	41.7%	49.6%	7.9
Reference Margin Level	15.0%	15.0%	0.0

WECC-AB			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2023 SRA**	**2024 SRA**	**2023 vs. 2024 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	11,206	12,201	8.9%
Demand Response: Available	0	0	-
Net Internal Demand	11,206	12,201	8.9%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	13,759	13,941	1.3%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	227	1,981	772.7%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	0	0	-
Anticipated Resources	13,986	15,922	13.8%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-
Prospective Resources	13,986	15,922	13.8%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	24.8%	30.5%	5.7
Prospective Reserve Margin	24.8%	30.5%	5.7
Reference Margin Level	9.9%	6.7%	-3.2

WECC-BC			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2023 SRA**	**2024 SRA**	**2023 vs. 2024 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	8,636	9,275	7.4%
Demand Response: Available	0	0	-
Net Internal Demand	8,636	9,275	7.4%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	11,135	11,022	-1.0%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	0	0	-
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	0	0	-
Anticipated Resources	11,135	11,022	-1.0%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-
Prospective Resources	11,135	11,022	-1.0%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	28.9%	18.8%	-10.1
Prospective Reserve Margin	28.9%	18.8%	-10.1
Reference Margin Level	9.7%	12.0%	-2.4

WECC-CA / MX			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2023 SRA**	**2024 SRA**	**2023 vs. 2024 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	56,356	54,029	-4.1%
Demand Response: Available	862	810	-6.0%
Net Internal Demand	55,494	53,219	-4.1%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	69,408	70,841	2.1%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	5,522	6,906	25.1%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	0	340	-
Anticipated Resources	74,930	78,087	4.2%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-
Prospective Resources	74,930	78,087	4.2%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	35.0%	46.7%	11.7
Prospective Reserve Margin	35.0%	46.7%	11.7
Reference Margin Level	16.8%	21.5%	4.7

WECC-SW			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2023 SRA**	**2024 SRA**	**2023 vs. 2024 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	25,992	26,661	2.6%
Demand Response: Available	380	278	-26.8%
Net Internal Demand	25,612	26,383	3.0%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	26,206	28,336	8.1%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	1,655	2,338	41.3%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	2,747	1,523	-44.6%
Anticipated Resources	30,608	32,197	5.2%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-
Prospective Resources	30,608	32,197	5.2%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	19.5%	22.0%	2.5
Prospective Reserve Margin	19.5%	22.0%	2.5
Reference Margin Level	10.8%	10.5%	-0.3

WECC-NW			
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	**2023 SRA**	**2024 SRA**	**2023 vs. 2024 SRA**
Demand Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	66,366	63,865	-3.8%
Demand Response: Available	1,038	907	-12.6%
Net Internal Demand	65,328	62,958	-3.6%
Resource Projections	**MW**	**MW**	**Net Change (%)**
Existing-Certain Capacity	76,587	78,057	1.9%
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	2,350	4,089	74.0%
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	5,004	3,192	-36.2%
Anticipated Resources	83,941	85,338	1.7%
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-
Prospective Resources	83,941	85,338	1.7%
Reserve Margins	**Percent (%)**	**Percent (%)**	**Annual Difference**
Anticipated Reserve Margin	28.5%	35.5%	7.0
Prospective Reserve Margin	28.5%	35.5%	7.0
Reference Margin Level	16.3%	16.4%	0.1

Variable Energy Resource Contributions

Because the electrical output of variable energy resources (e.g., wind, solar PV) depends on weather conditions, on-peak capacity contributions are less than nameplate capacity. The following table shows the capacity contribution of existing wind and solar PV resources at the peak demand hour for each assessment area. Resource contributions are also aggregated by Interconnection and across the entire BPS. For NERC's analysis of risk periods after peak demand (e.g., U.S. assessment areas in WECC), lower contributions of solar PV resources are used because output is diminished during evening periods.

BPS Variable Energy Resources by Assessment Area

	Wind			Solar			Hydro			Energy Storage Systems (ESS)		
Assessment Area / Interconnection	Nameplate Wind	Expected Wind	Expected Share of Nameplate (%)	Nameplate Solar PV	Expected Solar PV	Expected Share of Nameplate (%)	Nameplate Hydro	Expected Hydro	Expected Share of Nameplate (%)	Nameplate ESS	Expected ESS	Expected Share of Nameplate (%)
MISO	30,931	5,599	18%	10,169	4,981	49%	1,621	1,488	92%	2,678	2,591	97%
MRO-Manitoba Hydro	259	48	19%	–	-	0%	202	92	46%	-	-	0%
MRO-SaskPower	616	208	34%	30	6	21%	848	655	77%	-	-	0%
NPCC-Maritimes	1,209	262	22%	69	-	0%	1,312	1,181	90%	13	13	100%
NPCC-New England	1,546	122	8%	3,246	1,111	34%	550	367	67%	2,077	2,038	98%
NPCC-New York	2,590	340	13%	370	53	14%	984	386	39%	20	-	0%
NPCC-Ontario	4,883	720	15%	478	66	14%	8,922	5,171	58%	-	-	0%
NPCC-Québec	3,820	-	0%	10	-	0%	446	446	100%	-	-	0%
PJM	10,495	1,703	16%	10,990	5,694	52%	2,505	2,505	100%	190	151	79%
SERC-Central	1,220	172	14%	2,074	996	48%	4,966	3,332	67%	166	70	42%
SERC-East	-	-	-	2,769	2,405	87%	3,072	3,016	98%	24	10	43%
SERC-Florida Peninsula	-	-	0%	10,023	5,643	56%	-	-	0%	538	538	100%
SERC-Southeast	-	-	0%	7,887	7,217	91%	3,303	3,259	99%	115	105	92%
SPP	34,783	5,876	17%	756	486	64%	107	54	50%	12	2	13%
Texas RE-ERCOT	39,069	9,070	23%	24,463	17,797	73%	575	450	78%	7,876	2,661	34%
WECC-AB	4,482	666	15%	1,650	786	48%	894	450	50%	190	185	97%
WECC-BC	747	140	19%	2	0	22%	16,521	9,757	59%	-	-	0%
WECC-CA/MX	7,694	1,124	15%	21,790	13,147	60%	13,725	6,265	46%	7,295	6,858	94%
WECC-NW	19,709	2,964	15%	8,853	2,595	29%	41,705	24,147	58%	779	707	91%
WECC-SW	3,329	542	16%	2,690	1,294	48%	1,201	670	56%	988	893	90%
EASTERN INTERCONNECTION	88,702	15,220	17%	48,862	28,657	59%	28,394	21,507	76%	5,832	5,517	95%
QUÉBEC INTERCONNECTION	3,820	-	0%	10	-	0%	446	446	100%	-	-	0%
TEXAS INTERCONNECTION	39,069	9,070	23%	24,463	17,797	73%	575	450	78%	7,876	2,661	34%
WECC INTERCONNECTION	35,961	5,436	15%	34,985	17,822	51%	74,046	41,289	56%	9,252	8,643	93%
All INTERCONNECTIONS	**167,552**	**29,725**	**18%**	**108,320**	**64,277**	**59%**	**103,461**	**63,692**	**62%**	**22,960**	**16,821**	**73%**

Review of 2023 Capacity and Energy Performance

High temperatures, wildfires, and weather conditions challenged electric grid operators in many parts of North America to maintain a reliable supply of electricity during 2023. Prior to summer, NERC warned that much of North America was at risk of having insufficient resources to meet electricity demand if extreme temperatures and weather conditions were to develop. It is noteworthy that, after a summer of soaring temperatures, extended heat waves, and new electricity demand records, few high-level EEAs were issued, and no disruptions occurred as a result of inadequate resources. Nonetheless, operators at BAs, TOPs, and RCs faced significant challenges and drew upon procedures and protocols to obtain all available resources, manage system demand, and ensure the flow of supplies over the transmission network. Additionally, load-serving entities and state and local officials in many parts of North America used mechanisms and public appeals to lower customer demand during periods of strained supplies. The following section describes actual demand and resource levels in comparison with NERC's *2023 SRA* and summarizes 2023 resource adequacy events.

Eastern Interconnection–Canada and Québec Interconnection

Systems in parts of Canada experienced challenging conditions early in the summer from high electricity demand and wildfires over large areas. Electricity transfers from Québec to neighboring Maritimes and New England were curtailed or disrupted during periods in May and June when wildfires affected transmission facilities. Peak electricity demand in Ontario occurred in early September at a level near the 90/10 demand forecast. Additional imports helped the area meet the extreme demand.

Manitoba Hydro and SaskPower both experienced peak electricity demand in excess of 90/10 summer forecasts. Manitoba Hydro's peak occurred at the start of summer in June. Operators had sufficient reserves and were able to export supplies during the peak period to neighboring areas.

SaskPower peak electricity demand occurred in late July. A forced outage at a large thermal generator early in the summer contributed to operating challenges over much of the summer period. At the time of peak demand, forced outages were significantly higher than typical for summer peak periods.

Eastern Interconnection–United States

In SPP, summer electricity demand peaked in August and exceeded 90/10 forecasts. At the hour of peak demand, SPP experienced near-normal levels of forced thermal generation outages. Wind resource performance at the time of peak demand exceeded seasonal peak forecasts, helping to alleviate the strain on supplies. However, during periods in June and July, operators at SPP issued resource advisories during periods of forecasted high demand and low or uncertain wind resource output.

MISO also experienced peak electricity demand during the same period in August; however, demand was between the normal and 90/10 summer peak forecast levels. Wind and solar resource output at the time of peak demand were below expectations for summer on-peak contributions. Forced outages of thermal units, however, were lower than expected. An EEA (level 2) was issued in August due to high forecasted loads and wind uncertainty. MISO used operating procedures to ensure that sufficient reserves were maintained during periods of high electricity demand and high forced generator outages at times throughout the summer.

PJM experienced peak electricity demand in late July at a level between normal summer peak and the 90/10 forecast. Wind and solar resource output were below seasonal peak expectations, while low thermal generator outages were reported.

Peak electricity demand at NYISO and ISO-NE occurred in early September and fell below average summer peak forecasts.

Systems in the U.S. Southeast experienced peak demand above the 90/10 forecasts in mid to late August. Solar resource output exceeded the expected contributions for the peak demand period. Electricity imports into resource-constrained areas helped BAs maintain reserves during high demand periods.

Texas Interconnection–ERCOT

Extended heat waves led to record-setting system electricity demand in the ERCOT system throughout Summer 2023. Peak electricity demand occurred in mid-August at a level exceeding the 90/10 demand forecast. At the time of peak demand, wind and solar generation were slightly below expected levels for peak demand periods, and thermal generator outages were also slightly higher than normal for peak periods. Nonetheless, operators were able to maintain sufficient reserves. At various times throughout the summer, ERCOT issued public appeals for conservation to help manage high demand periods and evening periods when output from the solar resources is diminished. On September 6, ERCOT declared an EEA (level 2) to address a low-frequency condition on the system during a period of unusually high demand, declining solar output, and low wind output. Transmission system constraints led to the curtailment of some supply from wind resources in southern parts of the system. No load was shed during the event.

Western Interconnection–Canada

At the start of summer, the province of Alberta was in a state of emergency as a result of active wildfires and the threat of spreading from hot and dry conditions. A period of high demand from heat and humidity that coincided with generator forced outages and low wind conditions triggered an EEA. Alberta's system peak demand occurred in late July at a level above normal summer peak demand forecasts but below the 90/10 level. Wind and solar resource outputs were above seasonal forecast levels for peak demand periods. High temperatures in late August led to high demand at a time of planned transmission system maintenance. An EEA (level 3) was triggered when low wind conditions and insufficient imports resulted in reserve shortage.

The BC Hydro system also experienced peak electricity demand in early August at a level near the 90/10 summer peak forecast.

Western Interconnection–United States

The California-Mexico assessment area, which consists of the CAISO, Northern California, and CENACE BAs, experienced system peak electricity demand in mid-August at a level between the average summer peak demand forecast and the 90/10 peak demand forecast. Public appeals to shift electricity use to off-peak hours were used during some high-demand periods. The Mexico portion of the assessment area faced reserve shortages during periods in July and August as a result of high demand, generator outages, and unavailability of imports.

System peak electricity demand in the U.S. Northwest also occurred in mid-August and was below normal summer peak demand forecasts.

The U.S. Southwest experienced extended heat conditions and demand levels that exceeded normal summer peak demand forecasts. Wind and solar output fell below expected levels during the peak demand period.

2023 Summer Demand and Generation Summary at Peak Demand							
Assessment Area	Actual Peak Demand[1] (GW)	SRA Peak Demand Scenarios[2] (GW)	Wind – Actual[1] (MW)	Wind – Expected[3] (MW)	Solar – Actual[1] (MW)	Solar – Expected[3] (MW)	Forced Outages Summary[4] (MW)
MISO	120.8	116.8 123.9	8,598	5,488	2,096	3,750	6,638
MRO-Manitoba Hydro	3.5	3.1 3.4	83	47	-		95
MRO-SaskPower	3.7	3.5 3.6	381	203	15		737
MRO-SPP	56.0	52.6 55.1	8,278	4,500	130	378	6,533
NPCC-Maritimes	3.5	3.3 3.6	131	255	40	-	1,690*
NPCC-New England	23.5	24.7 26.5	186	186	145	1,163	1,969
NPCC-New York	30.2	30.8 32.7	223	331	-	84	9,716
NPCC-Ontario	23.7	21.8 23.7	786	771	200	126	3,419*
NPCC-Québec	22.5	22.9 22.9	496	-	8		12,287*
PJM	147.6	141.8 162.7	1,278	1,688	1,826	2,984	8,020
SERC-C	44.0	40.3 43.0	15	564	673	511	1,225
SERC-E	43.3	42.9 45.6	-	-	3,032	1,473	2,129
SERC-FP	54.1	49.3 52.4	-	-	4,590	4,534	1,610
SERC-SE	45.6	44.8	-	-	2,781	4,647	2,334
TRE-ERCOT	85.4	78.9 82.3	9,557	10,293	10,431	12,509	6,699
WECC-AB	11.5	11.2 11.6	906	309	894	763	-
WECC-BC	9.2	8.6 9.2	373	137	0	1	-

2023 Summer Demand and Generation Summary at Peak Demand							
Assessment Area	**Actual Peak Demand[1] (GW)**	**SRA Peak Demand Scenarios[2] (GW)**	**Wind – Actual[1] (MW)**	**Wind – Expected[3] (MW)**	**Solar – Actual[1] (MW)**	**Solar – Expected[3] (MW)**	**Forced Outages Summary[4] (MW)**
WECC-CA/MX	52.3	49.5 58.1	1,074	1,111	6,930	14,489	2,444
WECC-NW	64.7	61.0 67.2	2,137	593	3,821	1,411	4,855
WECC-SW	27.3	25.6 28.0	835	3,968	1,731	5,062	2,507
Highlighting Notes:	Actual peak demand in the highlighted areas met or exceeded extreme scenario levels.		Actual wind output in highlighted areas was significantly below seasonal forecast.		Actual solar output in highlighted areas was significantly below seasonal forecast.		Actual forced outages above or below forecast by factor of two

Table Notes:

[1] Actual demand, wind, and solar values for the hour of peak demand in U.S. areas were obtained from EIA From 930 data. For areas in Canada, this data was provided to NERC by system operators and utilities.

[2] See NERC *2023 SRA* demand scenarios for each assessment area (pp. 14–33). Values represent the normal summer peak demand forecast and an extreme peak demand forecast that represents a 90/10, or once-per-decade, peak demand. Some areas use other basis for extreme peak demand.

[3] Expected values of wind and solar resources from the *2023 SRA*.

[4] Values from NERC Generator Availability Data System for the 2023 summer hour of peak demand in each assessment area. Highlighted areas had actual forced outages that were more than twice the value for typical forced outage rates used in the 2023 summer risk period scenarios in the *2023 SRA*.

BEFORE THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Power Act Section 202(c) Emergency Order: Tri-State Generation and Transmission Association, Platte River Power Authority, Salt River Project, PacifiCorp, and Xcel Energy	))))))	Order No. 202-25-14

Exhibit to
Motion to Intervene and Request for Rehearing and Stay of
Public Interest Organizations

Filed January 28, 2026

Exhibit 1-29:
FERC Staff Winter Reliability Assessment

Winter Energy Market and Electric Reliability Assessment

2025-2026

A Staff Report to the Commission

November 20, 2025

FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

Office of Technical Reporting and Economics

Office of Electric Reliability

This report is a product of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission staff. This report does not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or any Commissioner.

Preface



Slide 1

The 2025-2026 Winter Energy Market and Electric Reliability Assessment (Winter Assessment) provides Commission staff's outlook for this winter – December 2025 to February 2026. It focuses on energy markets and electric reliability. The report contains four main sections. The first summarizes the findings of the Winter Assessment. The second details the weather outlook for the upcoming winter. The third discusses notable considerations for the upcoming winter. The last section discusses energy market fundamentals, primarily natural gas and electricity supply and demand expectations.

The 2025-2026 Winter Assessment is a joint product from the Commission's Office of Technical Reporting and Economics and the Office of Electric Reliability.

Winter Outlook

Slide 2

Winter Outlook

- Slightly warmer conditions expected in the southern and eastern U.S.
- Natural gas prices 26% higher compared to previous winter despite increased production.
- Electricity demand growth supported by generation and transmission additions.
- Resources and operating reserves adequate in all NERC assessment areas for normal winter conditions.
  - Possible reliability challenges in ERCOT, NPCC-NE, SERC-Central, SERC-East, WECC-Basin, and WECC-NW in extreme winter conditions

Winter Outlook In Summary

This winter, slightly warmer temperatures are expected compared to last winter, potentially contributing to lower domestic natural gas and electricity demand. A prolonged cold weather event could still affect prices and availability of natural gas and electricity. Drought and elevated wildfire risk conditions are forecast to continue in multiple regions and could affect grid operating conditions and reliability.

Notwithstanding the forecasted slightly warmer temperatures, natural gas prices are expected to rise slightly compared to last winter. As of November 4, futures prices for the Henry Hub national benchmark averaged $4.39/Million British thermal units (MMBtu), 26% higher than winter 2024-2025 settled prices. Total U.S. natural gas demand is forecasted to exceed production this winter, as in previous winters, with the difference met by storage inventory withdrawals. While warmer weather could cause residential and commercial demand to decline, net exports are expected to continue their long-term growth trend. Natural gas storage inventories began the withdrawal season above the five-year average but marginally below the starting level of last winter, which was the highest since 2016. Overall natural gas storage inventories are forecasted to remain relatively robust throughout the winter.

Electricity markets will see generators add 56.1 GW of net winter capacity nationwide, compared to last winter, with 64.7 GW of new additions offset by 8.6 GW of retirements. Solar and batteries comprise 80% of new capacity additions, while coal and natural gas will

account for 88% of retired capacity. Winter electricity consumption is projected to be 2.7% above the five-year average, with total monthly consumption expected to peak in January at 352 TWh. If realized, the projected consumption for this winter (1,035 TWh) will represent the second-highest level of the past five years, second only to last winter's record of 1,041 TWh.

To support the grid, 3,132 new electric transmission projects totaling 19,008 miles of line will be available this winter. Of this total, 14,736 miles were placed in service between March and November 2025, with another 4,272 miles expected to be completed between December 2025 and February 2026. The primary drivers for these projects nationwide are storm and fire hardening (7,101 line-miles) and system reliability (4,238 line-miles), which together account for nearly 60% of all projected mileage. Other significant drivers include load growth (2,785 line-miles), asset renewal (2,738 line-miles), and generation interconnection (903 line-miles).


While the costs to produce electricity have remained relatively stable, in recent winters uplift payments have increased significantly during extreme weather or as a result of proactive operator actions taken to maintain reliability and continue to serve load.

Looking at the broader picture, all North American Electric Reliability Corp. (NERC) assessment areas are expected to have adequate generating resources to meet expected winter demand and operating reserve requirements under normal operating conditions. Under extreme weather conditions, the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT), Northeast Power Coordinating Council-New England (NPCC-NE), SERC Reliability Corp.-Central (SERC-Central), SERC-East, Western Electricity Coordinating Council-Basin (WECC-Basin), and WECC-Northwest (WECC-NW) face a higher likelihood of tight generation availability, which may require operational mitigations to prevent potential reliability issues. However, NERC and the assessment areas have initiated various activities, such as readiness surveys of generators and facility inspections, to prepare for winter and increase the likelihood of their continued operation in the event of severe winter weather.

Weather

Slide 3

Milder than Average Temperatures Likely in Southern and Eastern United States



Weather Outlook


For the upcoming winter, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) is predicting a weak La Niña phenomenon. La Niña refers to the large-scale, ocean-atmosphere climate phenomenon characterized by periodic cooling in sea-surface temperatures across the central and east-central equatorial Pacific. Based on the prediction, NOAA expects mildly wetter-than-average conditions in the northern Mountain West and Ohio River Valley regions and mildly drier-than-average conditions in the southern United States. As shown by the blue colors in the map on **Slide 3**, NOAA expects mildly colder-than-average temperatures in the Pacific Northwest and northern Midwest. The orange colors indicate mildly warmer-than-average temperatures along the East Coast, extending down through the South and West into the Desert Southwest and into California. The rest of the continental United States – shown in white – has equal chances of above or below average temperatures this winter. For its part, the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) expects the population-weighted number of nationwide Heating Degree Days[1] in December, January, and February to decrease by 8% relative to last winter. This decrease reflects a slightly warmer winter nationwide.

[1] Heating Degree Days are a measure of how cold a location is on a given day or during a period of days. A Heating Degree Day compares the mean (the average of the high and low)

It is important to note that NOAA's long-range predictions are dynamic and may change as more data becomes available. Furthermore, extreme winter storms, such as polar vortexes, are difficult to predict far in advance and are typically forecasted much closer to the event dates.

outdoor temperatures recorded for a location to a standard temperature, 65° Fahrenheit (F) in the United States. The colder the temperature, the higher the number of heating degree days. Natural gas is sometimes traded in a "Winter Strip" between November and March, which may have a different HDD forecast trend due to the two additional months.

Slide 4



Weather – Drought Condition Impacts

Drought conditions, illustrated by the dark brown areas in the map on **Slide 4**, persist across much of the western and central United States and are expected to continue into winter. If below-average snowfall, runoff, or conditions similar to this past spring occur this winter, significant impacts to water supplies in multiple basins are possible. Based on the La Niña forecast and current conditions, drought persistence is likely in the Southwest. This puts water basins in the southwestern United States at an especially high risk of water shortage impacts in early to mid-2026. In the South-Central and eastern regions of the United States, drought development, shown in yellow, is expected. Finally, minimal drought improvement, shown in tan and green, in the Pacific Northwest is also forecast for this winter.[2]

This winter, these dry conditions in the West are expected to reduce output from a significant portion of hydroelectric resources in WECC, including those in the Colorado River and Yakima Basins. Output in the Pacific Northwest will also continue to be limited. In early fall, reservoir levels throughout the western United States dropped sharply because withdrawals occurred at a greatly accelerated rate. For example, withdrawals in Utah were at twice the

[2] NOAA, National Integrated Drought Information System, *The Western Drought Issue* (Sept. 3, 2025), https://www.drought.gov/news/western-drought-issue-2025-09-03.

typical rate and high withdrawals ended the water year[3] several weeks early in multiple irrigation districts in Washington state. If key headwaters do not receive above-average precipitation, it will not be possible to restore water supplies in the Pacific Northwest, Colorado and Great Basins to previous historical levels. The Colorado River Basin lost about 27.8 million acre-feet of groundwater between 2002-2024, roughly equal to the storage capacity of Lake Mead. As a result, water levels in Lake Powell are expected to fall into a lower balancing tier this winter, requiring reductions in output at the Glen Canyon Dam. Forecasts indicate that water levels could fall low enough to stop hydropower generation at the reservoir within the next year.[4] Impacts are also expected at downstream facilities, including at Hoover Dam, which is forecast to be in a Level 1[5] shortage condition this winter and fall to a Level 2[6] shortage by early spring 2026. This puts water basins in the southwestern United States at an especially high risk of water shortage impacts in early to mid-2026.

Also notable this winter, drought conditions are expected to continue in the central and southern United States. In the Mississippi River Basin, drought and extremely dry conditions have rapidly expanded due to above-average temperatures and low rainfall. As the region is entering what is typically a drier period, without significant and widespread rainfall, drought is expected to persist and expand across a significant portion of the Mississippi River Basin through December 31, 2025. For example, the Ohio River typically contributes 50% of the Mississippi River's flow. Recently, the Ohio River contribution fell to 8%.[7] These low water levels have impacted small hydroelectric facilities and restricted navigation, which could affect fuel transportation for some coal generators. Further downstream, low water levels on the Mississippi River may lead to the risk of saltwater intrusion and high-water temperatures, which could pose operational risks to thermal generators that use once-through-cooling

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[3] A water year is defined as October 1 to September 30 for surface water reports and water allocation planning.

[4] Bureau of Reclamation, *24-Month Study Inflow Scenarios* (Aug. 15, 2025), https://www.usbr.gov/uc/water/crsp/studies/images/PowellElevations.pdf.


[5] A Level 1 Shortage Condition is triggered when Lake Meade's elevation falls below 1,075 ft. under the *2007 Interim Guidelines and the Lower Basin Drought Contingency Plan* and reduces total deliveries to 7.167 million-acre-feet.

[6] A Level 2 Shortage Condition is triggered when Lake Meade's elevation falls below 1,050 ft under the *2007 Interim Guidelines and the Lower Basin Drought Contingency Plan* and reduces total deliveries to 7.083 million-acre-feet.

[7] NOAA, National Integrated Drought Information System, *Drought and Water Update for the Mississippi River Basin* (Sept. 18, 2025), https://www.drought.gov/drought-status-updates/drought-and-water-update-mississippi-river-basin-2025-09-18.

equipment. While temperature and water level impacts are possible all along the river, salinity impacts are most likely for generators located in high-demand areas at the mouth of the river in southern Louisiana.

Slide 5



Weather – Wildfire Risk

Due to persistent high temperatures and a lack of rainfall in the western, central and southern United States, the risk of wildfires remains elevated in several states. Specifically, as indicated by the red areas on the map on **Slide 5**, risks remain elevated throughout Texas as well as in the Southeast from Louisiana to Florida and up through the Carolinas. These regions all experienced persistent drought, high temperatures, and dry conditions from late summer into fall. They experienced similar circumstances at the start of last winter.

This elevated wildfire risk can translate to significant infrastructure and operational risks for utilities. During dry conditions, utilities may temporarily turn off power to specific areas through a practice known as a public safety power shutoff. This is done to reduce the risk of electrical infrastructure starting a fire or to protect equipment from damage by nearby fires. While shutoffs have been used primarily in western states, they are now increasingly used in other regions to mitigate wildfire risk, including the central United States (South Dakota and Minnesota) and eastern states such as New Jersey. Wildfires can also cause significant electric transmission disruptions, potentially leading to extended outages due to damage to grid equipment or supporting infrastructure.

Notable Items

Slide 6

Notable Items

- Cold Weather Reliability Standards
  - Extreme Cold Weather Preparedness and Operations: EOP-012-3
  - Transmission System Planning Performance Requirements for Extreme Temperature Events: TPL-008-1
- Gas-Electric Coordination
  - Infrastructure vulnerabilities in key components
  - NPCC Northeast Gas/Electric System Study
  - ***Industries improving coordination; more progress still needed***
  - NAESB NOPR

Cold Weather Reliability Standards

As winter 2025-2026 approaches, NERC Reliability Standards for generator winterization plans are becoming enforceable, and new additional requirements will require generator owners and operators to implement plans to remain operational in extreme cold temperatures. This is a shift from the now-retired Reliability Standard EOP-012-2 (Extreme Cold Weather Preparedness and Operations),[8] which mandated that generator owners and operators develop and implement extreme cold weather preparedness plans by winter 2025-2026. Its successor, Reliability Standard EOP-012-3,[9] additionally requires existing generators to begin implementing their plans to operate at their calculated unit's Extreme Cold Weather

[8] The purpose of this Reliability Standard was to address the effects of operating in extreme cold weather by ensuring each Generator Owner has developed and implemented plan(s) to mitigate the reliability impacts of extreme cold weather on its applicable generating units. *Order Approving Extreme Cold Weather Reliability Standard EOP-012-2 and Directing Modification*, 187 FERC ¶ 61,204 (2024).

[9] *Order Approving Extreme Cold Weather Reliability Standard EOP-012-3 and Directing Data Collection*, 192 FERC ¶ 61,229, at PP 34-37 (2025).

Temperature by October 1, 2025.[10] The Commission directed NERC to collect and submit generator owners' cold weather temperature reports detailing readiness for extreme conditions every May 15 beginning in 2025.[11]

Separately, Reliability Standard TPL-008-1 (Transmission System Planning Performance Requirements for Extreme Temperature Events) was approved earlier this year, with a phased implementation to begin in April 2026. Under this requirement, Planning Coordinators, in conjunction with their Transmission Planners, must conduct an extreme temperature assessment at least once every five years. These assessments evaluate future Bulk Electric System performance during extreme heat and extreme cold benchmark temperature events. The assessments required by this standard address a known reliability issue in which extreme temperatures cause operational failures by identifying vulnerabilities before those operational failures occur.[12]

Together, these standards will begin to help grid planners and operators anticipate and withstand any severe weather disruptions during winter 2025-2026.

Gas-Electric Coordination

Gas-electric coordination remains a critical focus for ensuring reliability across the electric grid, particularly during extreme cold weather events that could occur between December 2025 and February 2026. However, electric utilities, regional transmission organizations (RTOs), independent system operators (ISOs), and NERC have also taken actions to prepare for potential natural gas scarcity conditions based on lessons learned from past winter storms.

Cold weather vulnerabilities of natural gas infrastructure further compound risks to electric reliability. Cold weather-sensitive components such as electric-powered compressor stations and unprotected wellheads remain susceptible to freezing, and electrical or mechanical failures

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[10] Extreme Cold Weather Temperature refers to the lowest 0.2 percentile of the hourly temperatures measured in December, January, and February from 1/1/2000 through the date the temperature is calculated; NERC, Questions and Answers: Cold Weather Generator Data Request (Accessed Oct. 10, 2025), https://www.nerc.com/pa/comp/ColdWeatherGenDataDL/NERC_Cold_Weather_1600_DR_FAQ.pdf#:~:text=Extreme%20Cold%20Weather%20Temperature%20-%20The%20temperature,through%20the%20date%20the%20temperature%20is%20calculated.

[11] NERC, Questions and Answers: Cold Weather Generator Data Request (Accessed Oct. 10, 2025), https://www.nerc.com/pa/comp/ColdWeatherGenDataDL/NERC_Cold_Weather_1600_DR_FAQ.pdf#:~:text=Extreme%20Cold%20Weather%20Temperature%20-%20The%20temperature,through%20the%20date%20the%20temperature%20is%20calculated.

[12] *North American Electric Reliability Corporation*, 190 FERC ¶ 61,099, at PP 4-8 (2025).

at these points can disrupt natural gas deliveries to generating units during critical periods. While vulnerabilities at the production, gathering, and processing stages fall outside the Commission's jurisdiction, these vulnerabilities underscore the need for continued improvements in equipment winterization efforts and operational coordination.[13]

A study conducted by the NPCC, released on January 21, 2025, evaluated gas supply and pipeline constraints across New York and New England under extreme winter conditions. The study concluded that natural gas infrastructure in these regions is fully, or nearly fully utilized, during modeled cold weather events and found that any gas-side contingency, such as a pipeline disruption or a prolonged cold snap that affects gas production, could significantly stress the electric and natural gas systems and threaten electric grid reliability.[14]

On a positive note, the natural gas and electric industries have improved their coordination. For example, the performance of the Virginia-Carolinas Reliability Coordinator (VACAR) South region during the January 2025 Arctic cold wave illustrated notable gas-electric coordination.[15] According to a joint FERC-NERC report, improved performance in regions, including VACAR South, were made possible by enhanced coordination between pipeline operators and electric grid and generator operators, including proactive issuance of Operational Flow Orders[16] and real-time situational awareness calls.[17] Additionally, the same report highlights how natural gas infrastructure, including wellheads, compressor stations, and local distribution systems experienced minimal disruptions despite record-breaking demand of over 150 billion cubic feet per day (Bcfd). This marked improvement over previous winter storms was attributed to widespread winterization efforts and planned use of natural gas

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[13] FERC, NERC, and its Regional Entities (a joint staff report), *January 2025 Events: A System Performance Review* (April 17, 2025), https://www.ferc.gov/media/report-january-2025-arctic-events-system-performance-review-ferc-nerc-and-its-regional.

[14] NPCC, *NPCC Northeast Gas/Electric System Study* (Jan. 3, 2025), https://www.npcc.org/news/npcc-northeast-gas-electric-system-study.

[15] VACAR is a division within the SERC Reliability Corporation that includes systems located in Virginia, North Carolina and South Carolina. VACAR South are the VACAR companies that are not located in the PJM BA area.

[16] An Operational Flow Order is a directive issued by a natural gas pipeline operator to maintain the operational integrity of the pipeline system during periods of imbalance. It typically occurs when forecasted pipeline inventory, either too high or too low, threatens system reliability.

[17] FERC, NERC, and its Regional Entities (a joint staff report), *January 2025 Arctic Events: A System Performance Review,* at 12 (April 17, 2025), https://www.ferc.gov/media/report-january-2025-arctic-events-system-performance-review-ferc-nerc-and-its-regional.

storage assets. The Mountain Valley Pipeline, which was placed into service in 2024, also played a pivotal role in maintaining electric reliability in VACAR South by sustaining stable pipeline pressure during peak demand. Additionally, some dual-fuel generators switched to alternate fuels to maintain gas system balance, while battery storage was used to alleviate stress on both the electric grid and pipelines during critical hours. Collectively, these actions demonstrate how targeted collaboration, infrastructure hardening, and flexible energy resources are beginning to close long-standing coordination gaps between the gas and electric sectors.[18]

To further strengthen gas-electric coordination, the North American Energy Standards Board (NAESB) Wholesale Gas Quadrant (WGQ) recently updated business practice standards collaboratively developed by NAESB's gas, electric, and retail working groups.[19] The Commission issued a proposed rule on October 16, 2025, that proposes to incorporate by reference into the Commission's regulations certain modifications and one new standard to Version 4.0 of the NAESB WGQ standards. These proposed modifications aim to improve transparency and situational awareness across the gas-electric interface by requiring interstate natural gas pipelines to publicly post scheduled quantity information for power plants directly connected to the pipeline grid, including their location, affiliated RTO/ISO, and total scheduled volumes.[20]

In summary, while infrastructure vulnerabilities continue to challenge gas-electric coordination, enhanced collaboration between the gas and electric industries along with improved winterization efforts have begun to close critical reliability gaps. As the natural gas

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[18] *Id.* at 2.

[19] The NAESB Wholesale Gas Quadrant Business Practice Standards Version 4.0 Revised were jointly developed on a consensus basis by NAESB's Wholesale Gas Quadrant, Wholesale Electric Quadrant, and the Retail Market Quadrant. The Wholesale Gas Quadrant includes the following five co-equal segments: Producers; Pipelines; Local Distribution Companies; End-users; and Services. The NAESB Wholesale Electric Quadrant includes the following seven co-equal segments: Transmission; Generation; Marketers/Brokers; Distribution/Load-Serving Entities; End Users; Independent Grid Operators/Planners; and Technology and Services providers. The NAESB Retail Market Quadrant includes: Retail Electric Service Providers/Suppliers; Retail Electric Utilities; Retail Electric End Users/Public Agencies; and Retail Gas Market Interests. For more information on the NAESB Quadrant Segments and Subsegments see: https://www.naesb.org/pdf/quadrant_description.pdf.


[20] *Standards for Business Practices of Interstate Natural Gas Pipelines*, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Docket No. RM96-1-044, (issued Oct 16, 2025).

and electric systems become more interdependent, sustained coordination between the two sectors will remain essential to safeguarding electric grid reliability.[21]

[21] For more on gas-electric coordination, see Chapter 3: Gas-Electric Interdependency, in FERC's *Energy Primer, a Handbook for Energy Market Basics,* http://www.ferc.gov/sites/default/files/2024-01/24_Energy-Markets-Primer_0117_DIGITAL_0.pdf.

Natural Gas Fundamentals

Slide 7



Natural Gas Prices

Natural gas futures provide expectations for natural gas prices at key hubs for the upcoming winter, as illustrated by the chart on **Slide 7**. The chart displays futures prices for three consecutive winters, with the light green bars representing futures prices for the upcoming winter (2025-2026) and the gray bars showing prices from last winter (2024-2025). In particular, natural gas futures in New England, New York, and California for winter 2025-2026 are currently trading higher than at other major hubs, and elevated natural gas demand is expected to drive prices higher on average across much of the United States. Heading into winter 2025-2026, higher natural gas futures prices at most major trading hubs across the United States are partly driven by rising futures prices at the Henry Hub national benchmark hub. **Slide 7** includes the Henry Hub, located in Louisiana, and nine other major supply and demand hubs in the Lower 48 States. As of November 4, Henry Hub futures averaged $4.39/MMBtu for this winter, up 26% from last winter's settled average of $3.49/MMBtu.[22]

[22] Natural gas futures prices are price quotations of contracts for the exchange of natural gas, as either a physical or financial settlement, at a specified time in the future. Winter futures prices in this section are the average quotes of the last traded futures contracts, as of November 4, 2025, for the winter months of December 2025, January 2026, and February


Rising demand for natural gas in the South-Central region, including from liquefied natural gas (LNG) export facilities, is contributing to higher commodity prices at Henry Hub, which operates as a benchmark for regional hub pricing.[23]

Consistent with previous winters, natural gas futures in New England, New York, and California for winter 2025-2026 are currently trading higher than at other major hubs. As shown in **Slide 7**, the Algonquin Citygates hub near Boston could see the highest prices in the country, averaging $12.76/MMBtu, a slight increase of $0.47/MMBtu from last winter's average. New England relies on imported LNG in the winter to help meet peak natural gas demand, and the region continues to compete for LNG volumes with Europe and Asia. Additionally, storage inventories in the East are currently 3% below last year's level and slightly below the five-year average. New York's Transco Zone 6 futures prices averaged $9.48/MMBtu, above last winter's average of $6.30/MMBtu, as that hub may face supply constraints this winter. California natural gas futures prices averaged $5.80/MMBtu at the SoCal-Citygate hub in southern California and $5.01/MMBtu at the PG&E-Citygate in northern California, both above last winter's levels by an average of $0.94/MMBtu. Infrastructure constraints continue to keep California natural gas prices among the highest in the country, but high regional natural gas storage inventories should help moderate price volatility this winter.

2026 as retrieved from InterContinental Exchange, Inc. Previous winter averages are the final settled futures prices for each month as retrieved from InterContinental Exchange, Inc.

[23] Regional natural gas prices are calculated by adding the Henry Hub winter futures price to the winter basis futures prices at major trading hubs in the United States. Regional basis prices reflect, among other things, the distance from producing basins, availability of natural gas transportation, and local weather expectations for the coming winter.

Slide 8



Natural Gas Production

Domestic natural gas production indicates the market's ability to meet U.S. demand this winter. As of October 7, 2025, EIA forecasted winter 2025-2026 dry natural gas production to average 108.1 Bcfd.[24] This represents a 2.9% increase from the winter 2024-2025 average of 105.0 Bcfd and is 7.7% higher than the five-year average. As illustrated on **Slide 8,** this reflects a fifth year of consecutive growth in production since winter 2020-2021, when the COVID-19 pandemic reduced natural gas production and demand. The different colored segments within each bar break down the total production by region, illustrating how various shale plays contribute to the overall volume.

Although overall natural gas production is projected to increase this winter, lower oil prices will suppress a subset of the production known as "associated gas," which is gas produced

[24] "Natural gas production" refers to dry production, or gross withdrawals less gas used for repressuring, quantities vented and flared, and nonhydrocarbon gases removed in treating or processing operations. The term includes all quantities of gas used in field and processing plant operations.

through drilling activity in oil-rich basins.[25] Lower crude oil prices typically dampen drilling activity in such basins and—because their output is linked—reduce production of both oil and gas.[26] As of August 2025, there were 538 oil and natural gas rigs in operation, about 7% below the same time last year.

Over the past five winters, total U.S. dry gas production increased by at least 14.5 Bcfd in aggregate although occasional freeze-offs (freezing of oil and gas wells and pipes) reduced gas output during winter events, particularly Winter Storm Uri (2021), Winter Storm Elliott (2022), Winter Storm Heather/Gerri (2024), and the winter storms of January 2025. To prevent potential loss of production, the upstream natural gas sector has ramped up winter preparedness and equipment winterization efforts.[27] While winter storms are not directly comparable, operators reported fewer issues in winter 2024-2025, when Northeast natural gas production dropped only approximately 2 Bcfd, compared to 11 Bcfd that came off-line during Winter Storm Elliott two years earlier.[28] During the January 21-22, 2025 winter storm, the U.S. natural gas system mitigated reduced production from freeze-offs and unplanned outages and supported a record-setting peak domestic demand of 150 Bcfd without requiring load shedding by electric utilities.[29]

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[25] EIA, *Short-Term Energy Outlook*, at 9 (Sept. 9, 2025), http://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/archives/sep25.pdf.


[26] Crude oil prices for West Texas Intermediate at the Cushing Interchange in Oklahoma, the U.S. crude oil benchmark, are expected to average $48.33 per barrel, 32.7% lower than the five-year average and 33.3% lower than the average winter 2024-2025 price of $72.46 per barrel. *See* EIA, *Short-Term Energy Outlook* (Sept. 9, 2025), https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/data/browser/.

[27] American Gas Association, *Special Edition: Natural Gas Market Indicators – January 9, 2025* (Jan. 9, 2025), https://www.aga.org/research-policy/resource-library/special-edition-natural-gas-market-indicators-january-9-2025/.

[28] PJM Operating Committee, *Cold Weather Operations January 18–23, 2025,* at 22 (Feb. 6, 2025), https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/committees-groups/committees/oc/2025/20250306/20250306-item-15---january-2025-cold-weather-update.pdf.

[29] FERC, NERC and its Regional Entities (a joint staff report), *January 2025 Arctic Events: A System Performance Review,* at 1 (April 17, 2025). https://www.ferc.gov/media/report-january-2025-arctic-events-system-performance-review-ferc-nerc-and-its-regional.

Slide 9




Natural Gas Demand

Total U.S. natural gas demand, represented by a core set of demand drivers, indicates the market need for natural gas this winter, as shown in the chart on **Slide 9**. Natural gas demand is forecasted to average 127.6 Bcfd in winter 2025-2026, 1.6% lower than the 129.7 Bcfd in winter 2024-2025. As the chart illustrates, total U.S. demand, represented by the height of the stacked bars, has grown over the last several years. Forecasted demand for winter 2025-2026 remains higher than the previous five-winter average by 5.6%. The different colored segments of each bar break down total demand into its components: residential, commercial, and industrial demand; natural gas consumed for electricity generation (power burn); and net exports. Total U.S. domestic natural gas consumption, which excludes net exports, is expected to average 111.7 Bcfd in winter 2025-2026, a decrease of 4.6% from winter 2024-2025 levels and a 2.1% increase from the previous five-winter average. Exports are discussed in greater detail in the *Natural Gas Exports and Imports* section below.

The light blue segment of the bar represents the residential and commercial sector, which is forecasted to comprise a 32.6% share of total U.S. domestic demand mostly for winter space heating. EIA forecasts the residential and commercial sector to consume 41.6 Bcfd, a decrease of 10.2% from the notably high demand seen during winter 2024-2025 due to the January 2025 winter events. Lower residential and commercial demand usually reflects a warmer winter, resulting in lower demand for natural gas used for space heating. The light green portion of the bar represents power burn, which comprises 27.2% of domestic demand and is expected to remain relatively flat compared to last winter, averaging 34.6 Bcfd in winter

2025-2026. Natural gas-fired generation is forecasted to provide 38.6% of total U.S. electricity generation output in winter 2025-2026, nearly the same as the 38.3% share in winter 2024-2025, but slightly higher than the previous five-winter average of 37.6%.

Slide 10



Natural Gas Storage Inventories

Natural gas storage inventories help to balance natural gas supply and demand and thus are fundamental to winter natural gas price formation. The chart on **Slide 10** illustrates the current storage forecast in the context of recent history. Traders and wholesale consumers watch storage inventories for signs of a supply and demand imbalance.[30] The solid and dashed blue lines on the chart tracks inventory levels for the current winter (2025-2026). The U.S. natural gas storage withdrawal season began in early November with 3,915 Bcf in working gas inventories. At the end of the withdrawal season on April 1, 2026, EIA currently forecasts 1,935 Bcf remaining in storage, as shown in **Slide 10**. The starting inventory level was above the five-year average of 3,811 Bcf but lower than the previous season (2024-2025) when the starting inventory level was the highest since 2016. The ending inventory level is expected to be slightly higher than the five-year average level and much above the previous withdrawal season's level (1,698 Bcf on March 6, 2025). EIA expects total withdrawals of approximately 1,980 Bcf throughout the 2025-2026 withdrawal season, 13% less than 2024-2025 winter withdrawals but 2.3% more than the previous five-winter average. As such, overall natural gas storage inventories are forecasted to remain relatively robust through winter.

Regionally, natural gas storage inventories in the East and Midwest are expected to start the winter withdrawal season approximately 3% below last year's level but just 1% below the five-

[30] U.S. natural gas storage inventory data listed in this section is for the Lower 48 states.

year average. The lower-than-average storage inventories in the East and Midwest are expected to be offset by storage levels higher than the previous five-winter average in the Mountain, Pacific, and South-Central regions.[31]


Generators fueled by petroleum and liquid fuels, such as distillate or residual fuel, provide a small portion of the overall electric generation capacity in the United States but play an important reliability role during critical periods in the Northeast.[32] As of October 31, 2025, distillate fuel oil inventories, which include heating oil, were at 111.6 million barrels for the United States,[33] 8.8% below the five-year average.

[31] For more on storage and its role in U.S. energy markets, see the Natural Gas Storage section (page 25) in FERC's *Energy Primer: A Handbook on Energy Market Basics,* http://www.ferc.gov/sites/default/files/2024-01/24_Energy-Markets-Primer_0117_DIGITAL_0.pdf.

[32] For more on oil and its role in U.S. electricity generation, please see Chapter 4: U.S. Crude Oil and Petroleum Product Markets in FERC's *Energy Primer: A Handbook for Energy Market Basics*, http://www.ferc.gov/sites/default/files/2024-01/24_Energy-Markets-Primer_0117_DIGITAL_0.pdf.

[33] EIA, Weekly U.S. Ending Stocks of Distillate Fuel Oil (Oct. 31, 2025), https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=WDISTUS1&f=W.

Slide 11



Natural Gas Exports and Imports

Natural gas exports represent the fastest growing demand segment in the U.S. market and are expected to outpace natural gas imports this winter. The chart on **Slide 11** illustrates this trend, breaking down the volumes of U.S. natural gas LNG and pipeline imports and exports. The stacked bars are segmented to show the volume of LNG exports (in blue), pipeline exports (in light green), and pipeline imports (in black). Net natural gas exports are expected to increase this winter from last winter, primarily due to increased LNG export capacity from Calcasieu Pass LNG, Corpus Christi LNG Stage 3, and Plaquemines LNG, along with an expected increase in natural gas pipeline exports to Mexico. As seen in **Slide 11**, EIA forecasts U.S. gross LNG exports to average 16.3 Bcfd in winter 2025-2026, up 18.7% from winter 2024-2025. The United States remains the world's largest LNG exporter, with FERC-authorized liquefaction capacity in the Lower 48 United States expected to increase to 20.1 Bcfd by the end of the winter.[34]

While LNG imports play a minor (and declining) role in the U.S. gas balance, they are still important in pipeline-constrained New England. Additionally, some U.S. LNG export facility operators such as Cove Point in Maryland have allowed for the delivery of re-gasified LNG stored on site to provide additional supplies to market areas near export facilities during peak

[34] FERC, *North American LNG Export Terminals – Existing, Approved not Yet Built, and Proposed* (Oct. 14, 2025), https://www.ferc.gov/media/us-lng-export-terminals-existing-approved-not-yet-built-and-proposed.

winter demand days.[35] Altogether, the United States is expected to be a significant net exporter of natural gas this winter, with natural gas exports, including LNG and via pipeline, expected to exceed natural gas imports by an average of 15.8 Bcfd, compared to 12.6 Bcfd in winter 2024-2025.[36] This growth in net exports is represented by the blue line on the chart. Gross pipeline exports, including flows to both Canada and Mexico, are forecast to be 9.7 Bcfd, which is 0.3 Bcfd above average exports in winter 2024-2025. In total, the United States is a net gas importer from Canada and a net exporter to Mexico (via pipeline and trucks; the latter on a very small scale).

[35] Cove Point's LTD-3 service allows shippers to liquefy domestic natural gas, inject LNG into storage, and then withdraw that stored LNG at any time. *See* Cove Point LNG, LP, FERC Gas Tariff, Tariff Record No. 1., Third Revised Volume No. 1., http://www.ferc.gov/sites/default/files/2020-05/066131_000110__contents.pdf.

[36] For more on LNG markets, see the Liquefied Natural Gas section (page 14) of FERC's *Energy Primer: A Handbook for Energy Market Basics,* http://www.ferc.gov/sites/default/files/2024-01/24_Energy-Markets-Primer_0117_DIGITAL_0.pdf.

Slide 12

Natural Gas Infrastructure Additions

- LNG Export Capacity Grows to 20.1 Bcfd
  - Two new projects in-service since start of last winter
- Pipeline Projects Added 2.2 Bcfd in Capacity in 2025
  - Additional capacity to support LNG export facilities
  - Increased takeaway capacity in the Southwest and Texas
- Natural Gas Storage Capacity Grows by 6.5 Bcf
  - New working gas capacity added in December 2024

Natural Gas Infrastructure

Natural gas infrastructure additions measure the growth in capacity used to process, transport, and store natural gas as it moves from initial production (or import) to ultimate delivery (including export). Natural gas infrastructure additions since last winter included expansions to export capacity, pipeline capacity, and storage capacity. New LNG export facilities and expansions are expected to bring peak LNG capacity to 20.1 Bcfd by the end of the winter. Pipeline projects placed in-service since last winter added 2.2 Bcfd of new transportation capacity, and an expansion project added 6.5 Bcf in new underground natural gas storage capacity.[37]

The United States was the world's largest LNG exporter in 2024, and U.S. natural gas exports are expected to increase again this winter, supported by two major projects completed since last winter.[38] Plaquemines LNG Phase 1 began operating in Louisiana in late 2024 and Corpus Christi LNG Stage 3 in Texas began in March of 2025, while Plaquemines LNG Phase 2 is

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[37] This calculation is based on EIA's pipeline project database cross-referenced with FERC certificate filings and in-service announcements. EIA, Natural Gas Pipeline Projects (July 2025), https://www.eia.gov/naturalgas/pipelines/EIA-NaturalGasPipelineProjects_Jul2025.xlsx.

[38] EIA, *The United States remained the world's largest liquefied natural gas exporter in 2024* (March 27, 2025), https://www.eia.gov /todayinenergy/detail.php?id=64844.

expected to ship its first cargo in the fourth quarter of 2025. Including the new additions, by the end of the winter FERC-authorized U.S. LNG liquefaction capacity will be 20.1 Bcfd.[39]

Since November 2024, several interstate natural gas pipelines have increased pipeline capacity. Most notably, the Evangeline Pass Expansion Project Phase 2 entered service and increased the pipeline's total capacity to 2.2 Bcfd to deliver feedgas to Venture Global's Plaquemines LNG liquefaction and export facility. Several smaller pipeline expansion projects now in service are also expected to support production growth and demand, including the 0.19 Bcfd Texas to Louisiana Energy Pathway project which increases capacity between Haynesville production and Gulf Coast markets, and the 0.18 Bcfd East Lateral Xpress, which will supply the Plaquemine's LNG terminal.

Adding to natural gas storage capacity, the Tres Palacios Cavern 4 Storage Expansion project entered service in December 2024. Located in Texas, Tres Palacios Cavern 4 adds 6.5 Bcf of working gas capacity to the facility's existing 34.9 Bcf.[40] As a salt dome site, Tres Palacios can inject or withdraw gas quickly, supporting variable loads from a variety of users including LNG terminals.


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[39] EIA, U.S. Liquefaction Capacity (Sept. 17, 2025), https://www.eia.gov/naturalgas/data.php#imports; FERC, *North American LNG Export Terminals – Existing, Approved not Yet Built, and Proposed* (Sept. 18, 2025), https://www.ferc.gov/media/us-lng-export-terminals-existing-approved-not-yet-built-and-proposed.


[40] Jodi Shafto, *Enbridge Ready to Bring on Fourth Cavern at Texas Natural Gas Storage Facility,* Natural Gas Intelligence (Nov. 22, 2024), https://naturalgasintel.com/news/enbridge-ready-to-bring-on-fourth-cavern-at-texas-natural-gas-storage-facility/.

Electricity Market Fundamentals and Electric Reliability

Slide 13



Slide 14



Electricity Generation Additions, Retirements, and Outages

Compared to last winter, the EIA projects the electricity sector will have 56.1 GW of additional net generation capacity this winter.[41] This net increase reflects 64.7 GW of new capacity additions offset by 8.6 GW of retirements. Of these capacity changes, 25.7 GW of additions and 2.4 GW of retirements were already completed between March and November 2025, while 39.0 GW of additions and 6.2 GW of retirements are expected to occur between December 2025 and February 2026. Given their operating characteristics, new capacity from solar, wind, or storage facilities does not replace the retired thermal capacity from coal, natural gas, or oil units on a one-for-one basis.

Capacity Additions

The chart on **Slide 13** breaks down the 64.7 GW of new winter capacity additions by region and resource type. Each vertical bar represents the total new capacity for a specific region, while the segments within each bar show the mix of different resources being added. In total, solar accounts for 50% (32 GW) of new capacity additions and batteries represent 30% (20 GW), with wind accounting for 11% (6.8 GW) and natural gas (6 GW) comprising the remainder. Solar represents the largest share of new capacity additions in PJM (68%) and MISO (67%). New battery capacity additions have continued to grow steadily from 695 MW in 2021 to a projected 11.5 GW in 2025. As the chart shows, western and central regions drive nearly 80% of overall capacity additions: ERCOT (21.8 GW), WECC (14.1 GW), the Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO) (8.9 GW), and the California Independent System Operator (CAISO) (6.2 GW).

Capacity Retirements

Capacity retirements are projected to total 8.6 GW, with coal-fired steam units representing 5.8 GW (67%) and natural gas units 1.8 GW (21%). The chart on **Slide 14** breaks down these figures by region and shows the specific fuel types being retired in each area. The majority of planned coal retirements are in WECC (3.2 GW) and MISO (2.1 GW), while the largest volume of planned natural gas retirements is in PJM (0.8 GW). The largest individual coal plant retirements include the Intermountain Power Project (1.8 GW) in Utah, J.H. Campbell Generating Complex (1.3 GW) in Michigan, and TransAlta's Centralia Generation Station (0.7 GW) in Washington. Notably, the J.H. Campbell plant's retirement is subject to a U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) emergency order extending its operation until February 17,

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[41] Net capacity additions and retirements data from EIA Form 860M show new generating capacity that entered service and existing capacity that retired during March 2025 through February 2026. The net increase represents total additions minus total retirements across all fuel types and technologies. *See* EIA (September 9, 2025) Form EIA-860M, https://www.eia.gov /electricity /data/eia860/

2026, to ensure grid reliability.[42] Similarly, the 397 MW oil-fired Wagner Unit 4 has been extended beyond its environmental run-hour limitations by a DOE emergency order until December 31, 2025, to help meet anticipated electricity demand in PJM.[43] In addition, DOE has ordered Units 3 and 4 of the Eddystone Generating Station to remain available through November 26, 2025, to minimize the risk of generation shortfalls in PJM.[44] Another notable coal retirement is the Merrimack Station in New Hampshire (460 MW). That plant ceased commercial operations in early October 2025, earlier than its previously planned 2028 retirement.[45]

Pace of Winter Capacity Changes

The pace of winter capacity additions has recovered after slowing in 2022. Capacity additions fell from 37.4 GW in 2022 to 32.7 GW in 2023, a 13% decline. Since then, the pace of capacity additions has rebounded strongly, reaching 42.6 GW in 2024 and 52.6 GW in 2025. Projected additions for 2026 are 64.7 GW, which would represent the largest annual capacity addition in over a decade. Conversely, the pace of generation retirements has slowed significantly following a surge in coal plant closures. Annual retirements peaked at 17.8 GW in 2023, then declined to 15.7 GW in 2024 and 8.6 GW in 2025—a 51% reduction from the 2023 peak. Retirements are projected to remain at similar levels in 2026 at 8.7 GW, consistent with this return to more moderate retirement rates.

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[42] Additional DOE orders could potentially delay other planned retirements this winter. U.S. Department of Energy, Order No. 202-25-9, Federal Power Act Section 202(c): Midcontinent Independent System Operator (Nov. 18, 2025), https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2025-11/Order%20No%20202-25-9.pdf. *See* also U.S. Department of Energy, Order No. 202-25-7, Federal Power Act Section 202(c): Midcontinent Independent System Operator (Aug. 20, 2025), https://www.energy.gov/ceser/federal-power-act-section-202c-midcontinent-independent-system-operator-miso-0.

[43] *See* U.S. Department of Energy, Order No. 202-25-6A, Federal Power Act Section 202(c): PJM Interconnection (PJM) (Oct. 24, 2025), https://www.energy.gov/ceser/federal-power-act-section-202c-pjm-interconnection-0


[44] *See* U.S. Department of Energy, Order No. 202-25-8 Federal Power Act Section 202(c): PJM Interconnection (PJM) (August 28, 2025), https://www.energy.gov/ceser/federal-power-act-section-202c-pjm-interconnection-pjm.

[45] Retirement data is based on EIA-860M reported retirement dates. Some units, such as J.H. Campbell, continue operating under DOE emergency orders (202(c)) beyond their reported retirement dates, while others, such as the Merrimack Station, retired earlier than planned. Actual operational status may differ from reported retirement timing.


Planned Generation Outages

Oconee Nuclear Station Unit 3 (859 MW) in South Carolina is scheduled for a 28-day maintenance outage starting November 1, 2025. While the unit is scheduled to return to service before December 2025, any delays could reduce available capacity in the SERC region, emphasizing the importance of proactive grid management strategies for the winter season.

Slide 15



Slide 16



Electricity Consumption

EIA projects total winter electricity consumption to reach 1,035 TWh, or 2.7% above the five-year average of 1,007 TWh.[46] The chart on **Slide 15** provides historical context for this forecast, plotting projected consumption for winter 2025-2026 (the dashed green line) against the previous four winters. Among the last five winters, winter 2024-2025 represents the record peak at 1,041 TWh (3% above the five-year average), while winter 2025-2026 projections show more modest growth at 1,035 TWh, which would represent the second-highest consumption level of the five winters analyzed.


The breakdown of this electricity consumption by end-use sector for winter 2025-2026 is shown on **Slide 16**. The residential sector is projected to have the highest consumption at 387 TWh, followed by the commercial sector at 359 TWh and the industrial sector at 254 TWh. The stacked bars on the chart illustrate this monthly breakdown and show that consumption across all sectors is expected to peak in January, reaching a high of 352 TWh. The commercial sector is projected to see the strongest growth at 5% above its five-year average. Direct Use represents approximately 3% of total electricity consumption (or 35 TWh) and is expected to remain stable.[47]

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[46] EIA's *Short-Term Energy Outlook* (STEO) provides data and forecasts for U.S. electricity consumption retail sales to customers, broken down by residential, commercial, and industrial sectors. EIA, *STEO*, at Table 7A (Sept. 2025), https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/archives/sep25.pdf.

[47] According to EIA, Direct Use represents "commercial and industrial facility use of onsite net electricity generation; and electrical sales or transfers to adjacent or colocated facilities for which revenue information is not available." See EIA, *STEO*, at Table 7A (Sept. 2025), https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/archives/sep25.pdf.

Slide 17



NERC, 2025-2026 Winter Reliability Assessment
Net Internal Demand equals Total Internal Demand less Dispatchable, Controllable Capacity Demand Response used to reduce load.

NERC Forecasted Electricity Demand and Resources

According to NERC, electricity demand is expected to be higher this winter compared to last winter. NERC forecasts net internal demand[48] for electricity to increase by approximately 1.6%, or 11 GW, from 666 GW in winter 2024-2025 to 677 GW in winter 2025-2026. Actual electricity demand will depend on a number of factors, including the number, duration, and characteristics of extreme winter events.

Slide 17 shows the net internal demand as solid bars and the available resources and net transfer values (a combination of internal resources and additional external resources available to the region) as diamonds.[49] Despite the increased demand projected for Winter

[48] Forecasted Net Internal Demand: Total of all end-use customer demand and electric system losses within specified metered boundaries, reduced by the projected impacts of Controllable and Dispatchable Demand Response programs.

[49] "Resources and Net Transfers" refers to the addition of "Existing-Certain Capacity" and "Net Firm Capacity Transfers." Existing-Certain Capacity includes capacity to serve load during period of peak demand from commercially operable generating units with firm transmission or other qualifying provisions specified in the market construct. Net firm capacity transfers refers to the imports minus exports of firm contracts. NERC, *2024 Long Term Reliability Assessment* (December 2024, updated July 15, 2025), https://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/NERC_Long%2

2025-2026, all 15 U.S. NERC assessment areas are anticipated to have sufficient available generation resources and net transfers to meet their expected loads under normal winter conditions.[50] According to data from NERC,[51] planning reserve margins[52] exceed the reference reserve level margins[53] for the 15 NERC assessment areas. Even with expected ample planning reserve margins, regions can face tighter-than-expected supply if operating conditions deviate significantly from those expected for this winter. Planning reserve margins are a metric, but do not guarantee reliable operations at all times. For instance, they do not necessarily account for all extreme winter conditions that can lead to fuel unavailability for generators, derates of electric generators, unexpected generator outages, transmission outages, reduced power transfers from adjacent areas, delays in energy

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0Term%20Reliability%20Assessment_2024.pdf; *see also* Net Internal Demand equals Total Internal Demand less Dispatchable, Controllable Capacity Demand Response used to reduce load. NERC, *2025-2026 Winter Reliability Assessment,* (Nov. 18, 2025), http://www.nerc.com/globalassets/our-work/assessments/nerc_wra_2025.pdf.

[50] The 15 U.S. assessment areas, also shown in **Slide 20**, are the NPCC-New England and NPCC-New York subregions of NPCC-US; PJM Interconnection L.L.C. (PJM); the SERC-Central, SERC-East, SERC-Southeast, and SERC Florida Peninsula subregions of SERC-US; MISO; SPP; the Texas Reliability Entity-Electric Reliability Council of Texas (TRE/ERCOT); and the WECC-NW (Northwest), WECC-SW, WECC-Rocky Mountain, WECC-Basin and WECC-CAMX subregions of WECC-US. NERC, *2024 Long-Term Reliability Assessment* (Dec. 2024), https://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/NERC_Long%20Term%20Reliability%20Assessment_2024.pdf.

[51] NERC *2025-2026 Winter Reliability Assessment* (Nov. 18, 2025), http://www.nerc.com/globalassets/our-work/assessments/nerc_wra_2025.pdf.

[52] The planning reserve margin is the primary metric used to measure resource adequacy defined as the difference in resources (anticipated or prospective) and net internal demand divided by net internal demand, shown as a percentile. NERC, *2024 Long Term Reliability Assessment, at 138* (Dec. 2024), https://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/NERC_Long%20Term%20Reliability%20Assessment_2024.pdf.

[53] Also known as a target reserve margin, the reference reserve level margin is provided by the region/subregion based on load, generation, and transmission characteristics as well as regulatory requirements. If not provided, NERC assigns a 15 percent reserve margin. NERC, Reliability Indicators, Metric 1-Reserve Margin (accessed Oct. 22, 2025), https://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ri/Pages/PlanningReserveMargin.aspx.

resources coming online, and other factors that system operators must manage to maintain electric supply and reliability. In extreme scenarios, ERCOT, NPCC-NE, SERC-Central, SERC-East, WECC-Basin, and WECC-NW face a higher likelihood of challenges, which may require operational mitigations to avoid facing potential reliability issues. More comprehensive reliability assessments for these assessment areas are presented in the *Regional Highlights* section of this assessment.

To serve demand in winter 2025-2026, NERC forecasts a national decrease of 0.48%, or approximately 4.6 GW[54], in total electric generation capacity and net energy transfers from approximately 971.5 GW in winter 2024-2025 to approximately 966.8 GW in winter 2025-2026,[55] illustrated as diamonds in **Slide 17**.[56]

A forecast of the United States' electricity demand shows a significant upward trajectory.[57] This demand increase is driven by a combination of industrial sector recovery, electrification, and new demand from data centers and manufacturing. Currently, the size and speed with which data centers and crypto mining facilities can be constructed and connected to the grid presents unique challenges for demand forecasting and planning.[58] Data center demand alone

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[54] To determine these figures, using data provided in the "Demand and Resources Table of the NERC 2025-2026 Winter Reliability Assessment for each United States' assessment area, the Existing-certain capacity is summed across NERC assessment areas and the net firm capacity transfers projections are summed across all assessment areas, and compared to the same assessment area projections provided in the "2024-2025 WRA columns." The Existing-certain capacity and net firm transfers were described in FN 47 above Note that NERC's projected 4.6 GW decrease in generation capacity differs from EIA's anticipated 56.1 GW net increase in generation capacity because EIA estimates expected retirements and planned capacity through February 2025 based on data submitted to the annual EIA-860 and includes operating, out of service or on standby generators, as well as planned and not yet in operation generators. The EIA data is not directly comparable to the NERC data.

[55] NERC, *2025-2026 Winter Reliability Assessment* (Nov. 18, 2025), http://www.nerc.com/globalassets/our-work/assessments/nerc_wra_2025.pdf.

[56] *Id.*

[57] *Grid Strategies LLC, Strategic Industries Surging: Driving US Power Demand, (Dec. 2024), https://gridstrategiesllc.com/wp-content/uploads/National-Load-Growth-Report-2024.pdf.*


[58] NERC, *2024 Long-Term Reliability Assessment* at 8 (Dec. 2024), https://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/NERC_Long%20Term%20Reliability%20Assessment_2024.pdf.

is projected to consume over 5% of the total U.S. power demand for 2025, up from 4.4% in 2024.[59]

This increase in demand, in combination with the decrease in supply, is pressuring utilities to accelerate infrastructure upgrades and energy resource deployment, and to reconsider scheduled resource retirements to maintain grid reliability, such as those described further in the *Electricity Generation Additions, Retirements, and Outages* section above.

[59] Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, *2024 United States Data Center Energy Usage Report* at 52 (Dec. 2024), https://escholarship.org/uc/lbnl.

Slide 18



Electricity Transmission Projects

There are 3,132 new transmission projects supporting grid reliability this winter, including 1,551 substation-only projects, 1,070 transmission line projects, and 511 combined projects. These projects total 19,008 line-miles, with 14,736 miles already completed and placed in service between March and November 2025, and 4,272 miles expected to enter service between December 2025 and February 2026.[60] The chart on **Slide 18** breaks down these new line and line upgrades by region and project driver. Nationwide, the primary drivers for these projects are storm and fire hardening (7,101 line-miles) and system reliability (4,238 line-miles), which together account for nearly 60% of all projected mileage.

By project count, ERCOT (771), MISO (655), and PJM (610) are the most active regions for transmission development. As the chart illustrates, the top drivers vary by region: ERCOT is primarily focused on storm and fire hardening (23% of its line-miles) and load growth (29%), MISO is driven by a combination of asset renewal/aging infrastructure (32%) and system reliability (30%), PJM's development is concentrated on asset renewal/aging infrastructure


[60] Data on transmission line-miles is from The C Three Group's (Yes Energy) Electric Transmission and Distribution database. The projects listed in this report are limited to those placed into service between March 2025 and February 2026 that have one of the following statuses: conceptual, early development, advanced development, under construction, partial operations, or operating. Project terminology and the level of detail can vary significantly by region, which may result in incomplete data.

(46%) and system reliability (36%), and over 97% of CAISO's new mileage is for storm and fire hardening. Notably, all projects specifically developed for congestion relief are located in SPP and MISO, totaling 260 line-miles.

Most projects involve lines below 230 kV, accounting for 16,732 line-miles or 88% of total line-miles. For lines of 230 kV or higher, there are 2,277 line-miles or 12% of total mileage. The highest voltage lines of 500 kV or more account for 358 line-miles, primarily in CAISO (256 line-miles), WECC (91 line-miles), and MISO (7 line-miles).

Substation-only projects represent nearly half of all transmission infrastructure work this winter, with ERCOT (404 substations), MISO (320), and PJM (294) leading in substation development.

Slide 19



Data Source: Staff analysis of zonal uplift charges from January 2019 to September 2025

Electric Market Uplift Payments

Uplift payments in organized markets reflect the portion of the cost of reliably serving load that is not included in market prices. They compensate generators that are dispatched to operate but whose market revenues fail to cover their production costs. The costs of uplift payments are typically allocated among grid customers. For this coming winter, forecasted natural gas prices and electricity demand suggest that the cost of producing electricity will not be appreciably higher than that of recent winters.[61] But, unpredictable periods of extreme winter weather could still drive up both wholesale electricity prices and uplift payments for some days.

The chart on **Slide 19** illustrates this historical trend, visualizing how average daily uplift payments during the winter are typically higher than the average for the rest of the year across several grid regions.[62] Historical data shows that daily uplift payments have been higher on

[61] EIA, *Short-Term Energy Outlook* (Oct. 7, 2025), showing that the wholesale electricity outlook for the coming winter has average wholesale electricity prices that are close to historical winter averages, except January where prices are expected to increase slightly. https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/archives/oct25.pdf.

[62] Assessment in this report of zonal uplift payments are based on publicly available data obtained from datasets and market reports published by the ISO/RTOs from Jan. 1, 2019, to Aug. 31, 2025, for NYISO, MISO, and SPP and July 1, 2019, to Aug. 31, 2025, for PJM.

average during recent winters in several regions, driven by two key factors: extreme weather events and specific operator actions.[63]

- **Extreme Weather:** During an eight-day period of Winter Storm Uri in February 2021, total uplift payments exceeded $1.13 Billion in SPP and $160 million in MISO. The daily payments in SPP during the storm averaged over $140 million—more than 100 times the region's typical daily average since 2019.
- **Operator Actions:** Proactive operator decisions can also drive uplift. In January 2025, PJM's commitment of specific resources in advance of cold weather resulted in nearly $340 million in uplift payments across five days.[64] Such actions ensured system reliability,[65] but at the expected cost of atypically high uplift payments.[66]

This coming winter, system operators may similarly pre-position resources in advance of expected cold weather. This could reduce reliability risks but also increase uplift payments in RTOs/ISOs.

For example, for PJM see PJM, Data Miner 2: Daily Uplift Charges by Zone (last accessed Oct. 6, 2025), https://dataminer2.pjm.com/feed/uplift_charges_by_zone; for NYISO see Open Access Same-Time Information System: Pricing Data (last accessed Oct. 6, 2025), https://mis.nyiso.com/public/; for MISO see MISO, Market Reports (last accessed Oct. 6, 2025) https://www.misoenergy.org/markets-and-operations/real-time--market-data/market-reports/; and for SPP, see SPP, Make Whole Payment Report (last accessed Oct. 6, 2025), https://portal.spp.org/pages/make-whole-payment-report.

[63] Like daily uplift payments, daily wholesale electricity costs based on RTO/ISO LMPs are also higher in the winter on average, compared to the rest-of-the-year.


[64] Monitoring Analytics (PJM Independent Market Monitor), *2025 Quarterly State of the Market Report for PJM: January through June* at 284, 302-304 (Aug. 14, 2025), http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/PJM_State_of_the_Market/2025/2025q2-som-pjm-sec4.pdf.

[65] PJM Operating Committee, *Cold Weather Operations: January 18–23, 2025* at 3 (Feb. 6, 2025), https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/committees-groups/committees/mrc/2025/20250319/20250319-item-08---1-january-2025-cold-weather-update---presentation.pdf.

[66] PJM Members Committee, *Markets Report* at 27 (Feb. 18, 2025) (showing uplift as a percent of energy costs equal to almost 8% in January 2025 and below 2% for all preceding months), http://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/committees-groups/committees/mc/2025/20250218-web/item-05a---1---market-operations-report.pdf.

Slide 20

Regional Highlights and Probabilistic Assessment



Source: NERC

NERC Regional Probabilistic Assessments

In this section, staff relies on NERC's probabilistic risk analyses[67] to assess resource adequacy. Regions can face energy shortfalls despite having planned reserve margins that exceed the reference margin levels.[68]

NERC's analysis shows that all assessment areas, as shown in **Slide 20**, anticipate adequate supplies and reserve margins under normal conditions, but ERCOT, NPCC-NE, SERC-East, SERC-Central, WECC-Basin, and WECC-NW may face a higher likelihood of tight supply and reliability issues during extreme conditions.[69] For all assessment areas, above-normal

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[67] A probabilistic risk analysis assesses the potential variations in resources and load that can occur under changing conditions or during certain scenarios and incorporates operator actions that could help to mitigate any shortfalls in operating reserves.

[68] NERC, *2025-2026 Winter Reliability Assessment* (Nov. 18, 2025), http://www.nerc.com/globalassets/our-work/assessments/nerc_wra_2025.pdf.

[69] All Regional Entities and assessment areas provide a probability-based resource adequacy risk assessment for the winter season. NPCC-US consists of the states of Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont, and New York; PJM consists of all or parts of Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, and the

winter peak load and resource outages could result in the need to employ operational mitigations. In the event of challenging operating conditions, system operators take actions known as operational mitigations to address potential supply shortages, such as calling on demand response, canceling or postponing non-critical generation or transmission maintenance, and calling on voluntary conservation measures. If system conditions deteriorate sufficiently, Reliability Coordinators may declare an Energy Emergency Alert, allowing system operators to call on a variety of additional resources that are only available during scarcity conditions such as activating emergency demand response measures and increasing generation imports from neighboring regions.

Additionally, NERC assessment areas coordinate extensively ahead of anticipated extreme weather to try to prevent supply shortages. For example, ERCOT performs day-ahead and near-term studies to evaluate generation capacity at high risk due to extreme weather conditions to assess potential load shed scenarios. As part of ERCOT's protocols with SPP and MISO, ERCOT coordinates with the two RTO neighbors if look-ahead study results indicate that emergency conditions may arise.[70] NPCC-NE continues to closely monitor regional energy adequacy, particularly during extended cold snaps where constrained natural gas pipelines contribute to rapid depletion of stored fuel supplies.[71] Both SERC-Central and

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District of Columbia; SERC encompasses all or parts of North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Missouri, Kentucky, Florida, Arkansas, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Virginia, and Texas; MISO encompasses all or parts of 15 U.S. states including Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Texas, and Wisconsin, and the Canadian province of Manitoba; SPP encompasses all or parts of Arkansas, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas, and Wyoming; ERCOT is located entirely in the state of Texas; and WECC's footprint extends from Canada to Mexico and includes the provinces of Alberta and British Columbia; the northern portion of Baja California, Mexico; Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, Wyoming; and portions of Montana, Nebraska, South Dakota and Texas. *See* NERC, *Long Term Reliability Assessment* (December 2024), https://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/NERC_Long%20Term%20Reliability%20Assessment_2024.pdf.

[70] ERCOT, ERCOT-SPP Coordination Plan (Accessed Oct. 7, 2025), https://www.ercot.com/files/docs/2020/05/29/ERCOT-SPP-Coordination-Plan.pdf; ERCOT, ERCOT-MISO Coordination Plan (Accessed Oct. 7, 2025), https://www.ercot.com/files/docs/2019/03/27/ERCOT-MISO_Coordination_Plan.pdf.


[71] *NERC, 2025-2026 Winter Reliability Assessment* (Nov. 18, 2025), http://www.nerc.com/globalassets/our-work/assessments/nerc_wra_2025.pdf.

SERC-East report that fuel supplies and transportation remain stable, supported by firm natural gas contracts, storage resources, and reliable pipeline capacity. Coal and oil inventories are projected to remain adequate to meet winter demand.[72] WECC operators monitor grid market conditions in real time, with forecasts extending from the next day to seven days ahead for prescheduled trading.[73]

[72] *Id.*

[73] *Id.*

Slide 21



Source: NERC

Regional Highlights

NERC conducts probabilistic assessments of each assessment area that evaluates the risk of resource adequacy shortfalls for the winter. This winter risk period scenario compares chosen extreme scenarios determined by the NERC assessment areas. In this section, FERC staff highlights the following assessment areas: ERCOT, NPCC-NE, WECC-Basin, and WECC-NW. However, NERC's *2025-2026 Winter Reliability Assessment* also highlighted SERC-East and SERC Central.

NERC's *2025-2026 Winter Reliability Assessment* uses "waterfall" charts to provide a helpful visual of its probabilistic assessments for each region. The chart in **Slide 21** is an example seasonal risk assessment for a hypothetical region. The left blue column on the chart shows anticipated resources and the two orange columns on the right show the normal peak (50/50) and the extreme winter peak (90/10) demand scenarios.[74] The middle red bars show the factors that can reduce resource availability, including maintenance outages and forced outages, not already accounted for in anticipated resources. The middle green bar depicts potential additions in resource availability from operational mitigation actions, if any, that are available during scarcity conditions but have not been accounted for in the reserve margins.

[74] A 50/50 peak load forecast is based on a 50% chance that the actual system peak load will exceed the forecasted value. A 90/10 peak load forecast is based on a 10% chance that the actual system peak load will exceed the forecasted value.

The dotted, horizontal line represents the expected operating reserve requirement plus the extreme peak demand, or the amount of power that a region would need to produce to avoid a shortfall.

The seasonal risk assessment scenarios are determined by the assessment areas to provide insight into unanticipated events during normal and/or extreme winter conditions. However, they do not account for all the unique energy adequacy risks associated with a specific area. The scenarios generally assess the greatest risk hour(s) for Expected Unserved Energy, along with the varying demand and available resource profiles. The methods, scenarios considered, and assumptions differ by assessment area and may not be comparable.

ERCOT. Winter peak demand in ERCOT's Texas footprint typically occurs before sunrise and after sunset when solar generation is unavailable.[75] ERCOT anticipates having sufficient operating reserves during the winter peak load hour (the hour ending at 8:00 a.m.) under expected normal system conditions. However, under extreme scenarios, the region faces increased risk of reserve shortages during both the peak-load hour and high net load hours. During these hours, the system relies heavily on wind generation and dispatchable resources.

Generally, risk in ERCOT continues to rise primarily due to factors such as robust load growth, slower evening load declines—which are largely attributed to continuous data center operations—and limited additions of new dispatchable capacity to meet elevated morning and evening net loads.[76] This risk is heightened by potential forced outages of thermal resources and reduced output from intermittent resources. The load growth in West Texas combined with scenarios for "no solar" and low wind conditions can cause transmission lines into this area to become heavily loaded. As one way to address this risk, ERCOT improved dynamic line ratings that allow for greater transfers at colder temperatures and periods of low solar irradiance.[77] The rapid increase in installed battery storage in ERCOT will also help address this risk. However, maintaining an adequate state of charge during prolonged high-load events, such as a widespread, multi-day event like Winter Storm Uri, remains a significant challenge.[78]

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[75] NERC, *2025-2026 Winter Reliability Assessment* at 31 (Nov. 18, 2025), http://www.nerc.com/globalassets/our-work/assessments/nerc_wra_2025.pdf.

[76] NERC, *2025-2026 Winter Reliability Assessment* (Nov. 18, 2025), http://www.nerc.com/globalassets/our-work/assessments/nerc_wra_2025.pdf.

[77] *Id.*

[78] *Id. at 6*.

NPCC-NE. Under normal winter conditions, NPCC-NE has adequate resources to meet demand. However, a persistent concern in the region is whether sufficient energy will be available during an extended cold spell given the current resource mix, fuel delivery infrastructure, and expected fuel arrangements. Without significant efforts to replenish stored fuels such as fuel oil and LNG, energy adequacy could be challenged.[79]

In NPCC-NE, winter energy concerns are highest in scenarios when stored fuels are rapidly depleted; during these periods timely replenishment is critical to minimizing the potential for energy shortfalls. ISO-NE's 21-day energy forecast is intended to identify these types of scenarios. To support situational awareness and fuel procurement decisions, ISO-NE publishes a rolling 21-day energy assessment at least weekly with more frequent updates as needed.[80] This assessment provides early indications of potential fuel scarcity conditions for market participants.[81] ISO-NE has also expanded an existing winter readiness survey of generators to include more detailed questions, capturing additional data on potential temperature-related limitations.[82] ISO-NE will also continue to use its Probabilistic Energy Adequacy Tool to assess energy shortfall risks ahead of the 2025–2026 winter season.[83]

NPCC-NE shows little change to the anticipated reserve margin for this winter from the previous year, and a lower peak demand forecast and additional resources from demand

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[79] *Id at 22.*

[80] ISO-NE, 21-Day Energy Assessment Forecast and Report (accessed Sept. 23, 2025), https://www.iso-ne.com/isoexpress/web/reports/operations/-/tree/21-Day-Energy-Assessment-Forecast-and-Report-Results.

[81] *Id.*

[82] ISO-NE, OP-21, Operational Surveys, Energy Forecasting & Reporting, and Actions During an Energy Emergency (Accessed Oct. 7, 2025), https://www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/rules_proceds/operating/isone/op21/op21_rto_final.pdf.

[83] Probabilistic Energy Adequacy Tool is a tool that ISO-NE use for risk analysis under extreme weather events. It is essential for evaluating the region's risk of energy shortfall — the electricity supply falling below consumer demand — giving the region's stakeholders advance warning and the opportunity to take steps to avert it; ISO New England, Update on Energy Adequacy Tool, Energy Shortfall Threshold, and Perspectives on Retail Demand Response, (May 21, 2024), https://www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/100011/necpuc_sgeorge_may_2024_final.pdf; ISO New England, ISO Newswire: ISO-NE's study of energy shortfall risks produces innovative tool for assessing energy adequacy (Dec. 11, 2023), https://isonewswire.com/2023/12/11/iso-nes-study-of-energy-shortfall-risks-produces-innovative-tool-for-assessing-energy-adequacy/.

response and firm imports should offset recent generator retirements.[84] NPCC-NE imports power from Canada and neighboring RTOs/ISOs and periodically assesses its reliance on power transfers from neighboring Reliability Coordinator areas through market mechanisms and reliability studies. External resources may participate in the Forward Capacity Market, securing Capacity Supply Obligations to supply energy to New England when needed, integrating them into the region's capacity mix. An annual tie benefits study conducted by ISO-NE estimates reliable import capacity during stressed system conditions. [85]

WECC. WECC warns of potential reserve margin shortfalls in the WECC-Basin and WECC-NW assessment areas during the 2025–2026 winter season during the extreme condition scenario.

WECC-Basin. WECC-Basin encompasses all of Utah, the western part of Wyoming, and the southern and eastern part of Idaho. Under an extreme combination of derates and outages, WECC-Basin could be short one GW of internal supply and imports needed to serve load, and it expects an increased reliance on transfers. Net internal demand is expected to increase 1% since last winter, with total internal demand up 1.8%. This is offset by a doubling of controllable and dispatchable demand response. However, Tier 1 resources, which are capacity that is under construction or that has received approved planning requirements, have declined and do not appear to be offset by increases in existing-certain generation resource capacity.[86] Meanwhile, nameplate wind has increased by almost 18% and solar by almost 30%, and hydro is also up over 7% in total installed capacity since last winter, but derates need to

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[84] NERC, *2025-2026 Winter Reliability Assessment* at 5 (Nov. 18, 2025), http://www.nerc.com/globalassets/our-work/assessments/nerc_wra_2025.pdf.

[85] The study analysis accounts for expected emergency assistance, system reliability practices and the Total Transfer Capability of external interfaces. *See* ISO-NE*, Benefits Values for Reconfiguration Auctions to be Conducted in 2025,* https://www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/100015/a03_review_of_2025_2026_ara_3_tie_benefits_study_results.pdf ; ISO New England, Tie Benefits Methodology: Evaluation Review of Probabilistic Analysis, Tie Benefits Methodologies of ISO-NE and Other ISO/RTOs, and Tie Benefits Evaluation Scope of Work (Oct. 19, 2023), http://www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/100004/a05_tie_benefits_methodology_evaluation.pdf.

[86] Existing-certain includes commercially operable generating units or portions of generating units that meet at least one of the following requirements when examining the period of peak demand for the winter season: (1) unit must have a firm capability and have a power purchase agreement with firm transmission that must be in effect for the unit; (2) unit must be classified as a designated network resource; and/or, (3) where energy-only markets exist, unit must be a designated market resource eligible to bid into the market.

be factored into the performance calculations. Overall, WECC-Basin expects to be reliant on imports to maintain resource adequacy.[87]

WECC-NW. WECC-NW encompasses all of Montana, Washington, and Oregon, and the northern parts of both Idaho and California. WECC-NW has historically been a mixed-season peaking region and shows operating reserve margins expected to be met before needing imports for all winter scenarios. This winter, projected total and net internal demand are up 9.3%, with the primary drivers being data centers, residential electrification, transportation electrification, and semiconductor manufacturing. Large coal unit retirements and conventional hydro unit retirements contribute to the reduction in existing certain capacity by 10.5%; however, planned Tier 1 resources (capacity that is under construction or has received approved planning requirements) have soared over 580%, from 463 MW to over 3 GW. An increase in nameplate capacity for both wind and solar in WECC-NW has also led to a moderate increase in solar availability during the peak hour.

To assess long-term vulnerabilities for all of WECC, WECC conducted two studies evaluating the impact of extreme cold weather events on electric system reliability 10 and 20 years into the future.[88] Both studies highlight the risks[89] associated with heavy reliance on natural gas during severe winter conditions. According to WECC, currently there are no reported or planned pipeline disruptions or outages that would directly threaten natural gas delivery in winter 2025-2026. But lessons from Winter Storm Elliott underscore how freeze-offs, scheduling mismatches, and pipeline constraints have previously contributed to generation

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[87] NERC, *2025-2026 Winter Reliability Assessment* at 33 (Nov. 18, 2025), http://www.nerc.com/globalassets/our-work/assessments/nerc_wra_2025.pdf.

[88] WECC, *Year 10 Extreme Cold Weather Event* (Nov. 2023), https://www.wecc.org/sites/default/files/documents/meeting/2024/Year-10%20Extreme%20Cold%20Weather%20Event%20Report%202023.pdf; WECC, *Year 20 Extreme Cold Weather Event*, (April 2024), https://www.wecc.org/sites/default/files/documents/meeting/2024/Year%2020%20Cold%20Weather%20Event%20Study.pdf.

[89] The studies shows that the western grid depends heavily on natural gas-fired generation to meet demand during extreme cold events. According to the studies, during cold snaps natural gas supply and pressure can drop due to heating demand and infrastructure freezing. Also, the reports note that if gas supply is constrained or derated (by 15–35%), large amounts of unserved energy could occur.

shortfalls and power outages. Since then, improvements such as revised gas pipeline logic[90] and expedited emergency protocols have strengthened system resilience.[91]

The Western Interconnection remains a focal point for proposed pipeline expansions aimed at easing regional supply constraints.[92] While these projects could eventually stabilize fuel prices and support growing demand, most remain in early development stages and will not be in place for winter 2025-2026.[93]

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[90] Gas pipeline logic refers to the system of rules, controls and decision-making processes that govern the operation, monitoring, and optimization of natural gas transmission through pipelines.

[91] WECC Assurance Program provides WECC and its stakeholders with tools to help manage specific risks related to extreme weather and recommendations for improvements to policies, processes and procedures for reviewing system performance during extreme weather events; WECC, WECC Assurance Program explainer (May 15, 2025); https://www.wecc.org/sites/default/files/documents/initiative/2025/Assurance%20Program%205.15.2025.pdf.

[92] S&P Capital IQ Pro, Natural Gas Development Projects (Accessed Oct. 2, 2025), https://www.capitaliq.spglobal.com/web/client?auth=inherit#industry/GasProjects.

[93] These projects include the Desert Southwest Pipeline Expansion (Transwestern Pipeline Company, owned by Energy Transfer): This project involves constructing 516 miles of 42-inch pipeline and nine compressor stations to transport up to 1.5 Bcfd of natural gas from the Permian Basin (Texas/New Mexico) to markets in Arizona and the Southwest. It was announced in August 2025, with a binding open season launched in September 2025. The construction is pending regulatory approvals and final investment decisions. Energy Transfer LP, *Energy Transfer Announces Natural Gas Pipeline Project to Serve Growing Southwestern U.S. Markets*, press release, (August 6, 2025), https://ir.energytransfer.com/news-releases/news-release-details/energy-transfer-announces-natural-gas-pipeline-project-serve; Also included is the Helena-to-Three Forks Pipeline Project (NorthWestern Energy), a proposed natural gas pipeline in Montana, spanning from Helena south to the Three Forks area. It aims to enhance service reliability, add system redundancy by linking existing infrastructure, and support regional energy needs. Construction is expected to begin in 2027. NorthWestern Energy Group, Inc., Helena to Three Forks Natural Gas Transmission Pipeline Project 2024, (Accessed Oct. 7, 2025), https://northwesternenergy.com/about-us/our-projects/helena-to-three-forks-pipeline-project#.

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2025-2026 Winter Energy Market and Electric Reliability Assessment

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This concludes the 2025-2026 Winter Energy Market and Electric Reliability Assessment. For questions regarding this report please contact market.assessments@ferc.gov.

BEFORE THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Power Act Section 202(c) Emergency Order: Tri-State Generation and Transmission Association, Platte River Power Authority, Salt River Project, PacifiCorp, and Xcel Energy	))))))	Order No. 202-25-14

Exhibit to
Motion to Intervene and Request for Rehearing and Stay of
Public Interest Organizations

Filed January 28, 2026

Exhibit 1-30:
Winter Storm Elliott System Operations Inquiry

Inquiry into Bulk-Power System Operations During December 2022 Winter Storm Elliott

FERC, NERC and Regional Entity Staff Report
October 2023



Inquiry into Bulk-Power System Operations During December 2022 Winter Storm Elliott

FERC, NERC and Regional Entity Staff Report
October 2023



FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

NERC
NORTH AMERICAN ELECTRIC RELIABILITY CORPORATION

Regional Entities:
Midwest Reliability Organization, Northeast Power Coordinating Council, ReliabilityFirst Corporation, SERC Corporation, Texas Reliability Entity and Western Electricity Coordinating Council

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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report describes how the extreme cold weather event occurring between December 21 and 26, 2022 (Winter Storm Elliott) impacted the reliability of the Bulk Electric System ("BES" or colloquially known as the grid) and the supporting natural gas infrastructure in the U.S. Eastern Interconnection[1] ("the Event").[2] During the Event, 1,702 individual BES[3] generating units in the Eastern Interconnection experienced 3,565 unplanned outages, derates, or failures to start.[4] Each individual unit could, and often did, have multiple outages from the same or different causes. At the worst point of the Event, there were 90,500 MW of coincident unplanned generating unit outages, derates and failures to start (meaning they all occurred at the same time). Including generation that was already out of service,[5] a total of over 127,000 MW of generation was unavailable, representing 18 percent of the U.S. portion of the anticipated resources in the Eastern Interconnection.

The Event was the **fifth** in the past **11** years in which

1 There are four interconnections in North America, with three of those interconnections encompassing the lower 48 states: the Eastern Interconnection; the ERCOT Interconnection; and the Western Interconnection. NERC Interconnections, available at https://www.nerc.com/AboutNERC/keyplayers/PublishingImages/NERC%20Interconnections.pdf. *See also*, FERC Reliability Primer, 11 (2020), https://www.ferc.gov/media/2135.

2 This is a staff report, and does not speak for the Commission, NERC or any of the Regional Entities. ***See*** Press Release, FERC, NERC to Open Joint Inquiry into Winter Storm Elliott (December 28, 2022) for a description of the inquiry's commencement. *See* Appendix A for list of the Winter Storm Elliott Inquiry joint team members (the "Team"). The Team of over 50 subject matter experts from the Commission, NERC and all of its Regional Entities: Midwest Reliability Organization (MRO), Northeast Power Coordinating Council (NPCC), ReliabilityFirst Corporation (RF), SERC Corporation (SERC), Texas Reliability Entity (TRE) and the Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC); as well as the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), was formed shortly after the Event determine the causes of the Event and make recommendations to prevent recurrence of the effects that the extreme cold weather caused for the grid. Appendix B includes a list of acronyms Used in the Report. The Report is written for a reader who is already familiar with principles of energy markets, electric transmission operations, generating unit operations, and natural gas production, processing, and transportation. For readers who are not as familiar, the staff Primers on Electric and Natural Gas Markets detail the essential principles related to energy markets, electric transmission operations, generating unit operations, and natural gas production, processing, and transportation, *see* FERC Energy Primer (https://www.ferc.gov/media/energy-primer-handbook-energy-market-basics) and FERC Reliability Primer (https://www.ferc.gov/sites/default/files/2020-04/reliability-primer_1.pdf).

3 The Commission's jurisdiction extends to the Bulk-Power System, defined by Section 215(a) (1) of the Federal Power Act as "facilities and control systems necessary for operating an interconnected electric energy transmission network (or any portion thereof), and electric energy from generating facilities needed to maintain transmission system reliability." The mandatory Reliability Standards apply to owners and operators of the Bulk Electric System (BES). In Order No. 773, the Commission approved a definition of BES that generally covers all elements operated at 100 kV or higher, with a list of specific inclusions and exclusions. Revisions to Electric Reliability Organization Definition of Bulk Electric System and Rules of Procedure, Order No. 773, 141 FERC ¶ 61,236 (2012); order on reh'g, Order No. 773-A, 143 FERC ¶ 61,053 (2013), order on reh'g and clarification, 144 FERC ¶ 61,174 (2013). This report will use BES because its primary audience is most familiar with that term. There were some non-BES generating units (i.e., that did not meet the BES definition in the NERC Glossary of Terms) that experienced outages, derates, or failures to start within the Eastern Interconnection but the Team did not request data from them and they are not included in its analysis. By definition these units would be less than 20 MW individually or 75 MW in the aggregate with a common point of connection (e.g. a wind or solar facility). https://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Glossary%20of%20Terms/Glossary_of_Terms.pdf .

4 The Team obtained generating unit data directly from the Generator Owners and/or Operators (GOs/GOPs).

5 Those units that were already out of service included generating units undergoing planned maintenance outages and those units that incurred forced outages before the Event, that had not yet returned to service during the worst point of the Event.

unplanned cold weather-related generation outages jeopardized grid reliability.[6] Several Balancing Authorities (BAs) (grid operators that balance demand and electric energy) in the southeast U.S. needed to shed firm load during the Event to maintain system reliability, which in total (at different points in time) exceeded 5,400 MW. This was the largest controlled firm load shed recorded in the history of the Eastern Interconnection. Just one year before, in 2021, the Winter Storm Uri event in Texas and the South Central U.S. saw the largest controlled firm load shed event in U.S. history, with over 20,000 MW of firm load shed (20,000 MW in ERCOT alone). In that event, more than 4.5 million people lost power in Texas, and some went without power for as long as four days, while exposed to below freezing temperatures for as long as six days. Estimates of those who died during that event, primarily from causes connected to the power outages including hypothermia, carbon monoxide poisoning, and medical conditions exacerbated by freezing conditions, range from over 200 to over 800.[7] The Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas estimated the direct and indirect losses to the Texas economy from that event to be between $80 and $130 billion.[8]

The quantity of firm load shed during Winter Storm Elliott was not as large as in the Winter Storm Uri event, but it is especially disconcerting that it happened in the Eastern Interconnection which normally has ample generation and transmission ties to other grid operators that allow them to import and export power. And yet, for reasons described more fully in Section IV of the Report, electric grid operators were faced with a generation capacity shortage that resulted in 5,400 MW of firm load shed.

6 In February 2011, an arctic cold front impacted the southwest U.S. and resulted in 29,700 MW of generation outages, natural gas facility outages, and emergency power grid conditions with need for firm customer load shed. Report on Outages and Curtailments During the Southwest Cold Weather Event of February 1-5, 2011: Causes and Recommendations (Aug. 2011), Report on outages and curtailments during the Southwest cold weather event (ferc.gov) ("2011 Report"). In January 2014, a polar vortex affected Texas, central and eastern U.S., triggering 19,500 MW of generation outages, and natural gas availability issues resulting in emergency conditions including voluntary load management. NERC "Polar Vortex Review" (Sept. 2014), https://www.nerc.com/pa/rrm/January%202014%20Polar%20Vortex%20Review/Polar_Vortex_Review_29_Sept_2014_Final.pdf ("Polar Vortex Review"). In January 2018, an arctic high-pressure system and below average temperatures in the South Central U.S. resulted in 15,800 MW of generation outages and the need for voluntary load management emergency measures. South Central United States Cold Weather Bulk Electric Systems Event of January 17, 2018 (July 2019), https://www.ferc.gov/sites/default/files/2020-07/SouthCentralUnitedStatesColdWeatherBulkElectricSystemEventofJanuary17-2018.pdf ("2018 Report"). Finally, in February 2021, extreme cold weather and freezing precipitation in Texas and the South Central U.S. resulted in generating outages of over 60,000 MW and over 20,000 MW of firm load shed. The February 2021 Cold Weather Outages in Texas and the South Central United States | FERC, NERC and Regional Entity Staff Report (Nov. 2021), The February 2021 Cold Weather Outages in Texas and the South Central United States | FERC, NERC and Regional Entity Staff Report | Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("2021 Report").

7 Recent "excess death" analyses of deaths in Texas during the 2021 event range as high as 800. Amber Weber & Mose Buchele , *Texas has an official death count from the 2021 blackout. The true toll may never be known*., Texas Standard (Aug. 15, 2022),Texas has an official death count from the 2021 blackout. The true toll may never be known. | Texas Standard.


8 Garrett Golding et al., *Cost of Texas' 2021 Deep Freeze Justifies Weatherization*, Dallas Fed. Economics (Apr. 15, 2021), https://www.dallasfed.org/research/economics/2021/0415.

A. Synopsis of Event

The storm that came to be known as Winter Storm Elliott, variously characterized as a bomb cyclone and an extra-tropical cyclone,[9] moved from the upper Plains states eastward. By Wednesday, December 21, 2022, it reached the central U.S., eventually blanketing most of the eastern United States on December 23 and 24, and did not subside until December 26. In an unacceptably familiar pattern, the cold temperatures ushered in electric generation outages that coincided with winter peak electricity demands (i.e., winter peak loads), and resulted in many BAs declaring energy emergencies. The amount of generation that failed during the Event was unprecedented—90,500 MW in coincident unplanned outages.[10] The coincident incremental[11] unplanned generation outages *alone* represented 13 percent of the U.S. portion of the winter 2022-2023 anticipated generation resources in the Eastern Interconnection.[12]

Figure 1, below, shows the entities in the U.S. Eastern Interconnection most affected by Winter Storm Elliott, referred to as the "Event Area." The entities represented by a pink box shed firm load at some point during the Event, including Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), Louisiana Gas and Electric Company/Kentucky Utilities (LG&E/KU),

Figure 1: Bulk Electric System Map of Entities in the U.S. Eastern Interconnection Affected by the Extreme Cold Weather




9 Both are terms that denote a storm associated with a rapid drop in pressure—the more rapid the drop in pressure, the more intense the storm. Pandora Dewan, *Bomb Cyclone Photos: What to Expect From Freezing Weather Forecast*., Newsweek (Dec. 20, 2022), https://www.newsweek.com/bomb-cyclone-photos-freezing-weather-forecast-1768515#:~:text=Elliott%20is%20expected%20to%20arrive%20in%20the%20Pacific,the%20Midwest%20and%20parts%20of%20the%20East%20Coast.

10 The 2021 Winter Storm Uri event had 65,622 MW coincident incremental unplanned generating unit outages, the most that occurred before the Event.

11 "Incremental" generating unit outages, derates, and failures to start refers to those which occurred during the Event (December 21-26, 2022), as compared to those which occurred before the Event.

12 Based on data from the NERC 2022-2023 Winter Reliability Assessment. The 18 percent of Eastern Interconnection resources reference earlier is for unplanned outages that occurred during the Event at the moment when the most generation was offline during the Event ("the worst point"), plus unplanned and planned outages that were already in effect at the beginning of the Event. NERC, *2022- 2023 Winter Reliability Assessment* (Nov. 2022), https://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/NERC_WRA_2022.pdf.

Figure 2: Location and Fuel Type of Unplanned Generation Outages and Derates During the Event (Bubble Size by MW for each Outage), as of December 24, 2022



Duke Energy Progress (DEP) and Duke Energy Carolinas (DEC), Dominion Energy SC (DESC), and South Carolina Public Service Authority (Santee Cooper). Other entities issued Energy Emergency Alerts (EEAs),[13] but did not need to shed firm load, including PJM Interconnection, LLC (PJM), Southern Company (Southern), Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO), Southwest Power Pool (SPP), and ISO New England (ISO-NE). All of the affected entities experienced significant unplanned generating unit outages, derates, or failures to start within their footprints. See Figure 2, above, shows the approximate locations of the generating unit outages during the Event and their fuel type.

The 2021 Report attributed the unplanned generating outages to generating units unprepared for the cold weather and natural gas fuel supply issues:

> A confluence of two causes, both triggered by cold weather, led to the [Uri] Event, part of a recurring pattern for the last ten years. First, generating units unprepared for cold weather failed in large numbers. Second, in the wake of massive natural gas production declines, and to a lesser extent, declines in natural gas processing, the natural gas fuel supply struggled to meet both residential heating load and generating unit demand for natural gas, exacerbated by the increasing reliance by generating units on natural gas. Natural gas pipeline capacity is for the most part designed, certificated and constructed to accommodate firm transportation commitments, while many natural gas-fired generating units rely on non-firm commodity and/or pipeline transportation contracts.[14]

13 New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) did not declare an EEA during the Event.

14 2021 Report at 11-12.

The Event shows that, while some changes were implemented in response to previous cold weather events, generators and natural gas supply and infrastructure remain vulnerable to extreme cold weather.

Similar to other cold weather events,[15] the cold weather was forecast well in advance. Beginning with forecast colder weather mid-December, and with widespread warnings by December 20, grid operators knew that frigid weather was coming. Many issued cold weather preparation notices to their Generation and Transmission Owners and Operators. Temperatures were lower than normal during the Event, although not quite as far off normal lows as during the 2021 event. Winter Storm Elliott's departures from normal minimum lows were largely from 15 to 30 degrees lower than normal, though a small area was even lower. In Winter Storm Uri, departures from normal minimum lows ranged from 40 to 50 degrees lower than normal low temperatures. However, Winter Storm Elliott generally had higher winds than Uri, with gusts up to 60 miles per hour, which increased convective cooling. Rapid temperature drops to subfreezing levels across the eastern half of the U.S. occurred. For example, temperatures in Charleston, West Virginia dropped 42 degrees in six hours, and TVA reported a drop of 46 degrees in five hours. Some areas experienced blizzard conditions. Geographically, Winter Storm Elliott was a very large storm. At approximately 2,000 miles wide, its extreme cold and high winds covered the eastern two-thirds of the lower 48 U.S.

Winter Storm Elliott caused unplanned outages of natural gas wellheads due to wellhead freeze-offs and other frozen equipment. Weather-related poor road conditions prevented necessary maintenance.[16] This led to significant natural gas production decreases, which also occurred during the 2011 and 2021 events.[17] During the Event, "[d]ry natural gas production in the Lower 48 states dropped to a low of 82.5 Bcf on December 24, a 16 percent decrease (16.1 Bcf/d) from December 21...."[18] Gas production experienced the greatest declines in the Marcellus and Utica Shale formations, where it dropped by 23 to 54 percent during the Event.[19] Figure 3, below, shows the areas where production decreases occurred.

The affected grid operators, beginning with SPP and then MISO, saw rising load and increasing generating unit outages during the Event, which in many cases led to a reduction in their energy reserves. Neither SPP nor MISO needed to shed firm load throughout their footprints,[21] but, to combat the rising loads and generation outages, SPP twice curtailed non-firm exports on December 23 because its reserves were low. MISO and SPP closely coordinated on the Regional Directional Transfer Limit between MISO South and the rest of MISO (see Figures 41 and 42), twice lowering the limit at SPP's request.[22]

15 *See* Figure 4 below, for a side-by-side comparison of the past five extreme cold weather events in 11 years. For additional information on extreme cold weather conditions during the events, *see* the 2021 Report, Appendix B: Comparison of Similar Severe Weather Events, at 245.

16 The Team also obtained natural gas production and processing data directly from owners of these facilities, unless otherwise stated. However, because these entities are not subject to the Commission's jurisdiction, the Team did not receive all data requested.

17 The teams observed decreases in natural gas production in the 2011 and 2021 cold weather events. The teams studying the 2014 Polar Vortex and January 2018 events did not quantify natural gas production losses or investigate any causes for such losses.

18 James Easton and Max Ober, *U.S. natural gas consumption reached record daily high in late December 2022*, Today in Energy (Jan. 31, 2023), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=55359.

19 Source: S&P Global Commodity Insights, ©2023 by S&P Global Inc.

20 Source: EIA: Maps: Oil and Gas Exploration, Resources, and Production - Energy Information Administration (eia.gov), adapted from "Lower 48 Shale Plays."

21 SPP had a localized voltage issue caused by a combination of unplanned generating unit outages and transmission outages. Local transmission system operators initiated a [brief] firm load shed of 29 MW to alleviate issue. *See section* III.B.3.a), Thursday, December 22: Effects of Elliott begin to impact U.S. portion of Eastern Interconnection BES, for additional discussion.

22 Unplanned generation outages and underestimated loads in MISO's "South" region led it to increase its north-to-south power transfer to supply more power to that portion of its system. MISO agreed to limit its north-to-south transfer by half of its contractual limit (1,500 MW)..

On December 23, MISO declared EEA 1 and 2,[23] due to congestion on its transmission system and diminished generation deliverability and used 3,000 MW of Load Modifying Resources.[24] MISO also had several local transmission emergencies but did not need to shed any firm load.

Figure 3: Areas of Shale Natural Gas Production Where Extreme Cold Weather Occurred[25]



TVA experienced rapidly-increasing generating unit outages in the early morning hours of December 23. By 6 a.m. Eastern Standard Time,[26] TVA had lost over 5,000 MW of generation and declared EEA 1 and EEA 2. By 6:12 a.m., TVA declared EEA 3, which indicated that firm load shed was imminent, and secured emergency power from Duke, Southern, PJM, and MISO, but this solution was short-lived. As TVA continued to experience significant unplanned generation outages and increasing electricity demands, PJM needed to reduce the emergency power it was supplying to TVA, due to a transmission operating limit in PJM.[27] By 10:31 a.m., now faced with well over

23 *See* Reliability Standard EOP-011-2 - Emergency Preparedness and Operations, "Attachment 1-EOP-011-2 Energy Emergency Alerts" for the levels of alerts and energy emergencies, at https://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Reliability%20Standards/EOP-011-2.pdf. EEA levels indicate to neighboring Balancing Authorities that a Balancing Authority is experiencing an energy emergency and the level of severity. The Reliability Coordinator is responsible for declaring EEAs for its Balancing Authorities within its footprint per EOP-011-2, Requirement R6, and as detailed in Attachment 1.

24 Load Modifying Resources, or LMRs, are demand resources or behind-the-meter generation.

25 Source: EIA: Maps: Oil and Gas Exploration, Resources, and Production - Energy Information Administration (eia.gov), adapted from "Lower 48 Shale Plays."

26 All times stated within the Report, unless otherwise specified, are Eastern Standard Time (EST). If the entity is located in the Central Time Zone, all times were converted to EST.

27 PJM operators curtailed the emergency power schedule to TVA due to a System Operating Limit (SOL). The transmission facility at issue was exceeding its emergency limit in real time. *See also* sidebar on N-1 at 60.

6,000 MW of unplanned generating unit outages since midnight, continually rising system load, and depleted generation reserves, TVA ordered firm load shed of over 1,500 MW, which represented five percent of its peak system load.[28]

LG&E/KU also experienced significant unplanned generation derates during winter peak load conditions on the evening of December 23. To offset the generation derates, LG&E/KU was able to import 400 MW from PJM. At 4:29 p.m., PJM BA curtailed the 400 MW import due to experiencing rapidly increasing levels of unplanned generation outages coincident with increasing system load in its own footprint. In response, LG&E/KU requested emergency energy from the TVA Contingency Reserve Sharing Group, which TVA was able to supply. With its system load increasing, LG&E/KU entered into EEA 3 at 4:45 p.m. Following TVA's return at 5:18 p.m. to EEA 3, by 6:00 p.m. it also could no longer spare its 400 MW emergency power to LG&E/KU. With the loss of the import power to offset the unplanned generation derates, LG&E/KU began over 300 MW firm load shed at 5:58 p.m. This was the first time LG&E/KU had ever ordered firm load shed in response to an energy emergency (EEA) event.

Through the morning of December 24, PJM was providing emergency energy to neighboring Balancing Authorities, but as unplanned outages multiplied and its load increased, it needed to curtail those emergency energy export schedules and declared EEA 1 and EEA 2. PJM benefitted from a Simultaneous Activation of Ten-Minute Reserve (SAR) agreement with the Northeast Power Coordinating Council Balancing Authorities, which allowed PJM to call on reserves of up to 1,500 MW during the Event. PJM requested assistance under the SAR agreement five times between December 23 and 24. Although PJM said it was "close" to needing to shed firm load, it did not.[29]

Southern, like PJM, at first was able to provide emergency energy to other Balancing Authorities. By 6:25 a.m. on December 24, it declared EEA 2, having declared EEA 1 in the early morning hours. Southern obtained emergency energy from Florida Power and Light. The emergency energy import assisted Southern in meeting its all-time December record peak load early that morning and enabled it to provide emergency energy to DESC. DEC, DEP, DESC and Santee Cooper, Balancing Authorities in the Carolinas which form the Carolinas Reserve Sharing Group,[30] experienced escalating unplanned generating unit outages in the face of early morning peak load conditions. Combined with their inability to obtain import power from surrounding Balancing Authorities experiencing the same conditions, at worst points the four Balancing Authorities had to shed a combined total of over 2,000 MW firm load.

28 This was the first of two instances during Winter Storm Elliott where TVA needed to shed firm load. The other instance was during the early morning hours of December 24. From 6:12 a.m. on December 23 to midday December 24, TVA was at EEA 3, other than for a brief period the afternoon of December 23, when it was at EEA 2. Early the morning of December 24, TVA first ordered firm load shed of five percent of its peak system load, followed by an additional five percent reduction of firm load (in total, 10 percent of its peak system load which was **over 3,000 MW**). During those hours, most of TVA's neighboring BAs were faced with high electricity demands and escalating unplanned generating unit outages of their own and as a result, could not provide emergency power to TVA.

29 Although PJM was at an increased risk of load shedding approaching the morning peak on December 24, PJM still had options before shedding firm load, if it had lost another large generating unit or if NYISO had to cut its imports. PJM could have initiated a Voltage Reduction Action, which could have provided approximately 1,700 MW of relief. If necessary, PJM could have followed the Voltage Reduction with a Manual Load Dump Warning (providing Transmission Operators with their load allocations). Firm load shed would occur, if necessary, via Manual Load Dump Action, followed by issuance of EEA 3. PJM Report at 63.

30 *See*, CRSG, Dominion Energy South Carolina, Inc. OATT & SA, § SA No. 239, CRSG Operating Manual (0.0.0), https://etariff.ferc.gov/TariffSectionDetails.aspx?tid=6293&sid=312207.

B. Recurrence of Cold Weather Events with Unplanned Generating Unit Outages and Implications

The 2021 Report noted, "the [2021 Winter Storm Uri event] was the fourth cold-weather-related event in the last ten years to jeopardize BES reliability," and that "in each of the four BES events, planned and unplanned generating unit outages caused energy emergencies and in 2011, 2014 and 2021 they triggered the need for firm load shed."[31] Each event's report made recommendations to reduce the likelihood of similar consequences in the future.

In several of the previous events, there have been close calls, meaning, that if conditions worsened, it could have resulted in widespread firm load shed or outages. During Uri, for example, ERCOT came within four minutes of a potential complete blackout of the ERCOT Interconnection if the interconnection frequency had not recovered. During the January 2018 cold weather event, had the worst contingency generating unit forced outage occurred in MISO South, its electric grid operators would have needed to rely on post-contingency manual firm load shed to maintain voltages within limits, while faced with potential additional firm load shedding to maintain system balance and restore reserves. The Event, too, had its share of close calls. The natural gas provider for Manhattan, The Bronx, and portions of Queens and Westchester County, Consolidated Edison (Con Edison), faced reliability-threatening low pressures at its citygate[32] on all the interstate natural gas pipelines that it relies upon. Con Edison maintained its natural gas local distribution system pressure by using its own liquified natural gas (LNG) facility, among other measures. Had Con Edison not activated its LNG facility and taken its other emergency measures, or had the cold weather lasted longer, it could have faced large scale outages. System outages for a local natural gas distribution company generally take longer to restore than firm load shed, or even cascading outages, on the electric grid. Once electricity is restored to a circuit, all of the homes[33] can return to their normal functioning—lights turn back on, heating or air conditioning systems return to normal function, etc. By contrast, for the natural gas local distribution system to return system outages to normal operation, workers must go house-to-house and individually light every pilot light. Con Edison estimated it would have taken months to restore service, even with mutual assistance from other utilities, had it experienced a complete loss of its system.

In addition to the close call with Con Edison, the Eastern Interconnection's normally robust electric grid one-minute average frequency dropped to 59.936 Hz, slightly below its low frequency trigger limit of 59.95 Hz.[34] The frequency began declining on the morning of December 24 at 3:25 a.m. and over the next hour steadily decreased

31 2021 Report at 9.

32 Citygate - a point or measuring station at which a distributing gas utility receives gas from a natural gas pipeline company or transmission system. *See* EIA Definitions, Sources and Explanatory Notes, at https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/TblDefs/ng_pri_sum_tbldef2.asp.

33 For those that do not have secondary outage causes.

34 Frequency as a measure of the reliability status of a power system provides a key indicator of the overall integrity of operations. 60.000 Hz is the nominal frequency for the Eastern Interconnection, and maintaining it requires generating units to automatically respond to deviations, BAs to perform moment-to-moment balancing of the system's aggregate generation output to its load and maintain sufficient responsive reserves available to withstand the sudden tripping of the largest generator on the system. The Low Frequency Trigger Limit is approximately 59.95 Hz for the Eastern Interconnection and is used by BAs to calculate their required response to frequency deviations that are below 60 Hz. *See* NERC Reliability Standard BAL-001-2 – Real Power Balancing Control Performance, Attachment 2. RSCompleteSet.pdf (nerc.com)

from 60.00 Hz, reaching its lowest point by 4:25 a.m. At that time, the composite ACE[35] for the Core Event Area[36] was -2,754 MW, and PJM BA's portion of the composite ACE was -2,162 MW (due in part to PJM experiencing an additional 1,400 MW in unplanned generation outages from 4:20 a.m. to 4:25 a.m.). Although the Eastern Interconnection frequency recovered to its normal range[37] as PJM and several other Balancing Authorities concurrently initiated more severe emergency energy actions (including firm load shed for some Balancing Authorities), total unplanned generation outages continued to increase over and above generation that was already out of service, reaching a combined total of over 127,000 MW by 10:00 a.m. This left 18 percent of the winter 2022-2023 anticipated generation resources in the U.S. portion of the Eastern Interconnection offline during winter peak conditions.[38] Including this occasion, as well as the evening of December 23, there were four points during the Event at which the one-minute average frequency declined below 59.95 Hz, coinciding with lower online responsive reserves[39] within the Core Event Area due to generation outages. Ultimately on the morning of December 24, grid operators maintained frequency by reducing electricity demand, including by shedding over 5,400 MW of firm load, leaving hundreds of thousands of customers[40] without electricity to heat homes for several hours during the extreme cold weather conditions.

35 ACE stands for Area Control Error, which is the minute-to-minute measure of how well the BA is performing its balancing function; i.e., balancing its scheduled power outputs to meet actual inputs and outputs. If ACE is less than zero, then the BA needs to increase generation supply/output in its footprint to balance; or if additional generation increase is not possible, the BA may need to curtail export power schedules, or worst case, reduce demand by shedding firm load.

36 The "Core Event Area" refers to the location where concurrent EEA 2 and EEA 3 energy emergency measures were taken by electric grid entities the morning of December 24, 2022 (i.e., concurrent EEA 2 load management and EEA 3 firm load shed measures) to maintain BES reliability. These grid entities are NERC-registered Balancing Authorities. They are referred to as Core Entities or Core BAs in the Report, and are depicted in Figure 9, below.

37 For the Eastern Interconnection, the normal range is 59.95 – 60.05 Hz.

38 This exceeds NERC's 2022-2023 Winter Reliability Assessment "worst case" low generation condition for the U.S. portion of the Eastern Interconnection (worst case is calculated by combining MW outage shortfall scenarios of: extreme low gen + low wind + natural gas risk scenario) by 32,500 MW of additional generation reductions.

39 Responsive reserves are those online reserves that are capable of responding and recovering from frequency deviations.

40 On December 24, 2022, TVA ordered its 153 local power companies (LPCs) serving 10 million people in Tennessee and parts of six surrounding states to interrupt 10 percent of their firm load. Tennessee Valley Authority After Action Report, at 20-21, ((https://www.tva.com/about-tva/reports)), and https://www.tva.com/about-tva#:~:text=The%20Tennessee%20Valley%20Authority%20provides,industrial%20customers%20and%20federal%20installations. Duke Energy reported to the North Carolina Utilities Commission that on December 24, approximately 15 percent of customers overall – roughly 500,000 in total – were impacted by the company's rotating outages. (https://news.duke-energy.com/releases/duke-energy-updates-north-carolina-utilities-commission-on-winter-storm-elliott-emergency-outage-event#:~:text=CHARLOTTE%2C%20N.C.%20%E2%80%93%20-Leaders%20from%20Duke,from%20occurring%20that%20way%20again.) During rolling blackouts [firm load shed] instituted by LG&E/KU, 54,637 customers were affected. *Kentucky Utilities Co. & Louisville Gas and Electric Co. Response* (Mar. 10, 2023), https://psc.ky.gov/pscecf/2022-00402/rick.lovekamp%40lge-ku.com/03102023103319/02-AG_DR1_LGE_KU_Responses.pdf.

Figure 4: Comparison of Events' Effects on Bulk Electric System Generation and Resulting Need for Load Shed

Event Date/ Duration:	SW U.S. Event/ Feb. 1-5, 2011	Polar Vortex/ Jan 6-8, 2014	2018 Event/ Jan 15-19, 2018	2021 Event/ Feb 8-20, 2021	2022 Event/ Dec 21-26, 2022
Deviation from Average Daily Temperature	17 to 36 deg. below average	20 to 30 deg. below average	12 to 28 deg. below average	40 to 50 deg. below average	20 to 30 deg. below average
Geographic Area of Event	Texas and Southwest U.S.	Midwest, South Central, and East Coast regions	South Central U.S.	Texas and South Central U.S.	Central, Midwest, and large parts of Southeast and Northeast U.S.
Event Area Sq. Miles (approx.)	656,300	1,923,000	418,000	869,600	1,517,000
Unavailable Generation Due to Cold Weather, at Worst Point (MW)	14,702	9,800	15,600	65,622	90,500
Causes of Unavailable Generation (in alphabetical order)	Freezing Issues, Mechanical/ Electrical Issues, Natural Gas Fuel Issues	Freezing Issues (cold weather), Natural Gas Fuel Issues	Freezing Issues, Mechanical/ Electrical Issues, Natural Gas Fuel Issues	Freezing Issues, Natural Gas Fuel Issues, Mechanical/ Electrical Issues	Freezing Issues, Mechanical/ Electrical Issues, Natural Gas Fuel Issues
Energy Emergency Declared/ Highest Level	Yes/ EEA 3	Yes/ EEA 3	Yes/ EEA 2	Yes/ EEA 3	Yes/ EEA 3
Maximum Level of Firm Load Shed (MW)	5,411.6	300	0	23,418 (ERCOT 20,000, SPP 2,718, MISO South 700)	Over 5,400[41] Total (TVA over 3,000, DEC 1,000, DEP 961, LG&E/ KU 317,[42] DESC 94.7,[43] Santee Cooper 86.4)
Overall Duration of Firm Load Shed	ERCOT: 7 hours, 24 minutes	3 hours	N/A	ERCOT: over 70 hours, SPP: over 4 hours MISO South: over 2 hours	TVA: 7 hours, DEC: 3 hours, DEP: 2 hours, LG&E/KU: 4 hours, DESC and Santee Cooper: 9, and 17 min., respectively

41 Total of entities' maximum load shed ordered, which occurred on December 23 and 24, 2022 at different times. Section III.B.3. of the report describes more details on the magnitudes and timeframes of firm load shed for each entity.

42 317 MW was initial level of firm load shed. Load shed levels were decreased over duration.

43 94.7 MW was initial magnitude of firm load shed. After 2 minutes, load shed levels were decreased over duration.

Figure 5: Similarities to Past Extreme Cold Weather Events

	2011 Event	2014 Event	2018 Event	2021 Event	2022 Event
Significant levels of incremental unplanned electric generating unit losses with top causes found to be mechanical/electrical, freezing, and fuel issues.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Significant natural gas production decreases occurred, with some areas of the country more severely affected.	✓			✓	✓
Short-range forecasts of peak electricity demands were less than actual demands for BAs in event area.	✓		✓	✓	✓
Significant natural gas LDC outages or near miss.	✓				✓

As demonstrated by Figure 4, above, the Event was the fifth in the past 11 years in which unplanned cold-weather-related generation outages jeopardized grid reliability, and the fourth that triggered the need for firm load shed. Twice in 11 years the reliability of natural gas delivery to homes and businesses has been jeopardized. These recurring failures make clear that America's natural gas infrastructure and electric grid continue to be severely challenged during extreme cold weather events, repeatedly jeopardizing reliability during life-threatening conditions, even when technology exists to protect the vulnerable components.[44] Multiple extreme cold weather event reports, including the 2021 Report issued less than two years ago, have detailed the same three primary causes of the unplanned generating outages: Freezing Issues; Fuel Issues; and Mechanical/Electrical issues which are correlated with temperature, increasing in number as temperatures fall.[45]

Multiple extreme cold weather event reports made recommendations aimed at preventing recurrence of these events, and some progress has been made.[46] But some key drivers of these events remain unaddressed, especially the freezing of natural gas infrastructure. As noted in the NAESB Gas-Electric Harmonization Forum Report ("NAESB Report"):

> "In the last two decades, natural gas' fuel share for power generation has doubled: today it represents almost 40 percent of total resources. Both sectors of the American energy system have become highly interdependent economically and technically: natural gas represents the largest fuel resource for power generation, while power generation is the largest consumer of natural gas."[47]

44 *See* 2011 Report at 206-208 (recommendations on specific freeze protection maintenance measures); note 119 (methods to protect natural gas infrastructure), 2021 Report at 194-95 (Key Recommendation 6) (same).

45 Appendix E of the Report updates the progress on the recommendations from the 2021 Report.

46 Freezing-related generating unit outages are recognized as a significant driver of these events. As discussed below, Reliability Standards requiring appropriate generator winterization are currently in development or soon to be in effect.

47 North American Energy Standards Board Gas Electric Harmonization Forum Report ("NAESB Report"), July 28, 2023, at 1. https://www.naesb.org/pdf4/geh_final_report_072823.pdf .

2014 Polar Vortex Event

On January 5 through 8, 2014, "the Midwest, South Central, and East Coast regions of North America experienced a weather condition known as a polar vortex, where extreme cold weather conditions occurred in lower latitudes than normal, resulting in temperatures 20 to 30 [degrees] below average. Some areas faced days that were 35 [degrees] or more below their average temperatures. These temperatures resulted in record high electrical demand for these areas on January 6 and again on January 7, 2014."[48] Demand for natural gas also increased, and significant amounts of natural gas-fired generating units were unavailable because they did not have natural gas.[49] "By properly and appropriately communicating through the NERC [EEA][50] process using interruptible load, demand-side management tools, and voltage reduction, only one BA was required to shed firm load. The amount shed was less than 300 MW, representing less than 0.1 percent of the total load for the Eastern and ERCOT Interconnections."[51] The "lower temperatures had a drastic impact on load, with many of the Reliability Coordinators [e.g., MISO, PJM, TVA, VACAR-South, and Southeastern RC] reporting record or near-record winter peak demands. PJM exceeded its historic winter peak on both January 7 and January 8, 2014, and MISO reported that [it] exceeded [its] historic winter peak for three straight days (January 6–8, 2014)."[52]


NERC staff reviewed and validated the Generating Availability Data Systems (GADS)[53] data covering the Polar Vortex event. Analysis of these data identified two principal causes of generating unit outages: curtailment or interruption of natural gas fuel supply and over 17,700 MW of lost generating capacity due to frozen equipment.[54] The majority of forced outages, 55 percent, were natural gas-fired generating units, although they only represented 40 percent of capacity in the Polar Vortex event area (Eastern and ERCOT Interconnections).[55] Although the Polar Vortex Review stated that "many generator outages" occurred as a result of entities exceeding the design basis of their plants, it did not quantify the percentage. The Review identified associations between temperature and increasing outages in most of the Regional Entity footprints.[56]

The Review's ten recommendations included the following: that the electric industry work with the gas industry "to allow generators to be able to secure firm supply and transportation at a reasonable rate;" to review and update generating units' weatherization plans; to implement periodic site reviews of generating units' winter preparedness; to reconsider forced outage rate assumptions in winter assessments, as well as assumptions about natural gas outage rates and heating oil replenishment; to limit planned outages during winter peak periods; to improve BAs' awareness of generating units' fuel status; to protect stored fuel against effects of cold weather; to review generating units' design basis and protect against outages that occur within design basis; and to prepare to apply for necessary environmental (or other) waivers during emergencies.

48 Polar Vortex Review at iii.
49 Id.
50 *See* note 21.
51 Polar Vortex Review at iii.
52 Polar Vortex Review at vii.
53 Generating Availability Data System (GADS) is a mandatory industry program for tracking information about outages of BES generating units. Generating Availability Data System (GADS) (nerc.com).
54 Polar Vortex Review at 2.
55 Polar Vortex Review at 13.
56 Polar Vortex Review at 4-12.


Figures 6a, 6b: Event Area Incremental Unplanned Generating Unit Outages, Derates and Failures to Start by Fuel Type: Percentages by Number of Outages, and Percentages by Unavailable MW[57]

FIGURE 6a



1,702 Generating Units 3,565 Outages/Derates

FIGURE 6b



1,702 Generating Units 3,565 Outages/Derates

57 Additional Figures of unplanned generation outages by other fuel types can be found in Appendix C: Additional Charts and Figures for Unplanned Generation Outages During Event.


C. Key Findings and Causes

From December 21 to 26, 2022, in the Event Area, a total of 1,702 individual generating units—47 percent natural gas-fired, 21 percent wind, 12 percent coal, 3 percent solar, 0.4 percent nuclear, 17 percent other (oil, hydroelectric and biomass)—experienced 3,565 outages, derates, or failures to start (see Figures 6a & 6b, below).

Ninety-six percent of all outages, derates, and failures to start were attributed to three causes: Freezing Issues (31 percent), Fuel Issues (24 percent) and Mechanical/Electrical Issues (41 percent). Of those outages, derates, and failures to start, 55 percent were caused by either Freezing Issues or Fuel Issues, as shown in Figure 7 below. Natural Gas Fuel Issues[58] (a subset, but the majority, of Fuel Issues) were 20 percent of all causes, and issues with other fuels were four percent.

In addition to the outages, derates, and failures to start caused by Freezing Issues, those caused by Mechanical/Electrical Issues also indicated a clear pattern related to cold temperatures—as temperatures decreased, the number of generating units experiencing an outage, derate or failure to start due to Mechanical/Electrical Issues increased.

Figure 7: Incremental Unplanned Generating Unit MW Outages, Derates and Failures to Start, Total Event Area: by Cause



Prior to the Event, Generator Owners had ample reminders, guidance and opportunities to prepare for the extreme cold weather, and most did have plans in place. For example, FERC and NERC had provided

58 Natural Gas Fuel Issues include the combined effects of decreased natural gas production; cold weather impacts and mechanical problems at production, gathering, processing and pipeline facilities resulting in gas quality issues and low pipeline pressure; supply and transportation interruptions; curtailments and failure to comply with contractual obligations. Additionally, it includes shippers' inability to procure natural gas due to tight supply, prohibitive, scarcity-induced market prices, or mismatches between the timing of the natural gas and energy markets.

multiple prior recommendations and follow-up activities regarding steps for winter preparedness.[59] In addition, Generator Owners received annual reminders via Regional Entity workshops to prepare for winter (which provide detailed suggestions for how to protect generating units from freezing). Yet, despite these reminders, guidance, and their own preparation, over 75 percent of the generating unit failures caused by Freezing Issues[60] occurred at temperatures above the units' documented operating temperatures.[61] Over 150 blackstart-designated generating units,[62] totaling 19,000 MW, incurred outages during the Event, 119 of which were natural-gas-fueled generating units (accounting for just under 75 percent of all MW of blackstart-designated generation outages).

During the Event, natural gas production experienced its greatest decline since 2021's Winter Storm Uri, in which Texas production dropped by 70 percent. The Marcellus Shale[63] and Utica Shale[64] formations (combined, the Appalachia Region, which produced more natural gas than any other U.S. region in 2022) production dropped by 23 to 54 percent during the Event.[65] Wellhead freeze-offs, other natural gas supply chain equipment freezing and weather-related poor road conditions that prevented necessary maintenance were the top causes.

59 For examples of other activities to publicize the need for, and how, generators can protect their units from cold weather, *see* FERC, NERC and Regional Entities Technical Conference: Improving Winter-readiness of Generating Units; NERC Alerts I and II Cold Weather Preparations for Extreme Weather Events; Cold Weather Preparations for Extreme Weather Events II; NERC annual webinars on preparation for cold weather (https://www.nerc.com/pa/rrm/Pages/Webinars.aspx); NERC Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement Program practice guide (questions for BAs, RCs, and other entities for understanding their cold weather preparedness risk mitigation) https://www.nerc.com/pa/comp/guidance/CMEPPracticeGuidesDL/CMEP%20Practice%20Guide%20-%20Cold%20Weather%20Preparedness.pdf.

60 Includes unplanned outages, derates, and failures to start caused by Freezing Issues. This analysis is limited to generating units that provided outage data, ambient temperature data, and data concerning that units' operating parameters. Not all GOs provided data for each of these data sources in a manner and format which the Team was able to analyze.

61 GOs were given options for documenting their generating units' temperature limits in their data responses: design temperature, historical operating temperature, or current cold weather performance temperature determined by an engineering analysis. Many GOs provided the Team with more than one of these temperatures; if so, the Team used the highest of the temperatures to calculate the 75 percent figure. Using one of the lower temperatures provided for all GOs would have yielded a higher figure. The Team will use the phrase "documented operating temperatures" to refer to these temperatures.

62 Blackstart ("blackstart") refers to restarting the power grid after a major portion of the electrical network has been de-energized, and generators that have blackstart capability are those that can be started independently and without external power. *See* NERC Glossary of Terms for NERC definition of Blackstart Resource, and NERC Reliability Standard EOP-005-3 – System Restoration from Blackstart Resources.

63 The Marcellus Shale formation spreads across Pennsylvania, New York, West Virginia, Maryland, Tennessee, Kentucky, Ohio, and Virginia.

64 The Utica Shale formation covers parts of Pennsylvania, New York, West Virginia, Maryland, Tennessee, Kentucky, Ohio, New York, and Canada.

65 "In 2022, the Appalachia region produced more natural gas than any other U.S. region, accounting for 29 [percent] of U.S. gross natural gas withdrawals." U.S. Energy Information Administration - EIA - Independent Statistics and Analysis

D. Recommendations

In response to the continued failures of generating units due to Freezing Issues, the Team[66] urges prompt development and implementation of the remaining revisions to the Reliability Standards recommended by Key Recommendation 1 from the 2021 Report to strengthen generators' ability to maintain extreme cold weather performance. Additionally, the Team suggests robust monitoring of the implementation of currently-effective and approved cold weather Reliability Standards to determine if reliability gaps exist. The Team includes several recommendations to prevent generating unit freeze issues, one targeted at those units that failed above their designated operating limits, and three applicable to all units. Another recommendation suggests that Generation Owners communicate changes in their operating limits to the BA in real time. The Team also recommends a technical review of the individual causes of cold-related mechanical/electrical generation outages to reduce the frequency of these outages and inform whether additional Standards are needed. Finally, the Team recommends another blackstart study, like the one currently being conducted for the ERCOT Interconnection in response to Recommendation 26 from the 2021 Report, but focusing on the Eastern and Western Interconnections.

In response to the natural gas production, processing and pipeline issues, the Team recommends that Congress and state legislatures (or state regulatory entities that have jurisdiction over natural gas infrastructure reliability) take action to establish reliability rules for natural gas infrastructure necessary to support the grid and natural gas LDCs in three areas: cold weather preparedness/freeze protection; regional natural gas situational awareness, coordination and information sharing (similar to the grid's Reliability Coordinators); and the designation of critical natural gas infrastructure (for prioritization during load shed).

The Team makes several recommendations concerning natural gas-electric coordination, including consideration of whether to require a one-time report to the Commission from FERC-jurisdictional natural gas entities describing how they are assessing and responding to their vulnerabilities to extreme cold weather; a NAESB effort to enhance situational awareness through communication during extreme cold weather events (both among natural gas infrastructure entities, and with grid entities); and a study to analyze whether additional natural gas infrastructure, including interstate pipelines and storage, is needed to support the reliability of the electric grid and meet the needs of natural gas LDCs.

Finally, the Team recommends several potential improvements for grid operations, including Balancing Authorities improving their short-term load forecasts for extreme cold weather periods by implementing and sharing effective practices with peers for continuous improvement; Balancing Authorities assessing whether new or modified processes such as multi-day risk assessment or reliability commitments are needed to mitigate the risk of capacity shortages or other reliability issues during extreme cold weather events; resource planners and entities serving load sponsoring joint-regional reliability assessments of electric grid conditions that could occur during extreme cold weather; and a study to examine potential Eastern Interconnection stability risks on December 23 and 24 during periods of decreased frequency and low responsive reserves.

66 *See* note 1 for definition of the Team.

II. EVENT OVERVIEW AND RELEVANT BACKGROUND INFORMATION

A. Event Overview: Both the Electric Grid and the Natural Gas Pipeline System Experienced a Supply Shortage Event, Leaving Some System Operators with No Choice but to Take the Extreme Step of Shedding or Curtailing Firm Customers in Order to Maintain System Reliability

Both the electric grid and the interstate natural gas pipeline system must account for situations where there is too little supply to maintain system reliability. Insufficient supply can create the risk of dangerously low voltage on the grid or pressure on the pipelines, respectively. This event was a supply shortage event for both the electric grid and the natural gas pipeline system.

During the Event, natural gas supply shortages began with freezing issues and weather-related access issues associated with production facilities and equipment, which rippled throughout the natural gas infrastructure system. Natural gas pipelines faced decreased supply flowing into the pipelines at the same time that shippers requested increased volumes of gas, with some shippers taking volumes of gas in excess of their entitlement. The reduced supply relative to higher volumes of delivered gas (a situation known as a draft condition) resulted in lower line pressures and reduced line pack. Pipeline system operators faced not only draft conditions but also freezing issues that affected important equipment like compressor stations. While they deployed line pack and storage, and dispatched personnel to respond to these conditions, most pipelines also needed to issue critical notices and Operational Flow Orders (OFOs), and some issued force majeures (which curtail even firm transportation).[67] Eventually pressures on some pipelines reached reliability-threatening levels. Con Edison, which provides local distribution of natural gas to over a million customers in Manhattan, The Bronx, and portions of Queens and Westchester County, New York, established an internal Gas System Emergency to preserve its system reliability due to rapidly decreasing pipeline pressures at its citygate that were not recovering. Had pipeline pressures not recovered, Con Edison could have faced an unprecedented loss of its entire system that, in this worst case scenario, would have taken months to restore, even with mutual assistance. WE Energies, a local gas distribution utility in Wisconsin, had to resort to consumer appeals to drop thermostats to 60 degrees on the night of December 23 when one of the interstate pipelines it relied upon experienced an unexpected compressor outage and curtailed natural gas flow to WE Energies by 30 percent.[68]

On the electric grid, natural gas production declines reduced the supply available for natural gas-fired generating units. Many natural gas-fired generating units either do not contract for firm gas supply or transportation, or contract for only a portion of the firm supply or transportation needed to meet their winter peak needs.[69] They are then unable to obtain natural gas when natural gas supply and available pipeline capacity become scarce-to-unobtainable in extreme cold weather. On top of the natural gas-related fuel outages, the grid experienced

67 *See* p. 76 for sidebar on pipeline communications for explanations of these terms.

68 Karl Ebert, "*On a bitter cold night, We Energies begged customers to turn down their thermostats. How close did the natural gas supply system come to failure?*" Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, (Jan. 20, 2023), https://www.jsonline.com/story/money/business/energy/2023/01/20/what-caused-we-energies-natural-gas-crisis-on-dec-23/69785899007/.

69 *See* Figure 85 for contractual arrangements held by some of the GOs/GOPs in the Event.

generating unit outages, derates and failures to start due to Freezing Issues and Mechanical/Electrical Issues that were closely correlated with falling temperatures. Total unplanned coincident generating unit outages, derates and failures to start during the Event exceeded 90,000 MW, the most ever observed compared to other extreme cold weather events that impacted the U.S.

While interstate pipeline and electric grid operators used every tool (e.g., EEA 1 or 2 for the grid, OFOs for pipelines) to avoid disruptions in service, some operators were forced to make difficult decisions such as curtailing firm natural gas customers or shedding firm electricity customers, to allow the system to recover from reliability-threatening conditions rather than deteriorate into an uncontrolled loss of an entire pipeline or the electric grid.

The coldest areas in Winter Storm Elliott did not deviate from normal lows as much as the coldest areas in 2021's Winter Storm Uri (comparing the NOAA-produced graphics of deviation from normal lows). In Uri, the coldest areas were between 40 and 50 degrees below the normal low, while in Elliott the coldest areas, on the peaks of the Appalachian Mountains, were between 30 and 35 degrees below the normal low. However, temperature alone is not the only factor in determining the extent to which extreme cold weather will wreak havoc on generating units and natural gas infrastructure. Wind and precipitation exacerbate the effects of temperature.[70] In the Event, TVA noted that rain followed by extreme cold weather and wind created an environment that was beyond the design basis of some TVA generating sites. Freezing rain can coat wind turbine blades, rendering them out of service until the icing is removed, while snow causes the largest performance drops at solar facilities.[71] Rain can also soak insulation, limiting or eliminating its ability to protect against cold. Another factor, which played a strong role in the Event, is how quickly the winter temperatures dropped. An extremely rapid drop (for example, temperatures in Charleston, West Virginia, ranged from 45 degrees at 2:43 a.m. to 3 degrees[72] at 8:43 a.m., a drop of 42 degrees in six hours), increases system load as it challenges the ability of home heating systems to maintain consistent temperatures.

The Event had the largest footprint of any examined in a joint FERC-NERC-Regional Entity inquiry. As shown in Figure 8, below, the extreme cold weather covered most of the eastern half of the lower 48 United States, except for some of Florida. The Team focused on affected entities that either shed firm load or lost larger percentages of their generating unit capacity. All were located within the Eastern Interconnection and had multiple tie lines to other entities within the Eastern Interconnection.

Entities that were more severely affected (Core Entities)[73] included PJM, (represented by the blue box below in Figure 9); TVA and LG&E/KU BAs, within TVA's Reliability Coordinator footprint (represented by red and white striped boxes); Southern (represented by an aqua box); and DEP, DEC/VACAR-South RC, DESC and Santee Cooper, represented by pink boxes). Within the Event Area, the Team also examined MISO, SPP, ISO New England and NYISO (collectively represented by gold boxes) to better understand how their generating unit outages and flows exchanged with Core Entities impacted Event outcomes.

70 The effects of a lower dry bulb temperature is equivalent to those of a higher dry bulb temperature with high winds or associated precipitation.

71 Nicole D. Jackson & Thushara Gunda, Evaluation of extreme weather impacts on utility-scale photovoltaic plant performance in the United States, 302, Applied Energy, 1:7 (2021) Sandia National Labs.

72 The Report includes temperature references only in Fahrenheit.

73 See note 35 for definition of Core Event Area, which includes definition of Core Entities.

B. Background on Affected Systems and Entities

1. RELIABILITY ROLES


NERC categorizes the entities responsible for planning and operating the BES in a reliable manner into multiple categories of functional entity types. The NERC roles most relevant to the Event are Reliability Coordinators (RCs), Balancing Authorities (BAs), Generator Owners (GOs), Generator Operators (GOPs), Transmission Owners (TOs), Transmission Operators (TOPs), Planning Authority/Planning Coordinators (PA/PCs), and Transmission Planners (TPs). Several of the Core Entities (also referred to as "Core BAs"), especially PJM, TVA, Southern, DEC/VACAR-South RC, and DESC, served multiple reliability roles during the Event.

2. INTERCONNECTIONS BETWEEN AFFECTED ENTITIES AND OTHER PARTS OF THE ELECTRIC GRID

In North America, there are four separate power grids or "interconnections." The Eastern interconnection includes the eastern two-thirds of the continental United States and Canada from Saskatchewan east to the Maritime Provinces (see Figure 10, below), and is electrically independent from the other interconnections.

The Eastern Interconnection is the largest of the four interconnections, and by itself has been called the largest machine in the world.[74] The Eastern Interconnection is electrically connected to the Western, ERCOT and Quebec Interconnections by means of Direct Current (DC) asynchronous transmission tie lines.[75] Within each interconnection, power generally flows without barriers (subject to operational limits) from one utility's system to another across the entire grid via alternating current (AC) tie lines. A significant enough imbalance of generation and demand can cause instability of one utility's system to affect the stability of all utility systems operating in that interconnection.[76]

Figure 8: Extreme Cold Weather Conditions – December 24, 2022




74 "Multi Dimensional Issues in International Electric Power Grid Interconnections," 15 (2006), https://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/publications/energy/interconnections.pdf.

75 For DC transmission lines, the flow of power is controlled (i.e., scheduled), rather than flowing continuously as on synchronous ties.

76 *See* generally, U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force, Final Report on the August 14, 2003 Blackout in the United States and Canada: Causes and Recommendations, 5-10 (April 2004), https://www.ferc.gov/sites/default/files/2020-05/ch1-3_0.pdf.

Figure 9: Bulk Electric System Map of Affected Entities



3. DESCRIPTION OF U.S. BES ENTITIES IN THE EASTERN INTERCONNECTION AFFECTED BY WINTER STORM ELLIOTT

a. PJM and other RTOs/ISOs in the Eastern Interconnection[77]

PJM (Core Entity). PJM is a regional transmission organization (RTO) covering 13 states (Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia)[78] and Washington, DC for a total of 368,906 square miles.[79] PJM is NERC-registered as a BA, RC, PA/PC, and TOP, and in the latter capacity, operates 88,115 miles of transmission lines.[80] It monitors over 1,400 generating units. In 2022, PJM obtained energy from 40 percent gas generation, 20 percent coal, 32.3 percent nuclear, 1.9 percent hydroelectric, 3.7 percent wind, and 2.2 percent other (all calculated on a MWh basis). Its total installed capacity at the end of December 2022 was 183,385 MW.[81] PJM has historically been a summer-peaking region, and its all-time peak load was 165,563 MW during the summer of 2006. PJM operates an energy and ancillary services market that includes both day-ahead and real-time markets.

MISO. MISO is an RTO that operates the grid across 15 states and the Canadian province of Manitoba, and

77 While both New York ISO (NYISO) and ISO-NE incurred significant distribution power outages from Winter Storm Elliott, both experienced less-severe BES impacts during the Event. These ISOs are discussed in Section III of the Report.

78 https://www.pjm.com/about-pjm/who-we-are.

79 https://www.pjm.com/about-pjm, https://services.pjm.com/annualreport2022/.

80 https://learn.pjm.com/-/media/about-pjm/newsroom/fact-sheets/pjm-at-a-glance.ashx.

81 http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/PJM_State_of_the_Market/2022/2022-som-pjm-press-briefing.pdf.

serves as a BA and RC, among other reliability roles.[82] MISO operates 75,000 miles of transmission lines, is a summer-peaking region, and experienced its highest peak load to date, 130,917 MW, on July 20, 2011. MISO's generating capacity is 198,933 MW, comprised of 42 percent natural gas-fired generation, 29 percent coal, 19 percent renewables and eight percent nuclear generation. Currently, MISO operates one of the largest energy and operating reserve markets, with annual gross transactions of $22 billion, as well as an ancillary services market, and includes both day-ahead and real-time markets.

SPP. SPP is an RTO and serves as a BA and RC, among other reliability roles. It operates a 552,885-square-mile area that includes all or portions of 14 states, including: Arkansas, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas and Wyoming.[83] SPP operates 70,025 miles of transmission lines. It is a summer-peaking region and although it experienced its highest peak load of 56,184 MW on August 21, 2023, it experienced a new all-time winter peak load of 47,157 MW during Winter Storm Elliott. SPP's generating fleet is 38.5 percent (nameplate) natural gas, 29 percent wind, and 24.3 percent coal. However, coal accounts for the majority of the generated energy with 38.6 percent of the total, while wind and natural gas produce about 29.5 percent and 22.7 percent respectively.[84] SPP operates an energy and ancillary services market that includes both day-ahead and real-time markets.

b. Grid Operators in the Southeast U.S.

TVA (Core Entity). TVA is a federally-owned electric utility corporation, the largest public power provider in the U.S., and serves as a BA, RC, GO, GOP, TO and TOP, among others. TVA's service area covers most of Tennessee, portions of Alabama, Mississippi, and Kentucky, and small areas of Georgia, North Carolina and Virginia. TVA owns and operates approximately 16,200 miles of transmission lines and serves 12 million customers. TVA's generation fleet consists of 33 percent natural gas, 39 percent nuclear, 14 percent coal, 10 percent hydro, and four percent wind and solar. TVA is a dual (both summer and winter) peaking region and set a new record winter peak of 33,425 MW during the Event on December 23, 2022.

LG&E/KU (Core Entity). LG&E and KU are subsidiaries of PPL Corporation. They are regulated public utilities that serve more than 1 million electric customers combined. LG&E/KU operate their combined transmission systems as a joint BA Area, PC Area, and TOP Area. LG&E/KU are also registered as a GO, GOP, TSP, TP, and TO. TVA serves as LG&E/KU's RC. LG&E serves approximately 333,000 natural gas and 429,000 electric customers in Louisville and 16 surrounding counties.[85] KU serves approximately 566,000 electric customers in 77 Kentucky counties and five counties in Virginia operating as Old Dominion Power Company.[86] Together, the companies own approximately 5,400 miles of electric transmission lines.[87] Their combined generation fleet includes 37.5 percent natural gas, 59.6 percent coal, and 2.9 percent hydro and other. LG&E/KU is dual peaking, and its all-time winter peak BA load was 7,336 MW on January 6, 2014.

DEP and DEC (both Core Entities). DEP and DEC are subsidiaries of Duke Energy. DEP operates as a BA, GO, GOP, PA/PC, TO, and TOP. DEC is the agent for the VACAR-South RC, and operates as a BA, GO, GOP, PA/PC, TO, and TOP.[88] DEP has 16,390 megawatts of generation

82 MISO Corporate Fact Sheet, https://www.misoenergy.org/about/media-center/corporate-fact-sheet/.
83 SPP Fact Sheet https://www.spp.org/about-us/fast-facts/.
84 *Id.*
85 About LG&E and KU | LG&E and KU (lge-ku.com); https://lgeku.com/investments#:~:text=The%20same%20type%20of%20detailed,gas%20storage%20fields%20that%20enable .
86 https://lge-ku.com/about.
87 https://lge-ku.com/about.
88 https://www.nerc.com/comm/OC/Operating%20Reliability%20Subcommittee%20ORS%202013/ORS_Presentation_Nov_6-7_2019.pdf pg 15

capacity within its footprint, 1.7 million residential, commercial and industrial electricity customers across a 29,000-square-mile service area in North Carolina and South Carolina, and operates 6,300 miles of transmission lines. Generation within its footprint includes 38.1 percent natural gas, 19.4 percent coal, 22.8 percent nuclear, 1.5 percent hydro and other. DEC has 25,848 megawatts of generation capacity within its footprint (34.2 percent natural gas, 23.7 percent coal, 28.5 percent nuclear, 13.2 percent hydro and other), 2.8 million residential, commercial and industrial electricity customers across a 24,000-square-mile service area in North Carolina and South Carolina,[89] and operates 13,000 miles of transmission lines. DEP's and DEC's record winter peak loads were 15,569 MW and 21,620 MW, respectively.


DESC (Core Entity). DESC (formerly known as South Carolina Electric & Gas Company) is a vertically integrated electric utility for the central, southern, and southwestern portions of South Carolina. DESC serves as a BA, GO, GOP, PA/PC, TO, and TOP. VACAR-South is its RC. DESC also purchases and distributes natural gas.[90] DESC's generating fleet is 40 percent natural gas,[91] 25 percent coal, 14 percent solar,[92] and 9 percent nuclear energy for a total net winter capacity of 6,821 MW. DESC is dual peaking, and its record winter peak load was 4,970 MW.

Santee Cooper (Core Entity). Santee Cooper (shown as "SC PSA" in Figures 1 and 9 above) is South Carolina's state-owned electric utility. It provides power to approximately two million people,[93] and operates as a BA, GO, GOP, PA/PC, TO, and TOP. VACAR-South is its RC. Santee Cooper sells electricity to Central Electric Power Cooperative, a wholesale power provider, which in turn provides power to South Carolina's 20 electric cooperatives.[94] It also provides power to the cities of Bamber and Georgetown, 27 large industrial customers including Joint Base Charleston, the Alabama Municipal Electric Authority, and the 10 member cities that form the Piedmont Municipal Power Agency.[95] Santee Cooper schedules power over 5,223 miles of transmission lines.[96] Its generation consists of 66.5 percent coal, 22.0 percent natural gas, 6.1 percent nuclear, 2.7 percent hydro, and 2.8 percent other. Santee Cooper is a winter-peaking region, and its highest winter peak demand was 5,342 MW in 2022.

Southern (Core Entity). Southern provides energy to nine million customers through its family of companies, including Alabama Power, Southern Power, Georgia Power, and Mississippi Power.[97] Southern also serves as a BA, PA/PC, and TOP, among others, and its RC is Southeastern RC.[98] Southern has electric operating companies in three states and natural gas distribution companies in four.[99] The Southern BA Area had 57,895 MW of projected generating capacity prior to Winter Storm Elliott and more than 27,000 miles of transmission lines.[100] The Southern BA Area generating fleet consisted of 53.5 percent natural gas, 20.3 percent coal, 11.5 percent nuclear, 8.7 percent hydro, 5.3 percent solar and wind, and 0.7 percent other. The Southern BA footprint is

89 https://p-cd.duke-energy.com/-/media/pdfs/our-company/duke-energy-fast-facts.pdf?rev=77d14a34d96f449493f89595285d4d57.
90 https://www.dominionenergy.com/projects-and-facilities/natural-gas-facilities/south-carolina-natural-plants.
91 Thirty of the 40 percent of DESC's natural gas generating fleet is dual fuel.
92 According to DESC, "Most of the time, DESC gets close to zero percent solar at time of morning winter peak loads since they occur before the sun rises."
93 https://www.santeecooper.com/about/.
94 https://www.flipsnack.com/santeecooper/fingertip-facts-2022/full-view.html.
95 https://www.flipsnack.com/santeecooper/fingertip-facts-2022/full-view.html.
96 https://www.flipsnack.com/santeecooper/fingertip-facts-2022/full-view.html.
97 https://www.southerncompany.com/about/our-companies.html#:~:text=We%20support%209%20million%20customers,wireless%20communications%20across%20the%20country.
98 SERC recognizes Southern Company Services as the Reliability Coordinator for the Southeastern RC area.
99 https://www.southerncompany.com/about/our-companies.html#:~:text=We%20support%209%20million%20customers,wireless%20communications%20across%20the%20country.
100 https://www.southerncompany.com/about/our-business.html#:~:text=Southern%20Company%20operations%20has%20responsibility,a%20safe%20and%20reliable%20grid.

Figure 10: Electric Interconnections Map



generally dual peaking (summer and winter), with its all-time peak load being 48,008 MW.[101] Southern set a new December peak record during the Event of 45,153 MW on December 24.[102]

Figure 11, below, lists the capacity of BES generation resources for the Core Entities by fuel type, at the time of the Event. Natural gas-fueled generation comprised the largest percentage (41.90 percent) of generation across the core entities, followed by coal-fired generation at 24.19 percent. Renewable BES generation capacity was relatively low (1.94 percent solar and 1.12 percent wind, respectively) in the Core Event Area.

101 https://www.southerncompany.com/content/dam/southerncompany/sustainability/pdfs/2022-Year-in-Review.pdf.

102 https://www.southerncompany.com/content/dam/southerncompany/sustainability/pdfs/2022-Year-in-Review.pdf. For the Southern Company BA area, its all-time winter peak load was 45,887 MW.

Figure 11: Total Installed Net Capacity of BES Generation Resources Located within Core Entity Footprints During Event, and Resource Fuel Type Composition for Combined Core Entity Footprints

Core Entity Footprint	Capacity
	(MW)
DEC	25,848
DEP	16,390
DESC	6,821
LG&E/KU	7,973
PJM	186,270
Santee Cooper	5,237
Southern	57,895
TVA	36,456
TOTAL MW	**342,890**

Fuel Type	Combined Core Entity Footprints	
	(MW)	(Percent)
Coal	82,954	24.19%
Hydro*	34,455	10.05 %
Natural Gas	143,658	**41.90 %**
Nuclear	59,963	17.49 %
Solar	6,653	1.94 %
Wind	3,857	1.12 %
Other	11,350	3.31 %
TOTAL MW	**342,890**	**100%**

*Includes Pumped Storage

c. Tie Lines Between Entities

The affected entities, each operating as BAs, have AC transmission tie lines which connect one BA to another, and enable power transfers to be routinely scheduled between them (resulting in power imports and exports) when generation reserves in the exporting BA and available transmission capacity are sufficient to accommodate the power transfers. All BAs in the Eastern Interconnection have multiple tie lines connecting them to neighboring BAs (BAs that are directly connected via tie lines are often referred to as "adjacent BAs").

In general, there is an extensive network of transmission tie lines between the Core BAs in the Eastern Interconnection, which under normal conditions allow for significant imports and exports among them. Figure 12, below shows the number of tie lines, by voltage level, between the Core BAs. ISO-NE, NYISO, MISO, and SPP also have tie lines with Canadian BES BAs (not shown on Figure 12).

Figure 12: Total Number of AC Transmission Tie lines, Number of Tie Lines between Adjacent Core BAs, and with other BAs Affected by Elliott, by Voltage Level

	DEC			DEP			DESC			LG&E/KU			PJM			Santee Cooper			Southern			TVA		
Totals:	29			41			31			85			201			35			55			61		
Voltage Level	DEC - DESC	DEC - PJM	DEC - Santee Cooper	DEC - Southern	DEP - DEC	DEP - PJM	DEP - DESC	DEP - Santee Cooper	DESC - Santee Cooper	DESC - Southern	LG&E/KU - MISO	LG&E/KU - PJM	PJM - MISO	PJM - NYISO	Santee Cooper - Southern	Southern - Florida BAs	Southern - MISO	TVA - LG&E\KU	TVA - MISO	TVA - PJM	TVA - Southern	TVA - DEC	TVA - DEP	TVA - AECI
<100 kV	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	1	33	4	7	---	2	0	2	1	1	---	---	---	---
100 to 150 kV	2	1	---	---	3	4	1	2	10	3	7	17	33	6	---	12	1	---	1	2	1	---	---	---
150 to 300 kV	2	---	4	---	11	7	2	8	9	2	5	6	---	4	2	10	7	4	15	7	7	2	1	1
300 kV and Higher	---	1	---	1	1	1	---	---	---	---	7	2	51	11	---	2	1	1	7	3	4	1	---	---
TOTAL	4	2	4	1	15	12	3	10	19	5	20	58	88	28	2	26	9	7	24	13	12	3	1	1

C. Background on Preparation for 2022-2023 Winter Peak Operations

1. SEASONAL PROJECTIONS AND ASSESSMENTS BY AFFECTED GRID ENTITIES

In general, BAs and RCs (which included both RTO and non-RTO entities) performed 2022-2023 winter season demand forecasts and projections of adequacy for both generation resources and transmission performance for their respective footprints.

a. Season Peak Load Forecasts

Figure 13, below, provides a summary of peak load forecasts that were made by the Core BAs in advance of the 2022-2023 winter season (typically developed by entities during the third calendar quarter in advance of the subsequent winter). Figure 13 compares the forecast peak loads against the actual peak loads that occurred within each Core BA footprint during the Event (as well as, where available, against the estimated peak if firm load shed or demand response had not reduced the actual peak load).

Figure 13: Winter 2022-2023 Season BA Peak Load Forecasts and Actual Hourly Winter Peak Loads for the Core Event Area (in MW)

		DEC	DEP	DESC	LG&E/KU	PJM	Santee Cooper	Southern	TVA
Previous All-Time Hourly Winter Peak		21,620	15,569	4,970	7,336	143,225	5,869*	45,887	33,352
Date of Occurrence		01/05/18	02/20/15	02/20/15	01/06/14	02/20/15	02/20/15	01/07/14	01/24/14
Winter 2022-2023 50/50 Forecast		20,246	14,454	4,169	6,453	132,980	5,481	41,300	30,295
Winter 2022-2023 90/10 Forecast		22,147	16,911	4,726	7,051	143,782	6,000	45,462	34,363
December 2022 Actual Hourly Peak		20,568	13,819	4,678	6,891	134,189	5,342	45,153	33,427
Date		12/24/22	12/24/22	12/24/22	12/23/22	12/23/22	12/24/24	12/24/22	12/23/22
December 2022 Estimated Peak without Load Management		21,800	14,800	N/A	6,986	134,951	5,900	46,000	35,000
Percent 2022 Actual Peak was Above Forecasts:	50/50	1.59%	-4.39%	12.21%	6.79%	0.91%	-2.54%	9.33%	10.34%
	90/10	-7.13%	-18.28%	-1.02%	-2.27%	-6.67%	-10.97%	-0.68%	-2.72%
Percent 2022 Estimated Peak was Above Forecasts:	50/50	7.68%	2.39%	N/A	8.26%	1.48%	7.64%	11.38%	15.53%
	90/10	-1.57%	-12.48%	N/A	-0.92%	-6.14%	-1.67%	1.18%	1.85%

(a) DEC, DEP values listed for 90/10 forecasts were projected super peak loads, included "Super Peak" study as part of DEP and DEC winter 2022-2023 season transmission capability assessment. Super Peak values range from 9 (DEC) to 17 percent (DEP) to 17 percent (DEP) above 50/50 forecasts.

(b) DESC developed monthly 50/50 and extreme weather demand risk peak values. Jan-2023 forecasts were 50/50, 4,902 MW; extreme, 5,459 MW.

(c) PJM: previous All-Time Hourly Winter Peak value accounts for allocated 500 kV transmission losses. Winter 2022-2023 50/50 Forecast value represents the coincident peak 50/50 forecast and accounts for allocated 500 kV transmission losses (PJM uses the non-coincident peak 50/50 forecast (136,867 MW for Winter 2022-2023, not listed above) in its Operations Assessment Task Force seasonal studies). Winter 2022-2023 90/10 Forecastvalue accounts for allocated 500 kV transmission losses. 2022 Actual Hourly Peak and Estimated Hourly Peak without Load Management values account for allocated 500 kV transmission losses, and differ from peaks PJM reported elese where (135, 296) MW for actual and 136,010 MW for estimated peak w/o load management) due to a slight difference in the way load is defined for the long-term and short-term forecasting applications.

(d) *Santee Cooper 2015 / previous all-time winter peak load included load that is no longer served by Santee Cooper.

(e) Southern developed an extreme peak value based on statistical analysis.

Most of the BAs' actual winter peak loads during Winter Storm Elliott's extreme cold weather fell between their winter 2022-2023 50/50 and their 90/10 (or extreme forecast) winter season forecast peak loads.[103] A few BAs, such as TVA and Southern, would have exceeded both their 50/50 and 90/10 forecast peaks had they not implemented load management (Southern) or firm load reduction (TVA). Both BAs commented that winter peak load conditions do not exhibit a saturation point like summer peak air-conditioning-driven loads do, because electric heating (auxiliary backup heating for heat pumps, electric strip heating and electric space heaters) increases winter peak load in a non-linear manner as temperatures decrease.[104]

b. Capacity/Resource Reserves Projections

The Core BAs performed seasonal resource assessments in advance of the 2022/2023 winter to determine available generation reserves during winter peak conditions. The assessments included forecast peak loads, generation capacity, and projected reserves. Most of the Core BAs performed their respective winter season assessments assuming a 50/50 load forecast, although LG&E/KU's winter assessment assumed a 90/10 load forecast.[105] The paragraphs below summarize each BA's respective assessment.

Figure 14, below, depicts the winter 2022-2023 seasonal resource assessments for the Core BAs to meet their respective 50/50 and 90/10 forecast peak loads.

Figure 14: 2022-2023 Winter Season Resource Assessment Reserve Margins - Core BAs

		Without Demand Response		With Demand Response	
Balancing Authority	**NERC Region/Area**	50/50 Forecast Winter Peak Load (Percent)	90/10 Forecast Winter Peak Load (Percent)	50/50 Forecast Winter Peak Load (Percent)	90/10 Forecast Winter Peak Load (Percent)
DEC	SERC East	21.1	10.7	23.5	12.9
DEP	SERC East	9.0	-6.8	10.6	-5.5

103 A 50/50 peak load forecast is based on a 50 percent chance that the actual system peak load will exceed the forecast value, while a 90/10 peak load forecast is based on a 10 percent chance that the actual system peak load will exceed the forecast value.

104 *See* Recommendation 16 and Figure 108 from the 2021 Report, which shows how home heating demand due to electric auxiliary heating increases from two to four times once temperatures drop below 14 degrees (as compared to the demand at 32 degrees).

105 For more about how BAs conduct these assessments, *see* page 30 of the 2021 Report.

		Without Demand Response		With Demand Response	
Balancing Authority	**NERC Region/Area**	50/50 Forecast Winter Peak Load (Percent)	90/10 Forecast Winter Peak Load (Percent)	50/50 Forecast Winter Peak Load (Percent)	90/10 Forecast Winter Peak Load (Percent)
DESC	SERC East	18.7	6.6	23.5	10.9
LG&E/KU	SERC Central	15.1	5.4	15.1	5.4
PJM	RF/PJM	14.9	9.4	20.5	14.7
Santee Cooper	SERC East	-4.1	-12.4	7.3	-2.0
Southern	SERC Southeast	30.2	18.3	30.2	18.3
TVA	SERC Central	9.2	-3.7	14.6	1.0

DESC. DESC performed a Winter 2022/2023 resource assessment assuming a 50/50 load forecast. Based on its winter assessment, DESC believed that it could meet its projected winter peak demand of 4,902 MW with available generation and imports (based on normal weather conditions). DESC's extreme winter forecast[106] was 5,459 MW, higher than its previous all-time winter peak demand record of 4,970 MW, set in 2015. To meet that extreme peak demand, DESC projected a seasonal resource capacity of 5,819 MW, once 1,147 MW of planned and forced outages were deducted from available resources. This resulted in estimated reserves of 917 MW assuming the 50/50 load forecast and 360 MW for an extreme weather demand risk scenario.

Duke/DEC and DEP. Based on its winter resource reserves projection, Duke believed that it could meet its projected winter peak demand of 20,246 MW for DEC and 14,454 MW for DEP, for a combined load of 34,700 MW, with available generation and imports (based on normal weather conditions). To meet the projected winter demand, DEC projected a resource capacity of 24,510 MW, once 1,338 MW of planned and forced outages were deducted from available resources. DEP projected a resource capacity of 15,754 MW, once 636 MW of planned and forced outages were deducted from available resources. Duke assumed a forced outage rate of 2.5 percent based on recent historical performance. Duke adjusts reserves by third party imports/exports, projected demand response and units in extended reserve shutdown. This resulted in estimated reserves of 2,246 MW for DEC and 1,648 MW for DEP for the 50/50 load forecast.[107]

Duke's extreme winter forecast was 22,147 MW for DEC and 16,911 MW for DEP (39,058 MW combined), which was higher than its previous all-time winter peak demand record of 21,620 MW, set on January 5, 2018 for DEC and 15,569 MW, set on February 20, 2015 for DEP. Duke performed this super peak study to determine potential transfer capability limitations. The DEC transmission system would be capable of serving load of 24,457 MW before seeing any significant issues. The DEP transmission system would be capable of serving load of 17,491 MW before seeing any significant issues.

Santee Cooper. Santee Cooper performed a Winter 2022/2023 resource assessment assuming a 50/50 load forecast. Santee Cooper's winter load forecast is prepared using 20 years of monthly peak demand and energy usage each year around April. This forecast is composed of several component forecasts, including forecasts for different customer classes. Based on its winter

106 DESC uses a statistical regression technique to quantify an extreme winter weather demand level, based on its historically coldest winter days.

107 DEC and DEP also explained that there are no additional sub-areas, regions, or load pockets within the DEC and DEP BA areas where reserves are monitored to ensure sufficient resource reserves and/or deliverability of reserves for the regions or sub-areas.

assessment, Santee Cooper believed that it could meet its projected winter peak demand of 5,481 MW with available generation and imports (based on normal weather conditions).[108] Santee Cooper's extreme (i.e., 90/10) winter forecast was 6,000 MW, slightly higher than its previous all-time winter peak demand record of 5,869 MW, set on February 20, 2015.[109] To meet that extreme peak demand, Santee Cooper projected resource capacity of 5,237 MW and 626 MW of demand response. Without demand response, Santee Cooper projected a resource deficiency of up to 743 MW to meet its extreme load forecast of 6,000 MW. Santee Cooper relied on the Carolinas Reserve Sharing Group to recover from typical single-contingency outages of generating units and relied on import power purchases as needed for other scenarios such as multi-unit outage conditions.

LG&E/KU. LG&E/KU performed its Winter 2022/2023 resource assessment using the 90/10 load forecasts provided by the four load-serving entities in the LG&E/KU BA area: (1) LG&E/KU; (2) Owensboro Municipal Utilities; (3) Kentucky Municipal Power Agency; and (4) Kentucky Municipal Energy Agency. Although LG&E/KU used the 90/10 load forecast for their winter assessment, LG&E/KU also performed a 50/50 load forecast using the forecasts provided by the four load-serving entities (LSEs) in the BA area.[110] Based on the winter assessment, LG&E/KU believed that it could meet its projected winter peak demand of 6,453 MW with available generation and imports (based on normal weather conditions). LG&E/KU's extreme winter forecast demand was 7,051 MW. To meet that extreme peak demand, LG&E/KU projected resource capacity of 7,430 MW, assuming a 3.66 percent forced outage rate for coal units and 6.36 percent forced outage rate for natural gas units. LG&E/KU's assessment also considered multiple contingencies (e.g., analysis required in Reliability Standard TPL-001-5.1). This resulted in estimated reserves of 977 MW assuming the 50/50 load forecast and 379 MW for the 90/10 extreme load scenario.

TVA. TVA performed a Winter 2022/2023 resource assessment assuming a 50/50 load forecast. TVA uses 24 hourly regression models trained over the prior three years to estimate response of load to temperature (i.e., the corresponding MW increase from a one-degree increase or decrease of temperature). TVA's models use calendar factor variables (e.g., holidays, day of week, month, and year), seasonal weighted aggregate dry bulb temperatures based on the five largest cities in the TVA region,[111] and a 72-hour weighted average of the dry bulb temperature, where the more recent observations are more heavily weighted to estimate the impacts of thermal buildup. TVA uses these models to estimate load for its hourly temperature history (going back to 1960) as if the load had occurred with the current system size, in order to ensure a wide sample of load and temperature values. TVA uses the estimated loads to build a probability distribution to mitigate issues with a regression model. The models assume that the most extreme winter weather will occur in January and assume that the prior three years of hourly temperatures approximate current temperature response.

Based on its winter assessment, TVA believed that it could meet its projected winter peak demand of 30,295 MW with available generation and imports (based on normal weather conditions). TVA's extreme winter forecast was 34,363 MW, slightly higher than its previous all-time winter peak demand record of 33,352 MW, set on January 24, 2014. To meet that extreme peak demand, TVA projected resource capacity of 33,079 MW, once 577 MW of planned and 2,800 MW of unplanned outages were deducted from available resources. This resulted in estimated reserves of 2,784 MW for the 50/50 load forecast and 1,284 MW deficiency for the 90/10 extreme load scenario.


108 Based on its 50/50 forecast reserve margin without demand response, magnitude of imports to meet load and maintain operating reserves without deployment of demand response would have been in the range of 350-400 MW.

109 A portion of the load Santee Cooper was serving on February 20, 2015 is no longer served by Santee Cooper.

110 According to LG&E/KU, "[t]he [LG&E/KU] LSE forecasts the 50/50 winter peak load using the average temperature on the peak day over the last 20 years. To assess generation reliability and develop extreme weather load scenarios, the [LG&E/KU] LSE develops hourly demand forecasts based on the actual weather in each year since 1973. Degree days are the primary variable used to develop these forecasts."

111 I.e., Huntsville, Alabama; Memphis, Tennessee; Nashville, Tennessee; Chattanooga, Tennessee; and Knoxville, Tennessee.

Figure 15: PJM's Winter 2022-2023 Capacity Projections



However, TVA projected approximately 1,626 MW of load management available to respond to additional unplanned resource outages.

Southern. The Southern BA performed a winter 2022/2023 resource assessment assuming a 50/50 load forecast. Based on its winter assessment, the Southern BA believed that it could meet its projected winter peak demand of 41,300 MW with available generation and imports (based on normal weather conditions). The Southern BA's extreme winter forecast was 45,462 MW, slightly lower than its previous all-time winter peak demand record of 45,887 MW, which was set on January 7, 2014. To meet that extreme peak demand, Southern projected resource capacity of 53,759 MW, once 4,136 MW of planned and forced outages were deducted from available resources. This resulted in estimated reserves of 12,459 MW assuming the 50/50 load forecast and 8,297 MW for the 90/10 extreme load scenario. Southern BA also projected approximately 2,510 MW of load management available to respond to additional unplanned resource outages.

For assessing transmission system performance for the upcoming winter season, SERC (members include DESC, DEC, DEP, Santee Cooper, LG&E/KU, TVA, and Southern) conducted a 2022-2023 winter reliability study. The assessment studied an N-1 contingency analysis on the initial base case to determine whether there was adequate transmission for the upcoming winter season. SERC members also studied an "extreme weather" scenario under which a 12 GW power transfer was simulated from PJM to MISO South. A third study simulated what was termed as a "colder-than-normal" transfer case, which increased all generation in the SERC region that was online with available capacity and scaled the loads up in one subregion at a time, evaluating transmission adequacy given higher subregional demands that were 10 percent or higher above 50/50 forecasted levels. Overall, the above three studies did not show any transmission adequacy issues in the SERC subregions for the 2022-2023 winter season, and showed that potential thermal overloads identified in the studies could be mitigated with available operating guides or other mitigation strategies.

PJM. PJM performed a Winter 2022/2023 seasonal assessment assuming a 50/50 load forecast. PJM used power flow cases that simulated the expected system conditions for the 2022/2023 winter peak load period. For the PJM non-coincident load case, each transmission zone is set to its individual respective winter 50/50 peak load forecast value, without a reduction for load diversity and without considering any demand response resources that may be available. PJM also performed several sensitivity studies using the 50/50 non-coincident load case. Finally,

PJM calculated projected reactive interface transfer limits[112] for various interfaces.

As shown in Figure 15,[113] based on its winter assessment, PJM believed that it could meet its projected 50/50 winter peak demand of 136,867 MW with available generation (based on normal weather conditions). PJM's extreme winter forecast was 143,782 MW, slightly higher than its previous all-time winter peak demand record of 143,225 MW, which was set on February 20, 2015. To meet that extreme peak demand, PJM projected resource capacity of 157,314 MW, once 16.5 GW of generator outages, 4.2 GW of exports, 6.2 GW for the loss of its largest contingency (gas/electric single point of failure) and 6.1 GW for a no wind/no solar scenario were deducted from available resources. This resulted in estimated reserves of 16,233 MW assuming the 50/50 load forecast and 9,318 MW for the 90/10 extreme load scenario. However, PJM projected approximately 7.6 GW of load management available to respond to additional unplanned resource outages.

2. GENERATOR OWNERS'/OPERATORS' AND NATURAL GAS FACILITIES' WINTER SEASON PREPAREDNESS

a. Generation Resources' Seasonal Preparations

GOs/GOPs indicated that over 90 percent of generators that experienced an outage, derate, or failure to start had a cold weather preparedness plan in effect during the Event, and the same percentage used a pre-winter generating unit maintenance checklist in the fall. See section III for additional information on GOs/GOPs' cold weather preparation.

b. Natural Gas Infrastructure/Facilities' Seasonal Preparations

Natural gas infrastructure facilities took a variety of actions to prepare for winter.[114] Production facilities inspected and made repairs as necessary to insure functionality of heat trace and other heating systems, if applicable. They ordered and stocked essential winter supplies such as cinders for roads (used to access wellheads during icy road conditions), and portable generators. Some buried flowlines[115] to protect them from freezing, and/or added burners to increase temperatures on gas processing units. Natural gas processing entities purchased supplies such as tarps, batteries, spare parts, and mobile heaters, and performed maintenance such as repairing insulation on pipes and checking mobile heaters to ensure they were in good working order.

Pipeline operators implemented their winter operations programs which included performing preventive maintenance on compressor stations and at receipt and delivery points, testing all emergency equipment, servicing backup power supply sources, and performing any necessary equipment overhauls, among other tasks.

112 Interface transfer limits are the MW flow limitation across a transmission interface to protect the system from large voltage drops or collapse caused by any viable contingency.

113 Reproduced with permission of PJM and © PJM.

114 The Team instructed all natural gas entities that it asked for data to provide data for the following states, if applicable: New York, Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, New Jersey, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, District of Columbia, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Arkansas, Missouri, Iowa, Illinois, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Michigan, Indiana.

115 Flowline is the flow connection from the wellhead to the separation facility, pipeline or storage unit. *See* Piping and pipeline systems - PetroWiki (spe.org).

III. CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

A.Preparations in Advance of the Winter Storm

1. WEATHER FORECASTS PREDICTED SEVERE COLD FOR DECEMBER 23-24 AS EARLY AS DECEMBER 14

Similar to Winter Storm Uri, and past major winter storms, the storm that came to be called Winter Storm Elliott[116] was forecast many days in advance. On Wednesday, December 14, at 3 p.m., the National Weather Service issued its "US Hazards Outlook" covering the period that included December 22 to 25 and published its "8-14 Day Temperature Outlook" graphic, as shown in Figure 16, below, showing that large portions of the eastern U.S. were highly likely to experience below normal temperatures.[117]

In its outlook, the NWS predicted that "[a] negative Arctic Oscillation (AO) pattern forecast over North America later in December is expected to promote below normal temperatures" with "[h]igh risk of much below normal temperatures for much of the [contiguous U.S.] east of the Rockies excluding the Northeast, Thu[rsday through Sunday], Dec[ember] 22-25."[118]

SPP and MISO RCs. On the following day, December 15, SPP and MISO first identified the risk that the forecast extreme weather posed to their respective systems, with projected impacts beginning December 21-22.


TVA, Southern, and VACAR-South RCs. On December 14, TVA recognized that a major arctic outbreak was likely for Christmas weekend (December 23 to 25), and on December 19, communicated that across its organization. On December 16, Southeastern RC recognized the threat posed by the forecast and discussed on Southeastern RC's daily RC calls from that day until December 25. It also began sharing forecast system conditions via Southeastern RC emails on December 16. Duke updated internal stakeholders on December 19 regarding its concern with the forecast winter conditions, which it expected to be a powerful cold front arriving on December 23, bringing falling temperatures and precipitation (mostly rain).

116 The National Weather Service of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration does not name winter storms because, according to its then-Deputy Director of Public Affairs, "[w]inter storms are diverse with conditions that evolve throughout the storm's life. That is why our (NWS) forecasts, watches and warnings focus on specific impacts such as wind conditions, snowfall, ice, temperature, visibility, and other impacts. Winter storm conditions can vary widely and over a very large area, from community to community. It's critical that people understand how a storm will impact them, in their area or where they are going." A private company, The Weather Channel, began naming severe winter storms in 2012 and those names have been recognized by some, but not all, media sources. KSAT, for example, said that it would continue to follow the NWS and not recognize names for winter storms. Sarah Spivey, *Let's chat: Do winter storms really have names? The unofficial naming system has gained some popularity, but experts caution against the naming of winter storms*.,KSAT NEWS (Oct. 19, 2002) https://www.ksat.com/weather/2022/10/19/lets-chat-do-winter-storms-really-have-names/. In 2021 the Team did not recognize the naming of Winter Storm Uri, but given the widespread use of the winter storm names by media discussing both the 2021 and 2022 events, the Team used the names in the Report.

117 *See*, Melissa Ou, *National Weather Service Climate Prediction Center "U.S. Hazards Outlook"*,cpc.ncep.noaa.gov/products/archives/hazards/data/2022/KWNCPMDTHR.20221214, and "8-14 Day Temperature Outlook" graphic at 814temp.20221214.fcst.gif (3300×2550) (noaa.gov). *See* also examples of coverage in popular media: Anna Skinner, *Artic Blast to Bring Dangerous Below-Zero Temperatures to These States*, Newsweek (Dec. 20, 2022), https://www.newsweek.com/arctic-blast-dangerous-below-zero-temperatures-these-states-1768512; and Pandora Dewan, *Bomb Cyclone Photos: What to Expect From Freezing Weather Forecast*, Newsweek (Dec. 20, 2022), https://www.newsweek.com/bomb-cyclone-photos-freezing-weather-forecast-1768515#:~:text=Elliott%20is%20expected%20to%20arrive%20in%20the%20Pacific,the%20Midwest%20and%20parts%20of%20the%20East%20Coast.

118 Contiguous U.S. includes the 48 states south of Canada, including the District of Columbia.

Figure 16: National Weather Service 8-14 Day Temperature Outlook – December 14, 2022



PJM. The storm was expected to move into PJM's footprint on December 23, bringing snowfall and high wind gusts combining to create blizzard conditions, and freezing rain in the central Appalachians with ice accumulation of 0.10 to 0.25 inches. On December19, PJM weather forecasting alerted PJM Dispatch via email of upcoming blizzard conditions and extreme cold.


2. ALERTS ISSUED BY GRID ENTITIES AND EXPECTED PREPARATIONS FROM DECEMBER 16 THROUGH 22

All BAs and RCs have established emergency operating procedures (emergency procedures) as required by the Reliability Standards, particularly EOP-011-2, Emergency Preparedness and Operations.[119] Additionally, entities may have their own specific operating procedures that coordinate with or supplement the BA/RC emergency procedures. As part of their responsibilities under the emergency procedures, BAs and RCs issue cold weather advisories, alerts, and conservative operations notices, as necessary.[120] Each entity's emergency operating procedures document the actions that are required by the relevant TOs/TOPs and GOs/GOPs.

119 RSCompleteSet.pdf (nerc.com)

120 For purposes of this discussion, the Report uses the terms "advisories," "alerts," and "conservative operations notices" to encompass the range of notices that BAs and RCs issue as part of their respective emergency operating procedures, https://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Reliability Standards Complete Set/RSCompleteSet.pdf. Each BA and RC uses specific defined terms for their notices. *See, e.g.,* PJM Manual 13: Emergency Operations (Aug. 24, 2023), https://www.pjm.com/-/media/documents/manuals/m13.ashx (including PJM's defined terms for its alerts and notices).

Figure 17: RC Watches, Advisories, Alerts and Warnings Issued From Friday, December 16 Through Thursday, December 22, 2022




Before and during the Event, affected RCs issued cold weather advisories[121] and alerts,[122] as well as conservative operation declarations. Figure 17, above, summarizes the notices issued in advance of the more extreme cold weather days during the Event (including conservative operations declarations) from December 16 through December 22.

BAs issue the in-advance cold weather alerts and advisories to their stakeholders, including those BES

121 By way of example, PJM's cold weather advisories advised PJM members to prepare to (1) take freeze protection measures; (2) review weather forecasts, determine any forecast operational changes, and notify PJM of any changes; and (3) update PJM with operation limitations associated with cold-weather preparedness (e.g., generator capability and availability, fuel supply and inventory concerns, fuel switching capabilities, environmental constraints, and generating unit minimum temperatures).

122 Again, as an example, PJM's cold weather alerts stated that generation dispatchers should: (1) review fuel supply/delivery schedules in anticipation of greater-than-normal operation of units; (2) monitor and report projected fuel limitations to PJM dispatcher and update the unit Max Run field in PJM's Markets Gateway if less than 24 hours of run time is remaining; and (3) contact PJM Dispatch if it is anticipated that spot market gas is unavailable, resulting in unavailability of bid-in generation.

Figure 18: Cold Weather Event Preparation by GOs/GOPs with Outages/Derates/Failures to Start



GOs/GOPS within their footprints.[123] The GOs/GOPs are not required to respond to the alerts or verify that they completed their winter readiness steps (i.e., no confirmation to the BA that the generating unit is prepared for the forecast cold weather).

3. NEAR-TERM PREPARATIONS BY GENERATION OWNERS/OPERATORS

Under the currently effective Reliability Standards, GOs/GOPs are required to have cold weather preparedness plans that include inspection and maintenance of the generating unit's freeze protection measures.[124] A common method for implementing inspection and maintenance of freeze protection measures is the use of inspection and maintenance checklists. Over 40 percent of the GOs/GOPs that experienced an outage, derate or failure to start during the Event performed monthly inspections using their checklists, with a subset of those inspecting weekly.Approximately 40 percent of those that have a pre-winter checklist (used to prepare for the season) implement a "pre-event" checklist (which can be used to confirm that nothing has degraded, and that no new maintenance issues have arisen, since the pre-winter checklist was completed).[125] Sixty percent do not perform pre-event inspection or maintenance checklists, which suggests room for improvement. Figure 18, above, illustrates the responses provided by GOs/GOPs that had at least one generating unit that incurred an outage, derate, or failure to start during the Event, when asked whether they performed various near-term preparations. Other areas of cold weather preparedness that could benefit from improved effort include the actions that had 50 percent or less adoption rates in Figure 18, such as providing additional staffing (during an event), increasing operator rounds, verifying inventory of primary fuel and emergency supplies, and using a monthly maintenance checklist.

123 The Report discusses notices issued after December 22 during the Event in Section III.B.3., below.

124 Reliability Standard EOP-011-2, Requirement R7.2. RSCompleteSet.pdf (nerc.com).

125 For example, outages have resulted from insulation being moved away from pipes to perform work and not being properly replaced before the onset of freezing temperatures.

4. NEAR-TERM PREPARATIONS BY NATURAL GAS INFRASTRUCTURE ENTITIES

As the storm approached, natural gas infrastructure facilities supplemented their seasonal prparations. Some entities took steps to determine that readiness had not declined since the pre-winter preparations, along with implementing short-term measures to be taken shortly before a major storm.

Production. Producers stationed additional field personnel and supplied them with resources to prevent and manage freeze offs by ensuring functionality of heat trace and other heating systems, by injecting methanol, and by increasing flow rates.[126] They pre-arranged for removal of snow and ice from roads to ensure safe access to sites and facilities, along with prepping the roads with cinders in advance of cold weather conditions. Producers also pre-staged materials such as water tanks and portable backup generation where they would most likely be needed. Some producers used tarps and deployed shelters (which could hold heaters, if necessary) to protect equipment prone to freezing. They lowered levels in or emptied water, condensate, and oil tank levels at facilities to which access was expected to become difficult. Most conservatively, two producers anticipated production declines and proactively reduced the amount of natural gas that they marketed in the short term.

Processing. Processing companies increased personnel on duty to respond to plant issues and equipment failures, ensured adequate supplies of methanol, stocked critical spare parts (tarps, batteries, etc.), performed any last-minute maintenance (e.g., repair insulation), and coordinated with producer customers and purchasers of the residue gas produced by the plant. Finally, to the extent that they relied upon some form of an alternative power source (e.g. on-site backup generators), they serviced the power source to ensure operation during the Event.

Pipelines. Pipelines in the path of Winter Storm Elliott began to monitor the weather forecast as the storm began to form, while also implementing cold weather plans and holding internal meetings.[127] These meetings focused on estimated load forecasts, storage strategies, maintenance activities, and line pack management strategies. Due to anticipated operational challenges, some pipelines staffed key compressor stations that ordinarily are not staffed but are essential during peak demand for system reliability. Some tested emergency equipment in advance of the Event.

All pipelines proactively managed and monitored line pack and system integrity. Some pipelines issued critical notices in advance of the storm, ranging from weather advisories to OFOs. Each pipeline increased line pack in anticipation of high demand, supply loss, and potential equipment problems. Most also prepared storage facilities to allow them to withdraw natural gas – including liquid natural gas – to meet customer requests and respond to anticipated increased demand.

5. SHORT-TERM LOAD FORECASTS BY GRID ENTITIES

Accurate short-term load forecasts (that is, the load forecasts BAs performed just days in advance or during the Event, with knowledge of the forecast extreme cold weather) assist with committing and scheduling resources. Many of the BAs normally aim to keep their load forecast error near or below three percent. For example, PJM's daily peak forecast error only exceeded its target load forecast error of up to three percent on a single day between December 1 and December 23, 2022.

126 The Gas Technology Institute completed a report as part of the inquiry into the 2011 Southwest cold weather event, which detailed techniques for preventing freezing of natural gas production. L. Brun Hilbert et al., *Natural Gas Production in Extreme Weather*, Pipeline & Gas Journal, (June 2021), https://www.pgjonline.com/magazine/2021/june-2021-vol-248-no-6/guest-commentary/natural-gas-production-in-extreme-weather. Other methods included water removal using glycol dehydration and heating methods such as catalytic heaters, fuel line heaters and steam systems.

127 One pipeline held a November 2022 meeting with its customers regarding cold weather preparedness. Although this action was an outlier, it was an effective practice and the Team encourages all pipelines to consider holding similar meetings in the future.

Although BAs projected higher electricity demands for the impending winter storm, most core BA significantly underestimated the peak loads in advance of December 23 and 24, the most extreme cold weather days of the Event. Figures 19 and 20 below, show the Core BAs' four-, three-, two- and day-ahead forecasts versus actual peak loads for December 23 and 24, respectively. Figure 21, below, shows their Mean Absolute Percentage Error (MAPE) across the four-, three-, two-, and day-ahead peak load forecasts for December 23 and 24.

Figure 19: BAs' Four-, Three-, Two-, and Day-Ahead Peak Load Forecasts vs. Actual[128] Peak Loads (Percent Difference) For December 23, 2022






Figure 20: BAs' Four-, Three-, Two-, and Day-Ahead Peak Load Forecasts vs. Actual Peak Loads (Percent Difference) For December 24, 2022



128 For Figures 19, 20, and 21, for BAs that implemented load management measures during their respective peak load timeframes, actual peak loads used for calculations are based on BAs' estimated peak loads without load management.

Figure 21: Mean Absolute Percentage Error (MAPE) For BAs' Four-, Three-, Two-, and Day-Ahead Peak Load Forecasts for December 23 and 24, 2022



All of the BAs use weather data as inputs into their short-term forecasts. Most use only three years of data to train their models, which can be problematic if the conditions experienced have no similar day within the past three years. Some BAs have their own meteorologists, while others use only external vendors for weather forecasts. Two BAs automatically add buffers (MW or percentage of load forecast) to account for potential load forecast error. Some have a single system-wide forecast, while others split their forecast to reflect differences in the makeup of their load (e.g., mountains vs. beaches).

Figure 22, below, summarizes how each BA approaches these short-term load forecasts.

Figure 22: Summary of BAs' Short-Term Load Forecast Processes

	Weather Forecast Data	Short-Term Load Forecast Model
DEC, DEP	Internal meteorology team produces forecast.	Uses models developed by three external vendors and projects load based on evaluation of their outcomes. Usually picks highest for extreme cold weather day, or looks for historical day to match. DEP prepares east and west (Asheville only) forecasts.
DESC	Obtains weather data from third-party vendors.	Based on weather forecast model and load model inputs, uses combination of external vendors and one internal model for developing load forecast. Incorporates solar inputs, and any manual adjustments deemed necessary to account for lack of similar days to produce a seven-day hourly load forecast.
LG&E/KU	External weather information providers, vendors.	Short-term load forecast is an aggregate of the load forecasts provided by the LSEs in the LG&E/KU BA area. In week ahead/next-day studies use a five percent buffer.
PJM	Three external weather information vendors, uses weighted average based on recent performance.	Internal team manages suite of neural-network and pattern- matching models with final short-term load forecast based on staff evaluation. Benchmarks day-ahead forecast against actual for tracking of forecast error.

	Weather Forecast Data	Short-Term Load Forecast Model
Santee Cooper	External weather information providers, vendors	Primary short-term load forecast is provided by an external vendor and evaluated against alternative forecast provided by another vendor. Uses 100 MW (approximately 1.8 percent of winter season peak) adder for load forecast error.
Southern	External weather information providers, vendors	Next 10-days' hourly weather forecasts are provided by external vendors, with multiple cities' peak load weighted for input to load forecasting models, which are neural-network based. Southern has large number of models producing load forecasts, including a vendor-supplied forecast that uses distribution-level metered load data as inputs, which has proven to be the most accurate of their vendors' forecasts over the past two years for the 1-5 day-ahead load forecasts.
TVA	Two external weather information vendors feed into its load forecast software.	Internal blend of three load forecast models from vendors, based on three-year history, informed by weather data and weather forecast. If no similar event in the three-year history, look for similar events in more distant past to adjust/extrapolate the load forecast.

6. GRID ENTITIES' OPERATIONAL PLANNING ACTIONS TO PREPARE FOR EVENT

Given the higher electricity demands forecast for the upcoming Winter Storm Elliott, BAs arranged for resources to meet those demands, including attempting to return resources to service that were offline before the storm (e.g., for periodic maintenance). Planned generator outages are typically scheduled months or even years in advance, to perform necessary maintenance, or in the case of nuclear power plants, refueling. BAs in organized markets can ask GOs/GOPs to reschedule their planned generation outages for system reliability, but they cannot require the GOs/GOPs to do so.

a. Generation Returned to Service Prior to Most Severe Event Conditions

Forced outages and derates for the Event Area remained relatively constant (41,607 MW on December 21 versus 42,856 MW on December 23) before the worst part of Winter Storm Elliott began to impact the Event Area.[129] Figure 23 shows the planned and unplanned generation outages and derates within the Event Area from the start of December 21 to the start of December 23.[130] Overall, some BAs had more success than others in returning to service generation that was on outage before the worst period of the Event. For example, Santee Cooper's system operations coordinated with a gas generator in the week preceding the storm to return the unit to service following an unplanned outage due to a pump failure. The pump was repaired on December 21, restoring 28 MW of generating capacity. LG&E/KU was able to return to service nearly all of its generation that was on planned outages before the Event. A total of 8,501 MW of planned outages were returned to service within the BA footprints listed in Figure 23 before the worst part of Winter Storm Elliott began to impact the Event Area. Beyond December 23, GOs continued efforts to return prior-outaged generation to service where feasible, which offset the total unavailable generation during the Event.

129 Forced outages often occur due to equipment failure or freezing and when and if a unit can be timely returned to service is unpredictable.

130 The start of December 23 (with the exception of the SPP, which was impacted with increased unplanned generation outages during the Event beginning December 22) was prior to the most severe drops in temperature. Accordingly, SPP is not included in Figure 23 to provide a more uniform comparison.

Figure 23: Planned and Unplanned Generation Outages in BA Footprints, at the Start of December 21, and December 23, 2022 (Prior to the Most Severe Drops in Temperature)

BA	Planned at the start of :		Unplanned at the start of:		Total Unavailable, at the start of:		21st — 23rd Decrease in Generation Out-of-Service
	Dec. 21 (MW)	Dec. 23 (MW)	Dec 21 (MW)	Dec. 23 (MW)	Dec. 21 (MW)	Dec. 23 (MW)	(MW)
DEC	391	391	1,662	1,820	2,053	2,211	-158
DEP	983	1,811	507	841	1,490	2,652	-1,152
DESC	7	7	350	133	357	140	217
LG&E/KU	704	10	138	631	842	641	201
MISO	12,610	11,178	20,824	20,004	33,434	31,182	2,252
NYISO	3,161	2,085	2,414	3,119	5,575	5,204	371
PJM	9,586	6,253	12,582	12,787	22,168	19,040	3,128
Santee Cooper	570	570	400	110	1,540	1,250	290
Southern	3,022	2,486	758	913	3,780	3,399	381
TVA	3,153	895	1,972	2,498	5,125	3,393	1,732
TOTAL	34,187	25,686	41,607	42,856	75,794	68,542	7,252

b. Generation Committed Early for Reliability

In general, all BAs within the Core Event Area thought in advance of the Event that they individually had sufficient resources to meet their respective forecast electricity demands expected during Winter Storm Elliott. The BAs did not discount the possibility of some level of unplanned generation outages as a result of the storm, but those with smaller reserve margins thought they could purchase (i.e., import) power from external sources, or rely on bringing online quick-start/short-lead-time generating units to meet their peak electricity demands. TVA committed all available generation seven days prior to the Event and told the GOP when they would need the generation to be online. Santee Cooper planned to staff two generating units for quick start-up that would otherwise have longer lead times. SPP made multiple long-lead-time generating unit commitments: (1) on December 21, for the next two days, (2) on December 22, for Christmas Eve, and (3) on December 23, for Christmas Day, to improve the likelihood of having the additional online capacity for those days, as well as committing short-lead-time natural gas-fired units so that they could procure sufficient natural gas before the holiday weekend.


c. Transmission Facilities Returned to Service Before the Event

Some TOPs provided details on actions they took to return transmission facilities to service that had been on outage prior to the Event. TVA returned several transmission facilities to service before the Event, including one transmission line and two circuit breakers. Southern restored a transmission line that improved its ability to transfer power to and from Florida utilities, and additionally restored to service two other transmission lines, a circuit breaker, and two power transformers. PJM increased its transfer capability through coordination with its TOs which resulted in the return to service of two major transmission lines early on December 23. DEP and DEC indicated that they had no significant transmission outage plans or outages before or during the Event.

B. December 22 - 24: Extreme Cold Weather Conditions Lead to Widespread Generation Outages and Natural Gas Infrastructure Issues, Forcing Grid and Pipeline Operators to Make Difficult Decisions, Such as Shedding Firm Electric Load or Curtailing Firm Pipeline Customers

On December 22, the storm hit the Midwest, bringing snow, low temperatures and strong winds (with gusts up to 60 miles hour) and wind chill temperatures as low as -42 degrees. Although accumulation was minimal, the combination of snow and gusting winds caused blizzard conditions in some areas. The storm moved eastward and by December 23, Chattanooga, Tennessee had dropped from 49 degrees to 7 degrees. Similarly, Charleston, West Virginia dropped 42 degrees on December 23 (with wind gusts over 50 mph). The actual lows for December 23 for the Midwest and South Central U.S. were largely 20 degrees or below. From December 23 into 24 the extreme cold finally reached the east coast, and the actual lows for December 24, as shown on Figure 24, below, reflect that except for part of Florida, the lows were below 20 degrees. These temperatures were 15 to 30 degrees lower than normal low temperatures, with some elevated areas greater than 30 degrees lower (than normal low temperatures), as seen in Figure 25, further below.


Figure 24: December 23 and 24, 2022 Actual Minimum Temperatures – Lower 48



1. UNPLANNED GENERATING UNIT OUTAGES RAPIDLY ESCALATE

All of the BAs went into the Event with some measure of generation unavailable, but during the afternoon and evening of December 22 unplanned generation outages began to rapidly escalate. In fact, of the more than 371,000 MW of generation that was lost due to forced outages, derates and failures to start during the entire Event—a period stretching from December 21 to December 26—more than 20 percent (74,000) of all generation losses would occur in the 12 hours between 6:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m. on December 23.

Figure 25: Departures from Normal Minimum Low Temperatures, December 24, 2022



SPP (outages began afternoon of 12/22). SPP experienced "key generation losses in the eastern part of SPP's footprint"[131] beginning December 22 at around 3:40 p.m.[132] and continuing into the evening and early morning hours. By December 23 at 10 a.m., unplanned generation outages and derates in the SPP footprint escalated by 8,900 MW.


MISO (outages began early 12/23). In MISO, unplanned generation outages and derates began to escalate on December 23 and MISO BA operators were faced with over 6,000 MW of incremental unplanned generation outages; by 9:15 a.m., 2,000 MW of unit trips and failures to start in MISO South contributed to MISO BA operators implementing emergency measures.

TVA (outages began early 12/23). TVA unplanned generation outages began shortly before 1:00 a.m. on December 23. Outages and failures to start escalated sharply to a total of nearly 6,000 MW by 8 a.m. as shown in Figure 26, equivalent to nearly 20 percent of its peak load.

131 *See Review of SPP's Response to the Dec. 2022 Winter Storm* (April 2023), at 10.

132 All times stated within the Report, unless otherwise specified, are in Eastern Standard Time, even if the entity is in the Central Time Zone (EST).

Figure 26: Incremental Unplanned Generation Outages in the TVA BA Footprint During Event, December 23, 12 a.m. to 8 a.m.




LG&E/KU (outages began early 12/23). Beginning at 1:28 a.m. on December 23, then throughout the morning and afternoon, generators experienced derates and outages due to cold weather and mechanical issues; at 1:08 p.m., significant power plant derates due to fuel issues (discussed further in subsection (a) below) led to an approximately 900 MW reduction, including one unit trip and six units that were derated to operate at minimum output for approximately 50 hours (until December 25, 4:00 p.m.); then from 3:39 p.m. to 6:44 p.m., an additional 500 MW of unplanned generation outages occurred.

PJM (outages began about 4 a.m. on 12/23). Unplanned outages and derates began to escalate shortly after 4 a.m. on December 23, then from about 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., rapidly escalated at a rate of over 2,200 MW per hour (for a total of approximately 20,000 MW); outages continued to escalate until December 24 at 8:00 a.m.[133] Over the 24-hour period, PJM sustained nearly 33,000 MW of unplanned generation outages and derates, as illustrated in Figure 27.

133 This outage data, like all other generation outage data unless found on a graphic credited to an entity other than the Team, is based on the data the Team obtained directly from the GOs/GOPs.

Figure 27: Incremental Unplanned Generation Outages in the PJM BA Footprint During Event, December 23, 8 a.m. to December 24, 8 a.m.



DEC and DEP (outages began late evening 12/23). In the DEC and DEP footprints, unplanned generation outages and derates began at about 11:30 p.m. on December 23, and by December 24 at 8 a.m., DEC and DEP had lost about 2,000 MW; outages continued into the early afternoon of December 24.

Southern (outages began midnight 12/23). From December 24, 12:00 a.m. to December 24, 2:00 a.m., Southern had approximately 500 MW of gas/oil generating unit capacity forced offline; then from 2:00 a.m. to 6:00 a.m., it had an additional 890 MW of gas/combined cycle generating capacity forced offline (1,390 MW total incremental unplanned outages from midnight to December 24, 6:00 a.m.).

DESC (outages began early 12/24). Six generating units, over 1,000 MW of generation total, sustained unplanned outages from December 24, 12:30 a.m. until about 9:10 a.m.

Santee Cooper (outages began early 12/24). Santee Cooper experienced over 500 MW of unplanned generation outages and derates beginning December 24 at 2:35 a.m. to 7:00 a.m. In addition, a boiler tube leak forced a 300 MW unit offline late December 23; it was unrelated to the weather but increased Santee Cooper's total unplanned generation outages to over 800 MW.

GOs reported to several BAs, including TVA and LG&E/KU, that many of the generating unit outages were due to Freezing Issues.

a. Rapid Emergence of Fuel Issues

Fuel Issues were a significant driver of the unplanned generation outages and derates early on December 23. Notably, within PJM, outages caused by Fuel Issues grew eight-fold between 6:00 a.m. and noon on December 23—and fifteen-fold between 6:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m. that same day, outpacing the increase in outages due to Mechanical/Electrical Issues. By midnight on December 23, the total unplanned generation shortfall due to Fuel Issues exceeded the shortfall due to Freezing Issues, as seen in Figure 28, below.

Figure 28 Growth in Unplanned Generation Outages, Derates, and Failures to Start for Three Most Common Causes of Generation Outages in PJM, December 22 to 24

PJM	12/22/2022	12/23/2022				12/24/2022	
	Midnight	6:00am	Noon	6:00pm	Midnight	6:00am	Noon
Mechanical/Electrical Issues	5,746	6,448	7,497	10,927	12,458	16,909	16,130
Fuel Issues	576	597	5,062	9,014	11,133	13,283	12,709
Freezing Issues	1,966	2,625	5,436	10,770	10,379	12,979	12,928

Although the growth in Fuel-Issues-related generation loss was most acutely seen in PJM, virtually all of the BAs/RCs saw generation lost or derated due to Natural Gas Fuel Issues[134] on December 23 and 24. SPP, TVA, LG&E/KU, and VACAR-South RC all reported gaining awareness on December 23 or 24 that generating units were struggling to find adequate natural gas supply or that pipelines were struggling or unable to maintain adequate pressure at certain locations.

SPP. SPP began receiving system overrun limitation alerts for gas pipelines during the week of December 19. This was an early indication of potential fuel supply problems and SPP considered the alerts when evaluating forecasts of resource unavailability. Between December 22 and 25, SPP received communications from plant operators about fuel procurement issues through operator-to-operator communication and via plant operator outage entries made in SPP's generator outage management system.

MISO. Gas supply availability contributed to increased unplanned outages, particularly on the afternoon of December 23, that pushed MISO into emergency procedures. Generation in the MISO Region is connected to nearly three dozen interstate and intrastate pipelines, and the top five pipelines serve over 36 GW of gas generation in MISO. MISO became aware of gas availability issues when gas generators began communicating outages to MISO's generator outage management system, indicating an unavailable commitment status in their real-time offers, and/or phoning to inform the MISO Generation and Interchange operator of their expected outage submission due to gas unavailability. By the end of the day on December 23, MISO had experienced 23 GW of gas generation forced outages. Nearly 50 percent of gas generators reported outages to MISO that were due to Fuel Transportation/ Supply Issues. Most of these were forced/emergency outages with little or no prior notice to MISO Operations. Such a significant volume of unplanned outages eroded MISO's reserve margin and contributed to MISO's declaration of emergency procedures on December 23. Increased fuel risk and associated uncertainty regarding gas generator availability on December 24 contributed to MISO operators committing additional generation.

TVA. GOs reported to TVA BA operators that some generating units were experiencing outages due to low natural gas fuel pressure. For example, on December 24, at 8:00 a.m., a 900 MW combustion turbine (CT) / combined cycle (CC) site was derated by 243 MW due to low natural gas delivery pressure issues. Further, on December 25, at 4:20 a.m., a 1,075 MW multi-CT/CC site was reduced by 978

134 As described earlier in the Report, Natural Gas Fuel Issues include the combined effects of decreased natural gas production; cold weather impacts and mechanical problems at production, gathering, processing and pipeline facilities resulting in gas quality issues and low pipeline pressure; supply and transportation interruptions; curtailments and failure to comply with contractual obligations. Additionally, it includes shippers' inability to procure natural gas due to tight supply, prohibitive, scarcity-induced market prices, or mismatches between the timing of the natural gas and energy markets.

MW to minimum output (97 MW total), because of low gas delivery pressure issues.

LG&E/KU. On December 23, at 1:09 a.m., pipeline pressures for two natural gas-fired generating stations began to drop below the contract limits; and at 1:08 p.m., LG&E/KU experienced approximately 900 MW in generation losses (unit trip and six units derated) arising from low delivery pressures on a pipeline supplying these generating units.

DEC. On December 24, Transco pipeline notified DEC BA operators of low pressure issues and the potential timeline to recover pressure. The low pressure affected two natural gas-fired units, totaling 178 MW in unplanned generation derates.[135]

PJM. PJM had 186 generating units that failed to start. One-third of those were natural gas-fired CTs and CC units that reported to PJM that they did not have fuel or were fuel-limited.

135 Derates occurred after the DEC BA morning peak demand ended and did not impact DEC's ability to meet ongoing system demand, which remained at lower levels throughout the remainder of the holiday weekend.

Fuel Switching

As the 2021 Report noted, "[u]nits capable of fuel switching have both economic and reliability benefits: allowing operators to purchase the cheaper of two fuels and have an alternate source of fuel if one source is interrupted or curtailed." In the Event, about 259 generating units, representing 34,518 MW, were capable of a secondary fuel option. About 53 of those generating units, representing 15,405 MW, attempted to switch from their primary fuel to their secondary fuel. The majority, 88 percent, representing 12,567 MW, were initially successful in switching fuel types. Approximately twelve percent of the fuel-switching-capable units, representing 2,749 MW, either failed to switch or experienced outages related to their use of alternate fuels after switching, due to various mechanical problems. Causes for switching failures included low gas supply pressure, gas\fuel oil leak, fuel pump issues, fuel oil divider failure, feedwater pump breaker failure, isolator failure, combustor purge line failure, high exhaust spread temperature, and solenoid freezing.

Figure 29: Location of Fuel-Switching-Capable Units in the Event Area




Of the generating units that successfully switched fuels, 73 percent, representing 11,767 MW, used gas as their primary fuel and oil\distillate oil as an alternate fuel. About 27 percent, representing 672 MW, used oil or distillate oil as their primary fuel and gas as an alternate fuel, and two units, representing 520 MW, used gas as their primary fuel and coal as an alternate fuel.

2. NATURAL GAS INFRASTRUCTURE OPERATING ISSUES RAPIDLY MOVE FROM PRODUCTION FACILITIES TO PIPELINES

a. Production declines begin

As Winter Storm Elliott moved across North America and temperatures decreased, dry natural gas[136] production in the lower 48 states declined. Production volumes on December 22 fell by 4,411 MMcf/day from the previous day and reached their largest daily decline between December 22 and December 23 – a difference of 8,368 MMcf/day. Dry natural gas production declined by 18 percent, falling to a low of 82.9 Bcf/day on December 24, 2022, as shown in Figure 30, below. Winter Storm Elliott primarily affected production in the Marcellus and Utica Shale formations. Together the Marcellus and Utica Shale formations create the Appalachian basin, which produced more gas in 2022 than any other area of the U.S., accounting for 29 percent of U.S. gross natural gas withdrawals (or 34.6 Bcf/d), according to EIA (see Figure 31, below). As shown in Figure 32 below, Marcellus Shale production volumes reached a low of 21,856 MMcf/d on December 24 (a 23 percent decrease compared to maximum production on December 19). Utica Shale production volumes reached a low of 3,017 MMcf/d on December 26 (a 54 percent decrease compared to maximum production on December 19).

Figure 30: Daily Dry Natural Gas Production (October - December 2022)[137]



136 "Dry natural gas" is produced by natural gas processing facilities that remove other hydrocarbons to produce what is known as "pipeline quality" dry natural gas that meets the heating content and other restrictions necessary for the safe operation of pipeline and distribution company facilities.

137 S&P Global Commodity Insights, ©2023 by S&P Global Inc.

Figure 31: Monthly U.S. natural gas gross withdrawals by region (January 2012 - December 2022)





Figure 32: Natural Gas Production - Marcellus and Utica Shale Basins, December 14 – 31, 2022




All but one natural gas producer identified freeze-offs as the primary cause of production declines, including frozen production equipment as well as wellhead freeze offs. Seven of the ten reporting producers identified downstream issues[138] as a significant driver of production declines. Downstream issues included outages in gathering systems, compressors, and processing plants, as well as one pipeline that could

138 Some producers also own and operate gathering lines/facilities, others deliver their production to gathering systems owned by others. Thus the categorization of "downstream" may not be consistent or limited to gathering systems.

not take gas from certain producers,[139] which caused idling of producer equipment. The idling of producer equipment then exacerbated freezing of production equipment and caused further reductions in natural gas production. Poor road conditions, which prevented personnel and, in some cases, water hauling trucks, from reaching remote production sites were also identified as an issue, although not as commonly as during Winter Storm Uri.[140]

These natural gas losses from critical natural gas production areas, in conjunction with increased demand, caused prices to increase dramatically in natural gas markets. For example, natural gas prices for Transco Zone 5, which extends from the Georgia-South Carolina border to the Virginia-Maryland border, increased more than eight-fold for trading on December 23 as compared to December 21. See Figure 33, below. Higher price levels can have a cascading effect in the marketplace, as natural gas pipelines may calculate their OFO penalties by pricing the penalty as a multiple of the natural gas market price. As a result, a shipper that is out of balance on a pipeline may choose to pay higher market prices for natural gas to avoid paying penalties; this in turn produces higher penalties and adds to the incentive to buy ever more expensive natural gas.[141]

Figure 33: S&P Global Market Intelligence Day-Ahead Natural Gas Prices for Northeast Region – Non-NY/NE for December 2022[142]




139 One pipeline stated that leading up to and on the evening of December 23, it started to pack its lines in preparation for high demand on December 24. The high pressure temporarily prevented producers from being able to move their gas onto the pipeline. The same pipeline also had a lag in demand load the morning of December 24, causing pressures to remain high, which exposed producers further to freezing vulnerabilities as they could not move their supply onto the pipeline system at that time.

140 *See* Analysis, section IV.C.2., for more examination of the causes of production losses.

141 Natural gas traders have explained the exacerbating effect of potential penalties during scarcity events during previous extreme cold weather events. The Team did not interview traders in the Event about this issue, although the same preexisting conditions of scarcity and critical notifications with potential for penalties existed during the Event as existed during previous events.

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Figure 34: Natural Gas Processing Facilities - Receipt Volume (December 20 – 26, 2022)



b. Processing and Pipeline Operating Issues

The extreme low temperatures beginning December 22-23 caused natural gas demand to increase at the same time that the volume of gas received by processing facilities declined, as illustrated in Figure 34.

Some processing companies said that they did not receive the full contracted amount of gas supply from producers, though they reported that they generally processed the gas they received.

On December 23 and 24, the strained operating conditions due to gas supply shortages experienced across the pipeline network were further exacerbated by equipment issues faced on certain pipelines. Natural gas pipeline facilities experienced 19 equipment issues which directly affected shippers, such as GOs/GOPs and local gas distribution companies. The largest reported cause of pipeline equipment issues was weather/freezing issues, followed by mechanical issues. The cold temperatures caused valves and compressor units at varying locations along the pipeline system to freeze, reducing or preventing the flow of gas through these facilities (see Figure 35, below). These issues caused instances of reduced natural gas pressure and 14 declarations of force majeure on certain pipelines which directly affected shippers (see Figure 36, below). Pipeline operators issued force majeures (which curtailed firm and interruptible gas transportation) to inform shippers that an event outside of their ability to reasonably foresee would affect all or a portion of the gas scheduled to flow through a segment of the pipeline system. Two pipelines issued a total of seven force majeures which affected a total of 156 firm shippers due to freezing issues, mechanical issues and reduced supply at seven compressor stations.

Eight of the fifteen interstate pipelines surveyed by the Team reported a total of 53 instances of commercial power loss at their facilities, totaling 466.5 hours during the Event. The outages averaged approximately nine hours in duration, although some lasted longer than three days.[143]

143 *See* section IV.C.4 for additional analysis.

Figure 35: Number of Pipeline-Reported Equipment Issues with Some Associated Flow Reduction





Figure 36: Number of Pipeline-Reported Equipment Issues Directly Affecting Shippers




3. GRID OPERATORS' REAL-TIME ACTIONS AND COORDINATION DUE TO UNPLANNED GENERATION OUTAGES AND HIGH ELECTRICITY DEMANDS TO MAINTAIN BES RELIABILITY ACROSS A WIDE AREA

The breadth and scope of generation loss resulting from Winter Storm Elliott created unique and challenging conditions for grid operators. Figure 37, below, shows the total generation outages and derates impacting the Event Area during the most difficult period for the grid, the evening of December 23 and the morning of December 24. The graph includes both planned and unplanned generating unit outages; those existing at the beginning of the Event and those that occurred during the Event. Including generation that was already out of service,[144] a total of over 127,000 MW of generation was unavailable at the worst time, approximately 10 a.m. on December 24, which represented **18 percent** of the U.S. portion of the winter 2022-2023 anticipated resources in the Eastern Interconnection.[145]

144 Those units that were already out of service included generating units undergoing planned maintenance outages and those units that incurred forced outages before the Event, that had not yet returned to service during the worst point of the Event.

145 Based on data from NERC 2022-2023 Winter Reliability Assessment. *See* note 12. Without the generation that was already out of service, the outages represented 13 percent of the U.S. portion of the winter 2022-2023 anticipated resources in the Eastern Interconnection.


Figure 37: Total Estimated Unavailable Generation in U.S. Portion of Eastern Interconnection[146] – December 23, 4:00 p.m. to December 24, 12:00 p.m.



Due to the breadth and scope of generation loss during the Event, several BAs encountered the same set of circumstances during the day and into the evening on Friday, December 23: rapidly-increasing electricity demands due to the extreme cold weather and high levels of unplanned generation outages and derates. Figure 38, below, shows how dramatically BA electricity demands increased from Thursday morning, December 22, to Friday evening, December 23, and explains why BAs had little energy to share with other BAs experiencing EEAs. Other than Southern BA, which experienced its winter peak load the morning of December 24, the BAs shown *all* experienced their peak demands on the evening of December 23.

146 Total generation shortfall is estimated, since it does not include potential planned and unplanned generation outages that may have existed for the Florida peninsula during the timeframe, since analysis of that region was not included in the targeted scope of the inquiry.


Figure 38: BA Normalized Hourly System Load Patterns for December 22-23, 2022 (Normalized to December 23 Peak Loads Experienced)[147]



As demand grew and supply shrank over December 23 and 24, electric grid entities took proactive measures to protect their footprints by declaring conservative operations actions. By the end of December 24, almost all the BAs impacted by Winter Storm Elliott were forced to implement EEA procedures. See Figure 39, below. The gray shaded area represents the timeframe of highest system loads in the Core BAs.

147 DEC, DEP, DESC and Santee Cooper BAs (not shown in the figure), which are located further east, likewise experienced their system peak loads on Saturday, December 24, and experienced a similar pattern of increasing load.

Figure 39: Core Event Area and Eastern Interconnection (U.S.) System Loads and Event Area Energy Emergencies Timeline – December 23 12:00 a.m. to December 25, 12:00 p.m.



The widespread and simultaneous energy emergency conditions greatly reduced the BAs' ability to obtain power from neighboring entities.

Note regarding "N-1"


As described above in Section III, there were numerous coincident unplanned generator outages and derates. This meant the grid operators were operating a grid that was far from the N-1 planning criteria (e.g., loss/outage of one generator) used to plan the transmission grid.[148] Instead they were experiencing an **N-"numerous"** condition[149] at any given time during the Event. The AC transmission system that comprises the BES relies heavily on online generation for reliable operation. Having sufficient online generators enables more effective congestion management, by facilitating AC power transfers while allowing transmission constraints to remain within system operating limits, as well as enabling system stability and the maintenance of normal thermal and voltage limits.

a. Thursday, December 22: Elliott begins to impact U.S. portion of Eastern Interconnection

- Winter Storm Elliott begins to impact westernmost part of U.S. Eastern Interconnection
- SPP and its TOPs first face operating challenges

SPP was the first BA in the U.S. portion of the Eastern Interconnection to experience Elliott's extreme cold and high winds, although its footprint did not incur more severe emergency conditions as others did in Elliott, or as SPP had experienced in Winter Storm Uri. SPP noted that the storm front moved more quickly than in 2021 and swept from northwest to southeast.[150]

Figure 40: SPP and MISO Footprints



148 For more information on transmission system planning performance, *see* NERC Reliability Standards, Transmission Planning (TPL), TPL-001-5.1 - Transmission System Planning Performance Requirements. RSCompleteSet.pdf (nerc.com).

149 1,702 individual generating units experienced outages, derates, or failures to start for the entire Event Area from December 21 to 26, 2022.

150 *See* SPP Report at 21.

SPP reported that it did not experience an increase in unplanned transmission outages. SPP largely escaped the heavy snow and freezing precipitation that most threatens transmission elements. However, its system operators were challenged with escalating unplanned generation outages and electricity demands on December 22, before grid operators to the east like PJM experienced the same conditions. In addition, a localized area on its transmission grid created operational challenges.

Between 1:00 and 7:00 p.m. on December 22, SPP experienced multiple unplanned generating unit outages totaling 1,400 MW in the eastern portion of SPP's footprint in a very short time frame between 1:00 p.m. and 7:00 p.m. As these unplanned generation outages were occurring, SPP was on its way to setting a record for winter seasonal electricity demand of 47,157 MW, which occurred at 6:27 p.m.[151] In addition, SPP's eastern area grid conditions were further strained by a planned transmission line outage near the 1,400 MW of generating unit losses. The transmission outage, which began in September 2022, was scheduled for completion in January 2023 (a planned upgrade to increase the transfer of energy from the central portions of the SPP system eastward into the area most impacted during the Event).[152] The combination of events contributed to increased transmission congestion and low voltages on the 345 kV and 161 kV networks in southwest Missouri. Local transmission operators in the SPP footprint implemented 29 MW of load shed at 10:00 p.m. on December 22 in the Branson, MO area to alleviate the low transmission voltages.[153] After hydroelectric generation in the area was restored to provide voltage support and voltages recovered, transmission operators were able to restore the load by 12:00 a.m. on December 23.

b. Morning of Friday, December 23: BES reliability conditions worsen overnight

- Extreme cold weather moves eastward
- MISO and TVA operators faced with rising unplanned generation outages coupled with high electricity demands
- Grid operator coordination to manage transmission constraints
- SPP's ability to maintain reserves challenged during early morning
- SPP and TVA declare energy emergencies
- TVA declares EEA 3, sheds firm load[154]

MISO. As the extreme cold weather moved eastward, throughout the early morning hours of December 23, and as unplanned generation outages and failures to start began in the MISO South region, MISO found that its real-time MISO South system load exceeded its forecast. Pursuant to its security constrained economic dispatch, MISO's north-to-south power transfer, known as its Regional Directional Transfer (RDT),[155] increased to supply more power to meet its southern load (see Figures 41 and 42, below).

151 All times stated within the Report, unless otherwise specified, are in Eastern Standard Time (EST). If the entity is located in the Central Time Zone, the times were converted to EST.


152 SPP Report at 28.

153 SPP performed a post-event analysis and found that if during Elliott the planned transmission line outage (the line described earlier that was outaged from September 2022 to January 2023) had been back in service, along with an additional newly-constructed transmission line and a then-unavailable capacitor bank, it would have reduced low voltage limit exceedances to less than ten times as many (from 292 low voltage limit instances to only 25 low voltage limit instances).

154 Red text references EEAs experienced by BAs.


155 MISO limits the amount of power it transfers intra-market via its RDT, referred to as its Regional Directional Transfer Limit (RDTL), under a joint coordination agreement with SPP, AECI (Associated Electric Cooperative, Inc.), TVA, LG&E/KU, Southern and PowerSouth, to 3,000 MW from north-to -south (1,000 MW firm and 2,000 MW non-firm, as-available) and 2,500 MW from south-to -north (1,000 MW firm and 1,500 MW non-firm, as-available). While the total AC tie line capacity, calculated by adding the total capacity of all tie lines between the BAs at issue, may indicate a large transfer capacity, the actual ability to transfer power will be dependent on system conditions at the time of transfer, including ambient temperatures, generation outages and dispatch, transmission outages and derates, all of which drive actual power flows on transmission lines and can limit available transfer capability.

Figure 41: Illustration of MISO's Regional Directional Transfer




At 9:00 a.m., based on SPP's observed system conditions, SPP asked MISO to reduce its RDT limit (north-to-south power transfer) to 2,000 MW, and approximately an hour later, asked MISO to further reduce it to 1,500 MW. MISO complied with both requests, reducing the RDT, as shown in Figure 42, below. MISO and SPP coordinated to release the RDT reduction later that afternoon.

Figure 42: MISO Regional Directional Transfer (RDT) Flow,[156] December 23, 2022



156 Positive flow is MISO South-to-North flow; negative flow is MISO North-to-South flow. Image used by permission of MISO.

Figure 43: Status of TVA's Neighboring BAs for Potential of Scheduling Import Power, Morning of December 23



Throughout the morning of December 23, MISO's electricity demand continued to increase along with unplanned generation outages within its own footprint. At 9:15 a.m., MISO implemented a "Maximum Generation Warning" in MISO South.[157] MISO's entire BA footprint electricity demand also escalated throughout the morning of December 23, with morning and evening hour-average peak loads close in magnitude to one another. For the hour-ending 11:00 a.m., MISO's hourly load was 104,804 MW, 99 percent of what its evening peak hourly load would soon be. The combination of high system loads and higher-than-expected forced generation outages throughout the day eventually led MISO to declare an energy emergency at 5:30 p.m., as described further below.

SPP. SPP RC faced local transmission issues the morning of December 23. A combination of unplanned generating unit outages and transmission outages in the eastern SPP footprint contributed to depressed local voltage conditions in southwestern Missouri/northeastern Oklahoma.[158] In addition to these challenges, SPP BA faced operating reserve shortages to meet its early morning peak system load, which by hour-ending 10:00 a.m., had reached 96 percent of its previous-evening record-breaking winter peak load. From 9:27 a.m. to 11:00 a.m. on December 23, SPP declared EEA 1, and curtailed approximately 600 MW of non-firm exports due to its own operating reserve shortfalls, preventing SPP from being a source of power for neighboring BAs during that time. At 11:33 a.m., SPP declared a transmission operating emergency in response to abnormally large numbers of post-contingency system constraints that were breached due to system conditions. According to SPP, the purpose of its transmission operating emergency declaration was to ensure internal and neighboring entities were aware of the abnormal system conditions in its footprint. At 4:09 p.m., SPP terminated the transmission operating emergency. SPP did not need to implement pre-contingent load shed, but rather relied on post-contingent plans put in place by the TOPs within its footprint. At no time during the transmission operating emergency did SPP have an interconnection reliability operating limit (IROL) exceedance.

TVA. When TVA's available generation resources rapidly decreased the morning of December 23, TVA declared EEA 1 and 2 by 5:38 a.m., followed by EEA 3 at 6:12 a.m.

157 MISO's Maximum Generation Warning declaration, in addition to calling for all generation resources to be committed to meet load, called for its members to schedule in (to the MISO footprint) external resources, and to curtail non-firm exports.

158 AECI, a transmission operator and BA located in Missouri and northeastern Oklahoma, contacted TVA (its Reliability Coordinator) and other neighboring entities at approximately 8:30 a.m. to request voltage support for its southwestern Missouri/northeastern Oklahoma service area, which was affected by SPP's unplanned outages in the area. AECI declared a Transmission Emergency at 9:05 a.m., and prepared to shed load, but did not need to shed load due to improved conditions.

In addition to taking the emergency actions, TVA sought emergency energy from its neighboring BAs.

Initially, TVA received emergency energy imports from MISO, DEC, Southern, and PJM (depicted in Figure 43, above). These imports were sufficient to avert the need for TVA to order firm load shed for a time. By 9:38 a.m., PJM needed to curtail half (250 MW) of its emergency power delivery to TVA due to an SOL condition – a portion of PJM's emergency energy interchange schedule actual power flow caused a transmission facility within the PJM footprint to reach its emergency flow limit in real time.[159] Despite tightening conditions on the MISO system as the morning progressed, MISO maintained steadily increasing exports to TVA throughout the day. At 10:15 a.m., TVA was able to obtain 243 MW from its Reserve Sharing Group (from LG&E/KU), which offset a portion of the PJM reduction in emergency energy.[160] By 10:31 a.m., TVA operators ordered firm load shed of approximately five percent of its peak system load (estimated to provide over 1,500 MW in load reduction) in response to escalating unplanned generation outages (now at 6,500 MW, an increase of 2,000 MW since 5:00 a.m.) and rising electricity demand. At the same time, TVA's available emergency purchase power had decreased, and other neighboring BAs were unable to provide emergency energy.[161]

This was the first time in TVA's history that TVA ordered firm load shed. TVA would need to shed firm load a second time due to even worse conditions across the entire Event Area by early morning December 24. A little over two hours later, at 12:43 p.m., TVA was able to order restoration of firm load due to an increase in TVA's own available generation resources beginning early afternoon, and a limited increase in import power. These conditions enabled TVA to temporarily improve to EEA 2 for approximately three hours; it later returned to EEA 3 as the evening peak approached with energy supply conditions worsening.

c. Friday Evening, December 23: BES conditions continue to worsen

- Extreme cold weather now expands across LG&E/KU and PJM footprints
- Friday evening peak loads are highest for several BAs in Event Area
- Energy emergencies declared by SPP, TVA, MISO, LG&E/KU, and PJM
- MISO declares two local transmission emergencies, no load shed needed
- SPP returns back to EEA 1, challenges maintaining reserves
- TVA returns to EEA 3, continues load management measures and customer appeals for voluntary load reduction
- PJM and MISO declare EEA 2, implement load management measures
- LG&E/KU declares EEA 3, sheds firm load

During the day and into the evening hours on Friday, December 23, several BA footprints experienced the same challenging combination: rapidly increasing electricity demands due to the extreme cold weather (as illustrated in Figure 38, above), plus high levels of unplanned generation outages. For some BAs, the unplanned generation outages continued to increase at a rapid rate as illustrated earlier in Section III.

LG&E/KU. With LG&E/KU's system load already at 96 percent of its new all-time record winter peak load which occurred December 23, coupled with significant unplanned generation derates, by 1:36 p.m. on December 23, LG&E/KU declared EEA 3, but recovered to an EEA 2 by 2:52 p.m. At 4:29 p.m., PJM BA curtailed

159 High level of transmission facility loading or flow was further exacerbated by significant levels of unplanned generation outages (an N – "numerous" condition) combined with increasing electricity demands, in the region. PJM took appropriate actions to maintain the facility loading within its limit, maintaining BES reliability.

160 Again at 11:50 a.m., LG&/KU continued its assistance to TVA by extending provision of 243 MW Reserve Sharing to TVA.

161 As of 9:42 a.m., AECI BA was also at EEA 1. SPP, though not a neighboring BA to TVA but a potential source of power via wheeling through AECI or MISO, was also in an EEA 1 during this period.

the 400 MW import power due to experiencing rapidly increasing levels of unplanned generation outages coincident with increasing system load in its own footprint. With import power curtailment, at 4:29 p.m., LG&E/KU requested emergency energy from its contingency reserve sharing group. TVA, although in EEA 2 at the time, supplied LG&E/KU with 400 MW of emergency energy. At 4:45 p.m., LG&E/KU re-entered EEA 3. However, following TVA's return at 5:18 p.m. to an EEA 3 condition, at 6 p.m. it could no longer spare the 400 MW of emergency power to LG&E/KU. With the loss of its import power schedules to offset the generation derates, and its increasing system load conditions, LG&E/KU began over 300 MW firm load shed at 5:58 p.m. Over the next several hours, LG&E/KU was able to incrementally restore firm load that was shed as system loads decreased after its evening peak, and by 10:11 p.m., restored all firm load.

PJM. As the severe cold weather moved into the PJM area, loss of generation resources and load increases both exceeded their forecast amounts. As these factors increased throughout the Event, PJM needed to take emergency actions to mitigate the impact to its system. Earlier in the Event, before Winter Storm Elliott reached its footprint, PJM exported energy to neighboring BAs to its west that were short on capacity. However, as the storm moved in and the generation losses and loading increased on the PJM system, by 5:30 p.m. on December 23, PJM itself needed to declare EEA 2, invoking load management measures (e.g., demand response). PJM also reduced its energy exports, no longer able to be a source of power for BAs in need due to its own operating reserve shortfalls. According to PJM operators, PJM had barely avoided load shedding on December 23.[162]

Figures 44 and 45,[163] below, show how PJM's reserves declined throughout the day on December 23, driven heavily by unplanned generation forced outages in its footprint.

162 Affidavit of Paul McGlynn in Essential Power OPP, LLC et al. v. PJM Interconnection, LLC, Docket No. EL23-53-000, 23-54-000, 23-55-000 (hereafter "McGlynn Affidavit"), at ¶¶ 10, 34, 36-40, 48-51, 59.

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Figure 44: PJM Unplanned Generation Outages and Reserves, December 21-26, 2022




Figure 45: PJM BA Synchronized Reserves, December 23, 2:00 p.m. – December 24, 12:00 a.m.





Figure 46: PJM BA Area Control Error (ACE) and Actions Timeline, December 23, 4:15 p.m. – December 24, 6:15 p.m.



As shown in Figure 46[164] above, PJM was able to benefit from a Simultaneous Activation of Ten-Minute Reserve (SAR) agreement with the Northeast Power Coordinating Council (NPCC). The SAR Agreement allowed PJM to call on reserves of up to 1,500 MW during the Event. PJM requested SAR assistance five times between December 23 and 24, all of which were due to stressed system conditions. PJM remained in EEA 2 until midnight December 23, narrowly avoiding the need that evening to declare EEA 3 and shed firm load. By midnight, conditions improved enough for PJM to downgrade to EEA 1, but that was short-lived, as described further below.


MISO. System electricity demand levels remained elevated throughout the day on December 23. This was not only true for its south region, which, as described above, contributed to MISO invoking a maximum generation warning, but also for its entire footprint. Following MISO's morning peak load on December 23, demand levels remained at or above 95 percent of the Winter Storm Elliott peak demand that MISO would experience that evening. Those high loads, coupled with unplanned generation outages increasing throughout the afternoon, led MISO to declare EEA 1 at 5:30 p.m. and EEA 2 at 6:00 p.m., when load and generation losses did not improve. Similar to PJM, when MISO declared EEA 2, it implemented its demand response, which reduced the electricity demand in its footprint. MISO remained in EEA 2 until 9:00 p.m., when its electricity demand lessened.

During the evening of December 23, MISO RC operators declared two local transmission emergencies to help manage congestion on its system. As shown in Figure 47, below, on December 23, in southeastern Wisconsin, MISO established a post-contingent mitigation plan to avoid significant redispatch of generation within that local area. Also on December 23, in eastern Missouri, MISO declared a local transmission emergency, which provided access to additional hydroelectric generation that was only available during emergency conditions.

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
Finally, MISO declared a Transmission Loading Relief (TLR) 5[165] to manage transfers for a post-contingent constraint in southeastern Michigan, which was in effect from December 24 at 2:00 a.m. until 12:00 p.m. on December 26.

Figure 47: MISO Local Transmission Emergencies, Evening of December 23, 2022



165 Transmission Loading Relief (TLR) 5 is the highest level of Transmission Loading Relief that can be declared by a Transmission Provider. If system conditions warrant, a TLR 5 can enable the Transmission Provider to curtail a firm transmission reservation(s) to decrease the impact on an overloaded transmission facility. If a Transmission Provider curtails a Firm Transmission Reservation, it must curtail its own firm load on an equal basis.

Figure 48: December 24, 2022 Actual Minimum Temperatures – Lower 48



SPP. Just as in the morning, SPP BA was still facing operating reserve shortages to meet its December 23 evening peak system load, which by hour-ending 7:00 p.m., was already over 90 percent of December 22's evening record peak load and rising. The evening of December 23, SPP declared its second EEA 1 from 6:20 p.m. to 9:20 p.m. and curtailed approximately 1,100 MW of non-firm exports, which prevented SPP from being a source of power for BAs in need due to its own reserve shortfalls.


TVA. At 5:18 p.m., TVA returned to EEA 3 because neighboring entities such as Southern were dealing with their own energy emergencies by reducing their energy exports to TVA, and TVA's electricity demand was trending toward what would become its all-time record winter peak load later that evening. TVA, now at risk of shedding firm load, recalled the 400 MW contingency reserves that it was providing LG&E/KU at 6:00 p.m. This action, combined with later receiving emergency energy imports through their evening peak hours from DEC and Southern enabled TVA to avoid shedding firm load that evening. TVA would not be able to avoid load shed by the next morning. Figure 39, above, includes a timeline illustrating the Energy Emergencies declared by BAs on December 23.

d. Saturday Morning, December 24: Many simultaneous BES Energy Emergency conditions

- Extreme cold weather expands across southeastern U.S.
- Responsive reserves decline across the Core Event Area
- Simultaneous energy emergencies exist in TVA, LG&E/KU, PJM, DEC, DEP, DESC, Southern, and Santee Cooper
- PJM returns back to EEA 2, implements load management measures, and makes customer appeals for voluntary load reduction
- TVA, DEC, DEP, DESC, Santee Cooper BAs declare EEA 3, shed firm load
- Southern declares EEA 2, obtains emergency energy from Florida, implements load management measures to lower system load, did not need to shed firm load
- NYISO and ISO-NE impacts

Extreme cold weather continues – generation reserves continue to diminish. In the overnight hours heading into the morning of December 24, the extreme cold weather conditions accompanying Winter Storm Elliott eventually blanketed the southeastern U.S. all the way to the Atlantic Ocean, Figure 48, above).

Figure 49: PJM BA Frequency Plot and ACE Conditions, December 24, 2:00 a.m. – 8:00 a.m.



The pattern of unplanned generation outages and high electricity demands seen in the BA footprints described above continued overnight and into the morning of December 24 for BA footprints located in the easternmost region of the U.S. Forced outages and derates of generating units continued to diminish BA reserves during the early morning hours of December 24.

PJM. PJM began December 24 in EEA 1. As the PJM BA continued to experience significant unplanned generation outages and derates through the early morning hours as referenced in Figure 27, above, at 4:00 a.m. on December 24, PJM issued a call for voluntary conservation to last until 10:00 a.m. on December 25. PJM estimated that responses to its call for conservation helped to reduce load beginning at about 7:15 a.m.

At 4:20 a.m., PJM BA needed to return to EEA 2. At 4:23 a.m., PJM BA had a low ACE event,[166] and called for over 1,000 MW of synchronized (responsive) reserves from its reserve-assigned generation. Only 169 MW of synchronized generation reserves responded (a 16.8 percent response rate).[167]

As shown in Figure 49,[168] above, at 4:25 a.m., PJM BA issued EEA 2, and called for Maximum Generation Emergency Action. PJM also used load management measures during its EEA 2, to take effect at 6:00 a.m. At 6:17 a.m., PJM BA asked Market Participants to submit bids to sell emergency energy in case PJM needed to purchase or import emergency energy, but other actions that PJM took averted the need for the PJM BA to purchase emergency energy. At 6:30 a.m., PJM BA received reports that generators were having to limit their output due to federal government environmental restrictions. PJM petitioned the Department of Energy (DOE), and DOE later granted permission,[169] to lift emissions-related restrictions until noon, Monday December 26.

166 A low ACE event is the Low Balancing Authority ACE Limit (MW), calculated based on the Low Frequency Trigger Limit of approximately 59.95 Hz for the Eastern Interconnection. *See* Figure 49, above, and NERC Reliability Standard BAL-001-2 – Real Power Balancing Control Performance, Attachment 2. RSCompleteSet.pdf (nerc.com).

167 PJM has normally seen performance over the past three years in the 50 – 70 percent response range when calling for synchronized reserves.

168 Reproduced with permission of PJM and copyrighted by PJM.

169 PJM secured the order from the DOE under section 202(c) of the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. § 824a(c)). PJM received the DOE order at 5:45 p.m. on December 24 and immediately implemented it.

At 7:15 a.m., PJM BA issued a Voltage Reduction Warning and Reduction of Non-Critical Plant Load, indicating that a voltage reduction[170] may be required during a future critical period. At 7:30 a.m., PJM BA conducted an SOS Transmission conference call on which PJM BA advised TOs to prepare for a Voltage Reduction Action (i.e., order to perform voltage reduction) and to be sure to have their load shed plans in place. By 8:00 a.m., over 24 percent of the PJM generation fleet (approximately 46,000 MW) was experiencing a forced outage, which was higher than the 22 percent forced outage level that PJM experienced during the Polar Vortex in 2014.[171] In total, PJM BA faced approximately 57,000 MW of generator unavailability for the morning peak on December 24 (including planned outages and forced outages that began before the Event). The other load management measures improved system conditions enough over the next few hours that PJM did not need to order voltage reduction or firm load shed on the morning of December 24.[172] At first PJM estimated that its load management efforts reduced load by 7,400 MW, but it later realized that it only received approximately 3,500 MW.[173] Still, PJM was able to restore exports to support its neighbors by 10 a.m. At 10:00 p.m., PJM BA terminated its EEA.

TVA. As shown in Figure 39, above, TVA remained at EEA 3 since the evening of December 23. At 5:51 a.m. on December 24, with its system load still near where it had peaked the evening before, unplanned generation outages still occurring, and its import power curtailed, the TVA BA area again ordered firm load shed of approximately five percent of its peak system load/1,500 MW. At 6:12 a.m., TVA suffered an additional curtailment of import power and ordered an additional five percent firm load shed (10 percent total, estimated by TVA to be a 3,200 MW reduction).[174] TVA later incurred an additional unit trip of nearly 300 MW and was unable to reduce back to five percent of its peak system load until 10:27 a.m. Finally, at 11:30 a.m. TVA BA released its order for the remaining five percent load shed. As system load began to decrease and some generating capacity returned to service, TVA lowered from EEA 3 to EEA 2 at 12:08 p.m., dropping to EEA 1 at 1:07 p.m. and terminating its EEA at 1:45 p.m.

DEC. Already in EEA 1 at the start of December 24, as unplanned generation outages increased and PJM BA curtailed export schedules to DEC, DEC declared EEA 2 at 4:30 a.m., and EEA 3 at 6:10 a.m. By 6:27 a.m., DEC ordered 400 MW of firm load shed, later increasing it to 1,000 MW at 7:10 a.m. Later that morning, as system load dropped and a generation plant returned to service, DEC ordered the restoration of firm load at 10:00 a.m. DEC manually restored the last load shed circuits at 3:45 p.m.

DEP. Experiencing conditions similar to DEC, DEP declared EEA 1 December 24 at 5:37 a.m. DEP escalated to EEA 2 at 6:06 a.m. when its purchased power was curtailed, and to EEA 3 at 6:18 a.m. after an additional generation outage. With system load increasing, DEP ordered 600 MW of firm load shed at 6:25 a.m., but increased it to 800 MW at 7:10 a.m., up to a maximum of 961 MW by 7:56 a.m. By 8:14 a.m. DEP began restoring a portion of its firm load,

170 Based on transmission equipment which exists in certain locations of the BES, electric grid operators can control the transmission equipment to reduce voltage levels to lower the BA system load (while maintaining BES reliability) as an emergency load management measure, in advance of and to reduce the need for firm load shed. *See* PJM Manual 13: Emergency Operations.

171 McGlynn Affidavit, at ¶ 13.

172 At 6:15 p.m. on December 24, PJM ended the Voltage Reduction Warning and Reduction of Non-Critical Plant Load, and the Voltage Reduction Alert at 6:34 p.m.

173 PJM Report at 42 (for December 23 (1,100) and 24 (2,400).

174 In addition to PJM, other BAs neighboring TVA had concerns of meeting their own load/reserve requirements the morning of December 24 based on high electricity demands and unplanned generation outages, derates, and failures to start experienced thus far during Winter Storm Elliott. For example, with the SPP BA experiencing challenges to maintaining adequate operating reserves twice on December 23 during morning and evening peak timeframes, to limit further increase of the export of the SPP BA, the SPP transmission service provider (TSP) reduced their total [power] transfer capability (TTC) of the SPP export interface from December 23, 10:00 p.m., through December 25, 1:00 p.m. SPP BA communicated this action with MISO, TVA and Southern and notified them to contact SPP if they needed assistance and SPP would evaluate its ability to help. These calls were on the morning of the 24th. (*See* SPP Report at 9).

restoring all by 8:43 a.m. DEP improved to EEA 1 at 4:20 p.m.

DESC. With increasing generation outage levels, on December 24, at 4:56 a.m., DESC declared EEA 2 and initiated load management procedures, followed by voltage reductions to reduce system load. By 5:53 a.m., DESC declared EEA 3. At 8:00 a.m., DESC ordered approximately 95 MW firm load shed. DESC was able to purchase 100 MW of import power from Southern, and by 8:09 a.m., restored its firm load. DESC continued to implement load management, customer appeals for conservation, and voltage reduction to lower its system load, and at 7:10 p.m., dropped to EEA 2. DESC remained at this level overnight until 9:00 a.m. on December 25 when it exited its energy emergency.

Santee Cooper. Santee Cooper began experiencing unplanned generation outages related to Winter Storm Elliott during the early morning hours of December 24. At 5:34 a.m., Santee Cooper declared EEA 1, and by 7:18 a.m. was at EEA 3 and ordered 86 MW firm load shed. At 7:33 a.m., Santee Cooper ordered all firm load shed restored.

Southern, NYISO, and ISO-NE. On December 24, due to the unplanned generation outages and increasing loads, Southern BA declared an EEA 1 at 2:00 a.m. The Southern BA requested implementation of voltage reduction programs to help reduce load on its system. Faced with additional unplanned generation outages, at 6:25 a.m., the Southern BA declared an EEA 2 due to declining operating reserves and expected load increase, and requested emergency energy from its neighbors. At 7:00 a.m., Florida Power and Light provided 1,000 MW of emergency energy to the Southern BA Area. As it began to receive emergency energy from Florida Power, the Southern BA was able to provide 100 MW of emergency energy assistance to DESC. By midday, Southern BA load began to decrease, and Southern BA was able to increase this assistance to DESC to 400 MW at 1:00 pm, and by 2:15 p.m., downgraded to an EEA 1. As the need for emergency energy decreased due to improved system conditions in the DESC BA area, Southern BA decreased its emergency energy to 200 MW and finally to 0 MW at 10:00 p.m.

With the winter storm making its way to New York and New England, the governor of New York on Thursday December 22, declared a state of emergency for the entirety of New York, and on the same day, the National Weather Service Buffalo upgraded the winter storm watch to a blizzard warning, and warned of possible blizzard conditions in Buffalo to begin Friday afternoon December 23, and to last approximately 30 hours, with peak wind speeds that could reach approximately 70 mph, with one to three feet of snow.[175] Although there were over 100,000 power outages in the NYISO footprint, as well as tens of thousands of customers without power in the ISO-NE footprint across Maine, Vermont, and New Hampshire, they were mostly due to the winter storm's impact on the electric distribution systems. While there were unplanned BES generation outages in the NYISO footprint during the Event, NYISO did not need to enter into an energy emergency and was able to assist neighboring BAs during the Event, such as PJM, with reserves as described earlier in Section III.

ISO-NE needed to invoke EEA 1 the evening of December 24. ISO-NE incurred over 2,000 MW of unplanned generation outages and derates in its footprint on December 24, and also experienced over 1,000 MW reduction of import power from Hydro Quebec due to the winter storm's impact on Hydro Quebec's system. Those conditions, coupled with high electricity demands, led ISO-NE to declare EEA 1 from 4:30 p.m. to 7:00 p.m., which was then cancelled as conditions improved in its BA.

e. Operating Conditions Improve - Evening of December 24 –December 25

- Core Event Area operating conditions improve
- Energy Emergencies end

175 NEW YORK STATE PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE EFFORTS Blizzard of 2022 After-Action Review (August 2023) at 15, https://www.dhses.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2023/08/nys-aar-on-buffalo-blizzard-response.pdf.

As Christmas Eve and Christmas Day unfolded, Event Area electricity demands decreased (as seen on the graph in Figure 39, above). Also, on December 25, extreme cold weather ushered in by Elliott began to subside in some of the BA footprints. Some generating units also returned to service and increased BA reserve levels. However, also as shown in the Figure 39 timeline, above, multiple BAs were experiencing Energy Emergencies which extended into midday, December 25, although none needed to shed firm load on Christmas Day:

- DEC BA, returned to EEA 1, December 24, at 4:00 p.m., EEA 1 cancelled on December 25, at 11:00 a.m.
- DEP BA, EEA 1 cancelled on December 25, at 9:00 a.m.
- DESC BA, cancelled EEA 2 on December 25, at 9:00 am.
- Santee Cooper BA, EEA 2 until December 25, 5:04 a.m., EEA 1 cancelled December 25, at 9:00 a.m.
- Southern BA, EEA 1 cancelled December 25, 12:00 noon.
- PJM BA, EEA 1 cancelled December 24, at 10:00 p.m.

4. NATURAL GAS PIPELINE OPERATORS' REAL-TIME ACTIONS

a. Pipeline Operator Actions Due to Natural Gas Supply Shortfalls and Equipment/Facility Outages

1. Gas Pipeline Scheduling

The natural gas scheduling system is based on the Gas Day which is standard nationwide, beginning at 9:00 a.m. CCT[176] and ending at 9:00 a.m. CCT the following day. All nominations for transportation service are for a daily quantity to be transported over that 24-hour period. The rate at which a shipper may use its contracted quantity, also known as a flow rate, on a given pipeline is determined by the individual pipeline's tariff and the flexibility of that pipeline to permit non-ratable flows (that is, delivery in a single hour of more than 1/24 of the daily nominated quantity). Except for special services, pipeline services are generally based on the assumption of uniform hourly flows over the Gas Day.

At a designated time each day, a shipper "nominates" a quantity of natural gas that it wishes to have transported by the pipeline under a transportation contract between receipt and delivery locations on the pipeline. The nomination goes through a confirmation and scheduling process to ensure that the nomination matches the amount of gas that the pipeline will receive from or deliver to the designated locations, and that there is enough available capacity for the nomination to flow. Before a pipeline schedules a shipper's nominated quantity of natural gas for transportation, the pipeline confirms the shipper's nomination with upstream and downstream parties to make sure the shipper has contracted for sufficient gas with an upstream supplier to fulfill its nomination, and to ensure the downstream entity, such as an LDC, has sufficient capacity to accept the gas. If demand for service along a specific path exceeds the pipeline's capacity (i.e., if a pipeline has capacity constraint), priority rules are used to schedule higher priority nominations while lower priority nominations are reduced or rejected. After all gas has been scheduled, nominations are confirmed back to the shippers and the pipeline is obligated to deliver the confirmed nominated quantity of gas.

2. Gas Pipeline Operations Under Normal Conditions

Natural gas pipelines (and LDCs) have operations centers or control rooms that are staffed 24 hours a day, every day of the year. Pipeline personnel known as controllers monitor the pipeline systems for, among other things, operational status, natural gas flow rates, and readings of the natural gas pressure within the pipeline and temperatures. Controllers are the first to notice and respond to abnormalities such as pressure changes or compressor failures and notify and to communicate with field personnel who respond to these conditions.

Each pipeline must maintain a minimum pressure for gas to flow and must stay below the maximum allowable

176 Central Clock Time, which is Central Standard Time except during Daylight Savings Time, when it is one hour in advance of Central Standard Time.

operating pressure at which it can safely operate (MAOP). Like electric grid operators, pipeline operators use Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA);[177] pipelines use it primarily to monitor the flow of gas on the system.

Line pack is the volume of gas maintained or held within a pipeline system. The more gas that is "packed" into the pipeline, the higher the pressure. System operators continually manage the amount of gas in their pipelines to ensure that customer demands can be met while staying within safe and reliable pressure ranges, which vary from pipeline to pipeline. Pipelines rely on line pack to match the time-varying demands of their customers (shippers) and the supply of natural gas that generally is injected into the pipeline at a consistent rate through the day (production gas). Under normal operating conditions, line pack on a pipeline goes through a 24-hour cycle. During the morning peak, when some shippers, such as electric generating units, withdraw gas at a non-ratable flow rate, the line pack decreases. Later in the day, when shippers either pause or decrease the rate of gas withdrawal, pipelines pack the lines to replenish the gas taken off the system. As long as a customer's gas usage does not threaten the pipeline system's integrity, pipeline operators may provide customers with the flexibility of non-ratable flows or deviation from their scheduled quantity. Additionally, pipelines generally offer balancing services and bill their shippers monthly to allow for daily fluctuations. This allows shippers up to 30 days to balance the amount of gas that shippers delivered into the pipeline with the quantity of gas that was taken off the pipeline. Lastly, during normal operating conditions, if the pipeline is not constrained and is able to meet all of its firm contractual nominations, any excess capacity can be used for interruptible transportation service.

Ahead of weather events or at other times that stress the system, a pipeline system operator will store gas in its transmission system during the hours of low demand (packing) leading up to the event, and then use that gas during the hours of high demand, reducing the amount of gas in the system (drafting). During periods of high demand, natural gas supplies flowing ratably[178] into a pipeline over the 24-hour gas-day period may not be sufficient to satisfy the increased demand from shippers in the same overlapping period leading to the draft condition. A draft condition occurs when supply is less than demand. This may occur on an hourly or daily basis. A draft condition leads to lower line pressure and/or reduced line pack, to which operators respond with a variety of approaches, such as reduced system tolerances and the use of natural gas imbalance management techniques designed to maintain system integrity and provide reliable service to all shippers.

During constraint periods, a pipeline may more strictly enforce ratable flows and reduce system imbalances by requiring shippers to match their supply of gas delivered into the pipeline with the amount taken out. If a shipper's supply of natural gas into the pipeline is less than its nominated amount, a pipeline may reduce the shipper's confirmed nomination to match the amount of natural gas actually delivered into the pipeline system.[179] Pipelines may also use the types of notices described below in the sidebar on pipeline communications to keep the system balanced and within operating pressure range.[180] By using notices to reduce the amount of gas customers may take off the pipeline or the rate at which the gas is being taken off, pipelines can keep pressure up. During the Event, one pipeline restored its line pack by reversing flow in a segment of its system, but not all pipelines have that ability. Pipelines may also reduce or curtail certain

177 A Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system operates via coded signals sent over communication channels to remote stations to monitor and provide control of remote equipment.

178 Meaning at a constant rate; receipt operators flow on a steady-rate basis as mentioned above. Steady-state flow refers to the condition where the fluid properties at a point in the system do not change over time.

179 Changes in gas deliveries do not occur instantly. Operational Balancing Agreements (OBA) contractually specify how gas imbalances between flows and scheduled amounts are to be managed. Interstate pipelines are obligated by FERC regulations to have OBAs at interconnects with other interstate pipelines and with intrastate pipelines. These agreements enable counterparties to make operational changes and revise nominations.


180 *See* sidebar on pipeline communications at 76, below.

transportation services based on their priority level (e.g., interruptible transportation) if their capacity cannot meet all of the demand.

Pipelines can turn some facilities on and off, whether by remote operation via SCADA or manually using field personnel, to alleviate pressure concerns that could affect the reliability of their system. However, this option is rarely exercised. In 2011, New Mexico Gas Company curtailed pipelines to several rural communities when it received reports of no gas or low gas pressure in the Albuquerque area, indicating that its system was near collapse.[181] These curtailments allowed pressure to recover in the remainder of its system. The option to turn off facilities feeding shippers at designated delivery points that are supplying less gas than they are withdrawing is rarely, if ever, exercised. If enough customers take more gas than they are entitled to, this can negatively affect pipeline pressures for customers located farther down the pipeline.

Interstate pipelines use storage to support system operations (e.g., to provide system balancing or support no-notice transportation services), to provide contract storage services, or a combination of both. Interstate pipeline companies, intrastate pipeline companies, LDCs and independent storage service providers may own and operate underground or above-ground storage facilities. However, the owners/operators of storage are not necessarily the owners of the natural gas held in storage.

Figure 50: Magnitude of Supply Shortages by Receipt Point Locations for Gas Days December 20-26, 2022



Most of the working gas held in storage belongs to shippers, LDCs, or end users who own the gas. Some interstate pipelines reserve varying amounts (from three percent to 22 percent) of their natural gas storage capacity to support their system operations. During extreme cold weather events withdrawals from customers with rights to storage such as LDCs (for natural gas-fired home heating, among other uses) increases. In Winter Storm Uri, the South Central Region (including Texas) saw record storage withdrawals of 156 Bcf for the week ending February 19,

181 2011 Report at 127-130.

2021, which were instrumental in preventing more adverse outcomes on both the natural gas infrastructure system and the grid.

Each of these tools is important in maintaining the reliability of the pipeline system, allowing operators to ensure the proper amount of gas flows through the system. Force majeure can be issued when emergency conditions, such as freezing of equipment, threaten operations. OFOs are important because they notify shippers to stay within their nominated and confirmed quantities of gas or risk penalties.

3. Gas Pipeline Real-Time Operations During Winter Storm Elliott

Once Winter Storm Elliott struck, many pipelines began to experience decreased natural gas supply at numerous receipt points, which are the points where pipelines receive gas into their system. Figure 50, shows the magnitude of supply shortages during the relevant period by receipt point locations. Ten out of the 15 surveyed pipelines reported supply loss or underperformance, defined as the actual physical receipts being less than the shipper's confirmed nomination. The magnitude of supply loss is represented on Figure 50 by the green to red color gradient, with red indicating a higher volume of supply loss. Figure 50 clearly shows significant supply reductions at receipt points located in the Marcellus and Utica Shale formations. Pipelines also indicated that although they can track the volume of supply underperforming at receipt points on their respective systems, they were not always privy to the upstream issues causing the supply loss.

Pipeline Communications


Interstate pipelines issue a variety of communications and directives to shippers and, pursuant to FERC regulations (18 CFR §284.12 (2022)), post critical notices to describe strained operating conditions, to issue operational flow orders and, when applicable, to make force majeure announcements. Most intrastate pipelines provide similar information and instructions to shippers, either by posting or direct communications.

Critical notices describe situations when the integrity of the pipeline system is threatened. A critical notice will specify the reasons for and conditions making issuance necessary, and also state any actions required of shippers. Operational integrity may be determined by use of criteria such as the weather forecast for the market area and field area; system conditions consisting of line pack, overall projected pressures at monitored locations, and storage field conditions; facility status (defined as horsepower utilization) and availability; and projected throughput versus availability, for capacity and supply.

Operational flow orders (OFO) are used to control operating conditions that threaten the integrity of a pipeline system. (Individual pipeline companies may have other names for operational flow orders such as alert days, performance cut notices or an emergency strained operating condition). OFOs request that shippers balance their supply with their usage on a daily basis within a specified tolerance band. An OFO can be system-wide or apply to selected points. Failure by a shipper to comply with an OFO may lead to penalties. Pipelines may also limit services such as parking and lending of natural gas, no-notice (the provision of natural gas service without prior notice to the pipeline), interruptible storage and excess storage withdrawals and injections.

Force majeure, if authorized by the pipeline's tariff, is a declaration of the suspension of obligations because of unplanned or unanticipated events or circumstances not within the control of the party claiming suspension, and which the party could not have avoided through the exercise of reasonable diligence.

Figure 51: Natural Gas Supply and Demand, December 1 – 31, 2022[182]



Starting the morning of December 23, pipeline operators were faced with increasing demand for natural gas after seeing supply shortfalls throughout the night of December 23 (see supply and demand pattern in Figure 51, above). Supply shortfalls peaked on December 24 at 7.1 Bcf. The mismatch between supply and demand challenged pipeline operators' ability to provide consistent, dependable natural gas operations needed by generating units. Line pack was one strategy pipelines used to handle these hourly fluctuations in supply and demand, partially to assist generators' operations.

Figure 52 below, shows that the ongoing imbalance between the gas entering and leaving the pipeline systems caused the interstate pipelines' line pack to continuously drop throughout December 24. Pipelines actively monitored their line pack and pressures and responded promptly; issuing underperformance notices to shippers to inform them that they were not supplying all of the gas they were obligated to supply. To meet confirmed nominations of customers, pipelines used line pack and/or gas from storage to try to cover shortfalls as much as possible. These efforts were successful at the onset of the storm, allowing pipelines to deliver confirmed nominations of gas to meet customers' demand. However, as the storm progressed, supply shortfalls continued and customers' demand increased to a level where some customers began taking more gas than what they supplied and/or confirmed through nominations, which contributed to low pipeline pressures. On December 24, due to the mismatch of shippers' receipt and delivery volume, multiple shippers' confirmed nominations were reduced to match their supply of gas into the pipeline.

Figures 53 and 54, below, show the notices issued by the pipelines in advance of the Event on December 20 as well as during the Event from December 21 to 26. Force majeure and OFO issuances peaked on December 23, while critical notices peaked on December 24. One pipeline had compressor station outages that led to three force majeure issuances, affecting 93 firm shippers; another issued five force majeures from December 23 to 25 due to freezing-related compressor station outages, affecting 63 firm shippers.

182 Source: S&P Global Commodity Insights, ©2023 by S&P Global Inc.

Figure 52: Average of Normalized Line Pack Pressures For the 15 Interstate Pipelines Surveyed, December 20 – 26, 2022




Figure 53: Interstate Natural Gas Pipeline Notices Issued, December 20 – 26, 2022





Figure 54: Ongoing Notices with Associated Flow Reductions, December 20 – 26, 2022



Low pipeline pressures caused by reduced gas supply entering pipelines combined with increased demand also resulted in issues at interstate pipeline interconnections with other pipelines, where shippers' gas supply quantities were inconsistent with shippers' confirmed nominations on the receiving pipeline; resulting in confirmed nominations that failed to align with the quantity of gas flowing. These issues caused imbalances


between supply and demand at pipeline interconnection points, requiring some pipelines to implement scheduling restrictions and forcibly reduce previously confirmed nominations. The scheduling restrictions and forcible reduction of confirmed nominations may not have been necessary if non-performing shippers had acted to address their lack of performance. The pipelines had to contact those shippers repeatedly to find out how they planned to balance their gas flows and in some instances were unable to do so before it became necessary to implement scheduling restrictions and reduce nominations.

Several of the pipelines communicated with PJM or NYISO during the Event. These discussions allowed the pipelines to obtain useful information, for example, about PJM's load forecast or burn profiles for gas generators, and to share the performance of their systems and available capacity with the BAs. One pipeline provided PJM with a list of receipt points that were underperforming according to their nominated levels.[183]

2. INTERREGIONAL NATURAL GAS FLOW PATTERN CHANGES

As weather affected natural gas supply, demand, and pipeline operations, the movement of natural gas between regions in the eastern half of the United States changed. The Northeast region reduced outflows to neighboring regions and increased imports from Canada, while the Southeast region simultaneously increased outflows to the Midwest, decreased outflows through LNG exports, and had less access to Northeast supply.

Figure 55: Natural gas flows into and out of the U.S. Northeast region[184]



Since the dramatic growth of shale natural gas production in the Northeast began over a decade ago, the region has produced substantially more natural gas than it consumed, allowing for net outflows of


183 Winter Storm Elliott hit on a holiday weekend. This created pressure on pipelines' communications teams because of an increase in shipper inquiries due to the large volume of confirming party reductions they issued. This required some of the pipelines to call in vacationing staff.

184 Flow size arrows are approximate. Region borders are generalized and may not reflect modeled pipeline zones. Source: S&P Global Commodity Insights, ©2023 by S&P Global Inc.

natural gas to the south and west most of the time.[185] As seen in Figure 55 above, however, by the end of the Event, net scheduled outflows declined to just 5.3 Bcfd, compared to typical outflows of about 12.5 Bcfd (as measured a week earlier). The Northeast also typically sees substantial imports from Canada over the winter, and during the Event the Northeast increased its imports from Canada, with most of the LNG imports received coming from the Saint John LNG facility in New Brunswick, Canada. Net flows toward the southeast fell 4.8 Bcfd on December 16 to just over 1 Bcfd on December 26, which was the biggest portion of the reduction in total net outflows from the Northeast.

The change in flow patterns was not enough to change the Northeast into a net importer of natural gas, but, as seen in Figure 56 below, overall net outflows from the region reached a low of just under three Bcfd over the Christmas weekend. Flows did not return to their pre-storm levels of about 12 Bcfd, until December 30, 2022. Net outflows from the Northeast to the Midwest reduced by half during the Event as shippers in the Northeast kept more gas in-region and drops in production meant less gas was available after meeting Northeast regional demand. Cove Point LNG in Maryland consistently received flows for export throughout the Event, but also appears to have delivered significant volumes of natural gas back onto the pipeline system from its on-site storage at the same time.

Figure 56: Net Interregional Flows From the Northeast Over the Second Half of December 2023[186]



For the last decade, the Southeast region typically has received substantial net inflows, reversing the historic northwards flow direction on many of the major interstate pipelines. The Midwest market has in the recent past been supported by Northeast outflows, but during the Event Northeast outflows to the Midwest declined, creating room for flows from the Southeast. As a result, flows from the Northeast declined substantially while the Southeast increased net outflows to the Midwest. LNG feed gas demand declined, possibly due to higher supply costs for exporters that rely on spot purchases or difficulty in obtaining transportation capacity for exporters that use interruptible transmission. As seen in Figures 57 and 58 below, some

185 The data presented in this section is based on scheduled Intraday Cycle 3 nominations, which may not reflect actual pipeline flows due to irregular receipts by shippers.

186 Source: S&P Global Commodity Insights, ©2023 by S&P Global Inc.

amount of LNG regasification occurred in the Southeast during the Event, likely at LDC storage facilities and possibly at some LNG export facilities.

Figure 57: Natural Gas Flows Into and Out of the U.S. Southeast Region[187]





Figure 58: Interregional Flows from the Southeast over the second half of December 2023[188]



a. Storage Operations


The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) collects and provides weekly estimates of working gas volumes held in underground storage facilities in the lower 48 states and at five regional levels. EIA breaks down regions

187 Flow size arrows are approximate. Region borders are generalized and may not reflect modeled pipeline zones. Source: S&P Global Commodity Insights, ©2023 by S&P Global Inc.

188 Source: S&P Global Commodity Insights, ©2023 by S&P Global Inc.


for natural gas storage into the Pacific, Mountain, Midwest, South Central, and East. These are geographically-defined regions and the storage fields are concentrated in the South Central, East, and Midwest regions (see Figure 59, below). Changes in these gas inventories on a weekly basis primarily reflect net withdrawals or injections.

Figure 59: Natural Gas Storage Field Regions of the U.S.




According to S&P Global Insights data there was a notable decline in inventory of stored natural gas during the Event, which reflected reliance on stored natural gas as natural gas production fell and demand increased. Although the natural gas storage levels did not dip below the lowest level reflected in the five-year range, they did dip below both the five-year average and levels seen the year before (see Figure 60, below). S&P uses different regions from EIA, which vary slightly in the Event Area (e.g., Ohio and Kentucky are in the Northeast, not the East, and there is no South Central, only Southeast, Texas and Midcon Producing (Oklahoma, Arkansas, and Kansas).

Figure 60: Natural Gas Storage Levels: November 18, 2022 – February 3, 2023, and Five-Year Average for Same Period[189]



The majority of withdrawals during the Event were in the South Central, Midwest, and East Regions (see Figures 61 and 62, below). Once the storm passed and temperatures rose, gas returned to storage and the South Central region experienced net positive injections. During the Event, 235 Bcf of natural gas was withdrawn from storage nationwide to meet the heightened natural gas demand, a 55.5 percent increase in withdrawals from storage as compared to the five days prior (December 16-21). Regionally, the three most affected regions of the Northeast, Southeast, and Midwest withdrew 160.0 Bcf of natural gas from storage, nearly 70 percent of all withdrawals from storage in the U.S.


Figure 61: Natural Gas Storage Net Withdrawals From the Relevant Regions: December 15 – December 31, 2022[190]



189 Source: S&P Global Commodity Insights, ©2023 by S&P Global Inc.

190 Figures 61 and 62: source: S&P Global Commodity Insights, ©2023 by S&P Global Inc.

Figure 62: Natural Gas Storage Net Withdrawals in the U.S.: December 15 – December 31, 2022



c. Natural Gas-Fired Generating Units Faced with Loss of Interruptible Transportation, Inability to Find Sufficient Supply, and Force Majeure Cutoffs of Firm Transportation

The mismatch between the availability of gas and the demand from natural gas-fired generating units on December 23 and 24 had an immediate and substantial impact on generation. Natural gas-fired generating units that responded to inquiry data requests relayed their experiences in this period:


- A 300 MW+ fossil steam unit in SPP cut its generation in half early on December 23 because the gas supplier under its interruptible pipeline delivery arrangement was experiencing a supply limitation.
- An 800 MW+ combined cycle unit in PJM with a firm supply contract reported, on the morning of December 23, that it was forced to cease generating entirely because "gas fuel [was] unavailable."
- Four affiliated gas turbines in PJM, whose collective capacity was in excess of 800 MW, reported on December 23 that fuel unavailability due to market conditions had caused them to stop generating.
- Six centrally-located affiliated gas turbine units owned by a vertically-integrated utility, each with a capacity of nearly 200 MW, reduced their generation by more than 50 percent on the afternoon of December 23 because their pipeline was unable to provide the minimum delivery pressure to the units.
- In the late afternoon of December 23, a gas turbine located in PJM with nearly 200 MW capacity ceased generation because its gas supplier was unable to meet its needs under its firm pipeline delivery arrangement.

These individual narratives—just a handful of examples from many—illustrate the larger collective experience of natural gas-fired generating units during this critical period. On December 23 and 24, more than 41,700 MW of natural gas-fired generation reported outages, derates, or failures to start due to Fuel Issues. Figure 63, below lists the major sub-causes of Fuel Issues experienced by natural gas-fired generating units.

Figure 63: Gross Unavailable MW, Natural Gas Units Experiencing Fuel Issues, Top Sub-Causes, December 23-24, 2022

Fuel Issue - Sub-Cause[191]	December 23	December 24
Interruptible Pipeline Delivery Interruption	6,268	5,485
Market Issues	5,173	9,913
Firm Pipeline Delivery Curtailment	4,533	700
Gas Delivery Pressure Issues	1,532	2,557
Market Price Restriction	1,040	0
Failure to Fulfill Firm Supply Obligations	972	2,852
Transportation Scheduling Constraints	716	0
TOTAL	**20,234**	**21,507**

Figure 64: Incremental Unplanned Unavailable Generation in the Event Area, Natural Gas Units, Fuel Issues, December 22 - 25, 2022



There is a clear relationship between these outages and the system-wide struggle to obtain gas and maintain pressures described above. As illustrated in the below chart, there is a sharp upwards trend in net incremental natural gas-fired generation lost to Fuel Issues beginning the morning of December 23, just as pipelines began to experience supply shortfalls. As illustrated in Figure 64 above, starting that morning, and over the next 24 hours, nearly 19,000 MW of net incremental generation from natural gas-fired generating units were lost due to Fuel Issues.

d. Reliability-Threatening Delivery Pressure Decreases at Major Natural Gas LDC Citygate

Winter Storm Elliott greatly impacted the operations of Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. (Con

191 The following are descriptions of above sub-causes: Interruptible Pipeline delivery Interruption - Interruptible pipeline transportation unavailable due to contractual or tariff provision; Market Issues - Market issues other than high market prices, such as unable to purchase gas in short-term market (could not find a gas supplier in the market); Firm Pipeline Delivery Curtailment - Firm pipeline gas transportation curtailed (reduction of gas deliveries; Force majeure, Pipeline enforces ratable takes provision to tariff levels); Gas Delivery Pressure Issues - Delivered gas pressure below Generator's minimum operating pressure (e.g., pressure too low for generator to operate); Market Price Restriction - High market prices (chose not to purchase gas due to high market prices); Failure to Fulfill of Contractual Obligations - Failure of fuel supplier to fulfill firm contractual obligations (Selling counterparty fails to deliver firm gas to primary pipeline receipt point, force majeure on the supply); Transportation Scheduling Constraints - Transportation scheduling constraints due to Holiday schedule (less gas scheduled than needed).

Edison),[192] the natural gas LDC for Manhattan, The Bronx, and portions of Queens and Westchester County, NY. On Christmas Eve morning, the five interstate natural gas pipelines serving Con Edison began experiencing drops in pressure at Con Edison's citygate due to production losses and operational issues. The pressures declined precipitously and at noon, the pipelines informed Con Edison that they had exhausted their line pack and storage withdrawals, and pressures would not improve until demand decreased. Con Edison managed to supply its customers with gas and maintain necessary pressure, by declaring an internal Gas System Emergency and implementing its specification for "Limiting Gas Use and Load Shedding During a Supply Curtailment or Emergency." As part of the Gas System Emergency, Con Edison activated its LNG regasification plant.

Had Con Edison's citygate pressures not recovered, it was in danger of losing pressure on, or needing to cut service to, all or large portions of its system. Even losing service to 130,000 customers would be considered a major outage and could have taken five to seven weeks to restore, depending on the availability of mutual aid. Had it lost the majority of its system, over a million customers in New York City and nearby areas would have been unable to heat their apartments and houses while the outside temperature was in the single digits, for months. Moreover, a system-wide outage would likely have caused extensive property damage due to damaged water pipes within homes and buildings. Critically, these dire circumstances occurred despite Winter Storm Elliott not qualifying as a "design day" event. LDCs designate certain parameters for "design day" events to plan gas capacity requirements, and a "design day" reflects the highest gas demand that the LDCs expect to be obligated to serve on an extremely cold winter day. The actual average temperatures on December 23 and 24 in the Con Edison service territory were 17 and 15 degrees, respectively. By contrast, Con Edison's design day is based on a zero-degree temperature variable.[193]

On December 16, Con Edison began to prepare for Winter Storm Elliott, including communicating with relevant stakeholders to coordinate in preparation for the storm. In addition to standard daily communications, weather event coordination efforts began on December 19 between Con Edison, National Grid, and Pipeline Control from Enbridge, Inc. (Texas Eastern Transmission, LP ("Texas Eastern") and Algonquin Gas Transmission, LLC ("Algonquin")) (collectively, "Enbridge"), Williams Companies Inc. (Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Company, LLC) ("Williams"), and Iroquois Gas Transmission System, L.P. ("Iroquois") to discuss upcoming weather patterns and event preparation plans specific to the New York City market area.

On December 21, Con Edison notified its interruptible customers that they were being curtailed and issued OFOs. Additionally, due to colder trending forecasts and overlapping restrictions with Kinder Morgan Inc. (Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company, LLC), Con Edison activated its compressed natural gas (CNG) station and scheduled it to capacity. As the storm worsened, Con Edison issued additional curtailment notices to customers with dual-fuel interruptible and off-peak firm sales and transportation covering December 23 through 27. Also on December 23, Con Edison placed its liquid natural gas facility on stand-by. On December 24 Con Edison

192 Con Edison and its affiliated companies maintain a portfolio of contracts with varying lengths of expiration and flexibility. The companies have entered into supply agreements that are designed to provide reliable service to firm natural gas customers under design day winter conditions in the service areas. These contracts include firm gas supply (100 percent domestic or LNG), firm pipeline transportation, production area and market area storage, firm peaking services, LNG, and citygate baseload supplies. Con Edison had contracted for more interstate pipeline capacity and natural gas commodity than required to meet customer demand on December 24.

193 Con Edison uses a weather concept called "Temperature Variable" (TV) as a reference point in the weather adjustment process. The TV is used in calculating and forecasting future system peak demands, considering extreme winter weather conditions (sustained low temperatures over two Gas-Day periods). The gas day average (GDA) temperature is a 24-hour arithmetic average starting at 10 a.m. using the Central Park National Weather Station dry bulb temperature. The formula for calculating the system TV on a daily basis incorporates two days' worth of GDA's. The current day's GDA is weighted at 70 percent and the previous day's GDA at 30 percent.)

issued OFOs that restricted short positions to two percent of gas scheduled through the Event and began hourly transportation restrictions to 1/24th of schedule. At this time, all of Con Edison's upstream interstate pipelines had imbalance OFOs in place restricting the availability of unscheduled gas. Con Edison's upstream pipelines also began reporting various issues including operating constraints, receipt points underperforming, upstream low pressures, compressor station issues, force majeure, and maxed out line pack.

The Con Edison system performance continued to be within expected operating ranges through December 23. Despite interstate pipeline pressures beginning to fall at Con Edison's metering and regulating stations (which measure and control the pressure of gas and interconnect with interstate pipelines), the impacts on supply to Con Edison were within normal expectations through the morning of December 24. However, for the Intraday 1 (ID1) nomination cycle on December 24, interstate pipelines began to restrict underperforming meters. At that time, Con Edison was not notified of the specific reason for pipeline restrictions or reductions by marketers or producers. Due to the reduced supply and continuing high demand, the average meter station inlet pressure (reflecting the interstate pipelines' low pressure issues) for Con Edison declined rapidly and reached its lowest levels between the nomination deadline and scheduling for the December 24 ID1 cycle from 11:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. ET. The average pressure fell from 806 pounds per square inch gauge (psig) at 12:00 a.m. on December 23 to 441 psig at 2:00 pm on December 24. Con Edison Gas Control began implementing emergency measures after the interstate pipelines notified Con Edison that they had depleted their line pack, had no more ability to withdraw from storage, and would continue to have low interstate pipeline pressures until demand decreased. A likely contributing factor exacerbating pipelines' integrity issues was that some generators may have flowed in excess amounts over their confirmed nominations. The pipelines used line pack and gas from storage to meet the incremental demand, but as the Event progressed, the supplementary demand volumes in conjunction with continuing supply shortfalls led to low pressures and the reduction of confirmed nominations. Con Edison, given its downstream location near the end of the interstate pipelines, was disproportionately impacted by the deteriorating pipeline conditions, through no fault of its own.

e. LDC Gas System Emergency, Orders for Fuel Curtailments to Natural Gas-Fired Generation, and Public Appeals to Reduce Gas Demand

On December 24 at 1:26 p.m., Con Edison management declared an internal Gas System Emergency and dispatched its LNG facility, which ramped up to maximum dispatch, because the interstate pipelines serving Con Edison's citygate said that their pressures were not recovering. Later that day, at 2:14 p.m., Con Edison Gas Control declared Gas System Condition Red, which meant that "gas supply through gate station(s) . . . [was] . . . severely limited or completely interrupted resulting in imminent risk to more than 500 services." This Condition Red remained in place until December 26 at 10 a.m. In accordance with its "Guidelines for Major Contingencies on the Gas System" specification, Con Ed "order[ed] electric and steam generation stations to . . . completely curtail gas use." Con Edison had already dispatched its LNG Plant at 2 p.m., another step allowed under Gas System Condition Red. At 6:30 p.m. that evening, Con Edison issued a public appeal to reduce demand. Under the specification for Limiting Gas Use and Load Shedding During a Supply Curtailment or Emergency, Con Edison had 11 steps to mitigate a supply shortage or to limit gas during an emergency, which progresses from taking steps to increase the supply of natural gas to firm customer load shedding. Con Edison implemented actions through at least step 7, public appeals to reduce demand, before the Gas System Emergency abated. Figure 65 shows the average meter station inlet pressure on December 21-27, relative to the declaration of the Gas System Emergency and Gas System Condition Red. Figure 66, below, shows how the meter station inlet pressures for the five interstate pipelines serving Con Edison's citygate declined precipitously on Christmas Eve, before recovering on Christmas through December 27.

Figure 65: Con Edison Average Meter Station Inlet Pressure (PSIG), December 21 - 27, 2022





Figure 66: Con Edison Citygate Inlet Pressures, December 20 - 27, 2022



Efforts to address the situation continued on Christmas Day. Con Edison ramped down its LNG facility due to increasing pipeline pressures at its citygate and to preserve asset inventory, placing the LNG facility back on standby status at 8:13 a.m. Pressures at the citygate were recovering but the pipelines reported in a 7 a.m. call that line pack was still depleted. On December 26, Con Edison finally terminated its Gas System Condition Red.

C.Post-Event Actions by Affected Entities, Government Agencies and State Governments

1. ACTIONS BY AFFECTED ENTITIES

Several of the affected entities later conducted comprehensive reviews of the performance of their systems during Winter Storm Elliott. TVA created an "After Action Report" which included several recommendations to improve energy supply, real-time load forecasting and operations, emergency protocols, and customer and stakeholder engagement.[194] TVA has committed to adding 10,000 to 14,000 MW of new generation by 2030 to help meet demand. It is currently in the process of building 3,800 MW of new generation, including solar energy, energy storage, combustion turbines, and combined-cycle natural gas. It is also investing in infrastructure, enhancing its transmission systems, and building a new Systems Operations Center.[195]

PJM prepared an "Event Analysis and Recommendation Report," outlining the lessons learned from Winter Storm Elliott and improvements it plans to make.[196] These included improving generator performance, enhancing forecasting and modeling, and tackling long-standing gaps in gas-electric coordination. PJM is working on developing improvements through its Critical Issue Fast Path stakeholder process. PJM recently submitted proposed enhancements to the capacity market rules that address certain recommendations from its report, including, but not limited to, enhanced risk modeling, refined resource accreditation, updates to the balancing ratio, and changes to bonus eligibility for Demand Resources and Energy Efficiency Resources.[197]

LG&E/KU prepared two event summary reports, one for its Generation, Transmission and Distribution operations, and one for its Gas operations. It is looking at potential process improvements, such as public messaging and projects at plants to minimize valve freezing and other cold weather impacts.[198] Santee Cooper developed a historical average forced outage rate for units during extreme events to estimate how much additional reserves should be considered during this type of event.

2. ACTIONS BY GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND STATE GOVERNMENTS

On August 25, 2023, the South Carolina Office of Regulatory Staff filed a report titled "Inspection and Examination Report of Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC and Duke Energy Progress, LLC: December 2022 Winter Storm Outages and Blackouts."[199] The report identified five key causes for the rolling outages (firm load shed), which impacted over 500,000[200] customers across North and South Carolina, ranging from three to ten hours each: (1) Duke[201] significantly underestimated demand, failed to update its forecast estimates, and did not make

194 Tennessee Valley Authority After Action Report, at 20-21, https://bloximages.newyork1.vip.townnews.com/local3news.com/content/tncms/assets/v3/editorial/4/3e/43e4b436-eb67-11ed-a87a-530b1c4c2bd9/645537f5cd9d7.pdf.pdf).

195 *Id.* at 22.

196 PJM, Winter Storm Elliott Event Analysis and Recommendation Report ("PJM Report"), pages 2-3, https://www.pjm.com/-/media/library/reports-notices/special-reports/2023/20230717-winter-storm-elliott-event-analysis-and-recommendation-report.ashx .

197 *See PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.,* Docket No. ER24-98-000 (Oct. 13, 2023); *PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.,* Docket No. ER24-99-000 (Oct. 13, 2023). PJM has stated that it will continue to engage with stakeholders on recommendations from the PJM Report.

198 *Talking Points*,https://lge-ku.com/employee-resources/ce/talking-points/2023/01/winter-storm-elliott (last visited Oct. 26, 2023).

199 Inspection and Examination Report of Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC and Duke Energy Progress, LLC December 2022 Winter Storm Outages and Blackouts, Docket No. ND-2023-1-E (Aug. 25, 2023), ec372380-8639-406e-816e-fc9fe0d45cfd (sc.gov)

200 https://news.duke-energy.com/releases/duke-energy-updates-north-carolina-utilities-commission-on-winter-storm-elliott-emergency-outage-event#:~:text=CHARLOTTE%2C%20N.C.%20%E2%80%93%20Leaders%20from%20Duke,from%20occurring%20that%20way%20again

201 DEC and DEP.

supply planning adjustments; (2) Duke experienced multiple failures at various plants, some due to planned maintenance and others due to operational issues that forced them to shut down, such as cracks in the insulations and frozen instruments; (3) power purchases from neighboring utility companies were curtailed; (4) power generation contracted by other utilities failed; and (5) the automated software tool to manage the rotating outages failed, causing significant delays as Duke had to manually restore power. The report also discussed Duke's delay in communicating with customers. The outages began between 6:15 and 6:25 a.m. on December 24. The report found Duke began notifying customers one hour later. The investigation also found Duke told customers the timeframe for power restoration would be 30 to 60 minutes, when in fact it took several hours.

Ultimately, the report found that there is "room for improvement" in Duke's cold weather preparedness plans for its generation facilities. The investigation made several recommendations, including ensuring that doors and louvers that could expose equipment to the elements are left closed, and installing heaters. The investigation also recommended Duke enhance staffing and the frequency of operators making rounds during severe winter weather events. On August 29, 2023, Duke submitted a letter[202] to the Public Service Commission responding to the report, which took issue with several of its findings, including with the report's statement that Duke failed to respond to supply adequacy risk, asserting that Duke did respond and made purchases to increase operating reserves where they were forecasted to be below target. Duke also said that the models used by the industry to forecast power demand "look backwards in time" for similar circumstances, and that a similar day in December did not exist. However, the letter stated that Duke has created a corrective action plan, and that it has completed 76 of the 101 action items in the plan, with the action items in progress.

The Kentucky Public Service Commission has been using a preexisting docket regarding approval of a demand side management plan and approval of fossil fuel-fired generating unit retirements to obtain data from LG&E/KU regarding the Event, but has not issued any findings.[203] On February 17, 2023, the Kentucky Attorney General sent LG&E/KU an initial request for information.[204] The inquiry asked the companies to "[p]rovide a detailed, thorough and comprehensive explanation regarding the causes of the rolling blackouts [firm load shed] the Companies instituted during Winter Storm Elliott[…]." On March 10, 2023, LG&E/KU provided their responses to the initial data requests.[205] This included a summary of events prepared by LG&E/KU.[206] In this summary, the companies stated that the rolling blackouts were caused by interstate gas pipeline pressure limitations, mechanical issues, and other cold weather issues. The companies explained that the projected net peak load was far lower than the actual peak load on December 23. Three of the companies' units were offline during this time and not expected to be needed. The supplier for two of the plants also failed to meet its contractual obligations, and there were interruptions in energy deliveries. LG&E/KU explained that as the conditions across the regional grid began to deteriorate, they executed their Capacity and Energy Emergency Operating Plan in order to restore system balance.

202 36b057d1-aba3-47d5-9bbe-4a9f2d4fbb0f (sc.gov)

203 The record was closed as of September 15, 2023, and the Commission stated that it will issue a decision after October 5, 2023. The docket did not show a decision as of the morning of October 30. *Winter Storm Elliott Events in the LG&E and KU Balancing Authority Area (BAA)*(Dec. 24-25, 2022), https://psc.ky.gov/pscecf/2022-00402/rick.lovekamp%40lge-ku.com/03102023103319/03-AG_DR1_LGE_KU_Attach_to_Q13%28l%29_-_Att_1_Winter_Storm_Elliott_LKE_Event_Summary.pdf.

204 *Kentucky Coal Association First Data Request (filed Feb. 17, 2023)* https://psc.ky.gov/pscecf/2022-00402/mmalone%40hdmfirm.com/02172023095137/First_Data_Requests_to_Companies.final.pdf; *Attorney General Data Requests* (Feb.17, 2023), https://psc.ky.gov/pscecf/2022-00402/rateintervention%40ky.gov/02172023023845/23..02.17_AG-DR-1_2022-00402_FINAL.pdf.

205 *Kentucky Utilities Co. & Louisville Gas and Electric Co. Response* (Mar. 10, 2023),https://psc.ky.gov/pscecf/2022-00402/rick.lovekamp%40lge-ku.com/03102023103319/02-AG_DR1_LGE_KU_Responses.pdf.

206 *Winter Storm Elliott Events in the LG&E and KU Balancing Authority Area* (BAA) (Dec. 23-24, 2022), https://psc.ky.gov/pscecf/2022-00402/rick.lovekamp%40lge-ku.com/03102023103319/03-AG_DR1_LGE_KU_Attach_to_Q13%28l%29_-_Att_1_Winter_Storm_Elliott_LKE_Event_Summary.pdf.

IV. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

A. Overview of Event Causes

Three causes accounted for 96 percent of the generating unit outages, derates or failures to start, based on number of MW: Mechanical/Electrical, Freezing, and Fuel Issues, as shown in Figure 67. Natural Gas Fuel Issues, (the larger portion with small dots in the orange pie segment) were 20 percent of all causes (and 83 percent of outages caused by Fuel Issues).[207] Figure 68, below, illustrates the generating unit outages by fuel type over the course of the Event. Natural gas-fired units represented 47 or 63 percent of the incremental unplanned generation loss, based on number of outages or MW, respectively.[208] Unplanned outages of natural gas- and coal-fired generating units began to rise on December 22 and rose steadily into December 23. Early on December 23, the rate of outages of natural gas-fired generating units rose sharply, and this trend continued throughout December 23. This is consistent with what Balancing Authorities told the Team, especially in PJM and MISO: that multiple natural gas-fired generating units reported their inability to perform during that period, in many cases, only when called to find out why they had not come online.[209] Natural gas-fired generating unit outages peaked at nearly 60,000 MW for the Event Area by midday on December 24. Natural gas-fired generating units played such a large role in the Event due to the large percentage of natural gas-fired generation in the Event Area (nearly 42 percent, see Figure 11), and the multiple outage causes which affected this fuel type (Fuel Issues, Freezing Issues and Mechanical/Electrical Issues not directly caused by freezing). According to the NAESB Report, "trends in electrification coupled with the growth in renewable resources and the retirement of coal-fired generation, likely mean there will be a greater reliance upon electricity produced by natural gas as a balancing resource."[210]

Freezing Issues caused 31 percent of all generating unit outages, and over 75 percent of Freezing Issues occurred at ambient temperatures that were above the GOs' documented operating temperatures.[211] Both open-frame generating units, common throughout the south, and natural gas production infrastructure, with its associated water, are known to be vulnerable to freezing. In addition, wind turbines are known to be vulnerable to blade icing because of freezing precipitation. Coal-fired units can be vulnerable to frozen coal piles or difficulty processing wet coal, especially if the coal piles remain undisturbed during periods of freezing precipitation.[212] The extent to which generating units of all types still experienced outages, derates and failures to start to Freezing Issues continues to be a major concern. Freezing Issues and Fuel Issues combined to cause 55 percent of all unplanned generating unit outages, derates and failures to start during the Event, as shown in Figure 67 below (as measured by MW). Mechanical/Electrical Issues, responsible for an additional 41 percent of outages, derates and failures to

207 Natural Gas Fuel Issues include the combined effects of decreased natural gas production; cold weather impacts and mechanical problems at production, gathering, processing and pipeline facilities resulting in gas quality issues and low pipeline pressure; supply and transportation interruptions; curtailments and failure to comply with contractual obligations. Additionally, it includes shippers' inability to procure natural gas due to tight supply, prohibitive, scarcity-induced market prices, or mismatches between the timing of the natural gas and energy markets.

208 Unless otherwise indicated, within this section values expressed as percentages correspond to the total amount of incremental generation lost—*i.e.* unavailable MW—as reflected in data provided by generating unit owners and/or operators. *See* Appendix C.2 for a breakdown of outages, derates and failures to start by fuel type, among other analyses.

209 *See* Section III.B.1.a) regarding MISO and PJM experiences regarding generator reported fuel issues on December 23.

210 NAESB Report at 67.

211 *See* note 61 for an explanation of the various methods GOs can choose to document an operating temperature and how the Team calculated this statistic.

212 This can be mitigated by continuous movement of the coal pile (using bulldozers or similar equipment) during freezing precipitation/extreme cold weather conditions.

start, also increased as temperatures fell and decreased as temperatures rose, but unlike Freezing Issues, the method by which the cold affected the generating unit was less obvious.

Figure 67: Total MW Loss of Incremental Generation Outages, Derates, and Failures to Start (Outaged MW) by Cause, December 21-26, Total Event Area




Figure 68: Generation Outages, Derates, and Failures to Start (MW) by Fuel Type, December 21-26, Total Event Area





Figure 69: Incremental Unplanned Coincident Unavailable Generation in the Event Area, December 21-26, Total Event Area



At its worst point, the U.S. portion of the Eastern Interconnection had over 127,000 MW of generating outages, including outages that began before the Event, equivalent to **18 percent** of the U.S. portion of the anticipated resources in the Eastern Interconnection.[213] The peak coincident incremental unplanned unavailable generation in the Event (90,500 MW), as shown in Figure 69, above, was roughly 50 percent larger than the peak magnitude of coincident incremental unavailable generation during Winter Storm Uri (represented by the red dotted line in Figure 69), although the Uri event lasted more than twice as long (13 days versus six days).

213 According to the NERC 2022-2023 Winter Reliability Assessment. *See* note 12.

B. Causes of Generating Unit Outages During the Extreme Cold Weather

1. SUMMARY

An analysis of the data collected in connection with Winter Storm Elliott reiterates the relationship between the onset of freezing temperatures and the rise of generation loss caused by Freezing Issues, by Mechanical/Electrical Issues strongly correlated to declining temperatures, or by Fuel Issues whose root cause can be traced to the onset of extreme cold weather, as shown in Figure 70, below.

Winter Storm Elliott, and its impact on generation, is notable for two material reasons.

First, the scale of generation lost during Winter Storm Elliott is unprecedented, with a peak incremental unplanned generation loss totaling 90,500 MW. This reflects generation loss at 1,702 individual generating units spread over 3,565 discrete unplanned outages or derates. This incremental unplanned generation loss during Winter Storm Elliott, after the catastrophic effects of Winter Storm Uri just one year earlier, raises a concerning alarm about the ability of the grid to handle extreme cold weather events.

Second, Mechanical/Electrical Issues related to extreme cold weather events (as distinguished from Freezing Issues) rose as temperatures fell, a pattern seen in every extreme cold weather inquiry event since 2018. The 2021 Report noted that as temperatures fell, generation losses attributed to Mechanical/Electrical Issues increased[214] and that "[i]n the 2018 event, a similar pattern was evident—the total generating unit outages were correlated with temperatures—again, as temperatures fell, the incidence of unplanned outages and derates increased."[215] As reported in the 2021 Report, these outages may be caused by the impact of extreme cold weather on mechanical and thermal stress, thermal cycling fatigue and other effects of cold weather such as embrittlement and gelling of fuels and lubricants.[216]

2. MECHANICAL AND ELECTRICAL ISSUES

a. Summary Analysis

Overall, generating units reported 1,418 unplanned outages, derates or failures to start for various reasons linked to Mechanical/Electrical Issues – accounting for 40 percent of all generation losses reported during the Event and peaking at more than 31,000 MW of incremental unplanned generation loss during the Event. Most manifested as forced outages (48 percent) or forced derates (43 percent).

Within the Mechanical/Electrical Issues category, the most significant individual sub-cause of outages was Equipment Failures/Issues by a wide margin (72 percent). Other than Equipment Failures/Issues, the only other sub-cause within the Mechanical/Electrical Issue category that had a material presence (approximately 10 percent) was Control System Issues. No other single sub-cause identified by GOs/GOPs materially contributed to lost generation attributable to Mechanical/Electrical Issues.

b. Relationship Between Freezing Conditions and Mechanical/Electrical Issues

As indicated in Figure 71, below, over 80 percent of the incremental unplanned MW lost to Mechanical/Electrical Issues occurred when generating units began to experience below-freezing temperatures.

214 *See* Recommendation 11 and Figure 105 in 2021 Report.

215 *See* 2021 Report at 217.

216 *See* 2021 Report at 215-217.

Figure 70: Incremental Unplanned Unavailable Generation in the Event Area, Primary Event Causes, December 21 - 26, 2022






Figure 71: Generation Loss, Mechanical/Electrical Issues by Temperature (°F) Reported at Time of Outage, December 21-26 2022



As illustrated below, generating units steadily lost generation due to Mechanical/Electrical Issues as temperatures declined. In aggregate, generating units reported more than 49,000 MW of lost generation due to Mechanical/Electrical Issues in temperatures between 32 degrees and 10 degrees, as seen in Figure 72, below.

Figure 72: Cumulative Gross Generation Loss, Mechanical/Electrical Issues by Temperature (°F) Reported by Generating Unit, December 21-26, 2022




Not every generating unit that experienced a Mechanical/Electrical Issue in below-freezing conditions during Winter Storm Elliott did so *because of* extreme cold weather conditions. The Team believes it is reasonable to conclude that a material portion of Mechanical/Electrical Issues are causally connected to these extreme cold weather conditions. This relationship is supported by reasonable inferences drawn from the numerical data provided by generating units, as well as by narrative responses provided by units explaining their Mechanical/Electrical Issues. Some units that reported Mechanical/Electrical Issues in below-freezing conditions explicitly linked those Mechanical/Electrical Issues to the impacts of cold weather. For example, one generating unit reported that generation was lost because "[g]enerator gas temperature became too low due to ambient temperature." Another claimed that the generating unit "would not start due to oil temperature too low." However, even without considering these explicit claims, many units reported a range of issues that Team members believe, based on their review of the data provided, were likely or probably caused by cold weather conditions. For example:

- Increased oil viscosity with colder ambient temperature (or colder cooling water) was a common issue in the Event:
  - Losses in fuel oil pressure can be caused by cold-induced high viscosity, leading to inability to operate a unit on fuel oil.
  - Wind turbine generators may also suffer from high oil viscosity (lubricant or hydraulic controls), creating pitch problems seen in the Event.
- Many generating units reported material dimensional changes (*i.e.,* shrinkage) during the Event, which may add stress in mechanical systems.

The data also suggest that the ***extreme*** nature of these cold weather events—that is to say, unusually quick drops in temperature, high winds and/or atypical combinations of conditions—may play a role in generation loss due to Mechanical/Electrical Issues.

Figure 73: Generation Loss, Mechanical/Electrical Issues, December 21-26, 2022



As shown in Figure 73, above, comparing generating units' documented operating temperature to the ambient temperature conditions that they reported while experiencing Mechanical/Electrical Issues revealed a clear and disturbing outcome. A substantial majority of generation losses due to Mechanical/Electrical Issues (87 percent) occurred at an ambient temperature above the generating units' documented operating temperature.[217]

Using only the units' ambient design temperature, for those units that provided that temperature, nearly 39,000 MW of generation was lost due to Mechanical/Electrical Issues where units (a) reported freezing or below-freezing ambient temperatures in connection with the generation loss, (b) provided an ambientdesign temperature, and (c) where the ambient design temperature was 10 degrees or more below the temperature at which the Mechanical/Electrical Issue occurred.

The data available suggests that some portion of the Mechanical/Electrical Issues outages may have been more appropriately categorized as Freezing Issues, and that the remainder illustrate a relationship between mechanical/electrical component malfunction and temperature that, to date, has not been fully explored or understood. Given the large percentage (40 to 41 percent, by number of units and MW, respectively) and MW losses (150,569 MW) caused by Mechanical/Electric Issues, better understanding the relationship between mechanical/electrical component malfunctions and temperatures is critical to improving future extreme cold weather performance by generating units. The Team believes an improved understanding can and should be evaluated on both a unit-by-unit basis—which the Team hopes can be obtained, in part, through the practices advanced in Recommendation 1—and on a systematic basis—through the study advanced in Recommendation 2.

3. FREEZING ISSUES

a. Summary Analysis

Data collected from generating units related to Freezing Issues during Winter Storm Elliott demonstrated similar trends to the data analyzed in the 2021 Report. Overall, units reported 1,030 distinct Freezing Issue-related

217 This figure is based only on units that provided ambient temperature conditions for their units experiencing outages—not all units reported ambient temperatures as requested. It is also based on the highest of the (up to three) temperatures that the entity could have provided: ambient design temperature, historical operating temperature, or current cold weather performance temperature determined by an engineering analysis. *See* also, note 61. Other materials related to the Report, including the presentation given by Team members on September 21, 2023, stated that nearly 80 percent of Mechanical/Electrical Issues occurred above a generating units' minimum operating temperature. That figure was based on a conservative earlier analysis of the data collected.

unplanned outages, derates, or start-up failures, which, combined, caused 110,962 MW of generation loss at various times during the Event,[218] and as illustrated in Figure 67, above, were 31 percent of the total MW of generation outages, derates, and failures to start during the Event. Variations by approximate U.S. geographic region basis in the Event Area for all unplanned generation MW outages due to **Freezing Issues** (as compared to other outage causes, e.g., Mechanical/Electrical Issues or Fuel Issues) are shown in Figure 74, below.

Figure 74: Variation by Approximate U.S. Geographic Region in the Event Area for Unplanned Unavailable Generation (MW) due to Freezing Issues

Approximate U.S. Geographic Region	Unplanned Unavailable Generation Due to Freezing Issues(Percent of MW)
New York	5%
MidAtlantic/Midwest	27%
Central/South Central	33%
Southeast	43%
Total Event Area	**31%**

Most BA footprints located in the southeast portion of the Event Area experienced higher percentages of unplanned generation outages due to Freezing Issues as compared to other geographic regions––especially compared to the northern portions of the Event Area.[219]

The specific types of Freezing Issues were similar to those seen during Winter Storm Uri. A substantial number of outages were linked to frozen transmitters, frozen sensing lines, or other frozen instrumentation – approximately 42 percent of all generation lost to Freezing Issues (Figure 75, below). As in the 2021 event, Freezing Issues caused a large percentage of unplanned wind generation outages and derates — 53 percent (by MW) or 40 percent (by number of outages). Freezing Issues caused 75 percent (by MW) and 43 percent (by number of outages) of unplanned outages and derates of nuclear units. Historically, Freezing Issues have been rare in nuclear units, due in part to their enclosed design.[220]

b. Existing and Pending Reliability Standards

Two sets of mandatory NERC Reliability Standards applicable to GOs—NERC Standard EOP-011-2, and the forthcoming EOP-012-1—are of particular relevance here.

In August 2021, the Commission approved the adoption of EOP-011-2, effective April 1, 2023, as part of a package of cold weather Reliability Standards.[221] As part of these updates, EOP-011-2 was revised to make clear that the GO is the "entity responsible for compliance" with the extreme cold weather Reliability Standards. This

218 This value is distinct from the 90,500 MW of incremental coincident unplanned outages during the Event, which is was the level of unplanned generation outages, derates, and failures to start for all causes the grid operators in the Core Event Area were faced with at approximately 10:00 a.m. on December 24, 2022. The 111,000 MW represents the MW of generation capacity outages, derates, and failures to start that were due to Freezing Issues at various times during the entire Event, from December 21-26, 2022.

219 Open-frame generation facilities, which are common throughout warmer climates in the U.S., are designed and constructed without enclosed building structures to avoid excessive heat build-up in the summer but are more vulnerable to freezing. *See* 2011 Report, Appendix: Power Plant Design for Ambient Weather Conditions, and 2021 Report at 162.

220 *See* Appendix C.2., Additional Charts and Figures for Unplanned Generation Outages During Event, Unplanned Generation Outages by Fuel Type.

221 *See N.* Am. Elec. Reliability Corp., 176 FERC ¶ 61,119 at P 1 (2021).

required GOs to "develop, implement, and train on their extreme cold weather preparedness plans."[222]

Figure 75: Unavailable MW by Balancing Authority, Freezing Issues, December 21 - 26, 2022[223]

Equipment Category	Components and Systems Impacted	Event Count	MWs Outaged or Derated	
Turbine Blades	Icing on blades	127	6,281	5.7%
Instrumentation	Frozen transmitter	49	17,776	16.0%
	Frozen sensing lines	27	9,757	8.8%
	Frozen instrumentation	58	18,824	17.0%
Other Equipment Freezing Problems	Frozen equipment	27	4,388	4.0%
	Frozen valve	39	11,860	10.7%
	Frozen water lines	19	6,547	5.9%
	Frozen pipes	24	5,702	5.1%
	Equipment failure	57	8,026	7.2%
	Other freeze-related issue	173	21,668	19.6%

Requirement R7 requires each GO to "implement and maintain one or more extreme cold weather preparedness plan(s) for its generating units" linked to each unit's "design temperature, . . . historical operating temperature, or . . . current cold weather performance temperature determined by an engineering analysis."[224]

More recently, in February 2023, the Commission approved new Reliability Standard EOP-012-1 – Extreme Cold Weather Preparedness and Operations. The new standard builds on EOP-011-2, "enhance[] the reliable operation of the [grid] by requiring generator owners to implement freeze protection measures, develop enhanced extreme cold weather preparedness plans, implement annual trainings, draft and implement corrective action plans to address freezing issues, and provide certain extreme cold weather operating parameters to Reliability Coordinators, Transmission Operators, and Balancing Authorities for use in their analyses and planning."[225]

The crux of these standards is that generating units are expected to have an extreme cold weather preparedness plan tethered to one or more of the minimum operating temperatures associated with the unit – ambient design, historical operating minimums, or an extreme cold weather performance temperature determined by an engineering analysis. This minimum operating temperature is conveyed to that generating unit's Balancing Authority so that it may rely on the temperature information in connection with planning and dispatch decisions.

c. Operating Parameters Provided by Generating Units

The vast majority of generating units that provided data for this report had obtained an ambient design temperature, minimum historical operating temperature, or extreme cold weather performance temperature determined by an engineering analysis. Of generating units that responded to the data request,[226] 67 percent

222 *Id.* at PP 4, 6.

223 "Other freeze-related issue" includes freeze-related sub-causes external to the generating unit such as frozen coal or ice on transmission lines.

224 *See* EOP 011-2 R7.3.2. RSCompleteSet.pdf (nerc.com).


225 N. Am. Elec. Reliability Corp., 182 FERC ¶ 61,094 at P 36 (2023). The effective date for Reliability Standard EOP-012-1 is October 1, 2024.

226 Unless otherwise noted, percentages in this section are based on the nameplate capacity of the generating units that provided the necessary data.

reported a minimum design temperature. A slightly higher percentage, 74 percent, reported a historical minimum operating temperature, and very few units, only eight percent, reported an extreme cold weather performance temperature determined by engineering analysis.


As illustrated in Figures 76 and 77, below, approximately two-thirds of the generating unit capacity (measured by nameplate MW) that responded with an ambient design temperature or a historical minimum operating temperature indicated a design temperature or a historical minimum operating temperature below zero degrees. More than 80 percent of units responded with an ambient design temperature below 10 degrees. Ambient design temperatures of coal units were spread across temperatures ranging from less than -20 up to 20 degrees. Similarly, ambient design temperatures of natural gas units were spread mostly across those ranges, except for a few units that had temperatures over 20 degrees. Over 80 percent of wind and one hundred percent of the solar units reported ambient design temperatures below zero degrees.

Figure 76: Ambient Design Temperature by Fuel Type and Total Capacity



The primary takeaway from this data is that of the units that reported outages, derates, or failures to start during the Event, nearly 84 percent of the total unit capacity reported a "documented operating temperature"—that is to say, the highest of their stated design temperature, historical minimum operating temperature, or an extreme cold weather performance temperature determined by an engineering analysis, of 10 degrees or lower. Although these data suggest that the generating units impacted by Winter Storm Elliott were, at a minimum, designed to operate or had successfully operated in extreme cold, over 63,000 MW (over 75 percent) of generation had outages, derates or failed to start due to Freezing Issues at temperatures above their documented operating temperature during the Event, as discussed below.

Figure 77: Historical Minimum Operating Temperature by Fuel Type and Total Capacity




d. Freezing Above Documented Operating Temperature

A substantial majority of generation loss by units that reported Freezing Issues occurred at temperatures that were above the documented operating temperature thresholds incorporated into EOP-011-2, Requirement R7. Generating units of all primary fuel types—with the exception of a small number of generating units whose primary fuel type was oil—reported Freezing Issues well above their documented operating temperature.

In sum, generators did not perform according to their documented operating temperature. The scatter plot (Figure 78, below) compares the ambient temperatures reported by generating units with Freezing Issues to the documented operating temperature of that unit. The diagonal line represents the points at which the ambient temperature and documented operating temperature are equal. A substantial majority all of the generating unit outages plotted fall below (or the right of) the line, meaning that their outage occurred at temperatures above their documented operating temperature.

Figure 78: Temperature Reported at Time of Outage versus Documented Operating Temperature for Generators with Freezing Issues



e. Impact of Wind and Precipitation on Freezing Issues

The Team reviewed data to evaluate the impact of other weather conditions—wind and precipitation—on generating units reporting Freezing Issues. Wind can have a cooling effect that may cause unexpected Freezing Issues below ambient design temperatures. Precipitation coupled with freezing temperatures can also greatly impact generating unit operations during extreme cold weather events. This review did not reveal significant or clear trends—in part because the low number of units experiencing Freezing Issues below their minimum operating temperature frustrates a comparative analysis on those grounds.

On average, the wind speeds reported for units that had Freezing Issues above their document operating temperature averaged 16 mph, while wind speeds reported for units that had Freezing Issues below their minimum operating temperature averaged 20 mph. These two data points suggest that the cooling effect of wind did not substantially affect whether a given generating unit would experience a Freezing Issue above or below its minimum operating temperature. See Figure 79, below.

Precipitation affected whether a unit would fail above its documented operating temperature for some fuel types, such as oil and wind, but not for others fuel types such as natural gas and coal. Figure 80 below, breaks down performance by fuel type.

Protecting generator cold weather critical components from extreme cold weather is not complicated. Freeze protection measures -- such as heat trace, insulation, wind breaks, or targeted roofing to protect insulation from getting wet—have been used for years to prevent failure. What makes the difference between successful operation for the duration of an extreme cold weather event and unplanned outages due to freezing? Observations over multiple extreme cold weather events suggest that improved outcomes are associated with attention to detail, consistency in implementing the plan for protecting generator cold weather critical components, and preventing complacency when preparing for winter. Several entities involved in the Event shared stories about generating units lost because seemingly insignificant areas were insufficiently protected. For example, one entity had a false floor in its unit, and did not realize that a pipe was not insulated beneath the floor. The small section of pipe under the floor froze and caused the unit to trip.

Figure 79: Average of Wind Speed Reported for Units with Freezing Issues Comparing Above/Below Documented Operating Temperature





Figure 80: Precipitation Reported for Units with Freezing Issues Comparing Above/Below Documented Operating Temperature



The Lesson of Consecutive Cold Weather Events: Consistency, Attention to Detail, and a Sense of Urgency are Critical to Effective Cold Weather Preparation

As described more fully below, there have twice been extreme cold weather events that resulted in no load loss shortly after a similar event during which firm load was shed.

The first set of events occurred in February, 2011. In early February 2011, ERCOT, Salt River Project, and El Paso Electric Company needed to shed firm customer electric load, over 4,000 MW total, due in part to generating unit outages caused by freezing. On February 10, 2011, cold temperatures returned to Texas. "Actual temperatures in the ERCOT region averaged a low of 19 degrees with a 12-degree wind chill."[227] Yet ERCOT did not shed either firm or interruptible load despite setting a new winter peak of 57,915 MW.[228]

The 2011 Report found that "ERCOT avoided service interruptions on February 10 largely because there were far fewer forced outages."[229] While weather differences also played a role,[230] **the 2011 report found that "repairs made and protective measures taken during the event of February 2 remain[ing] in place" were a significant factor.**[231] GOs/GOPs had addressed vulnerabilities including "re-routing piping or moving vulnerable equipment, correcting transformer oil levels at wind farms, and adding freeze-resistant chemicals.

227 2011 Report at 99.

228 2011 Report at 99.

229 2011 Report at 99.

230 The February 10 low of 19 degrees was the same as the February 2 low, however the wind chill was lower on February 2 and low temperatures during the earlier event were more persistent, remaining in the low twenties for four days with wind chills between 10 and 14 degrees. 2011 Report at 99.

231 Generator owners had "installed wind breaks, including tarps or enclosures, added portable heaters or heat lamps, repaired or added insulation, and repaired or added heat trace. One generator changed its procedures for monitoring the reliability of its heat trace. Some generators also continued their increased level of staffing to address freeze protection issues, and others changed elements of their control logic to prevent units from automatically tripping." 2011 Report at 100.

At least five generators kept units running, started units earlier or took other measures to keep from having a cold start. After so many static sensor and other lines froze the week before, some units left water lines draining, or took other measures to keep water flowing."[232]

The second set of events occurred in January 2014 and February 2015. On January 6 and 7, 2014, parts of the Eastern Interconnection experienced a "polar vortex," with "temperatures 20 to 30 [degrees] below average, and some areas [35 or more degrees] below their average temperatures."[233] As NERC noted in its "Polar Vortex Review," "these lower temperatures had a drastic impact on load, with many of the RCs/BAs [e.g., MISO, PJM, TVA, VACAR-South RC (including Duke), and Southern/Southeastern-RC] reporting record or near-record winter peak demands. PJM exceeded its historic winter peak on both January 7 and January 8, 2014, and MISO reported that they exceeded their historic winter peak for three straight days (January 6–8, 2014)."[234] Due to the high loads and unplanned generating unit outages, including an estimated 19,500 MW of generation outages due to "cold weather conditions," and "a significant reduction of generating capacity due to curtailments and interruptions of natural gas delivery," affected entities needed to use "load reduction procedures such as voltage reduction, interruptible loads, and demand-side management," and in one case, to shed 300 MW of firm load, to maintain system reliability.[235]

A little more than a year later, severe cold temperatures hit the Eastern Interconnection again. "Numerous cities [in the Eastern Interconnection] hit their daily low-temperature records during February 2015. Due to the low temperatures and associated high electricity demand for heating needs, PJM set a new wintertime peak demand record of 143,086 megawatts the morning of February 20, 2015 . . . The new peak record surpassed the previous all-time winter peak . . . set [during the Polar Vortex]. Although the new record winter peak was set during this time frame, no emergency demand response or any other capacity emergency actions were required. Many other areas also set all-time record winter peaks in 2015."[236] PJM and DEP set winter peak load records in 2015 that remained unbroken during the Event, and DEC broke its 2015 record by less than 150 MW.[237] Yet "[g]enerator performance in . . . February of 2015 showed improvement over 2014 with improved overall forced outage rates." or example, PJM's forced outage rate dropped from 22 percent to 13.4 percent.[238] NERC attributed this improvement to "steps generation owners . . . initiated after the winter of 2014."[239] NERC used GADS[240] data to compare winter 2015 equivalent forced outage rates (EFOR) to those during the polar vortex in 2014 and to previous years' rates.[241]

232 2011 Report at 100.
233 Polar Vortex Review at iii.
234 Polar Vortex Review at vii.
235 Polar Vortex Review at 2,4.
236 NERC 2015 Winter Review, December 2015, at iv. https://www.nerc.com/pa/rrm/ea/ColdWeatherTrainingMaterials/2015_Winter_Review_December_2015_FINAL.pdf
237 *See* Table 2, in 2015 NERC report. Southern Company and TVA still did not break their 2014 winter peak load records.
238 NERC 2015 Winter Review, December 2015, at iv.
239 NERC 2015 Winter Review, at iv.
240 *See* note 44.
241 NERC 2015 Winter Review, at 1.

NERC provided examples of preparations taken by the generating unit owners, including:


- Owners started units earlier than expected, due to anticipated colder temperatures, helping to mitigate the risk of taking more time to start.
  - Keeping stations in service overnight with a reduced output level was beneficial to ensuring that the unit would stay warm and online when needed for the peak.
- Proactive staffing of typically unmanned stations enabled more rapid response.
- Many generating units in the PJM footprint participated in prewinter operational testing, and those that did, had a lower rate of forced outages than those that did not.

But seven years later, faced with peak loads that were generally lower than in 2014 or 2015, many of the same BAs experienced high rates of forced outages. PJM, for example, found that despite many measures undertaken in the wake of the Polar Vortex, its Capacity Resource forced outage rate was worse in the Event than in the Polar Vortex (24 percent versus 22 percent).

4. BLACKSTART UNITS

Of significant concern is that blackstart-designated generating units totaling 19,000 MW experienced forced outages, derates or failures to start during the Event. Blackstart-designated units are those that claim the ability to be started without the aid of external power sources. Given this unique functionality, blackstart units serve a critical grid reliability function—restarting the grid in the event of its failure. It is, therefore, disconcerting that generation loss due to the unavailability of blackstart-designated units coincided with the arrival of extreme cold weather conditions and the corresponding acceleration of generation loss throughout the bulk electric system.

Figure 81: Unavailable Generation - Blackstart-Capable Generating Units, December 22 - 24, 2022



242 NERC 2015 Winter Review at 6.

Figure 82: Unavailable Generation in the Event Area, Blackstart-Capable Generating Units, By Primary Cause

Blackstart Units – Reported Event Cause	Event Count	Unavailable MW
Mechanical/Electrical Issues	89	7,737
Fuel Issues	86	6,717
Freezing Issues	61	3,565
Environmental/ Safety Issues	6	810
Transmission System Issues	6	261

Figure 83: Unavailable Generation in the Event Area, Blackstart-Capable Generating Units, By Primary Cause and Dual Fuel Capability

Blackstart Units Type	Freezing Issues (MW)	Fuel Issues (MW)	Mechanical/Electrical Issues (MW)	Other (MW)
Gas Only	1,266	5,060	1,200	0
Gas/Oil	1,678	920	3,607	561
Other	621	737	2,910	510
Total	3,565	6,717	7,737	1,071

Altogether, 155 blackstart-designated generating units (119 of which were natural gas-fired) reported more than 248 discrete outages, derates or failures to start. Of these, 29 percent reported *multiple* outages, and 23 percent were start-up failures—*i.e.* units that failed to perform the essential function of blackstart units.

Blackstart generation loss unit types included natural gas-fired, dual-fuel capable, and other primary fuel types.

5. HIGH WIND SHUTOFFS

Most conventional wind turbines are designed to operate at wind speeds of no more than 55 mph and must shut down when wind speed exceeds those levels.[243] Excluded from the foregoing analysis of Freezing Issues and Mechanical/Electrical Issues were wind turbine units that reported generation loss due to high winds—High Wind Shutdown—as the cause of their forced outage. Some generating units reported unique outages lasting only a handful of minutes on a turbine-by-turbine basis, resulting in hundreds of spreadsheet lines—but ultimately these shutoffs did not constitute a significant source of generation loss during Winter Storm Elliott. In aggregate, Generation Owners attributed fewer than 1,000 MW of generation loss to High Wind Shutdowns.

6. FUEL ISSUES

Fuel Issues accounted for 24 percent of all generation lost during the Event—a cumulative total of more than 86,000 MW—and were the third largest cause of unplanned

243 *See*, Office of Energy Efficiency & Renewable Energy, *How Do Wind Turbines Survive Severe Storms?* (June 20, 2017), https://www.energy.gov/eere/articles/how-do-wind-turbines-survive-severe-storms ("When the anemometer registers wind speeds higher than 55 mph (cut-out speed varies by turbine), it triggers the wind turbine to automatically shut off.").

outages, derates and failures to start. In total, 452 generating units reported 730 distinct forced outages, derates or failures to start during the Event due to Fuel Issues. Natural gas-fired generating units experienced the overwhelming majority of Fuel Issues: 71,423 MW of natural gas-fired generating unit outages and derates were 83 percent of all Fuel Issue-caused generation outages and derates during the Event, as shown in Figure 84, below.[244] For natural gas-fired generation alone, comparing the outages during the Event caused by Natural Gas Fuel Issues to Freezing Issues and Mechanical/Electrical Issues, Natural Gas Fuel Issues caused nearly one-third (31 percent, by MW) of natural gas-fired generating units' unplanned outages and derates.[245]

Figure 84: Unplanned Unavailable Generation in the Event Area Caused by Fuel Issues, December 21-26, 2022

Generating Unit Primary Fuel Type	Unplanned Outages During Event (MW)	Percent of Unplanned MW Outages Due to Fuel Issues
Gas	71,423	83%
Coal	13,439	16%
Other	1,602	2%

Fuel-Issue-caused natural gas-fired generation outages (referred to as the sub-cause "Natural Gas Fuel Issues" described earlier in the Report) include the combined effects of decreased natural gas production; cold weather impacts and mechanical problems at production, gathering, processing and pipeline facilities resulting in gas quality issues and low pipeline pressure; supply and transportation interruptions; curtailments and failure to comply with contractual obligations. Additionally, it includes shippers' inability to procure natural gas due to tight supply, prohibitive, scarcity-induced market prices, or mismatches between the timing of the natural gas and energy markets.

See Figure 85, below, for information on the contractual arrangements held by some of the GOs/GOPs involved in the Event.

Each subset of the 71,423 MW of natural gas-fired generating unit outages and derates due to Natural Gas Fuel Issues total tells a distinct story:

- Nearly 7,500 MW of generation outages were linked to gas delivery pressure issues, reflecting the difficulty natural gas pipelines and other distribution points faced in responding to production losses. Another 2,000 MW was linked to transportation constraints.
- Market Issues and Market Price Restrictions accounted for approximately 24,000 MW of generation loss—reinforcing how surging demand and production losses impacted generating units. Somewhat paradoxically, GOs/GOPs of natural gas-fired generating units attributed more generation loss to the failure of gas suppliers to satisfy firm supply commitment and/or pipeline firm curtailments (16,500 MW of cumulative generation loss) than to interruptible pipeline interruptions

244 This is in part because natural gas-fired generating units were the most common (over 41 percent of the generation capacity in the Event Area, as seen in Figure 11). Natural gas-fired units were also the most common in prior extreme cold weather events (2011: ERCOT – 52 percent; 2021: ERCOT – 52 percent, MISO South – 60.6 percent, SPP – 38.5 percent). The only other units that experienced material generation loss due to Fuel Issues during Winter Storm Elliott were coal units. Fuel Issues for all fuels other than gas and coal, combined, accounted for two percent of all unplanned outages, derates and failures to start.

245 *See* Appendix C.3. Causes of Unplanned Generation Outages, by Fuel Type of Generation.

(14,000 MW of cumulative generation loss). This finding was supported by the Team's cross-check of the causes claimed against data provided by the GOs/GOPs of those generating units about their contractual arrangements.

Figure 85: Generating Unit Natural Gas Commodity and Transportation Contracts

Generating Unit Natural Gas Commodity and Transportation Contracts										
Type of Gas Commodity and Transportation Contract:	MISO		PJM		Southern		SPP		Other BAs	
	Generators	Percent	Generators	Percent	Generators	Percent	Generators	Percent	Generators	Percent
Firm Commodity/Firm Transportation	53	38%	61	37%	0	0%	0	0%	28	26%
Firm Commodity/Mixed Transportation	0	0%	1	1%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
Firm Commodity/Non-Firm Transportation	8	6%	26	16%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
Non-Firm Commodity/Non-Firm Transportation	28	20%	18	11%	2	5%	27	34%	9	8%
Non-Firm Commodity/Mixed Transportation	3	2%	0	0%	0	0%	15	19%	2	2%
Non-Firm Commodity/Firm Transportation	20	14%	11	7%	0	0%	17	21%	0	0%
Mixed Commodity/Mixed Transportation	11	8%	21	13%	0	0%	16	20%	20	19%
Mixed Commodity/Firm Transportation	7	5%	3	2%	14	38%	0	0%	14	13%
Mixed Commodity/Non-Firm Transportation	8	6%	17	10%	21	57%	3	4%	28	26%
Did not provide information re: commodity contract type	1	1%	2	1%	0	0%	2	3%	0	0%
No contract or did not provide information about transportation contract type	2	1%	7	4%	0	0%	0	0%	5	5%
Total	**141**	**100%**	**167**	**100%**	**37**	**100%**	**80**	**100%**	**106**	**100%**

During the Event, unplanned natural production outages due to freeze-related issues, road conditions, loss of power and unplanned outages of gathering and processing facilities decreased the natural gas available for supply and transportation to many natural gas-fired generating units in the Eastern Interconnection. Out of the **61** power plants[246] that reported having at least 75 percent of their fuel requirement under firm transportation, only **25** reported also having at least 75 percent of the fuel needed for their winter

246 The Team had a sample size of slightly over 200 generating plants that provided most of the requested information about fuel contracting practices. Generator owners provided fuel contract data on a plant basis, which often included multiple generating units. The Team removed plants that did not answer the requests for their total or daily gas natural gas requirements, resulting in a list of 155 plants.

peak operation under firm supply contracts. The Team focused on GOs/GOPs that provided their fuel requirements. As shown in the figure, the plants were nearly evenly split between those that had no firm transportation at all, and those that had over 75 percent of their natural gas fuel requirements supported by firm transportation.

Figure 86: Number of Power Plants by the Level of Firm Transportation Service Contracts Covering Their Natural Gas Fuel Requirements




C. Causes of Natural Gas Supply and Delivery Facility Outages[247]

1. SUMMARY

As Winter Storm Elliott moved across North America and temperatures dropped, natural gas production in the lower 48 states declined, with volumes on December 22 decreasing 4,411 MMcf/day from the previous day. The largest daily decline in natural gas production – 8,368 MMcf/day – occurred between December 22 and December 23. Dry natural gas production for the lower 48 U.S. saw an 18 percent decline, falling to a low of 82.9 Bcf/day on December 24, 2023, as shown in Figure 87, below.

Figure 87: Daily Dry Natural Gas Production (November - December 2022)[248]



Winter Storm Elliott primarily affected the Marcellus and Utica Shale formations. Marcellus Shale production volumes reached a low of 21,856 MMcf/d on December 24 (23 percent decrease compared to maximum production on December 19). Utica Shale production volumes reached a low of 3,017 MMcf/d on December 26 (54 percent decrease compared to maximum production on December 19). Focusing on states, the largest natural gas production decreases in the Event Area occurred in Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia, whereas Louisiana production was relatively unaffected. Ohio saw the largest relative decline compared to maximum production volumes for December, reaching a low of 3,018 MMcf/d on December 26 (54 percent decline compared to production on December 17). Pennsylvania and West Virginia both reached their lowest production volumes of 16,226 MMcf/d (22 percent decline compared to production on December 20) and 5,630 MMcf/d (26 percent decline compared to production on December 18), respectively, two days prior on December 24. Figures 88 and 89[249] show the declines by state over time, and the geographic locations of the volumetric outages, respectively.

247 Unless otherwise stated, the source of data for this section is the sample of producers, gatherers, processors, and pipelines that responded to the Team's data requests.

248 Source: S&P Global Commodity Insights, ©2023 by S&P Global Inc.

249 Source for both figures: S&P Global Commodity Insights, ©2023 by S&P Global Inc.

Figure 88: Sum of Natural Gas Production Volume, by Date and State (October - December 2022)





Figure 89: Natural Gas Production Volumetric Outages by State, December 20 – 26, 2022



Certain pipeline injection points were especially affected. Westmoreland, Pennsylvania, declined by over 6.8 Bcf over the Gas Days of December 21-26, compared to expected production, and Greene, Pennsylvania, declined by over 3 Bcf. Other points experiencing declines over one Bcf included Calhoun and St. Clair Pennsylvania, Monroe, Ohio and Marshall, West Virginia.[250]


The last time U.S. natural gas production rapidly declined to this degree was during Winter Storm Uri.

250 *See* Figure 50 for a map of receipt points experiencing supply shortages.

Record natural gas demand during Winter Storm Elliott was met by increasing withdrawals from storage and pipeline imports from Canada. Natural gas pipeline imports from Canada supplied 10.4 Bcf of natural gas to the United States on December 24, the highest daily natural gas imports from Canada since February 2007.[251]

Figure 90 below shows record peak demand for natural gas on December 23 and the production nadir on December 24.

Figure 90: Daily Natural Gas Supply and Demand in the Lower 48 States, December 1 – 31, 2022[252]



It is important to note that natural gas demand, as that term is used by the U. S. Energy Information Administration, is the sum of actual gas consumption, natural gas and LNG exports, pipeline losses and fuel gas. EIA's natural gas demand does not include the gas that would have been burned by dispatched natural gas-fired generating units rendered unavailable due to Natural Gas Fuel Issues, Freezing Issues, or other causes. Put another way, although EIA reported record demand for December 23, that figure under-represented the potential natural gas demand because it excluded natural gas that generators would have consumed had they not experienced an outage, derate, or failure to start.

The December 23 demand for gas of 162.5 Bcf included estimated total consumption of natural gas in the lower 48 states of 141 Bcf – a record daily high (exceeding the previous record daily high of 137.4 Bcf set on January

251 Natural Gas Weekly Update, January 19, 2023 – U.S. Energy Information Administration, (last visited November 3, 2023).

252 Source: S&P Global Commodity Insights, ©2023 by S&P Global Inc.

1, 2018) and 21.5 Bcf of exported gas, pipeline losses, and fuel gas. Figure 91, below, shows the relative shares of natural gas consumption for natural gas fired-generating units ("PowerBurn"), industrial production, residential and commercial use ("ResComm"), and LNG feedgas for the Event Area. Power burn and residential and commercial use consumed similar shares until the onset of the extreme cold weather, when residential and consumer usage spiked. LNG feedgas decreased by nearly 20 percent, mostly in the Southeast as shown in Figure 92, below. Figure 92 shows the overall and relative increase (or decrease) in the various sectors' natural gas consumption for the Northeast, Midwest and Southeast regions, combined. Residential and commercial use had the largest percentage increase by far, at nearly 50 percent, with pipe losses coming in second, increasing by a third.

Figure 91: Northeast/Midwest/Southeast Natural Gas Consumption[253]




Figure 92: Overall and Relative Increase in Natural Gas Consumption for the Northeast, Midwest and Southeast Regions[254]

Bcfd	December 15-20 Average	December 21-26 Average	Percent Change
Northeast/Midwest/Southeast Natural Gas Demand	82.3	100.5	22.1%
Power Burn	21.2	24.6	15.8%
Res/Comm	31.4	46.0	46.5%
Industrial	15.3	16.5	7.9%
LNG Feedgas	10.6	8.5	-19.8%
Pipe Loss	3.9	5.0	29.2%

253 Source: S&P Global Commodity Insights, ©2023 by S&P Global Inc.

254 Source: S&P Global Commodity Insights, ©2023 by S&P Global Inc.

2. NATURAL GAS PRODUCTION DECLINES

The Team sought to gather information from the largest producers in the area that experienced the greatest decreases in natural gas production. Based on the Team's analysis of publicly-available information and data from S&P Global Community Insights, the Team focused its data collection efforts on a sample of 12 large producers in Pennsylvania, Ohio and West Virginia. Eight producers with operations in Pennsylvania, Ohio, West Virginia, and Virginia – representing over 15,000 natural gas wells – provided responses to questions about estimated marketed production declines during Winter Storm Elliott.[255] Producers were asked to identify production volume declines by date and county, and to identify an associated cause for the declines. Only 38 to 53 percent of the production entities provided the requested data for December 23 to 26,[256] the days with the most substantial production losses, as shown in Figure 93, below. One producer did not provide any information after several attempts by the Team.[257] The Team grouped them into the following categories: Freeze-offs; Downstream Issues; Access to roads cut-off; Proactive Reduction in Sales.[258]

Figure 93: Natural Gas Marketed Production Volume Declines, December 20 – 26, 2022

Date	Marketed Production Volume Decline MMcf/d with Causes	Total Marketed Production Volume Decline (MMcf/d)	% of Data
12/20/2022	541.24	718.82	75%
12/21/2022	569.87	838.19	68%
12/22/2022	532.48	854.27	62%
12/23/2022	2,044.46	3,869.75	53%
12/24/2022	1,579.86	4,209.68	38%
12/25/2022	1,878.98	4,416.39	43%
12/26/2022	1,743.17	3,832.59	45%

All but one producer identified freeze-offs as a primary cause of production reductions, including frozen production equipment as well as wellhead freeze offs. Seven of the 10 producers identified downstream issues

255 In total, 10 producers responded to the data request, but only eight provided the data on the estimated marketed production declines. *See* footnote 100 which describes the relevant regions the entities were asked to provide production data.

256 This is an example of an issue the Team faced when gathering information from non-jurisdictional entities.


257 Details regarding the way in which this producer responded illustrate the benefits that will obtain if an agency or entity is given jurisdiction over the reliability of the natural gas system. The Team initially tried to contact the producer via written data requests. When the producer did not respond, the Team assumed that the data requests had not been received or had reached the wrong person – issues that had arisen with other producers and that could be resolved via a phone call. The Team contacted the producer and was referred to a specific individual. He, however, did not return calls. The Team finally managed to reach him in his office, and he said that it was his understanding that cooperation with the Team was "voluntary." Although the Team explained the importance of cooperation in helping to tell the entire story of what happened during Winter Storm Elliott, he said only that he would discuss it with others at the producer and would call back in a week or two. The Team never heard from him again.

258 The Team had to group the causes provided into overarching categories since there was a significant variation in the causes used/provided in the responses. This is also another reason why an agency or entity with jurisdiction over the reliability of the natural gas system could prove beneficial by creating some level of standardization or uniformity in outage/operational impacts cause designations that could support meaningful analysis (compare, e.g., GADS data specifications for BES GOs/GOPs to provide data about generating unit outages Generating Availability Data System (GADS) (nerc.com)).

as a significant driver of production declines; these issues included outages in gathering systems, compressors, and processing plants, as well as pipelines that could not take the gas from the producers,[259] which caused idling of producer equipment, which itself exacerbated production equipment freezing and caused further reductions in natural gas production. Five out of 10 identified poor road conditions, which prevented personnel and, in some cases, water hauling trucks, from reaching remote sites, although this was not as common as during Winter Storm Uri. Finally, two producers proactively reduced the volume of contractual sales during the Event because they expected production declines.

Figure 94, below, illustrates the decline by category calculated against the daily estimated production as reported by producers. Figure 95 breaks down the causes of production losses on December 23 to 26. Freeze-offs peaked as the leading cause of production declines on December 24 and 25, while downstream issues peaked on December 23.

Figure 94: Natural Gas Daily Production Decline by Cause, December 20 – 26, 2022



259 One pipeline stated that leading up to and on the evening of December 23, they started to pack their lines in preparation for high demand on December 24. The high pressure temporarily prevented producers from being able to move their gas onto the pipeline. The same pipeline also had a lag in demand load on the morning of December 24, causing pressures to remain high, which exposed producers to further freezing vulnerabilities as they could not move their supply onto the pipeline system at that time.

Figure 95: Total Percentages of Natural Gas Daily Production Decline by Cause, December 23 – 26, 2022

	Production Event Causes on December 23rd	
	Natural Gas Infrastructure Condition	Facility Event Causes
Freeze-offs	Equipment freezing at well/gathering facilities.	16.6%
Downstream Issues	Third party/downstream issues (e.g., processing plant down)	44.5%
Access to roads cut-off	Road/access to well/gathering facilities	8.4%
Multiple	Multiple issues (combination of two or more of above issues)	24.0%
Other Issues, Unrelated Issues	Proactive shut-in	0.0%
	Other Issues	6.5%
Total		100.0%

	Production Event Causes on December 24th	
	Natural Gas Infrastructure Condition	Facility Event Causes
Freeze-offs	Equipment freezing at well/gathering facilities.	46.9%
Downstream Issues	Third party/downstream issues (e.g., processing plant down)	1.2%
Access to roads cut-off	Road/access to well/gathering facilities	3.8%
Multiple	Multiple issues (combination of two or more of above issues)	47.8%
Other Issues, Unrelated Issues	Proactive shut-in	0.0%
	Other Issues	0.3%
Total		100.0%


	Production Event Causes on December 25th	
	Natural Gas Infrastructure Condition	Facility Event Causes
Freeze-offs	Equipment freezing at well/gathering facilities.	55.4%
Downstream Issues	Third party/downstream issues (e.g., processing plant down)	1.0%
Access to roads cut-off	Road/access to well/gathering facilities	3.7%
Multiple	Multiple issues (combination of two or more of above issues)	39.5%
Other Issues, Unrelated Issues	Proactive shut-in	0.1%
	Other Issues	0.3%
Total		100.0%

	Production Event Causes on December 26th	
	Natural Gas Infrastructure Condition	Facility Event Causes
Freeze-offs	Equipment freezing at well/gathering facilities.	51.8%
Downstream Issues	Third party/downstream issues (e.g., processing plant down)	1.0%
Access to roads cut-off	Road/access to well/gathering facilities	5.7%
Multiple	Multiple issues (combination of two or more of above issues)	41.1%
Other Issues, Unrelated Issues	Proactive shut-in	0.1%
	Other Issues	0.3%
Total		100.0%

3. NATURAL GAS PROCESSING

The Team obtained data from a total sample size of 26 natural gas processing plants located in the Texas-Louisiana-Mississippi Salt Basin (8) and Appalachian Basin (18). However, the Report focuses on the Appalachian Basin because it experienced the largest decrease in natural gas supply during the Event. Data regarding the Texas-Louisiana-Mississippi Salt Basin is in Appendix D. See Figure 96, below for depiction of geographic locations of the processing facilities.

Figure 96: Natural Gas Processing Facilities in Event Area



As shown in Figure 97 below, temperatures declined drastically on December 23. Weather stations in Morgantown, West Virginia, which is located within the Appalachian Basin, captured temperatures ranging from 46 degrees to -2 degrees on December 23. This decline continued December 24, over the course of which the average temperature in Morgantown was 29 degrees below the historical normal.[260]

Figure 97: Morgantown, WV Actual Daily Temperatures





Figure 98: Appalachian Basin Processing Facility Receipt Volume and Processed Volume, December 20 – 26, 2022



260 *See* Figure 25 for departures from normal lows for December 25.

As temperatures plunged, natural gas demand increased, while at the same time, the volume of gas received by processing facilities declined, as seen in Figure 98, above.

Some processing facilities that participated in the inquiry reported they did not receive the full contracted amount of gas supply from producers. Despite not receiving all the gas they expected, processing facilities reported that they processed all the gas they received on the days that receipt volume was most decreased.

Processing losses, analyzed by the day of maximum losses in each basin, were largely caused by reduced gas supply, which in turn was caused by producers' equipment freezing or pressure issues in their gathering pipeline systems. However, as shown in Figure 99 below, as it became colder, some processing facilities also experienced mechanical outages/failures, power outages, and plant equipment Freezing Issues. Overall, the top causes in both basins are, in order, reduction in receipt volumes, producer freeze/pressure issues (these would also cause a reduction in receipt volumes but some producers expressly identified these causes), power outages, and processing facility mechanical outages. As shown in Figure 100, on the December 23 (the second) table, reduced natural gas receipts were by far the largest cause of lost processing facility volume, accounting for 71 to 84 percent of those losses. Processing facility Freezing Issues caused 10 to 16 percent of the lost processing volume, and curtailment or loss of power supply, which had been a substantial cause in the 2021 Event, maxed out at 5.6 percent. Only 25 percent of the 26 processing plants were protected from power outages by local power provider critical load designation agreements.

Figure 99: Appalachian Basin Event Processing Facility Event Causes—Dec. 22 – 29, 2022




Figure 100: Processing Facilities Event Causes, December 22 – 26, 2022

Processing Facility Disruption Event Causes on December 22		
Cause	**Natural Gas Infrastructure Conditon**	**Facility Event Causes**
Freezing Temperature and Weather Conditions	Reduced Natural Gas Receipt from Production/Gathering/Facilities	71.4%
	Freezing Issues at Processing Facilities	0%
Loss of Power	Processing Facilties- Loss of Power Supply or curtailmennt	0%
Other issues	Mechanical Outage - Non weather Related	28.6%
Total		100%
* There were a total of 7 causes of processing plant events occuring on December 22		

Processing Facility Disruption Event Causes on December 23		
Cause	**Natural Gas Infrastructure Conditon**	**Facility Event Causes**
Freezing Temperature and Weather Conditions	Reduced Natural Gas Receipt from Production/Gathering/Facilities	72.2%
	Freezing Issues at Processing Facilities	16.6%
Loss of Power	Processing Facilties- Loss of Power Supply or curtailmennt	5.6%
Other issues	Mechanical Outage - Non weather Related	5.6%
Total		100%
* There were a total of 18 causes of processing plant events occuring on December 23		

Processing Facility Disruption Event Causes on December 24		
Cause	**Natural Gas Infrastructure Conditon**	**Facility Event Causes**
Freezing Temperature and Weather Conditions	Reduced Natural Gas Receipt from Production/Gathering/Facilities	81.82%
	Freezing Issues at Processing Facilities	13.60%
Loss of Power	Processing Facilties- Loss of Power Supply or curtailmennt	4.500%
Other issues	Mechanical Outage - Non weather Related	0%
Total		100%
* There were a total of 22 causes of processing plant events occuring on December 24		

Processing Facility Disruption Event Causes on December 25		
Cause	**Natural Gas Infrastructure Conditon**	**Facility Event Causes**
Freezing Temperature and Weather Conditions	Reduced Natural Gas Receipt from Production/Gathering/Facilities	84.2%
	Freezing Issues at Processing Facilities	10.5%
Loss of Power	Processing Facilties- Loss of Power Supply or curtailmennt	5.3%
Other issues	Mechanical Outage - Non weather Related	0%
Total		100%
* There were a total of 19 causes of processing plant events occuring on December 25		

Processing Facility Disruption Event Causes on December 26		
Cause	**Natural Gas Infrastructure Conditon**	**Facility Event Causes**
Freezing Temperature and Weather Conditions	Reduced Natural Gas Receipt from Production/Gathering/Facilities	83.3%
	Freezing Issues at Processing Facilities	11.1%
Loss of Power	Processing Facilties- Loss of Power Supply or curtailmennt	5.6%
Other issues	Mechanical Outage - Non weather Related	0%
Total		100%
* There were a total of 18 causes of processing plant events occuring on December 26		

4. NATURAL GAS DELIVERY

The interstate natural gas pipeline facilities experienced 19 equipment issues which directly affected shippers, including Generation Owners and LDCs. The largest reported cause of equipment issues was weather/ freezing issues, followed by mechanical issues (see Figure 101, below). The cold temperatures caused valves and compressor units at varying locations along the pipeline system to freeze, reducing or preventing the flow of gas through the facilities (see Figure 102, below). Eight force majeures, five of which were due to freezing, affected a total of 156 firm customers.[261] Yet a sampling of the force majeure provisions of interstate natural gas pipeline tariffs indicates that they either expressly included language that used "freezing of pipelines [or pipes or lines]" as examples of force majeure, even though pipeline owners can take measures to avoid

261 *See* Section III.B.4(a)(3).

freezing of pipeline equipment; or they included broad language about "unscheduled repairs" or "mechanical or physical failure that affects the ability to transport gas," which could be interpreted to include freezing-related issues."[262] Similarly, the force majeure clause in the NAESB "Base Contract for Sale and Purchase of Natural Gas" expressly includes "weather related events affecting an entire geographic region, such as low temperatures which cause freezing or failure of wells or lines of pipe." Using express inclusions or broad language in force majeure clauses disincentivizes natural gas infrastructure entities from taking steps to ensure that natural gas will be available when it is most needed, during an extreme cold weather event.

Figure 101: Pipeline-Reported Equipment Issues Directly Affecting Shippers – Cause Breakdown





Figure 102: Pipeline-Reported Equipment Issues Directly Affecting Shippers by Equipment Type




262 Rockies Express Pipeline, LLC, Tariffs, § 21.2 Force Majeure (3.0.0), Columbia Gas Transmission. LLC, Baseline Tariffs, Gen. Terms & Conditions, § 15.1 Force Majeure (0.0.0), Northern Natural Gas Co, Gas Tariffs, Sheet No. 217, G T and C § 10 Force Majeure (1.0.0), Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co. Fifth Revised Volume No. 1, Provision and Contract Entitlements, § 11 Force Majeure (5.0.0).

Figure 103: Pipelines - Total Power Outages Reported



Eight of the 15 pipelines reported a total of 53 instances of commercial power loss at their facilities from December 20-26 (shown in Figure 103 above), averaging approximately nine hours in duration, although some lasted longer than three days (see Figure 104, below). Only one power outage impacted shippers because the compressor stations used redundant compressor units powered by gas-fueled backup or portable generation. Of the 15 pipelines that provided data, only four have facilities designated as critical with their electricity provider. Some pipelines stated that they did not see the need to designate critical facilities, while others stated that they prefer to communicate with electric providers during any load shedding events. One pipeline stated that it performed a study following the Event and did not identify any critical site within the service territory of its power provider.

Figure 104: Total Duration of Pipeline Power Outages



D.Grid Entities' Preparedness and Emergency Operations

1. SHORT-TERM LOAD FORECASTING ANALYSIS

A significant majority of the short-term forecasts (4-, 3-, 2-, and next-day peak load forecasts for actual peak loads) for all eight BAs underestimated the actual peak demand. There were only eight instances of the 64 short-term forecasts that overestimated the actual peak demand. The Mean Average Percent Error (MAPE) for all the short-term forecasts for the peak load of December 23 was approximately 11.25 percent and the MAPE for all the short-term forecasts for the peak load of December 24 was approximately 8.51 percent; with an average MAPE of 9.88 percent for both days for all eight BAs. The short-term forecasts generally improved as the day for the forecast peak demand approached, as shown in Figures 19 and 20, in Section III.

The Team identified some of the possible reasons for the underestimation of the actual peak demand: inaccurate weather forecasts, changes in consumer behavior, especially on peak, and changes to the grid (e.g., addition of non-conforming loads or population growth). The Team also found that many of the entities' models lacked the data history (e.g., similar historical days) for the holiday weekend winter peak extreme cold weather conditions forecast. Some BA operators made manual adjustments to the load forecasts to attempt to make them more realistic. Those that used an "adder" to account for potential load forecast error (LG&E/KU, Santee Cooper) had the lowest MAPE for December 24.

While weather-related factors were important, those that did "backcasts" found that their load forecasts were still off even after being corrected for temperature, so clearly temperature was only one factor, although an important one. Multiple entities noted the difficulty of predicting load for a holiday weekend, when there may be few holiday weekends within the historical data available to the model, and few or none of those may coincide with colder-than-ordinary weather. The combination of a holiday weekend plus extreme cold weather made reliance on prior similar days especially challenging. Most entities expected holidays to lower load, but because of the extreme cold, did not see this pattern emerge. A couple of entities mentioned that they had experienced load growth within their service territory, and the importance of being aware of where this load growth is occurring and its composition (is it residential? Data centers? Commercial? Industrial?)

Another important element to identify in an entity's load is the presence of resistive heating. As explained in the 2021 Report in connection with Recommendation 16,[263] as temperatures drop below zero, homes with heat pumps must rely on electric resistance heating, and the hourly electric demand in kilowatts increases sharply as temperatures decline, to up to four times as much as at 32 degrees, once the temperature reaches minus 10.[264] Multiple entities mentioned the fact that temperatures dropped extremely quickly from relatively temperate temperatures to abnormal lows for their area. When temperatures drop very quickly, but homeowners keep their heat set at the same temperature, heating units must run constantly to try to maintain a steady temperature, rather than cycling as is expected and calculated for "normal" winter load forecasts. Some mentioned the severity of the cold—for one entity, three standard deviations beyond their normal December lows—so that they did not have loads at those temperatures in the historical sample of loads used in the load forecasting models (three years for the majority of the entities).

263 "BAs should have staff with specialized knowledge of how weather impacts load, including the effects of heat pump backup heating and other supplemental electric heating . . ." 2021 Report at 225

264 2021 Report at 225 and Figure 108.

2. ANALYSIS OF OPERATIONAL PLANNING PROCESSES

As summarized earlier in Section III, the BAs thought prior to the Event that they individually had sufficient resources to meet their respective expected forecast electricity demands. They anticipated the possibility of some level of unplanned generation outages from the winter storm; they were proactive in their preparation efforts. To determine steps the BAs could take to improve their processes, the Team considered the following outcomes from the Event:

- Most of the BAs underforecast their peak electricity demands experienced on December 23-24.
- The BAs did not anticipate the significant level of unplanned generation outages and derates that would occur during the storm, or the rates at which they would occur, which were similar to the outage rates experienced in Texas during Winter Storm Uri in 2021.[265]
- Many natural gas-fired generating units were unavailable because they had not made advance arrangements for natural gas fuel supply for when they ultimately would be committed to operate, and by the time they were notified of their commitment, natural gas supplies were not available.
- The entities thought that they had sufficient reserves to meet their anticipated peak electricity demands, but the severity and widespread nature of the storm, which left multiple neighboring entities in the same position, forced them into a reactionary state of operation, with limited flexibility, options, or time. As a result, several entities needed to shed firm load.

Short-term planning processes typically use deterministic methods and calculations to develop short range resource plans for the next day or several days in advance of the operating day, with plans easily adjusted for the unplanned outage of one or two generation resources through deterministic recalculations. However, the Team found that preparation for another event like Winter Storm Elliott and other extreme cold weather events would benefit from considering a wider range of outcomes representing greater uncertainty, multiple days in advance of the extreme cold weather operating day in risk areas such as:

- Load forecast
- Generation extreme cold weather availability
- Generation fuel availability
- Multiple-neighboring entity impact
- Transmission system constraints

The Team recognizes consideration of this wider range of outcomes may be seen as suggesting use of long-range planning "probabilistic methods" in the control room. However, because these cold weather events have repeatedly revealed significant differences between what was expected and what the operators actually faced, the Team finds that considering a wider range of outcomes representing greater uncertainty should aid in preparation and decision-making multiple days in advance of future extreme cold weather events like Winter Storm Elliott.

3. ANALYSIS OF EMERGENCY OPERATING CONDITIONS AND COORDINATION

a. Coincident high electricity demands, unplanned generation outages and derates, and many Energy Emergency Alerts

Several of the Core BAs' resource assessments and scenarios for the winter 2022-2023 season relied

265 Section III.B.1. above, describes TVA's unplanned generation outages which increased by 6,000 MW from shortly before 1:00 a.m. to 8:00 a.m. on December 23. Within the PJM footprint, unplanned outages and derates began to escalate shortly after 4 a.m. on December 23, and then from about 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., they rapidly escalated at a rate of over 2,200 MW per hour. The TVA and PJM experiences were similar to the rate of increase in generation outages and derates that was experienced in the February 2021 event in the ERCOT footprint, from February 14, 10:00 p.m. to February 15, 1:00 p.m. (3-hour period). *See* 2021 Report at 130

on the availability of external generation resources (i.e., purchase power/import power schedules and emergency energy availability) to meet winter season reserve targets. This reliance is dependent on both availability of the power to be imported and on the interregional transfer capability to deliver the power. Some of the BAs' approaches to reliance on external generation resources in planning to serve higher than normal winter peak load levels combined with higher levels of resource outages are as follows:

- One BA identified use of firm transmission (for importing power), combined with economic interruptible energy products for reserves coverage, of 505 MW, 1,519 MW, and 205 MW, for the months of December 2022, January 2023, and February 2023, respectively, to meet its winter reserve above normal load/above normal resource outage scenario margins.
- Another BA assumed 1,000 MW in purchases as part of its 2023 winter season planning and sensitivity analysis.
- One BA calculated a negative reserve margin based on its 90/10 load forecast coupled with expected generation outages, even with use of demand response measures (implying a likely need for purchase power during extreme cold weather conditions).
- Another BA calculated a negative reserve margin based on its 90/10 load forecast without accounting for any generation outages, and with use of demand response measures (again, implying likely need for purchase power during extreme cold weather conditions).


As described above in Section III, during the Event, many BAs in the U.S. Eastern Interconnection had to declare energy emergencies, with some shedding firm load. Most BAs experienced their highest levels of unplanned generation outages and derates and winter peak loads within several hours of one another as Winter Storm Elliott blanketed their footprints simultaneously.[266] A BA's reliance on purchased or import power to meet its system load plus reserves often meant the difference between having to shed load or not. See Figure 39.

System load in the U.S. portion of the Eastern Interconnection increased by 132,000 MW during a 14-hour period coinciding with the arrival of Winter Storm Elliott. By 10 a.m. on December 24, system load levels for several BAs were well above 90 percent of their respective peak loads during Winter Storm Elliott, and most of those BAs had already invoked load management measures (EEA 2) or even firm load interruptions, reducing the percentages which are shown in Figure 39, above. Had the load management and firm load shed measures not been in place, the December 24 peak would have been close to the December 23 evening peak of 482,444 MW (shown in Figure 39, above).

The affected BAs arranged for purchase power imports to cover forecast or actual declining reserves positions that reflected their own unplanned generation outages and derates coupled with rising forecast and actual system loads for December 23 and 24. Those BAs that anticipated potential need and already had prior arrangements for purchase power took steps to schedule those deliveries with the purchase-selling entity (within the source BA) for the coldest days. Because many of the BAs that were in need are directly connected via AC ties as illustrated in Figure 12 (listing the tie lines between BAs), arranging for purchase power imports from a purchase-selling entity within an adjacent BA during less extreme circumstances would normally be fairly straightforward, especially for BAs directly connected to each other like PJM and Duke, or PJM and TVA. But most of the directly-neighboring BAs found themselves simultaneously experiencing Energy Emergencies and did not have energy to share with their neighbors.

266 The five extreme cold weather events in the past 11 years (2011, 2014, 2018, 2021, and 2022) covered large geographic regions. During the 2018 and 2021 events, generation reserves existed in distant operating footprints where the extreme cold weather event was not as intense or had not yet impacted those areas, which afforded the opportunity for power transfers, limited by transmission constraints.

Figure 105: Total Reserves, Generation Outages and Derates, and Load for Event Area: December 21 - December 26, 2022



b. Health of the Eastern Interconnection during Winter Storm Elliott peak electricity demand

The Core Event Area and the U.S. portion of the Eastern Interconnection were experiencing the highest winter electricity demands during Winter Storm Elliott, as shown in Figure 39, above. Meanwhile, while system loads were peaking across the Interconnection, total unplanned generation outages and derates were climbing as shown in Figure 69, above. To gain perspective on the overall health of the Interconnection during this most critical period of the Event, the Team estimated the remaining responsive reserves. The Team reviewed:

- the total online/synchronized reserves in the Core Event Area (see Figure 105),
- the system load of the U.S. portion of the Eastern Interconnection (see Figure 39), and
- total unavailable generation in the U.S. portion of the Eastern Interconnection during the Event (see Figure 37).

The Team found that there were periods during the evening of December 23 and the morning of December 24 when the "potential responsive reserves" (which included online and any offline resources) were lowest while system demand was at its highest levels, as illustrated in Figure 105, below. The Team notes that its estimates of how low responsive reserves dropped are conservative, since they may include offline capacity, and do not account for additional offline capacity in other portions of the Eastern Interconnection.[267] During this same period, Eastern Interconnection frequency excursions were common. Figure 106, below, illustrates one-minute-average system frequency, which declined below 59.95 Hz several times on the evening of December 23 and the morning of December 24 during periods of low responsive reserve capacity.

267 The Team conservatively estimated capacity; the actual capacity shortage could have been worse as the Team did not account for any offline capacity in Canada or the Florida peninsula (i.e., other portions of the Eastern Interconnection), which were not within the Event Area.

Figure 106: Eastern Interconnection Frequency: December 23, 4:00 p.m. to December 24, 12:00 p.m.





Figure 107: Eastern Interconnection Frequency: December 23, 11:00 p.m. to December 24, 6:00 a.m.



As seen in Figure 107 above, at about 5:40 p.m. on December 23, the Eastern Interconnection frequency decreased to a one-minute average of 59.943 Hz, and dropped to its lowest point during the Event, 59.936 Hz, at about 4:25 a.m. on the morning of December 24. Based on this limited review, the Team is concerned that, accounting for next contingencies (e.g., large generation outage, single point of failure contingency), the Eastern Interconnection appears to have been at risk of potential instability during this timeframe of escalating winter system demands, rapidly escalating unplanned generation outages and derates, and declining responsive reserves.[268]

c. Grid Communications and Coordination

Before and during the Event, RCs remained in contact with each other, as well as with their member BAs, either directly via voice communication or through the NERC-managed Reliability Coordinator Information System (RCIS). RCs were able to communicate EEAs and other emergency measures they took during the Event on the

268 The study should also consider how close the Interconnection may have been to an underfrequency load shed event.

RCIS message system. All RCs have read and write access to the RCIS. Although they do not have write access to the RCIS, BAs and TOPs can request read access to the system. Given the valuable information shared by RCs on the RCIS during emergency events, BAs that have not already done so should request access to the RCIS system and monitor those communications during extreme cold weather events, at a minimum. BAs can also ask their RC to communicate on RCIS their ability, or lack thereof, to provide energy to other BAs experiencing energy shortages during emergencies. This practice could reduce the number of entities that a BA short on energy would need to contact in an emergency.

Generally, many of the RCs have a daily operational call, as well as ad hoc calls and other communications as system conditions dictate. Examples of some of the standing calls relevant to the Event include: (1) NPCC has a brief standing daily 9:30 a.m. call (which includes PJM, MISO, and others), which can be initiated by any RC, and any follow up items from these calls are assigned to control room managers;[269] (2) MISO has a standing daily 8:00 a.m. MISO RC coordination conference call, which includes TOPs and BAs within the MISO Reliability Coordination Area, as well as neighboring RCs, including PJM, SPP, and TVA.

Before and during the Event, RCs coordinated on specific issues and concerns affecting their systems, including the following:

- VACAR-South RC coordinated with adjacent RCs on two potential thermal overloads, one involving a tie line between DEP and PJM and the other involving a tie line between Santee Cooper and Southern. In both cases, the potential overloads were mitigated through the use of adjusted ratings.
- SPP RC agreed to allow an additional increase in the RDT on Saturday, December 24, for an emergency energy request that TVA made from MISO.
- TVA RC coordinated with PJM RC to mitigate real-time overloads within the PJM/AEP footprint on the morning of December 23, and PJM and TVA RCs also coordinated to resolve low voltage conditions observed in the East Kentucky Power Cooperative area.

When conditions permitted, entities directly impacted by the storm provided neighboring entities with emergency energy. Examples included:

- PJM, Duke, MISO, and Southern provided emergency energy to TVA,
- TVA provided emergency energy to LG&E/KU,
- Florida Power and Light and MISO provided emergency energy to Southern, and
- Southern provided emergency energy to DESC.

As described earlier, PJM was able to leverage its simultaneous activation of reserves/SAR procedure with NPCC during the Event.[270] During the evening of December 23, for example, PJM asked NPCC for reserves support (up to 1,500 MW) during the period that PJM activated its Synchronous Reserves emergency procedure. The Team found that the entities communicated and cooperated well during the Event, doing as much as possible to assist their neighboring BAs even while under their own systems were experiencing emergency conditions.

269 *See*, Northeast Power Coordinating Council, Inc., NPCC Emergency Preparedness Communications Procedures (Sept. 2, 2022), https://www.npcc.org/content/docs/public/program-areas/standards-and-criteria/regional-criteria/procedures/c-01-emergency-preparedness-procedure.pdf. (outlining procedures for NPCC ad hoc call).

270 *See* R22 and Attachment B of the NPCC Regional Reliability Reference Directory # 5 - Reserve https://www.npcc.org/content/docs/public/program-areas/standards-and-criteria/regional-criteria/directories/directory-5-reserve-20200426.pdf.

E. Variable Energy Resources' Performance and Uncertainty Analysis

Variable energy resources (VERs) such as wind and solar were part of the energy supply mix during the Event. During the Event, solar and wind comprised 1.94 percent and 1.12 percent of installed capacity, respectively, in the core Event Area, as noted in Figure 11. For PJM, solar and wind comprised 1 percent and 2 percent, respectively, of the net installed generation capacity. Figure 108, below, illustrates the actual generation output by VERs, as a percentage of the total generation production output in the PJM footprint during the Event.

Figure 109, below, shows day-ahead versus actual production profiles of both wind and solar resources in PJM during the Event. Winter Storm Elliott occurred shortly after the winter solstice,[271] resulting in a relatively narrow potential solar production time window each day during the Event.

Figure 108: PJM Percent VER Actual Generation Production Output, December 21 – 26, 2022







Figure 109: PJM Day-Ahead and Actual Hourly MW Wind and Solar Production, December 21 – 26, 2022





271 Winter Solstice for the Northern Hemisphere was December 21, 2022 4:47 p.m. The winter solstice marks the shortest day and longest night of the year.

Figure 110: MISO Actual Wind Generation – Storms Uri (2021) and Elliott (2022)[272]



The limited availability of solar production time during winter, when daylight hours are shorter, highlights the value of storing energy from solar production for when it is needed most during the winter non-daylight peak load timeframes. For example, DESC noted that on the morning of December 24, their solar resources began to produce energy, which, while after the morning peak, contributed to DESC's ability to pump water at its pumped storage facility so that its capacity would be available for the December 24 evening peak and the December 25 pre-dawn morning peak.

Wind energy production in higher-penetration areas west of the core Event Area (SPP, MISO) was high, especially during the onset of the Event on December 22 and 23. Figure 110, above, shows a wind production comparison between Winter Storm Uri and Winter Storm Elliott in MISO.

For SPP, wind resources performed above accredited capacity on December 22 at 17,900 MW, coinciding with high SPP system load. With high system loads expected to continue, SPP had to anticipate uncertainty including whether the forecast for high wind levels would hold, and the extent to which wind farms would be shut down or derated for low ambient temperatures or high wind cutoff. The actual wind generation output level slowly decreased after the December 22 peak load and reached its lowest level of 2,700 MW 20 hours later, on December 24 at 6 p.m.[273] SPP's experience illustrates the challenge of aligning VER production levels with power grid needs. Absent energy storage opportunities, the higher variability of wind and solar production increases the demand for dispatchable generation with high ramping capacity[274] to balance generation with load during times when wind or solar power is low, and the system is near peak demand.

Understanding and modeling uncertainties with VER production in the operations planning horizon can help minimize reliability and resource adequacy risks, especially at times of system stress, such as during extreme cold weather events. Shifting from deterministic to probabilistic methods for resource availability/adequacy analyses can better model the uncertainties surrounding VER production. See Recommendation 8 in section V.

272 Reprinted with permission of MISO.

273 SPP Report at 6.

274 *See* Department of Energy, *Importance of Flexible Electricity Supply* (May 2011), https://www1.eere.energy.gov/solar/pdfs/50060.pdf.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS[275]

A. Generator Cold Weather Reliability

Each successive analysis of extreme cold weather events has highlighted the need for generating units to proactively prepare for the onset of cold weather events.[276] Each inquiry report has built on previous analyses and findings to explain how generating units can best achieve that end. In August 2021, the Commission approved the adoption of EOP-011-2, effective April 1, 2023, in response to a recommendation from the 2018 Report, and required Generator Owners to have cold weather preparedness plans for their units. The 2021 Report took the next logical step by recommending that generating units be required to "(i) identify cold-weather-critical components and systems and (ii) identify and implement freeze protection measures for those components and systems."[277] The 2021 Report also recommended that generating units that experienced unplanned outages due to freezing should be required to develop Corrective Action Plans to guard against future outages.[278]

More recently, the Commission has approved revisions to the NERC Reliability Standards, in EOP-012-1, that implemented recommendations from the 2021 Report.[279] These changes, the Commission found, "represent[] an improvement to the Reliability Standards and enhance[] the reliable operation of the Bulk-Power System by requiring generator owners to implement freeze protection measures, develop enhanced cold weather preparedness plans, implement annual trainings, draft and implement corrective action plans to address freezing issues, and provide certain cold weather operating parameters to Reliability Coordinators, Transmission Operators, and Balancing authorities for use in their analyses and planning."[280] These modifications have not yet become effective.

Recommendation 1(a): Findings support the need for prompt development and implementation of the remaining recommended revisions to the Reliability Standards from 2021 Report Key Recommendation 1 to strengthen generators' ability to maintain extreme cold weather performance.

Despite the fact that nearly two thirds of all generating units that provided data indicated that they had begun to make improvements to their cold weather preparedness plans in response to the findings of the 2021 Report, and that many units had already begun to implement improvements required under EOP-011-2, R7.3.2, prior to its effective date of April 2023, 111,000 MW of generating units in the Event footprint still experienced unplanned outages, derates or failures to start due to Freezing Issues.[281] The Team considered whether to recommend additional mandatory Reliability Standards, but with many important Standards either approved, but not yet effective, or still in the drafting stage (e.g. identification of generator cold weather critical components, developing Corrective Action Plans

275 Because the recommendations are intended to be shared widely and may be shared without the remainder of the Report, terms that have been otherwise been abbreviated elsewhere in the Report, such as GOs/GOPs for Generator Owners/Operators, will be spelled out the first timethey are used in each recommendation.

276 *See* 2021 Report at 185-86.

277 *See* 2021 Report at 185-86, Recommendations 1(a) and (b).

278 *See N. Am. Elec. Reliability Corp.,* 176 FERC ¶ 61,119, at P 1 (2021).

279 The first of its Requirements become effective October 1, 2024.

280 *N. Am. Elec. Reliability Corp.,* 182 FERC ¶ 61,094, at P 36 (2023).

281 An encouraging finding was that roughly two-thirds of all generating units said they had begun to make improvements to their cold weather preparedness plans in response to the findings of the 2021 Report.

to operate at Extreme Cold Weather Temperatures), this recommendation focuses instead on fully implementing the recommendations already made in response to the 2021 Report. That over 75 percent of the generating units with unplanned outages due to Freezing Issues failed above their documented minimum operating temperatures suggests that work in this area is not yet complete. For additional background and analysis relevant to Recommendation 1(a) see section IV.B.3., above.

Recommendation 1(b): Findings from the Report support the need for robust monitoring by NERC and the Regional Entities of compliance with the currently-effective and approved generator cold weather Reliability Standards, to determine if reliability gaps exist. NERC should identify the generating units that are at the highest risk during extreme cold weather and work with the Regional Entities (and Balancing Authorities, if applicable) to perform cold weather verifications of those generating units until all of the extreme cold weather Standards proposed by the 2021 Report are approved and effective. (Verify highest risk units by Q4, 2023; implement by Q3, 2024)

As mentioned in 1(a), the Team considered recommending additional Reliability Standards, including for several of the sub-parts of Recommendation 1, but was persuaded to focus on fully implementing the 2021 Report recommendations. Robust compliance monitoring of the currently-effective and approved extreme cold weather Standards can help to discern whether there are patterns which suggest that sub-parts of Recommendation 1 may need to be added to the Standards. For example, if compliance monitoring were to show that large numbers of Generator Owners/Operators were not fully-prepared for winter until mid-December or later, it may suggest that Recommendation 1(g) should be considered for addition to the Standards.

Given that the Extreme Cold Weather Preparedness and Operations Reliability Standards will not be fully effective until May 2028, and that generating units continue to experience high volumes of unplanned outages due to the top three causes of Freezing and Fuel issues as well as Mechanical/Electrical Issues, the Team considered what could be done in the meantime to improve generating unit performance to enhance the reliable operation of the grid. The Team recommends identifying those units at the highest risk of unplanned outages due to Freezing Issues (based on generating units' performance in previous events, their responses to NERC's Level 3 Alert or other criteria) for expedited cold weather verifications. The Team also recommends additional near-term, but slightly less expedited, cold weather verifications as explained in the next recommendation.

Recommendation 1(c): Generator Owners/Operators should assess their own freeze protection measure vulnerability, and NERC or the Regional Entities should perform targeted cold weather verifications pursuant to a risk-based approach.

Generator Owners/Operators should not wait for an extreme cold weather event to occur in their Balancing Authority Area, but should learn from the experiences of others, as well as the many resources available.[282] Based on the guidance provided by the Report, the 2021 Report, and the resources available from NERC and the Regional Entities, GOs/GOPs should assess their own freeze protection measures protecting generator cold weather critical components, and determine whether the generator cold weather critical components continue to be vulnerable to extreme cold, the accelerated cooling effect of wind, and precipitation. To determine whether GOs/GOPs are implementing the currently-effective cold weather Reliability Standards, NERC and the Regional Entities should conduct targeted cold weather verifications, using a risk-based approach. The GOs/GOPs selected would not be those considered at the highest risk of unplanned outages due to Freezing Issues, (i.e., those that are targeted by Recommendation 1(b)), but should be those in the next tier of risk and below. These verifications

282 *See* note 52 for a list of resources.

should continue until all of the Reliability Standards revisions recommended by Key Recommendation 1 of the 2021 Report have become effective. For additional information in support of Recommendation 1(c) see Key Recommendation 1 in the 2021 Report.

Recommendation 1(d): Generator Owners/Operators of generating units that have experienced outages, derates, or failures to start above their documented operating temperature limits should consider conducting engineering design reviews to: (1) evaluate the accuracy and completeness of existing design information (including as it relates to the documented operating temperature limits) and calculated extreme cold weather operational thresholds: (2) evaluate whether existing freeze protection measures are adequate to protect their identified generator cold weather critical components; (3) evaluate whether design features to address cold weather and freezing conditions are being optimally implemented; (4) evaluate the impact of any modifications or additions to the original design on the documented operating temperature limits; (5) evaluate whether any modifications or additions resulted in new generator cold weather critical components; (6) evaluate the impact a unit's "cold" versus "hot" status has on its design limits, including the identification of a "cold start-up" temperature for each unit, if applicable; and (7) determine whether the generating unit's operating characteristics have been altered in a way that creates a potential "weak link" component.

The Team recommends that Generator Owners/Operators consider taking additional steps to ensure the reliability of their generating units for the substantial number of units that, during Winter Storm Elliott, experienced Freezing Issues at temperatures above their documented operating temperature limits. The failures above the units' documented operating temperature limits suggest that the information relied upon by many generators may be inaccurate or may no longer be valid after modifications made to the generating units. Generator Owners/Operators that have experienced unplanned outages, derates, or failures to start due to freezing during extreme cold weather events should consider reviewing their documented operating temperature limits, with appropriate expert assistance, to determine whether modifications have changed their limits or whether the limits should be changed for some other reason. A generating unit may have a higher "cold" low temperature limit (the temperature at which it can start in extreme cold weather, when it has not already been running, versus the "hot" temperature, at which it can run continuously). Identifying these temperatures and sharing them with the BA is critical. However, the Team cautions against GOs/GOPs simply raising their documented operating temperature limits to temperatures above those at which the units failed during the Event, without analyzing whether the units could perform at lower temperatures with appropriate protection of their cold weather critical components.

Recommendation 1(e): Generator Owners/Operators should consider conducting operational/functional testing of their "active" freeze protection systems.

Generator Owners/Operators should consider conducting operational and functional testing of their "active" freeze protection systems (e.g., heat trace circuitry/controls, partial discharge recirculation systems) on at least an annual basis, and always prior to winter, to ensure their continued functionality during extreme cold weather events. Like other systems, active freeze protection systems are subject to wear and tear over time. For instance, even a small section of inoperable heat trace system or circuit can leave a critical component unprotected, leading to a freezing-related outage. A heat trace system that no longer properly alarms for circuits that are inoperable will not warn the GO/GOP that its critical components are vulnerable to freezing.

Recommendation 1(f): Generator Owners/Operators should communicate their low temperature limits, and changes to those limits, to their Balancing Authority and Reliability Coordinator on a real-time basis.

Discussions with Balancing Authority representatives while preparing the Report underscored the substantial

efforts that BA personnel took in real time to activate generation; only for them to learn that that the generation was unavailable. As noted in PJM's analysis of its own response to Winter Storm Elliott, on the afternoon of December 24, 2022, its operational situation was "strained" in part because of a lack of reliable information of this kind:

> *PJM had put generation resources on notice, through Advisories and Alerts, of PJM's need for them to be prepared to run. PJM relied on Generator Owner/operator-submitted data and believed these reserves were available. In many cases, this data did not reflect the actual capability of the generator and PJM would only learn of the generation resource failures at the time PJM was expecting these resources to begin to run.*[283]

Balancing Authorities seeking to address cold weather events should not be expected to learn such information on an ad hoc basis while simultaneously attempting to respond to worsening generation conditions and/or increased load. The onus should be placed on generating units to communicate and update such information, in real time, to BAs. If a GO/GOP knows that there is a meaningful difference between its cold start-up temperature and the temperature at which it can continue to operate when warm, the GO/GOP should inform the BA, so that the BA can consider the generating unit for pre-operational warming in advance of extreme cold weather events. Before an extreme cold weather event, GOs/GOPs should consider whether high winds or precipitation might affect their ability to perform at the documented low temperature limit(s) that they provided to the BA. Generator Owners/Generator Operators should update this data in real time, and BAs should consider amending their tariffs or procedures to require real-time updates if not already required. BAs should use all information provided by GOs/GOPs regarding the operating limits of their generating units to the fullest extent possible in their operations.

Recommendation 1(g): Generator Owners/Operators should complete their preparations for winter, including implementing their winter preparedness plans and inspecting and maintaining their generating units' freeze protection measures, no later than the earliest first freeze date for the generating unit's location, as determined by National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration data.[284] Generator Owners/Operators should maintain those preparations until after the last freeze date, as provided by the same data. Those preparations are in addition to any preparations, inspection or maintenance done in anticipation of a specific extreme cold weather event.

Although annual inspections and maintenance of generating units' freeze protection measures are required by EOP-011-2 R 7.2, some evidence suggests that Generator Owners/Operators may not have completed freeze protection maintenance on all of their units before Winter Storm Elliott hit, relatively early in the winter. Winter Storm Elliott is not the only proof that the worst weather can happen early in the season—in the 2021 Report, Appendix B examined five extreme cold weather events that impacted Texas and the South Central U.S. Two of those events happened in December, one in January, and two in February. December is too late for GOs/GOPs to be finishing their preparation for winter.

(1(c) to 1(g): Implement as soon as possible, but by no later than Q4, 2025)

Recommendation 2: NERC should initiate a technical review of the individual causes of cold-weather-related unplanned generation outages caused by Mechanical/Electrical Issues during the Event to identify the root causes of these failures with the goal of determining what can be done to reduce the frequency of these outages during extreme cold weather events. The study should also consider whether additional Reliability Standards are appropriate to address the root causes of these issues. The study should be conducted by

283 PJM Report at 28.

284 *National Weather Service Frost and Freeze Information* (Sept. 2022), https://www.weather.gov/iwx/fallfrostinfo.

either an independent subject-matter expert such as the Electric Power Research Institute or an academic institution, with participation by Generation Owners/ Generation Operators on scoping and providing generating-unit-specific technical expertise. (Initiate Technical Review by Q1, 2024)

Successive reports reviewing cold weather events have consistently demonstrated a steady relationship between decreasing temperatures and a rise in Mechanical/ Electrical Issues in generating units. The 2021 Report suggested that further analysis was required by Generation Owners to "understand the impact of extreme cold weather on mechanical/electrical failures, so that GOs can identify possible methods of reducing the incidence of unplanned outages, derates and failures to start due to [Mechanical/Electrical Issues] during similar events."[285] The persistence of these issues, even in the face of increased awareness, suggests further action needs to be taken.

An independent subject matter group with knowledge of electrical generator design and operations, as well as materials science, among other topics, should study the relationship between Mechanical/Electrical Issues and cold weather events. The study should analyze the types of Mechanical/Electrical Issues experienced by generating units during extreme cold weather events; the types of components and systems most vulnerable to these events; methods and best practices to prevent Mechanical/Electrical Issues from affecting those components and systems; and any other information deemed relevant. Further, the study should differentiate between Mechanical/Electrical Issues caused by extreme cold weather events, and those that simply occurred during such events (e.g., boiler tube leaks).

Recommendation 3: A joint NERC-Regional Entity team, collaborating with FERC staff, should study the overall availability and readiness of blackstart units to operate during cold weather conditions. This study should cover all portions of the U.S. not already studied, and should incorporate existing literature, studies, reports, and other analyses as to the availability and readiness of blackstart units. The scope of the study should include:

- **an evaluation of existing blackstart restoration plans, including a review of potential single points of failure related to natural gas system dependence;**
- **an evaluation of the sufficiency of existing blackstart availability, readiness, and testing criteria, including whether unscheduled, unannounced, or criteria-based testing (e.g., those used in ERCOT) would improve reliability during cold weather events;**
- **the need for ensuring that generating units with dual-fuel capability providing blackstart service have appropriate fuel storage (as determined by the Balancing Authority);**
- **the need to require blackstart generators to test their fuel switching capabilities seasonally;**
- **the need to require additional fuel storage due to import constraints;**
- **the need for Transmission Operators to incorporate generating units' cold weather preparations into the qualification process for certifying generators as blackstart units; and,**
- **any other subject areas identified as areas of substantial interest or concern in the report issued as a result of ongoing efforts to study blackstart unit availability and readiness in ERCOT.[286] (Initiate study by Q1, 2024)**

Over 19,000 MW of blackstart designated generating units (155 units) incurred outages, derates, or failures to start during the Event. Of the 155 units, 119 were natural-gas fueled units (accounting for just under 75 percent of all generation lost by blackstart designated units). These failures were not geographically or causally isolated, instead, they covered the entire area impacted by the Event, arose from Freezing Issues, Mechanical/Electrical Issues, and Fuel Issues, and impacted gas, oil and dual-fuel capable units.

285 2021 Report at 218 (Recommendation 11).

286 *See* 2021 Report Recommendation 26.

The readiness and availability of blackstart units is paramount to the reliability of the grid during extreme weather scenarios, and the breadth (both in numbers and causes) of the outages and derates to blackstart units during Winter Storm Elliott suggests the need for systematic evaluation of the readiness of these units. For additional background and analysis relevant to Recommendation 3, see Section IV.B.4.

B. Natural Gas Infrastructure Cold Weather Reliability

Recommendation 4: Legislation by Congress and state legislatures (and/or regulation by entities with jurisdiction over natural gas infrastructure reliability) is needed to establish reliability rules for natural gas infrastructure necessary to support the grid and natural gas local distribution companies that address the needs described in 4(a), (b) and (c).

The 2021 Report noted that "the reliability of the BES depends, in large part, on the reliability of the natural gas infrastructure system, but unlike the BES, with its mandatory Reliability Standards enforced by FERC and NERC, the reliability of the natural gas infrastructure system rests largely on voluntary efforts."[287] In February 2011, extreme cold weather in Texas and New Mexico "resulted in widespread wellhead, gathering system, and processing plant freeze-offs in the Permian and San Juan basins," reducing flow by approximately 20 percent, a much greater extent than had occurred up to that point. LDCs interrupted gas service to more than 50,000 customers in New Mexico, Arizona, and Texas, including the cities of El Paso, Texas, Tucson, Arizona and Taos, New Mexico. While some LDCs were able to restore service within hours because they had only cut a few customers, it took one LDC a week to restore 4,300 customers, using a workforce of 700. The 2011 Report recommended that state legislators and regulators, working with "all sectors of the natural gas industry. . . should determine whether production shortages during extreme cold weather events can be effectively and economically mitigated through the adoption of minimum, uniform standards for the winterization of natural gas production and processing facilities."[288] The 2011 event highlighted the increasing interdependency of natural gas infrastructure and the BES.[289]

In Winter Storm Uri, Natural Gas Fuel Issues were "the second-largest cause of generating unit outages that left residents without heat and light and energy in ERCOT for nearly three days, during freezing temperatures,"[290] even though that event did not involve LDCs interrupting service to customers. Texas natural gas production declined during Winter Storm Uri by 70.1 percent, Oklahoma, by 56.8 percent, and Louisiana, by 53.5 percent,[291] while the lower 48 states' production declined by 28 percent.[292] Like the 2011 Report, the 2021 Report recognized that freezing at the wellheads and other natural gas infrastructure facilities, as well as weather-related road conditions, caused the majority of the gas production decline that contributed to the Natural Gas Fuel Issues. To prevent recurrence of these dramatic drops in production in areas on which the entire United States relies for the production of natural gas, the 2021 Report recommended that "Congress, state legislatures, and regulatory agencies with jurisdiction over natural gas infrastructure facilities should require those natural gas infrastructure facilities to implement and maintain cold weather preparedness plans,

287 2021 Report at 197.

288 2011 Report at 126-132, 212, 214.

289 As the 2021 Report recorded, "[a]fter the 2011 event, the Commission initiated a proceeding (Docket No. AD12-12-000) in early 2012, requesting comments on questions about topics including market structure and rules, scheduling, communications, infrastructure, and reliability." The Commission convened five regional conferences and issued two orders which enhanced pipeline communication with grid entities and increased pipeline scheduling flexibility. The 2021 Report noted "some aspects of the problem are either outside [the Commission's] authority or require cooperation among jurisdictions" (e.g. the natural gas production shortages). 2021 Report at 201.

290 2021 Report at 197.

291 As compared to January production. 2021 Report at 174. The Team used January so that it could compare the 2011 event, which happened February 1-5.

292 As compared to February 8 production. 2021 Report at 174.

including measures to prepare to operate when specific cold weather events are forecast."[293]

Despite the 2011 and 2021 recommendations for protecting natural gas infrastructure, including wellheads, from extreme cold weather, production remained insufficiently protected during the Event, which led to a reliability-threatening Gas Emergency for Con Edison in New York City. Had its entire system been cut off, Con Edison said it would have taken "many months" to restore service to its million-plus customers, even with mutual assistance, leaving natural gas customers without heat in the middle of winter. No regulatory entity is tasked with ensuring the *reliability* of the natural gas fuel supply relied upon by the BES/grid. The Team recommends that Congress exercise its regulatory power over natural gas infrastructure necessary to ensure grid reliability. Congress could consider whether additional or exclusive authority for natural gas infrastructure reliability should be placed within a single federal agency, as it did with bulk power system reliability in 2005, when it added section Federal Power Act section 215.[294]

Recommendation 4(a): Because extreme cold weather events have repeatedly impaired the production, gathering, processing, and transportation of natural gas, the reliability rules suggested in Recommendation 4 should address, among other topics, the need for natural gas infrastructure reliability rules, from wellhead through pipeline, requiring cold weather preparedness plans, freeze protection measures, and operating measures for when extreme cold weather periods are forecast, and during the extreme cold weather periods.

The last two extreme cold weather events resulted in substantial natural gas wellhead production declines in key locations. In 2021, Texas, Oklahoma and Louisiana saw 50-percent-plus declines, with Texas most impacted with a 70.1 percent decline. In the Event, the Marcellus and Utica Shale formations of the Appalachian Basin declined by 23 and 54 percent, respectively. "On its own, the Appalachian Basin would have been the third-largest natural gas producer in the world [for] the first half of 2021, behind Russia and the rest of the United States."[295] The largest percentage of natural gas production declines were freeze-related in the Event, and this was also true in 2021.[296]

Unlike in Winter Storm Uri, the natural gas production areas most affected during the Event were in areas that routinely experience cold weather. All of the gas producing entities that provided data about outages and disruptions to their facilities had implemented some cold weather preparedness activities for winter. The combination of the rapid temperature drops, and strong winds defeated many of the protections that were put in place. The interrelated nature of the natural gas supply chain added to its vulnerability. See generally IV.C. Each

293 Key Recommendation 5, 2021 Report at 194. Recognizing that mandatory natural gas infrastructure reliability rules would not likely be in place for the upcoming winter, the 2021 Report also recommended multiple practices that natural gas infrastructure entities could voluntarily implement. Some could be quickly implemented, such as obtaining emergency back-up generators, pre-draining storage tanks before severe weather, or manning key facilities around the clock. Key Recommendation 6, 2021 Report at 194.

294 The NAESB Forum Chairs recommended "**a natural gas reliability organization akin to the one currently responsible for electric reliability, NERC**," NAESB Report at 3 (emphasis in original). Similarly, the National Academy of Science, in its 2021 report on the Future of Electric Power in the U.S., The Future of Electric Power in the United States | The National Academies Press, recommended that the Commission "designate a central entity to establish standards for and otherwise oversee the reliability of the nation's natural gas delivery system. Congress should also authorize FERC to require greater transparency and reporting of conditions occurring on the natural gas delivery system to allow for better situational awareness as to the operational circumstances needed to help support electric system reliability." National Academy of Sciences (nasonline.org).

295 Corinna Ricker and Warren Wilczewski, Shale natural gas production in the Appalachian Basin sets records in first half of 2021, Today in Energy (Sept.1, 2021) U.S. Energy Information Administration - EIA - Independent Statistics and Analyhttps://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=49377sis.

296 Fifty-eight percent of production declines in the 2021 event were caused by freezing or severe cold weather, including "production declines directly caused by freezing, preemptive shut-ins to protect natural gas facilities from freeze-related impacts, and poor road conditions (due to precipitation) that prevented the removal of fluids from production sites or access to facilities to make necessary repairs." 2021 Report at 175.

part of the natural gas supply chain is dependent upon the reliability of other sections, which increases the importance of requiring all sections of the natural gas supply chain to protect against the effects of extreme winter weather. Regulators should develop winterization guidelines to protect and continue the operations of production, gathering and processing system facilities during extreme weather events.[297] Those guidelines should address issues arising from low temperature and high winds, as well as precipitation (if precipitation meaningfully worsens the effect of cold on the applicable natural gas infrastructure).[298]

Recommendation 4(b): The reliability rules suggested in Recommendation 4 should address, among other topics, the need for regional natural gas communications coordinators, with situational awareness of the natural gas infrastructure similar to the grid's Reliability Coordinators, that can share timely operational communications throughout the natural gas infrastructure chain and communicate potential issues to, and receive grid reliability information from, grid reliability entities.

During the Event, both Balancing Authorities and natural gas infrastructure entities such as Local Distribution Companies had limited situational awareness as to the extent to which natural gas production losses rippled through the interconnected systems. PJM headed into the operating day of December 23 expecting approximately 158,000 MW of available generation to meet a forecast load of 127,000 MW. But PJM did not anticipate the rapidly escalating generation outages that peaked at over 46,000 MW early on December 24, 70 percent of which were natural-gas-fired units.[299] PJM was unaware of the magnitude of the natural gas production losses despite the fact that PJM's Gas Electric Coordination Team conducts daily reviews during the winter months (November through March) of the interstate pipeline bulletin boards to assess pipeline operating conditions, identify potential natural gas supply risks to the natural gas-fired generation fleet, and provide daily gas risk assessment reports to its dispatch personnel. Con Edison also did not anticipate that it would be notified of potential severe operating pressure reductions that would not recover unless demand was reduced. Pipelines necessarily had to have been aware of decreasing receipts at various points as pressures began to drop. While producers may have had flexibility to make up their nominations over the course of a day, shippers were unaware of what was happening in real time and did not know that the gas they had purchased and nominated had not been delivered to the pipeline until notified of sometimes very large cuts in nominations on December 24.

Operating personnel at the wellhead communicate with gatherers and processors to which they deliver their gas, gatherers and processors communicate their operational issues to the pipelines to which they deliver gas, and pipelines communicate operational issues to their shippers. Although natural gas infrastructure entities often communicate marketing information to end-use customers, in accordance with contractual obligations, it is not the norm for them to communicate with grid operators (e.g., BAs and RCs). Instead, news of operational issues is often communicated in piecemeal fashion from the affected operator to the next operator in the gas production and delivery chain. Absent any informal arrangement to share information, grid operators and Generator Owners/Operators typically receive information about pipeline operational issues only in the form of operational flow orders and critical notices, which often are issued many hours after the issues begin to occur upstream. There is no natural gas infrastructure entity that has the system-wide view as

297 This recommendation is also consistent with Recommendation 16 from the NAESB Report, which stated, in part, that "applicable state authorities should consider the development of weatherization guidelines appropriate for their region/jurisdiction . . .." NAESB Report at 58-59.

298 *See* 2021 Report at 194-95 (Recommendation 6, which included a long list of measures that natural gas infrastructure entities could use to protect against freezing and other cold-related limitations).

299 *See* PJM Report at 2.

the RC does for the grid. The NAESB Report recognized the "importance of a wide-area view of natural gas system operations to help ensure reliability and the value of being able to access timely data to assist in operational planning, particularly during critical events or anticipated critical events."[300] While interstate pipelines are required to post certain information on their electronic bulletin boards, intrastate pipelines generally have no such requirements.

Multiple entities, including gas and electric trade groups, BAs and RCs, and GOs, described various information gaps existing in the operations of natural gas infrastructure. Many requested that intrastate pipelines be required to post data similar to what interstate pipelines post on their electronic bulletin boards.[301] A generation trade group noted that increased intrastate transparency would assist "particularly in the posting of actual flow data that can assist in validating force majeure claims and posting of available capacity to assist in identifying locations for additional supply/capacity."[302] An Regional Transmission Organization/Independent System Operator complained about the timeliness of information, noting that "last minute force majeure calls" were the only information they received about availability of commodity during the Event.[303] One entity pointed out that "[s]ince most intrastate pipeline operators also own and operate interstate pipelines, they already have the necessary infrastructure and knowledge of how to accomplish this information sharing at minimal cost and effort."[304] Finally, one trade group argued that the intrastate pipelines' lack of transparency combined with their ability to control both capacity and transportation posed a reliability risk:

> The lack of separation between pipeline operational and marketing functions allows intrastate pipelines to operate as regional monopolies and exert market power in the pricing of gas supply services particularly during time of high demand during extreme weather events, such as Winter Storm Uri. Customers are then forced to choose between exorbitant prices or the real prospect of having no access to natural gas supplies. This lack of competitive choice affects both the system reliability as well as the cost to gas and electric end-use customers.[305]

Based on their experience during the Event, shippers indicated that helpful changes would include providing information *linked to specific receipt points, as soon as possible, updated as often as possible, that included information about the volumetric effect at various receipt points if possible.* NAESB Report Recommendation 1 suggested that FERC could improve the timeliness of information available by directing NAESB to revise its business practice standards related to the timely reporting of natural gas pipeline informational website

300 November 8, 2022 GEH Forum Meeting Staff Notes (NAESB Report at 18 n.68). The NAESB Report found that some information sharing between natural gas and grid entities was supported by FERC Order No. 787, which permits the communication between certain parties of operational information to support reliability of natural gas and electric systems, as well as the NAESB WEQ and WGQ Business Practice Standards, incorporated by reference as part of 18 C.F.R § 38.1(a) and 18 C.F.R § 284.12. However, it also noted that some BAs and RCs (a/k/a ISOs/RTOs in their market roles) stated that there are challenges in accessing and analyzing such information. (NAESB Report at 18 nn. 69, 71).

301 *See*, e.g., comments of Electric Power Supply Association, (Page 93, GEH Survey Response Comment Submissions – February 27, 2023) https://naesb.org/pdf4/geh030323w5.docx; comments of Texas Competitive Power Advocates, Page 144, GEH Survey Response Comment Submissions – February 27, 2023) https://naesb.org/pdf4/geh030323w5.docx; comments of Process Gas Consumers Group and American Forest & Paper Association, Page 144, GEH Survey Response Comment Submissions – February 27, 2023) https://naesb.org/pdf4/geh030323w5.docx

302 (Page 144, GEH Survey Response Comment Submissions – February 27, 2023) https://naesb.org/pdf4/geh030323w5.docx.

303 Comments of PJM Interconnection, LLC, combined comment record at page 258.
PJM (Page 118, GEH Survey Response Comment Submissions – February 27, 2023) https://naesb.org/pdf4/geh030323w5.docx.

304 Comments of Texas Competitive Power Advocates, combined comment record at page 284.
TCPA (Page 144, GEH Survey Response Comment Submissions – February 27, 2023) https://naesb.org/pdf4/geh030323w5.docx.

305 Comments of Texas Competitive Power Advocates, combined comment record at page 288.
TCPA (Page 148, GEH Survey Response Comment Submissions – February 27, 2023) https://naesb.org/pdf4/geh030323w5.docx.

posting data;[306] enabling the data to be accessible to grid operators as soon as it is reported and available. Additionally, to address the fact that BAs and RCs are reliant on 24/7 operations while some natural gas infrastructure and marketing entities are not available around the clock, NAESB Report Recommendation 7 suggests that natural gas infrastructure operations be fully functioning on a 24/7 basis in preparation for and during events in which extreme cold weather is forecast.[307]

RCs and BAs could use improved information provided to better plan their operations during periods of extreme cold weather. BAs could dispatch more or different generation. For example, PJM could have dispatched long-lead-time units had it known the number of natural gas-fired generating units that would likely have failed to perform. Natural gas-fired generators could seek or activate alternate fuel supply or transportation arrangements (e.g., fuel oil (for dual-fuel units), natural gas storage, switch transportation to another pipeline if the facility is served by more than one pipeline). LDCs could act more quickly to preserve their system reliability (both for their commercial and residential customers as well as to maintain deliveries to any behind-the-citygate generation)[308] and reduce their draw on already-challenged pipelines during extreme cold weather conditions. For example, Con Edison used its LNG facility to preserve necessary system pressure at its citygate, but would have started it earlier, had it known how production declines were likely to affect delivery at receipt points.[309] Recommendation 4(b) differs from Recommendation 5 primarily in scope and timing, as well as prerequisites for achieving the outcome. Recommendation 4(b) seeks natural gas infrastructure entities that have the tools and authority to have the wide-area view, like a Reliability Coordinator does for the grid, and will likely rely on legislation and/or regulation; Recommendation 5 seeks near-term improvements in information sharing that do not require legislation or regulation.

Recommendation 4(c): The reliability rules suggested in Recommendation 4 should address, among other topics, the need to require natural gas infrastructure entities to identify those natural gas infrastructure loads that should be designated as critical for priority treatment during load shed and provide criteria for identifying such critical loads.

Recommendations from the 2011 Report[310] and the 2021 Report[311] highlighted the importance of Transmission Owners/Operators and Distribution

306 For example, operationally available capacity, total scheduled quantity, and any other data necessary to assist regional operators in maintaining system reliability. The NAESB Report noted, "There was substantial support from both electric and natural gas participants to explore ways to streamline and add efficiencies to the reporting, posting, and data sharing processes of natural gas pipelines (NAESB Report 17 n.62).

307 To address these differences, NAESB Recommendation 7 suggested that "[s]tate public utility commissions and applicable state authorities in states with competitive energy markets should engage with producers, marketers and intrastate pipelines to ensure that such parties' operations are fully functioning on a 24/7 basis in preparation for and during events in which extreme weather is forecast to cause demand to rise sharply for both electricity and natural gas, including during weekends and holidays. (States could consider the approaches adopted in FERC regulations affecting the interstate pipelines.) In instances where state authorities lack enabling authority to take such actions, the FERC should adopt regulations to achieve identical outcomes within its authority."

308 For example, Con Edison's distribution system served 19 generating units.

309 More accurate and timely information from upstream entities could also help LDCs when to use their demand response and requests for voluntary customer conservation. Both are important tools for managing the tight conditions during extreme cold weather events. The NAESB Report recommended that State public utility commissions encourage LDCs within their jurisdictions to "structure incentives for the development of natural gas and electric demand-response programs" and "to provide voluntary conservation public service announcements for residential, commercial and industrial customers" "in preparation for and during events in which demand is expected to rise sharply for both electricity and natural gas." NAESB Report, Recommendations 10 and 11, at 44-45. NAESB Recommendation 10 was supported by 91 percent of the Wholesale Gas Market and 91 percent of the Wholesale Electric Market, as those terms are defined in the NAESB Report. Id. at 44-45. NAESB Recommendation 11 was supported by 93 percent of the Wholesale Gas Market and 100 percent of the Wholesale Electric Market, as those terms are defined in the NAESB Report. Id. at 45.

310 Recommendation 25, 2011 Report at 211-12.

311 Key Recommendation 1i, 2021 Report at 208.

Providers performing critical load reviews of gas production and transmission facilities and prioritizing critical loads during load shed. Few natural gas facilities were impacted by power outages during the Event, as compared to Winter Storm Uri, because the volume of load shed paled in comparison to ERCOT's 20,000 MW during Winter Storm Uri. But the Team was concerned to find that few natural gas infrastructure entities designated *any* of their facilities as critical loads to their local electricity provider.

All 10 of the natural gas producers who provided information in conjunction with the inquiry responded that they do *not* identify *any of their facilities* as protected or as critical loads even though winterization systems including heat trace can be dependent upon utility-provided electric power. Their utility-powered natural gas production facilities also have no, or limited, alternate or backup power. The Team is aware of producers that do rely on the grid for their electricity but have not identified any of their facilities as critical loads.

Of the two gathering system operators from whom data were collected, one indicated that its gathering system compression facilities do not depend on utility/grid power, but it does depend on the utility power to operate air compressors to maintain emergency shut- down valve positions, start the units and operate control equipment within the facility. Gas-fired backup generators are available at the stations in the event of a power outage to the air compressors/system at the majority of their facilities. The second entity indicated that utility power is its primary source of power. Several of its facilities rely heavily on electricity for gas compression and delivery capacity for a significant portion of their operations, and a loss of electrical power would result in the inability to transport and process large quantities of gas. Only 25 percent of the 26 processing plants that provided data were protected from power outages by local power provider critical load designation agreements.

Of the 15 interstate pipelines that provided data to the Team, four stated that they have facilities designated as critical with their power provider, and 11 provided reasons for not designating any facilities.[312] In total, four pipelines designated 60 facilities as critical. The majority of those facilities (42) are owned by a single pipeline. Pennsylvania had the most identified in a single state, with nine.[313]

The Team recommends that legislative and regulatory actions be taken to either establish criteria for natural gas infrastructure facilities to be designated as critical or create or designate an agency or entity to establish such criteria. The critical facilities identified should then be required to register with or otherwise communicate to their electric service necessary information about their critical natural gas infrastructure facilities such as location. Facilities could include producers, gathering/compressing facilities, processing facilities, and both intrastate and interstate pipelines. Legislators or regulators can look to the collaboration between the Public Utility Commission of Texas and the Texas Railroad Commission on rules for designating natural gas facilities and entities as critical, which was required by Texas House Bill 3648, in the wake of Winter Storm Uri's devastating effects on Texas. On November 30, 2021, the Public Utility Commission and Railroad Commission separately adopted rules to codify HB 3648 and establish new regulations for electric utilities and natural gas entities to ensure critical natural gas facilities are appropriately identified.[314]

312 *See* Section IV.C.4 for a discussion of the reasons given for not identifying facilities as critical.

313 The other states and number of critical facilities identified were Virginia (6), New York (5), Kentucky (4), Alabama (3), Tennessee, Mississippi, Ohio, Georgia, and New Jersey (all with two or fewer).

314 https://www.puc.texas.gov/industry/electric/cng/default.aspx

C. Natural Gas-Electric Coordination for Cold Weather Reliability

Recommendation 5: The North American Energy Standards Board should convene natural gas infrastructure entities, electric grid operators, and LDCs to identify improvements in communication during extreme cold weather events to enhance situational awareness. (Q2, 2024)

This Recommendation differs from Recommendation 4b in that it does not seek legislation or regulation but seeks near-term options for enhancing situational awareness among natural gas infrastructure and electric grid entities. The Team recognizes that producers, processors, interstate and intrastate pipelines, as well as grid operators such as Balancing Authorities and Reliability Coordinators, could improve their real-time coordination and communication to some extent without the need for a Reliability Coordinator-equivalent for natural gas infrastructure.

There is a need for improved communication among the operators of production facilities (producers, gatherers, processors) and the timely dissemination of this coordinated communication from the production facilities to other natural gas infrastructure entities, BAs, shippers, and end-use customers (i.e., Local Distribution Companies). Discussions should include what should be communicated, how it should be communicated, and to whom it should be communicated. In particular, operators of gas production facilities should provide information to the extent that they are aware of situations that may have potential adverse impacts on the BAs, pipelines, LDCs, and/or shipper reliability, whether such information becomes available before or during extreme weather events. Ideally those communications would include aggregated volume data or confirmed scheduled quantities for key upstream receipt points on the pipeline systems. Information about operational issues (e.g., location, estimated duration of outage) should be communicated to BAs, LDCs, and shippers so they can anticipate and plan for potential critical notices, OFOs or force majeures, rather than react after those notices are issued. Communication can occur without endangering sensitive commercial information, as it does on the BES grid side, by, among other methods, separating the operational employees who share information from the marketing employees.

NAESB Report Recommendations 2 and 3 identified a potential tool that can be used to accomplish the desired information sharing—Argonne National Laboratory's *NGInsight* Tool.[315] The tool makes it possible to identify the potential impact of weather or other critical events on overall natural gas supply.[316] Additionally, through machine learning informed by electric wholesale market participant input, *NGInsight* can rank the severity of natural gas pipeline notifications posted on EBBs to further enhance situational awareness.[317] For more information about how information sharing could be used to improve natural gas and grid system reliability, see Recommendation 4(b).

315 According to the Forum Report, NGInsight "collects EBB data and provides near real-time assimilation of information from approximately 75 percent of interstate and offshore natural gas pipelines, creating a national-level view of natural gas system situational awareness. Argonne National Laboratory Presentation – June 29, 2023 (Page 3, Argonne National Laboratory) (NAESB Report n.101). The data collected and displayed by the tool include information that identifies unsubscribed capacity, total scheduled quantity as a function of state, county, and/or pipeline as well as critical and non-critical notices, and the tool has the ability to layer other relevant datasets, such as utility service territories and weather alerts. Argonne National Laboratory Presentation – June 29, 2023 (Pages 3 – 4, Argonne National Laboratory) (NAESB Report n.102). NAESB Report Recommendation 2 noted that the Commission should "take steps to facilitate the expansion of the Argonne National Laboratory NGInsight tool, with funding from a federal governmental agency, such as the Department of Energy," while acknowledging the importance of security and market protections. NAESB Report at 21. This recommendation received support from 46 percent of the Wholesale Gas Market and 85 percent of the Wholesale Electric Market, as those terms are defined in the NAESB Report. Id. at 19-20.

316 Argonne National Laboratory Presentation – June 29, 2023 (Pages 3 – 6, Argonne National Laboratory) (NAESB Report n. 103).

317 Argonne National Laboratory Presentation – June 29, 2023 (Page 5, Argonne National Laboratory) (NAESB Report n. 104).

Recommendation 6: The Commission should consider whether to order Commission-jurisdictional natural gas entities to provide the Commission with one-time reports describing their roles in assessing and responding to natural gas supply and transportation vulnerabilities in extreme cold weather events.

As discussed in Section IV.C.4 above, freezing was a significant cause of pipeline equipment outages that caused some flow reduction, and the primary cause of pipeline equipment outages directly affecting shippers. Recommendation 6 is based in part on the various preparations for Winter Storm Elliott that pipelines shared with the Team. The Team surveyed a total of 15 interstate pipelines within the Event Area. Pipelines shared common practices in the planning and preparation for Winter Storm Elliott, specifically in areas such as proactively monitoring weather forecasts, manning key facilities, issuing critical notices, increasing line pack, and putting storage facilities on stand-by. However, these measures were assigned different priorities by different pipelines and implemented in different ways depending on the location, design, and size of each individual pipeline system. For example, some pipelines issued pre-emptive Operational Flow Orders (OFOs) prior to the start of the Event, whereas others issued generic notices alerting customers of extreme conditions. Internal (gas control, operations, scheduling, storage, commercial personnel) and external (RTOs, customers, utilities) stakeholder meetings also occurred with varying degrees of frequency among the pipelines. These meetings aired concerns about reliability issues, nominations, and scheduling as applicable to each pipeline's system.

If the Commission were to proceed with an order regarding the one-time reports, it could consider asking the FERC-jurisdictional entities to analyze their experiences in Winter Storms Uri and Elliott, and to address the entities' plan(s) for mitigating identified vulnerabilities. The collected data would allow the Commission to determine if it could take additional actions within its jurisdiction to address the risk that extreme cold weather events pose to the natural gas infrastructure system. If a FERC-jurisdictional gas entity were to submit a one-time report, it could seek CEII treatment or other protections available under the Commission's regulations, as appropriate.

Recommendation 7: An independent research group (e.g., selected National Laboratories from the Department of Energy), should perform one or more studies to analyze whether additional natural gas infrastructure, including interstate pipelines and storage, is needed to support the reliability of the electric grid and meet the needs of natural gas Local Distribution Companies. The study should include information about the cost of the infrastructure buildout. (Initiate study Q1, 2024)

In light of the Commission's role in reviewing interstate natural gas projects and other gas infrastructure (e.g., interstate natural gas storage facilities), as well as the need for sophisticated modeling, the Team recommends that an independent entity with robust modeling capabilities undertake the study. It would be ideal if one of the DOE National Laboratories would conduct the study, as they have the technical expertise and have invested in modeling of the U.S. natural gas and electric infrastructure. However, if that is not feasible, the National Academies of Science and Engineering, and the Electric Power Research Institute have also performed sophisticated grid-related studies in the past, as well as studies of natural gas issues.

The purpose of the study would be to identify additional natural gas infrastructure needs, if any, needed to ensure the continued reliability of the electric and natural gas systems, and the preferred locations of such infrastructure, if applicable, including pipeline infrastructure, natural gas storage, and other supporting systems. The study should consider the needs in light of coincident peaks of LDC demand for natural gas as well as demand from natural gas-fired generation during periods of prolonged, abnormally cold weather. The study should analyze needs on a regional basis and consider current as well as forecast future needs, in light of our evolving and interdependent energy

system. The study should consider whether there will be adequate natural gas infrastructure to support new gas usage patterns by gas-fired generation to manage the increased penetration of variable, renewable energy resources and thermal resource retirements, including increased ramping requirements and seasonal resource availability, among others. In addition, the study should consider natural gas infrastructure needs during anticipated, extended extreme heat and cold weather periods. It should also consider recent patterns of natural gas production declines during extreme cold weather (e.g., Winter Storm Uri, Winter Storm Elliott).

The study should include information about the cost of the infrastructure buildout. In making this recommendation, the Team notes that two of the North American Energy Standards Board Report recommendations for additional studies concerned the cost of natural gas infrastructure, for storage and for infrastructure to provide additional firm transportation capacity.[318]

318 Recommendation 18 sought a study about "whether market-incentivized investments in strategic natural gas storage facilities are sufficient to address natural gas supply shortfalls during extreme cold weather events, and if the level of investment is sufficient to preserve such facilities for use during extreme cold weather events. The study should also explore whether public sources of funding are needed for investment to secure sufficient storage." Recommendation 19 asked for a study of "whether additional financial incentives for the natural gas infrastructure system, including infrastructure to provide additional firm transportation capacity, would help to address natural gas supply shortfalls during such events [like Uri], and further support the Bulk Electric System's performance during extreme cold weather events." NAESB Report at 63-64.

D. Electric Grid Operations Cold Weather Reliability

Recommendation 8: Balancing Authorities should assess whether new processes or changes to existing ones—such as multi-day risk assessment processes or advance or multi-day reliability commitments—are needed to address anticipated capacity shortages or transmission system-related reliability problems during well-forecast extreme cold weather events. In performing risk assessments or supporting multi-day reliability commitment, BAs should consider the following:

A. how to account for uncertainty in load forecasts, generating unit fuel availability and extreme cold weather availability, and the effects of extreme cold weather across multiple regions; and

B. committing generating units prior to the onset of extreme cold weather, including a means of ensuring units are compensated for their commitment costs (including the costs of obtaining fuel), even if no dispatch occurs. (Q4, 2023)

The five extreme cold weather events have revealed a set of uncertainty risks that have challenged BAs as they plan for and operate during these events. In every extreme cold weather event, BAs have faced unexpectedly high amounts of unplanned generating unit outages.[319] In four of the last five events, short-term load forecasts were lower than actual for some BAs, and in three of the last five events (the only ones that examined the issue) significant reductions in natural gas production occurred. Many natural gas-fired generating units indicated during the Event that they were unavailable because they did not have advance arrangements for natural gas fuel supply for the hours they were committed to operate, and by the time they were notified for commitment, natural gas supplies were unavailable. All of the BAs thought that they had sufficient reserves arranged to meet their forecast peak electricity demands, until they were faced with escalating unplanned outages and increased customer demand that, for most, exceeded their load forecasts. By the time that these trends were apparent, the BAs had limited flexibility, leading many of them to declare Energy Emergencies and some to shed firm customer load.

These scenarios should no longer be unexpected. BAs need to evaluate the uncertainty or risk they face when preparing for extreme cold weather events that have been forecast well in advance (and all the most serious extreme cold weather events have been forecast many days in advance) to reduce their reliability risk during these events. Evaluating risk or uncertainty, which some BAs already combine with a multi-day reliability unit commitment process, in advance of and during extreme cold weather events will best enable BAs to prepare to meet their commitments and maintain system reliability.

SPP's experience during the Event provides one example of how a BA can combine the evaluation of risk or uncertainty with multi-day unit commitment.[320] According to SPP's Winter Storm Elliott Report, "going into [Winter Storm Elliott] SPP had to anticipate uncertainty in the following areas:

- Uncertainty of accurate load forecasting for December 23, December 24, December 25 due to wind chill.
- Uncertainty if the forecast for high wind levels would hold, and to what extent wind farms would be shut down or de-rated for low ambient temperatures.
- Uncertainty if the gas resources SPP committed would be able to purchase gas.
- Uncertainty if resources SPP committed would be timely due to preheat and start-up.[321]
- Uncertainty of how many resources would trip because of freezing of equipment resulting from low temperatures and high wind chill conditions.
- Uncertainty of how much congestion SPP would

319 *See* Figure 5, which reveals similarities among past extreme cold weather events.

320 This is one example. Other BAs may have their own methods of evaluating uncertainty and/or multi-day unit commitment.

321 SPP was concerned about all gas resources committed, not just those committed in the day-ahead.

experience that required re-dispatch of resources that could lock up headroom of resources.
- Uncertainty if the Missouri River would develop ice blocks preventing adequate river flow and potentially limit hydro generation and cooling water availability."[322]

SPP's Elliott experience revealed the importance of remaining flexible when evaluating uncertainty in extreme cold weather events. For example, the Missouri River freezing issue developed during the Event. During the Event, SPP's Uncertainty Response Team, [323] which helps to identify and address upcoming capacity challenges given forecast system conditions, recommended the commitment of long-lead-time generation, which SPP then committed using its Multi-Day Reliability Assessment process.[324] On December 21, SPP committed generation for December 22 and 23, to help with capacity, deliverability concerns and uncertainty; on December 22, it committed generation for Christmas Eve, and on December 23, for Christmas Day.[325]

SPP also "committed several GW of primarily gas generation ahead of time for Dec[ember] 22 through . . . 25, to cover normal long-lead time units as well as help ensure there was a sufficient amount of gas procured to cover the forecast obligations (a portion of short-lead-time gas units),"[326] through its Multi-Day Reliability Assessment process. This advanced commitment process is particularly helpful if the extreme weather event is expected to occur over the weekend, on a Monday, or on a Tuesday following a holiday weekend, given the limited natural gas market liquidity during these periods. SPP also committed natural gas units that were not long-lead units early so that they could obtain natural gas in advance of Winter Storm Uri and believes that it enabled more units to operate during the worst of the Winter Storm Uri event.[327]

The Team notes that the North American Energy Standards Board Report recommended that Independent System Operators/Regional Transmission Organizations "adopt multiday unit commitment processes to better enable the industry to prepare for and provide reliable service during events in which weather is forecast to cause demand to rise sharply for both electricity and natural gas," and it received 90 percent support from both the gas and electric wholesale quadrants.[328] Additionally, the PJM Report recommended that it "[e]valuate the current multi-day commitment process for use during expected critical

322 SPP Report at 6-7.

323 Daily evaluations flag uncertainty risks for the next seven days. The URT applies uncertainty factors for load forecast, wind forecast and resource (generation outage) error. The URT puts historical data into "bins" for wind forecast error, load forecast error, and generation outage error, analyzes what weather conditions are associated with particular ranges of error and then applies uncertainty error percentages to available offline and online capacity for every hour for the next seven days. This refined "scaling" process results in, for example, instead of predicting the possibility of 500 MW of error on a particular day, predicting 100 MW of error for hour 0700, 200 MW of error for hour 1900, and so on. SPP analyzes for coincidental error—the percentage chance of all of the errors happening at the same time. They look at 50/50, 90/10, and 99.5 percent likely scenarios, all of which are shared with operators. If operators see insufficiency all the way down to the 50/50 scenario they know it is more likely that the system will experience insufficient resources that day. Larger potential capacity gaps are found at the lesser percentile, and smaller gaps are more common, more likely to be found in the 50/50 scenario (equally likely to happen or not happen). SPP uses the uncertainty evaluations produced by the URT to help coordinate how much generation will be allowed to be on planned outages, to commit long-lead-time units that may otherwise become unavailable (any unit for which the minimum start-up or down time is such that the unit cannot be committed in the day-ahead market, or has another start-up availability limiting circumstance), and to prepare mitigation plans for scenarios where analysis shows a risk of SPP's capacity being inadequate to meet its obligations.

324 The URT recommends units when an uncertainty forecast merits the need for such units and such units may become unavailable if not acted upon.

325 SPP Report at 7.

326 SPP Report at 7. SPP has filed proposed tariff revisions to clarify the ability to commit short-lead-time-units so that they can obtain natural gas, among other proposed revisions.

327 In Uri, SPP needed all available units online. In Elliott, SPP ended up needing much more natural gas-fired capacity than the short-lead-time gas units they had committed early.

328 NAESB Report at 2, 5 (Recommendation 9).

high demand periods so as to analyze the costs and benefits of providing greater certainty of fuel supply procurement through the critical period, with a focus on weekends when the gas commodity market can be less liquid."[329]

Pre-operational warming is a practice that has been recommended since the 2011 Report to avoid unplanned freezing-related outages.[330] One way to reduce the risk of unplanned outages is for BAs use their evaluation of the uncertainty to manually commit a portion of their generating units to operate the units before the coldest temperatures arrive, even if the units are not needed to serve load at that point. Doing so will help mitigate the extra challenge created by cold-starting a unit in extreme cold conditions. If a unit fails *during* the advanced commitment, the BA will be able to identify and potentially address generation shortfalls before the extreme weather arrives. During extreme cold weather events like Winter Storms Elliott and Uri, it is not uncommon for BAs to rely on generating units that rarely operate. PJM's experience with units that had not run in four weeks or more is consistent with committing some generation before the coldest temperatures arrive, in an effort to make more generation available when it is most needed. PJM noted that 70.5 percent of units that had not run in four weeks or more before the Event experienced an outage, while only 45.5 percent of units that had run within four weeks did so, a 25 percent improvement. Both testing and manually committing generation before the coldest temperatures arrive can increase the likelihood that the unit will be available to run when needed in real time.[331]

Recommendation 9: Balancing Authorities should improve their short-term load forecasts for extreme cold weather periods by implementing the lessons and practices identified below and sharing newly identified effective practices with peer BAs for continuous improvement. (Implement sharing Q4, 2023)

In four of the last five extreme cold weather events, short-term load forecasts, or forecasts of peak electricity demand, were lower than the actual peak electricity demand, for some BAs in the Core Event Area. Accurate short-term load forecasts in advance of extreme cold weather events enable BAs to commit long-lead-time resources, plan for additional imports that may be needed to meet reserves, and notify customers in advance of potential emergency conditions, to achieve greater awareness and participation if voluntary load reduction is needed. Most BAs in the Event under-forecast load in their 5-day, 4-day, 3-day, 2-day and day-ahead load forecasts, and the Team encourages them to implement and share effective practices for improving short-term load forecasts. However, accurate load forecasts alone could not have overcome the massive volume of unplanned generating unit outages experienced by many of the BAs.

Two key practices for improving short range load forecasts are (1) understanding the drivers of the BAs' extreme cold weather load and (2) studying the drivers of BAs' under-forecast load for past events. The Team found that some entities understood the drivers of their cold weather load far better than others, and those entities performed better on their short-term load forecasts. The use of distribution-level smart meter data, combined with Artificial Intelligence (AI)-powered predictive intelligence, is a promising new approach for understanding load drivers.[332] Some entities used third-party load forecast services and participated in the load forecast process in varying degrees. Entities that were more engaged in and better understood the load

329 *See* PJM Report Recommendation 9, at 4.

330 2011 Report at 60-61. During Winter Storm Uri, units reported pre-operational warming in response to an ERCOT directive. *See* 2021 Report at 53.

331 PJM recommended, but did not require, generating units to perform a "Generation Resource Operational Exercise" before the winter. *See* PJM Report at 10. These units are compensated as price takers, like any other self-scheduled units.

332 This service provides insights to the grid entity (e.g. how much of the load in a particular area is driven by heating and/or cooling, whether behind-the-meter assets may be located within its footprint and their hourly demand), which helps to better predict volatility in demand, both as to timing and magnitude. The third-party provider used by the entities was Innowatts (https://www.innowatts.com/).

forecast process, instead of treating it as a "black box" service, performed somewhat better.

Balancing Authorities identified multiple factors that played a role in underestimating short-term load as compared to actual load. For example, they noted that load forecasts were affected by a mismatch between the temperature used in the forecast versus the actual temperatures,[333] high winds,[334] blizzard conditions, and struggles to predict the exact timing of when the coldest weather would arrive. Several entities also found that they did not experience a normal load profile with a deep valley during the night—the drop in temperatures/extreme cold temperatures meant that the "valleys" were abnormally high. Another important element was identifying the presence of resistive heating in an entity's load.

The Team recognizes that some entities and regions already engage in sharing effective practices and encourages them to continue. But based on the wide variety the Team observed in load forecasting practices within the Event Area, the Team believes that sharing of effective practices can be enhanced, with the aim of improving the accuracy of short-term load forecasts. For more information on improving short-term load forecasts, see Section IV.D.1 and Figures 19-21, above.

Recommendation 10: Resource Planners and entities that serve load should sponsor joint-regional reliability assessments of electric grid conditions that could occur during extreme cold weather events.[335] (Initiate assessments, Q4, 2024)

Recommendation 10 focuses on improvements that entities responsible for planning and/or acquiring capacity and energy resources to serve firm load can make to help address the risk of firm load shed during future extreme cold weather events. As described in Section III.B, several Balancing Authorities in advance of winter 2022-2023 and during the Event relied on the availability of external generation resources (i.e., in the form of purchase power/import power schedules and emergency energy) to serve their firm load. When the Event impacted all of the adjacent BAs, resulting in curtailment of imports, that curtailment contributed to the need for firm load shed within the BAs that had relied upon imports or the possibility of emergency energy.

The types of extreme cold weather events to be studied are those that, like Winter Storms Elliott and Uri, simultaneously impact multiple operating areas and Regional Entity footprints.[336] The assessments should be conducted jointly, involving multiple planning regions, multiple Regional Entities, and/or multiple BA footprints within regions. They should consider the use of probabilistic approaches in accounting for uncertainties in availability of external generation resources, potential for simultaneous winter peak load conditions in multiple footprints, and uncertainties in deliverability of generation resources (e.g., arrangements from

333 Some entities performed "backcasts" (calculating their load forecast with the actual temperatures) to isolate the effect of temperature from other factors.

334 "Air movement is an important cause of energy loss, particular[ly] in residential buildings, where infiltration [accidental introduction of outside air into a building, typically through cracks in the building] commonly causes between 30 and 75 [percent] of the total heat load in winter." Edward A. Arens and Philip B. Williams, The effect of Wind Energy consumption in buildings, (1977), https://www.aivc.org/sites/default/files/members_area/medias/pdf/Airbase/airbase_00017.pdf#:~:text=Wind%20flow%20around%20a%20building%20causes%20forced%20convection,layer%20itself%2C%20the%20wind-flow%20patterns%20around%20the%20building%2C185.

335 Forms of sponsorship could include, but not be limited to, providing input or advice on the development of interregional planning models, extreme cold weather study cases and scenarios, and/or through support of collaborative planning activities.

336 The February 2021 Winter Storm Uri impacted the ERCOT Interconnection, and MISO and SPP footprints in the Eastern Interconnection (TRE, MRO, and SERC Regional Entity footprints); the January 2018 cold weather bulk electric system event impacted, MISO, SPP, TVA, and Southern in the Eastern Interconnection (MRO and SERC Regional Entity footprints); the 2014 Polar Vortex impacted both the Eastern and ERCOT Interconnections (MRO, RF, NPCC, SERC, and TRE Regional Entity footprints), and the February 2011 event impacted ERCOT and the Western Interconnection.

generation resources external to a load serving area).[337]

In accounting for generation resource unavailability, winter assessments typically account for generating unit scheduled/planned outages expected to occur during winter peak load timeframes, as well as an estimated amount of unplanned generation outages. The projected available resource capacity is used to calculate projected resource reserves above the 50/50 and 90/10 winter peak load forecast, or whether there will be an expected shortfall. In estimating the impact of unplanned generation outages, resource planners and entities serving firm load should consider the likelihood of higher levels of unplanned generation outages across multiple regions during extreme cold weather. As an example, NERC uses operational risk analysis as part of its seasonal assessment process, which provides an approach for determining reliability impacts from certain scenarios and understanding how various factors affecting resources and demand can combine to impact overall resource adequacy. Adjustments are applied cumulatively to anticipated capacity—such as reductions for typical generation outages/derates and additions that represent the quantified capacity from operational measures, if any, that are available during scarcity conditions (e.g., emergency maximum generation available). The effects from low-probability events are also considered.

In accounting for risks that peak load conditions may have on serving firm load, planners should consider that winter peak electricity demands during the Event in the BA footprints located from the Central Plains to the Atlantic Seaboard all occurred within a 36-hour period. A multi-area concurrent peak load scenario, coupled with many thousands of MW of unplanned generation outage scenario, compounds the risk of unavailable external generation resources or unavailability of purchase power for import, regardless of intraregional or interregional transfer capability. If a BA is experiencing a worsening capacity and energy emergency condition, it may reach a point when it must curtail all exports unless those exports are backed by installed capacity that is not already counted towards installed capacity for the BA's native load. Purchasing-selling entities[338] should understand the answer to the question "How firm is my firm power purchase?" in advance of future extreme cold weather periods.

In accounting for risks in resource deliverability, winter case extreme scenarios can be performed to determine potential constraints or limitations. For example, as part of its winter assessment, SERC performed a powerflow case simulating a MISO to SERC-East 6,000 MW power transfer to study the impact of a west-to-east transfer during peak conditions. There are related initiatives underway which can be leveraged to ultimately assist entities that serve load to evaluate risks to serving firm load during extreme cold weather periods. NERC Standards development project 2022-03 – Energy Assurance with Energy-Constrained Resources, proposes that entities (most likely BAs and RCs) conduct energy reliability assessments, and when predefined criteria are not met (criteria need not be defined in Standard), the responsible entity shall develop Corrective Action Plans, operating plans, or other mitigating actions. In addition, the Commission recently issued Order No. 896, which directs, among other things, the development of extreme cold weather benchmark events that will form the basis for assessing system performance during extreme heat and cold weather events. The base case, representing system conditions under the relevant benchmark event, will be used to study the potential wide-area impacts of anticipated extreme cold weather events.

337 The 2018 Report recommended that Planning Coordinators and Transmission Planners should jointly develop and study more-extreme condition scenarios with modeling that includes removing generation units entirely to represent actual generation outages (especially outages known to occur during severe weather), versus scaling of generating unit outputs, and modeling system loads so that the study accurately tests the system for the extreme conditions being studied. 2018 Report at 94-95 (Recommendation 7).

338 The entity that purchases or sells, and takes title to, energy, capacity, and Interconnected Operations Services. Purchasing-Selling Entities may be affiliated or unaffiliated merchants and may or may not own generating facilities. *See* NERC Glossary of Terms, at https://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Glossary%20of%20Terms/Glossary_of_Terms.pdf.

Recommendation 11: A team of subject-matter experts (e.g., the Eastern Interconnection Planning Collaborative) should conduct a study of the state of the Eastern Interconnection during the evening of December 23 and early morning hours of December 24, to examine dynamic stability and system inertia, and determine how close the interconnection may have been to triggering an underfrequency load shed event. (Initiate study, Q1, 2024)

As seen in Winter Storm Uri, when the power grid suffers an extreme loss of generation resources during periods of high system demands, the grid becomes more vulnerable to a complete blackout. In that event, ERCOT operators were forced to shed larger and larger blocks of firm load, within minutes of one another, to restore frequency and avoid a blackout of the ERCOT Interconnection.[339] As discussed in Section III, and demonstrated by Figure 39, on late December 23 and early December 24, the Core Event Area and the Eastern Interconnection were experiencing their highest winter electricity demands. Figure 37 shows that, at the same time, generating unit outages were climbing. As a result, there were times on the evening of December 23 and the morning of December 24 when the potential responsive operating capacity, which included online and any offline capacity, was within 15,000 to 20,000 MW of the combined loads at the worst points. While that may appear to be an adequate level of reserves, spread over the Eastern Interconnection, and at a time when the risk of additional generating outages was high, the Team is concerned that it may not have provided a sufficient safety net.

During the same period, Eastern Interconnection frequency excursions were common, dropping below 59.95 Hz (the lower band limit for maintaining frequency) four times and dropping as low as 59.936 Hz at approximately 4:25 a.m. Based on these findings, the Team is concerned that the Eastern Interconnection could have been at risk of instability during the period of high winter electricity demands and rising generating unit outages.

The Team believes that the Eastern Interconnection Planning Collaborative,[340] in coordination with NERC, Regional Entity and FERC staff, could assess next-contingency/single-point of failure contingency conditions to assess dynamic stability of the Interconnection through modeling and assessing the Bulk Electric System conditions during the Event. Further study(s) of the Eastern Interconnection during the critical period of the evening of December 23 and early morning December 24 can be used to identify actions needed to improve situational awareness and enhance operator tools and analysis capabilities. Real-time evaluation of such system conditions in the future could provide Reliability Coordinators with visibility of dynamic system conditions (e.g., through integration into its real-time contingency analysis processes), and assist in determining what actions may be taken (remedial analysis). Enhanced operator tools for situational awareness could prove especially useful when operators are faced with future resource mix changes that potentially expose the grid to more stability risks (e.g., as "high-inertia" coal units are retired and replaced by smaller intermittent resources with less inertia).

339 *See* 2021 Report, at 133.

340 The Eastern Interconnection Planning Collaborative (EIPC) is an organization that was formed in 2009 by NERC-registered Planning Coordinators in the Eastern Interconnection to perform coordinated interconnection-wide transmission analysis.

VI. CONCLUSION

This report provides a detailed assessment of the Event and the impact it had on portions of the Nation's energy infrastructure and service to consumers. The recommendations are designed to address matters identified in this report that call for improvement.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: INQUIRY JOINT TEAM MEMBERS

FERC Staff

Office of Electric Reliability

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Robert Clark
Michael Gandolfo
An Jou Hsiung
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Eric Oben
Raymond Orocco-John (Generation Sub-team Guide)
Sandeep Sadanandan
Lodie White

Office of Enforcement

Sheryl Caro
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Heather Polzin (Team Co-lead)
Michael Raibman
Akshay Thyagarajan
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Office of Energy Infrastructure and Security

Sanjay Bhatia
Donald Gerkin
Amelia Lewis

Office of the General Counsel

Michael Haddad

NERC Staff

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Marisa Hecht (Team Co-lead)
Matthew Lewis (Team Co-lead)
Kiel Lyons (Team Co-lead)
Heather Miller
Mark Olson
Elsa Prince (Gas Sub-team Co-lead)
Darrel Richardson
Craig Struck
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Regional Entity Staff

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Mark Tiemeier

Northeast Power Coordinating Council

Ryan McSherry
Andrey Oks

ReliabilityFirst Corporation
Dwayne Fewless
Kellen Phillips

SERC Reliability Corporation
Maria Haney
Stony Martin
Melinda Montgomery
Richard Stachowicz

Texas Regional Entity
Mark Henry
David Penney

Western Electricity Coordinating Council
Curtis Holland

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Weather Service
Greg Carbin


APPENDIX B: ACRONYMS USED IN THE REPORT

AC	Alternating Current
BA	Balancing Authority
BES	Bulk Electric System
CST	Central Standard Time
DC	Direct Current
DSM	Demand-Side Management
EEA	Energy Emergency Alert
EHV	Extra-High Voltage
EMS	Energy Management System
EOP	Emergency Operations Procedure
ERCOT	Electric Reliability Council of Texas
ERO	Electric Reliability Organization
FERC	Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
FRAC	Forward Reliability Assessment Commitment
GO	Generator Owner
GOP	Generator Operator
HVDC	High Voltage Direct Current
IROL	Interconnection Operating Reliability Limit
ISO	Independent System Operator
kV	Kilovolt
LBA	Local Balancing Authority
LMR	Load Modifying Resources
MSSC	Most Severe Single Contingency
MISO	Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc.
MRO	Midwest Reliability Organization
MVA	Megavolt-Ampere
MW	Megawatt
NERC	North American Electric Reliability Corporation
OPA	Operational Planning Analysis
PC	Planning Coordinator
PRC	Physical Responsive Capability
RC	Reliability Coordinator
RCIS	Reliability Coordinator Information System
RDT	Regional Directional Transfer
RDTL	Regional Directional Transfer Limit
RF	ReliabilityFirst Corporation
RTCA	Real-Time Contingency Analysis
RTO	Regional Transmission Organization
SCED	Security Constrained Economic Dispatch
SCRD	Security Constrained Redispatch
SERC	SERC Corporation
SeRC	Southeastern Reliability Coordinator
SOL	System Operating Limit
SPP	Southwest Power Pool, Inc.


TDU	Transmission Dependent Utility
TLR	Transmission Loading Relief
TO	Transmission Owner
TOP	Transmission Operator
TP	Transmission Planner
TRE	Texas Regional Entity
TVA	Tennessee Valley Authority
UDS	Unit Dispatch System
VSA	Voltage Stability Analysis
WECC	Western Electricity Coordinating Council


APPENDIX C: ADDITIONAL CHARTS AND FIGURES FOR UNPLANNED GENERATION OUTAGES DURING EVENT


1. Number of Incremental Unplanned Generation Outages, Derates, and Failures to Start BY CAUSE, December 21-26, Total Event Area




2. Unplanned Generation Outages by Fuel Type











3. Causes of Unplanned Generation Outages, by Fuel Type of Generation









Gas: Number of Incremental Unplanned Outages and Derates (Percentages by Number of Outages), Total Event Area, December 21-26, 2022
Transmission Issues, 11, 1%
Other, 9, 0%
Environmental/Safety Issues, 64, 4%
Freezing Issues, 381, 23%
Mechanical/Electrical Issues, 604, 36%
Fuel Issues, 602, 36%



Gas: Number of Incremental Unplanned Outages and Derates (Percentages by Unavailable MW), Total Event Area, December 21-26, 2022
Transmission Issues, 1,221, 1%
Other, 2,265, 1%
Environmental/Safety Issues, 5,522, 2%
Freezing Issues, 66,688, 29%
Mechanical/Electrical Issues, 83,839, 36%
Fuel Issues, 71,423, 31%



Nuclear: Number of Incremental Unplanned Outages and Derates (Percentages by Number of Outages), Total Event Area, December 21-26, 2022
Transmission Issues, 1, 14%
Other, 0, 0%
Environmental/Safety Issues, 0, 0%
Freezing Issues, 3, 43%
Mechanical/Electrical Issues, 3, 43%
Fuel Issues, 0, 0%



Nuclear: Number of Incremental Unplanned Outages and Derates (Percentages by Unavailable MW), Total Event Area, December 21-26, 2022
Transmission Issues, 87, 6%
Other, 0, 0%
Environmental/Safety Issues, 0, 0%
Mechanical/Electrical Issues, 285, 19%
Fuel Issues, 0, 0%
Freezing Issues, 1,155, 75%



Wind: Number of Incremental Unplanned Outages and Derates (Percentages by Number of Outages), Total Event Area, December 21-26, 2022
Transmission Issues, 25, 3%
Other, 4, 0%
Environmental/Safety Issues, 0, 0%
Freezing Issues, 297, 40%
Mechanical/Electrical Issues, 272, 37%
High Wind Shutdown, 146, 20%


Wind: Number of Incremental Unplanned Outages and Derates (Percentages by Unavailable MW), Total Event Area, December 21-26, 2022
Transmission Issues, 922, 6%
Other, 670, 5%
Environmental/Safety Issues, 0, 0%
Freezing Issues, 8,019, 53%
Mechanical/Electrical Issues, 4,505, 30%
High Wind Shutdown, 936, 6%



Solar: Number of Incremental Unplanned Outages and Derates (Percentages by Number of Outages), Total Event Area, December 21-26, 2022
Transmission Issues, 4, 4%
Freezing Issues, 42, 42%
Mechanical/Electrical Issues, 53, 54%



Solar: Number of Incremental Unplanned Outages and Derates (Percentages by Unavailable MW), Total Event Area, December 21-26, 2022
Transmission Issues, 116, 3%
Freezing Issues, 109, 3%
Mechanical/Electrical Issues, 3,350, 94%


Other Fuel Types: Number of Incremental Unplanned Outages and Derates (Percentages by Number of Outages), Total Event Area, December 21-26, 2022
Transmission Issues, 80, 13%
Other, 4, 1%
Environmental/Safety Issues, 3, 0%
Freezing Issues, 211, 33%
Mechanical/Electrical Issues, 257, 41%
Fuel Issues, 74, 12%



Other Fuel Types: Number of Incremental Unplanned Outages and Derates (Percentages by Unavailable MW), Total Event Area, December 21-26, 2022
Transmission Issues, 1,095, 4%
Other, 149, 1%
Environmental/Safety Issues, 149, 0%
Freezing Issues, 5,652, 19%
Fuel Issues, 1,603, 6%
Mechanical/Electrical Issues, 20,408, 70%


4. Cause: Freezing Issues – Additional Charts and Figures





APPENDIX D: NATURAL GAS PROCESSING DATA FOR TEXAS-LOUISIANA-MISSISSIPPI SALT BASIN





APPENDIX E: PROGRESS ON 2021 INQUIRY REPORT

FERC-NERC-Regional Entity Cold Weather Inquiry Reports - Recommendations Completion Tracking (as of October 2023)

URI Report Recommendations	URI / Percent Completed	Completion Notes		Elliott Report Recommendations (abbreviated text)
Extreme Cold Weather Event Prevention and Preparedness-Oriented Recommendations				
Rec. 1: Develop Reliability Standards for electric generator cold weather reliability	70%	Submitted Part of Ph. 2 Stds. to FERC by 11-1-23	Related to Elliott Rec.	Rec. 1: Robust implementation monitoring of freeze protection Standards to determine if reliability gaps exist
Rec. 2: Generator compensation opportunities for investments	(states)			---
Rec. 3: Generator winter readiness technical conference	100%	FERC/ERO conference held April 2022		---
Rec. 4: Generator freeze protection inspection and maintenance timing	20%	observation from Elliott event inquiry	Related to Elliott Rec.	Rec. 1: Seven recommendation sub-parts (1a-1g) for assuring freeze protection sufficiency
Rec. 5: Require natural gas facility cold weather preparedness plans and measures	20%	Now Required in Texas	Related to Elliott Rec.	Rec. 4a: Establish reliability rules for natural gas infrastructure, requiring cold weather plans, freeze protection, and operating measures for extreme cold weather periods
Rec. 6: Voluntary measures for natural gas facility cold weather preparedness	(states)		Related to Elliott Rec.	Rec. 6: Commission consider whether to have jurisdictional gas entities provide one-time reports on assessing, responding to natural gas vulnerabilities in extreme cold weather
Rec. 7: Establish natural gas-electric reliability forum	100%	NAESB, Commission Forums, NAESB Report		---
Rec. 8: Understanding generator natural gas contract risks	50%	NERC drafting new fuel assurance/risk guideline		---
Rec. 9: (Seasonal) Peak load forecasts and reserve margin calculations	100%	Incorporated in NERC Winter Assessment	Related to Elliott Rec.	Rec. 10: joint-regional reliability assessments of electric grid conditions during extreme cold weather periods, for use in power supply planning to reduce the risk of firm load
Rec. 11: Generator cold weather effects-mechanical, electrical systems	0%	observation from Elliott event inquiry	Related to Elliott Rec.	Rec. 2: Technical review of root causes of generator cold-related mechanical/electrical outages to identify prevention measures, determine if additional Standards are needed
Rec. 12: Generator use of weather forecasts for operating plans	50%	observation from Elliott event inquiry		---
Rec. 14: Natural gas production facilities SCADA control	(states)			---
Rec. 16: Improve Near-term Load Forecasts	0%	observation from Elliott event inquiry	Related to Elliott Rec.	Rec. 9: BAs should improve their short-term load forecasts for extreme cold weather periods cold weather periods by implementing the lessons and practices identified below and sharing newly identified effective practices with peer BAs for continuous improvement
Rec. 17: Analyze Intermittent Generation to improve Load Forecasts	50%	observation from Elliott event inquiry		
Rec. 19: Retail Incentives for Energy Efficiency Improvements	(states)			---
Rec. 23: Report Times for Generation and Transmission Outages	25%	observation from Elliott event inquiry		---
Rec. 24: Study: Measures to Address Natural Gas Supply Shortfalls	50%	NERC & NERC RAS	Related to Elliott Rec.	Rec. 7: Study: analyze whether additional natural gas infrastructure, including interstate pipelines and storage, is needed to support reliability of electric grid, meet needs of LDCs
Rec. 28: Study: Guidelines to Identify Critical Natural Gas Facility Loads	(states)	Now Required in Texas	Related to Elliott Rec.	Rec. 4c: Establish rules requiring designation of critical natural gas infrastructure loads for priority treatment during load shed
Average Percent Addressed (excluding state-level recs.) - URI:	**49%**			Rec. 4b: Establish rules requiring establishing regional natural gas communications coordinators, with situational awareness ofnatural gas infrastructure similar to grid's RCs
Number of state-level recommendations to help support prevention - URI:	5			Rec. 5: The North American Energy Standards Board should convene natural gas / electric grid / LDC entities to identify communication improvements during extreme cold
				Rec. 8: BAs assess whether new or modified processes, such as multi-day risk assessment processes or advance reliability commitments are needed to address anticipated capacity shortages or transmission reliability problems during extreme cold weather
Emergency Response-Oriented Recommendations				
Rec. 10: Improve rotational load shed plans	90%	NERC RAS & RTOS		---
Rec. 13: Study of ERCOT generators to review low-frequency effects	10%	PRC-024 SDT, combined with Rec. 27 effort		---
Rec. 15: Develop or enhance emergency response centers	(states)			---
Rec. 18: Additional Rapidly-Deployable Demand Response	(states)			---
Rec. 20: Perform Bi-Directional Seasonal Transfer Studies	90%	NERC RAS & RTOS		---
Rec. 21: Operator-Training Rotational Firm Load Shed Simulations	100%	NERC RTOS		---
Rec. 22: Generator Protection Settings/ UFLS Coordination	100%	ERCOT completed		---
Rec. 25: Study: Additional ERCOT Interconnection Links	100%	ERCOT, completed		---
Rec. 26: Study: ERCOT Black Start Unit Reliability	98%	FERC/ERO Report near completion	Related to Elliott Rec.	Rec. 3: Study: Black start unit reliability covering all portions of the U.S. not already studied
Rec. 27: Study: Low-Frequency Effects in Eastern, Western Interconnects	10%	NERC SME staff assigned; gathering data	Related to Elliott Rec.	Rec. 11: Study: examine potential stability risks on December 23-24 for periods of decreased frequency and low responsive reserves during Winter Storm Elliott
Average Percent Addressed (excluding state-level recs.) - URI:	**75%**			
Number of state-level recommendations to help support response - URI:	2			

